Situation Report

SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - 310600Z AUG 25 (UPDATE 1)

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: Russian Federation (RF) maintains multi-domain deep strike and reconnaissance posture. Eastern Ukraine remains highly contested. RF internal information operations focus on military construction and propaganda. RF also demonstrates active drone-based kinetic strikes on Ukrainian armored vehicles and positions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with new kinetic drone activity and KABs in Zaporizhzhia)

• Northern Ukraine (Chernihiv Oblast): UAF Air Force reports enemy UAVs detected in eastern Chernihiv Oblast, moving southwest. This indicates continued reconnaissance or potential strike vector from the north. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Previous confirmed reconnaissance activity, re-confirmed by new message)

• Eastern Ukraine (Kharkiv Oblast): UAF Air Force reports launches of KABs (Guided Aerial Bombs) towards Kharkiv Oblast. This confirms an active deep strike engagement following previous reconnaissance efforts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Previous confirmed kinetic strike activity)

• Eastern Ukraine (Donetsk Oblast - Krasnoarmiysk/Pokrovsk): TASS reports that RF forces claim the transfer of units from at least 10 brigades and regiments of UAF and National Guard from various front sectors to Krasnoarmiysk. This suggests an RF perception of UAF force consolidation or reinforcement in the area. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - RF claim, requires independent verification.)

• Eastern Ukraine (Donetsk Oblast): RF claims of control over Kamyshevakha and previous UAF claims of encirclement in Dobropillya remain unverified by new information. This area remains contested. Colonelcassad is amplifying general propaganda images from the "SMO zone," likely referring to this contested eastern front, and also releasing footage of drone strikes on Ukrainian positions. (CRITICAL GAP - No new information to verify contested claims; RF is pushing general morale-boosting imagery and now showing drone combat footage.) "Операция Z" is amplifying combat video from the Zaporizhzhia front, featuring the 291st Regiment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New information)

• Southern Ukraine (Zaporizhzhia Oblast): UAF Air Force reports launches of KABs towards Zaporizhzhia Oblast. UAF Air Force now reports new enemy UAVs detected in Zaporizhzhia. RF reports "massed UAV attack" being repelled in Volgograd Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New confirmed kinetic strike activity and UAV presence, new RF internal UAV defense) UAF PVO is reported active in Zaporizhzhia. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New information)

• Central Ukraine (Possible - Drone Strike Footage): Colonelcassad's video showing drone strikes on a MaxxPro MRAP, trenches, and communication structures (including thermal imagery) is captioned "Donbass." This confirms active kinetic drone operations, likely in the eastern or southern regions, targeting UAF ground assets. Identified drones include 'BABA-YAGA' and 'MAVIC.' (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New confirmed kinetic drone activity with specific target types)

• RF Internal (Volgograd Oblast): Rosaviatsiya reports restrictions on aircraft arrival and departure have been lifted at Volgograd airport. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW INFORMATION, REVERSAL OF PREVIOUS RESTRICTION) However, the governor of Volgograd Oblast reports a "massed UAV attack" is being repelled in the region. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW INFORMATION, CONFLICTING SIGNALS ON SECURITY)

• RF Internal (Rostov Oblast): RF Air Defense Forces (PVO) reportedly destroyed a UAV in Rostov Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - RF claim, demonstrates ongoing internal defense against UAVs.)

• RF Internal (Kaliningrad): TASS reports that copies of monuments "destroyed in Europe" will be displayed in a park in Kaliningrad, commemorating the start of WWII. This is an information operation, not a military one. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New Information)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Aerial Operations: The confirmed UAV activity in Chernihiv and Zaporizhzhia, KAB launches towards Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia, and drone strike footage from "Donbass" indicate continued favorable weather conditions for drone and air-launched guided munition operations. Thermal imaging use in the drone footage suggests operations at night or in low-visibility conditions. No significant atmospheric impediments are reported for the immediate future. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with thermal imagery observation, re-confirmed by new UAV activity)
• Space Weather: TASS reports strong magnetic storms are forecast for 02 SEP due to solar plasma ejection. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Previous Information)
  • Impact Assessment: Strong magnetic storms could potentially affect satellite communications, GPS reliability, and sensitive electronic equipment, impacting both friendly and enemy C2 and ISR capabilities. This is a potential disruptor for precision-guided munitions and long-range communications. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Analytical Judgment)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF:

  • Reconnaissance & Strike Operations: RF is conducting active reconnaissance-in-force using UAVs across Northern (Chernihiv) and Southern (Zaporizhzhia) axes, and conducting KAB strikes on Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia. Furthermore, RF is actively employing drones for direct kinetic strikes on UAF ground assets. This confirms and expands the intelligence-to-strike cycle. A "massed UAV attack" in Volgograd indicates a potential new axis of internal threat for RF, or a significant internal security incident. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New confirmed drone strike capabilities and KABs in Zaporizhzhia, new internal UAV defense activity)
  • Force Generation/Technological Advancement: TASS reports RF has begun to apply "group FPV-drone control technology" using a single operator in the "special operation zone." This indicates an advanced and highly efficient tactical drone capability. Colonelcassad is promoting a new heavy fire drone from Rostec. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW INFORMATION, significant technological advancement)
  • Internal Affairs/Force Generation: RF Deputy Minister of Defense, Major General Pavel Fradkov, is featured discussing capital construction projects. Colonelcassad announces the opening of a new Higher Military Engineering School of Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense (RCBD) in Saratov, featuring Hero of Russia Lt Gen Igor Kirillov. This emphasizes RF's long-term commitment to military infrastructure and specialized force generation. Colonelcassad continues to publish general photo messages related to the "SMO zone," likely intended as morale-boosting propaganda, and images of modern tactical rifles. The new drone strike footage on "Donbass" serves as operational propaganda. RF Air Defense in Rostov Oblast indicates ongoing internal security measures against UAV threats. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with new propaganda content and internal PVO activity)
  • Internal Disruptions: The lifting of restrictions at Volgograd airport indicates a return to normalcy for that specific logistical node. However, the reported "massed UAV attack" in the same region raises concerns about the nature of the previous restriction or a new and immediate threat. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Conflicting New Information) TASS reports on fraudsters imitating "Mir Pay" app, indicating internal cybercrime. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New information on cybercrime)
  • Information Operations (Historical Revisionism): The Kaliningrad monument exhibition serves as a clear information operation to shape historical narratives. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New Information)
  • Information Operations (UAF Prisoner Interrogation): Colonelcassad is disseminating a video showing the interrogation of a captured UAF soldier, aimed at demoralizing UAF forces and boosting RF morale. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New information)
  • Diplomatic Engagement: TASS publishes video of Putin's arrival in China, indicating the state visit is underway. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New information)

• UAF:

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) & ISR: UAF Air Force is demonstrating highly effective real-time threat detection and warning for enemy UAVs (Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia) and incoming KABs (Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia), indicating robust surveillance and warning capabilities. UAF PVO is actively engaged in Zaporizhzhia. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with KABs and UAVs in Zaporizhzhia, active PVO)
  • Civilian Defense: Ukrainian authorities are providing prompt public alerts and all-clear notifications for aerial threats. Zaporizhzhia OVA reports power restored to all consumers after an RF attack. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Confirmed power restoration in Zaporizhzhia)
  • Force Reinforcement (RF Claim): RF claims UAF is reinforcing Krasnoarmiysk. This should be verified. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - RF Claim, Requires Verification)

1.4. Intelligence Gaps from Previous Report Addressed/Updated:

• RF Ballistic Missile Types (Zaporizhzhia/Dnipropetrovsk): No new information. (REMAINS A GAP.)
• BDA on RF Deep Strikes on Ukrainian DIB: No new information. (CRITICAL GAP PERSISTS.)
• Accurate Ground Truth Kamyshevakha / Dobropillya: No new information to verify contested claims. (CRITICAL GAP PERSISTS, now more urgent due to lack of update.)
• RF Paratrooper Activity in Zaporizhzhia: No new specific intelligence. (REMAINS A GAP.)
• UAF Reinforcement in Krasnoarmiysk: New RF claim to be verified. (NEW GAP)
• Volgograd Airport Closure: Restriction lifted, but new "massed UAV attack" reported. (GAP SHIFTED, NEW GAP ON UAV ATTACK)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:

  • Persistent Multi-Oblast Reconnaissance & Multi-Domain Strike: RF demonstrates the capability to deploy reconnaissance UAVs across wide geographical areas (Sumy, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Chernihiv) and immediately follow with kinetic strikes (KABs on Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia). New intelligence confirms the capability to conduct direct kinetic strikes on ground targets using various drone models ("BABA-YAGA," "MAVIC"), including armored vehicles and entrenched positions. This signifies an integrated and diversified ISR-to-strike capability. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New information on drone strike capability and KABs in Zaporizhzhia, confirmed by new UAV activity)
  • Advanced Drone Technology (FPV Swarms): RF has demonstrated the application of "group FPV-drone control technology" by a single operator, indicating a significant advancement in tactical drone swarm capabilities, increasing efficiency and potential lethality on the battlefield. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW INFORMATION, significant capability)
  • Specialized Force Generation: RF continues to invest in specialized military education and infrastructure, as evidenced by the new RCBD school. This suggests a long-term strategy for developing specific military capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Previous Information)
  • Internal Infrastructure Development: RF continues to develop its internal military-construction complex, indicating long-term planning for military sustainment and expansion. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Diplomatic Engagement: President Putin's visit to Tianjin (China) signals continued high-level diplomatic engagement to maintain or expand strategic partnerships. Lukashenko's meeting with Xi Jinping at the SCO summit also signals continued Belarus-China diplomatic engagement. TASS reports that Witkoff is reporting directly to Trump after meetings with Putin, indicating continued, potentially covert, diplomatic engagement outside traditional channels. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New information on Lukashenko-Xi meeting, Witkoff/Trump engagement, Putin's arrival in China)
  • Hybrid Warfare (Information): RF actively uses historical narratives for information operations (Kaliningrad memorial). RF is actively using captured UAF personnel for propaganda purposes. ISW reports RF attempts to convince the West of "inevitability of victory." (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New information on Kaliningrad and UAF prisoner video, ISW report)
  • Internal Security (Covert Operations/Paramilitary): "НгП раZVедка" video depicting individuals in tactical gear with balaclavas, carrying equipment in a public setting, suggests the presence or movement of specialized internal security/paramilitary forces within RF. The "archive video" caption might be a cover. RF PVO activity in Rostov and the reported "massed UAV attack" in Volgograd also demonstrate internal security capabilities and a potential increase in internal threats. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Analytical Judgment based on imagery, updated with PVO activity and Volgograd UAV attack)

• Intentions:

  • Degrade UAF Defense/Offensive Capabilities: RF intends to use reconnaissance and follow-on kinetic strikes (KABs, drone strikes, including advanced FPV swarm tactics) to degrade UAF military assets, energy infrastructure, and potentially critical civilian infrastructure across multiple fronts, including the expansion of KAB usage into Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia, and direct drone strikes on ground units. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with FPV swarm tactics)
  • Sustain Long-Term Military Capacity: RF intends to bolster its military infrastructure, specialized forces, and logistical resilience through ongoing construction projects and educational initiatives, signaling a commitment to protracted conflict. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Maintain Strategic Alliances & Diplomatic Influence: Putin's visit to China highlights RF's intent to reinforce key strategic alliances. Lukashenko's presence at SCO further strengthens Belarus's ties to China, aligning with RF's broader geopolitical goals. The Witkoff/Trump reporting suggests an intention to maintain influence with key figures in potential adversary nations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Shape Public Opinion (Internal & External): RF intends to project an image of strength, historical legitimacy, and victimhood through propaganda (e.g., Kaliningrad memorial, Colonelcassad "SMO zone" footage, UAF prisoner interrogation video, ISW reports). (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New information, including ISW report)
  • Maintain Internal Security: The activities of internal security forces (as suggested by "НгП раZVедка" video) and PVO in Rostov and Volgograd point to RF's intent to control its internal environment, potentially against dissent or perceived threats, and to defend against internal UAV attacks. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Updated with Volgograd UAV attack)
  • Influence UAF Force Disposition: RF claims of UAF redeploying units to Krasnoarmiysk could be an information operation to influence UAF decision-making regarding force allocation. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Analytical Judgment)

• Courses of Action (COA) Currently Observed:

  • Widespread Reconnaissance Operations Followed by Diversified Kinetic Strikes: RF is conducting extensive reconnaissance using UAVs in Northern, Eastern, and Southern Ukraine, immediately followed by KAB strikes, and now also direct drone strikes on ground targets, including the use of FPV drone swarm technology. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with FPV swarm technology)
  • Continued Internal Military Development & Specialized Training: RF is actively engaged in large-scale military construction projects and the establishment of new specialized military academies, alongside the development of advanced military technologies. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with FPV swarm technology)
  • Strategic Diplomatic Engagements: RF is actively pursuing high-level diplomatic engagements with key partners (e.g., China, Belarus) and potentially maintaining back-channel communications. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New information on back-channels and Belarus engagement, Putin's arrival in China)
  • Intensified Information Operations: RF is leveraging historical narratives, combat footage, captured personnel, and reports on "inevitability of victory" for propaganda purposes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New information, including ISW report)
  • Internal Security Operations: Likely deployment or movement of specialized internal security forces and active internal air defense, including against "massed UAV attacks." (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Updated with Volgograd UAV attack)

2.2. Recent tactical changes or adaptations

• Direct Kinetic Drone Operations on Ground Targets: The most notable adaptation is the confirmed direct kinetic engagement of UAF ground assets (armored vehicles, trenches, communication structures) using drones, expanding beyond mere reconnaissance or long-range missile strikes. This signifies a more granular and immediate tactical strike capability directly linked to drone reconnaissance. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New and significant tactical adaptation)
• Advanced FPV Drone Swarm Control: The reported implementation of "group FPV-drone control technology" by a single operator represents a significant tactical adaptation, increasing the efficiency, coordination, and potential scale of FPV drone attacks on the battlefield. This could lead to more concentrated and overwhelming tactical drone assaults. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW AND SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL ADAPTATION)
• Expanded KAB Strike Axes: The confirmed KAB launches in Zaporizhzhia Oblast indicate a geographical expansion of this deep strike method. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New tactical adaptation)
• Expansion of RCBD Training Capacity: The opening of a new RCBD school suggests an adaptation to potential future warfare scenarios or a response to perceived gaps in existing capabilities, reflecting a long-term doctrinal emphasis. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Refinement of IO on Battlefield Imagery: Colonelcassad's detailed drone footage with overlays ("MaxxPro MRAP," "блиндаж," "патч-антенна") and drone model identification ("BABA-YAGA," "MAVIC") suggests a more sophisticated approach to presenting combat operations as propaganda. The video of the captured UAF soldier is a new element of tactical-level IO. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New adaptation)

2.3. Logistics and sustainment status

• RF Logistics (UAVs/KABs/Drones): The sustained and widespread use of reconnaissance UAVs, immediate KAB strikes, and now diverse kinetic drones (including FPV swarms) indicates a robust supply of these platforms and munitions, along with their associated operational support. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with FPV swarm technology)
• RF Logistics (General Military): The emphasis on military construction projects and specialized training facilities suggests an ongoing commitment and capability to invest in and sustain long-term military infrastructure and human capital. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF Internal Logistics (Air): The lifting of restrictions at Volgograd airport indicates a restoration of normal air logistics at that facility. However, the concurrent "massed UAV attack" in the region suggests ongoing security or operational challenges. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Conflicting New Information)

2.4. Command and control effectiveness

• RF C2: The synchronized deployment of reconnaissance UAVs across multiple axes, immediately followed by KAB strikes, and now the integration of direct kinetic drone strikes, including advanced FPV swarm control from a single operator, suggests highly effective operational and tactical-level C2, capable of coordinating surveillance efforts with diverse kinetic strike operations rapidly and efficiently. RF PVO successfully destroying a UAV in Rostov and repelling a "massed UAV attack" in Volgograd also indicates effective regional C2. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with drone strike integration, FPV swarm C2, and internal PVO effectiveness)
• UAF C2: UAF Air Force's rapid detection, identification, and public warning about UAVs in Chernihiv and Zaporizhzhia, and KABs on Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia demonstrates highly effective C2 and integrated air defense surveillance. Active PVO in Zaporizhzhia further confirms effective C2. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with KABs and UAVs in Zaporizhzhia, active PVO)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

• Ukrainian force posture and readiness: UAF forces are maintaining a high state of vigilance against aerial threats, with particularly effective detection and warning systems for reconnaissance UAVs and air-launched munitions. Readiness remains high. The emergence of direct kinetic drone strikes on ground targets, now with advanced FPV swarm capabilities, necessitates heightened awareness and specific counter-measures for forward ground units. UAF units in the Krasnoarmiysk area must be prepared for potential RF information operations or direct action if RF believes UAF units are consolidating there. UAF PVO is actively engaged, indicating responsive defense. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with new threat type, FPV swarm capabilities, and RF claims regarding Krasnoarmiysk, and active PVO)

• Recent tactical successes or setbacks:

  • Successes:
    • UAF Air Force is providing timely and comprehensive warnings on enemy aerial threats (UAVs in Chernihiv and Zaporizhzhia, KABs on Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia), demonstrating effective ISR and IAMD situational awareness. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Rapid and effective public alerting system for aerial threats is operational. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Zaporizhzhia OVA reports successful power restoration to all consumers after an RF attack, indicating effective repair and resilience. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW SPECIFIC SUCCESS)
    • UAF PVO is actively engaged and operating in Zaporizhzhia. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW SPECIFIC SUCCESS)
  • Setbacks:
    • RF continues to project a multi-front, multi-domain reconnaissance and strike threat, now with demonstrated immediate kinetic follow-up in Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia (KABs) and direct drone strikes on ground targets (Donbass), including advanced FPV drone swarm tactics. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New specific setback with drone strikes, FPV swarms, and KABs in Zaporizhzhia)
    • The contested ground situation in Eastern Ukraine (Kamyshevakha/Dobropillya) remains a point of concern with no new updates to verify UAF claims. (CRITICAL GAP)
    • The capture of a UAF soldier by "НгПшники" (likely RF internal security or paramilitary) represents a minor tactical setback and propaganda victory for RF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New specific setback)

• Resource requirements and constraints:

  • Counter-UAV & Anti-KAB/Drone Systems: The expanded reconnaissance threat followed by immediate KAB strikes and direct kinetic drone attacks, including advanced FPV swarm tactics, necessitates additional and enhanced counter-UAV systems (especially those against smaller, high-altitude reconnaissance platforms and loitering munitions), anti-KAB capabilities, and, critically, point-defense systems specifically designed to counter offensive drones targeting ground units. This includes EW, kinetic interceptors (including loitering munitions of our own to counter enemy drones), and ground-based air defense (GBAD) at the tactical edge, with an urgent need for solutions against coordinated FPV drone swarms.
  • ISR (Ground Truth): Urgent need for ISR assets to verify the highly contested claims in Donetsk Oblast (Kamyshevakha, Dobropillya) and RF claims regarding Krasnoarmiysk.
  • Air Defense (Pre-strike): As reconnaissance UAVs are "spotters" and KABs/kinetic drones represent immediate follow-on strikes, there's an immediate need for rapid-response air defense assets (e.g., mobile GBAD, short-range interceptors) to interdict these platforms before they can effectively guide strike assets or deliver their payload. This now extends to tactical air defense against direct-attack drones at the company/battalion level, with a focus on countering FPV drone swarms. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated for kinetic drones and FPV swarms)
  • Resilience to Space Weather: UAF must assess vulnerabilities of its C2, ISR, and precision strike assets to magnetic storms predicted for 02 SEP. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

• Propaganda and disinformation campaigns:

  • RF Narratives (Internal Strength/Capacity): RF continues to propagate narratives of internal strength and long-term planning by highlighting military construction and infrastructure development (e.g., new RCBD school). Colonelcassad is amplifying general visual propaganda from the "SMO zone," showcasing modern small arms, and now releasing combat drone footage to demonstrate RF operational effectiveness and damage inflicted on UAF assets, including new heavy fire drone capabilities. TASS reports on new FPV drone swarm control technology, amplifying RF technological prowess. This aims to project stability, capability, and modernity to its domestic audience. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for RF amplification, with new specific examples, drone combat footage, and FPV swarm tech)
  • RF Narratives (Internal Security): TASS reporting on treason arrests and fraudsters imitating "Mir Pay" serves to reinforce state control and deter dissent, while also acknowledging domestic issues. RF reporting a UAV shot down in Rostov Oblast and a "massed UAV attack" repelled in Volgograd Oblast reinforces the narrative of effective internal air defense and a secure homeland, even while confirming internal threats. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New information on Mir Pay fraud, internal PVO, and Volgograd UAV attack)
  • RF Narratives (Historical Victimhood/Revisionism): TASS reporting on the Kaliningrad memorial of "destroyed monuments in Europe" is a clear information operation designed to invoke historical grievances, portray Russia as a victim, and shape narratives around historical events for current political gains, potentially aimed at a European audience. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New and significant IO)
  • RF Narratives (Economic Impact of Migration): "Операция Z" is amplifying content concerning the economic effect of migrants. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Narratives (UAF Weakness/Demoralization): Colonelcassad's video of the captured UAF soldier is a direct psychological operation aimed at demoralizing UAF forces, boosting RF morale, and portraying UAF soldiers as vulnerable. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New and significant IO)
  • RF Narratives (UAF Force Disposition): TASS report on UAF troop movements to Krasnoarmiysk, if widely disseminated, could be an IO effort to mislead UAF or international observers about RF's own intentions or to justify future RF actions in that area. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Analytical Judgment)
  • RF Narratives (Inevitability of Victory): RBC-Ukraine reports ISW analysis that RF is attempting to convince the West of the "inevitability of victory over Ukraine." This is a significant strategic IO effort. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW and significant IO)
  • UAF Counter-Narratives (Transparency, Resilience): UAF continues to provide timely and accurate threat information, reinforcing trust and preparedness. Zaporizhzhia OVA reports successful power restoration, highlighting Ukrainian resilience. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with power restoration)
  • UAF Narratives (RF Economic Weakness): RBC-Ukraine's reporting on Rosneft's profit drop highlights RF economic vulnerabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Public sentiment and morale factors:

  • Ukrainian Public: The persistent threat of reconnaissance UAVs, confirmed KAB strikes in Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia, and now explicit kinetic drone attacks on ground units (with advanced FPV swarm capabilities) will maintain public and frontline anxiety. Prompt UAF warnings and successful engagement efforts (like PVO in Zaporizhzhia and power restoration) provide reassurance. Reporting on RF economic struggles may boost Ukrainian morale. The video of the captured UAF soldier will be demoralizing if widely seen. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated for kinetic drone and KAB impact, FPV swarms, captured soldier video, and UAF successes)
  • Russian Public: RF IO focusing on military construction, general SMO propaganda, specialized military education, modern equipment, combat drone footage, FPV swarm technology, and the captured UAF soldier aims to foster a sense of progress, stability, technological advancement, and long-term commitment, likely boosting morale and support for the leadership. Reports of treason arrests could instill fear and conformity. The narrative regarding the economic impact of migrants might be a pre-emptive measure to manage public discontent regarding economic conditions or labor shortages. The Kaliningrad memorial aims to reinforce a sense of national pride and victimhood. The successful UAV shootdown in Rostov and repulsion of a "massed UAV attack" in Volgograd will reassure the public regarding internal security, even as it signals internal threats. The lifting of Volgograd airport restrictions might be presented as a return to normalcy. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated for new IO, drone footage, FPV swarm tech, and captured soldier video, and Volgograd developments)

• International support and diplomatic developments:

  • The RF internal messaging on military construction and specialized training is unlikely to have a direct impact on international support for Ukraine in the immediate term, but reinforces the long-term nature of the conflict. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
  • President Putin's visit to China, now confirmed by TASS video of his arrival, will be closely watched by international partners. Any significant agreements (military, economic) could impact the perception of international support for RF and Ukraine. RBC-Ukraine confirming Putin's arrival highlights the continued strategic importance of this visit. Lukashenko's meeting with Xi Jinping at the SCO summit further consolidates the anti-Western bloc. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with Lukashenko-Xi meeting, Putin's arrival)
  • TASS report on Witkoff reporting directly to Trump after Putin meetings is a significant development, suggesting a potential for extra-official influence or communication channels that could impact international relations and support for Ukraine, depending on the nature of these communications. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - New and significant development)
  • RBC-Ukraine's report on ISW's analysis of RF attempting to convince the West of "inevitability of victory" highlights a significant RF strategic IO effort targeting international support for Ukraine. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW AND SIGNIFICANT DIPLOMATIC/IO DEVELOPMENT)
  • TASS reporting on the US considering a counter-UAV group suggests Western recognition of the evolving drone threat, which may lead to new technologies or strategies beneficial to UAF. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Analytical Judgment)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 24-48 HOURS)

• Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

  1. Sustained Diversified Kinetic Strikes Following Reconnaissance, Emphasizing Advanced Drone Tactics: RF will likely continue to use intelligence gathered by its reconnaissance UAVs to conduct precision strikes using KABs (Kharkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia), artillery, possibly cruise missiles/ballistic missiles, and now increasingly direct kinetic drone strikes on UAF ground targets, incorporating FPV drone swarm technology (armored vehicles, trenches, communication nodes) in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, within the next 12-24 hours. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Observed pattern of reconnaissance followed by diversified strikes, now with advanced drone tech.)
  2. Sustained and Geographically Expanded Reconnaissance Efforts: RF will continue to employ reconnaissance UAVs to monitor the front lines, assess UAF force dispositions, and identify high-value targets across all active fronts, with particular emphasis on the northern axis (Sumy/Chernihiv/Kharkiv) and the contested eastern and southern fronts. This will feed into the advanced FPV drone operations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  3. Reinforced Ground Pressure in Eastern Ukraine: RF will likely continue localized ground assaults in Donetsk Oblast, attempting to consolidate claimed gains (Kamyshevakha) and break UAF encirclements (Dobropillya). The information environment will remain heavily contested regarding territorial control, with RF amplifying general propaganda, combat footage, advanced drone capabilities, and potentially new claims about UAF force dispositions (e.g., Krasnoarmiysk). "Операция Z" will continue to amplify combat videos. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with new IO content)
  4. Intensified Strategic Information Operations Amplification: RF state and pro-Kremlin media will continue to amplify narratives of internal stability, military construction, specialized military education, "SMO" successes, drone combat footage (including advanced FPV swarm tech), videos of captured UAF personnel, and the strategic IO message that RF victory is "inevitable." They will continue to downplay economic woes and internal dissent, and use historical narratives (Kaliningrad memorial) to shape public opinion. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Updated with FPV swarm tech and "inevitability" narrative)
  5. Continued Diplomatic Engagements during Putin's China Visit: Putin's visit will likely result in public statements emphasizing strong bilateral ties, potential economic agreements, and a shared geopolitical stance. Lukashenko's presence at SCO further cements this. Back-channel communications (e.g., Witkoff/Trump) will likely continue. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  6. Sustained Internal Security Measures and UAV Defense: RF will likely maintain heightened internal security, responding to and reporting on UAV incursions (as seen in Volgograd and Rostov), potentially escalating internal measures against perceived threats. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

• Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

  1. Massive Coordinated Kinetic Strike with Diversified Assets, Leveraging Advanced Drone Swarms: RF could launch a highly coordinated strike package (KABs, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and various attack UAVs/drones, including multiple FPV drone swarms controlled by single operators for tactical saturation) on multiple critical targets (DIB, energy, C2, major urban centers, and forward ground units) across Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia, and potentially other Oblasts. This would utilize preceding reconnaissance to maximize effectiveness and overwhelm UAF air defenses. The impact of predicted magnetic storms (02 SEP) could either hamper RF's ability to execute precision strikes or, conversely, create a window for RF to launch less precise, but still destructive, attacks if UAF systems are more affected. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Pre-positioning of recce, current KAB usage, and new kinetic drone capabilities, especially FPV swarms, are precursors; low confidence on magnetic storm impact specifics.)
  2. Exploitation of Reconnaissance and Advanced Drone Capabilities to Launch Surprise Ground Offensive: RF could use its enhanced reconnaissance, now including direct drone observation and targeting via FPV swarms, to identify a vulnerable point along the northern border (Sumy/Kharkiv/Chernihiv) or in the eastern/southern fronts, leading to a rapid, localized ground offensive supported by heavy fire and coordinated drone strikes (including swarms), aimed at achieving a tactical breakthrough or seizing key terrain. This could be coupled with information operations leveraging claims about UAF force movements (e.g., Krasnoarmiysk) to create confusion. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Reconnaissance enables exploitation, augmented by new advanced drone capabilities.)
  3. Escalated Hybrid Operations Targeting New Infrastructure/Regions and International Support: RF could combine kinetic strikes (guided by reconnaissance and drones) with cyberattacks and intensified disinformation campaigns targeting newly identified vulnerabilities or regions (including critical civilian infrastructure), aiming to create widespread disruption and panic, possibly exploiting the magnetic storm effects. Concurrently, RF will intensify its strategic information operations targeting international audiences to convince them of the "inevitability of victory," aiming to erode international support for Ukraine. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Updated with strategic IO component)

• Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

  • Immediate (0-12 hours): UAF IAMD and ground units in Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts must be on highest alert for incoming kinetic strikes, particularly KABs, cruise missiles, and direct-attack drones, especially FPV drone swarms. ISR assets should prioritize tracking inbound reconnaissance UAVs and identifying kinetic drone launch sites (deep and tactical, including FPV swarm control points) to interdict them before they can relay targeting data or deliver payloads. Ground commanders in Eastern Ukraine must maintain strong defensive postures and continue attempts to verify and exploit the Kamyshevakha/Dobropillya situation. Verify RF claims of UAF force consolidation in Krasnoarmiysk. Investigate the cause and nature of the "massed UAV attack" in Volgograd. STRATCOM must prepare to counter RF propaganda using captured UAF personnel and the "inevitability of victory" narrative.
  • Short-term (12-48 hours): UAF must conduct immediate BDA on any targets hit by subsequent strikes. STRATCOM needs to actively counter RF narratives, particularly those exaggerating internal stability, battlefield successes (especially regarding advanced drone tech), and explicitly counter the Kaliningrad historical revisionism and the exploitation of captured UAF personnel and the "inevitability of victory" narrative. Transparently report on UAF PVO successes and resilience (e.g., power restoration in Zaporizhzhia). Monitor Putin's and Lukashenko's statements from China for potential propaganda opportunities or shifts in RF/Belarus foreign policy, and assess the implications of the Witkoff/Trump reports. Diplomatic channels should be utilized to highlight the escalating and geographically expanded reconnaissance activities and reiterate urgent IAMD requirements, especially systems capable of interdicting reconnaissance platforms, KABs, and direct-attack drones, with specific emphasis on countering FPV drone swarms.
  • 02 SEP: Assess the actual impact of predicted magnetic storms on C2, ISR, and precision strike capabilities for both UAF and RF. Adjust operational plans accordingly, potentially prioritizing hardened systems.
  • Next Week: Continuous assessment of RF's ability to sustain widespread reconnaissance and diversified kinetic strikes, especially the deployment and effectiveness of FPV drone swarm technology. Strategic planning for long-term DIB protection and hardening remains crucial. Ukraine's diplomatic corps will need to vigorously engage with international partners to secure a significant boost in counter-UAV/IAMD capabilities, with a clear focus on defeating both reconnaissance and strike platforms across all threatened regions, including tactical ground defense against attack drones and FPV swarms. Monitor for follow-up on Putin's China visit and its implications, and the fallout from the Witkoff/Trump reporting. Continue monitoring for Western initiatives on counter-UAV technology that could benefit UAF.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• CRITICAL: Full Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) on RF Deep Strikes Against Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base (DIB) and Critical Civilian Infrastructure (PRIORITY Kharkiv, Odesa, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk): Urgent IMINT (satellite imagery, drone reconnaissance), SIGINT (intercepts), and HUMINT (local sources, technical intelligence) are required to verify the specific targets, extent of damage, and operational impact of recent RF strikes on all identified and alleged DIB and critical infrastructure targets. This is paramount for assessing Ukraine's long-term defense capabilities and national resilience.
• CRITICAL: Accurate Ground Truth Kamyshevakha / Dobropillya (Donetsk Oblast) and RF Force Dispositions/Intentions: Urgent ISR (UAVs, HUMINT from frontline sources) is required to confirm/deny RF claims of capture of Kamyshevakha and UAF claims of encirclement at Dobropillya. This is essential for validating the front line, assessing RF offensive capabilities, and informing immediate tactical exploitation or defensive action. Specifically, identify RF troop strength, reinforcement capabilities, and intent in this contested area.
• HIGH: RF Reconnaissance UAV, Kinetic Drone, and FPV Swarm Operational Patterns, C2, and Associated Strike Assets (PRIORITY Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia, and active Eastern/Southern Fronts): Enhanced SIGINT, EW (electronic warfare) intercept capabilities, and IMINT (drone reconnaissance) are required to understand the specific types of reconnaissance UAVs and kinetic drones (including FPV swarms and their single-operator control mechanisms) being employed, their C2 mechanisms, launch sites, flight paths, and, critically, their direct link to follow-on strike assets (e.g., artillery positions, KAB launch platforms, missile systems, and ground units operating kinetic drones). This is essential for developing effective pre-emptive counter-reconnaissance and counter-strike strategies, especially against coordinated drone attacks.
• HIGH: Effectiveness and Proliferation of RF Anti-Thermal Vision Cloaks/Counter-ISR Measures: Urgent technical intelligence (SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT from captured materiel or battlefield observations) is required to assess the effectiveness of new RF anti-thermal cloaks, their prevalence among RF units, and their impact on UAF thermal detection capabilities. This will inform UAF tactical adjustments and counter-measures.
• HIGH (UPDATED): Impact of Predicted Magnetic Storms on UAF and RF C2, ISR, and Precision Strike Capabilities: Urgent technical assessment and modeling are required to determine the specific vulnerabilities and potential degradation of UAF communications, GPS-guided systems, and ISR platforms due to the strong magnetic storms forecast for 02 SEP. Simultaneously, assess the potential impact on RF capabilities and identify any specific vulnerabilities RF might possess (e.g., reliance on commercial GPS). This will inform mitigation strategies and operational adjustments.
• HIGH (UPDATED): Cause and Duration of "Massed UAV Attack" in Volgograd Oblast, and Broader Internal RF Security Incidents: Immediate OSINT, HUMINT (local sources), and potential SIGINT are required to ascertain the precise nature of the "massed UAV attack" in Volgograd (e.g., Ukrainian strike, internal sabotage, RF false flag) and its impact. This is crucial for assessing internal RF vulnerabilities and potential new avenues of attack. Furthermore, investigate the "Mir Pay" fraud reports for any potential links to state-sponsored activity or wider economic instability. Investigate the context and purpose of the "НгП раZVедка" video depicting tactical teams and the "НгПшники" involved in the interrogation of the UAF soldier.
• HIGH (NEW): Verification of UAF Force Dispositions and Intentions in Krasnoarmiysk: Urgent ISR (UAVs, HUMINT from local sources) is required to confirm or deny RF claims of UAF force transfer and concentration in Krasnoarmiysk. This will inform UAF defensive planning and counter-IO.
• MEDIUM: Assessment of RF Strategic Aviation and Ballistic Missile Activity and Intent: Enhanced SIGINT and IMINT are required to continuously monitor RF strategic bomber bases (e.g., Engels-2) and ballistic missile launch sites for signs of heightened activity, pre-flight preparations, and sortie/launch generation patterns, to provide early warning of potential "massive attacks" or high-threat strikes.
• MEDIUM (UPDATED): Impact and Outcomes of Putin's Visit to China and Back-Channel Diplomatic Engagements: HUMINT (diplomatic sources), OSINT (Chinese and Russian state media, international press), and SIGINT (relevant intercepts) are required to assess any new agreements (military, economic, technological), joint statements, or shifts in policy that may result from Putin's China visit and Lukashenko's meeting with Xi. Additionally, gather more information on the Witkoff/Trump reporting to understand the nature and implications of this communication channel. This will inform long-term strategic assessments of RF's international support and capabilities.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. IMMEDIATE: Enhance Counter-Reconnaissance, Anti-KAB, and Anti-Kinetic Drone Capabilities (Especially Anti-FPV Swarms) in Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, and along the Eastern/Southern Frontlines - FOCUS ON INTERDICTING SPOTTERS AND INBOUND STRIKE ASSETS:

   • ACTION: Immediately deploy additional mobile, short-range GBAD systems (e.g., MANPADS, anti-aircraft artillery, short-range missile systems), EW assets capable of detecting, jamming, and kinetically engaging reconnaissance UAVs, inbound KABs, and direct-attack kinetic drones (with a specific focus on countering FPV drone swarms and their single-operator control systems). Prioritize systems that can rapidly relocate and engage multiple targets across all threatened regions and at the forward tactical edge. Task UAF Air Force to maintain combat air patrols or quick reaction alerts to intercept these spotter UAVs, KAB launch platforms, and dedicated drone launch/control sites. Ground units should implement enhanced tactical drone detection and defense measures, specifically training to counter FPV drone swarm tactics.
   • PRIORITY: CRITICAL (IMMEDIATE - NEW AND EXPANDED RECONNAISSANCE AND DIRECT KINETIC STRIKE THREATS, INCLUDING ADVANCED FPV SWARMS)
   • REASONING: The confirmed presence of enemy reconnaissance UAVs explicitly identified as "spotters" now directly followed by KAB strikes, and the documented use of kinetic drones for direct attacks on ground units, now including advanced FPV swarm tactics, indicates an immediate and diversified kinetic threat. Interdicting these platforms and their munitions before they can guide fires or deliver payloads, and developing robust defenses against FPV swarms, is paramount to preventing or mitigating damage across both deep and tactical battlefields.

2. IMMEDIATE: Intensify All-Source ISR on RF Deep Strike Assets (UAVs, KAB Platforms, Cruise Missile Platforms, Kinetic Drone Launch/Control Units, especially FPV Swarm Control Points) and Ground Force Movements in Eastern and Northern Axes, with Focus on Contested Areas, UAV Swarm C2/Launch Logistics for Multiple Axes, and RF Tactical Concealment:

   • ACTION: Task all-source ISR assets (IMINT, SIGINT, long-range drones, HUMINT, and potentially specialized multi-spectral sensors) for continuous 24/7 monitoring of RF airfields, KAB launch platforms, cruise missile launch sites, and all suspected drone launch sites (deep and tactical, including FPV drone swarm control points), especially those capable of reaching Southern, Eastern, and Northern Oblasts (including the new activity in Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia). Prioritize identifying UAV/kinetic drone (especially FPV swarm) launch and control sites, as well as logistical nodes enabling the rapid re-arming and relaunch of drone waves responsible for the Odesa attacks and new attacks in Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Donbass, to enable pre-emptive targeting. Increase ISR coverage of RF ground force concentrations, logistics, and suspected advance routes in the Donetsk direction (including Kamyshevakha/Dobropillya) and verify RF claims regarding Krasnoarmiysk, to provide early warning of potential localized ground assaults and to immediately verify contested claims. Actively search for and identify RF units utilizing anti-thermal cloaks to assess their deployment and effectiveness.
   • PRIORITY: CRITICAL (IMMEDIATE - ESCALATED & GEOGRAPHICALLY WIDER, NEW TACTICAL FOCUS, ADVANCED DRONE THREAT)
   • REASONING: Real-time, actionable intelligence on RF deep strike capabilities and ground intentions, now including diverse drone threats and advanced FPV swarms, is essential for pre-emptive defense, effective targeting of launch platforms, and informing tactical defensive maneuvers. Targeting the logistics and C2 elements of rapid UAV/drone swarm operations can directly reduce attack tempo and prevent new axes of attack. Immediate and accurate ground truth for Kamyshevakha/Dobropillya and verification of UAF movements in Krasnoarmiysk is vital for UAF tactical response and counter-IO. Countering RF's tactical concealment is crucial for maintaining battlefield transparency.

3. IMMEDIATE: Assess and Mitigate Risks from Predicted Magnetic Storms:

   • ACTION: UAF G6 and relevant technical branches must immediately conduct an assessment of all critical C2, ISR, and precision-guided munition systems for vulnerability to strong magnetic storms (forecast for 02 SEP). Implement immediate mitigation strategies, including prioritizing hardened communication channels, alternative navigation methods, and backup systems. Issue guidance to field units on potential impacts.
   • PRIORITY: CRITICAL (IMMEDIATE - NEW ENVIRONMENTAL THREAT)
   • REASONING: Predicted magnetic storms can severely degrade electronic systems crucial for modern warfare. Proactive assessment and mitigation are essential to maintain operational effectiveness and prevent exploitable vulnerabilities.

4. HIGH: Proactive STRATCOM Campaign to Counter RF Disinformation and Advocate for Urgent, Broad IAMD Aid and Counter-ISR Support (Including Tactical Drone Defense Against FPV Swarms):

   • ACTION: Immediately launch a comprehensive STRATCOM and PSYOP campaign, using verified imagery and UAF operational updates, to highlight the intensity, coordinated, and geographically expanded, multi-domain nature of RF deep strikes (especially in Odesa, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia, and now explicit drone attacks on ground units in Donbass, including the threat of advanced FPV drone swarms). Explicitly expose RF's disinformation and historical revisionism (e.g., Kaliningrad memorial), the exploitation of captured UAF personnel for propaganda, and directly counter the RF narrative of "inevitability of victory." Transparently report on UAF defensive actions, including drone shoot-downs, successful PVO engagements (e.g., Zaporizhzhia), and effective repair efforts (e.g., power restoration in Zaporizhzhia). Actively counter RF's attempts to shape diplomatic outcomes, RF claims of territorial gains (e.g., Kamyshevakha) and UAF force movements (e.g., Krasnoarmiysk) by providing factual context and reinforcing the strength of allied support. Specifically, counter RF's attempts to project global military strength through cooperation (e.g., CSTO, China, India) by highlighting RF's aggression in Ukraine, and expose the propaganda intent behind images of modern small arms, new specialized training facilities, and combat drone footage (including the new FPV swarm tech, emphasizing its offensive nature). Amplify reports of RF economic difficulties (e.g., Rosneft profit drop) to highlight the costs of the war on Russia and counter any narratives shifting blame to migration. Emphasize the urgent need for advanced IAMD systems and munitions from international partners, with a clear focus on defeating multi-wave, high-tempo drone and KAB attacks across all threatened regions, and for counter-ISR/counter-kinetic drone technology at both the strategic and tactical levels, with a specific and urgent focus on anti-FPV swarm capabilities.
   • PRIORITY: HIGH
   • REASONING: RF's aggressive and diversified IO aims to demoralize Ukraine, dilute international support, legitimize its actions, and project global strength. The "inevitability of victory" narrative and advanced drone tech propaganda are particularly dangerous. A strong, factual counter-narrative, coupled with direct calls for critical IAMD aid capable of defeating rapid, multi-wave multi-domain attacks (including FPV swarms), and exposure of RF's military-industrial supply chains and tactical adaptations, is vital to maintain domestic morale, expose RF's actions, and ensure continued international assistance.

5. MEDIUM: Exploit Internal RF Weaknesses and Diplomatic Isolation where feasible:

   • ACTION: Monitor developments regarding the "massed UAV attack" in Volgograd and the "Mir Pay" fraud for exploitation in information operations to highlight RF's vulnerabilities and resource strain. Closely analyze outcomes of Putin's China visit and Lukashenko's meeting with Xi for opportunities to highlight areas of limited support or to counter RF narratives of a robust international coalition. Further investigate the Witkoff/Trump reporting and assess opportunities to expose or counter RF influence operations. Assess the "НгП раZVедка" video for insights into RF internal security capabilities that could be exploited.
   • PRIORITY: MEDIUM (STRATEGIC)
   • REASONING: Internal disruptions and limited international engagement are points of weakness for RF that can be leveraged to further strategic objectives.

8. ANNEXES

• Annex A: Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) Summary - (Video of Odesa explosions/fires from previous report, "Colonelcassad" alleged UAF military equipment strike from previous report, "Сливочный каприз" alleged UAF equipment strike from previous report, Colonelcassad aviation strike footage, Операция Z anti-thermal cloak video, Colonelcassad military construction video, Colonelcassad "SMO zone" images, Colonelcassad tactical rifle image from new messages, Colonelcassad RCBD school opening image from new messages, Colonelcassad Donbass drone strike video, НгП раZVедка tactical team video from new messages, Colonelcassad FPV drone strike on MaxxPro video from new messages, Colonelcassad "НгПшники изловили хохла" video of captured UAF soldier, TASS video of Putin's arrival in China, Операция Z combat video from Zaporizhzhia, Colonelcassad Rostec fire drone video)
• Annex B: Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) References - (Links to ТАСС, Colonelcassad, Военкор Котенок, Повітряні Сили ЗС України / Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Сливочный каприз, Николаевский Ванёк, Alex Parker Returns, Операция Z, РБК-Україна, Запорізька обласна військова адміністрація 🇺🇦, ASTRA, Deep State map reference in thermal footage from previous report, new references in this report for KABs on Kharkiv and UAV in Chernihiv, НгП раZVедка, The Wall Street Journal, ASTRA's videos on Moscow detentions, ТАСС on Trump's executive order and sports convictions, Запорізька обласна військова адміністрація 🇺🇦 alert from new messages, ТАСС on Krasnoarmiysk troop movements, ТАСС on Rostov UAV, ТАСС on Xi-Lukashenko meeting, ТАСС on US counter-UAV group, РБК-Україна on ISW report, ТАСС on Volgograd airport, ТАСС on Volgograd UAV attack, ТАСС on FPV swarm tech, Запорізька обласна військова адміністрація 🇺🇦 on power restoration, РБК-Україна on PVO in Zaporizhzhia, Повітряні Сили ЗС України / Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on UAVs in Zaporizhzhia/Chernihiv)
• Annex C: SIGINT and EW Summary - (UAF Air Force alerts on UAV threats for Odesa, Chornomorsk, Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Николаевский Ванёк reporting on drone waves, new alerts for Chernihiv UAV, Kharkiv KABs, Zaporizhzhia KABs, potential SIGINT on C2 of kinetic drones in Donbass, SIGINT on FPV drone C2 in Donbass, potential SIGINT on RF PVO activity in Rostov Oblast, SIGINT on FPV drone swarm control, SIGINT on Volgograd UAV attack)