Situation Report

SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - 302133Z AUG 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: Russian Federation (RF) maintains a high-tempo, multi-domain deep strike campaign, with a renewed and intensifying focus on Southern Oblasts, particularly Odesa. Ground pressure continues in Eastern Ukraine, while Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) sustain defensive operations and conduct tactical counter-strikes. The information environment remains heavily contested. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Northern Ukraine (Sumy Oblast):

  • Air Activity: UAF Air Force (AF) reports "БпЛА на Сумщині ➡️ курсом на північно-східний напрямок." This indicates RF UAV activity, likely reconnaissance or targeting, moving away from Ukrainian territory. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Eastern Ukraine (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast):

  • Pavlohrad: "Суспільне" reports "У Павлограді чути звуки вибухів." This confirms kinetic activity, likely ongoing RF deep strikes via UAVs as previously reported, or potentially missile impacts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for explosions, MEDIUM for specific munition type.)
  • Unspecified Eastern Front: Colonelcassad (RF source) claims "#6_армия сожгла два танка ВСУ." Video footage shows a damaged tank in a wooded area, with Russian text "ОПЕРАТИВНЫЙ ПРОСТОЙ" (Operational Downtime/Standby). This is likely RF information operation attempting to demonstrate UAF losses, but the video content is ambiguous regarding the "burning of two tanks" and the tank shown appears to be RF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for RF claim, LOW CONFIDENCE for UAF losses, MEDIUM CONFIDENCE for RF IO attempt.)

• Southern Ukraine (Odesa Oblast):

  • Black Sea/Chornomorsk/Odesa: UAF AF reports "БпЛА в Чорному морі ➡️ курсом на південь" and then "БпЛА в акваторії Чорного моря ➡️ курсом на Чорноморськ." Николаевский Ванёк then reports "1 мопед подлетает к Черноморску - может быть громковато!" and later "ещё 5 мопедов летят к Черноморску/южным районам Одессы. подлетят через минут 10-15." Операция Z (RF source) confirms "Взрывы и пожары: мощная атака на объекты врага в Одессе" with accompanying videos showing explosions and a significant glow over a city identified as Odesa. This confirms a renewed, sustained, and multi-wave RF drone attack on Odesa and Chornomorsk/Illichevsk. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Aerial Operations: The continuation of multi-wave UAV attacks (Odesa, Chornomorsk, Pavlohrad, Sumy) confirms ongoing favorable weather conditions for RF air assets, particularly for night operations. Clear skies and moderate winds are likely. The ability to launch numerous "Shahed" type drones suggests no significant weather impediments. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Visibility/Night Operations: The reported night-time explosions and fires in Odesa/Chornomorsk (Операция Z, previous reports) confirm RF's continued capability and intent for effective night operations, leveraging UAVs and precision munitions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF:

  • Deep Strike Operations (Multi-Domain): RF is sustaining and intensifying its deep strike campaign, primarily utilizing UAVs ("Shahed"/"Geran") to target critical infrastructure and urban centers, particularly in Southern Ukraine. The multi-wave nature of the Odesa attack indicates a persistent effort to overwhelm UAF air defenses. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Information Warfare (IO): RF sources (Colonelcassad, Операция Z) are actively pushing narratives designed to demonstrate UAF losses and RF battlefield success, even with ambiguous or misleading evidence (e.g., alleged UAF tank losses). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Political Messaging: RF leadership (Putin, TASS) continues to use national holidays (Miners' Day) to project an image of internal stability, national pride, and economic resilience, despite the ongoing conflict. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for intent; LOW CONFIDENCE for direct tactical relevance.)

• UAF:

  • Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD): UAF Air Force is demonstrating highly effective real-time threat detection and warning for UAVs (Odesa, Chornomorsk, Pavlohrad, Sumy), enabling civilian population protection and defensive posture. Engagements against multi-wave drone attacks in Odesa/Chornomorsk are ongoing. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Information Warfare (IO): UAF (CyberBoroshno) is actively monitoring and reporting on RF UAV technology developments ("Gerbera" drone with camera test in China), indicating a proactive approach to understanding and countering RF capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.4. Intelligence Gaps from Previous Report Addressed/Updated:

• RF Ballistic Missile Types (Zaporizhzhia/Dnipropetrovsk): Previous RF claim of an X-101 cruise missile strike in Dnipropetrovsk remains the most specific munition type reported in that region. No new information on ballistic missile types. (NO NEW UPDATE.)
• BDA on RF Deep Strikes on Ukrainian DIB: The current report confirms renewed infrastructure impact in Odesa/Chornomorsk (explosions, fires) due to drone strikes. However, specific BDA on DIB targets remains a critical gap. (CRITICAL GAP PERSISTS for DIB BDA, but infrastructure impact in Odesa confirmed.)
• Accurate Ground Truth Kamyshevakha / Dobropillya: No new direct information on these specific areas from this update. These remain collection requirements. (REMAINS A GAP.)
• RF Paratrooper Activity in Zaporizhzhia: No new specific intelligence regarding RF paratrooper activity in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. This specific Zaporizhzhia gap remains. (REMAINS A GAP.)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:

  • Sustained Deep Strike Capability: RF maintains a robust capability for coordinated deep strikes, deploying various UAV platforms ("Geran," "Shahed") to hit targets across multiple oblasts, including civilian and critical infrastructure. The multi-wave drone attacks demonstrate an ability to launch significant numbers of UAVs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Adaptive IO Operations: RF is demonstrating an ability to pivot its information operations to target specific narratives (e.g., UAF losses) to bolster its own image and undermine UAF morale. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Strategic Communication: RF leadership effectively utilizes internal events (like Miners' Day) for strategic communication, aiming to foster national unity and project an image of a functioning, prosperous state. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Event; LOW CONFIDENCE - Tactical Relevance.)

• Intentions:

  • Degrade Ukrainian Warfighting Capability & Morale: RF intends to continue degrading Ukraine's critical infrastructure (ports, energy) and military assets (claimed UAF tank losses) to undermine UAF's ability to wage war and erode civilian morale through sustained attacks. The renewed focus on Odesa points to an intent to disrupt port operations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Project Internal Stability and Strength: RF intends to use state-controlled media and public appearances by leadership to project an image of strength, stability, and national unity, both internally and externally. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Maintain Offensive Pressure: RF intends to continue localized ground and air pressure to fix UAF forces and achieve tactical gains, as seen in ongoing operations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Courses of Action (COA) Currently Observed:

  • Strategic Deep Strikes: Executing coordinated multi-wave UAV and potentially cruise missile strikes on Ukrainian critical civilian infrastructure (ports, energy) and military targets across Southern, Eastern, and Northern Oblasts, with a particular surge in Odesa. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Aggressive Information Operations: Sustained propaganda efforts targeting Ukrainian society and external audiences, designed to demonstrate RF military effectiveness and UAF losses. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Internal Political Messaging: Utilizing state-controlled media to disseminate messages of national unity, economic success, and strong leadership to bolster domestic support. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Recent tactical changes or adaptations

• Intensified Multi-Wave Drone Attacks on Southern Ukraine: The current reports indicate an immediate and significant intensification of multi-wave drone attacks specifically targeting Odesa and Chornomorsk/Illichevsk. This could be an adaptation to exploit perceived vulnerabilities or to achieve specific objectives related to port infrastructure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Continued Use of Ambiguous/Misleading IO: RF continues to utilize media (Colonelcassad) to publish claims of UAF losses (e.g., "two tanks burned") with visuals that are often inconclusive or misleading (e.g., damaged RF tank presented as UAF loss). This demonstrates a persistent, opportunistic, and low-cost information warfare tactic. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.3. Logistics and sustainment status

• RF Logistics: The continued deployment of a large number of UAVs suggests a sustained, though not inexhaustible, supply of these deep strike munitions. The reported UAF monitoring of "Gerbera" drone camera tests in China (CyberBoroshno) suggests a potential ongoing reliance or exploration of foreign sources for UAV components or platforms, which could indicate domestic production limitations or an effort to scale up capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for continued supply for current tempo; MEDIUM CONFIDENCE for long-term sustainability due to potential foreign reliance.)
• UAF Logistics: The previous report's concern over DIB attacks and the need for IAMD protection remains acute, given the renewed and intensified RF deep strikes on civilian infrastructure that may indirectly impact logistics. (NO DIRECT NEW INFO, BUT CONTINUED RF STRIKES INCREASE PRESSURE.)

2.4. Command and control effectiveness

• RF Strategic C2: The coordination of multi-wave drone attacks across different oblasts, alongside a synchronized IO campaign and strategic political messaging, points to effective and centralized strategic C2. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF Tactical C2: The ability to conduct sustained and multi-directional drone attacks on specific targets (Chornomorsk/Illichevsk) and quickly deploy UAVs for reconnaissance (Sumy) suggests effective tactical C2 for localized kinetic and ISR operations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• UAF Strategic C2: UAF Air Force's immediate and widespread alerts across multiple regions for various threats (UAVs) demonstrates highly effective strategic C2 and robust air defense coordination for early warning. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• UAF Tactical C2: UAF's proactive monitoring of RF drone technology (CyberBoroshno) demonstrates effective tactical intelligence gathering and analysis, contributing to overall preparedness. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

• Ukrainian force posture and readiness: UAF forces are maintaining an active defense against widespread RF deep strikes (UAVs in Odesa, Chornomorsk, Pavlohrad, Sumy) and effectively providing early warning. UAF IAMD is actively engaging multi-wave drone attacks. Overall readiness remains high, sustained by resilient national will and crucial international support. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Recent tactical successes or setbacks:

  • Successes:
    • UAF Air Force providing timely and comprehensive warnings on multi-wave UAV threats, demonstrating effective IAMD situational awareness and enabling civilian response. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • UAF intelligence actively monitoring and analyzing RF UAV technology developments. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Setbacks:
    • RF has successfully initiated renewed multi-wave UAV attacks on Odesa/Chornomorsk/Illichevsk, causing explosions and fires, indicating potential damage to infrastructure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Explosions reported in Pavlohrad indicate successful RF kinetic activity. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Resource requirements and constraints:

  • Air Defense (CRITICAL - URGENT): The escalating and sustained multi-wave UAV attacks, particularly on major port cities, demand an immediate and significant increase in advanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capabilities, especially mobile, short-to-medium range systems capable of engaging drone swarms. The scale of attacks in Odesa/Mykolaiv/Dnipropetrovsk highlights this critical need.
  • Counter-UAV Systems: Specific counter-UAV systems (EW, laser, kinetic) are urgently needed to effectively engage and neutralize the large numbers of "Geran"/"Shahed" drones being used.
  • Repair and Recovery: Resources for rapid repair of critical infrastructure (e.g., port facilities, energy grid in Odesa) and humanitarian aid are continuously required due to widespread strikes.
  • ISR for BDA: Enhanced IMINT (satellite/drone) is crucial for accurate BDA on DIB and critical infrastructure targets following these extensive deep strikes, especially in Odesa. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

• Propaganda and disinformation campaigns:

  • RF Narratives (Military Effectiveness & Internal Cohesion):
    • Battlefield Success: RF (Операция Z, Colonelcassad) continues to claim battlefield successes (e.g., "destroyed two UAF tanks") to project an image of military effectiveness, even with ambiguous evidence.
    • National Unity: RF (TASS, Putin) emphasizes national holidays and economic achievements (e.g., Miners' Day, Kuzbass coal production) to foster national unity and internal stability. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for all RF IO activity and intent.)
  • UAF Counter-Narratives (Transparency & Resilience):
    • Reporting Threats: UAF Air Force continues to provide timely and accurate threat information, reinforcing trust and preparedness among the population.
    • Monitoring Enemy Capabilities: UAF intelligence (CyberBoroshno) actively monitors and reports on RF military technological developments, including UAVs, demonstrating an informed and proactive defense posture. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for all UAF IO activity and intent.)

• Public sentiment and morale factors:

  • Ukrainian Public: The renewed and intensified multi-wave drone attacks on critical southern port cities like Odesa will cause significant anxiety and disruption. However, timely UAF alerts and transparent reporting help maintain resilience. The RF narratives of UAF losses and internal RF strength are unlikely to significantly impact Ukrainian morale, given the persistent attacks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Russian Public: RF IO aims to project strength and legitimacy for the conflict, emphasizing strategic strikes, internal stability, and national achievements. This is designed to maintain public support and deflect attention from the realities of the war. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• International support and diplomatic developments:

  • Potential UAV Sourcing: UAF intelligence noting "Gerbera" drone camera tests in China (CyberBoroshno) could indicate continued or new foreign sourcing for RF UAV components or platforms, which, if confirmed, would have significant international diplomatic implications. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE for implications based on report, HIGH for UAF monitoring.)
  • RF Internal Policy: The LDPR's legislative proposal for mandatory photo reports on capital repairs (TASS) indicates an internal RF focus on governance and public accountability, but has no direct bearing on military operations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Event; LOW CONFIDENCE - Tactical Relevance.)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 24-48 HOURS)

• Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

  1. Sustained and Intensified Multi-Wave Deep Strikes Across Southern Oblasts (Odesa, Mykolaiv) and Eastern/Central Oblasts (Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia): RF will likely continue to launch coordinated multi-wave UAV and potentially cruise missile attacks targeting critical infrastructure (energy, port facilities), DIB targets, and military assets, particularly in Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts. The current surge in Odesa is expected to continue. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  2. Increased Localized Ground Offensives and Fire Support in Eastern Ukraine: RF will maintain offensive pressure in Donetsk, using small ground units supported by drones for ISR and precision strikes against UAF personnel and equipment. Expect continued attempts to target UAF armored vehicles and C2 nodes, accompanied by exaggerated claims of success. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  3. Aggressive Information Operations Focused on Demoralization and Disinformation: RF will amplify claims of battlefield successes and UAF losses (e.g., claimed tank destruction) and will continue PSYOP campaigns targeting Ukrainian societal cohesion. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

  1. Massive Coordinated Strike Package with Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and UAV Swarms Targeting Kyiv/Major Urban Centers and Remaining DIB: RF could launch an exceptionally large and coordinated multi-domain strike using a full spectrum of air assets (ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, KABs, and advanced UAV swarms) to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, specifically targeting Kyiv and other major urban centers, as well as high-value DIB targets previously untouched. This would aim to cause widespread panic, disrupt governance, and severely cripple remaining defense production. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
  2. Significant RF Ground Offensive to Create a Buffer Zone Along the Northern Border (Sumy/Kharkiv) or Seize Coastal Access (Odesa/Mykolaiv): RF could commit significant ground forces, potentially including reserves and newly trained units, to launch a large-scale offensive from the north, aiming to establish a substantial buffer zone in Sumy/Kharkiv Oblasts or to make a decisive push towards Odesa/Mykolaiv to sever Ukraine's access to the Black Sea. This would involve heavy air and artillery support. While a full-scale offensive on Odesa from the ground is unlikely in 24-48 hours, an intensified naval-supported landing or concentrated artillery/missile barrage to soften the ground for a later push remains a concern. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
  3. Escalated Hybrid Warfare and Cyberattacks Against Critical Infrastructure, Coordinated with Ground Operations and Physical Deep Strikes: RF could launch a highly destructive cyberattack campaign targeting Ukraine's energy grid, telecommunications, and financial systems, coordinated with intense physical deep strikes and ground offensives, aiming to create systemic chaos and collapse national resilience. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

• Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

  • Immediate (0-12 hours): UAF IAMD forces must remain on highest alert, especially in Odesa, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy Oblasts, to counter ongoing and anticipated multi-wave UAV/KAB/missile attacks. Commanders in Eastern and Northern Ukraine must maintain robust defensive postures and be prepared for localized ground assaults. ISR assets should prioritize tracking incoming UAV swarms, KAB launch platforms, and cruise missile trajectories. Internal security agencies must be vigilant against continued civilian targeting and potential new DRG activity.
  • Short-term (12-48 hours): UAF must conduct immediate BDA on all affected areas, prioritizing DIB and critical infrastructure (especially Odesa port facilities), to assess damage and initiate repair/recovery. Counter-battery fire and air defense efforts should focus on suppressing RF air activity responsible for KAB and missile launches. STRATCOM needs to actively counter RF narratives regarding battlefield gains and losses and continue to report RF aggression transparently. Diplomatic channels should be utilized to highlight the intensity of RF deep strikes and reiterate urgent IAMD requirements, especially in light of potential foreign UAV sourcing.
  • Next Week: Continuous assessment of RF's ability to sustain high-tempo multi-domain strikes and ground pressure. Strategic planning for long-term DIB protection and hardening is crucial. Monitoring RF training developments for potential future capabilities and adapting UAF training accordingly. Ukraine's diplomatic corps will need to vigorously engage with international partners to secure a significant boost in air defense capabilities and munitions.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• CRITICAL: Full Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) on RF Deep Strikes Against Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base (DIB) and Critical Civilian Infrastructure (PRIORITY Odesa): Urgent IMINT (satellite imagery, drone reconnaissance), SIGINT (intercepts), and HUMINT (local sources, technical intelligence) are required to verify the specific targets, extent of damage, and operational impact of recent RF strikes on all identified and alleged DIB and critical infrastructure targets, with immediate focus on Odesa port facilities and energy infrastructure. This is paramount for assessing Ukraine's long-term defense capabilities and national resilience.
• CRITICAL: RF UAV Swarm Composition, Command & Control, and Operational Patterns (PRIORITY Odesa): Enhanced SIGINT, EW (electronic warfare) intercept capabilities, and IMINT (drone reconnaissance) are required to understand the technical specifications, C2 mechanisms, launch sites, and operational tactics of large RF UAV swarms (e.g., multi-wave attacks on Odesa). This is essential for developing effective counter-drone strategies and IAMD upgrades, and for verifying foreign sourcing for these platforms.
• HIGH: Accurate Ground Truth Kamyshevakha / Dobropillya (Donetsk Oblast): ISR must be tasked to confirm/deny RF claims of capture and UAF claims of encirclement to enable immediate tactical exploitation or defensive action.
• HIGH: Assessment of RF Strategic Aviation and Ballistic Missile Activity and Intent: Enhanced SIGINT and IMINT are required to continuously monitor RF strategic bomber bases (e.g., Engels-2) and ballistic missile launch sites for signs of heightened activity, pre-flight preparations, and sortie/launch generation patterns, to provide early warning of potential "massive attacks" or high-threat strikes, especially in coordination with UAV swarms.
• MEDIUM: Verification of RF Tank Losses Claims on Eastern Front: IMINT and HUMINT (frontline sources) are required to verify RF claims of destroying UAF tanks and confirm the actual status of forces in sectors mentioned by RF sources, especially given the ambiguous visual evidence provided.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. IMMEDIATE: Deploy Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) to Southern Oblasts, Prioritizing Odesa and Counter-UAV/KAB/Cruise Missile Capabilities:

   • ACTION: Immediately reallocate and deploy additional, mobile, short-to-medium range IAMD assets, especially those with advanced counter-drone capabilities (e.g., EW systems, anti-aircraft artillery with radar-guided munitions) and anti-cruise missile capabilities, to Odesa and Mykolaiv Oblasts. Prioritize defending port infrastructure, energy facilities, DIB targets, and population centers. Develop and implement rapid-response counter-swarm and anti-missile tactics specifically tailored to the current, intensified threat in the south.
   • PRIORITY: CRITICAL (IMMEDIATE)
   • REASONING: The escalating and concentrated multi-wave drone attacks on critical southern port infrastructure represent an immediate and severe threat. Robust, multi-layered air defense is paramount for mitigating damage, preserving critical economic lifelines, and saving lives.

2. IMMEDIATE: Intensify All-Source ISR on RF Deep Strike Assets (UAVs, Cruise Missile Platforms) and Ground Force Movements in Eastern Axes:

   • ACTION: Task all-source ISR assets (IMINT, SIGINT, long-range drones, HUMINT) for continuous 24/7 monitoring of RF airfields, KAB launch platforms, cruise missile launch sites, and suspected drone launch sites, especially those capable of reaching Southern, Eastern, and Northern Oblasts. Increase ISR coverage of RF ground force concentrations, logistics, and suspected advance routes in the Donetsk direction to provide early warning of potential localized ground assaults. Prioritize identifying UAV launch and control sites responsible for the Odesa attacks.
   • PRIORITY: CRITICAL (IMMEDIATE)
   • REASONING: Real-time, actionable intelligence on RF deep strike capabilities and ground intentions is essential for pre-emptive defense, effective targeting of launch platforms, and informing tactical defensive maneuvers. Targeting UAV launch/control elements can directly reduce attack tempo.

3. HIGH: Proactive STRATCOM Campaign to Counter RF Disinformation and Advocate for Urgent IAMD Aid:

   • ACTION: Immediately launch a comprehensive STRATCOM and PSYOP campaign, using verified imagery and UAF operational updates, to highlight the intensity and coordinated nature of RF deep strikes (especially in Odesa), expose RF's disinformation (e.g., ambiguous claims of UAF tank losses), and transparently report on UAF defensive actions. Emphasize the urgent need for advanced IAMD systems and munitions from international partners, using the current RF attack wave in Odesa as a compelling case study, and raise awareness about potential foreign sourcing for RF UAVs.
   • PRIORITY: HIGH
   • REASONING: RF's aggressive IO aims to demoralize Ukraine and dilute international support. A strong, factual counter-narrative, coupled with direct calls for critical IAMD aid and exposure of RF's military-industrial supply chains, is vital to maintain domestic morale, expose RF's actions, and ensure continued international assistance.

8. ANNEXES

• Annex A: Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) Summary - (Video of Odesa explosions/fires, "Colonelcassad" alleged UAF tank video, "CyberBoroshno" "Gerbera" drone image)
• Annex B: Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) References - (Links to РБК-Україна, Николаевский Ванёк, ТАСС, Colonelcassad, Операция Z, Повітряні Сили ЗС України / Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, КіберБорошно | CyberBoroshno)
• Annex C: SIGINT and EW Summary - (UAF Air Force alerts on UAV threats for Odesa, Chornomorsk, Pavlohrad, Sumy)