Situation Report

SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - 051630Z SEP 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: RF continues its multi-axis ground offensives, maintaining pressure on Velikomikhailovka and Orikhiv, and claiming advances in the Donetsk sector (Markovo, Fedorovka) with a stated vector "towards Kramatorsk." DeepState reports RF advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts. Intense ground operations persist on the Kupyansk-Sieversk axis, with RF claims of beginning an assault on Kupyansk and liberating 16% of the city. RF special forces are conducting cross-border ground operations in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv Oblasts with the stated intent to create a "buffer zone," with RF claims of destroying a UAF forward deployment point (PVD) of the 119th Brigade in the Sumy direction. RF deep strikes continue against Ukrainian energy and defense industries, with a large industrial fire in Dnipro (cause unknown) and recent ballistic missile strike in Chernihiv Oblast. Air defense systems are challenged by high-volume, multi-vector drone attacks. UAF is actively defending across all axes, launching deep strikes on RF territory (Ryazan oil refinery, Anapa radar, Luhansk oil depot, artillery depots in Luhansk), and conducting successful special operations in the Black Sea and Dnipro Delta. UAF claims destruction of a Russian Buk-M2 SAM system. Diplomatic activity is high; Ukraine seeks accelerated security guarantees, while RF attempts to fracture Western unity through information operations. NATO ISR activity near Kaliningrad/Belarus border indicates heightened vigilance. DPSU warns of potential provocations during "Zapad-2025." Ukraine reports 2577 service members in Russian captivity. UAF Air Force is actively engaged. Ukraine is pursuing forensic and war crimes documentation.

• NEW DEVELOPMENTS (1600Z - 1630Z SEP 25):

  • UAF Air Defense Success (Donetsk axis): Оперативний ЗСУ reports video footage of the destruction of a Russian Buk-M2 self-propelled surface-to-air missile system by a Ukrainian UAV. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Naval Modernization (Arctic): MoD Russia reports a flag-raising ceremony on the modern ship Ivan Papanin for the Arctic. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF IO (Humanitarian Aid/Propaganda): WarGonzo publishes a video discussing humanitarian aid challenges and the impact of propaganda in conflict zones, with a caption implying conditional aid ("You think if your husband is in the Armed Forces, we won't give you insulin?"). (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as IO)
  • UAF Local Governance (Dnipropetrovsk): Дніпропетровська ОДА (ОВА) reports participation in a thematic session of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities dedicated to frontline needs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF IO (Anti-Ukrainian Sentiment in Poland): Операция Z cites "Russian Spring military correspondents" claiming Polish media reports Ukrainians were severely beaten in Poland due to their nationality. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF claim/IO)
  • RF IO (Medvedev/Security Guarantees): Colonelcassad and Alex Parker Returns publish videos of Medvedev dismissing European "security guarantees" for Ukraine as "nonsense," "madness," and "bullshit" near a border crossing. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as IO)
  • RF Domestic Repression (Journalist): ASTRA and Colonelcassad report that TV Rain host Kateryna Kotrikadze has been declared wanted on criminal charges. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Maritime Drone Development: Воин DV reports Ukraine and the Philippines are developing an agreement for joint production of naval drones. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Domestic Crime IO: ТАСС reports fraudsters are sending fake messages from the Russian Pension Fund to retirees. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF domestic news)
  • UAF Diplomatic Stance (Energy): STERNENKO and РБК-Україна report Zelenskyy's statement that Ukraine is ready to supply oil and gas to Slovakia if it's not Russian, reiterating "we have a war, period." Fico stated they have diametrically different views on energy. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Claim (Sumy Direction): Дневник Десантника🇷🇺 claims the destruction of a forward deployment point (PVD) of the 119th Brigade in the Sumy direction. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - as RF claim)
  • UAF Diplomatic Meeting: Оперативний ЗСУ reports Zelenskyy and Fico agreed to a new meeting in Slovakia. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF IO (Occupied Territories/Legitimization): Colonelcassad publishes videos of Sergey Kirienko, First Deputy Head of RF Presidential Administration, visiting "liberated territory," specifically Hornyak in Kurakhove municipal district and other "liberated settlements," showcasing military personnel interacting with civilians and assessing observation posts in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as IO)
  • RF Domestic Repression (LGBT): ASTRA reports a man was detained in Moscow for a kiss in a park and charged with "LGBT propaganda." (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF domestic news/repression)
  • RF IO (Militarization of Education): ТАСС reports Volodin stated that teachers from "SMO participants" should work in every Russian school, as their qualities are needed for child education. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as IO)
  • UAF POW Capture: ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS reports that over the week, soldiers of the 425th "Skelya" regiment captured 26 occupiers. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Claim (Kupyansk): Alex Parker Returns claims the assault on Kupyansk has begun, with approximately 16% of the city liberated. (LOW CONFIDENCE - as RF claim, highly contested)
  • UK Cabinet Reshuffle: ТАСС reports Starmer replaced David Lammy with Yvette Cooper as UK Foreign Secretary. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - non-military, but geopolitical)
  • UAF Weekly Overview: РБК-Україна publishes a weekly overview of key events. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Air Operations: UAF destruction of a Buk-M2 SAM system by UAV indicates continued reliance on and effectiveness of UAS in current conditions. RF tactical aviation activity in the northeast persists. UAF/Philippines agreement on maritime drones points to continued favorable conditions for UAS development and deployment across domains.
• Maritime Operations: RF commissioning of the "Ivan Papanin" for Arctic operations highlights their ongoing naval development. UAF's agreement to jointly produce maritime drones suggests an increasing focus on this domain, indicating conditions are suitable for continued maritime drone operations in the Black Sea and beyond.
• Ground Operations: RF claims of advances in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Donetsk, and cross-border operations in Sumy/Chernihiv, suggest conditions are conducive to sustained ground maneuvers. UAF's capture of 26 RF personnel demonstrates effective ground operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF:
  • Ground Forces: Continuing multi-axis offensive with reported advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts (DeepState) and Donetsk (Markovo, Fedorovka, towards Kramatorsk). Maintaining pressure on Velikomikhailovka and Orikhiv. Sustained cross-border operations for "buffer zone" creation, with claims of destroying a UAF PVD in Sumy direction. Claims of an assault on Kupyansk beginning with 16% liberated (LOW CONFIDENCE).
  • Air Assets: Sustained tactical aviation activity in the northeast. Actively fielding precision artillery (Krasnopol) on Dnipropetrovsk axis.
  • Naval Assets: Commissioning of new Arctic vessel "Ivan Papanin" indicates continued naval modernization. Developing training for unmanned surface vessels (BECs). Maintaining presence in Black Sea.
  • Information Operations (IO): Intensified, aggressive IO, including overt dehumanization ("kill Khokhols"), explicit nuclear threats, "liberation" narratives, criminalization of Ukrainian defenders/civilians (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), efforts to discredit Ukrainian cultural figures/media (Kateryna Kotrikadze), and attempts to fracture Western unity (Trump/NYT disinformation, Fico's statements, RF claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland). Medvedev's rhetoric on Finland/NATO and his dismissal of Ukrainian security guarantees are escalating border security narratives and perceived threats. IO also includes narratives on domestic issues (migration tax, internal corruption, domestic repression regarding LGBT, pension fund fraud warnings), and soldier support (Putin's niece's foundation), and militarization of education by integrating "SMO participants" as teachers. Kirienko's visits to "liberated territories" are key legitimization efforts.
  • Domestic Repression: Increased judicial repression against dissent (Yamal janitor) and criminalization of journalists (Kateryna Kotrikadze) and LGBT individuals indicate tightening control on internal narrative. RF security services are actively disrupting perceived Ukrainian sabotage efforts (Krasnodar).
  • Military-Industrial Base: Developing training platforms for BECs. Commissioning new Arctic patrol vessel.
• UAF:
  • Defensive Posture: Continuing active defense across all axes, responding to RF air activity, and maintaining a strong defense on the ground, particularly in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts following reported RF advances. Air Force maintains operational readiness. Actively conducting counter-offensive actions (Prymorske).
  • Special Operations/Deep Strike Capabilities: Demonstrated effective long-range strike capabilities with the destruction of artillery depots in Luhansk. Continuing special reconnaissance and strike operations (GUR in Black Sea, "Buzky Gard" in Dnipro Delta), and effective drone strikes on underground positions ("Shadow" unit). Demonstrated effective counter-air capability with the destruction of a Buk-M2 SAM system by UAV. Demonstrated successful capture of 26 RF personnel.
  • Precision Strike Capabilities: Effective use of drones for reconnaissance and precision strikes against RF assets (Kinburn Spit, Prymorske, Donetsk Grad, Buk M1 SAM system, Novopavlivka personnel, underground bunker, Buk-M2 SAM system).
  • Strategic Resolve & Diplomacy: Leadership maintains unwavering resolve (Zelenskyy on energy retaliation, Zelenskyy on China parade, Zelenskyy on non-Russian energy supply to Slovakia) and actively engages in high-level diplomatic efforts to secure and sustain international aid. Slovakia's continued rejection of an energy blockade (despite other reservations) is a positive development. Agreement for another Zelenskyy-Fico meeting in Slovakia suggests ongoing diplomatic engagement.
  • Resource Management: Significant procurement of drones and transport for military units in Zaporizhzhia demonstrates active efforts to enhance capabilities. Ukraine developing joint maritime drone production with the Philippines.
  • Civilian Resilience & Governance: Active construction of underground schools/kindergartens in Zaporizhzhia and regular local defense council briefings (Kryvyi Rih) highlight proactive measures for civilian protection and continuity of governance. Dnipropetrovsk OMA participating in congress on frontline needs.
• International:
  • Diplomatic Momentum: EU and bilateral partners continue to engage with Ukraine. Slovakia's stance against an energy blockade is a positive, though PM Fico's general anti-Ukrainian policy and rhetoric of swift conflict resolution remain a concern. Agreement for another Zelenskyy-Fico meeting.
  • Focus on Russian Aggression: International bodies and nations continue to condemn RF actions and nuclear rhetoric. EU delegation to the US for sanctions work indicates sustained pressure on RF.
  • Regional Tensions (INCREASED): Medvedev's visit to Svetogorsk on the Finnish border and warnings underscore heightened tensions on NATO's Eastern Flank. Medvedev's dismissal of security guarantees for Ukraine is a continued attempt to undermine international support.
  • UK Cabinet Reshuffle (NEW): Change in UK Foreign Secretary. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - non-military, but geopolitical)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:

  • Persistent Ground Offensive & Consolidation: RF maintains capability for sustained, multi-axis ground offensives (Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk axes), localized breakthroughs, cross-border operations, and effective political-administrative integration of occupied territories. Precision artillery (Krasnopol) enhances offensive reach. Claims of initiating an assault on Kupyansk (LOW CONFIDENCE) indicate continued offensive ambition.
  • Long-Range Strike & Air Presence: RF retains significant capability for deep strikes against critical infrastructure (Dnipro industrial fire, FABs in Sumy) and sustains tactical aviation activity. RF also maintains capability for loitering munition strikes against maritime targets (Lancet against BEC).
  • Advanced Information & Psychological Warfare: RF continues to demonstrate a high capability for aggressive and inflammatory information operations, including explicit nuclear threats, militarization of youth ("kill Khokhols", Volodin on "SMO teachers"), "liberation" narratives, criminalization of Ukrainian defenders/civilians (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), efforts to control domestic information space (Kotrikadze wanted, LGBT repression, pension fund fraud warnings), and attempts to sow disunity among Western allies (Trump/NYT disinformation, Fico's statements, claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland). Medvedev's rhetoric on Finland/NATO and "security guarantees" is escalating border security narratives and perceived threats. IO also includes narratives on domestic issues (migration tax, internal corruption), and soldier support (Putin's niece's foundation).
  • Internal Control & Repression: RF is highly capable of controlling its domestic information environment, suppressing dissent (Yamal janitor, Kateryna Kotrikadze), and isolating itself from undesirable international organizations. Medvedev's statements highlight a focus on reinforcing state border protection against perceived NATO threats. The Krasnodar incident underscores their capability to frame events as Ukrainian terrorism for domestic consumption. New reports of LGBT repression reinforce tightening social control.
  • Manpower & Social Support: While recruitment challenges persist, the attention to soldier appeals (Putin's niece's foundation) indicates an effort to manage morale and provide social support, likely to sustain the long-term war effort. Integration of "SMO participants" into schools serves a dual purpose of legitimizing the war and potentially providing social re-integration for veterans.
  • Naval Operations: RF maintains capability for naval operations in the Black Sea and is actively developing its unmanned surface vessel capabilities (training BEC). Commissioning of "Ivan Papanin" for Arctic demonstrates continued naval investment.
  • Foreign Military Relations: Actively engaging with other nations to deepen military ties (Libya).

• Intentions:

  • Achieve Territorial Objectives: RF intends to continue offensive operations to secure and consolidate control over claimed and newly occupied territories, especially in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv Oblasts. The confirmed advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv (DeepState) suggest an intention to expand control beyond existing lines. Establishing "buffer zones" along border regions remains a priority, as evidenced by special forces operations and claims of destroying UAF positions in Sumy. The claimed assault on Kupyansk aligns with this intent, though its veracity is highly questionable.
  • Degrade UAF Combat Effectiveness & Morale: RF aims to deplete UAF resources through attrition, disrupt logistics (UAF ammunition depots in Kharkiv), and undermine public morale through strikes and propaganda, including the dehumanization of Ukrainians and the criminalization of their defenders. The targeting of industrial infrastructure (Dnipro fire) and continued artillery/drone attacks (Dnipropetrovsk) align with this. RF IO on conditional humanitarian aid ("insulin" narrative) aims to sow distrust and demoralize.
  • Deter Western Intervention & Support & Fracture Alliances: RF will continue to use escalatory rhetoric (e.g., nuclear threats, "legitimate targets" for NATO troops), IO campaigns (Trump/NYT disinformation, Medvedev's dismissal of security guarantees), and border provocations (Medvedev on Finland) to deter Western military aid and direct involvement, and to exploit perceived divisions within the international community. Medvedev's statements signal a clear intention to escalate political pressure on NATO's Eastern Flank. RF claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland also serve this purpose.
  • Maintain Domestic Control & Legitimacy: RF will continue to tightly control its internal information space, suppress dissent, and project an image of self-sufficiency and moral justification for its actions. The Krasnodar "terrorist" narrative serves to justify internal security measures and demonize Ukraine. Medvedev's visit to the Finnish border and statements aim to rally nationalist support and justify military posture. Kirienko's visits to occupied territories and the integration of "SMO teachers" into schools are key legitimization efforts. Increased domestic repression (Kotrikadze, LGBT) reinforces internal control.
  • Counter UAF Special Operations & Deep Strikes: RF intends to actively counter Ukrainian special operations and maritime drone activities, particularly in the Black Sea and coastal areas, and prevent cross-border incursions. They also intend to prevent and attribute deep strikes on their territory (e.g., Luhansk artillery depot, "AZS" claims).
  • Reinforce Borders Against NATO: Medvedev's statements indicate a clear intention to enhance border security and adjust military posture along its borders with Finland and the Baltic states due to perceived NATO threat. Commissioning Arctic vessel indicates long-term strategic naval ambitions.

• Courses of Action (COAs):

  • MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action):

    1. Sustained, Attritional Ground Offensives with Emphasis on New Axes, Consolidation, and Buffer Zone Creation, Coupled with Expanded Industrial/Energy Strikes: RF will maintain and intensify methodical ground offensives across current axes (Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Siversk, Novopavlovka - including Krasnoarmeysk direction, Kupyansk), with a likely increased focus on the reported advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts. Cross-border special forces operations in Chernihiv, Sumy (including strikes on UAF PVDs), and Kharkiv will intensify to create "buffer zones" and destroy UAF logistics. Claims of an assault on Kupyansk (LOW CONFIDENCE) indicate possible, though unconfirmed, new large-scale offensive operations. This will be supported by continued deep strikes against critical infrastructure, with a likely expanded focus on industrial targets (e.g., the Dnipro industrial fire), energy facilities (Zelenskyy's statement), and precision artillery. FAB launches in Sumy will continue. Confidence: HIGH
    2. Escalated Hybrid Operations with Deepening Nuclear Coercion, Aggressive Dehumanization, and Legal/Information Warfare to Fracture Western Unity and Project Strength: RF will amplify highly escalatory rhetoric, including explicit nuclear threats and warnings against NATO troops ("legitimate targets"), coupled with increased cyberattacks and border provocations (especially during "Zapad-2025" and along the Finnish/Baltic borders, as indicated by Medvedev's visit). Information operations will intensify to militarize its youth ("SMO teachers"), dehumanize Ukrainians (e.g., "kill Khokhols," Azov criminalization, discrediting cultural figures/journalists like Kotrikadze), and criminalize captured Ukrainian defenders/civilians through show trials (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), while simultaneously promoting narratives of Western disunity (e.g., Trump/NYT disinformation, Fico's statements on security guarantees/conflict resolution, claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland) and leveraging recruitment of medically unfit personnel. RF will continue to restrict internal information flow and use domestic arrests/events as IO tools (Yamal janitor, Kateryna Kotrikadze, LGBT repression, pension fund fraud warnings). RF will also continue efforts to project its military capabilities and UAF weakness (Rybar) and legitimize control over occupied territories (Kirienko visits). Confidence: HIGH
    3. Increased Tactical Aviation and Counter-Special Operations/ISR, with Reinforced Border Defenses and Expanded Naval Capabilities: RF will maintain high tactical aviation activity in the eastern and northeastern directions, focusing on ISR and strike preparations (e.g., FABs in Sumy). RF will also increase efforts to detect and neutralize UAF special operations (e.g., in Dnipro Delta, GUR Black Sea operations) and naval drone threats (e.g., Lancet strikes against BECs), as well as enhance counter-infiltration measures along border regions, especially in the Sumy direction following claims of UAF PVD destruction. In response to perceived NATO threats, RF will implement Medvedev's stated intention to reinforce its borders with Finland and the Baltic states, potentially involving new troop deployments or upgraded surveillance systems, as part of "Zapad-2025" preparations. Development and deployment of training BECs indicate an increased focus on countering/employing maritime drones. Commissioning of "Ivan Papanin" for Arctic indicates broader naval modernization efforts. Confidence: MEDIUM

  • MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action):

    1. Limited Tactical Nuclear Demonstration: As previously assessed, a low-yield tactical nuclear demonstration remains a low-probability but extremely high-impact MDCOA to force negotiations on RF terms and drastically alter the geopolitical landscape, especially given the recent rhetoric and explicit threats. Confidence: LOW (but extreme impact)
    2. Coordinated Hybrid Attack against NATO Critical Infrastructure: Leveraging the "Zapad-2025" timeframe and Medvedev's rhetoric regarding perceived NATO threat, RF orchestrates a significant, multi-domain hybrid attack (e.g., large-scale cyber-physical attack, sabotage against energy or communications infrastructure) against a NATO member state on the Eastern Flank, designed to test Article 5 and create severe disruption without direct kinetic military engagement. Confidence: MEDIUM
    3. Massed Air/Missile Strike on Major Urban Center with Civilian/Industrial Infrastructure as Primary Target: RF conducts a coordinated, large-scale air and missile strike utilizing multiple vectors (UAVs, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles) against a major Ukrainian urban center, specifically targeting residential areas, hospitals, or critical industrial/energy facilities (e.g., Dnipro industrial fire potentially signaling this shift, Zelenskyy's statements on energy retaliation) to maximize civilian casualties and induce panic. Confidence: MEDIUM

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

• Ukrainian force posture and readiness:
  • Resilient Defense & Adaptable Air Defense: UAF continues to demonstrate resilience in defending against RF drone and artillery attacks (Nikopol district) and responding to tactical aviation activity. The destruction of an RF Buk M1 SAM system on the Donetsk axis and the destruction of an RF Buk-M2 SAM system by UAF UAV highlights effective UAF counter-air capabilities and adaptability. SBU's "Spiderweb" operation indicates proactive efforts to disrupt RF strike capabilities. UAF Air Force maintains operational readiness and is vigilant regarding FAB launches.
  • Effective Special Operations & Precision Strike: The successful evacuation of soldiers from occupied territory, "Buzky Gard" operations in the Dnipro Delta, GUR naval special operations in the Black Sea (destroying boat/radar), "Shadow" unit's drone strike on an underground bunker, and the strike on Luhansk artillery depots highlight high readiness and capability in special reconnaissance, rescue, amphibious, and precision strike missions, demonstrating an ability to operate effectively behind enemy lines and against hardened targets. Night-time precision strikes (Novopavlivka) show advanced capabilities. Interrogation of POWs provides valuable intelligence. Capture of 26 RF personnel by 425th regiment demonstrates strong ground operational capabilities.
  • Unwavering Political Will & Diplomatic Proactivity: Leadership maintains a strong stance against aggression (Zelenskyy on energy retaliation, Zelenskyy on China parade, Zelenskyy on non-Russian energy for Slovakia) and actively engages international partners to sustain vital support and discuss long-term security. Active discussions on a US drone agreement underway. Slovakia's support for EU accession is a significant diplomatic success, though their non-participation in security guarantees is a setback. Zelenskyy's reiterated commitment to respond to energy strikes and long-term vision on RF oil/gas indicates strong resolve. Fico's rejection of Putin's request for an energy blockade is a positive diplomatic development. Agreement for another Zelenskyy-Fico meeting in Slovakia indicates ongoing high-level engagement.
  • Resource Management & DIB: Significant procurement of drones and transport for military units in Zaporizhzhia (over 208 million hryvnias) demonstrates effective resource allocation and ongoing efforts to enhance DIB capabilities. The visit of the Minister of Defense to the front lines further reinforces this. Agreement for joint maritime drone production with the Philippines indicates strategic planning for long-term DIB enhancement.
  • Training & Readiness: Ongoing training of units like the 22nd Mechanized Brigade highlights efforts to maintain combat readiness and integrate new personnel. Focus on soldier mental health (Presidential Brigade) is a positive development for long-term readiness. Individual soldier resilience (Воин DV footage) is high.
  • Commitment to Rule of Law & Governance: The Office of the Prosecutor General's partnership with the Netherlands for war crimes documentation and the successful repatriation of stolen funds demonstrate Ukraine's dedication to accountability, legal processes, and anti-corruption. Regional governance meetings and proactive measures for civilian protection (underground schools in Zaporizhzhia, Kryvyi Rih defense council briefings, Dnipropetrovsk OMA participation in congress on frontline needs) reinforce efforts for internal stability and public trust.
• Recent tactical successes or setbacks:
  • Successes:
    • Special Operations Evacuation: Successful evacuation of four soldiers from occupied territory by Naval Special Reconnaissance Forces. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Kinburn Spit Strikes: Successful drone strikes against enemy military assets on the Kinburn Spit. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Prymorske Infantry Destruction: Successful destruction of RF infantry in Prymorske by 33rd Separate Assault Regiment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Donetsk MLRS Strike: Successful drone strike on RF BM-21 Grad MLRS in Donetsk Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Dnipro Delta Special Operations: Successful special reconnaissance and fire engagements by "Buzky Gard" in the Dnipro Delta, including drone-guided targeting. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • RF Buk M1 SAM System Destruction: "Lazar" OSP battalion, 27th Pechenizka Brigade NGU, destroyed an RF Buk M1 (SA-11/17) SAM system on the Donetsk axis. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • SBU "Spiderweb" Operation: Disruption of RF strike capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • GUR Black Sea Operation: Destruction of enemy boat, radar station, and personnel. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • "Shadow" Unit Bunker Strike: Successful drone strike on an RF underground position/bunker. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Novopavlivka Night Strike: Elimination of 3 RF personnel by "Gr. Pilot" drone. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Luhansk Artillery Depot Strike: Successful UAF strike on artillery depots in Luhansk. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • RF Buk-M2 SAM System Destruction: UAF UAV successfully targeted and destroyed a Russian Buk-M2 SAM system. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • RF Personnel Capture: 425th "Skelya" regiment captured 26 RF occupiers. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Diplomatic Engagements: Productive meetings with European leaders (António Costa, Swedish Foreign Minister, Slovak PM Fico) to discuss defense projects and continued support. Discussion of drone agreement with US. Slovakia's support for EU accession. Fico rejecting Putin's energy blockade request. Agreement for another Zelenskyy-Fico meeting. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Anti-Corruption Win: Successful repatriation of funds stolen by corrupt officials. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • War Crimes Documentation: Partnership with the Netherlands for forensic science and war crimes documentation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Resilience & Adaptation: Construction of underground schools and kindergartens in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk OMA participation in congress on frontline needs demonstrate proactive adaptation to ensure civilian services. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Command Presence: Minister of Defense visit to Zaporizhzhia frontlines. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Drone Procurement: Significant drone procurement for Zaporizhzhia military units. Joint maritime drone production agreement with Philippines. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Setbacks:
    • Persistent RF Ground Pressure & Advances: RF continues localized ground offensives (Krasnoarmeysk, Novopavlivka) and cross-border regions, forcing UAF to commit significant resources to defense. DeepState reports RF advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts. RF artillery/drone strikes reported in Dnipropetrovsk region (Nikopol district). RF claims of destroying UAF PVD in Sumy direction. RF claims of beginning assault on Kupyansk (LOW CONFIDENCE) indicate continued pressure on key fronts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for general pressure, MEDIUM for specific RF claims)
    • Deep Strike Vulnerability: The major industrial fire in Dnipro, possibly due to an RF strike, and ongoing FAB launches in Sumy highlight continued vulnerability of critical infrastructure, including industrial sites and border regions, to RF deep strikes. RF claims of destroying an ammunition depot in Kharkiv indicate continued vulnerability of logistics. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • RF Information Operations Effectiveness: RF propaganda aimed at dehumanizing Ukrainians ("kill Khokhols" videos, "SMO teachers"), militarizing its youth, criminalization of Ukrainian defenders/civilians (as seen in Azov criminalization, Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), discrediting cultural figures/journalists (Kateryna Kotrikadze wanted), and historical revisionism continues to be a potent threat in the cognitive domain. RF efforts to sow disunity in the West (Trump meme, NYT citation, Fico's statements, anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland) are also a concern. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Slovak Withdrawal from Security Guarantees: Slovak PM Fico's statement against participation in security guarantees and his belief in swift conflict resolution are diplomatic setbacks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • DIB Funding Gap: Confirmed financial shortfall for long-range weapon development. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • POW Numbers: 2577 Ukrainian service members reportedly in Russian captivity, representing a significant challenge for humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Resource requirements and constraints:
  • Air Defense Systems & Ammunition (CRITICAL): Continued RF tactical aviation activity (FABs in Sumy) and potential deep strikes (Dnipro industrial fire, Dnipropetrovsk air threat) necessitate a constant supply of interceptor missiles and advanced short-range air defense systems to protect both frontline areas and critical infrastructure. The destruction of RF Buk-M1 and Buk-M2 is positive, but air defense for UAF remains paramount.
  • Counter-Artillery Capabilities (CRITICAL): With RF maintaining ground pressure and using precision artillery (Krasnopol, Nikopol district), sustained and effective counter-battery fire is essential. This requires consistent artillery ammunition supply and advanced targeting systems, especially in areas like Donetsk and Dnipropetropavsk. The successful strike on Luhansk artillery depots highlights the effectiveness of UAF counter-battery/deep strike capabilities.
  • Indigenous DIB Funding (CRITICAL): The $6B deficit for rockets remains paramount. Dedicated international funding and technological transfer for Ukraine's defense industrial base are crucial to achieve self-reliance and produce long-range missiles, which are essential for strategic depth. Expedited drone agreement with US is a positive step. Significant drone procurement in Zaporizhzhia, while positive, underscores ongoing demand. Joint maritime drone production with Philippines is a long-term positive, but immediate needs for long-range missiles persist.
  • Counter-UAS & EW Capabilities (HIGH): The proliferation of RF drones, tactical aviation activity, and loitering munitions (Lancets) requires enhanced Counter-UAS systems and Electronic Warfare capabilities to protect ground forces, maritime assets, and critical infrastructure, especially in the context of RF border operations.
  • Maritime ISR & Strike (HIGH): Given continued RF naval operations and loitering munition threats against BECs, and Russia's development of a training BEC, enhanced maritime ISR and precision strike capabilities are needed to protect coastal/riverine areas and support UAF GUR operations. The joint maritime drone production initiative is a good long-term solution, but immediate needs remain.
  • Border Security Resources (MEDIUM): RF cross-border operations and reported advances in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk regions necessitate increased resources for border security, ISR, and rapid response units to prevent buffer zone creation and interdict sabotage groups. FAB launches in Sumy and claims of destroying UAF PVDs reinforce this need.
  • Mental Health Support (MEDIUM): Acknowledged combat stress and individual soldier accounts (Воин DV) indicate a need for continued and expanded mental health services for UAF personnel.
  • POW Advocacy & Support (MEDIUM): The high number of Ukrainian POWs (2577) requires sustained international advocacy for their humane treatment and mechanisms for exchange, while also supporting their families.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive domain)

• Propaganda and disinformation campaigns:
  • RF Objectives:
    • Dehumanization & Youth Militarization: The explicit propaganda showcasing RF youth training to "kill Khokhols," the criminalization of Ukrainian "saboteurs" through show trials (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), criminalization of Azov members, the discrediting of Ukrainian cultural figures/journalists (Kateryna Kotrikadze), and Volodin's proposal for "SMO teachers" in schools directly aim to instill hatred, legitimize aggression, and delegitimize Ukrainian forces among the next generation and wider RF populace. WarGonzo's "insulin" narrative attempts to create a false sense of RF benevolence while subtly dehumanizing Ukrainian soldiers.
    • Psychological Deterrence (Nuclear & NATO): General Gurulyov's explicit nuclear threat, the President's warning about NATO troops being "legitimate targets," and Medvedev's statements on NATO borders (Finland) continue to be high-impact psychological operations aimed at terrifying the Ukrainian population and deterring Western support. Medvedev's dismissal of Stubb's concerns as "phantom pains" and his outright rejection of security guarantees for Ukraine as "nonsense" attempts to belittle European efforts and sow division.
    • Demoralization & Division (Mobilization/Conflict Resolution): The "Mogilizatsiya" narrative persists. Fico's statement on swift conflict resolution could be exploited by RF to suggest that international support for a prolonged conflict is waning. Claims about UAF weapon supplies (Rybar) and claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland aim to project UAF weakness and demoralize. Reports of recruiting medically unfit individuals could also be used to normalize poor conditions or a "total war" mentality domestically. The fabricated Trump/NYT story aims to sow discord within NATO/Western leadership. The "AZS" claim by Butusov Plus (RF source) indicates RF attempting to use UAF strikes to frame their own lack of response, or to test public opinion.
    • Legitimizing Occupation & Domestic Control: Kirienko's visits to "liberated territories" (Hornyak) and the internal "whitelist" saga for internet services, signal RF's determined efforts to legitimize its control and tightly manage its domestic information space. Declaration of "undesirable" international organizations and the "foreign agents" list reinforce this isolationist policy. The Krasnodar "terrorist" arrest and journalist detention (Kateryna Kotrikadze declared wanted) are framed to justify internal security measures. Domestic repression against LGBT individuals reinforces social conservatism and control. Domestic news (Moscow forum, Nevada murder, musical premiere, inefficient encyclopedia, pension fund fraud warnings) serves to normalize the information space and distract from the war. The migration tax proposal may be part of a broader socio-political strategy to address perceived internal issues.
    • Projecting Strength/Self-Sufficiency & Anti-Westernism: Promotion of the "import-substituted" SJ-100 aircraft and deployment of Chechen "volunteers" aims to demonstrate RF industrial resilience and sustained manpower despite sanctions. Primakov's historical revisionism on Japan's surrender reinforces anti-Western narratives. Continued engagement with Belarus (Bryansk-Gomel forum) and Libya projects regional stability and expands influence. RF actively attempts to portray Western disunity and justify its aggressive posture along NATO borders. The development of a training BEC and commissioning of "Ivan Papanin" for Arctic aims to project naval capabilities. Claims of "liberating" Kupyansk also project strength, though veracity is questionable.
  • UAF Counter-Narratives:
    • Resolve & Resilience: Statements from President Zelenskyy (on energy retaliation, on China parade, on non-Russian energy supply for Slovakia) and SBU Head Maliuk, alongside continued diplomatic engagement, actively counter RF's demoralization efforts by demonstrating unwavering determination and commitment to victory. Footage of resilient UAF soldiers (Воин DV, Air Force readiness), and successful operations (GUR Black Sea, Shadow unit, Novopavlivka, Luhansk artillery strike, Buk-M2 destruction, 26 RF personnel captured) reinforces this.
    • Highlighting Operational Successes: Reports of successful special operations evacuations, precision strikes (Kinburn Spit, Prymorske, Donetsk Grad, Dnipro Delta, Buk M1 destruction, Novopavlivka, Luhansk artillery strike, Buk-M2 destruction), effective SBU counter-intelligence (Spiderweb), and capture of RF personnel reinforce UAF's effectiveness and resilience.
    • Highlighting International Support: Zelenskyy's meetings with international leaders (Costa, Swedish FM) directly counter RF's attempts to fracture unity and demonstrate continued solidarity. Slovakia's support for EU accession is a key success, despite Fico's other statements, and his rejection of Putin's energy blockade request is a positive signal. EU delegation to the US for sanctions work further supports this. Discussions for a US drone agreement are a positive signal. Agreement for joint maritime drone production with Philippines also highlights international collaboration.
    • Transparency, Governance & Accountability: Efforts by regional administrations (Zaporizhzhia OMA, Dnipropetrovsk OMA, Dnipropetrovsk OMA participating in congress on frontline needs) to address civilian needs (underground schools, regional congresses, reporting on Nikopol district shelling), ensure continuity of services, and combat corruption (repatriation of funds) contribute to public trust and stability. UAF's open training footage and focus on soldier mental health also projects readiness and care. UAF foreign policy on peacekeeping clarifies its sovereign stance. The OPG's partnership with the Netherlands for war crimes documentation reinforces commitment to justice. Local briefings (Kryvyi Rih) further reinforce this.
    • Humanitarian Concerns: Reporting on the number of Ukrainian POWs highlights humanitarian concerns and RF's violations of international law.
• Public sentiment and morale factors:
  • Ukrainian Public (RESILIENT, but STRESSED & VIGILANT): UAF's operational successes (GUR Black Sea, Shadow unit, Novopavlivka, Luhansk strike, Buk-M2 destruction, 26 RF personnel captured) and leadership's firm stance (Zelenskyy on energy retaliation, China parade, non-Russian energy for Slovakia) bolster morale. However, the explicit nuclear threats, persistent RF ground pressure, deep strikes (Dnipro fire, FABs in Sumy, Nikopol district shelling), reported RF advances in Dnipropetrovsk/Kharkiv, the criminalization/dehumanization of Ukrainian defenders/civilians (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), and the high number of POWs create significant stress and uncertainty. The dehumanizing rhetoric against "Khokhols" and Azov will undoubtedly fuel outrage and resolve, but also adds to the psychological burden. RF claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland, if believed, would likely cause further frustration. Continued proactive measures for civilian protection (underground schools, Dnipropetrovsk congress on frontline needs), soldier welfare (combat stress awareness), and strong governance (anti-corruption, regional congresses) help mitigate fear and reinforce trust.
  • Russian Public (MANAGED & INDOCTRINATED): RF's tight control over the internet and information flow, coupled with aggressive propaganda (including youth militarization, glorification of Krasnoarmeysk "liberators," "volunteer" deployments, anti-Western historical narratives, "terrorist" arrests, and suppression of dissent), likely maintains a managed level of support. The narrative of "liberated territories" (Kirienko visits), DIB self-sufficiency (SJ-100), and successful operations (claims of Kupyansk assault, claims of UAF PVD destruction in Sumy) aims to reinforce a sense of achievement and justification for the war. Domestic news about local issues (migration tax, Kerch official, failed encyclopedia, pension fund fraud warnings, LGBT repression) helps to fill the information space with non-military content. Medvedev's rhetoric on NATO borders aims to rally nationalist support. The significant number of appeals to Putin's niece's foundation suggests a degree of internal strain and need for support, which RF is attempting to address. Integration of "SMO teachers" aims to further normalize the war and create nationalistic fervor.
• International support and diplomatic developments:
  • Sustained Diplomatic Engagement: High-level meetings and continued discussions on security guarantees and military aid (EU delegation to US for sanctions, US drone agreement discussions, Zelenskyy-Fico meetings) underscore persistent international political will to support Ukraine. Slovakia's continued rejection of an energy blockade request from Putin is a positive, but their other positions (against security guarantees, swift conflict resolution) introduce nuance. Zelenskyy's firm stance on non-Russian energy to Slovakia is a key diplomatic signal.
  • Challenges of Unity/Conditionality (INCREASED): While new EU sanctions are positive, the nuances of international military support (e.g., Slovenia's conditional troop deployment) suggest potential for RF exploitation of divisions. Hungary's stance on EU accession talks for Ukraine and its claims of "secret oil purchases" remain a point of contention and potential RF leverage. Fico's statements align with RF narratives and highlight existing divisions within the EU/NATO. RF IO is actively trying to amplify these divisions through narratives like the fabricated Trump/NYT story and claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland.
  • Increased Vigilance on Eastern Flank (PERSISTING): "Zapad-2025" and past drone violations keep NATO's Eastern Flank on high alert for RF provocations. Medvedev's visit to the Finnish border and warnings indicate RF perceives increased NATO activity and is reacting aggressively, raising regional tensions. Medvedev's dismissal of security guarantees for Ukraine is a direct challenge to Western resolve.
  • Renewed Focus on Hybrid Threats & Accountability: The EU's work on sanctions and discussions around border security indicate an international focus on countering RF's multi-domain hybrid aggression. The dehumanizing rhetoric (youth training) and criminalization of POWs/civilians will likely further solidify international condemnation. Ukraine's clear stance on peacekeeping contingents provides clarity for international partners. The OPG-Netherlands partnership signifies international commitment to legal accountability for war crimes. UK cabinet reshuffle is a notable, albeit external, geopolitical development.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

• Most likely enemy courses of action (MLCOA):

  1. Sustained, Attritional Ground Offensives with Emphasis on New Axes, Consolidation, and Buffer Zone Creation, Coupled with Expanded Industrial/Energy Strikes: RF will continue methodical, attritional ground assaults in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts (including Nikopol district), alongside persistent pressure on Siversk, Novopavlovka (Krasnoarmeysk direction), and Kupyansk. Reported advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts suggest an expansion of offensive axes. Active cross-border special forces operations in Chernihiv, Sumy (including continued FAB launches and efforts to destroy UAF PVDs), and Kharkiv will intensify to create "buffer zones" and destroy UAF logistics. The objective remains to wear down UAF defenses, consolidate control, and integrate newly seized territories. Deep strikes against critical infrastructure, including an expanded focus on industrial targets (as potentially indicated by the Dnipro fire) and energy facilities (Zelenskyy's statement), will continue, using various means including FABs and precision artillery. Confidence: HIGH
  2. Intensified Hybrid Warfare with Deepening Nuclear Coercion, Aggressive Dehumanization, and Legal/Information Warfare to Fracture Western Unity and Project Strength: RF will amplify highly escalatory rhetoric (including nuclear threats, "legitimate targets" for NATO troops), coupled with increased cyberattacks and border provocations against Ukraine and NATO's Eastern Flank during "Zapad-2025" and along the Finnish/Baltic borders, as indicated by Medvedev's statements and visit. Propaganda will intensify to dehumanize Ukrainians ("kill Khokhols," Azov criminalization, discrediting cultural figures/journalists like Kotrikadze), militarize RF youth ("SMO teachers"), and criminalize captured Ukrainian defenders/civilians through show trials (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), while simultaneously promoting narratives of Western disunity (e.g., Trump/NYT disinformation, Fico's statements on security guarantees/conflict resolution, claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland) and leveraging recruitment of medically unfit personnel. RF will also continue efforts to control its domestic information space (Yamal janitor, Kateryna Kotrikadze, LGBT repression, pension fund fraud warnings) and isolate from perceived external threats, using historical revisionism, domestic issues (migration tax, encyclopedia failure), and claims of UAF weakness (Rybar) as ideological tools. Confidence: HIGH
  3. Increased Tactical Aviation Activity and Enhanced Counter-Special Operations/ISR, with Reinforced Border Defenses and Expanded Naval Capabilities: RF will maintain high tactical aviation ISR and strike operations, particularly in the eastern and northeastern sectors (e.g., Dnipropetrovsk air threat, FABs in Sumy). RF will also focus on detecting and neutralizing UAF special operations (e.g., in Dnipro Delta, GUR Black Sea operations) and maritime drone activities (e.g., Lancet strikes against BECs) in the Black Sea and coastal areas, as well as enhance counter-infiltration measures along border regions, especially in the Sumy direction. The development of a training BEC indicates a commitment to improving these capabilities. In response to perceived NATO threats, RF will implement Medvedev's stated intention to reinforce its borders with Finland and the Baltic states, potentially involving new troop deployments or upgraded surveillance systems, as part of "Zapad-2025" preparations. Commissioning of "Ivan Papanin" for Arctic reflects a broader naval strategy. Confidence: MEDIUM

• Most dangerous enemy courses of action (MDCOA):

  1. Tactical Nuclear Demonstration: Given recent explicit rhetoric, a low-yield tactical nuclear demonstration (either a test or a strike in an unpopulated area of Ukraine) remains a low-probability, but extremely high-impact, MDCOA to fundamentally alter the conflict. Confidence: LOW (but extreme impact)
  2. Coordinated Hybrid Attack against NATO Critical Infrastructure: Leveraging the "Zapad-2025" timeframe and Medvedev's rhetoric regarding perceived NATO threat, RF orchestrates a significant, multi-domain hybrid attack (e.g., large-scale cyber-physical attack, sabotage against energy or communications infrastructure) against a NATO member state on the Eastern Flank, designed to test Article 5 and create severe disruption without direct kinetic military engagement. Confidence: MEDIUM
  3. Massed Air/Missile Strike on Major Urban Center with Civilian/Industrial Infrastructure as Primary Target: RF conducts a coordinated, large-scale air and missile strike utilizing multiple vectors (UAVs, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles) against a major Ukrainian urban center, specifically targeting residential areas, hospitals, or critical industrial/energy facilities (e.g., Dnipro industrial fire potentially signaling this shift, Zelenskyy's statements on energy retaliation) to maximize civilian casualties and induce panic. Confidence: MEDIUM

• Timeline estimates and decision points:

  • Immediate (0-24 hours):
    • RF Decision Point: Assess the impact of dehumanizing propaganda, tactical aviation activity (FABs in Sumy), and precision artillery/drone strikes (Nikopol district). Evaluate UAF responses to ground offensives on new axes, especially reported advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv, and cross-border incursions in Sumy/Chernihiv/Kharkiv. Continue to utilize domestic arrests and "foreign agent" designations for IO purposes. Monitor Western reactions to "legitimate targets" rhetoric for NATO troops and Fico's statements on security guarantees. Execute Lancet strikes against UAF maritime drones. Continue developing training BECs. Respond to UAF Luhansk strike and Buk-M2 destruction with counter-IO. Amplify claims of Kupyansk assault and UAF PVD destruction.
    • UAF Decision Point: Publicly condemn RF youth militarization propaganda, criminalization of POWs/civilians, and Medvedev's escalatory rhetoric, particularly regarding Finland and "security guarantees." Expedite BDA for Dnipro industrial fire and allocate air defense assets accordingly, especially in Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy. Reinforce defenses on new RF offensive axes (Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Krasnoarmeysk, Novopavlivka) and against cross-border incursions, particularly in Sumy. Maintain high alert for tactical aviation in the east/northeast. Continue special operations in Dnipro Delta and Black Sea, and deep strikes (e.g., Luhansk). Exploit success of Buk M1 and Buk-M2 destruction by further targeting RF air defense gaps. Publicly address Fico's statements and emphasize Ukraine's long-term energy strategy (non-Russian). Leverage successful capture of 26 RF personnel in IO.
    • International Decision Point: NATO and EU states to issue strong, unified condemnations of RF's dehumanizing rhetoric, nuclear threats, "legitimate target" warnings for NATO troops, and Medvedev's aggressive border rhetoric and dismissal of security guarantees. Address Fico's statements regarding security guarantees. Advance discussions on US drone agreement and UAF-Philippines maritime drone collaboration. Acknowledge and condemn the Krasnodar "terrorist" framing.
  • Short-Term (24-72 hours):
    • RF Decision Point: Evaluate Western response to dehumanization, nuclear threats, and "legitimate target" rhetoric; tailor further IO accordingly. Continue "Zapad-2025" preparations with potential for increased border incidents with Belarus, Finland, and Baltic states (following Medvedev's visit). Reinforce air defense networks after Buk M1 and Buk-M2 loss. Assess the effectiveness of recruitment of medically unfit personnel. Continue to deepen foreign military relations (Libya). Refine BEC development and training. Continue Kirienko's visits to occupied territories.
    • UAF Decision Point: Actively counter RF dehumanization narratives with transparent communication on war crimes and international law, as well as the Geneva Conventions regarding POWs (especially given the 2577 reported POWs). Intensify diplomatic efforts for DIB funding and air defense. Continue to highlight operational successes and soldier resilience. Publicize war crimes documentation efforts with international partners. Develop specific counter-IO strategies to address Fico's statements and RF claims of UAF weapon weakness, and claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland. Continue drone procurement and integration in front-line operations (Zaporizhzhia), and advance joint maritime drone production with Philippines. Dnipropetrovsk OMA to implement measures from congress on frontline needs.
    • International Decision Point: EU to make progress on the new sanctions package, addressing any divisions (e.g., Hungary's claims) and countering RF IO regarding Western disunity and Fico's statements. Member states to coordinate responses to potential Zapad-2025 provocations, especially along the Eastern Flank, particularly in light of Medvedev's border visit. International bodies to condemn RF's recruitment practices (medically unfit), domestic repression (Yamal janitor, Kateryna Kotrikadze, LGBT repression), and militarization of education ("SMO teachers").
  • Mid-Term (1-2 weeks):
    • RF Decision Point: Execute "Zapad-2025" exercises, potentially incorporating more aggressive hybrid scenarios and testing of NATO border responses along the Finnish and Baltic borders. Consolidate gains and administrative control in occupied Ukrainian territories and buffer zones, including recently advanced areas in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv, and any claimed advances in Kupyansk.
    • UAF Decision Point: Implement enhanced anti-corruption measures and public transparency to maintain public trust. Integrate new Western military aid (if secured) and indigenous production (e.g., from US drone agreement, UAF-Philippines maritime drone collaboration) into operational planning. Prioritize development of counter-IO strategies to address RF youth militarization, criminalization narratives, disinformation about UAF capabilities, Fico's rhetoric, and claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland. Continue efforts to harden civilian infrastructure like schools and expand mental health support for soldiers. Intensify international pressure for POW exchanges.
    • International Decision Point: NATO to reassess its Eastern Flank posture post-Zapad-2025, specifically considering Medvedev's threats. Countries with conditional troop deployment stances (e.g., Slovenia) may engage in further discussions. Western nations should publicly address RF's internal repression tactics and its dehumanizing rhetoric. Support further international collaboration on war crimes documentation. Reaffirm strong, unified stance against RF on security guarantees for Ukraine.

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Immediate & Robust Counter-Propaganda Against Dehumanization, Criminalization, and Alliance Fracture: Launch a comprehensive, international public diplomacy campaign to expose and condemn RF's militarization of youth ("SMO teachers"), dehumanization of Ukrainians ("Khokhol" rhetoric, discrediting cultural figures/journalists like Kotrikadze, Azov criminalization), the criminalization of captured Ukrainian defenders/civilians (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), and their efforts to sow discord within the Western alliance (e.g., Fico's statements, Trump/NYT disinformation, RF claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland). This campaign must highlight war crimes, violations of international law (Geneva Conventions, recruitment of medically unfit, targeting of journalists, LGBT repression), and the psychological warfare implications, targeting both international and, where possible, Russian domestic audiences. Leverage recent UAF diplomatic meetings to amplify this message, and use Zelenskyy's recent strong statements as a launchpad. (CRITICAL)
2. Enhanced Air Defense & ISR for Dnipro and Eastern/Northeastern Axes; Exploit RF Air Defense Gaps; Prioritize Counter-Artillery: Immediately prioritize additional mobile air defense systems and advanced ISR assets to protect Dnipro and critical industrial infrastructure, especially given the recent industrial fire and the renewed air threat in Dnipropetrovsk and FAB launches in Sumy. Simultaneously, bolster air defense and Counter-UAS capabilities on the eastern and northeastern axes in response to increased RF tactical aviation activity and cross-border operations, especially in light of reported RF advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts and RF claims of an assault on Kupyansk. Exploit the proven destruction of the RF Buk M1 and Buk-M2 SAM systems by targeting other RF air defense assets and re-evaluating their coverage gaps. Continue to prioritize counter-battery fire, leveraging successes like the Luhansk artillery depot strike. (CRITICAL)
3. Accelerate Counter-Special Operations, Maritime/Riverine Security, and Border Defense: Increase ISR and rapid response capabilities along the Black Sea coast and in the Dnipro Delta to counter RF naval drone threats (e.g., Lancet strikes) and protect UAF special operations (e.g., GUR operations). Invest in faster, more resilient maritime drone platforms and coastal/riverine defense systems, in anticipation of RF developing training BECs. Concurrently, reinforce border security in Chernihiv, Sumy (following claims of UAF PVD destruction), and Kharkiv Oblasts with additional personnel, ISR, and rapid response units to counter RF buffer zone efforts and interdict sabotage groups, especially in response to claims of ammunition depot destruction and FAB launches, and DeepState reports of RF advances. Leverage successful UAF drone strikes on underground positions to inform targeting of similar RF assets. (HIGH)
4. Sustain Diplomatic Pressure for DIB Funding and Security Guarantees; Expedite Drone Agreement & Maritime Drone Collaboration: Leverage recent high-level diplomatic engagements (including the EU delegation to the US for sanctions and the US drone agreement discussions, and Zelenskyy-Fico meetings, as well as the UAF-Philippines maritime drone collaboration agreement) to secure concrete commitments for long-term funding and technology transfer for Ukraine's defense industrial base, particularly for rocket and missile production, to address the stated funding gap. Push for expedited security guarantees, working to mitigate the impact of Fico's statements while highlighting his positive stance against an energy blockade, and reaffirming unified international support. The US drone agreement is a critical step and should be finalized swiftly, building on the significant drone procurement already observed in Zaporizhzhia. (HIGH)
5. Strengthen Public Trust Through Transparency, Governance, and POW Advocacy; Counter RF Claims on UA Weakness: Continue to address internal governance challenges and pursue anti-corruption efforts transparently, especially building on the successful repatriation of stolen funds. This will be crucial to maintain public confidence and national unity amidst RF's aggressive information operations. Advocate vigorously through international legal channels for the proper treatment and exchange of all Ukrainian prisoners of war, directly countering RF's efforts to criminalize them and highlighting the reported 2577 POWs and 26 newly captured RF personnel. Emphasize UAF commitment to soldier mental health and publicly acknowledge soldier resilience under fire, as well as the continued operational readiness of UAF Air Force. Counter RF claims about UAF weapon supplies (Rybar) and claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland with verifiable data and operational successes. Expand collaboration with international partners on forensic science and war crimes documentation. Publicly support and showcase local initiatives like underground schools and community defense efforts, including Dnipropetrovsk OMA efforts for frontline needs. (MEDIUM)

//END REPORT//