Situation Report

SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - 310700Z AUG 25 (UPDATE 7)

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: Russian Federation (RF) continues a persistent multi-domain deep strike posture, with confirmed massed UAV activity targeting critical civilian infrastructure in Odesa Oblast. UAF Air Force reports intercepting/suppressing a high number of enemy UAVs (142 reported as "air attack means" by ASTRA, matching previous UAF figure for total detected). A new deep strike is confirmed in Dnipro. RF also persists with tactical drone usage for kinetic strikes and maintains ballistic missile threat to Northern/Central Ukraine. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with new deep strike on Dnipro, confirmation of "142 UAVs" by ASTRA, and RF tactical drone strike claim remains relevant.)

• Northern Ukraine (Sumy Oblast): UAF Air Force reports missile danger, now cleared. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - No change.)

• Central Ukraine (Poltava Oblast): UAF Air Force reports missile danger, now cleared. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - No change.)

• Central Ukraine (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast): "РБК-Україна" reports an explosion in Dnipro. "Операция Z" and "Colonelcassad" also report explosions in Dnipro. This indicates a new deep strike. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW DEEP STRIKE.)

• Eastern Ukraine (Donbas - Unspecified, possibly Kyiv): Video from "Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦" shows fire damage to a multi-story residential building, location still ambiguous. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - No change.)

• Southern Ukraine (Odesa Oblast): Widespread reports/evidence of RF massed drone attacks on Odesa District overnight, confirmed targeting four DTEK energy facilities, with 29,000 residents without electricity and one wounded. "Colonelcassad" specifically claims a "Geran-2" strike on a railway ferry complex in Illichivsk (Chornomorsk), destroying equipment and rolling stock. UAF Air Force reports an enemy UAV in the Black Sea heading towards Odesa Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Widespread confirmation of deep strikes on Odesa energy infrastructure, civilian impact, specific target claim in Illichivsk, and continued UAV activity.)

• Southern Ukraine (Unspecified, but with "Vostok" Group attribution): "Воин DV" claimed RF's 37th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Army, "Vostok" Group) destroyed a UAF mortar crew, personnel, and logistics vehicle using drone operators. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - No change.)

• Multiple Regions: UAF Air Force issued a general warning about ballistic missile threats from the southeast, now cleared. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - No change.)

• RF Internal (Multiple Regions): "ASTRA" reports "Russia attacked Ukraine with 142 UAVs overnight," directly attributing the number of detected UAVs to RF. "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" publishes a video showing a soldier requesting a DJI Mavic 3 drone for reconnaissance. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - ASTRA explicitly confirms 142 UAVs from RF; RF ground unit demand for tactical ISR confirmed.)

• RF Internal (Moscow Oblast): ASTRA reports a large fire in Balashikha, Moscow Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW INFORMATION.)

• RF Internal (General): TASS reports that Russians no longer regret the departure of Western brands, and that presidential scholarships will increase. "Новости Москвы" (repeating TASS content) reports on a profile of drivers who don't wear seatbelts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New information on public sentiment and internal regulatory measures, no direct military impact.)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Aerial Operations: Continued widespread RF drone attacks (Odesa/Chornomorsk) and a new deep strike on Dnipro, along with reported UAF UAV neutralizations, indicate continued favorable weather conditions for air- and ground-based operations. Nighttime operations are confirmed. The immediate all-clear for ballistic missile threats does not negate the window for such operations. The new UAF Air Force report of a UAV heading towards Odesa further confirms continued operational conditions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with new Dnipro strike and Odesa UAV activity.)
• Space Weather: TASS reports strong magnetic storms are forecast for 02 SEP due to solar plasma ejection. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Impact Assessment: Strong magnetic storms could potentially affect satellite communications, GPS reliability, and sensitive electronic equipment, impacting both friendly and enemy C2 and ISR capabilities. This is a potential disruptor for precision-guided munitions and long-range communications. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Analytical Judgment.)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF:

  • Reconnaissance & Strike Operations: RF is conducting massed drone attacks (likely Shahed variants, with "Geran-2" specifically claimed for Illichivsk) on Odesa, explicitly targeting DTEK energy infrastructure and a railway ferry complex. A new deep strike on Dnipro is confirmed. RF is also using tactical drones for kinetic strikes on UAF ground assets and continues to pose a ballistic missile threat. "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" video shows a Russian soldier requesting a DJI Mavic 3 drone, highlighting continued demand and decentralized use of tactical ISR by RF ground units. "ASTRA" explicitly states "Russia attacked Ukraine with 142 UAVs overnight." (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New deep strike on Dnipro, specific target claim in Illichivsk, explicit attribution of 142 UAVs, and continued RF tactical drone demand.)
  • Force Generation/Logistics/Technological Advancement: The continued reliance on COTS drones for tactical ISR within RF forces (DJI Mavic 3 request) indicates a persistent gap in organic ISR at the small unit level and an adaptive, decentralized approach. New videos from "Colonelcassad" show volunteer/civilian efforts in Moscow distributing body armor, radios, and medical kits, specifically for units going to Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, as well as general requests for essential protective and medical gear, and tactical equipment (rifles, bipods, drone countermeasures, etc.) for units in Donbas/Konstantinovka. This highlights persistent logistical shortfalls being compensated by volunteer efforts, and a continued demand for basic and advanced tactical gear. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New information on COTS drone requests, significant evidence of volunteer logistical support addressing RF shortfalls.)
  • Information Operations (Internal/External): "Военкор Котенок" publishes a video of a personal testimony ("Mikhail 'Migel'") alleging brutal and inhumane actions by Russian forces in Belarus and against civilians, including torture in detention. This is likely a UAF/pro-Ukrainian information operation (IO) intended to expose RF atrocities. "Colonelcassad" continues to frame Putin's diplomatic engagements (SCO summit, 80th anniversary of victory over Japan) as significant international events, boosting RF prestige. TASS reports on public sentiment regarding Western brands and increased presidential scholarships, aimed at projecting internal stability and well-being. "Рыбарь" and "Colonelcassad" publish content regarding "asymmetric measures" and claims of "Geran-2" strikes, reinforcing RF military effectiveness. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New specific IO content from both sides, ongoing RF internal/external IO.)
  • Diplomatic Engagement: Colonelcassad confirms Putin's participation in the SCO summit (Tianjin, 31 AUG-1 SEP) and subsequent bilateral talks with Xi Jinping in Beijing, including commemorative events for the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Confirmed high-level diplomatic activity.)

• UAF:

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) & ISR: UAF Air Force is demonstrating effective real-time threat detection and warning for enemy aerial threats (missile danger, UAVs towards Odesa). "ASTRA" (citing UAF Air Force) reports 142 enemy UAVs attacked Ukraine overnight. UAF Air Force's previous claim of 126 neutralizations out of 142 "air attack means" indicates highly effective IAMD. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Explicit attribution of 142 UAVs, and continued high neutralization rate.)
  • Civilian Defense: Ukrainian authorities are providing prompt public alerts. "🇺🇦 Запорізька обласна військова адміністрація 🇺🇦" reports 8 people remain in hospitals after a recent attack on Zaporizhzhia, indicating continued civilian impact and ongoing medical care needs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New information on civilian casualties/ongoing care.)
  • Information Operations: "РБК-Україна," "Оперативний ЗСУ," and "ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS" are all disseminating reports from the General Staff (Genshtab) stating that "RF's offensive has ended with practically nothing, the occupiers have not gained control over any large city." This is a direct counter-narrative to RF claims of success. "БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС" publishes a video claiming an RF soldier's suicide attempt was finished by a UAF kamikaze drone, portraying RF demoralization and UAF tactical superiority. "STERNENKO" posts an image with a cryptic "rock carving" message, possibly a morale-boosting or nationalist reference. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Strong, coordinated UAF counter-narrative on RF offensive failures, new IO regarding RF demoralization, and nationalist messaging.)
  • Operational Readiness (Southern Front): "Сили оборони Півдня України" states they "continue to strike enemy locations, firing positions, and rear areas," indicating ongoing offensive and interdiction operations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Ongoing operational activity.)

1.4. Intelligence Gaps from Previous Report Addressed/Updated:

• RF Ballistic Missile Types (Zaporizhzhia/Dnipropetrovsk): A new deep strike occurred in Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast), but specific missile type is not identified. (REMAINS A GAP for specific type.)
• BDA on RF Deep Strikes on Ukrainian DIB: UPDATED - Odesa energy infrastructure (DTEK, 4 objects) confirmed damaged by drone strikes, railway ferry complex in Illichivsk (Chornomorsk) claimed hit by "Geran-2," and an explosion in Dnipro. These are new targets for comprehensive BDA. Comprehensive BDA across all DIB targets (including Yuzhmash, Motor Sich from previous report) remains a critical gap. (CRITICAL GAP PERSISTS AND IS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE NEW STRIKES, especially Dnipro and Illichivsk.)
• Accurate Ground Truth Kamyshevakha / Dobropillya: No new information to verify contested claims. (CRITICAL GAP PERSISTS.)
• RF Paratrooper Activity in Zaporizhzhia: No new specific intelligence. (REMAINS A GAP.)
• UAF Reinforcement in Krasnoarmiysk: No new information to verify RF claim. (REMAINS A GAP.)
• Volgograd Airport Closure: No new information on "massed UAV attack" or airport status. (REMAINS A GAP.)
• RF Strike on UAF Reinforcement Areas in Sumy Oblast: No new information. (REMAINS A GAP.)
• Simferopol Airport Damage: New OSINT report on destroyed helicopters still requires IMINT verification. No new information in this update. (NEW GAP - URGENT.)
• Context of UAF Air Force Claim of 126 UAVs Shot Down/Suppressed: UPDATED - "ASTRA" explicitly states "Russia attacked Ukraine with 142 UAVs overnight." This clarifies the origin and total number of detected enemy UAVs. The reported 126 neutralizations (from previous report) out of 142 refers to RF drones over Ukraine. (PARTIALLY ADDRESSED - Context on origin and total count clarified; timeframe (overnight vs. 24-hour) remains to be explicitly confirmed from UAF Air Force official statement.)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:

  • Persistent Multi-Oblast Reconnaissance & Multi-Domain Strike (Expanded): RF demonstrates the capability for sustained massed drone attacks on critical infrastructure (Odesa energy facilities, Illichivsk railway ferry complex) and deep strikes (Dnipro). RF continues to pose ballistic missile threats. The explicit attribution by ASTRA (citing UAF Air Force) of "142 UAVs" underscores the scale of this capability. RF ground units continue to leverage COTS drones for tactical ISR and control. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New deep strike on Dnipro, specific target claim in Illichivsk, explicit attribution of 142 UAVs, and continued RF tactical drone demand.)
  • Logistical Sustainment (Volunteer Dependence): RF demonstrates a capability to partially offset logistical shortfalls for frontline units through organized volunteer/civilian collection and distribution networks, sourcing protective gear, radios, and medical supplies. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New evidence of volunteer support.)
  • Hybrid Warfare (Information): RF continues to use historical narratives (Putin's diplomatic engagements), claims of military success, and deflect criticism. UAF IO (Mikhail "Migel" testimony) indicates RF's vulnerability to exposure of alleged atrocities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New IO from both sides.)

• Intentions:

  • Degrade UAF Defense/Offensive Capabilities and Critical Infrastructure (Intensified Focus): RF intends to systematically degrade Ukraine's critical civilian energy and transport infrastructure (Odesa, Illichivsk, Dnipro) through sustained deep strikes to impact civilian resilience, disrupt logistics, and reduce support for military operations. RF also intends to continue tactical battlefield interdiction and to project international legitimacy through diplomatic engagements. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with explicit targeting of energy and transport infrastructure, new Dnipro strike.)
  • Shape Public Opinion (Internal & External): RF intends to project an image of strength, internal stability, and international relevance (Putin's diplomatic activities) while counteracting UAF narratives. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Ongoing IO, new diplomatic activity.)
  • Sustain Force Generation via External Support: RF intends to supplement official military logistics through volunteer efforts to maintain equipment and morale for frontline units. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New evidence of volunteer support.)

• Courses of Action (COA) Currently Observed:

  1. Sustained Massed Drone and Missile Strikes on Critical Infrastructure (Energy & Transport) & Deep Areas: RF is conducting and will continue massed drone attacks, explicitly targeting critical energy and transport infrastructure (Odesa, Illichivsk), and conducting deep strikes (Dnipro). Missile threats (Sumy/Poltava) will persist. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Observed pattern, new targets.)
  2. Continued Tactical Drone Strikes on UAF Ground Assets: RF ground units will continue to employ tactical drones for reconnaissance and direct kinetic strikes against UAF personnel and equipment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - No change.)
  3. Intensified Strategic Information Operations Amplification & Diplomatic Engagement: RF state and pro-Kremlin media will continue to amplify historical propaganda, claim tactical successes, promote diplomatic engagements (Putin in China), and project internal stability. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Ongoing IO, new diplomatic activity.)
  4. Reliance on Volunteer Support for Logistical Sustainment: RF will continue to facilitate and rely on volunteer and civilian networks for the provision of essential equipment (protective gear, radios, medical supplies) to frontline units. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New evidence.)

2.2. Recent tactical changes or adaptations

• Explicit Targeting of Civilian Energy AND Transport Infrastructure (Odesa, Illichivsk): The confirmed massed drone attacks on four DTEK energy facilities and the claimed "Geran-2" strike on a railway ferry complex in Illichivsk (Chornomorsk) represent a tactical adaptation to broaden the target set to include critical civilian transport infrastructure, aiming for widespread disruption beyond just energy, impacting logistics and economic activity. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW AND SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL ADAPTATION.)
• Continued Refinement of Tactical Drone Interdiction: The claimed destruction of a UAF mortar crew, personnel, and a logistics vehicle by drone operators demonstrates continued refinement in RF's tactical drone operations for battlefield interdiction. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - No change.)
• Decentralized COTS Drone Procurement/Use and Volunteer Logistical Support: The request for COTS drones by RF soldiers, combined with widespread volunteer efforts to supply basic and advanced tactical gear, confirms a decentralized, adaptive logistical and force generation strategy supplementing official channels. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW TACTICAL/LOGISTICAL ADAPTATION.)
• Information Operations (Counter-Atrocity Messaging): The release of the "Mikhail 'Migel'" testimony by a pro-Ukrainian channel indicates UAF is actively targeting RF's image by exposing alleged atrocities, forcing RF to potentially adapt its IO to counter such narratives. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New IO.)

2.3. Logistics and sustainment status

• RF Logistics (UAVs/Missiles/Drones): The sustained massed drone attacks (142 UAVs reported) on Odesa, Dnipro, and Illichivsk, and the continued missile threat, indicate a robust supply of UAVs and missiles, along with necessary operational support. The use of "Geran-2" drones (Shahed variants) suggests continued reliance on this platform.
• RF Logistics (Ground Force Equipment): New evidence of organized volunteer efforts supplying body armor, radios, medical kits, and other tactical gear (rifles, drone countermeasures, etc.) to units in Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Donbas confirms persistent logistical shortfalls within the RF military's official supply chain for essential frontline equipment. This reliance on external civilian support is a critical indicator of sustainment challenges. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW EVIDENCE OF LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES.)
• RF Internal Logistics (General): TASS reports on public sentiment and scholarships are administrative and do not directly reflect military logistics. (HIGH CONFIDENCE.)

2.4. Command and control effectiveness

• RF C2: The coordinated massed drone attacks on Odesa and Illichivsk, explicitly targeting energy and transport infrastructure, and the new strike on Dnipro, suggest effective operational-level C2 capable of synchronizing multiple drone launches for maximum impact. The widespread nature of these attacks (142 UAVs reported) indicates robust command and control over these assets. The reliance on volunteer logistics suggests a gap in centralized C2 for equipment provision. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with new targets and explicit UAV count; C2 over logistics remains an area of concern for RF.)
• UAF C2: UAF Air Force's rapid detection and warning for aerial threats (missile danger, UAVs towards Odesa), subsequent all-clear, and the high reported number of UAV neutralizations (126 out of 142) demonstrate highly effective C2 for IAMD operations and real-time threat management. The coordinated counter-narrative from UAF General Staff sources indicates effective strategic C2 over information operations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with explicit UAV count and strong IO C2.)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

• Ukrainian force posture and readiness: UAF forces are maintaining a high state of vigilance against aerial threats, with effective detection and warning systems demonstrated for missiles and reconnaissance/attack UAVs. Readiness remains high. The explicit targeting of civilian energy and transport infrastructure necessitates heightened awareness and enhanced point-defense systems for all critical infrastructure targets across Ukraine. The high rate of UAV neutralizations by UAF PVO demonstrates a strong defensive posture against massed drone attacks. The new deep strike on Dnipro and persistent threats to Sumy/Poltava require continued vigilance across a broad geographic area. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with new deep strike on Dnipro, specific Illichivsk target, and explicit UAV count.)

• Recent tactical successes or setbacks:

  • Successes:
    • UAF Air Force is providing timely and comprehensive warnings on enemy aerial threats (missile danger, UAVs towards Odesa), demonstrating effective ISR and IAMD situational awareness. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - No change.)
    • Rapid and effective public alerting system for aerial threats is operational, with timely all-clear notifications. (HIGH CONFIDENCE.)
    • UAF Air Force reports neutralizing 126 out of 142 enemy UAVs, which, if confirmed for a single operational period, represents a significant air defense success against massed drone attacks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Confirmed 142 total UAVs by ASTRA, confirming the scale of UAF defense.)
    • UAF General Staff is successfully countering RF propaganda regarding the "Spring-Summer 2025 campaign" ("ended with practically nothing"), maintaining a strong information posture. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New specific success.)
    • "Сили оборони Півдня України" confirms ongoing successful strikes against enemy locations, firing positions, and rear areas in the south, indicating sustained offensive pressure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New specific success.)
    • "БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС" publishes a video claiming a UAF kamikaze drone completed an RF soldier's failed suicide attempt, which, if verified, represents a tactical success in demoralizing enemy forces and using FPVs against personnel. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - NEW POTENTIAL SPECIFIC SUCCESS, requires verification.)
    • UAF IO is exposing alleged RF atrocities (Mikhail "Migel" testimony), potentially influencing international and domestic opinion. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW SPECIFIC SUCCESS.)
  • Setbacks:
    • RF executed massed drone attacks on Odesa, explicitly targeting four DTEK energy facilities, causing power outages for 29,000 residents and wounding one person. This represents a significant setback in critical infrastructure protection. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - No change.)
    • RF claimed a "Geran-2" strike on a railway ferry complex in Illichivsk (Chornomorsk), causing damage to equipment and rolling stock. This is a setback for critical transport infrastructure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW SPECIFIC SETBACK.)
    • A new deep strike occurred in Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast). (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW SPECIFIC SETBACK.)
    • A multi-story residential building sustained significant fire damage, likely from military action, as documented by "Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦", highlighting continued destruction of civilian infrastructure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - No change.)
    • RF claims a successful drone strike against a UAF mortar crew, personnel, and a logistics vehicle, which, if true, represents a tactical loss of equipment and personnel. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - No change.)
    • The persistent missile threat to Sumy and Poltava Oblasts indicates ongoing danger to these regions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - No change.)
    • Eight people remain in hospitals in Zaporizhzhia after a recent attack, highlighting continued civilian casualties. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW SPECIFIC SETBACK.)

• Resource requirements and constraints:

  • Critical Infrastructure Defense (Expanded): The explicit targeting of Odesa's energy infrastructure and Illichivsk's railway ferry complex, plus the Dnipro strike, highlights an urgent need for additional and enhanced point-defense systems specifically for all critical civilian infrastructure (energy, transport, industrial), capable of defeating massed drone attacks (e.g., Shahed variants). This includes both kinetic and non-kinetic (EW) solutions.
  • Air Defense (North/Central/South): Continued missile threats to Sumy, Poltava, and deep strikes on Dnipro necessitate robust and mobile air defense coverage in these regions, capable of intercepting ballistic and cruise missiles. Continued UAV activity towards Odesa demands sustained PVO.
  • Counter-Tactical Drone Capabilities: The claimed RF drone strike on a UAF mortar crew and ongoing use of COTS drones underscore the need for effective counter-drone measures at the small unit and tactical level, including detection, jamming, and kinetic interceptors for offensive tactical drones operating on the frontline.
  • ISR (Ground Truth): Urgent need for ISR assets to explicitly confirm the timeframe of UAF Air Force's claim of 126 UAV neutralizations and comprehensive BDA on all new deep strike targets.
  • Resilience to Space Weather: UAF must assess vulnerabilities of its C2, ISR, and precision strike assets to magnetic storms predicted for 02 SEP. (HIGH CONFIDENCE.)

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

• Propaganda and disinformation campaigns:

  • RF Narratives (Internal Strength/Capacity): RF continues to propagate narratives of internal stability (public sentiment on Western brands, increased scholarships) and diplomatic relevance (Putin's SCO summit participation). "Рыбарь" and "Colonelcassad" reinforce RF military effectiveness and "asymmetric measures." The reliance on volunteer support for logistics (Colonelcassad videos) could be spun internally as patriotic unity or external support for forces, despite indicating systemic shortfalls. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for RF amplification, with new specific examples.)
  • RF Narratives (Historical Revisionism/Hero Worship): "WarGonzo" is actively engaged in hero worship and historical revisionism (Zakharchenko commemoration). "Colonelcassad" uses Putin's participation in victory over Japan commemorations to boost historical legitimacy. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Ongoing IO.)
  • RF Narratives (Battlefield Effectiveness): "Воин DV" is promoting RF battlefield effectiveness (claimed drone strike). "Colonelcassad" specifically claims the destruction of a railway ferry complex in Illichivsk with a "Geran-2." (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW SPECIFIC IO CONTENT.)
  • UAF Counter-Narratives (Transparency, Resilience): UAF continues to provide timely and accurate threat information (missile warnings, all-clears), reinforcing trust and preparedness. The high number of reported UAV neutralizations (126/142) highlights Ukrainian resilience and defensive prowess. "Генеральний штаб ЗСУ" directly counters RF propaganda, stating RF's offensive "ended with practically nothing." "БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС" uses a video of an RF soldier's suicide attempt finished by a UAF drone to portray RF demoralization and UAF tactical superiority. "Сили оборони Півдня України" maintains an active narrative of striking enemy positions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with new UAV neutralization numbers, direct counter to RF propaganda, new IO on RF demoralization, and ongoing operational narratives.)
  • UAF Counter-Narratives (RF Illegitimacy/Weakness/Atrocities): STERNENKO's strong language ("monkey Putin," "communist China") delegitimizes RF leadership and its allies. "Военкор Котенок" (likely a pro-Ukrainian channel using the alias) publishes the "Mikhail 'Migel'" testimony, a powerful counter-narrative exposing alleged RF atrocities and war crimes, including torture and killing of civilians. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW AND SIGNIFICANT COUNTER-NARRATIVE ON ATROCITIES.)
  • UAF Counter-Narratives (RF Casualties/Losses): "РБК-Україна" and "Оперативний ЗСУ" continue to publish daily RF casualty and equipment loss figures, a consistent effort to counter RF narratives of success and boost domestic morale. (HIGH CONFIDENCE.)

• Public sentiment and morale factors:

  • Ukrainian Public: The massed drone attacks on Odesa's energy infrastructure, Illichivsk's transport infrastructure, and the new deep strike on Dnipro will significantly impact public sentiment, leading to heightened anxiety, hardship, and fear. The continued civilian casualties (Zaporizhzhia) and destruction of residential buildings (Donbas/Kyiv) will further underscore the human cost. However, UAF's timely warnings, all-clear notifications, and the high reported number of UAV neutralizations will provide reassurance and boost confidence in air defenses. The direct rebuttal of Gerasimov's claims by the UAF General Staff, and IO highlighting RF demoralization and atrocities, will maintain morale and reinforce the legitimacy of the Ukrainian defense. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated for new deep strikes, specific transport target, Dnipro, and strong UAF IO.)
  • Russian Public: RF IO focusing on internal stability (public sentiment on Western brands, scholarships), diplomatic relevance (Putin's SCO visit), and claimed battlefield successes (Illichivsk strike) aims to foster a sense of progress, stability, and patriotism, likely boosting morale and support for the leadership. The volunteer efforts for frontline units could also be spun to highlight public support for the "SMO," potentially offsetting the reality of logistical shortfalls. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated for new IO content and volunteer support.)

• International support and diplomatic developments:

  • President Putin's arrival in China for the SCO summit and bilateral talks with Xi Jinping confirms continued high-level diplomatic engagement to maintain or expand strategic partnerships. The tenor of STERNENKO's caption and the "Mikhail 'Migel'" testimony (if widely disseminated) could influence international perception of RF and increase calls for further support to Ukraine. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Confirmed high-level diplomatic activity, new IO framing against RF.)
  • The explicit targeting of critical energy and transport infrastructure (Odesa, Illichivsk) and the new deep strike on Dnipro by RF will likely intensify international condemnation and urgent calls for further air defense assistance to Ukraine, highlighting the need for comprehensive infrastructure protection. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW DEVELOPMENT.)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 24-48 HOURS)

• Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

  1. Sustained Massed Drone and Missile Attacks Targeting Critical Energy and Transport Infrastructure (Expanded Target Set) and Reconnaissance Followed by Kinetic Strikes: RF will likely continue to conduct massed drone attacks (e.g., "Geran-2"/Shaheds) explicitly targeting critical civilian energy and transport infrastructure (e.g., ports, railways, power generation/distribution) across multiple oblasts (Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava) within the next 12-24 hours. Concurrently, RF reconnaissance UAVs will continue to monitor front lines and deep areas, feeding into kinetic strikes (KABs, artillery, MLRS), and particularly tactical drone strikes (including FPVs and COTS drones) against UAF ground assets, with potential for further claims of success against high-value targets like mortar crews and logistics. Missile threats (ballistic, cruise) to Sumy and Poltava Oblasts are likely to persist or re-emerge. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Observed pattern of massed drone strikes on critical infrastructure, new transport targets, continued reconnaissance/kinetic strikes, new tactical drone strike claims, and persistent missile threat.)
  2. Continued Tactical Drone Use for ISR and Direct Kinetic Action by RF Ground Units, Augmented by Volunteer Logistics: RF ground units will continue to rely on and actively seek out commercial drones (e.g., DJI Mavic 3) for tactical reconnaissance, target identification, and direct kinetic engagement of UAF positions and logistics on the front lines. This decentralized drone use will remain a persistent, granular threat. Furthermore, RF will continue to leverage volunteer and civilian logistical networks to acquire and distribute essential protective gear, communication equipment, and medical supplies to compensate for official supply chain deficiencies. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Confirmed demand and adaptation by RF ground units, new evidence of volunteer logistical support.)
  3. Intensified Strategic Information Operations Amplification, Focusing on Diplomatic Achievements, Battlefield Claims, and Countering Atrocity Narratives: RF state and pro-Kremlin media will intensify efforts to amplify Putin's diplomatic engagements (SCO summit), promote claimed tactical battlefield successes (Illichivsk strike), project internal stability, and directly counter any narratives exposing alleged RF atrocities (e.g., "Mikhail 'Migel'" testimony). (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Ongoing IO, new diplomatic activity, new counter-atrocity focus.)

• Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

  1. Massive Coordinated Multi-Domain Attack on Critical Infrastructure (Energy & Transport) and Military C2, Leveraging Drone Swarms and Cyber Attacks: RF could launch a highly coordinated, multi-domain strike (massed drones, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles) targeting multiple critical civilian energy and transport infrastructure sites (e.g., across Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy) and key UAF military C2 nodes simultaneously, aiming to cause widespread blackouts, transport disruption, and command disruption. This could be augmented by large-scale cyber attacks on SCADA systems controlling infrastructure and military networks. The effectiveness of this would be maximized by preceding reconnaissance and could be exacerbated if UAF air defenses are overwhelmed or if predicted magnetic storms (02 SEP) degrade UAF systems. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Precursors include massed drone attacks on energy and transport infrastructure, ballistic missile threats, multi-domain capabilities, and increased RF deep strike activity; low confidence on magnetic storm impact specifics.)
  2. Localized Ground Offensive Exploiting Reconnaissance and Tactical Drone Superiority, Supported by Intensified IO: RF could leverage its persistent reconnaissance and enhanced tactical drone capabilities (including FPVs and COTS drones at the unit level) to identify a vulnerable point along the front line in Eastern or Southern Ukraine, leading to a rapid, localized ground offensive supported by heavy fire and coordinated tactical drone strikes, aimed at achieving a tactical breakthrough or seizing key terrain, particularly if UAF assets (like artillery) are effectively neutralized by RF drones. This would be immediately followed by intense IO claiming significant breakthroughs and demoralization of UAF. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Reconnaissance and tactical drone capabilities enable exploitation, but no direct indicators of an imminent large-scale ground offensive; IO aspect is highly likely.)
  3. Expanded Hybrid Operations (Kinetic, Cyber, Atrocity-Denial IO) Targeting New Infrastructure/Regions and Escalated Geopolitical Confrontation: RF could expand its hybrid operations (kinetic strikes on new critical infrastructure sectors, cyber attacks, intensified disinformation) to target new critical infrastructure sectors (e.g., water, communications) or new geographical regions, aiming to create widespread disruption. Concurrently, RF might use its diplomatic engagements (e.g., SCO summit) to solidify an anti-Western bloc and overtly challenge international support for Ukraine, leading to more aggressive geopolitical actions or rhetoric beyond the current scope, while simultaneously launching massive IO campaigns to deny any and all allegations of war crimes or atrocities by RF forces. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Precedents in hybrid operations and geopolitical maneuvering exist, with new Odesa/Illichivsk/Dnipro strikes highlighting target expansion; new IO focus on atrocity-denial is likely.)

• Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

  • Immediate (0-12 hours): UAF IAMD and ground units in Sumy, Poltava, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, and all areas under air raid alert must remain on highest alert for incoming kinetic strikes, particularly massed drone attacks targeting critical energy and transport infrastructure, and ballistic/cruise missile threats. ISR assets should prioritize tracking inbound reconnaissance UAVs, identifying kinetic drone/MLRS/artillery launch sites (deep and tactical, including COTS drone operations by RF ground units), and deep strike drone launch sites to interdict them before they can relay targeting data or deliver payloads. Urgent IMINT verification of Simferopol airport helicopter destruction remains a top priority. STRATCOM must prepare to counter RF propaganda using diplomatic events and claimed tactical drone successes, and continue to expose RF's "outright lies" regarding battlefield outcomes. Clarify explicit timeframe (e.g., "overnight") for UAF Air Force claim of 126/142 UAVs neutralized. UAF must immediately conduct BDA for Dnipro and Illichivsk strikes.
  • Short-term (12-48 hours): UAF must conduct immediate comprehensive BDA on all critical infrastructure targets hit by recent strikes, especially Odesa's energy facilities, Illichivsk railway ferry complex, and Dnipro, assessing civilian casualties and damage. STRATCOM needs to actively counter RF narratives, particularly those promoting diplomatic achievements, historical revisionism, and exaggerating battlefield successes. Transparently report on UAF PVO successes (especially the high number of UAV neutralizations) and resilience (e.g., power/transport restoration, effective warnings), and confirmed RF losses. Highlight the explicit targeting of civilian energy and transport infrastructure by RF to international partners. Monitor Putin's statements from China for any significant shifts in RF foreign policy. Diplomatic channels should be utilized to reiterate urgent IAMD requirements, with a clear focus on systems capable of defeating massed drone attacks against critical infrastructure (energy, transport), ballistic missiles, and tactical offensive drones. Prioritize measures to protect and harden critical energy and transport infrastructure, particularly in the Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhia regions.
  • 02 SEP: Assess the actual impact of predicted magnetic storms on C2, ISR, and precision strike capabilities for both UAF and RF. Adjust operational plans accordingly, prioritizing hardened systems.
  • Next Week: Continuous assessment of RF's ability to sustain widespread massed drone attacks and diversified kinetic strikes, and the effectiveness of UAF's IAMD against these evolving threats. Strategic planning for long-term DIB and critical infrastructure protection remains crucial. Ukraine's diplomatic corps will need to vigorously engage with international partners to secure a significant boost in counter-UAV/IAMD capabilities, with a clear focus on defeating both reconnaissance and strike platforms across all threatened regions, including tactical ground defense against attack drones.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• CRITICAL: Full Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) on RF Deep Strikes Against Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base (DIB) and Critical Civilian Infrastructure (PRIORITY Odesa Energy Facilities, Illichivsk Railway Ferry Complex, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Poltava) AND UAF Strikes on RF Military Assets (PRIORITY Simferopol Airport, Tula Explosives Warehouse): Urgent IMINT (satellite imagery, drone reconnaissance), SIGINT (intercepts), and HUMINT (local sources, technical intelligence) are required to verify the specific targets, extent of damage, and operational impact of recent RF strikes, especially the damage to four DTEK energy facilities in Odesa, the railway ferry complex in Illichivsk, and the confirmed strike in Dnipro, and the destruction of two helicopters at Simferopol airport and the Tula explosives warehouse. This is paramount for assessing Ukraine's long-term defense capabilities, national resilience, and UAF deep strike effectiveness.
• CRITICAL: Accurate Ground Truth Kamyshevakha / Dobropillya (Donetsk Oblast) and RF Force Dispositions/Intentions: Urgent ISR (UAVs, HUMINT from frontline sources) is required to confirm/deny RF claims of capture of Kamyshevakha and UAF claims of encirclement at Dobropillya. This is essential for validating the front line, assessing RF offensive capabilities, and informing immediate tactical exploitation or defensive action. Specifically, identify RF troop strength, reinforcement capabilities, and intent in this contested area.
• HIGH: RF Massed Drone Attack Patterns, C2, and Associated Strike Assets (PRIORITY Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Illichivsk, Sumy, Poltava, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and active Eastern/Southern Fronts - with specific focus on critical energy/transport infrastructure targeting, tactical drone capabilities including COTS, and missile launch platforms): Enhanced SIGINT, EW (electronic warfare) intercept capabilities, and IMINT (drone reconnaissance) are required to understand the specific types of massed drones (e.g., "Geran-2"/Shaheds) and tactical kinetic drones (including COTS models like DJI Mavic 3) being employed, their C2 mechanisms, launch sites, flight paths, and, critically, their direct link to follow-on strike assets (e.g., artillery positions, KAB launch platforms, missile systems). This is essential for developing effective pre-emptive counter-drone and counter-missile strategies, especially against coordinated attacks on critical infrastructure. Specifically, investigate the RF claims of the drone strike on a UAF mortar crew.
• HIGH: Impact of Predicted Magnetic Storms on UAF and RF C2, ISR, and Precision Strike Capabilities: Urgent technical assessment and modeling are required to determine the specific vulnerabilities and potential degradation of UAF communications, GPS-guided systems, and ISR platforms due to the strong magnetic storms forecast for 02 SEP. Simultaneously, assess the potential impact on RF capabilities and identify any specific vulnerabilities RF might possess (e.g., reliance on commercial GPS). This will inform mitigation strategies and operational adjustments.
• HIGH: Verification of RF Claims on Tactical Drone Successes and UAF Claims on RF Demoralization/Atrocities: Urgent IMINT (drone footage analysis, satellite imagery) and HUMINT (frontline reporting, interviews with captured personnel or defectors) are required to verify RF claims, such as the destruction of a UAF mortar crew and logistics vehicle. Concurrently, verify UAF claims such as the FPV drone strike on a suicidal RF soldier and the "Mikhail 'Migel'" testimony alleging RF atrocities. This is crucial for accurate BDA, assessing RF's tactical drone capabilities, and informing IO.
• HIGH: RF Tactical COTS Drone Procurement, Integration, and Volunteer Logistical Support Networks: Further in-depth investigation into RF ground unit procurement, training, and integration of COTS drones (e.g., DJI Mavic 3). This requires HUMINT (captured personnel, local sources) and OSINT (social media posts, procurement channels) to understand the scale and effectiveness of this adaptation. Additionally, investigate the scale, organization, and funding of the civilian/volunteer logistical networks supporting RF forces to identify potential interdiction points.
• MEDIUM: Location and Extent of Damage to Residential Building (Donbas/Kyiv): Urgent IMINT/HUMINT is required to precisely geo-locate the damaged residential building shown in "Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦" video and assess the full extent of damage, clarifying the contradictory location statements.
• MEDIUM: RF Paratrooper Activity in Zaporizhzhia: What is the composition, disposition, and intent of RF paratrooper units previously reported in the Zaporizhzhia direction? Urgent ISR (UAVs, HUMINT from frontline sources) is required.
• MEDIUM: Assessment of RF Strategic Aviation and Ballistic Missile Activity and Intent: Enhanced SIGINT and IMINT are required to continuously monitor RF strategic bomber bases (e.g., Engels-2) and ballistic missile launch sites for signs of heightened activity, pre-flight preparations, and sortie/launch generation patterns, to provide early warning of potential "massive attacks" or high-threat strikes, especially for Sumy, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts.
• MEDIUM: Impact and Outcomes of Putin's Visit to China: HUMINT (diplomatic sources), OSINT (Chinese and Russian state media, international press), and SIGINT (relevant intercepts) are required to assess any new agreements (military, economic, technological), joint statements, or shifts in policy that may result from Putin's China visit.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. IMMEDIATE: Enhance Point-Defense for All Critical Civilian Infrastructure (Energy, Transport, Industrial) and Bolster IAMD for All Threatened Oblasts Against Missile/Drone Threats - FOCUS ON DEFEATING MASSED DRONE ATTACKS:

   • ACTION: Immediately deploy additional mobile, short-range GBAD systems (e.g., MANPADS, anti-aircraft artillery, short-range missile systems), EW assets capable of detecting, jamming, and kinetically engaging massed deep strike drones (Shaheds, "Geran-2") and ballistic/cruise missiles, specifically prioritizing critical energy, transport (ports, railway hubs), and industrial infrastructure in Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Poltava. Task UAF Air Force to maintain combat air patrols or quick reaction alerts to intercept incoming missile and drone launch platforms. Implement enhanced physical hardening and dispersal strategies for all critical facilities. (PRIORITY: CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE - EXPLICIT TARGETING OF WIDER RANGE OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, CONTINUED MISSILE THREAT.)
   • REASONING: The confirmed massed drone attacks on Odesa's energy, Illichivsk's transport infrastructure, and new strike on Dnipro, coupled with persistent missile threats, highlight an immediate and severe threat to all critical civilian infrastructure and regional security. Robust and adaptable air defense, particularly point defense, is paramount to mitigating damage and maintaining national resilience and economic function.

2. IMMEDIATE: Intensify All-Source ISR on RF Deep Strike Assets (UAVs, Missile Platforms, Kinetic Drone Launch/Control Units, Tactical COTS Drone Operations by Ground Units, and Logistical Support Networks) and Ground Force Movements in Eastern and Northern Axes, with Focus on Contested Areas, Drone C2/Launch Logistics for Multiple Axes, and RF Tactical Concealment:

   • ACTION: Task all-source ISR assets (IMINT, SIGINT, long-range drones, HUMINT, and potentially specialized multi-spectral sensors) for continuous 24/7 monitoring of RF airfields, missile launch platforms, deep strike drone launch sites, all suspected tactical drone launch sites (including those operating COTS drones by RF ground units), and heavy artillery/MLRS positions, especially those capable of reaching Southern, Eastern, and Northern/Central Oblasts. Prioritize identifying UAV/kinetic drone (especially COTS drone) launch and control sites, as well as logistical nodes enabling the rapid re-arming and relaunch of drone waves responsible for attacks, to enable pre-emptive targeting. Increase ISR coverage of RF ground force concentrations, logistics (including volunteer supply networks), and suspected advance routes in the Donetsk direction (including Kamyshevakha/Dobropillya) and verify RF claims regarding Krasnoarmiysk and strikes on UAF reinforcement areas in Sumy, to provide early warning of potential localized ground assaults and to immediately verify contested claims. Pursue urgent IMINT verification of Simferopol airport helicopter destruction and Tula explosives warehouse.
   • PRIORITY: CRITICAL (IMMEDIATE - ESCALATED & GEOGRAPHICALLY WIDER THREAT TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, NEW TACTICAL FOCUS ON COTS DRONES AND LOGISTICAL NETWORKS, NEW UAF DEEP STRIKE VERIFICATION)
   • REASONING: Real-time, actionable intelligence on RF deep strike capabilities and ground intentions, now including diverse drone threats, explicit critical infrastructure targeting, and identified logistical shortfalls, is essential for pre-emptive defense, effective targeting of launch platforms, and informing tactical defensive maneuvers. Targeting the logistics and C2 elements of rapid UAV/drone operations and volunteer supply lines can directly reduce attack tempo and operational effectiveness. Immediate and accurate ground truth for contested ground and verification of UAF deep strikes are vital for UAF tactical response and counter-IO.

3. IMMEDIATE: Assess and Mitigate Risks from Predicted Magnetic Storms:

   • ACTION: UAF G6 and relevant technical branches must immediately conduct an assessment of all critical C2, ISR, and precision-guided munition systems for vulnerability to strong magnetic storms (forecast for 02 SEP). Implement immediate mitigation strategies, including prioritizing hardened communication channels, alternative navigation methods, and backup systems. Issue guidance to field units on potential impacts.
   • PRIORITY: CRITICAL (IMMEDIATE - NEW ENVIRONMENTAL THREAT)
   • REASONING: Predicted magnetic storms can severely degrade electronic systems crucial for modern warfare. Proactive assessment and mitigation are essential to maintain operational effectiveness and prevent exploitable vulnerabilities.

4. HIGH: Proactive STRATCOM Campaign to Counter RF Disinformation, Highlight Critical Infrastructure Attacks and Atrocities, and Advocate for Urgent, Broad IAMD Aid (Including Tactical Drone Defense Against COTS Drones and Counter-Critical Infrastructure Defense):

   • ACTION: Immediately launch a comprehensive STRATCOM and PSYOP campaign, using verified imagery and UAF operational updates, to highlight the intensity, coordinated, and explicitly critical infrastructure-targeting nature (energy, transport) of RF deep strikes (especially in Odesa, Illichivsk, Dnipro, Sumy, Poltava, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia), and the documented damage to residential buildings and civilian casualties. Explicitly expose RF's disinformation and historical revisionism (e.g., Zakharchenko commemoration, diplomatic spin), directly counter RF claims of tactical battlefield successes (e.g., drone strike on UAF mortar crew) with factual context, and aggressively highlight and verify alleged RF atrocities (e.g., "Mikhail 'Migel'" testimony). Transparently report on UAF defensive actions, including high numbers of UAV shoot-downs (126/142), successful PVO engagements, effective repair efforts (e.g., power/transport restoration), and significant RF losses. Emphasize the urgent need for advanced IAMD systems and munitions from international partners, with a clear focus on defeating multi-wave, high-tempo drone (including deep strike and COTS tactical drones) and missile attacks across all threatened regions, and for counter-ISR/counter-kinetic drone technology at both the strategic and tactical levels, with a specific and urgent focus on protecting critical civilian energy and transport infrastructure. If confirmed, publicly report the Simferopol airport strike and Tula explosives warehouse strike. Use strong counter-narratives against RF leadership and its allies where appropriate.
   • PRIORITY: HIGH
   • REASONING: RF's aggressive and diversified IO aims to demoralize Ukraine, dilute international support, and legitimize its actions. The explicit targeting of critical energy and transport infrastructure by massed drones is a particularly dangerous development that requires immediate exposure and a strong, factual counter-narrative, now including detailed exposure of alleged atrocities. Coupled with direct calls for critical IAMD aid capable of defeating these evolving threats, this is vital to maintain domestic morale, expose RF's actions, and ensure continued international assistance.

5. MEDIUM: Enhance Tactical Counter-Drone Capabilities for Frontline Units and Target RF Volunteer Logistical Networks:

   • ACTION: Immediately prioritize the deployment of tactical counter-drone systems (e.g., jammers, short-range kinetic interceptors, specialized small arms for drone engagement) to frontline UAF units, with specific training focused on identifying and neutralizing COTS drones (like DJI Mavic 3) and other tactical offensive drones used by RF ground units. Incorporate lessons learned from recent RF tactical drone strikes (e.g., against mortar crews) into revised defensive tactics and training. Simultaneously, task HUMINT and OSINT assets to identify key nodes, individuals, and financial channels within RF's volunteer logistical networks to enable potential disruption.
   • PRIORITY: MEDIUM (TACTICAL - NEW RF TACTICAL DRONE STRIKE CLAIM, COTS DRONE REQUEST, AND IDENTIFIED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT SYSTEM)
   • REASONING: The confirmed use and request for COTS drones by RF ground units highlight an immediate and persistent tactical threat. Equipping frontline units with effective counter-drone capabilities is crucial. Identifying and disrupting RF's volunteer logistical networks can further degrade their ability to sustain combat operations.

8. ANNEXES

• Annex A: Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) Summary - (Video of Odesa explosions/fires from previous report, "Colonelcassad" alleged UAF military equipment strike from previous report, "Сливочный каприз" alleged UAF equipment strike from previous report, Colonelcassad aviation strike footage, Операция Z anti-thermal cloak video, Colonelcassad military construction video, Colonelcassad "SMO zone" images, Colonelcassad tactical rifle image from previous messages, Colonelcassad RCBD school opening image from previous messages, Colonelcassad Donbass drone strike video, НгП раZVедка tactical team video from previous messages, Colonelcassad FPV drone strike on MaxxPro video from previous messages, Colonelcassad "НгПшники изловили хохла" video of captured UAF soldier, TASS video of Putin's arrival in China, Операция Z combat video from Zaporizhzhia, Colonelcassad Rostec fire drone video, Operatyvnyi ZSU video of downed "Gerbera" camera footage, Zaporizhzhia OVA photos of attack aftermath, Serhiy Lysak / Dnipropetrovsk OVA photos of building damage, Basurin O Glavnom "DAYinHISTORY" images, Colonelcassad BM-27 Uragan MLRS video, Два майора Odesa attack videos/photos, Олександр Вілкул Kryvyi Rih update photo, АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАZА "Good morning" photo (likely propaganda), РБК-Україна Odesa firefighter video/photos, Олег Синєгубов, голова Харківської ОДА Kharkiv damage photos, ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS Simferopol airport satellite imagery, Оперативний ЗСУ Simferopol airport satellite imagery, ТАСС FPV drone strike on UAF howitzer video, Fighterbomber C-130 cockpit video, Басурин о главном Zakharchenko commemoration video, Воин DV artillery strike video (Novoselivka-Sosnovka), ТАСС Putin's Aurus in China photo, Colonelcassad 360-degree video of Putin's arrival, РБК-Україна German female conscription photo, 46 окрема аеромобільна Подільська бригада ДШВ ЗС України memorial run photos, Операция Z Putin arrival video, Запорізька обласна військова адміністрація 🇺🇦 minute of silence video, КМВА (Київська міська військова адміністрація) memorial photo, РБК-Україна "Рубіж" Brigade fundraising photo, Оперативний ЗСУ minute of silence photo, Повітряні Сили ЗС України / Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine 126 UAVs neutralized graphic, Сили оборони Півдня України operational information graphic. UPDATED IMINT from previous SITREP: Дневник Десантника🇷🇺 video (soldier requesting drone), ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS photo (Odesa energy damage graphic), WarGonzo photo (Zakharchenko commemoration), Операция Z videos (Odesa explosions/fires, Dnipro explosion), Colonelcassad videos (Chornomorsk explosions/fires, Dnipro explosion, Odesa explosion), STERNENKO video (Putin arrival in China), Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦 video (damaged residential building), ASTRA photos/video (Odesa firefighter, damaged truck, Odesa damage), ОТУ "Харків"🇺🇦 photo (RF losses graphic), Воин DV video (drone strike on UAF mortar crew/vehicle), Координаційний штаб з питань поводження з військовополоненими photos (children at music competition), Генеральний штаб ЗСУ photo (Gerasimov counter-propaganda graphic), РБК-Україна photo (Odesa DTEK damage graphic). NEW IMINT: Военкор Котенок video (Mikhail "Migel" testimony), Colonelcassad photos (Putin SCO summit), Рыбарь photo ("Asymmetric measures"), Colonelcassad photo (Illichivsk "Geran-2" strike), БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС video (RF soldier suicide/drone), Оперативний ЗСУ photo (RF offensive failed graphic), Сили оборони Півдня України photo (strikes on enemy), ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS photo (RF offensive failed graphic), 🇺🇦 Запорізька обласна військова адміністрація 🇺🇦 photo (hospitalized civilians), Colonelcassad videos (Moscow volunteer supplies, Zaporizhzhia/Kherson supplies, Donbas/Konstantinovka requests), STERNENKO photo ("rock carving" message), ASTRA photos (Balashikha fire), АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА photo (Ukrainian mercenaries in Africa - RF IO). )
• Annex B: Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) References - (Links to ТАСС, Colonelcassad, Военкор Котенок, Повітряні Сили ЗС України / Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Сливочный каприз, Николаевский Ванёк, Alex Parker Returns, Операция Z, РБК-Україна, Запорізька обласна військова адміністрація 🇺🇦, ASTRA, Deep State map reference in thermal footage from previous report, previous references in this report for KABs on Kharkiv and UAV in Chernihiv, НгП раZVедка, The Wall Street Journal, ASTRA's videos on Moscow detentions, ТАСС on Trump's executive order and sports convictions, Запорізька обласна військова адміністрація 🇺🇦 alert from previous messages, ТАСС on Krasnoarmiysk troop movements, ТАСС on Rostov UAV, ТАСС on Xi-Lukashenko meeting, ТАСС on US counter-UAV group, РБК-Україна on ISW report, ТАСС on Volgograd airport, ТАСС on Volgograd UAV attack, ТАСС on FPV swarm tech, Запорізька обласна військова адміністрація 🇺🇦 on power restoration, РБК-Україна on PVO in Zaporizhzhia, Повітряні Сили ЗС України / Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on UAVs in Zaporizhzhia/Chernihiv, Operatyvnyi ZSU on downed "Gerbera" camera footage, ТАСС on Gaza humanitarian aid, Запорізька обласна військова адміністрація 🇺🇦 on casualties in Zaporizhzhia, ТАСС on Trump/NSC, Генеральний штаб ЗСУ on RF losses, Оперативний ЗСУ on RF losses, ТАСС on Sumy strikes, Сергій Лисак / Дніпропетровська ОДА (ОВА) on Dnipropetrovsk attacks, Басурин о главном on "DAYinHISTORY", ТАСС on 21 UAVs shot down, AV БогомаZ on Bryansk UAV, Два майора on Odesa strikes, РБК-Україна on RF losses, Олександр Вілкул on Kryvyi Rih, Оперативний ЗСУ on Odesa UAV attack, ТАСС on hotel registration, АSTRA on 21 UAVs, РБК-Україна on Odesa energy, STERNENKO on Odesa UAV, ТАСС on Scott Ritter, АSTRA on Kherson wounded, ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS on ISW report, АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАZА "Good morning" post, ТАСС on "Wheely" restrictions, ASTRA on Moscow singer detention, ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS on Putin in China, Олег Синєгубов, голова Харківської ОДА on Kharkiv strikes, 46 окрема аеромобільна Подільська бригада ДШВ ЗС України on memorial run, ТАСС on holiday planning, ТАСС on FPV drone strike on howitzer, Colonelcassad on Estonian handover, Воин DV on Novoselivka-Sosnovka strikes, Дневник Десантника🇷🇺 "Good morning" post, STERNENKO "Morning donation" post, ТАСС on Kazakhstan Russian language, БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС on Solovyov's threats, Генеральний штаб ЗСУ "Tactical Analysis" boilerplate, КМВА (Київська міська військова адміністрація) memorial boilerplate, Сили оборони Півдня України boilerplate. NEW OSINT: ASTRA Telegram channel (142 UAVs, Balashikha fire), Военкор Котенок Telegram channel (Mikhail "Migel" testimony), Рыбарь Telegram channel (review, asymmetric measures), ТАСС Telegram channel (Western brands, scholarships), Новости Москвы Telegram channel (traffic accidents - repeating TASS), БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС Telegram channel (RF soldier suicide/drone), Повітряні Сили ЗС України / Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Telegram channel (Odesa UAV), Colonelcassad Telegram channel (volunteer supplies/requests, Illichivsk strike). )
• Annex C: SIGINT and EW Summary - (UAF Air Force alerts on UAV threats for Odesa, Chornomorsk, Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Николаевский Ванёк reporting on drone waves, previous alerts for Chernihiv UAV, Kharkiv KABs, Zaporizhzhia KABs, potential SIGINT on C2 of kinetic drones in Donbass, SIGINT on FPV drone C2 in Donbas, potential SIGINT on RF PVO activity in Rostov Oblast, SIGINT on FPV drone swarm control, SIGINT on Volgograd UAV attack, UAF Air Force alerts on UAV/KABs/artillery in Dnipropetrovsk, SIGINT on "Gerbera" drone's internal data link, potential SIGINT on RF claims of strikes in Sumy Oblast, SIGINT on widespread RF PVO activity in multiple regions, potential SIGINT on Odesa deep strike drones, potential SIGINT on BM-27 Uragan C2 and drone BDA integration, potential SIGINT on FPV drone C2 and targeting of UAF howitzers near Konstantinovka, potential SIGINT from Simferopol airport strike BDA, SIGINT related to UAF Air Force claim of 126 UAV neutralizations, potential SIGINT on artillery C2 in Novoselivka-Sosnovka area. UPDATED SIGINT from previous SITREP: UAF Air Force alerts on missile danger in Sumy/Poltava, SIGINT on RF deep strike drones over Odesa/Chornomorsk (e.g., "Geraniums"), SIGINT related to RF tactical drone strike on UAF mortar crew/vehicle, SIGINT related to RF ground unit COTS drone operations/requests. NEW SIGINT: SIGINT on deep strike on Dnipro, SIGINT on UAV in Black Sea towards Odesa. )