Situation Report

SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - 051803Z SEP 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: RF continues its multi-axis ground offensives, maintaining pressure on Velikomikhailovka and Orikhiv, and claiming advances in the Donetsk sector (Markovo, Fedorovka) with a stated vector "towards Kramatorsk." DeepState reports RF advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts. Intense ground operations persist on the Kupyansk-Sieversk axis, with RF claims of beginning an assault on Kupyansk and liberating 16% of the city (LOW CONFIDENCE). RF special forces are conducting cross-border ground operations in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv Oblasts with the stated intent to create a "buffer zone," with RF claims of destroying a UAF forward deployment point (PVD) of the 119th Brigade in the Sumy direction (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). RF deep strikes continue against Ukrainian energy and defense industries, with a large industrial fire in Dnipro (cause unknown, but now confirmed power outages due to enemy attacks) and recent ballistic missile strike in Chernihiv Oblast. Air defense systems are challenged by high-volume, multi-vector drone attacks. UAF is actively defending across all axes, launching deep strikes on RF territory (Ryazan oil refinery, Anapa radar, Luhansk oil depot, artillery depots in Luhansk), and conducting successful special operations in the Black Sea and Dnipro Delta. UAF claims destruction of a Russian Buk-M2 SAM system and a Buk-M1 SAM system. Diplomatic activity is high; Ukraine seeks accelerated security guarantees, while RF attempts to fracture Western unity through information operations. NATO ISR activity near Kaliningrad/Belarus border indicates heightened vigilance. DPSU warns of potential provocations during "Zapad-2025." Ukraine reports 2577 service members in Russian captivity. UAF Air Force is actively engaged. Ukraine is pursuing forensic and war crimes documentation.

• NEW DEVELOPMENTS (1733Z - 1803Z SEP 25):

  • UAF Internal Protest (Kyiv): RBC-Ukraine and Operatyvny ZSU report protests starting in Kyiv against controversial Bill 13452, which proposes stricter, non-alternative prison sentences for military personnel (5-10 years). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Casualties (Belgorod): ASTRA reports three people injured in shelling of Belgorod Oblast, according to Gladkov. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF IO (KNDR Support for RF): ТАСС reports DPRK will fully support RF's struggle to protect state sovereignty and territorial integrity, according to Kim Jong Un. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as IO/diplomatic statement) MoD Russia also reports Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov participated in a solemn reception for DPRK's 77th anniversary, emphasizing historical ties. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF IO (NYT "US Navy SEALs" Story): Операция Z (WarGonzo) reports NYT claims US Navy SEALs failed a secret operation in DPRK. (LOW CONFIDENCE - as IO, likely RF disinformation based on an older, unrelated event)
  • RF Domestic Politics (Mironov on Car Payments): ТАСС reports Sergey Mironov (A Just Russia – For Truth) does not propose new payments for motorists. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF domestic news)
  • RF Propaganda (Kotsnews poll on European Fear): Kotsnews reports 52% of subscribers believe Europeans fear RF, but expect mischief from "sworn neighbors." (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as IO)
  • UAF Drone Strike (Southern Axis): БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС and Оперативний ЗСУ (re-post) report a drone operator from the 414th UAV Brigade "Birds of Madyar" neutralizing a Russian occupier near the "sea." STERNENKO (re-post of Operatyvny ZSU) also shows drone footage of an RF occupier being targeted near a body of water. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Artillery Strike (Donetsk Axis): Два майора reports a drone-filmed artillery strike on the Konstantinovka direction, towards Druzhkovka, showing an explosion and smoke plume. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Strike (UAF PVD in Sumy): Colonelcassad publishes a video claiming a strike on a temporary deployment point (PVD) of the 119th Territorial Defense Brigade in Zelenaya Dibrova, allegedly destroying hangars, equipment, and fuel reserves. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - as RF claim with limited visual evidence of destruction)
  • RF Logistics (4th Motorcade Collection): Colonelcassad publishes a video showing military-style clothing being packaged, labeled "КОЛОННА" (column), suggesting preparation for distribution to troops in the 4th motorcade. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF internal logistics/support)
  • RF Naval Development (FPV Drone): WarGonzo reports "VETER" Design Bureau presented a new "Veter-X" FPV drone with an aerial repeater at the EEF, capable of operating at ranges of 30km+. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF DIB development)
  • RF Kharkiv Direction Claims (Map): Дневник Десантника🇷🇺 publishes a map with overlaid annotations and text, showing the "Kharkiv direction." (LOW CONFIDENCE - as map only, no ground truth)
  • RF Strikes (Building Destruction): Дневник Десантника🇷🇺 publishes videos of drone-filmed strikes on a building in a town/city, showing explosion and destruction, with text "PVA 57 OMBr." Another video shows multiple explosions in a wooded area and thermal imaging of heat signatures. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - as RF claim, unclear specific location/BDA for both)
  • UAF Local Governance (Zaporizhzhia): Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration reports representatives of the Cabinet of Ministers Coordination Center and UNICEF visited Zaporizhzhia Oblast, focusing on children. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Infrastructure (Dnipro Power Outages): Оперативний ЗСУ and РБК-Україна report scheduled power outages in Dnipro due to enemy attacks, with some areas experiencing up to 12 hours without electricity. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Infrastructure (Uzhhorod-Chop Railway): Оперативний ЗСУ and РБК-Україна confirm the opening of the Uzhhorod – Chop European-gauge railway, linking Uzhhorod to Bratislava, Kosice, Budapest, and Vienna, with first direct trains from Sep 12. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF President (Zelenskyy on Energy Retaliation): ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS publishes a video of President Zelenskyy stating Ukraine will respond to Russian energy strikes, addressing Slovak PM Fico. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Zelenskyy also highlights damage to the Flextronics plant in Mukachevo due to an August 21st missile strike, causing 17 casualties. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF FM (Hungary on EU Accession): Операция Z and Colonelcassad report Hungarian FM Szijjarto stated Hungary will not support Ukraine's EU accession, despite Russia allegedly not being against it. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Mod (Sever Group Mortar Strikes): MoD Russia publishes a video of Sever Group forces conducting mortar strikes on enemy positions, facilities, and hardware. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Medevdev (Finland/NATO Border): Басурин о главном publishes an image of Medvedev stating Russia cannot ignore Finland's NATO membership at the Finnish border. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as IO/diplomatic statement)
  • RF Medevdev (Security Guarantees Dismissed): Басурин о главном publishes Medvedev dismissing European "security guarantees" for Ukraine as "nonsense." (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as IO/diplomatic statement)
  • RF CSTO Exercises (NATO ISR): АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА reports CSTO is training while NATO is observing/filming. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as IO/event report)
  • RF Air/Drone Strikes (Animated Map): Colonelcassad publishes an animated map showing RF drone strikes and flight paths across Ukraine between September 4-5, 2025, highlighting Sumy, Poltava, Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Odesa oblasts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF claims)
  • UAF Drone Interception (RF Claims): Операция Z (Русской Весны) reports mobile fire groups "Sever V" intercepting UAF "Lyutyi" (fierce) strike drones at night. Footage shows apparent engagements and a large fire. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - as RF claim of interception, fire visible)
  • RF FPV Drone Activity (Slovyansk-Izium Highway): DeepState reports RF FPV drone strikes on the Slovyansk-Izium highway. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Belgium Frozen Assets: RBC-Ukraine reports Belgium will not transfer frozen RF assets to Ukraine. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Domestic Judicial: ТАСС reports Oleg Mitvol, convicted of fraud, requested a pardon. ТАСС also reports basketball player Kasatkin refused extradition to the US. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF domestic news)
  • RF IO (Trump "Defeat" Narrative): Басурин о главном publishes an image claiming Trump admitted US defeat. (LOW CONFIDENCE - as IO/disinformation)
  • RF IO (Meduza Financial Issues): Alex Parker Returns publishes an image implying financial difficulties for "Meduza." (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as IO)
  • RF IO (Putin Doubles Conspiracy): Alex Parker Returns publishes a social media post discussing claims of Putin using body doubles. (LOW CONFIDENCE - as IO/disinformation)
  • Russian POW "Wives" Movement: ASTRA features Irina Krynina from "Nash Vykhod" (Our Way Out) movement, focused on searching for and returning Russian soldiers, appealing to relatives for information. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as IO/social movement)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Air Operations: UAF destruction of a Buk-M1 and Buk-M2 SAM system by UAV indicates continued reliance on and effectiveness of UAS in current conditions. RF tactical aviation activity in the northeast persists. UAF/Philippines agreement on maritime drones points to continued favorable conditions for UAS development and deployment across domains. New UAF air threat warnings for UAVs in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts indicate continued clear-enough weather for drone operations. New UAF drone strike footage (near "sea") and RF drone-filmed artillery strikes (Konstantinovka) and building strikes (Kharkiv direction claims) further confirm favorable conditions for UAS operations. RF's new "Veter-X" FPV drone with extended range suggests development for varied weather conditions. DeepState reporting RF FPV drone strikes on Slovyansk-Izium highway indicates conditions remain suitable for such operations. RF claims of intercepting "Lyutyi" drones by mobile fire groups "Sever V" during nighttime further confirms sustained UAS activity even in low-light conditions.
• Maritime Operations: RF commissioning of the "Ivan Papanin" for Arctic operations highlights their ongoing naval development. UAF's agreement to jointly produce maritime drones suggests an increasing focus on this domain, indicating conditions are suitable for continued maritime drone operations in the Black Sea and beyond. The UAF drone strike footage "near the sea" further confirms operational conditions for maritime drone activity.
• Ground Operations: RF claims of advances in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Donetsk, and cross-border operations in Sumy/Chernihiv, suggest conditions are conducive to sustained ground maneuvers. UAF's capture of 26 RF personnel demonstrates effective ground operations. The mine incident in Kherson highlights ongoing hazards in previously occupied/contested areas. UAF footage of a drone strike on an RF soldier in varied terrain (dry grass/snow-dusted) indicates general operability for UAS in these conditions. RF footage of mortar strikes by Sever Group in a wooded environment indicates conditions for traditional ground combat, likely in forested or vegetated areas. RF logistics footage for winter clothing suggests anticipation of cold weather conditions. RF FPV drone strikes on the Slovyansk-Izium highway confirm ground conditions allow for targeted FPV operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF:
  • Ground Forces: Continuing multi-axis offensive with reported advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts (DeepState) and Donetsk (Markovo, Fedorovka, towards Kramatorsk). Maintaining pressure on Velikomikhailovka and Orikhiv. Sustained cross-border operations for "buffer zone" creation, with claims of destroying a UAF PVD in Sumy direction (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). Claims of an assault on Kupyansk beginning with 16% liberated (LOW CONFIDENCE). New claims of destroying a UAF dugout/bunker with secondary detonation (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). New drone-filmed artillery strike near Konstantinovka (Donetsk axis) and mortar strikes by Sever Group (unspecified location but "special operation zone") confirm ongoing ground fire support. Claims of destroying a PVD of 119th TDF in Zelenaya Dibrova (Sumy) are further evidence of cross-border operations (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). RF internal logistics for "4th motorcade" (clothing) indicates sustained resupply efforts for ground forces. Claims of striking a building and wooded areas (Kharkiv direction) point to continued offensive efforts (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). DeepState reporting RF FPV drone strikes on Slovyansk-Izium highway indicates persistent tactical drone use on key ground lines of communication.
  • Air Assets: Sustained tactical aviation activity in the northeast. Actively fielding precision artillery (Krasnopol) on Dnipropetrovsk axis. Air threat warnings for UAVs in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts indicate active RF drone presence. New "Veter-X" FPV drone with 30km+ range indicates continued investment in advanced drone capabilities for ISR and strike. Animated map of drone strikes 04-05 SEP 25 confirms widespread RF drone activity. RF claims of intercepting UAF "Lyutyi" drones by "Sever V" mobile groups indicate an active counter-UAS posture.
  • Naval Assets: Commissioning of new Arctic vessel "Ivan Papanin" indicates continued naval modernization. Developing training for unmanned surface vessels (BECs). Maintaining presence in Black Sea.
  • Information Operations (IO): Intensified, aggressive IO, including overt dehumanization ("kill Khokhols"), explicit nuclear threats, "liberation" narratives, criminalization of Ukrainian defenders/civilians (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), efforts to discredit Ukrainian cultural figures/media (Kateryna Kotrikadze), and attempts to fracture Western unity through information operations (Trump/NYT disinformation, Fico's statements, RF claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland). Medvedev's rhetoric on Finland/NATO and his dismissal of Ukrainian security guarantees are escalating border security narratives and perceived threats. IO also includes narratives on domestic issues (migration tax, internal corruption, domestic repression regarding LGBT, pension fund fraud warnings, Kerch official corruption exposé), and soldier support (Putin's niece's foundation), and militarization of education by integrating "SMO participants" as teachers (Volodin's statement), and historical revisionism/hero worship (Korelyakov monologue). Peskov discussing Telegram scammers indicates internal narrative management. Kirienko's visits to "liberated territories" are key legitimization efforts. New IO includes DPRK's stated support for RF, claims of failed US Navy SEALs operation in DPRK (likely disinformation), a Kotsnews poll indicating Europeans "fear" RF, and FM Szijjarto's statement on Hungary opposing Ukraine's EU accession, which RF frames as not being against Russia's wishes. RF also actively portrays CSTO exercises as professional while NATO is "just observing." Additional IO includes: MoD Russia showcasing Belousov's participation in DPRK's anniversary, leveraging Trump "defeat" narrative (LOW CONFIDENCE), highlighting "Meduza" financial issues, and promoting Putin doubles conspiracy theories (LOW CONFIDENCE). The "Nash Vykhod" movement, while potentially humanitarian, is also a vector for RF to manage POW narrative and potentially gather intelligence from Ukrainian relatives.
  • Domestic Repression: Increased judicial repression against dissent (Yamal janitor) and criminalization of journalists (Kateryna Kotrikadze) and LGBT individuals indicate tightening control on internal narrative. RF security services are actively disrupting perceived Ukrainian sabotage efforts (Krasnodar). Former Deputy Head of Rosprirodnadzor Mitvol's failed appeal indicates continued judicial pressure on prominent figures. Mironov's statement on car payments is an internal political development. RF reports 3 casualties in Belgorod shelling. Oleg Mitvol's request for a pardon, and Kasatkin's refusal for US extradition are domestic legal updates that RF frames for internal consumption.
  • Military-Industrial Base: Developing training platforms for BECs. Commissioning new Arctic vessel. New "Veter-X" FPV drone with extended range (30km+) at EEF indicates continued development of advanced UAS capabilities.
  • Foreign Military Relations: Actively engaging with other nations to deepen military ties (Libya, DPRK, Myanmar). DPRK's public statement of full support for RF strengthens this relationship. Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov's participation in DPRK's anniversary reception further solidifies this alliance.
• UAF:
  • Defensive Posture: Continuing active defense across all axes, responding to RF air activity, and maintaining a strong defense on the ground, particularly in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts following reported RF advances. Air Force maintains operational readiness. Actively conducting counter-offensive actions (Prymorske). New UAF air threat warnings indicate active monitoring of RF drone activity. Dnipro has implemented scheduled power outages due to enemy attacks, directly linking to RF deep strikes on energy infrastructure. UAF President Zelenskyy has publicly stated Ukraine will respond to Russian energy strikes. Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration is hosting UNICEF and KCMU representatives, focusing on child welfare, indicating continued civil administration resilience. Protests in Kyiv against stricter military sentences indicate an internal challenge to soldier welfare and morale.
  • Special Operations/Deep Strike Capabilities: Demonstrated effective long-range strike capabilities with the destruction of artillery depots in Luhansk. Continuing special reconnaissance and strike operations (GUR in Black Sea, "Buzky Gard" in Dnipro Delta), and effective drone strikes on underground positions ("Shadow" unit). Demonstrated effective counter-air capability with the destruction of a Buk-M2 SAM system by UAV and a Buk-M1 SAM system. Demonstrated successful capture of 26 RF personnel. New footage of a UAF drone striking an RF soldier highlights persistent successful tactical drone operations. New UAF drone strike footage neutralizing an RF occupier near the "sea" further reinforces successful tactical drone operations. UAF President Zelenskyy has reaffirmed Ukraine's commitment to respond to Russian energy strikes. STERNENKO footage of drone-based destruction of RF assets and personnel ("Rusoriz") confirms ongoing and effective tactical drone operations.
  • Precision Strike Capabilities: Effective use of drones for reconnaissance and precision strikes against RF assets (Kinburn Spit, Prymorske, Donetsk Grad, Buk M1 SAM system, Novopavlivka personnel, underground bunker, Buk-M2 SAM system, RF soldier in combat). New UAF drone strike on an RF occupier further demonstrates precision strike capabilities.
  • Strategic Resolve & Diplomacy: Leadership maintains unwavering resolve (Zelenskyy on energy retaliation, Zelenskyy on China parade, Zelenskyy on non-Russian energy supply to Slovakia) and actively engages in high-level diplomatic efforts to secure and sustain international aid. Slovakia's continued rejection of an energy blockade (despite other reservations) is a positive development. Agreement for another Zelenskyy-Fico meeting in Slovakia suggests ongoing diplomatic engagement. Zelenskyy's opening of the Uzhhorod-Chop railway highlights strategic infrastructure development and EU integration. President Zelenskyy's statement to Slovak PM Fico about responding to energy strikes demonstrates firm resolve. The Uzhhorod-Chop railway is a significant strategic infrastructure development, enhancing connectivity with EU. Hungary's stance against Ukraine's EU accession is a diplomatic setback. Zelenskyy's video highlighting the missile strike on the Flextronics plant in Mukachevo serves to galvanize international support by showcasing RF attacks on civilian infrastructure.
  • Resource Management: Significant procurement of drones and transport for military units in Zaporizhzhia demonstrates active efforts to enhance capabilities. Ukraine developing joint maritime drone production with the Philippines. The government launched a support program for 238 frontline communities for the heating season, indicating proactive resource allocation for humanitarian needs.
  • Civilian Resilience & Governance: Active construction of underground schools/kindergartens in Zaporizhzhia and regular local defense council briefings (Kryvyi Rih) highlight proactive measures for civilian protection and continuity of governance. Dnipropetrovsk OMA participating in congress on frontline needs. Kharkiv OMA participating in Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. Successful repatriation of funds stolen by corrupt officials demonstrates effective governance. Tragic mine incident in Kherson highlights persistent dangers for civilians. Dnipro implementing scheduled power outages due to enemy attacks is a direct response to infrastructure damage, demonstrating civil resilience under pressure. The protest in Kyiv against stricter military sentences highlights internal discourse on military justice. Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration's engagement with UNICEF on child welfare underscores ongoing efforts to support civilians. KMVA's statement on regional leadership conveying information to the government underscores functional governance and communication channels.
• International:
  • Diplomatic Momentum: EU and bilateral partners continue to engage with Ukraine. Slovakia's stance against an energy blockade is a positive, though PM Fico's general anti-Ukrainian policy and rhetoric of swift conflict resolution remain a concern. Agreement for another Zelenskyy-Fico meeting. President Zelenskyy's direct statement to PM Fico on energy retaliation. Hungary's FM Szijjarto stating opposition to Ukraine's EU accession is a new diplomatic challenge.
  • Focus on Russian Aggression: International bodies and nations continue to condemn RF actions and nuclear rhetoric. EU delegation to the US for sanctions work indicates sustained pressure on RF.
  • Regional Tensions (INCREASED): Medvedev's visit to Svetogorsk on the Finnish border and warnings underscore heightened tensions on NATO's Eastern Flank. Medvedev's dismissal of security guarantees for Ukraine is a continued attempt to undermine international support. Medvedev's explicit statements regarding Finland's NATO membership and dismissing "security guarantees" for Ukraine are direct escalations in rhetoric. CSTO exercises being monitored by NATO (as claimed by RF IO) highlights continued vigilance on Eastern Flank.
  • UK Cabinet Reshuffle: Change in UK Foreign Secretary. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - non-military, but geopolitical)
  • RF Deepening Ties (NEW): RF meetings with DPRK and Myanmar defence officials indicate efforts to strengthen military-technical cooperation with non-Western partners. DPRK's public statement of full support for RF reinforces this trend. RF claims of failed US Navy SEALs operations in DPRK could be an attempt to discredit Western special operations capabilities and align with DPRK. Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov's participation in DPRK's anniversary reception solidifies military-diplomatic ties.
  • International Aid/Sanctions (MIXED): Belgium's decision not to transfer frozen RF assets to Ukraine is a setback for international aid mechanisms. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:

  • Persistent Ground Offensive & Consolidation: RF maintains capability for sustained, multi-axis ground offensives (Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk axes, including Konstantinovka/Druzhkovka direction), localized breakthroughs, cross-border operations (Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv), and effective political-administrative integration of occupied territories. Precision artillery (Krasnopol) enhances offensive reach. Claims of initiating an assault on Kupyansk (LOW CONFIDENCE) indicate continued offensive ambition. Demonstrated ability to destroy UAF defensive positions (dugout/bunker claims, PVD in Zelenaya Dibrova claims). Sever Group's mortar strikes indicate effective close-range fire support for ground operations. Claims of destroying a building (Kharkiv direction) show continued destructive capability. RF FPV drone strikes on Slovyansk-Izium highway demonstrate tactical precision strike capability for ground targets.
  • Long-Range Strike & Air Presence: RF retains significant capability for deep strikes against critical infrastructure (Dnipro industrial fire, FABs in Sumy, Mukachevo Flextronics plant) and sustains tactical aviation activity. RF also maintains capability for loitering munition strikes against maritime targets (Lancet against BEC). Active drone threats in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts indicate persistent drone strike capabilities. The new "Veter-X" FPV drone with 30km+ range significantly extends RF's tactical ISR and precision strike capabilities, potentially allowing for deeper penetration and faster targeting. Animated map of RF drone/missile strikes for 04-05 SEP 25 confirms extensive deep strike capability. RF claims of intercepting UAF drones indicates active counter-UAS capabilities.
  • Advanced Information & Psychological Warfare: RF continues to demonstrate a high capability for aggressive and inflammatory information operations, including explicit nuclear threats, militarization of youth ("kill Khokhols", Volodin on "SMO teachers"), "liberation" narratives, criminalization of Ukrainian defenders/civilians (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), efforts to control domestic information space (Kotrikadze wanted, LGBT repression, pension fund fraud warnings, Kerch official corruption exposé), and attempts to sow disunity among Western allies (Trump/NYT disinformation, Fico's statements, claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland). Medvedev's rhetoric on Finland/NATO and "security guarantees" is escalating border security narratives and perceived threats. IO also includes narratives on domestic issues (migration tax, internal corruption), and soldier support (Putin's niece's foundation). Historical revisionism/hero worship (Korelyakov monologue) is a new IO vector. Peskov discussing Telegram scammers indicates subtle internal narrative management. Kirienko's visits to "liberated territories" are key legitimization efforts. New IO includes public support from DPRK, claims of failed US Navy SEALs operations in DPRK (likely disinformation), a Kotsnews poll asserting European fear of RF, FM Szijjarto's statement on Hungary opposing Ukraine's EU accession being framed as not opposing Russia, and portraying CSTO exercises as professional while NATO is merely observing. Additional IO includes: MoD Russia showcasing Belousov's participation in DPRK's anniversary, leveraging Trump "defeat" narrative (LOW CONFIDENCE), highlighting "Meduza" financial issues, and promoting Putin doubles conspiracy theories (LOW CONFIDENCE). The "Nash Vykhod" movement can be leveraged for psychological and intelligence gains.
  • Internal Control & Repression: RF is highly capable of controlling its domestic information environment, suppressing dissent (Yamal janitor, Kateryna Kotrikadze), and isolating itself from undesirable international organizations. Medvedev's statements highlight a focus on reinforcing state border protection against perceived NATO threats. The Krasnodar incident underscores their capability to frame events as Ukrainian terrorism for domestic consumption. New reports of LGBT repression reinforce tightening social control. Mitvol's failed appeal indicates continued prosecution of former officials. Mironov's statement on car payments is a domestic political maneuver. Belgorod casualties will likely be leveraged for domestic anti-Ukrainian sentiment. Oleg Mitvol's pardon request and Kasatkin's refusal for US extradition are domestic legal updates leveraged for state control narratives.
  • Manpower & Social Support: While recruitment challenges persist, the attention to soldier appeals (Putin's niece's foundation) indicates an effort to manage morale and provide social support, likely to sustain the long-term war effort. Integration of "SMO participants" into schools serves a dual purpose of legitimizing the war and potentially providing social re-integration for veterans. RF internal logistics for clothing ("4th motorcade") indicates continued support for front-line personnel. The "Nash Vykhod" movement, even if civilian-led, provides a channel for RF to address internal soldier welfare concerns and manage public expectations regarding POWs.
  • Naval Operations: RF maintains capability for naval operations in the Black Sea and is actively developing its unmanned surface vessel capabilities (training BEC). Commissioning of "Ivan Papanin" for Arctic demonstrates continued naval investment.
  • Foreign Military Relations: Actively engaging with other nations to deepen military ties (Libya, DPRK, Myanmar). DPRK's public statement of full support is a significant diplomatic and potential military-technical alignment. Belousov's visit to DPRK further solidifies military-diplomatic ties.

• Intentions:

  • Achieve Territorial Objectives: RF intends to continue offensive operations to secure and consolidate control over claimed and newly occupied territories, especially in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv Oblasts. The confirmed advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv (DeepState) suggest an intention to expand control beyond existing lines. Establishing "buffer zones" along border regions remains a priority, as evidenced by special forces operations and claims of destroying UAF positions in Sumy, including the 119th TDF PVD in Zelenaya Dibrova. The claimed assault on Kupyansk aligns with this intent, though its veracity is highly questionable. RF drone footage of strikes on buildings and wooded areas (Kharkiv direction) indicates continued efforts to push into these areas. RF FPV drone strikes on the Slovyansk-Izium highway indicate intent to disrupt UAF logistics and movement in eastern sectors.
  • Degrade UAF Combat Effectiveness & Morale: RF aims to deplete UAF resources through attrition, disrupt logistics (UAF ammunition depots in Kharkiv), and undermine public morale through strikes and propaganda, including the dehumanization of Ukrainians and the criminalization of their defenders. The targeting of industrial infrastructure (Dnipro fire, now confirmed power outages due to enemy attacks, Mukachevo Flextronics plant) and continued artillery/drone attacks (Dnipropetrovsk, Konstantinovka/Druzhkovka) align with this. RF IO on conditional humanitarian aid ("insulin" narrative) aims to sow distrust and demoralize. Demonstrated tactical drone strikes against UAF personnel contribute to this attrition. President Zelenskyy's statement about responding to energy strikes indicates RF's intention to target energy infrastructure is being fulfilled.
  • Deter Western Intervention & Support & Fracture Alliances: RF will continue to use escalatory rhetoric (e.g., nuclear threats, "legitimate targets" for NATO troops), IO campaigns (Trump/NYT disinformation, Medvedev's dismissal of security guarantees), and border provocations (Medvedev on Finland) to deter Western military aid and direct involvement, and to exploit perceived divisions within the international community. Medvedev's statements signal a clear intention to escalate political pressure on NATO's Eastern Flank. RF claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland also serve this purpose. Deepening military ties with DPRK and Myanmar signals a counter-balancing to Western alliances. Medvedev's explicit statements on Finland/NATO and dismissal of security guarantees confirm this intent. RF IO framing Hungary's position on EU accession as not being against Russia, and portraying CSTO exercises as effective while NATO observes, directly targets Western unity and resolve. Belgium's decision on frozen assets provides further material for RF IO to highlight Western disunity. Belousov's visit to DPRK further solidifies the anti-Western bloc narrative.
  • Maintain Domestic Control & Legitimacy: RF will continue to tightly control its internal information space, suppress dissent, and project an image of self-sufficiency and moral justification for its actions. The Krasnodar "terrorist" narrative serves to justify internal security measures and demonize Ukraine. Medvedev's visit to the Finnish border and statements aim to rally nationalist support and justify military posture. Kirienko's visits to occupied territories and the integration of "SMO teachers" into schools are key legitimization efforts. Increased domestic repression (Kotrikadze, LGBT) reinforces internal control. Exposing Kerch corruption may be an attempt to manage public dissent by showing internal action. Domestic reports of Belgorod casualties will be leveraged to justify further aggression. Mironov's statement on car payments indicates internal political maneuvering to manage public sentiment. The Kotsnews poll portraying European fear reinforces a strong domestic image. Oleg Mitvol's pardon request and Kasatkin's extradition refusal are domestic legal cases that RF uses to demonstrate rule of law (as they define it). The "Nash Vykhod" movement aids in managing domestic sentiment regarding soldiers.
  • Counter UAF Special Operations & Deep Strikes: RF intends to actively counter Ukrainian special operations and maritime drone activities, particularly in the Black Sea and coastal areas, and prevent cross-border incursions. They also intend to prevent and attribute deep strikes on their territory (e.g., Luhansk artillery depot, "AZS" claims). Claims of striking a UAF PVD in Zelenaya Dibrova are a direct attempt to counter UAF forward deployments and logistics. RF claims of intercepting UAF "Lyutyi" drones demonstrate active counter-UAS intent and capability.
  • Reinforce Borders Against NATO: Medvedev's statements indicate a clear intention to enhance border security and adjust military posture along its borders with Finland and the Baltic states due to perceived NATO threat. Commissioning Arctic vessel indicates long-term strategic naval ambitions. Medvedev's statements from the Finnish border confirm this intention. RF IO on CSTO exercises being watched by NATO indicates a desire to portray a strong, active defense posture.

• Courses of Action (COAs):

  • MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action):

    1. Sustained, Attritional Ground Offensives with Emphasis on New Axes, Consolidation, and Buffer Zone Creation, Coupled with Expanded Industrial/Energy Strikes: RF will maintain and intensify methodical ground offensives across current axes (Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Siversk, Novopavlovka - including Krasnoarmeysk direction, Kupyansk), with a likely increased focus on the reported advances in Dnipropetropavsk and Kharkiv Oblasts. Cross-border special forces operations in Chernihiv, Sumy (including strikes on UAF PVDs and continued FAB launches, as claimed in Zelenaya Dibrova), and Kharkiv will intensify to create "buffer zones" and destroy UAF logistics. Claims of an assault on Kupyansk (LOW CONFIDENCE) indicate possible, though unconfirmed, new large-scale offensive operations. This will be supported by continued deep strikes against critical infrastructure, with a likely expanded focus on industrial targets (e.g., the Dnipro industrial fire, now confirmed power outages due to enemy attacks, Mukachevo Flextronics plant), energy facilities (Zelenskyy's statement), and precision artillery (Konstantinovka/Druzhkovka direction, Sever Group mortar strikes). FAB launches in Sumy will continue. RF will also seek to destroy UAF defensive positions using precision strikes (claims of striking building/wooded areas in Kharkiv direction). RF FPV drone operations will continue to target UAF positions and logistics on key axes like Slovyansk-Izium highway. Confidence: HIGH
    2. Escalated Hybrid Operations with Deepening Nuclear Coercion, Aggressive Dehumanization, and Legal/Information Warfare to Fracture Western Unity and Project Strength, and Strengthen Non-Western Alliances: RF will amplify highly escalatory rhetoric, including explicit nuclear threats and warnings against NATO troops ("legitimate targets"), coupled with increased cyberattacks and border provocations (especially during "Zapad-2025" and along the Finnish/Baltic borders, as indicated by Medvedev's visit). Information operations will intensify to militarize its youth ("SMO teachers"), dehumanize Ukrainians (e.g., "kill Khokhols," Azov criminalization, discrediting cultural figures/journalists like Kotrikadze), criminalize captured Ukrainian defenders/civilians through show trials (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), and use historical revisionism (Korelyakov monologue), while simultaneously promoting narratives of Western disunity (e.g., Trump/NYT disinformation, Fico's statements on security guarantees/conflict resolution, claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland, Hungarian FM's statements on Ukraine's EU accession, Belgium's frozen assets decision), and leveraging recruitment of medically unfit personnel. RF will continue to restrict internal information flow and use domestic arrests/events as IO tools (Yamal janitor, Kateryna Kotrikadze, LGBT repression, pension fund fraud warnings, Kerch corruption exposé, Peskov on Telegram scammers, Belgorod casualties, Mitvol's pardon request, Kasatkin extradition refusal, "Nash Vykhod" movement). RF will also continue efforts to project its military capabilities and UAF weakness (Rybar) and legitimize control over occupied territories (Kirienko visits). Concurrently, RF will actively pursue and deepen military-technical cooperation with non-Western partners (DPRK, Myanmar, as evidenced by DPRK's public support and Belousov's visit), and use disinformation (e.g., US Navy SEALs in DPRK, Trump "defeat" narrative) to undermine Western credibility. Confidence: HIGH
    3. Increased Tactical Aviation and Counter-Special Operations/ISR, with Reinforced Border Defenses and Expanded Naval Capabilities: RF will maintain high tactical aviation activity in the eastern and northeastern directions, focusing on ISR and strike preparations (e.g., FABs in Sumy). RF will also increase efforts to detect and neutralize UAF special operations (e.g., in Dnipro Delta, GUR Black Sea operations) and naval drone threats (e.g., Lancet strikes against BECs), as well as enhance counter-infiltration measures along border regions, especially in the Sumy direction following claims of UAF PVD destruction, and in Chernihiv and Kharkiv Oblasts. The deployment of the "Veter-X" FPV drone with extended range will significantly enhance ISR capabilities for these objectives. In response to perceived NATO threats, RF will implement Medvedev's stated intention to reinforce its borders with Finland and the Baltic states, potentially involving new troop deployments or upgraded surveillance systems, as part of "Zapad-2025" preparations. Development and deployment of training BECs indicate an increased focus on countering/employing maritime drones. Commissioning of "Ivan Papanin" for Arctic indicates broader naval modernization efforts. CSTO exercises will continue to be a platform to showcase military capabilities and project strength. RF will actively seek to intercept UAF drones, as claimed by "Sever V" mobile groups. Confidence: MEDIUM

  • MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action):

    1. Limited Tactical Nuclear Demonstration: As previously assessed, a low-yield tactical nuclear demonstration remains a low-probability but extremely high-impact MDCOA to force negotiations on RF terms and drastically alter the geopolitical landscape, especially given the recent rhetoric and explicit threats. Confidence: LOW (but extreme impact)
    2. Coordinated Hybrid Attack against NATO Critical Infrastructure: Leveraging the "Zapad-2025" timeframe and Medvedev's rhetoric regarding perceived NATO threat, RF orchestrates a significant, multi-domain hybrid attack (e.g., large-scale cyber-physical attack, sabotage against energy or communications infrastructure) against a NATO member state on the Eastern Flank, designed to test Article 5 and create severe disruption without direct kinetic military engagement. Confidence: MEDIUM
    3. Massed Air/Missile Strike on Major Urban Center with Civilian/Industrial Infrastructure as Primary Target: RF conducts a coordinated, large-scale air and missile strike utilizing multiple vectors (UAVs, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles) against a major Ukrainian urban center, specifically targeting residential areas, hospitals, or critical industrial/energy facilities (e.g., Dnipro industrial fire potentially signaling this shift, Zelenskyy's statements on energy retaliation, confirmed Dnipro power outages, Mukachevo Flextronics plant) to maximize civilian casualties and induce panic. Confidence: MEDIUM

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

• Ukrainian force posture and readiness:
  • Resilient Defense & Adaptable Air Defense: UAF continues to demonstrate resilience in defending against RF drone and artillery attacks (Nikopol district) and responding to tactical aviation activity. The destruction of an RF Buk M1 SAM system and a Buk-M2 SAM system by UAF UAV highlights effective UAF counter-air capabilities and adaptability. SBU's "Spiderweb" operation indicates proactive efforts to disrupt RF strike capabilities. UAF Air Force maintains operational readiness. New air threat warnings indicate constant vigilance against RF drone activity. The implementation of scheduled power outages in Dnipro due to enemy attacks demonstrates the operational impact of RF strikes but also UAF's ability to manage and mitigate. President Zelenskyy's statement about responding to energy strikes shows proactive strategic intent. The protest in Kyiv against proposed stricter military sentences indicates an internal challenge to soldier welfare and morale that needs careful management and transparent resolution.
  • Effective Special Operations & Precision Strike: The successful evacuation of soldiers from occupied territory, "Buzky Gard" operations in the Dnipro Delta, GUR naval special operations in the Black Sea (destroying boat/radar), "Shadow" unit's drone strike on an underground bunker, the strike on Luhansk artillery depots, and drone strike on an RF soldier highlight high readiness and capability in special reconnaissance, rescue, amphibious, and precision strike missions, demonstrating an ability to operate effectively behind enemy lines and against hardened targets. Night-time precision strikes (Novopavlivka) show advanced capabilities. Interrogation of POWs provides valuable intelligence. Capture of 26 RF personnel by 425th regiment demonstrates strong ground operational capabilities. New UAF drone strike footage neutralizing an RF occupier near the "sea" further reinforces successful tactical drone operations. STERNENKO footage ("Rusoriz") confirms ongoing, effective, and lethal drone operations targeting RF assets and personnel.
  • Unwavering Political Will & Diplomatic Proactivity: Leadership maintains a strong stance against aggression (Zelenskyy on energy retaliation, Zelenskyy on China parade, Zelenskyy on non-Russian energy supply for Slovakia) and actively engages international partners to sustain vital support and discuss long-term security. Active discussions on a US drone agreement underway. Slovakia's support for EU accession is a significant diplomatic success, though their non-participation in security guarantees is a setback. Zelenskyy's reiterated commitment to respond to energy strikes and long-term vision on RF oil/gas indicates strong resolve. Fico's rejection of Putin's request for an energy blockade is a positive diplomatic development. Agreement for another Zelenskyy-Fico meeting in Slovakia indicates ongoing high-level engagement. Zelenskyy's opening of the Uzhhorod-Chop railway highlights strategic infrastructure development and EU integration. President Zelenskyy's direct statement to Slovak PM Fico on energy retaliation reinforces political will. The Uzhhorod-Chop railway is a significant strategic infrastructure development, enhancing connectivity with EU. Hungary's stance against Ukraine's EU accession is a diplomatic setback. Zelenskyy's video highlighting the missile strike on the Flextronics plant in Mukachevo demonstrates a strategic use of public information to garner international sympathy and support.
  • Resource Management & DIB: Significant procurement of drones and transport for military units in Zaporizhzhia (over 208 million hryvnias) demonstrates effective resource allocation and ongoing efforts to enhance DIB capabilities. The visit of the Minister of Defense to the front lines further reinforces this. Agreement for joint maritime drone production with the Philippines indicates strategic planning for long-term DIB enhancement. The government launched a support program for 238 frontline communities for the heating season, indicating proactive resource allocation for humanitarian needs. Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration's meeting with UNICEF on child welfare demonstrates continued proactive resource management for humanitarian support.
  • Training & Readiness: Ongoing training of units like the 22nd Mechanized Brigade highlights efforts to maintain combat readiness and integrate new personnel. Focus on soldier mental health (Presidential Brigade) is a positive development for long-term readiness. Individual soldier resilience (Воин DV footage) is high. The protest in Kyiv against proposed stricter military sentences indicates an internal challenge to soldier welfare and morale that needs careful management.
  • Commitment to Rule of Law & Governance: The Office of the Prosecutor General's partnership with the Netherlands for war crimes documentation and the successful repatriation of stolen funds demonstrate Ukraine's dedication to accountability, legal processes, and anti-corruption. Regional governance meetings and proactive measures for civilian protection (underground schools in Zaporizhzhia, Kryvyi Rih defense council briefings, Dnipropetrovsk OMA participation in congress on frontline needs, Kharkiv OMA participation in Congress) reinforce efforts for internal stability and public trust. Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration's engagement with UNICEF is a good example of transparent governance. The protest in Kyiv regarding military sentences signals ongoing internal debate on military justice, requiring transparent legislative review. KMVA's statement underscores functional governance and communication between regional and national authorities.
• Recent tactical successes or setbacks:
  • Successes:
    • Special Operations Evacuation: Successful evacuation of four soldiers from occupied territory by Naval Special Reconnaissance Forces. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Kinburn Spit Strikes: Successful drone strikes against enemy military assets on the Kinburn Spit. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Prymorske Infantry Destruction: Successful destruction of RF infantry in Prymorske by 33rd Separate Assault Regiment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Donetsk MLRS Strike: Successful drone strike on RF BM-21 Grad MLRS in Donetsk Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Dnipro Delta Special Operations: Successful special reconnaissance and fire engagements by "Buzky Gard" in the Dnipro Delta, including drone-guided targeting. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • RF Buk M1 SAM System Destruction: "Lazar" OSP battalion, 27th Pechenizka Brigade NGU, destroyed an RF Buk M1 (SA-11/17) SAM system on the Donetsk axis. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • SBU "Spiderweb" Operation: Disruption of RF strike capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • GUR Black Sea Operation: Destruction of enemy boat, radar station, and personnel. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • "Shadow" Unit Bunker Strike: Successful drone strike on an RF underground position/bunker. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Novopavlivka Night Strike: Elimination of 3 RF personnel by "Gr. Pilot" drone. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Luhansk Artillery Depot Strike: Successful UAF strike on artillery depots in Luhansk. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • RF Buk-M2 SAM System Destruction: UAF UAV successfully targeted and destroyed a Russian Buk-M2 SAM system. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • RF Personnel Capture: 425th "Skelya" regiment captured 26 RF occupiers. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • RF Soldier Targeted by Drone: Successful drone strike on an RF soldier, as shown in video footage. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • New Drone Strike (Southern Axis): Drone operator from 414th UAV Brigade "Birds of Madyar" neutralized an RF occupier near the "sea." (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Drone-based Destruction of RF Assets/Personnel: STERNENKO footage (re-post) clearly shows drone-based destruction of RF assets and personnel. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Diplomatic Engagements: Productive meetings with European leaders (António Costa, Swedish Foreign Minister, Slovak PM Fico) to discuss defense projects and continued support. Discussion of drone agreement with US. Slovakia's support for EU accession. Fico rejecting Putin's energy blockade request. Agreement for another Zelenskyy-Fico meeting. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) President Zelenskyy's statement to Fico on energy retaliation reinforces firm stance.
    • Anti-Corruption Win: Successful repatriation of funds stolen by corrupt officials. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • War Crimes Documentation: Partnership with the Netherlands for forensic science and war crimes documentation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Resilience & Adaptation: Construction of underground schools and kindergartens in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk OMA participation in congress on frontline needs, Kharkiv OMA participation in Congress, government support for frontline communities demonstrate proactive adaptation to ensure civilian services and support. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Zaporizhzhia RMO meeting with UNICEF on child welfare. KMVA statements on regional synchronization.
    • Command Presence: Minister of Defense visit to Zaporizhzhia frontlines. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Drone Procurement: Significant drone procurement for Zaporizhzhia military units. Joint maritime drone production agreement with Philippines. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Infrastructure Development: Opening of the Uzhhorod – Chop European-gauge railway, linking to EU cities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Setbacks:
    • Civilian Mine Casualty: A boy was killed by a Russian mine in Kherson. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Persistent RF Ground Pressure & Advances: RF continues localized ground offensives (Krasnoarmeysk, Novopavlivka, Konstantinovka/Druzhkovka direction) and cross-border regions, forcing UAF to commit significant resources to defense. DeepState reports RF advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts. RF artillery/drone strikes reported in Dnipropetrovsk region (Nikopol district). RF claims of destroying UAF PVD in Sumy direction (119th TDF in Zelenaya Dibrova, MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). RF claims of beginning assault on Kupyansk (LOW CONFIDENCE) indicate continued pressure on key fronts. RF drone-filmed strikes on buildings and wooded areas (Kharkiv direction) point to ongoing ground pressure (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). DeepState reports RF FPV drone strikes on Slovyansk-Izium highway indicate continued disruption to UAF movement. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for general pressure, MEDIUM for specific RF claims)
    • Deep Strike Vulnerability & Energy Sector Impact: The major industrial fire in Dnipro, possibly due to an RF strike, and ongoing FAB launches in Sumy highlight continued vulnerability of critical infrastructure, including industrial sites and border regions, to RF deep strikes. RF claims of destroying an ammunition depot in Kharkiv indicate continued vulnerability of logistics. New air threat warnings for Chernihiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts indicate ongoing air defense challenges. Confirmed scheduled power outages in Dnipro due to enemy attacks are a direct, measurable setback for civilian infrastructure and morale. Zelenskyy's video on the Mukachevo Flextronics plant damage due to an August 21st missile strike serves as a reminder of persistent vulnerabilities and casualties. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • RF Information Operations Effectiveness: RF propaganda aimed at dehumanizing Ukrainians ("kill Khokhols" videos, "SMO teachers"), militarizing its youth, criminalization of Ukrainian defenders/civilians (as seen in Azov criminalization, Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), discrediting cultural figures/journalists (Kateryna Kotrikadze wanted), and historical revisionism (Korelyakov monologue) continues to be a potent threat in the cognitive domain. RF efforts to sow disunity in the West (Trump meme, NYT citation, Fico's statements, anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland, Hungarian FM's statement) are also a concern. DPRK's public support for RF, and RF claims of US Navy SEALs failure (disinformation) further bolster RF's narrative. New IO includes: MoD Russia showcasing Belousov's participation in DPRK's anniversary, leveraging Trump "defeat" narrative (LOW CONFIDENCE), highlighting "Meduza" financial issues, and promoting Putin doubles conspiracy theories (LOW CONFIDENCE). The "Nash Vykhod" movement can also serve RF IO. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Slovak Withdrawal from Security Guarantees: Slovak PM Fico's statement against participation in security guarantees and his belief in swift conflict resolution are diplomatic setbacks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Hungarian Opposition to EU Accession: Hungarian FM Szijjarto explicitly stated Hungary will not support Ukraine's EU accession, a significant diplomatic setback. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Domestic Military Justice Concerns: The protest in Kyiv against Bill 13452, proposing stricter, non-alternative prison sentences for military personnel, indicates a potential internal morale issue and public concern regarding military justice. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • DIB Funding Gap: Confirmed financial shortfall for long-range weapon development. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • POW Numbers: 2577 Ukrainian service members reportedly in Russian captivity, representing a significant challenge for humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Belgium Frozen Assets: Belgium's decision not to transfer frozen RF assets to Ukraine represents a setback in securing financial aid. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Resource requirements and constraints:
  • Air Defense Systems & Ammunition (CRITICAL): Continued RF tactical aviation activity (FABs in Sumy) and potential deep strikes (Dnipro industrial fire, Dnipropetrovsk air threat, confirmed power outages in Dnipro, Mukachevo Flextronics plant) necessitate a constant supply of interceptor missiles and advanced short-range air defense systems to protect both frontline areas and critical infrastructure. The destruction of RF Buk-M1 and Buk-M2 is positive, but air defense for UAF remains paramount, especially with new air threat warnings. The extended range of RF's new "Veter-X" FPV drone increases the demand for effective counter-UAS systems. RF claims of intercepting UAF drones by "Sever V" mobile groups highlights the need for continued UAF air defense upgrades.
  • Counter-Artillery Capabilities (CRITICAL): With RF maintaining ground pressure and using precision artillery (Krasnopol, Nikopol district, Konstantinovka/Druzhkovka direction, Sever Group mortar strikes), sustained and effective counter-battery fire is essential. This requires consistent artillery ammunition supply and advanced targeting systems, especially in areas like Donetsk and Dnipropetropavsk. The successful strike on Luhansk artillery depots highlights the effectiveness of UAF counter-battery/deep strike capabilities.
  • Indigenous DIB Funding (CRITICAL): The $6B deficit for rockets remains paramount. Dedicated international funding and technological transfer for Ukraine's defense industrial base are crucial to achieve self-reliance and produce long-range missiles, which are essential for strategic depth. Expedited drone agreement with US is a positive step. Significant drone procurement in Zaporizhzhia, while positive, underscores ongoing demand. Joint maritime drone production with Philippines is a long-term positive, but immediate needs for long-range missiles persist.
  • Counter-UAS & EW Capabilities (HIGH): The proliferation of RF drones, tactical aviation activity, and loitering munitions (Lancets) requires enhanced Counter-UAS systems and Electronic Warfare capabilities to protect ground forces, maritime assets, and critical infrastructure, especially in the context of RF border operations and new air threat warnings. The development of RF's new "Veter-X" FPV drone with 30km+ range further highlights this critical requirement. RF FPV drone activity on Slovyansk-Izium highway and claims of UAF drone interceptions emphasize this need.
  • Maritime ISR & Strike (HIGH): Given continued RF naval operations and loitering munition threats against BECs, and Russia's development of a training BEC, enhanced maritime ISR and precision strike capabilities are needed to protect coastal/riverine areas and support UAF GUR operations. The joint maritime drone production initiative is a good long-term solution, but immediate needs remain. New UAF drone strike "near the sea" highlights the ongoing need for maritime drone capabilities.
  • Border Security Resources (MEDIUM): RF cross-border operations and reported advances in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk regions necessitate increased resources for border security, ISR, and rapid response units to prevent buffer zone creation and interdict sabotage groups. FAB launches in Sumy and claims of destroying UAF PVDs (119th TDF in Zelenaya Dibrova) reinforce this need. RF claims of strikes in the "Kharkiv direction" further emphasize this.
  • Mental Health Support (MEDIUM): Acknowledged combat stress and individual soldier accounts (Воин DV) indicate a need for continued and expanded mental health services for UAF personnel. The protest against stricter military sentences could exacerbate morale issues if not addressed carefully.
  • POW Advocacy & Support (MEDIUM): The high number of Ukrainian POWs (2577) requires sustained international advocacy for their humane treatment and mechanisms for exchange, while also supporting their families. RF's "Nash Vykhod" movement highlights a potential counter-intelligence vulnerability for UAF regarding POW information.
  • Demining Efforts (HIGH): The tragic mine incident in Kherson highlights the critical and ongoing need for extensive demining resources and public safety campaigns in liberated and contested areas.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive domain)

• Propaganda and disinformation campaigns:
  • RF Objectives:
    • Dehumanization & Youth Militarization: The explicit propaganda showcasing RF youth training to "kill Khokhols," the criminalization of Ukrainian "saboteurs" through show trials (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), criminalization of Azov members, the discrediting of Ukrainian cultural figures/journalists (Kateryna Kotrikadze), Volodin's proposal for "SMO teachers" in schools, and the historical revisionism/hero worship (Korelyakov monologue) directly aim to instill hatred, legitimize aggression, and delegitimize Ukrainian forces among the next generation and wider RF populace. WarGonzo's "insulin" narrative attempts to create a false sense of RF benevolence while subtly dehumanizing Ukrainian soldiers. The Kotsnews poll on European fear of RF also serves to boost domestic morale and project strength. Claims of a failed US Navy SEALs operation in DPRK are likely disinformation aimed at discrediting Western special operations and aligning with DPRK's anti-Western stance. DPRK's public statement of full support for RF is a significant propaganda victory. MoD Russia showcasing Belousov's participation in DPRK's anniversary and emphasizing historical ties serves to normalize and strengthen this alliance.
    • Psychological Deterrence (Nuclear & NATO): General Gurulyov's explicit nuclear threat, the President's warning about NATO troops being "legitimate targets," and Medvedev's statements on NATO borders (Finland) continue to be high-impact psychological operations aimed at terrifying the Ukrainian population and deterring Western support. Medvedev's dismissal of Stubb's concerns as "phantom pains" and his outright rejection of security guarantees for Ukraine as "nonsense" attempts to belittle European efforts and sow division. Medvedev's explicit statements on Finland's NATO membership and dismissal of security guarantees from the Finnish border are direct escalations. RF IO on CSTO exercises being watched by NATO aims to project military strength and deter.
    • Demoralization & Division (Mobilization/Conflict Resolution): The "Mogilizatsiya" narrative persists. Fico's statement on swift conflict resolution could be exploited by RF to suggest that international support for a prolonged conflict is waning. Claims about UAF weapon supplies (Rybar) and claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland aim to project UAF weakness and demoralize. Reports of recruiting medically unfit individuals could also be used to normalize poor conditions or a "total war" mentality domestically. The fabricated Trump/NYT story aims to sow discord within NATO/Western leadership. The "AZS" claim by Butusov Plus (RF source) indicates RF attempting to use UAF strikes to frame their own lack of response, or to test public opinion. Hungarian FM Szijjarto's statement against Ukraine's EU accession is a significant gain for RF's narrative of Western disunity. Belgium's decision on frozen assets provides further material for RF IO to highlight Western disunity. The "Nash Vykhod" movement, while appearing humanitarian, can serve to manipulate sentiment around POWs and potentially extract information.
    • Legitimizing Occupation & Domestic Control: Kirienko's visits to "liberated territories" (Hornyak) and the internal "whitelist" saga for internet services, signal RF's determined efforts to legitimize its control and tightly manage its domestic information space. Declaration of "undesirable" international organizations and the "foreign agents" list reinforce this isolationist policy. The Krasnodar "terrorist" arrest and journalist detention (Kateryna Kotrikadze declared wanted) are framed to justify internal security measures. Domestic repression against LGBT individuals reinforces social conservatism and control. Domestic news (Moscow forum, Nevada murder, musical premiere, inefficient encyclopedia, pension fund fraud warnings, Kerch official corruption exposé, Mitvol's failed appeal) serves to normalize the information space and distract from the war. The migration tax proposal may be part of a broader socio-political strategy to address perceived internal issues. Peskov discussing Telegram scammers indicates subtle internal narrative management. Domestic reports of Belgorod casualties will be used to justify the "SMO" and further aggression. Mironov's statement on car payments is an internal political maneuver to appease domestic audiences. Oleg Mitvol's pardon request and Kasatkin's extradition refusal are domestic legal cases that RF uses to demonstrate rule of law (as they define it).
    • Projecting Strength/Self-Sufficiency & Anti-Westernism: Promotion of the "import-substituted" SJ-100 aircraft and deployment of Chechen "volunteers" aims to demonstrate RF industrial resilience and sustained manpower despite sanctions. Primakov's historical revisionism on Japan's surrender reinforces anti-Western narratives. Continued engagement with Belarus (Bryansk-Gomel forum), Libya, DPRK, and Myanmar projects regional stability and expands influence. RF actively attempts to portray Western disunity and justify its aggressive posture along NATO borders. The development of a training BEC and commissioning of "Ivan Papanin" for Arctic aims to project naval capabilities. Claims of "liberating" Kupyansk also project strength, though veracity is questionable. The new "Veter-X" FPV drone with extended range presented at EEF projects technological advancement and self-sufficiency. DPRK's public statement of full support is a significant diplomatic and propaganda victory. RF claims of intercepting UAF "Lyutyi" drones by "Sever V" groups projects a strong counter-UAS capability.
  • UAF Counter-Narratives:
    • Resolve & Resilience: Statements from President Zelenskyy (on energy retaliation, on China parade, on non-Russian energy supply for Slovakia) and SBU Head Maliuk, alongside continued diplomatic engagement, actively counter RF's demoralization efforts by demonstrating unwavering determination and commitment to victory. Footage of resilient UAF soldiers (Воин DV, Air Force readiness), and successful operations (GUR Black Sea, Shadow unit, Novopavlivka, Luhansk artillery strike, Buk-M2 destruction, Buk-M1 destruction, drone strike on RF soldier, 26 RF personnel captured, new drone strike neutralizing RF occupier, STERNENKO "Rusoriz" footage) reinforces this. Zelenskyy's video on the Mukachevo Flextronics plant damage highlights RF's aggression and Ukrainian resilience.
    • Highlighting Operational Successes: Reports of successful special operations evacuations, precision strikes (Kinburn Spit, Prymorske, Donetsk Grad, Dnipro Delta, Buk M1 destruction, Buk-M2 destruction, RF soldier targeted, new drone strike neutralizing RF occupier), effective SBU counter-intelligence (Spiderweb), and capture of RF personnel reinforce UAF's effectiveness and resilience. STERNENKO footage showcases successful drone operations. KMVA's statements reinforce effective governance.
    • Highlighting International Support: Zelenskyy's meetings with international leaders (Costa, Swedish FM) directly counter RF's attempts to fracture unity and demonstrate continued solidarity. Slovakia's support for EU accession is a key success, despite Fico's other statements, and his rejection of Putin's energy blockade request is a positive signal. EU delegation to the US for sanctions work further supports this. Discussions for a US drone agreement are a positive signal. Agreement for joint maritime drone production with Philippines also highlights international collaboration. President Zelenskyy's direct statement to PM Fico on energy retaliation emphasizes international engagement.
    • Transparency, Governance & Accountability: Efforts by regional administrations (Zaporizhzhia OMA, Dnipropetrovsk OMA, Dnipropetrovsk OMA participating in congress on frontline needs, Kharkiv OMA participating in Congress) to address civilian needs (underground schools, regional congresses, reporting on Nikopol district shelling), ensure continuity of services, and combat corruption (repatriation of funds) contribute to public trust and stability. UAF's open training footage and focus on soldier mental health also projects readiness and care. UAF foreign policy on peacekeeping clarifies its sovereign stance. The OPG's partnership with the Netherlands for war crimes documentation reinforces commitment to justice. Local briefings (Kryvyi Rih) further reinforce this. Government support for frontline communities for heating season enhances trust. Opening of Uzhhorod-Chop railway demonstrates progress and EU integration. Zaporizhzhia RMO meeting with UNICEF on child welfare demonstrates transparent and humanitarian governance. The protest in Kyiv regarding military sentences signals ongoing internal debate on military justice, requiring transparent legislative review.
    • Humanitarian Concerns: Reporting on the number of Ukrainian POWs highlights humanitarian concerns and RF's violations of international law. The mine incident in Kherson highlights the danger RF actions pose to civilians. Confirmed power outages in Dnipro due to enemy attacks emphasize the humanitarian impact of RF strikes. Zelenskyy's video on the Mukachevo plant damage highlights civilian casualties.
• Public sentiment and morale factors:
  • Ukrainian Public (RESILIENT, but STRESSED & VIGILANT): UAF's operational successes (GUR Black Sea, Shadow unit, Novopavlivka, Luhansk strike, Buk-M2 destruction, Buk-M1 destruction, drone strike on RF soldier, 26 RF personnel captured, new drone strike neutralizing RF occupier, STERNENKO "Rusoriz" footage) and leadership's firm stance (Zelenskyy on energy retaliation, China parade, non-Russian energy for Slovakia) bolster morale. However, the explicit nuclear threats, persistent RF ground pressure, deep strikes (Dnipro fire, FABs in Sumy, Nikopol district shelling, confirmed power outages in Dnipro, Mukachevo Flextronics plant), reported RF advances in Dnipropetrovsk/Kharkiv, the criminalization/dehumanization of Ukrainian defenders/civilians (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), and the high number of POWs create significant stress and uncertainty. The dehumanizing rhetoric against "Khokhols" and Azov will undoubtedly fuel outrage and resolve, but also adds to the psychological burden. RF claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland, if believed, would likely cause further frustration. The tragic mine incident in Kherson will undoubtedly cause public anger and grief. Continued proactive measures for civilian protection (underground schools, Dnipropetrovsk congress on frontline needs, Kharkiv Congress, government heating support, Zaporizhzhia RMO meeting with UNICEF), soldier welfare (combat stress awareness), and strong governance (anti-corruption, regional congresses) help mitigate fear and reinforce trust. Opening of the railway to EU is a significant morale boost for integration. The protest in Kyiv against stricter military sentences indicates an internal dynamic that could impact military morale and public trust if not handled carefully.
  • Russian Public (MANAGED & INDOCTRINATED): RF's tight control over the internet and information flow, coupled with aggressive propaganda (including youth militarization, glorification of Krasnoarmeysk "liberators," "volunteer" deployments, anti-Western historical narratives, "terrorist" arrests, and suppression of dissent), likely maintains a managed level of support. The narrative of "liberated territories" (Kirienko visits), DIB self-sufficiency (SJ-100, "Veter-X" FPV drone), and successful operations (claims of Kupyansk assault, claims of UAF PVD destruction in Sumy, claims of UAF bunker destruction, drone-filmed strikes in Kharkiv direction) aims to reinforce a sense of achievement and justification for the war. Domestic news about local issues (migration tax, Kerch official, failed encyclopedia, pension fund fraud warnings, LGBT repression, Mitvol's failed appeal, Mironov on car payments) helps to fill the information space with non-military content. Medvedev's rhetoric on NATO borders aims to rally nationalist support. The significant number of appeals to Putin's niece's foundation suggests a degree of internal strain and need for support, which RF is attempting to address. Integration of "SMO teachers" aims to further normalize the war and create nationalistic fervor. Peskov discussing Telegram scammers is a subtle message that state actors are in control of information even on independent platforms. Reports of Belgorod casualties will be used to reinforce the narrative of Ukrainian aggression and justify the conflict. The Kotsnews poll on European fear of RF also reinforces a strong domestic image of national power. Oleg Mitvol's pardon request and Kasatkin's extradition refusal are domestic legal cases that RF uses for internal consumption. The "Nash Vykhod" movement helps manage domestic sentiment regarding POWs.
• International support and diplomatic developments:
  • Sustained Diplomatic Engagement: High-level meetings and continued discussions on security guarantees and military aid (EU delegation to US for sanctions, US drone agreement discussions, Zelenskyy-Fico meetings) underscore persistent international political will to support Ukraine. Slovakia's continued rejection of an energy blockade request from Putin is a positive, but their other positions (against security guarantees, swift conflict resolution) introduce nuance. Zelenskyy's firm stance on non-Russian energy to Slovakia is a key diplomatic signal. Opening of the Uzhhorod-Chop railway demonstrates tangible steps toward EU integration.
  • Challenges of Unity/Conditionality (INCREASED): While new EU sanctions are positive, the nuances of international military support (e.g., Slovenia's conditional troop deployment) suggest potential for RF exploitation of divisions. Hungary's stance on EU accession talks for Ukraine and its claims of "secret oil purchases" remain a point of contention and potential RF leverage. Fico's statements align with RF narratives and highlight existing divisions within the EU/NATO. RF IO is actively trying to amplify these divisions through narratives like the fabricated Trump/NYT story and claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland. Hungarian FM Szijjarto's explicit statement against Ukraine's EU accession is a significant challenge to EU unity and Ukraine's aspirations. Belgium's decision not to transfer frozen RF assets to Ukraine further highlights internal divisions and challenges in aid.
  • Increased Vigilance on Eastern Flank (PERSISTING): "Zapad-2025" and past drone violations keep NATO's Eastern Flank on high alert for RF provocations. Medvedev's visit to the Finnish border and warnings indicate RF perceives increased NATO activity and is reacting aggressively, raising regional tensions. Medvedev's dismissal of security guarantees for Ukraine is a direct challenge to Western resolve. Medvedev's explicit statements on Finland's NATO membership and dismissal of security guarantees directly escalate tensions. RF IO highlighting NATO observing CSTO exercises suggests a continued focus on deterrence on the Eastern Flank.
  • Renewed Focus on Hybrid Threats & Accountability: The EU's work on sanctions and discussions around border security indicate an international focus on countering RF's multi-domain hybrid aggression. The dehumanizing rhetoric (youth training) and criminalization of POWs/civilians will likely further solidify international condemnation. Ukraine's clear stance on peacekeeping contingents provides clarity for international partners. The OPG-Netherlands partnership signifies international commitment to legal accountability for war crimes. UK cabinet reshuffle is a notable, albeit external, geopolitical development. RF deepening ties with DPRK and Myanmar indicates a broader geopolitical shift and challenge to the international order. DPRK's public statement of full support for RF is a notable development in shaping the international geopolitical landscape, confirming a growing anti-Western bloc. Belousov's visit to DPRK further solidifies military-diplomatic ties with non-Western partners.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

• Most likely enemy courses of action (MLCOA):

  1. Sustained, Attritional Ground Offensives with Emphasis on New Axes, Consolidation, and Buffer Zone Creation, Coupled with Expanded Industrial/Energy Strikes: RF will continue methodical, attritional ground assaults in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts (including Nikopol district), alongside persistent pressure on Siversk, Novopavlovka (Krasnoarmeysk direction), and Kupyansk. Reported advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts suggest an expansion of offensive axes. Active cross-border special forces operations in Chernihiv, Sumy (including continued FAB launches and efforts to destroy UAF PVDs, as claimed in Zelenaya Dibrova), and Kharkiv will intensify to create "buffer zones" and destroy UAF logistics. The objective remains to wear down UAF defenses, consolidate control, and integrate newly seized territories. Deep strikes against critical infrastructure, including an expanded focus on industrial targets (as potentially indicated by the Dnipro fire, now confirmed power outages due to enemy attacks, Mukachevo Flextronics plant) and energy facilities (Zelenskyy's statement), will continue, using various means including FABs and precision artillery (Konstantinovka/Druzhkovka direction, Sever Group mortar strikes). RF will prioritize precision strikes against UAF defensive positions (claims of striking building/wooded areas in Kharkiv direction). RF FPV drone operations will continue to target UAF positions and logistics on key axes like Slovyansk-Izium highway, utilizing new capabilities like the "Veter-X" FPV drone. Confidence: HIGH
  2. Intensified Hybrid Warfare with Deepening Nuclear Coercion, Aggressive Dehumanization, and Legal/Information Warfare to Fracture Western Unity and Project Strength, and Strengthen Non-Western Alliances: RF will amplify highly escalatory rhetoric (including nuclear threats, "legitimate targets" for NATO troops), coupled with increased cyberattacks and border provocations against Ukraine and NATO's Eastern Flank during "Zapad-2025" and along the Finnish/Baltic borders, as indicated by Medvedev's statements and visit. Propaganda will intensify to dehumanize Ukrainians ("kill Khokhols," Azov criminalization, discrediting cultural figures/journalists like Kotrikadze), militarize RF youth ("SMO teachers"), criminalize captured Ukrainian defenders/civilians through show trials (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), and utilize historical revisionism (Korelyakov monologue), while simultaneously promoting narratives of Western disunity (e.g., Trump/NYT disinformation, Fico's statements on security guarantees/conflict resolution, claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland, Hungarian FM's statements on Ukraine's EU accession, Belgium's frozen assets decision), and leveraging recruitment of medically unfit personnel. RF will also continue efforts to control its domestic information space (Yamal janitor, Kateryna Kotrikadze, LGBT repression, pension fund fraud warnings, Kerch corruption exposé, Peskov on Telegram scammers, Belgorod casualties, Mitvol's pardon request, Kasatkin extradition refusal, "Nash Vykhod" movement) and isolate from perceived external threats. Concurrently, RF will deepen military-technical cooperation with non-Western partners (DPRK, Myanmar, as evidenced by DPRK's public support and Belousov's visit) to offset Western sanctions and isolation, and use disinformation (e.g., US Navy SEALs in DPRK, Trump "defeat" narrative) to undermine Western credibility. Confidence: HIGH
  3. Increased Tactical Aviation Activity and Enhanced Counter-Special Operations/ISR, with Reinforced Border Defenses and Expanded Naval Capabilities: RF will maintain high tactical aviation ISR and strike operations, particularly in the eastern and northeastern sectors (e.g., Dnipropetrovsk air threat, FABs in Sumy), as indicated by the animated strike map. RF will also focus on detecting and neutralizing UAF special operations (e.g., in Dnipro Delta, GUR Black Sea operations) and maritime drone activities (e.g., Lancet strikes against BECs) in the Black Sea and coastal areas, as well as enhance counter-infiltration measures along border regions, especially in the Sumy direction following claims of UAF PVD destruction, and in Chernihiv and Kharkiv Oblasts. The deployment of the "Veter-X" FPV drone with extended range will significantly enhance ISR capabilities for these objectives. In response to perceived NATO threats, RF will implement Medvedev's stated intention to reinforce its borders with Finland and the Baltic states, potentially involving new troop deployments or upgraded surveillance systems, as part of "Zapad-2025" preparations. Development and deployment of training BECs indicate an increased focus on countering/employing maritime drones. Commissioning of "Ivan Papanin" for Arctic reflects a broader naval strategy. CSTO exercises will continue to be a platform to showcase military capabilities and project strength while accusing NATO of observing. RF will actively seek to intercept UAF drones, as claimed by "Sever V" mobile groups. Confidence: MEDIUM

• Most dangerous enemy courses of action (MDCOA):

  1. Tactical Nuclear Demonstration: Given recent explicit rhetoric, a low-yield tactical nuclear demonstration (either a test or a strike in an unpopulated area of Ukraine) remains a low-probability, but extremely high-impact, MDCOA to fundamentally alter the conflict. Confidence: LOW (but extreme impact)
  2. Coordinated Hybrid Attack against NATO Critical Infrastructure: Leveraging the "Zapad-2025" timeframe and Medvedev's rhetoric regarding perceived NATO threat, RF orchestrates a significant, multi-domain hybrid attack (e.g., large-scale cyber-physical attack, sabotage against energy or communications infrastructure) against a NATO member state on the Eastern Flank, designed to test Article 5 and create severe disruption without direct kinetic military engagement. Confidence: MEDIUM
  3. Massed Air/Missile Strike on Major Urban Center with Civilian/Industrial Infrastructure as Primary Target: RF conducts a coordinated, large-scale air and missile strike utilizing multiple vectors (UAVs, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles) against a major Ukrainian urban center, specifically targeting residential areas, hospitals, or critical industrial/energy facilities (e.g., Dnipro industrial fire potentially signaling this shift, Zelenskyy's statements on energy retaliation, confirmed Dnipro power outages, Mukachevo Flextronics plant) to maximize civilian casualties and induce panic. Confidence: MEDIUM

• Timeline estimates and decision points:

  • Immediate (0-24 hours):
    • RF Decision Point: Assess the impact of dehumanizing propaganda, tactical aviation activity (FABs in Sumy, new air threat warnings, animated strike map), and precision artillery/drone strikes (Nikopol district, drone strike on RF soldier, Konstantinovka/Druzhkovka, Sever Group mortar strikes, strikes in Kharkiv direction, Slovyansk-Izium FPV strikes). Evaluate UAF responses to ground offensives on new axes, especially reported advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv, and cross-border incursions in Sumy/Chernihiv/Kharkiv. Continue to utilize domestic arrests and "foreign agent" designations for IO purposes. Monitor Western reactions to "legitimate targets" rhetoric for NATO troops and Fico's statements on security guarantees. Execute Lancet strikes against UAF maritime drones. Continue developing training BECs. Respond to UAF Luhansk strike and Buk-M1/Buk-M2 destruction with counter-IO. Amplify claims of Kupyansk assault and UAF PVD/bunker destruction. Continue diplomatic engagements with non-Western partners (DPRK, Myanmar) and leverage their public support (DPRK, Belousov's visit). Continue promoting new DIB developments (Veter-X drone) and claims of UAF drone interceptions.
    • UAF Decision Point: Publicly condemn RF youth militarization propaganda, criminalization of POWs/civilians, and Medvedev's escalatory rhetoric, particularly regarding Finland and "security guarantees." Expedite BDA for Dnipro industrial fire and allocate air defense assets accordingly, especially in Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, and Chernihiv given new warnings, and in Dnipro due to confirmed power outages. Reinforce defenses on new RF offensive axes (Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Krasnoarmeysk, Novopavlivka, Konstantinovka/Druzhkovka) and against cross-border incursions, particularly in Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv. Maintain high alert for tactical aviation in the east/northeast. Continue special operations in Dnipro Delta and Black Sea, and deep strikes (e.g., Luhansk). Exploit success of Buk M1 and Buk-M2 destruction by further targeting RF air defense gaps. Publicly address Fico's statements and emphasize Ukraine's long-term energy strategy (non-Russian, as stated by Zelenskyy). Leverage successful capture of 26 RF personnel and drone strike on RF soldier in IO. Accelerate demining efforts and public safety warnings in Kherson and other liberated areas. Promote the Uzhhorod-Chop railway as a symbol of integration and resilience. Address the protest in Kyiv regarding military sentences carefully and transparently. Use Zelenskyy's video on the Mukachevo plant to highlight RF targeting of civilian infrastructure. Continue STERNENKO's "Rusoriz" operations.
    • International Decision Point: NATO and EU states to issue strong, unified condemnations of RF's dehumanizing rhetoric, nuclear threats, "legitimate target" warnings for NATO troops, Medvedev's aggressive border rhetoric and dismissal of security guarantees, and RF's deepening military ties with DPRK and Myanmar (including DPRK's public support, Belousov's visit). Address Fico's statements regarding security guarantees and Hungarian FM's statement on EU accession, and Belgium's decision on frozen assets. Advance discussions on US drone agreement and UAF-Philippines maritime drone collaboration. Acknowledge and condemn the Krasnodar "terrorist" framing and the Kherson mine casualty.
  • Short-Term (24-72 hours):
    • RF Decision Point: Evaluate Western response to dehumanization, nuclear threats, and "legitimate target" rhetoric; tailor further IO accordingly. Continue "Zapad-2025" preparations with potential for increased border incidents with Belarus, Finland, and Baltic states (following Medvedev's visit). Reinforce air defense networks after Buk M1 and Buk-M2 loss. Assess the effectiveness of recruitment of medically unfit personnel. Continue to deepen foreign military relations (Libya, DPRK, Myanmar). Refine BEC development and training. Continue Kirienko's visits to occupied territories.
    • UAF Decision Point: Actively counter RF dehumanization narratives with transparent communication on war crimes and international law, as well as the Geneva Conventions regarding POWs (especially given the 2577 reported POWs). Intensify diplomatic efforts for DIB funding and air defense. Continue to highlight operational successes and soldier resilience. Publicize war crimes documentation efforts with international partners. Develop specific counter-IO strategies to address Fico's statements and RF claims of UAF weapon weakness, and claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland, and Hungarian FM's statement on EU accession, and Belgium's decision on frozen assets. Continue drone procurement and integration in front-line operations (Zaporizhzhia), and advance joint maritime drone production with Philippines. Dnipropetrovsk OMA and Kharkiv OMA to implement measures from congress on frontline needs. Publicize government support for heating season preparations. Engage with the protesters in Kyiv and conduct a transparent review of Bill 13452, considering its impact on military morale and recruitment.
    • International Decision Point: EU to make progress on the new sanctions package, addressing any divisions (e.g., Hungary's claims) and countering RF IO regarding Western disunity and Fico's statements. Member states to coordinate responses to potential Zapad-2025 provocations, especially along the Eastern Flank, particularly in light of Medvedev's border visit. International bodies to condemn RF's recruitment practices (medically unfit), domestic repression (Yamal janitor, Kateryna Kotrikadze, LGBT repression, Mitvol's failed appeal), militarization of education ("SMO teachers"), and deepening military cooperation with rogue states (DPRK, Myanmar, including DPRK's public support, Belousov's visit).
  • Mid-Term (1-2 weeks):
    • RF Decision Point: Execute "Zapad-2025" exercises, potentially incorporating more aggressive hybrid scenarios and testing of NATO border responses along the Finnish and Baltic borders. Consolidate gains and administrative control in occupied Ukrainian territories and buffer zones, including recently advanced areas in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv, and any claimed advances in Kupyansk.
    • UAF Decision Point: Implement enhanced anti-corruption measures and public transparency to maintain public trust. Integrate new Western military aid (if secured) and indigenous production (e.g., from US drone agreement, UAF-Philippines maritime drone collaboration) into operational planning. Prioritize development of counter-IO strategies to address RF youth militarization, criminalization narratives, disinformation about UAF capabilities, Fico's rhetoric, claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland, and Hungarian FM's statements. Continue efforts to harden civilian infrastructure like schools and expand mental health support for soldiers. Intensify international pressure for POW exchanges. Expand demining and UXO clearance operations. Finalize legislative review of Bill 13452, prioritizing long-term military morale and public trust.
    • International Decision Point: NATO to reassess its Eastern Flank posture post-Zapad-2025, specifically considering Medvedev's threats and the new RF ties to DPRK/Myanmar. Countries with conditional troop deployment stances (e.g., Slovenia) may engage in further discussions. Western nations should publicly address RF's internal repression tactics and its dehumanizing rhetoric. Support further international collaboration on war crimes documentation. Reaffirm strong, unified stance against RF on security guarantees for Ukraine.

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Immediate & Robust Counter-Propaganda Against Dehumanization, Criminalization, Alliance Fracture, and Non-Western Alignment: Launch a comprehensive, international public diplomacy campaign to expose and condemn RF's militarization of youth ("SMO teachers"), dehumanization of Ukrainians ("Khokhol" rhetoric, discrediting cultural figures/journalists like Kotrikadze, Azov criminalization), the criminalization of captured Ukrainian defenders/civilians (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), their efforts to sow discord within the Western alliance (e.g., Fico's statements, Trump/NYT disinformation, RF claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland, Hungarian FM's statement on EU accession, Belgium's decision on frozen assets), and their deepening military ties with rogue states (DPRK, Myanmar, including DPRK's public support, Belousov's visit). This campaign must highlight war crimes, violations of international law (Geneva Conventions, recruitment of medically unfit, targeting of journalists, LGBT repression, mine warfare against civilians), and the psychological warfare implications, targeting both international and, where possible, Russian domestic audiences. Leverage recent UAF diplomatic meetings to amplify this message, and use Zelenskyy's recent strong statements as a launchpad. (CRITICAL)
2. Enhanced Air Defense & ISR for Dnipro and Eastern/Northeastern Axes; Exploit RF Air Defense Gaps; Prioritize Counter-Artillery & Demining: Immediately prioritize additional mobile air defense systems and advanced ISR assets to protect Dnipro and critical industrial/energy infrastructure, especially given the recent industrial fire and the renewed air threat in Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, and Chernihiv Oblasts (new warnings), and confirmed power outages in Dnipro due to enemy attacks. Simultaneously, bolster air defense and Counter-UAS capabilities on the eastern and northeastern axes in response to increased RF tactical aviation activity and cross-border operations, especially in light of reported RF advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts and RF claims of an assault on Kupyansk. Special attention must be given to countering RF's new long-range FPV drone ("Veter-X") and existing FPV activity on the Slovyansk-Izium highway. Exploit the proven destruction of the RF Buk M1 and Buk-M2 SAM systems by further targeting other RF air defense assets and re-evaluating their coverage gaps. Continue to prioritize counter-battery fire, leveraging successes like the Luhansk artillery depot strike and targeting newly identified active positions (Konstantinovka/Druzhkovka, Sever Group mortar positions). Critically, immediately allocate extensive resources for demining and UXO clearance in liberated areas, particularly Kherson, with concurrent public safety campaigns to prevent further civilian casualties. (CRITICAL)
3. Accelerate Counter-Special Operations, Maritime/Riverine Security, and Border Defense: Increase ISR and rapid response capabilities along the Black Sea coast and in the Dnipro Delta to counter RF naval drone threats (e.g., Lancet strikes) and protect UAF special operations (e.g., GUR operations). Invest in faster, more resilient maritime drone platforms and coastal/riverine defense systems, in anticipation of RF developing training BECs. Concurrently, reinforce border security in Chernihiv, Sumy (following claims of UAF PVD destruction, specifically the 119th TDF in Zelenaya Dibrova), and Kharkiv Oblasts with additional personnel, ISR, and rapid response units to counter RF buffer zone efforts and interdict sabotage groups, especially in response to claims of ammunition depot destruction and FAB launches, and DeepState reports of RF advances. Leverage successful UAF drone strikes on underground positions and individual soldiers to inform targeting of similar RF assets. (HIGH)
4. Sustain Diplomatic Pressure for DIB Funding and Security Guarantees; Expedite Drone Agreement & Maritime Drone Collaboration; Leverage Infrastructure Development: Leverage recent high-level diplomatic engagements (including the EU delegation to the US for sanctions and the US drone agreement discussions, Zelenskyy-Fico meetings, and the UAF-Philippines maritime drone collaboration agreement) to secure concrete commitments for long-term funding and technology transfer for Ukraine's defense industrial base, particularly for rocket and missile production, to address the stated funding gap. Push for expedited security guarantees, working to mitigate the impact of Fico's statements while highlighting his positive stance against an energy blockade, and reaffirming unified international support. The US drone agreement is a critical step and should be finalized swiftly, building on the significant drone procurement already observed in Zaporizhzhia. Publicly promote the opening of the Uzhhorod-Chop railway as a tangible success of European integration and a strategic logistical asset, demonstrating progress despite conflict. (HIGH)
5. Strengthen Public Trust Through Transparency, Governance, and POW Advocacy; Address Internal Military Justice Concerns: Continue to address internal governance challenges and pursue anti-corruption efforts transparently, especially building on the successful repatriation of stolen funds. This will be crucial to maintain public confidence and national unity amidst RF's aggressive information operations. Advocate vigorously through international legal channels for the proper treatment and exchange of all Ukrainian prisoners of war, directly countering RF's efforts to criminalize them and highlighting the reported 2577 POWs and 26 newly captured RF personnel. Emphasize UAF commitment to soldier mental health and publicly acknowledge soldier resilience under fire, as well as the continued operational readiness of UAF Air Force. Counter RF claims about UAF weapon supplies (Rybar) and claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland with verifiable data and operational successes. Expand collaboration with international partners on forensic science and war crimes documentation. Publicly support and showcase local initiatives like underground schools and community defense efforts, including Dnipropetrovsk OMA and Kharkiv OMA efforts for frontline needs, and government support for heating season preparations. Crucially, engage in transparent public dialogue and legislative review regarding Bill 13452 (stricter military sentences) to address soldier and public concerns, ensuring that justice is balanced with morale and retention needs. Counter RF's leveraging of the "Nash Vykhod" movement with transparent information on POWs and a focus on humanitarian treatment. (MEDIUM)

//END REPORT//