Archived operational intelligence briefing
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF:
UAF:
1.4. Intelligence Gaps from Previous Report Addressed/Updated:
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Intentions:
Courses of Action (COA) Currently Observed:
Ukrainian force posture and readiness:
Recent tactical successes or setbacks:
Resource requirements and constraints:
Propaganda and disinformation campaigns:
Public sentiment and morale factors:
International support and diplomatic developments:
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)
Sustained Multi-Domain Deep Strikes and Frontline Pressure (with Renewed Focus on Kyiv, Civilian/Foreign Infrastructure, and Persistent UAVs): RF will continue massed drone and missile attacks on critical civilian infrastructure (energy, transport, water) in Southern, Central, and Northern Ukraine, particularly Odesa, Chornomorsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv, and Kyiv Oblasts. The massed drone attack on Kyiv Oblast confirms this renewed focus. This will likely extend to non-military foreign-affiliated infrastructure (as seen with the British Council). These will be augmented by tactical kinetic strikes (FPV drones, artillery, guided bombs like KABs, Krasnoarmiysk direction artillery, drone bombing in Zaporizhzhia direction) on UAF deployment points and frontline positions across the Donbas, Pokrovsk, Kupiansk, Lyman, Siversk, and Dnipropetrovsk axes. RF will continue to use MiG-31K launches as a psychological and strategic threat (even if brief). RF will likely attempt to exploit any IAMD gaps in Crimea created by UAF strikes to conduct its own counter-strikes or ISR, while also bolstering remaining AD assets. UAF deep strikes into RF territory will prompt continued RF air defense responses. New UAV alerts in Chernihiv and Sumy Oblasts and KAB launches in Donetsk indicate this is an ongoing, widespread tactic. RF will likely continue to claim destruction of high-value UAF/Western assets (Patriot, HIMARS) to project battlefield success. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Localized Ground Probes and Consolidation with Persistent IO and Enhanced Internal Security (Despite High Losses): RF will maintain localized ground pressure along the Donetsk, Pokrovsk, Kupiansk, and Lyman axes, focusing on consolidating recent gains (e.g., Zarichne, Pisciy coal mine, Siversk flanks, Kamyshevakha liberation claim, Shandryholove "cutting") and conducting further reconnaissance-in-force. RF is demonstrating a willingness to incur high casualties for these gains, as evidenced by the Kupiansk testimony. This will be accompanied by an intensified information operations campaign, leveraging the outcomes of the SCO summit and bilateral meetings to portray RF's international strength and Western decline (Tianjin Declaration, Greece's stance, Lukashenko's statements, Putin's global governance initiative, alleged von der Leyen EW incident), while continuing to discredit Ukrainian leadership and allies through PSYOP (e.g., "UAF drone killed surrendering soldier", "summons at funerals"). RF will also intensify internal security measures, targeting alleged collaborators and tightening information control (FSB arrests, discussion on mobile phones in schools, new "extremist materials" law, migrant tracking app, new school ranking criteria, prosecution of journalists). RF will continue to promote narratives of domestic stability ("Day of Knowledge," Kerch Bridge video). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
CSTO Military Signaling and Border Pressure (with Emphasis on Deterrence against Western Intervention and EW Capabilities): RF will continue to use CSTO exercises in Belarus as a strategic signaling tool, maintaining a credible threat to Ukraine's northern border. The integration of "special military operation" experience into these exercises (confirmed by MoD Russia) indicates a more direct and relevant threat. RF will also continue localized border operations and drone/KAB strikes in Sumy and Chernihiv Oblasts (as evidenced by new UAV alerts), aiming to fix UAF forces in the north and degrade civilian resilience in border regions. RF will leverage statements from Western nations, such as Germany's, explicitly stating no troop deployment, to reinforce its deterrence narrative against direct Western intervention. RF will likely continue to demonstrate or hint at its EW capabilities (as in the alleged von der Leyen incident) as a means of strategic deterrence and psychological pressure against NATO/EU. This could extend to further disruption of air navigation in border regions or over the Black Sea. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)
Coordinated Strategic Escalation: Massed Combined-Arms Offensive and WMD Threat (Utilizing Belarus/SCO Alliance): RF initiates a large-scale, coordinated combined-arms offensive on one or more axes (e.g., a renewed push from the north, or a major breakthrough in Donbas/Zaporizhzhia), simultaneously launching a massive wave of precision-guided munitions and ballistic missiles (including Kinzhdal strikes) against Ukraine's remaining critical infrastructure, C2 nodes, and major troop concentrations. This offensive would be coupled with explicit and credible threats of tactical nuclear weapon use (potentially derived from CSTO exercise planning), especially if Western support for Ukraine continues or if UAF attempts to counter the offensive. This could be coordinated to leverage diplomatic support from the SCO bloc, aiming to present a unified front against Western intervention. The intention would be to overwhelm UAF defenses, force a collapse of international support, and impose a negotiated settlement on RF terms. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Hybrid Escalation: Targeted Assassinations, Cyberattacks on Civilian Infrastructure, and International Provocations (Leveraging Internal Control and Information Dominance with Enhanced EW): RF conducts a series of high-profile, targeted assassinations of key Ukrainian political or military figures (beyond the Parubiy incident), aimed at creating internal chaos and leadership vacuums. The confirmed external instruction/facilitation of the Parubiy assassination heightens the risk of further, more impactful, state-sponsored assassinations. Simultaneously, RF launches sophisticated, widespread cyberattacks designed to cripple critical civilian infrastructure (e.g., power grid, communication networks, financial systems) across Ukraine, potentially extending to key Western support nations. This would be combined with overt acts of international provocation, such as naval blockades of Black Sea shipping or direct interference with humanitarian aid convoys, and aggressive diplomatic rhetoric to isolate Ukraine further. RF's increasingly tight internal security and information control (e.g., migrant tracking app, "extremist materials" law) would be leveraged to suppress any internal dissent or information leaks regarding these operations. RF EW capabilities (as allegedly used against von der Leyen's plane) could be employed to further isolate targeted regions or disrupt C2 during these operations. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Black Sea Domination and Economic Strangulation with NATO Provocation (Testing NATO's Eastern Flank Commitments): RF significantly escalates its military presence in the Black Sea, effectively blockading all Ukrainian maritime trade (civilian and military) through intensified mine-laying and overt naval interdiction, potentially extending into international waters. This could be accompanied by direct provocations against NATO naval or air assets conducting ISR in the Black Sea, potentially leading to an incident designed to test NATO's resolve and unity, particularly in light of new Western DIB investments in Bulgaria. The goal would be to economically strangle Ukraine while simultaneously attempting to fracture NATO's response and test the commitment to the Eastern flank. (LOW CONFIDENCE)
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
//END REPORT//
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