Situation Report

SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - 051030Z SEP 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: The RF ground offensive in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts continues to be a primary concern, with RF forces reinforcing pressure on Velikomikhailovka and Orikhiv following claimed "liberations" of Novoselivka (Dnipropetrovsk) and Novoselovka (Zaporizhzhia). RF has also claimed the liberation of Markovo and Fedorovka in DNR, indicating continued ground pressure in the Donetsk sector. Intense ground operations persist on the Kupyansk-Sieversk axis, with RF pushing for control of Kupyansk. RF deep strikes continue to target Ukrainian energy and defense industries (Khmelnytskyi, Sumy, Lozova, Dnipro, Odesa), leading to civilian casualties and significant infrastructure damage. A ballistic missile strike in Chernihiv Oblast against a humanitarian demining mission has been confirmed. Air defense remains challenged by high-volume, multi-vector drone attacks, particularly in Dnipro, Sumy, and Chernihiv Oblasts. UAF is actively defending across all axes, launching deep strikes on RF territory (Ryazan oil refinery, Anapa radar, Luhansk oil depot), and conducting successful special operations in the Black Sea. Diplomatic activity remains high, with Ukraine seeking accelerated security guarantees and RF attempting to fracture Western unity through information operations. NATO ISR activity near Kaliningrad/Belarus border indicates heightened regional vigilance.

• NEW DEVELOPMENTS (1000Z - 1030Z SEP 25):

  • UAF Diplomatic Engagement: Zelenskyy held a meeting in Uzhhorod with European Council President António Costa, following joint participation in the "Coalition of the Willing" in Paris and a call with President Trump. This emphasizes continued high-level UAF diplomatic efforts to secure support and advance peace initiatives. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF IO / Western Weakness: TASS and Operatsiya Z (Русской Весны) amplify statements by Merz (likely German politician Friedrich Merz) acknowledging Europe's inability to play its desired role in global affairs. This is RF IO aimed at projecting Western decline and disunity. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF IO / Trump's Geopolitical Assessment: RBC-Ukraine, TASS, and Оперативний ЗСУ all report on Donald Trump's statement lamenting the "loss" of India and Russia to China, implying the formation of a powerful anti-Western alliance due to his aggressive trade policies. This is a significant piece of RF IO, amplified by UAF sources, to highlight perceived Western geopolitical failures. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Internal Security (Voronezh): Colonelcassad reports the FSB and Rosgvardia detained a Russian citizen in Voronezh suspected of treason for transferring cryptocurrency to UAF GUR. This reinforces RF's active counter-intelligence capabilities against internal financial support for Ukraine. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Internal Affairs (Veterans Support): TASS reports the "Defenders of the Fatherland" fund resolved 96% of nearly 2 million appeals from veterans of combat operations over two years. This is RF IO aimed at projecting strong support for its military personnel and veterans, boosting morale. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Air Threat (Sumy): UAF Air Force reports a UAV is heading towards Sumy. This indicates an immediate and active RF drone threat to a city already impacted by recent strikes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Ground Operations (Donetsk Sector): TASS reports RF Armed Forces, after liberating Markovo in DNR, have intensified the encirclement and pressure on Ukrainian forces around Kostiantynivka. This indicates continued RF ground advances and consolidation efforts in the Donetsk direction. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Internal Affairs (Finland Deportations): Север.Реалии reports 104 Russian citizens who were denied asylum were deported from Finland between January and September. This is relevant to RF internal affairs and relations with a NATO border state, though not directly military. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Internal Affairs (Railway Sabotage Detention): ASTRA reports a minor was detained on suspicion of arson of railway infrastructure. This highlights RF's ongoing internal security challenges related to infrastructure sabotage, potentially linked to pro-Ukrainian sentiment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Internal Affairs (Internet Restrictions): Новости Москвы reports the Ministry of Digital Development named online services accessible to Russians during mobile internet restrictions. This indicates RF's capability and intent to impose internet controls, potentially during times of crisis or for information control. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Deep Strike Summary (MoD Russia): MoD Russia released a photo message summarizing the progress of the "special military operation" from August 30 to September 5, 2025. This is an official RF IO piece, likely intended to showcase perceived successes over the past week. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Morale / IO (Kyiv): KMVA reports the "Alley of Defenders of Ukraine" was established in central Kyiv, showcasing a "new practice of culture of gratitude" to soldiers. This is UAF IO aimed at boosting morale, honoring military personnel, and reinforcing national identity during wartime. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Milblogger Narrative / Soldier Life: Два майора posts a series of photos under the rubric "Soldier's Daily Life," depicting various mundane and combat-related scenes of RF soldiers. This is RF IO designed to humanize its soldiers, boost morale, and show resilience. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Diplomatic Setback (Hungary): ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS reports Zelenskyy stating in Uzhhorod that Hungary is delaying Ukraine's entry into the EU. This indicates a diplomatic obstacle for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Internal Affairs (Actress Drug Case Update): TASS reports the investigation is requesting house arrest for actress Aglaya Tarasova, and she faces up to 7 years in prison. This is an internal RF news item, not military relevant but for context of normalcy. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Airspace Clear (Zaporizhzhia): Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration reports the air raid alert has been lifted. This indicates a temporary cessation of RF aerial threat to the region. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF IO (Putin's Speech Analysis): Старше Эдды provides analysis of Putin's speech at the EEF, highlighting its focus on international politics, economy, and the "SMO," indicating its importance for RF messaging. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Internal Affairs (Water Infrastructure - Donbas): Mash на Донбассе posts a video showing the Monakhovsky quarry, which supplies water to the Khanzhenkovo reservoir. This is an internal RF report relevant to infrastructure management in occupied territories. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Ground Operations / IO (Janus Putkonen): Janus Putkonen posts a video of soldiers advancing across a field, with explosions and smoke, implying active combat. The caption "Let's go over this swamp so it shakes" (from "Unknown Soldier") is a reference to Finnish military literature, likely used as RF-aligned IO to invoke a sense of determined, perhaps desperate, advance, or to celebrate past military resilience. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• RF Drone Threat (Sumy): A UAV is inbound towards Sumy, indicating localized air quality degradation from potential explosions and debris. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF Internal Incident (Railway Infrastructure Sabotage): The alleged arson of railway infrastructure by a minor in RF highlights localized environmental damage and disruption to transportation networks, even if not combat-related. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Donbas Water Infrastructure (RF occupied): The video of the Monakhovsky quarry supplying water to the Khanzhenkovo reservoir highlights the critical nature of water infrastructure in the Donbas, where access remains a key humanitarian and environmental concern. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF:
  • Air Assets: UAV activity confirmed targeting Sumy. Continued high-volume drone and missile attacks (157 UAVs, 7 missiles overnight). КАБ launches on Donetsk Oblast. Tactical aviation active in eastern and north-eastern directions.
  • Ground Forces: Concentrated in the Kupyansk-Sieversk axis, with confirmed infiltration in Kupyansk. New offensive axis westward into Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, claiming Novoselivka and Novoselovka. Intensified encirclement and pressure on Kostiantynivka (DNR) following claimed liberation of Markovo. Claims of liberating Fedorovka (DNR). Anti-thermal imaging cloaks observed for infiltration tactics. Heavy equipment and small infantry groups used in Zaporizhzhia direction assaults. RF "Vostok" Group of Forces prominently mentioned in claimed gains. "Dnepr" Group of Forces actively using reactive artillery in Orikhiv direction. Deployment of new 2S43 "Hyacinth-K" self-propelled artillery system. Combined arms operations with ISR and precision strikes.
  • Internal Security: FSB and Rosgvardia detained a Russian citizen in Voronezh for allegedly transferring cryptocurrency to UAF GUR. Detention of a minor for alleged railway infrastructure arson. Active counter-sabotage efforts in Tokmak.
  • Control Measures: Temporary flight restrictions have been lifted in Penza and Kaluga Oblasts. Air alert regime in Lipetsk Oblast (red level for multiple districts) was lifted. RF control over unofficial information in Belgorod. RF Ministry of Digital Development named online services accessible during mobile internet restrictions.
• UAF:
  • Defensive Posture: Maintaining defensive lines across multiple sectors, repelling numerous RF attacks (Southern-Sloboda (8), Kupyansk (8), Lyman (18), Bakhmut (19), Avdiivka (27), Novopavlivka (18), Orikhiv (15), Kherson (7)). Active defense in Kupyansk, denying full RF control.
  • Air Defense: Actively engaging incoming RF UAVs (successful neutralization of 15 of 20 UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk). Air raid alerts issued for Sumy. Air raid alert for Zaporizhzhia has been lifted.
  • Deep Strike Capability: Successful strikes on Ryazan oil refinery, Anapa radar, Luhansk oil depot.
  • Special Operations: GUR conducted a successful Black Sea operation destroying an RF boat and RLS. Special forces active in Sumy Oblast.
  • Diplomatic Engagement: Zelenskyy meeting with European Council President António Costa in Uzhhorod. Discussing security guarantees with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte.
  • Domestic Development: Brave1 cluster launching grant competitions for tactical ballistic missiles and anti-UAV air defense systems.
  • Internal Security: SBU detained a former top tax official in Kyiv for a 1.5 billion hryvnia conversion center. Prevention of a school attack in Zakarpattia. Combatting mobilization evasion.
  • Morale/IO: "Alley of Defenders of Ukraine" established in Kyiv. POW interrogation videos. Continuous reporting of RF losses.
• Control Measures:
  • UAF Air Raid Alert (Sumy): A UAV alert has been issued for Sumy. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Airspace Clear (Zaporizhzhia): The air raid alert for Zaporizhzhia has been lifted. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:

  • Sustained Ground Offensive: RF demonstrates the capability to open new offensive axes and achieve localized gains (Novoselivka, Novoselovka, Markovo, Fedorovka). It can concentrate forces for urban warfare (Kupyansk) and apply sustained pressure across multiple sectors. The deployment of new heavy artillery (Hyacinth-K) and combined arms tactics (ISR/precision strikes) enhances this capability. RF is adapting ground infiltration tactics (anti-thermal cloaks).
  • Adaptive Multi-Domain Strikes: RF maintains the capability for high-volume, multi-vector drone and missile attacks, targeting critical infrastructure (energy, rail, defense industry) and population centers. It can rapidly adapt targeting (UAV launch points, humanitarian missions) and conducts precision strikes with LMUR and Lancet drones. RF possesses active and widespread air defense for its own territory.
  • Robust Information Warfare: RF exhibits a strong capability to conduct complex IO, including disinformation, propaganda, and narrative control, across multiple platforms and target audiences (Western, internal RF, occupied territories). It can rapidly amplify narratives (Trump's statements) and create new, aggressive ones (Ukraine using children for sabotage).
  • Internal Security & Mobilization: RF can actively counter internal dissent, sabotage attempts, and financial support for Ukraine through its security services. It also has the capability to mobilize public support for military personnel through welfare funds and IO.

• Intentions:

  • Strategic Objective: Degrade Ukrainian Warfighting Capacity & Break Resilience: RF intends to systematically erode Ukraine's ability to wage war, disrupt economic life, and sow public discontent through ground advances and deep strikes on critical infrastructure, including energy and logistics. The expansion of ground operations into Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia, and the continued push in Donetsk, is intended to seize more territory and destroy UAF forces.
  • Neutralize UAF Asymmetric Advantages: RF intends to specifically target UAF drone capabilities (C2 nodes, launch points) and EW-resistant systems.
  • Fracture Western Unity: RF aims to intensify IO to exploit and exacerbate perceived divisions within the Western alliance, particularly regarding military aid and sanctions, leveraging statements from key Western figures to undermine support for Ukraine.
  • Project Strength & Legitimacy: RF intends to project an image of military strength, economic resilience, and global influence, especially to non-Western nations, while consolidating control and promoting development in occupied Ukrainian territories.
  • Deter External Intervention: Putin's explicit statement that foreign troops in Ukraine are legitimate targets is a clear intent to deter direct military intervention by Western nations.

• Courses of Action (COAs):

  • MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action):
    1. Sustained Ground Offensive with Prioritized Axes: RF will focus on consolidating and expanding its claimed gains in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Donetsk Oblasts, particularly around Kostiantynivka, Orikhiv, and Velikomikhailovka. Intense pressure will be maintained on Kupyansk. This will involve continued small-unit assaults, heavy artillery fire (including Hyacinth-K), and aggressive reconnaissance. Confidence: HIGH
    2. Adaptive & High-Volume Multi-Domain Strikes: RF will continue sustained, multi-vector drone (Shahed, Lancet, FPV) and missile (ballistic, КАБ) attacks. Primary targets will remain Ukrainian energy infrastructure (Dnipro, Lozova, Sumy), defense industry, and logistics. Expect continued opportunistic strikes on population centers and a persistent threat of aviation weapon use in Donetsk Oblast. RF will enhance its internal air defense capabilities following UAF deep strikes. Confidence: HIGH
    3. Aggressive Information Warfare & Diplomatic Realignment: RF will intensify IO to portray Western weakness and disunity (amplifying Trump's geopolitical assessments, Europe's perceived decline, and Western internal debates). RF will continue to demonize Ukraine (e.g., "children for sabotage") and justify its own actions (e.g., reframing Chernihiv strike). Diplomatic outreach to non-Western nations (BRICS, China, India, DPRK) will continue to build an anti-Western bloc. Confidence: HIGH

• Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

  1. Direct Hybrid Attack on NATO Member (Baltics/Poland): RF initiates a multi-vector hybrid attack against a frontline NATO state, potentially triggered by perceived Western escalation (e.g., European troop deployment, major UAF deep strike). This would involve large-scale cyberattacks, kinetic strikes on military/C2 targets, provocative airspace violations, and overt sabotage by special forces, accompanied by an IO campaign blaming NATO for escalation. Confidence: MEDIUM
  2. Tactical Nuclear Demonstration/Attack with Pre-emptive Escalation against Ukraine: Faced with significant battlefield losses or the collapse of a key front, RF conducts a limited tactical nuclear demonstration or strike within Ukraine, preceded by an intense global IO campaign, to coerce a ceasefire and negotiations on RF terms. Confidence: LOW

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

• Ukrainian force posture and readiness:

  • Defensive Resilience: UAF maintains a strong defensive posture, repelling numerous RF attacks across all major fronts, demonstrating high readiness and morale despite intense pressure. Commanders are actively engaging at the front lines.
  • Adaptive Capabilities: UAF is rapidly developing and deploying innovative solutions, including EW-resistant FPV drones, ground robotic complexes, and domestic ballistic missiles/air defense systems. Naval special operations are being enhanced.
  • Deep Strike Effectiveness: UAF continues to demonstrate effective deep strike capabilities against high-value RF targets in occupied territories and within RF itself (Ryazan oil refinery, Anapa radar, Luhansk oil depot, Black Sea operations).
  • Air Defense Strain: UAF air defense is highly active and effective against high-volume drone attacks, but remains under severe strain, with some penetrations resulting in infrastructure damage and civilian casualties. Urgent need for additional and advanced air defense assets.
  • Internal Security & Accountability: UAF is actively combating corruption and internal security threats (RF agents, mobilization evasion, internal financial schemes), demonstrating a commitment to rule of law.
  • Diplomatic Engagement: Zelenskyy's continuous high-level diplomatic engagements (European Council, NATO, US, Italy) aim to secure sustained military, financial, and political support, and advocate for pre-end-of-hostilities security guarantees.

• Recent tactical successes or setbacks:

  • Successes:
    • Deep Strikes: Successful strikes on Ryazan oil refinery, Anapa radar station (Kasta-2E2), Luhansk oil depot, and GUR operation in the Black Sea destroying an RF boat and RLS. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Air Defense: High interception rates against massive RF drone attacks (84/112 drones, 15/20 in Dnipropetrovsk, all 14 Shaheds over Odesa). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Ground Defense: Repelling a high number of RF attacks across all key sectors (Avdiivka, Bakhmut, Lyman, Kupyansk). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Counter-Armor/Artillery: Destruction of RF tanks, BMPs, artillery, and ground robotic complexes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Special Operations/Tactical Skill: Successful small unit engagements, POW interrogations, and naval special operations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Counter-Intelligence/Corruption: Significant arrests of RF agents and high-level corruption schemes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Setbacks:
    • New RF Ground Offensive: RF claimed "liberation" of Novoselivka (Dnipropetrovsk), Novoselovka (Zaporizhzhia), Markovo, and Fedorovka (DNR), opening new axes of advance and placing UAF under increased pressure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Critical Infrastructure Damage: Power outages in Sumy and Lozova, warehouse fire in Odesa, ongoing explosions and damage to homes in Dnipro, and dam damage in Lozova. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Civilian Casualties: Confirmed fatalities and injuries from RF strikes on Chernihiv (humanitarian mission), Kostiantynivka (hospital), Nikopol region, Zaporizhzhia, Orikhiv, Druzhkivka, Kozacha Lopan, and a farmer in Kherson. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Equipment Losses: Destruction of a Leopard 2 tank, PzH 2000 howitzer, and DPSU vehicle in Sumy (RF claims and UAF reports). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Diplomatic Obstacle: Hungary delaying Ukraine's EU entry. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Resource requirements and constraints:

  • Air Defense (CRITICAL): Constant high-volume RF drone and missile attacks (157 drones, 7 missiles overnight) necessitate urgent and expanded supply of modern IAMD systems, counter-UAS technology, and EW-resistant FPV drones.
  • Artillery Ammunition & Armor (HIGH): High intensity of ground combat on multiple fronts and equipment losses require sustained and increased resupply of artillery ammunition, replacement of armored vehicles, and enhanced anti-armor capabilities.
  • Manpower (MEDIUM): Sustained casualties and new offensive axes place demands on manpower, requiring effective mobilization, training, and retention efforts.
  • ISR (HIGH): Urgent need for comprehensive ISR to monitor new RF offensive axes, understand force dispositions, and support dynamic targeting.
  • Humanitarian Aid & Reconstruction (HIGH): Widespread civilian casualties and infrastructure damage require continued international humanitarian assistance and long-term reconstruction funding.
  • Fuel/Energy (MEDIUM): Continued RF targeting of energy infrastructure necessitates robust protection and diversification of energy supplies.
  • Funding (HIGH): Sustained military operations, defense industry expansion, and reconstruction efforts require ongoing substantial financial support from international partners.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive domain)

• Propaganda and disinformation campaigns:

  • RF Objectives:
    • Undermine Western Unity: Intensifying narratives of Western decline, disunity, and abandonment of Ukraine, leveraging Trump's statements and perceived European weakness.
    • Dehumanize/Discredit Ukraine: Continuing to portray Ukraine as corrupt, engaging in illicit activities, and using children for sabotage. Highlighting UAF casualties through graphic IO.
    • Project RF Strength & Legitimacy: Amplifying military successes ("liberations"), showcasing domestic industrial capacity, promoting social welfare, and projecting global influence through non-Western alliances.
    • Justify RF Actions: Reframing controversial strikes and blaming Ukraine for escalation or cross-border attacks.
    • Escalation Rhetoric: Putin's explicit warning about foreign troops in Ukraine being legitimate targets is a key piece of escalation IO.
    • Internal Control: Maintaining strict information control, promoting normalcy, and addressing internal economic/social issues through IO.
  • UAF Counter-Narratives:
    • Highlight RF War Crimes: Documenting civilian casualties, infrastructure damage, and human rights abuses.
    • Showcase Resilience & Success: Emphasizing domestic defense innovation, air defense effectiveness, tactical victories, and internal anti-corruption efforts.
    • Reinforce Western Support: Highlighting diplomatic engagements, military aid, and international condemnation of RF actions.
    • Transparency & Accountability: Providing regular operational updates and demonstrating commitment to rule of law.
    • National Unity & Identity: Promoting patriotism, honoring fallen soldiers, and showcasing civilian resilience.

• Public sentiment and morale factors:

  • Ukrainian Public (HIGH Stress): Facing increasing stress and anxiety due to new offensive axes, persistent multi-vector drone/missile attacks, and associated civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. Resilience remains evident but is constantly tested. Morale is sustained by UAF military successes, diplomatic efforts, and internal unity.
  • Russian Public (CONTROLLED/Managed): RF IO is largely successful in projecting normalcy, military strength, and economic stability, managing public perception of the conflict's costs. Support for veterans and social programs are key for maintaining internal morale. However, reports of internal security incidents (sabotage, service evasion) suggest underlying vulnerabilities.

• International support and diplomatic developments:

  • Strong Support for Ukraine (HIGH): Sustained military aid commitments (Germany, Nordic/Baltic), financial support (UK), and high-level diplomatic engagement (Zelenskyy with European Council, NATO, US, Italy) continue to underpin Ukraine's defense. The prospect of European troop deployments is a significant development.
  • RF Diplomatic Efforts (MEDIUM): Putin's engagements with China (BRICS, EEF), India, DPRK, and various African/Asian nations demonstrate a concerted effort to build a non-Western bloc and challenge US hegemony. RF continues to seek dialogue with Trump to fracture Western unity.
  • Western Internal Debates/Disunity (MEDIUM): RF IO is actively exploiting perceived fissures within the Western alliance, particularly concerning Trump's rhetoric on sanctions, European aid, and direct engagement with Putin. Hungary's stance on EU entry creates an internal EU challenge for Ukraine.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

• Most likely enemy courses of action (MLCOA):

  1. Sustained Ground Offensive on Prioritized Axes: RF will focus on consolidating and expanding its claimed gains in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Donetsk Oblasts, particularly around Kostiantynivka, Orikhiv, and Velikomikhailovka. Intense pressure will be maintained on Kupyansk. This will involve continued small-unit assaults, heavy artillery fire (including Hyacinth-K), and aggressive reconnaissance. RF will also continue efforts to interdict UAF counter-attacks and special operations, as well as target UAF engineering efforts in border regions. Confidence: HIGH
  2. Adaptive & High-Volume Multi-Domain Strikes: RF will continue sustained, multi-vector drone (Shahed, Lancet, FPV) and missile (ballistic, КАБ) attacks. Primary targets will remain Ukrainian energy infrastructure (Dnipro, Lozova, Sumy), defense industry, and logistics. Expect continued opportunistic strikes on population centers and a persistent threat of aviation weapon use in Donetsk Oblast. RF will enhance its internal air defense capabilities following UAF deep strikes (Ryazan, Anapa). Confidence: HIGH
  3. Aggressive Information Warfare & Diplomatic Realignment: RF will intensify IO to portray Western weakness and disunity (amplifying Trump's geopolitical assessments, Europe's perceived decline, and Western internal debates). RF will continue to demonize Ukraine (e.g., "children for sabotage") and justify its own actions (e.g., reframing Chernihiv strike). Diplomatic outreach to non-Western nations (BRICS, China, India, DPRK) will continue to build an anti-Western bloc. Putin's explicit warnings about foreign troops will be central to this IO. Confidence: HIGH

• Most dangerous enemy courses of action (MDCOA):

  1. Direct Hybrid Attack on NATO Member (Baltics/Poland): RF initiates a multi-vector hybrid attack against a frontline NATO state, potentially triggered by perceived Western escalation (e.g., European troop deployment, major UAF deep strike). This would involve large-scale cyberattacks, kinetic strikes on military/C2 targets, provocative airspace violations, and overt sabotage by special forces, accompanied by an IO campaign blaming NATO for escalation. Confidence: MEDIUM
  2. Tactical Nuclear Demonstration/Attack with Pre-emptive Escalation against Ukraine: Faced with significant battlefield losses or the collapse of a key front, RF conducts a limited tactical nuclear demonstration or strike within Ukraine, preceded by an intense global IO campaign, to coerce a ceasefire and negotiations on RF terms. Confidence: LOW

• Timeline estimates and decision points:

  • Immediate (0-24 hours):
    • RF Decision Point: Assess UAF defensive responses on the new Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia/Donetsk axes and adjust ground operations (exploitation or consolidation).
    • RF Decision Point: Evaluate the impact of overnight deep strikes (Dnipro, Lozova) and the UAF strike on the Ryazan oil refinery and Anapa radar; decide on immediate retaliatory strikes and/or enhanced internal air defense.
    • UAF Decision Point: Allocate immediate reserves to new RF offensive axes and conduct counter-operations.
    • UAF Decision Point: Sustain high-volume air defense operations against ongoing RF drone threats (Sumy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Zhytomyr) and prioritize rapid damage assessment and recovery in Dnipro and Lozova.
    • International Decision Point: Monitor Russia's reaction to Zelenskyy's diplomatic engagements with the European Council and NATO, and Trump's latest statements, for potential shifts in RF IO or military posture.
  • Short-Term (24-72 hours):
    • RF Decision Point: Determine commitment of additional forces for a large-scale offensive in the Donbas.
    • UAF Decision Point: Accelerate domestic defense production and secure additional international air defense and artillery supplies.
    • International Decision Point: Fico-Zelenskyy meeting results to inform regional diplomatic efforts. Germany's equipment provision to begin influencing UAF defensive planning.
  • Mid-Term (1-2 weeks):
    • RF Decision Point: Initiate large-scale offensive operations in the Donbas, potentially expanding westward, based on the "largest regrouping since 2022."
    • UAF Decision Point: Consolidate new defensive lines on the Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia axis and execute sustained counter-battery/deep strike operations.
    • International Decision Point: "Coalition of the Resolute" to finalize security guarantees, providing long-term framework for UAF capabilities. Potential deployment of 10,000-30,000 European troops would be a major inflection point.

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Reinforce Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia Sector: Immediately re-task available UAF mobile reserves, anti-tank assets, and additional artillery to rapidly bolster defensive lines on the newly active Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia axes. Prioritize ISR coverage for real-time tracking of RF advances, particularly targeting reconnaissance elements and heavy equipment concentrations.
2. Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) for Central Ukraine: Given the ongoing and high-volume drone attacks on Dnipro, Sumy, Chernihiv, and now Kyiv/Zhytomyr Oblasts, prioritize the deployment of additional modern air defense systems and mobile fire teams. Accelerate fielding of EW-resistant FPV drones and counter-UAS systems to protect critical infrastructure (energy, water, dams) and population centers.
3. Counter-Battery Operations (CBO) & Deep Strike Prioritization: Intensify CBO against RF artillery and MLRS systems supporting new offensive axes (Orikhiv direction, Kostiantynivka encirclement). Maintain and expand deep strike capabilities against RF logistics, C2, and critical energy/ISR infrastructure within occupied territories and RF territory (learning from Ryazan and Anapa strikes) to disrupt RF offensive tempo.
4. Information Environment Resilience: Proactively counter RF IO narratives, particularly those promoting Western disunity, dehumanizing Ukraine, or justifying RF actions. Enhance public communication regarding UAF successes, international support, and the realities of RF war crimes. Provide clear and consistent updates on internal security efforts against sabotage and corruption to maintain public trust.
5. Diplomatic Advocacy for Pre-Conflict Security Guarantees: Zelenskyy and other high-level Ukrainian officials should continue to strongly advocate for the implementation of robust security guarantees before the cessation of hostilities. This will secure long-term support and reduce vulnerabilities during potential future negotiation phases.

//END REPORT//