Situation Report

SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - 051530Z SEP 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: RF ground offensives continue to exert pressure on Velikomikhailovka and Orikhiv following claimed "liberations" of Novoselivka (Dnipropetrovsk) and Novoselovka (Zaporizhzhia). RF maintains ground pressure in the Donetsk sector, with claims of Markovo and Fedorovka "liberation" and TASS specifying an advance "towards Kramatorsk." Intense ground operations persist on the Kupyansk-Sieversk axis, with RF pushing for control of Kupyansk. RF deep strikes continue against Ukrainian energy and defense industries (Khmelnytskyi, Sumy, Lozova, Dnipro, Odesa), including a recent ballistic missile strike in Chernihiv Oblast against a humanitarian demining mission. A large industrial fire in Dnipro, cause unknown, indicates potential expanded targeting of industrial infrastructure. Air defense systems are challenged by high-volume, multi-vector drone attacks, particularly in Dnipro, Sumy, and Chernihiv Oblasts. UAF is actively defending across all axes, launching deep strikes on RF territory (Ryazan oil refinery, Anapa radar, Luhansk oil depot), and conducting successful special operations in the Black Sea and Dnipro Delta. Diplomatic activity is high, with Ukraine seeking accelerated security guarantees and RF attempting to fracture Western unity through information operations. NATO ISR activity near Kaliningrad/Belarus border indicates heightened regional vigilance. The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (DPSU) warns of potential provocations during the upcoming "Zapad-2025" exercises. Ukraine reports 2577 Ukrainian service members are in Russian captivity. UAF Air Force is actively engaged in maintaining operational readiness. Ukraine is pursuing forensic and war crimes documentation partnerships with international bodies.

• NEW DEVELOPMENTS (1500Z - 1530Z SEP 25):

  • RF Ground Engagements / Awards: Russian MoD reports servicemen of the 228th Guards Motorised Rifle Regiment of the 90th Guards Tank Division (Tsentr Group) were awarded for successful combat tasks in the Krasnoarmeysk direction. This indicates continued, and potentially successful, RF ground operations in this sector. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF IO (Political Commentary): Colonelcassad publishes a meme about Trump regretting not being in Beijing, reflecting RF's ongoing efforts to engage with Western political narratives and sow discord. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as IO)
  • UAF Naval Special Operations Success: GUR special forces have reportedly destroyed an enemy boat, a radar station, and personnel in the Black Sea. This indicates continued UAF offensive maritime capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Maritime Drone Strike: Colonelcassad claims a Lancet loitering munition destroyed a Ukrainian BEC (likely an unmanned surface vessel) in the Black Sea, with footage showing explosions. The text overlay "ДНЕПРОВСКИЙ РУБЕЖ" (Dnieper Frontier) is visible, which may indicate location or a unit designation for defense of riverine/coastal areas. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF claim, MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - as verified strike)
  • UAF Drone Strike on Underground Position: "Shadow" unit reports a successful drone strike on an RF underground position/bunker, with thermal imagery showing impact and fire. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Air Activity (FABs): Ukrainian Air Force reports launches of guided aerial bombs (FABs) by enemy tactical aviation on Sumy Oblast, indicating continued RF air-to-ground strike capabilities in the northeastern sector. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF IO (UA Weapon Supplies): Rybar publishes a graphic claiming to show "SUPPLIES OF WEAPONRY OF UKRAINIAN FORMATIONS as of September 2025," likely a propaganda effort to project UAF weakness or to justify RF actions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as IO)
  • RF Foreign Policy (Libya): Russian Defence Minister Belousov held talks with Colonel General Khaled Haftar (Libyan National Army), indicating deepening military ties with actors in Libya. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Precision Strike (Novopavlivka): STERNENKO reports UAF "Gr. Pilot" eliminated 3 RF personnel in the Novopavlivka direction at night, using thermal drone footage. This suggests effective UAF night operations and ISR-to-strike capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Rhetoric (NATO/Border): Medvedev states Russia will change its military approach to the Finnish border due to NATO expansion and claims Finland, Norway, and Poland are increasing military activity near RF territory. He also notes the need to increase border protection reliability due to Baltic states' military activity. This indicates a heightened RF perception of threat from NATO's Eastern Flank. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Slovak PM Fico's Stance on Security Guarantees: Slovak PM Fico stated Slovakia will not play a role in security guarantees for Ukraine, a setback for Ukraine's diplomatic efforts. Fico also expressed belief in a swift end to the conflict and normalization of relations with RF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Zelenskyy on Energy Retaliation: President Zelenskyy reiterates that Ukraine will respond to Russian strikes on energy facilities and will not "tolerate darkness," emphasizing continued retaliation. He also stated that Russian oil and gas have no future. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Dnipropetrovsk Shelling: Serhii Lysak / Dnipropetrovsk OMA reports Marganetska, Pokrovska, Myrivska communities, and the district center in Nikopol district, suffered from enemy attacks using drones and artillery. Photos show damaged civilian structures and vehicles. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Visibility/Night Operations: The "Gr. Pilot" thermal drone footage from Novopavlivka confirms conditions are suitable for effective night-time ISR and precision strikes. The GUR Black Sea operation, while not explicitly night footage, suggests conditions allowed for covert naval movement.
• Air Operations: Continued FAB launches in Sumy Oblast and the previous air threat warning in Dnipropetrovsk indicate conditions remain suitable for RF tactical aviation.
• Maritime Operations: The reported UAF GUR operation and RF Lancet strike in the Black Sea indicate favorable conditions for maritime and naval drone operations.
• Dnipropetrovsk: Clear skies during the day were suitable for drone and artillery attacks in Nikopol district, as evidenced by damage photos.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF:
  • Ground Forces: Continuing multi-axis offensive with focus on Krasnoarmeysk direction (awards to 228th Guards MRR), Novopavlivka (UAF counter-strikes), Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia axes (artillery/drone attacks in Nikopol district), and active cross-border operations in Chernihiv/Sumy/Kharkiv.
  • Air Assets: Sustained tactical aviation activity in the northeast (FAB launches in Sumy Oblast), continued deep strike capabilities.
  • Naval Assets: Maintaining presence in Black Sea, with capabilities for loitering munition strikes (Lancet against BEC). Actively countering UAF maritime drones.
  • Information Operations (IO): Intensified, aggressive IO including explicit nuclear threats, youth militarization propaganda ("kill Khokhols"), "liberation" narratives, criminalization of Ukrainian defenders through judicial processes, attempts to discredit Ukrainian cultural figures, reinforcement of anti-Western historical narratives, and efforts to sow disunity among Western allies (NYT article citation, Trump meme). RF is attempting to project UAF weakness by disseminating claims on weapon supplies (Rybar). RF is also actively using diplomatic channels to deepen military ties (Libya). Medvedev's statements on Finland/NATO and Baltic states indicate a hardening stance on border security and a perception of increased threat from NATO.
  • Domestic Repression: Increased judicial repression against dissent (Kursk incursion justification sentencing, actress detention) and the declaration of international organizations as "undesirable" indicate a tightening grip on the internal narrative. "Foreign agent" lists continue to be used.
• UAF:
  • Defensive Posture: Continuing active defense across all axes, responding to RF air activity, maintaining a strong defense on the ground, and conducting targeted counter-offensives (Prymorske, Donetsk MLRS strike, Buk M1 destruction, Novopavlivka). UAF Air Force maintains operational readiness and is reporting on RF air activity.
  • Special Operations: Demonstrating high capability and initiative in naval special reconnaissance and strike operations (GUR in Black Sea), special reconnaissance and evacuation operations (Naval Special Reconnaissance Forces evacuating soldiers, "Buzky Gard" in Dnipro Delta), and effective counter-intelligence (SBU "Spiderweb"). Effective drone strikes on underground positions ("Shadow" unit). Interrogation of POWs provides valuable intelligence.
  • Precision Strike Capabilities: Effective use of drones for reconnaissance and precision strikes against RF assets (Kinburn Spit, Prymorske, Donetsk Grad, Buk M1 SAM system, Novopavlivka personnel, underground bunker).
  • Strategic Resolve & Diplomacy: Leadership maintains unwavering resolve (Zelenskyy on energy retaliation) and actively engages in high-level diplomatic efforts to secure and sustain international aid (Zelenskyy meetings with Costa, Swedish FM). Slovakia's support for EU accession is a positive diplomatic development, though their withdrawal from security guarantees is a setback. Zelenskyy's statements about RF oil and gas having no future emphasize a long-term strategic vision.
  • Legal & Governance Focus: Active pursuit of war crimes documentation with international partners (Netherlands) and successful repatriation of stolen funds highlight a commitment to rule of law and good governance. Regional congress meetings underscore continued efforts to strengthen local governance and stability.
• International:
  • Diplomatic Momentum: EU and bilateral partners (Sweden, Portugal) continue to engage with Ukraine. Discussions for a US drone agreement underway. Slovakia's support for Ukraine's EU path is a positive signal, but its refusal for security guarantees for Ukraine and Fico's statement on swift conflict resolution indicates a divergence.
  • Focus on Russian Aggression: International bodies and nations continue to condemn RF actions and nuclear rhetoric. EU delegation heading to the US for sanctions work indicates sustained pressure on RF.
  • Internal EU Divisions (PERSISTING): Hungary's claim of EU countries secretly buying Russian oil highlights existing divisions within the EU. RF IO is actively attempting to amplify these divisions.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:

  • Persistent Ground Offensive & Consolidation: RF maintains the capability for sustained, multi-axis ground offensives (Krasnoarmeysk direction), localized breakthroughs, cross-border operations, and effective political-administrative integration of occupied territories. Precision artillery (Krasnopol) enhances offensive reach.
  • Long-Range Strike & Air Presence: RF retains significant capability for deep strikes against critical infrastructure (Dnipro industrial fire, FABs in Sumy) and sustains tactical aviation activity. RF also maintains capability for loitering munition strikes against maritime targets (Lancet against BEC).
  • Advanced Information & Psychological Warfare: RF continues to demonstrate a high capability for aggressive and inflammatory information operations, including explicit nuclear threats, militarization of youth ("kill Khokhols"), "liberation" narratives, criminalization of Ukrainian defenders (e.g., Krasnodar arrest, discrediting Azov members), discrediting Ukrainian cultural figures, efforts to control domestic information space, and attempts to sow disunity among Western allies. They are also adept at historical revisionism and using domestic criminal events for IO purposes. RF is attempting to project UAF weakness through weapon inventory claims.
  • Internal Control: RF is highly capable of controlling its domestic information environment, suppressing dissent, and isolating itself from undesirable international organizations. Medvedev's statements highlight a focus on reinforcing state border protection against perceived NATO threats.
  • Manpower Recruitment (Degraded Quality): While efforts to recruit "volunteers" continue, reports of recruitment of individuals with HIV/hepatitis suggest a degrading quality of available manpower, indicating potential internal pressures on overall force generation.
  • Naval Operations: RF maintains capability for naval operations in the Black Sea, and is actively employing loitering munitions to counter UAF maritime drones.
  • Foreign Military Relations: Actively engaging with other nations to deepen military ties (Libya).

• Intentions:

  • Achieve Territorial Objectives: RF intends to continue offensive operations to secure and consolidate control over claimed and newly occupied territories, especially in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts, and to establish "buffer zones" along border regions. The claimed destruction of UAF ammunition depots in Kharkiv underscores this. Krasnoarmeysk direction remains a key objective.
  • Degrade UAF Combat Effectiveness & Morale: RF aims to deplete UAF resources through attrition, disrupt logistics, and undermine public morale through strikes and propaganda, including the dehumanization of Ukrainians and the criminalization of their defenders (e.g., Azov). The targeting of industrial infrastructure (Dnipro fire) likely aligns with this intention. RF seeks to project UAF weakness (Rybar claims).
  • Deter Western Intervention & Support & Fracture Alliances: RF will continue to use escalatory rhetoric (e.g., nuclear threats, "legitimate targets" for NATO troops), IO campaigns, and border provocations to deter Western military aid and direct involvement, and to exploit perceived divisions within the international community (e.g., Hungary's claims on oil purchases, NYT article citation, Fico's statements). Medvedev's statements indicate an intention to fortify borders against NATO.
  • Maintain Domestic Control & Legitimacy: RF will continue to tightly control its internal information space, suppress dissent, and project an image of self-sufficiency and moral justification for its actions. Continued engagement with Belarus and Libya is part of this strategy.
  • Counter UAF Special Operations: RF intends to actively counter Ukrainian special operations and maritime drone activities, particularly in the Black Sea and coastal areas, and prevent cross-border incursions.
  • Reinforce Borders Against NATO: Medvedev's statements indicate a clear intention to enhance border security and adjust military posture along its borders with Finland and the Baltic states due to perceived NATO threat.

• Courses of Action (COAs):

  • MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action):

    1. Sustained Ground Pressure & Intensified Attrition on Multiple Axes with Increased Border Activity & Targeted Industrial/Energy Strikes: RF will maintain and intensify methodical ground offensives across current axes (Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Siversk, Novopavlovka - including Krasnoarmeysk direction, Kupyansk), focusing on attriting UAF forces and consolidating control. Cross-border special forces operations in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv will intensify to create "buffer zones" and destroy UAF logistics. This will be supported by continued deep strikes against critical infrastructure, with a likely expanded focus on industrial targets (e.g., the Dnipro industrial fire), energy facilities (Zelenskyy's statement), and precision artillery. FAB launches in Sumy will continue. Confidence: HIGH
    2. Escalated Hybrid Operations with Nuclear Coercion, Aggressive Dehumanization, and Legal/Information Warfare to Fracture Western Unity and Project Strength: RF will amplify highly escalatory rhetoric, including explicit nuclear threats and warnings against NATO troops ("legitimate targets"), coupled with increased cyberattacks and border provocations (especially during "Zapad-2025" and along the Finnish/Baltic borders). Information operations will intensify to militarize its youth, dehumanize Ukrainians (e.g., "kill Khokhols," Azov criminalization), and criminalize captured Ukrainian defenders through show trials, while simultaneously promoting narratives of Western disunity (e.g., NYT citation, Fico's statements) and leveraging recruitment of medically unfit personnel. RF will continue to restrict internal information flow and use domestic arrests/events as IO tools. RF will also continue efforts to project its military capabilities and UAF weakness (Rybar). Confidence: HIGH
    3. Increased Tactical Aviation and Counter-Special Operations/ISR, with Reinforced Border Defenses: RF will maintain high tactical aviation activity in the eastern and northeastern directions, focusing on ISR and strike preparations (e.g., FABs in Sumy). RF will also increase efforts to detect and neutralize UAF special operations (e.g., in Dnipro Delta, GUR Black Sea operations) and naval drone threats (e.g., Lancet strikes against BECs), as well as enhance counter-infiltration measures along border regions. In response to perceived NATO threats, RF will also implement Medvedev's stated intention to reinforce its borders with Finland and the Baltic states, potentially involving new troop deployments or upgraded surveillance systems. Confidence: MEDIUM

  • MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action):

    1. Limited Tactical Nuclear Demonstration: As previously assessed, a low-yield tactical nuclear demonstration remains a low-probability but extremely high-impact MDCOA to force negotiations on RF terms and drastically alter the geopolitical landscape, especially given the recent rhetoric and explicit threats. Confidence: LOW (but extreme impact)
    2. Coordinated Hybrid Attack against NATO Critical Infrastructure: Leveraging the "Zapad-2025" timeframe, RF orchestrates a significant, multi-domain hybrid attack (e.g., large-scale cyber-physical attack, sabotage against energy or communications infrastructure) against a NATO member state on the Eastern Flank, designed to test Article 5 and create severe disruption without direct kinetic military engagement. This is reinforced by Medvedev's rhetoric regarding perceived NATO threat. Confidence: MEDIUM
    3. Massed Air/Missile Strike on Major Urban Center with Civilian/Industrial Infrastructure as Primary Target: RF conducts a coordinated, large-scale air and missile strike utilizing multiple vectors (UAVs, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles) against a major Ukrainian urban center, specifically targeting residential areas, hospitals, or critical industrial/energy facilities (e.g., Dnipro industrial fire potentially signaling this shift, Zelenskyy's statements on energy retaliation) to maximize civilian casualties and induce panic. Confidence: MEDIUM

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

• Ukrainian force posture and readiness:
  • Resilient Defense & Adaptable Air Defense: UAF continues to demonstrate resilience in defending against RF drone and artillery attacks (Nikopol district) and responding to tactical aviation activity. The destruction of an RF Buk M1 SAM system on the Donetsk axis highlights effective UAF counter-air capabilities. SBU's "Spiderweb" operation indicates proactive efforts to disrupt RF strike capabilities. UAF Air Force is actively maintaining operational readiness and is vigilant regarding FAB launches.
  • Effective Special Operations & Precision Strike: The successful evacuation of soldiers from occupied territory, "Buzky Gard" operations in the Dnipro Delta, GUR naval special operations in the Black Sea (destroying boat/radar), and "Shadow" unit's drone strike on an underground bunker highlight high readiness and capability in special reconnaissance, rescue, amphibious, and precision strike missions, demonstrating an ability to operate effectively behind enemy lines and against hardened targets. Night-time precision strikes (Novopavlivka) show advanced capabilities. Interrogation of POWs provides valuable intelligence.
  • Unwavering Political Will & Diplomatic Proactivity: Leadership maintains a strong stance against aggression and actively engages international partners to sustain vital support and discuss long-term security. Active discussions on a US drone agreement underway. Slovakia's support for EU accession is a significant diplomatic success, though their non-participation in security guarantees is a setback. Zelenskyy's reiterated commitment to respond to energy strikes and long-term vision on RF oil/gas indicates strong resolve.
  • Training & Readiness: Ongoing training of units like the 22nd Mechanized Brigade highlights efforts to maintain combat readiness and integrate new personnel. Focus on soldier mental health (Presidential Brigade) is a positive development for long-term readiness. Individual soldier resilience (Воин DV footage) is high.
  • Commitment to Rule of Law & Governance: The Office of the Prosecutor General's partnership with the Netherlands for war crimes documentation and the successful repatriation of stolen funds demonstrate Ukraine's dedication to accountability, legal processes, and anti-corruption. Regional governance meetings reinforce efforts for internal stability.
  • Challenges in Domestic Production & Funding (PERSISTING): The previously identified $6B deficit for rockets continues to be a major constraint for scaling indigenous military production, affecting long-term self-sufficiency. President Zelenskyy's statement confirms this.
• Recent tactical successes or setbacks:
  • Successes:
    • Special Operations Evacuation: Successful evacuation of four soldiers from occupied territory by Naval Special Reconnaissance Forces. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Kinburn Spit Strikes: Successful drone strikes against enemy military assets on the Kinburn Spit. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Prymorske Infantry Destruction: Successful destruction of RF infantry in Prymorske by 33rd Separate Assault Regiment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Donetsk MLRS Strike: Successful drone strike on RF BM-21 Grad MLRS in Donetsk Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Dnipro Delta Special Operations: Successful special reconnaissance and fire engagements by "Buzky Gard" in the Dnipro Delta, including drone-guided targeting. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • RF Buk M1 SAM System Destruction: "Lazar" OSP battalion, 27th Pechenizka Brigade NGU, destroyed an RF Buk M1 (SA-11/17) SAM system on the Donetsk axis. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • SBU "Spiderweb" Operation: Disruption of RF strike capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • GUR Black Sea Operation: Destruction of enemy boat, radar station, and personnel. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • "Shadow" Unit Bunker Strike: Successful drone strike on an RF underground position/bunker. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Novopavlivka Night Strike: Elimination of 3 RF personnel by "Gr. Pilot" drone. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Diplomatic Engagements: Productive meetings with European leaders (António Costa, Swedish Foreign Minister, Slovak PM Fico) to discuss defense projects and continued support. Discussion of drone agreement with US. Slovakia's support for EU accession. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Anti-Corruption Win: Successful repatriation of funds stolen by corrupt officials. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • War Crimes Documentation: Partnership with the Netherlands for forensic science and war crimes documentation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Resilience & Adaptation: Construction of underground schools in Zaporizhzhia demonstrates proactive adaptation to ensure civilian services. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Setbacks:
    • Persistent RF Ground Pressure: RF continues localized ground offensives (Krasnoarmeysk, Novopavlivka) and cross-border regions, forcing UAF to commit significant resources to defense. RF artillery/drone strikes reported in Dnipropetrovsk region (Nikopol district). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Deep Strike Vulnerability: The major industrial fire in Dnipro, possibly due to an RF strike, and ongoing FAB launches in Sumy highlight continued vulnerability of critical infrastructure, including industrial sites and border regions, to RF deep strikes. RF claims of destroying an ammunition depot in Kharkiv indicate continued vulnerability of logistics. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • RF Information Operations Effectiveness: RF propaganda aimed at dehumanizing Ukrainians, militarizing its youth, criminalization of Ukrainian defenders (as seen in Azov criminalization), discrediting cultural figures, and historical revisionism continues to be a potent threat in the cognitive domain. RF efforts to sow disunity in the West (NYT citation, Trump meme) are also a concern. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Slovak Withdrawal from Security Guarantees: Slovak PM Fico's statement against participation in security guarantees and his belief in swift conflict resolution are diplomatic setbacks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • DIB Funding Gap: Confirmed financial shortfall for long-range weapon development. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • POW Numbers: 2577 Ukrainian service members reportedly in Russian captivity, representing a significant challenge for humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Resource requirements and constraints:
  • Air Defense Systems & Ammunition (CRITICAL): Continued RF tactical aviation activity (FABs in Sumy) and potential deep strikes (Dnipro industrial fire, Dnipropetrovsk air threat) necessitate a constant supply of interceptor missiles and advanced short-range air defense systems to protect both frontline areas and critical infrastructure. The destruction of an RF Buk M1 is positive, but air defense for UAF remains paramount.
  • Counter-Artillery Capabilities (CRITICAL): With RF maintaining ground pressure and using precision artillery (Krasnopol, Nikopol district), sustained and effective counter-battery fire is essential. This requires consistent artillery ammunition supply and advanced targeting systems, especially in areas like Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk.
  • Indigenous DIB Funding (CRITICAL): The $6B deficit for rockets remains paramount. Dedicated international funding and technological transfer for Ukraine's defense industrial base are crucial to achieve self-reliance and produce long-range missiles, which are essential for strategic depth. Expedited drone agreement with US is a positive step.
  • Counter-UAS & EW Capabilities (HIGH): The proliferation of RF drones, tactical aviation activity, and loitering munitions (Lancets) requires enhanced Counter-UAS systems and Electronic Warfare capabilities to protect ground forces, maritime assets, and critical infrastructure, especially in the context of RF border operations.
  • Maritime ISR & Strike (HIGH): Given continued RF naval operations and loitering munition threats against BECs, enhanced maritime ISR and precision strike capabilities are needed to protect coastal/riverine areas and support UAF GUR operations.
  • Border Security Resources (MEDIUM): RF cross-border operations in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv regions necessitate increased resources for border security, ISR, and rapid response units to prevent buffer zone creation and interdict sabotage groups. FAB launches in Sumy reinforce this need.
  • Mental Health Support (MEDIUM): Acknowledged combat stress and individual soldier accounts (Воин DV) indicate a need for continued and expanded mental health services for UAF personnel.
  • POW Advocacy & Support (MEDIUM): The high number of Ukrainian POWs requires sustained international advocacy for their humane treatment and mechanisms for exchange, while also supporting their families.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive domain)

• Propaganda and disinformation campaigns:
  • RF Objectives:
    • Dehumanization & Youth Militarization: The explicit propaganda showcasing RF youth training to "kill Khokhols," the criminalization of Ukrainian "saboteurs" through show trials (Bryansk, Krasnodar), criminalization of Azov members, and the discrediting of Ukrainian cultural figures (Alex Parker Returns) directly aim to instill hatred, legitimize aggression, and delegitimize Ukrainian forces among the next generation and wider RF populace.
    • Psychological Deterrence (Nuclear & NATO): General Gurulyov's explicit nuclear threat, the President's warning about NATO troops being "legitimate targets," and Medvedev's statements on NATO borders continue to be high-impact psychological operations aimed at terrifying the Ukrainian population and deterring Western support.
    • Demoralization & Division (Mobilization/Conflict Resolution): The "Mogilizatsiya" narrative persists. Fico's statement on swift conflict resolution could be exploited by RF to suggest that international support for a prolonged conflict is waning. Claims about UAF weapon supplies (Rybar) aim to project UAF weakness and demoralize. Reports of recruiting medically unfit individuals could also be used to normalize poor conditions or a "total war" mentality domestically.
    • Legitimizing Occupation & Domestic Control: Kirienko's visits to "liberated territories" and the internal "whitelist" saga for internet services, signal RF's determined efforts to legitimize its control and tightly manage its domestic information space. Declaration of "undesirable" international organizations and the "foreign agents" list reinforce this isolationist policy. The Krasnodar "terrorist" arrest and actress detention are framed to justify internal security measures. Domestic news (Moscow forum, Nevada murder, musical premiere) serves to normalize the information space and distract from the war.
    • Projecting Strength/Self-Sufficiency & Anti-Westernism: Promotion of the "import-substituted" SJ-100 aircraft and deployment of Chechen "volunteers" aims to demonstrate RF industrial resilience and sustained manpower despite sanctions. Primakov's historical revisionism on Japan's surrender reinforces anti-Western narratives. Continued engagement with Belarus (Bryansk-Gomel forum) and Libya projects regional stability and expands influence. RF actively attempts to portray Western disunity (NYT citation, Trump meme) and justify its aggressive posture along NATO borders.
  • UAF Counter-Narratives:
    • Resolve & Resilience: Statements from President Zelenskyy (on energy retaliation) and SBU Head Maliuk, alongside continued diplomatic engagement, actively counter RF's demoralization efforts by demonstrating unwavering determination and commitment to victory. Footage of resilient UAF soldiers (Воин DV, Air Force readiness), and successful operations (GUR Black Sea, Shadow unit, Novopavlivka) reinforces this.
    • Highlighting Operational Successes: Reports of successful special operations evacuations, precision strikes (Kinburn Spit, Prymorske, Donetsk Grad, Dnipro Delta, Buk M1 destruction, Novopavlivka), and effective SBU counter-intelligence (Spiderweb) reinforce UAF's effectiveness and resilience.
    • Highlighting International Support: Zelenskyy's meetings with international leaders (Costa, Swedish FM) directly counter RF's attempts to fracture unity and demonstrate continued solidarity. Slovakia's support for EU accession is a key success, despite Fico's other statements. EU delegation to the US for sanctions work further supports this. Discussions for a US drone agreement are a positive signal.
    • Transparency, Governance & Accountability: Efforts by regional administrations (Zaporizhzhia OMA, Dnipropetrovsk OMA) to address civilian needs (underground schools, regional congresses, reporting on Nikopol district shelling), ensure continuity of services, and combat corruption (repatriation of funds) contribute to public trust and stability. UAF's open training footage and focus on soldier mental health also projects readiness and care. UAF foreign policy on peacekeeping clarifies its sovereign stance. The OPG's partnership with the Netherlands for war crimes documentation reinforces commitment to justice.
    • Humanitarian Concerns: Reporting on the number of Ukrainian POWs highlights humanitarian concerns and RF's violations of international law.
• Public sentiment and morale factors:
  • Ukrainian Public (RESILIENT, but STRESSED & VIGILANT): UAF's operational successes (GUR Black Sea, Shadow unit, Novopavlivka) and leadership's firm stance (Zelenskyy on energy retaliation) bolster morale. However, the explicit nuclear threats, persistent RF ground pressure, deep strikes (Dnipro fire, FABs in Sumy, Nikopol district shelling), the criminalization/dehumanization of Ukrainian defenders, and the high number of POWs create significant stress and uncertainty. The dehumanizing rhetoric against "Khokhols" and Azov will undoubtedly fuel outrage and resolve, but also adds to the psychological burden. Continued proactive measures for civilian protection (underground schools), soldier welfare (combat stress awareness), and strong governance (anti-corruption, regional congresses) help mitigate fear and reinforce trust.
  • Russian Public (MANAGED & INDOCTRINATED): RF's tight control over the internet and information flow, coupled with aggressive propaganda (including youth militarization, glorification of Krasnoarmeysk "liberators," "volunteer" deployments, anti-Western historical narratives, and "terrorist" arrests), likely maintains a managed level of support. The judicial repression against dissent further discourages alternative viewpoints. The narrative of "liberated territories," DIB self-sufficiency (SJ-100), and successful operations (Lancet strike) aims to reinforce a sense of achievement and justification for the war. Domestic news about local issues helps to fill the information space with non-military content. Medvedev's rhetoric on NATO borders aims to rally nationalist support.
• International support and diplomatic developments:
  • Sustained Diplomatic Engagement: High-level meetings and continued discussions on security guarantees and military aid (EU delegation to US for sanctions, US drone agreement discussions) underscore persistent international political will to support Ukraine.
  • Challenges of Unity/Conditionality (INCREASED): While new EU sanctions are positive, the nuances of international military support (e.g., Slovenia's conditional troop deployment) suggest potential for RF exploitation of divisions. Hungary's stance on EU accession talks for Ukraine and its claims of "secret oil purchases" remain a point of contention and potential RF leverage. Fico's statements about not participating in security guarantees and his belief in a swift end to the conflict align with RF narratives and highlight existing divisions within the EU/NATO. RF IO is actively trying to amplify these divisions.
  • Increased Vigilance on Eastern Flank (PERSISTING): "Zapad-2025" and past drone violations keep NATO's Eastern Flank on high alert for RF provocations. Medvedev's statements on Finland/Baltic borders indicate RF perceives increased NATO activity and is reacting.
  • Renewed Focus on Hybrid Threats & Accountability: The EU's work on sanctions and discussions around border security indicate an international focus on countering RF's multi-domain hybrid aggression. The dehumanizing rhetoric (youth training) and criminalization of POWs will likely further solidify international condemnation. Ukraine's clear stance on peacekeeping contingents provides clarity for international partners. The OPG-Netherlands partnership signifies international commitment to legal accountability for war crimes.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

• Most likely enemy courses of action (MLCOA):

  1. Sustained, Attritional Ground Offensives with Emphasis on New Axes, Consolidation, and Buffer Zone Creation, Coupled with Expanded Industrial/Energy Strikes: RF will continue methodical, attritional ground assaults in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts (including Nikopol district), alongside persistent pressure on Siversk, Novopavlovka (Krasnoarmeysk direction), and Kupyansk. Active cross-border special forces operations in Chernihiv, Sumy (FAB launches), and Kharkiv will intensify to create "buffer zones" and destroy UAF logistics. The objective remains to wear down UAF defenses, consolidate control, and integrate newly seized territories. Deep strikes against critical infrastructure, including an expanded focus on industrial targets (as potentially indicated by the Dnipro fire) and energy facilities (Zelenskyy's statement), will continue, using various means including FABs and precision artillery. Confidence: HIGH
  2. Intensified Hybrid Warfare with Deepening Nuclear Coercion, Aggressive Dehumanization, and Legal/Information Warfare to Fracture Western Unity and Project Strength: RF will amplify highly escalatory rhetoric (including nuclear threats, "legitimate targets" for NATO troops), coupled with increased cyberattacks and border provocations against Ukraine and NATO's Eastern Flank during "Zapad-2025" and along the Finnish/Baltic borders, as indicated by Medvedev's statements. Propaganda will intensify to dehumanize Ukrainians ("kill Khokhols," Azov criminalization, discrediting cultural figures), militarize RF youth, and criminalize Ukrainian defenders through show trials, while simultaneously promoting narratives of Western disunity (e.g., NYT citation, Fico's statements on security guarantees/conflict resolution) and leveraging recruitment of medically unfit personnel. RF will also continue efforts to control its domestic information space and isolate from perceived external threats, using historical revisionism, domestic issues, and claims of UAF weakness (Rybar) as ideological tools. Confidence: HIGH
  3. Increased Tactical Aviation Activity and Enhanced Counter-Special Operations/ISR, with Reinforced Border Defenses: RF will maintain high tactical aviation ISR and strike operations, particularly in the eastern and northeastern sectors (e.g., Dnipropetrovsk air threat, FABs in Sumy). RF will also focus on detecting and neutralizing UAF special operations (e.g., in Dnipro Delta, GUR Black Sea operations) and maritime drone activities (e.g., Lancet strikes against BECs) in the Black Sea and coastal areas, as well as enhance counter-infiltration measures along border regions. In response to perceived NATO threats, RF will implement Medvedev's stated intention to reinforce its borders with Finland and the Baltic states, potentially involving new troop deployments or upgraded surveillance systems, as part of "Zapad-2025" preparations. Confidence: MEDIUM

• Most dangerous enemy courses of action (MDCOA):

  1. Tactical Nuclear Demonstration: Given recent explicit rhetoric, a low-yield tactical nuclear demonstration (either a test or a strike in an unpopulated area of Ukraine) remains a low-probability, but extremely high-impact, MDCOA to fundamentally alter the conflict. Confidence: LOW (but extreme impact)
  2. Coordinated Hybrid Attack against NATO Critical Infrastructure: Leveraging the "Zapad-2025" timeframe and Medvedev's rhetoric regarding perceived NATO threat, RF orchestrates a significant, multi-domain hybrid attack (e.g., large-scale cyber-physical attack, sabotage against energy or communications infrastructure) against a NATO member state on the Eastern Flank, designed to test Article 5 and create severe disruption without direct kinetic military engagement. Confidence: MEDIUM
  3. Massed Air/Missile Strike on Major Urban Center with Civilian/Industrial Infrastructure as Primary Target: RF conducts a coordinated, large-scale air and missile strike utilizing multiple vectors (UAVs, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles) against a major Ukrainian urban center, specifically targeting residential areas, hospitals, or critical industrial/energy facilities (e.g., Dnipro industrial fire potentially signaling this shift, Zelenskyy's statements on energy retaliation) to maximize civilian casualties and induce panic. Confidence: MEDIUM

• Timeline estimates and decision points:

  • Immediate (0-24 hours):
    • RF Decision Point: Assess the impact of dehumanizing propaganda, tactical aviation activity (FABs in Sumy), and precision artillery/drone strikes (Nikopol district). Evaluate UAF responses to ground offensives on new axes, especially cross-border incursions. Continue to utilize domestic arrests and "foreign agent" designations for IO purposes. Monitor Western reactions to "legitimate targets" rhetoric for NATO troops and Fico's statements. Execute Lancet strikes against UAF maritime drones.
    • UAF Decision Point: Publicly condemn RF youth militarization propaganda, criminalization of POWs/civilians, and Medvedev's escalatory rhetoric. Expedite BDA for Dnipro industrial fire and allocate air defense assets accordingly, especially in Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy. Reinforce defenses on new RF offensive axes (Krasnoarmeysk, Novopavlivka) and against cross-border incursions. Maintain high alert for tactical aviation in the east/northeast. Continue special operations in Dnipro Delta and Black Sea. Exploit success of Buk M1 destruction by further targeting RF air defense gaps. Publicly address Fico's statements and emphasize Ukraine's long-term energy strategy.
    • International Decision Point: NATO and EU states to issue strong, unified condemnations of RF's dehumanizing rhetoric, nuclear threats, "legitimate target" warnings for NATO troops, and Medvedev's aggressive border rhetoric. Address Fico's statements regarding security guarantees. Advance discussions on US drone agreement.
  • Short-Term (24-72 hours):
    • RF Decision Point: Evaluate Western response to dehumanization, nuclear threats, and "legitimate target" rhetoric; tailor further IO accordingly. Continue "Zapad-2025" preparations with potential for increased border incidents with Belarus, Finland, and Baltic states. Reinforce air defense networks after Buk M1 loss. Assess the effectiveness of recruitment of medically unfit personnel. Continue to deepen foreign military relations (Libya).
    • UAF Decision Point: Actively counter RF dehumanization narratives with transparent communication on war crimes and international law, as well as the Geneva Conventions regarding POWs (especially given the 2577 reported POWs). Intensify diplomatic efforts for DIB funding and air defense. Continue to highlight operational successes and soldier resilience. Publicize war crimes documentation efforts with international partners. Develop specific counter-IO strategies to address Fico's statements and RF claims of UAF weapon weakness.
    • International Decision Point: EU to make progress on the new sanctions package, addressing any divisions (e.g., Hungary's claims) and countering RF IO regarding Western disunity and Fico's statements. Member states to coordinate responses to potential Zapad-2025 provocations, especially along the Eastern Flank. International bodies to condemn RF's recruitment practices (medically unfit).
  • Mid-Term (1-2 weeks):
    • RF Decision Point: Execute "Zapad-2025" exercises, potentially incorporating more aggressive hybrid scenarios and testing of NATO border responses along the Finnish and Baltic borders. Consolidate gains and administrative control in occupied Ukrainian territories and buffer zones.
    • UAF Decision Point: Implement enhanced anti-corruption measures and public transparency to maintain public trust. Integrate new Western military aid (if secured) and indigenous production (e.g., from US drone agreement) into operational planning. Prioritize development of counter-IO strategies to address RF youth militarization, criminalization narratives, disinformation about UAF capabilities, and Fico's rhetoric. Continue efforts to harden civilian infrastructure like schools and expand mental health support for soldiers. Intensify international pressure for POW exchanges.
    • International Decision Point: NATO to reassess its Eastern Flank posture post-Zapad-2025, specifically considering Medvedev's threats. Countries with conditional troop deployment stances (e.g., Slovenia) may engage in further discussions. Western nations should publicly address RF's internal repression tactics and its dehumanizing rhetoric. Support further international collaboration on war crimes documentation. Reaffirm strong, unified stance against RF on security guarantees for Ukraine.

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Immediate & Robust Counter-Propaganda Against Dehumanization, Criminalization, and Alliance Fracture: Launch a comprehensive, international public diplomacy campaign to expose and condemn RF's militarization of youth, dehumanization of Ukrainians ("Khokhol" rhetoric, discrediting cultural figures, Azov criminalization), the criminalization of captured Ukrainian defenders/civilians, and their efforts to sow discord within the Western alliance (e.g., Fico's statements, Trump meme). This campaign must highlight war crimes, violations of international law (Geneva Conventions, recruitment of medically unfit), and the psychological warfare implications, targeting both international and, where possible, Russian domestic audiences. Leverage recent UAF diplomatic meetings to amplify this message. (CRITICAL)
2. Enhanced Air Defense & ISR for Dnipro and Eastern/Northeastern Axes; Exploit RF Air Defense Gaps: Immediately prioritize additional mobile air defense systems and advanced ISR assets to protect Dnipro and critical industrial infrastructure, especially given the recent industrial fire and the renewed air threat in Dnipropetrovsk and FAB launches in Sumy. Simultaneously, bolster air defense and Counter-UAS capabilities on the eastern and northeastern axes in response to increased RF tactical aviation activity and cross-border operations. Exploit the proven destruction of the RF Buk M1 SAM system by targeting other RF air defense assets and re-evaluating their coverage gaps. (CRITICAL)
3. Accelerate Counter-Special Operations, Maritime/Riverine Security, and Border Defense: Increase ISR and rapid response capabilities along the Black Sea coast and in the Dnipro Delta to counter RF naval drone threats (e.g., Lancet strikes) and protect UAF special operations (e.g., GUR operations). Invest in faster, more resilient maritime drone platforms and coastal/riverine defense systems. Concurrently, reinforce border security in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv Oblasts with additional personnel, ISR, and rapid response units to counter RF buffer zone efforts and interdict sabotage groups, especially in response to claims of ammunition depot destruction and FAB launches. Leverage successful UAF drone strikes on underground positions to inform targeting of similar RF assets. (HIGH)
4. Sustain Diplomatic Pressure for DIB Funding and Security Guarantees; Expedite Drone Agreement: Leverage recent high-level diplomatic engagements (including the EU delegation to the US for sanctions and the US drone agreement discussions, and Slovakia's support for EU accession) to secure concrete commitments for long-term funding and technology transfer for Ukraine's defense industrial base, particularly for rocket and missile production, to address the stated funding gap. Push for expedited security guarantees, working to mitigate the impact of Fico's statements and reaffirming unified international support. The US drone agreement is a critical step and should be finalized swiftly. (HIGH)
5. Strengthen Public Trust Through Transparency, Governance, and POW Advocacy; Counter RF Claims on UA Weakness: Continue to address internal governance challenges and pursue anti-corruption efforts transparently, especially building on the successful repatriation of stolen funds. This will be crucial to maintain public confidence and national unity amidst RF's aggressive information operations. Advocate vigorously through international legal channels for the proper treatment and exchange of all Ukrainian prisoners of war, directly countering RF's efforts to criminalize them and highlighting the reported 2577 POWs. Emphasize UAF commitment to soldier mental health and publicly acknowledge soldier resilience under fire, as well as the continued operational readiness of UAF Air Force. Counter RF claims about UAF weapon supplies (Rybar) with verifiable data and operational successes. Expand collaboration with international partners on forensic science and war crimes documentation. (MEDIUM)

//END REPORT//