OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: The Russian Federation (RF) continues its multi-domain pressure campaign with significant aerial threats. RF strategic bombers (Tu-95MS and now Tu-160) are airborne from Engels, indicating a high probability of impending large-scale missile strikes. Widespread drone activity continues across southern and central Ukraine. RF Information Operations (IO) remain highly active, focusing on internal narratives and discrediting Western support. Ukrainian forces (UAF) maintain a defensive posture, actively adapting air defense strategies, and managing the human and material costs of RF aggression.
Central/Northern Ukraine:
Kyiv Oblast: Air raid alarms were declared due to the threat of RF attack UAVs. People are seeking shelter in the metro. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Zhytomyr Oblast: UAF Air Force reports UAVs from Kyiv Oblast heading towards Zhytomyr Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Cherkasy Oblast: Explosions reported, likely linked to drone or missile activity. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Eastern Front (Donetsk/Kharkiv):
Kharkiv Oblast: Explosions reported, suggesting continued RF targeting or frontline activity. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Donetsk Direction (Pokrovsk area): RF milbloggers continue to claim fierce fighting and significant destruction of UAF equipment and personnel near Pokrovsk. (LOW CONFIDENCE, milblogger claim with visual evidence lacking independent verification).
Donetsk Direction (Novotoretske area): DeepStateUA reports drone footage depicting a field "strewn with corpses of katsaps [RF soldiers]" and destroyed military equipment, including what appear to be tanks or armored vehicles, indicating a recent, significant engagement with heavy RF losses. (HIGH CONFIDENCE, visual evidence).
Donetsk Direction (Dobropolye area): Colonelcassad (RF milblogger) reports "Gerans working on military objects" in Dobropolye, accompanied by video showing explosions and a large fire. This suggests targeted drone strikes. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE, RF milblogger claim with visual evidence, 'military object' not independently verified).
Donetsk Direction (Figolivka area): DeepStateUA reports drone footage showing "a couple of f**kers (RF soldiers) climbed into Figolivka, but their invisibility ended and they were destroyed," indicating successful UAF interdiction of RF personnel/small units. (HIGH CONFIDENCE, visual evidence of engagement).
Krasnolymansk Direction: "Два майора" (RF milblogger) has launched a fundraising campaign for Mavic 3 drones for the 752nd Motor Rifle Regiment on this direction, indicating ongoing equipment needs and active operations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Southern Front (Zaporizhzhia/Mykolaiv/Kherson/Odesa):
Zaporizhzhia Oblast: An RF drone attacked an industrial enterprise, causing a fire. A 69-year-old man was wounded in the Zaporizhzhia district as a result of an enemy attack. A single "moped" (UAV) is approaching Zaporizhzhia city. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Mykolaiv Oblast: UAF Air Force reports UAVs on the southeastern part of the oblast, heading northwest, now explicitly towards Odesa Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Kherson Oblast: UAF Air Force reports threat of RF attack UAVs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Odesa Oblast: UAVs from Mykolaiv Oblast are now inbound. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Internal:
Rostov-on-Don: ASTRA and РБК-Україна reported a large fire on the left bank of the Don behind "Rostov Arena" following loud explosions. RF milbloggers (Операция Z / Военкоры Русской Весны) acknowledge the fire but dismiss Ukrainian "rejoicing," attributing it to unknown causes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for fire, LOW CONFIDENCE for cause/attribution).
Engels Airfield: Monitoring channels report the launch of Tu-160 strategic bombers in addition to previously reported Tu-95 from this airfield. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Novorossiysk: ASTRA reports over a ton of oil spilled into the Black Sea from a Turkish vessel near Novorossiysk. Ukrainian sources (Оперативний ЗСУ) also report this. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Sevastopol (Crimea): RF milbloggers (Операция Z / Военкоры Русской Весны) report the RF army is repelling an attack on Crimea and Sevastopol. Colonelcassad previously reported an air raid alarm, which has now been rescinded. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Volgograd: Temporary restrictions on aircraft arrivals and departures have been imposed at Volgograd airport. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Conscription Policy: RF milbloggers (Операция Z / Военкоры Русской Весны) confirm the decision to extend conscription validity to two campaigns. "Новости Москвы" states a decree has been signed to collect conscripts year-round. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
International:
USA/NATO: Colonelcassad reports US Permanent Representative to NATO Matthew Whitaker stated Trump understands the need for Putin's continued presence in Ukraine settlement talks. TASS reports this, and that Polyansky declared RF finds it "absolutely unacceptable" for NATO countries to "cultivate" Ukrainian-controlled territories. TASS also claims "positive shifts" in understanding the conflict at an Alaska summit are "scaring" Kyiv and its European patrons. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for statement attribution, LOW CONFIDENCE for actual US intent/RF claims of effect).
Germany: "Операция Z / Военкоры Русской Весны" reports Chancellor Merz stated "Germany is in a state of conflict with Russia." (HIGH CONFIDENCE for attribution of statement).
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
Drone Operations: Persistent UAF Air Force warnings and confirmed strikes across multiple oblasts (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhzhia, Khmelnytskyi, Zhytomyr, Odesa, Cherkasy) confirm continued favorable weather for widespread RF UAV operations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Fires/Explosions: Multiple reports of fires (Zaporizhzhia industrial, Rostov-on-Don, Dobropolye) indicate conditions (e.g., dry weather, industrial materials) conducive to large-scale blazes once initiated by strikes or other incidents. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Naval Environment: The oil spill near Novorossiysk could introduce localized environmental challenges for naval operations, particularly in port areas, though direct military impact is currently low. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Air Travel: Restrictions at Volgograd airport could be weather-related or a security precaution, impacting both civilian and potentially military air movements. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF:
Air/Missile Operations: Sustained widespread use of attack UAVs (Geran-type confirmed in Dobropolye, threat to Kyiv, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Zaporizhzhia, Zhytomyr, Odesa, Cherkasy) and missile strikes targeting industrial infrastructure (Zaporizhzhia) and urban centers. RF strategic bombers (Tu-95MS and Tu-160) are airborne from Engels, signaling imminent large-scale long-range missile strikes. RF is repelling an attack on Crimea/Sevastopol, indicating ongoing UAF aerial activity near Crimea, though the air raid alarm has been rescinded. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Ground Forces: Claims of fierce fighting near Pokrovsk and visual evidence of heavy losses near Novotoretske and successful UAF interdiction near Figolivka indicate continued localized ground pressure and attritional engagements in the Donetsk direction. RF units (752nd Motor Rifle Regiment) are actively seeking drone support for the Krasnolymansk direction. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for continued engagements; LOW for RF claims of success).
Internal Security/Mobilization: Extended conscription validity and year-round conscription suggests RF is adapting its manpower procurement system to meet ongoing military needs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Information Warfare/Propaganda: RF milbloggers (Операция Z, Colonelcassad, Рыбарь) and official sources (TASS, Russian Mission to UN) continue to push narratives of RF ground successes (Pokrovsk), RF's defense against Ukrainian attacks (Crimea/Sevastopol), and RF military development (conscription policy). Colonelcassad and TASS are actively framing US/NATO statements to suit RF narratives of Western divisions or RF legitimacy. The Russian Mission to the UN emphasizes the "unacceptability" of NATO presence on Ukrainian-controlled territory. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
UAF:
Air Defense/Offensive Air: UAF Air Force is actively monitoring and issuing warnings for RF attack UAVs across multiple regions, including Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, and Cherkasy. UAF continues to demonstrate capabilities for aerial activity near Crimea (Sevastopol air alarm, RF reports repelling attack). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Ground Forces: UAF forces are engaged in heavy defensive operations in the Donetsk direction, inflicting high RF casualties near Novotoretske and successfully interdicting small RF units near Figolivka. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Neutral/Other:
USA: US Permanent Representative to NATO's statements, as reported by TASS and Colonelcassad, are being used by RF to frame diplomatic narratives and highlight perceived internal divisions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for RF use of statement).
Germany: Chancellor Merz's statement regarding Germany being in conflict with Russia, as reported by RF milbloggers, is a significant diplomatic development, indicating a hardening of official German stance. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
1.4. Intelligence Gaps from Previous Report Addressed/Updated:
RF Air Campaign Shift (Civilian Logistics): Addressed. RF has expanded tactical targeting to industrial facilities in addition to civilian logistics.
Krasnolymansk Axis (UAF 3rd Army Corps losses): Still a HIGH gap. No independent verification of specific UAF 3rd Army Corps losses. RF milbloggers continue to fundraise, indicating active engagements.
Zaporizhzhia Axis (RF Paratrooper Activity): Still a HIGH gap. Previous daily report mentioned "paratrooper activity." This update only confirms general drone strikes and a single "moped" approaching Zaporizhzhia, providing no further specifics on VDV.
Foreign Personnel (Estonian Mercenary Liquidation): Still a HIGH gap. No new specific intelligence in this update.
RF Conscription Policy: Updated. "Новости Москвы" reports year-round conscription, providing more detail on the policy. (NEW LOW gap addressed/updated).
RF Strategic Bomber Launches: Updated. Tu-160 from Engels detected, in addition to Tu-95. (NEW LOW gap addressed/updated).
Rostov-on-Don Fire: Updated. RF milbloggers acknowledge the fire but attempt to dismiss its significance. Cause still unconfirmed. (NEW LOW gap addressed/updated).
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Persistent Air/Drone Warfare: RF continues to demonstrate a robust capability for widespread drone (Geran-type confirmed) and missile strikes. The launch of Tu-95MS and Tu-160 strategic bombers signifies a capability for large-scale, long-range cruise missile attacks with increased payload and range potential. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Information Warfare & Narrative Control: RF effectively integrates official statements with milblogger amplification to rapidly disseminate narratives, including false claims of UAF setbacks (Pokrovsk), promoting long-term military modernization (conscription policy), attempting to exploit Western diplomatic divisions (Hungary, US statements), and actively generating narratives of Ukrainian aggression (Crimea attacks). RF milbloggers use highly inflammatory language and promote dehumanizing narratives. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Localized Ground Offensives: RF maintains the capability for localized ground assaults in attritional environments (Donetsk direction), aimed at achieving incremental gains and fixing UAF forces, despite incurring heavy casualties (Novotoretske). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Internal Security Control: RF demonstrates capacity to suppress internal dissent and enforce control through detentions and proposed data collection. Year-round conscription further enhances control over manpower. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Intentions:
Degrade UAF Warfighting and Economic Capacity: RF intends to continue degrading UAF combat effectiveness, civilian morale, and explicitly Ukraine's industrial base (including defense-related facilities like Baykar) through persistent aerial strikes. The targeting of civilian logistics and industrial enterprises is a deliberate effort to impact UAF and civilian sustainment and economic stability. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Sustain Offensive Pressure and Achieve Incremental Gains: RF intends to continue localized ground offensives, particularly in the Donetsk direction, to achieve limited territorial gains and maintain pressure on UAF forces. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Exploit Western Divisions & Influence International Policy: RF aims to exploit any perceived divisions among Western allies (e.g., Hungary's stance, US statements regarding Trump/Putin talks) and generate narratives of Ukrainian aggression to weaken support for Ukraine and promote its own preferred "peace" settlement. RF seeks to portray NATO military presence in Ukraine as "unacceptable." (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Reinforce Internal Mobilization & Control: RF seeks to streamline and enforce military conscription to sustain its manpower requirements for the ongoing conflict and tighten internal security, suppressing dissent and controlling information. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Courses of Action (COA) Currently Observed:
Large-scale Aerial Strikes targeting Critical Infrastructure (including Industrial and Civilian Logistics) and Urban Centers: Execution of widespread drone operations and missile strikes (indicated by Tu-95MS and Tu-160 launch) targeting logistics hubs, industrial enterprises (Zaporizhzhia, Dobropolye, Baykar factory), and urban centers (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Zaporizhzhia, Zhytomyr, Odesa, Cherkasy), with warnings of further threats. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Aggressive Information Operations focused on RF Successes, Ukrainian Aggression, and Diplomatic Solutions: Dissemination of official statements, milblogger content, and selective media reports to promote RF's desired diplomatic outcomes and highlight perceived cracks in Western unity, while accusing Ukraine of external sabotage or internal attacks (Crimea). This includes dehumanizing language against Ukrainian leadership and people. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Continued Localized Ground Engagements: Continued localized ground pressure in the Donetsk direction, likely attritional, aimed at fixing UAF forces, despite significant losses. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Reinforced Mobilization Policies and Internal Security Measures: Adjustments to conscription policy including year-round conscription and increased internal security crackdowns/surveillance measures. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2.2. Recent tactical changes or adaptations
RF Strategic Bomber Deployment: The launch of Tu-160 from Engels, in addition to Tu-95, indicates a potential increase in the scale and payload of an upcoming missile strike. Tu-160 carries a larger number of cruise missiles and has a longer range. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Targeting Shift to Industrial Facilities: The confirmed strike and fire at an industrial enterprise in Zaporizhzhia and reported strikes in Dobropolye, coupled with the UAF report of repeated RF attacks on the Baykar factory, mark an explicit expansion of RF targeting to Ukraine's industrial base, beyond civilian logistics. This aims to cripple Ukraine's ability to produce or repair goods, including defense-related materials. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Year-Round Conscription: The decree for year-round conscription is a significant adaptation to ensure a more consistent and robust flow of manpower into the RF armed forces, potentially allowing for greater flexibility in deployment and training cycles. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
UAF Counter-Offensive Successes: DeepStateUA's report of heavy RF casualties and destroyed equipment near Novotoretske and the successful interdiction near Figolivka indicate UAF's continued effectiveness in repelling RF ground assaults and inflicting significant damage. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2.3. Logistics and sustainment status
RF Munitions: The high volume of drone and missile activity, including deep strikes on industrial targets and the launch of Tu-95MS and Tu-160 bombers, indicates a robust supply of aerial munitions. The sustained production of Geran-type drones suggests RF is managing to sustain its aerial campaign. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Manpower: The year-round conscription policy signals a long-term strategy for RF in maintaining sufficient manpower. RF units like the 752nd Motor Rifle Regiment are still fundraising for drones, indicating persistent, granular equipment needs at the tactical level. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
UAF Civilian Logistics/Industrial Base: The deliberate targeting of industrial enterprises (Zaporizhzhia, Dobropolye, Baykar factory) suggests RF is attempting to impact Ukraine's DIB and general economic sustainment. This poses an ongoing challenge for Ukraine to protect critical civilian and industrial supply chains. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2.4. Command and control effectiveness
RF Strategic C2 (Military/Political): RF's ability to adapt targeting priorities (e.g., to industrial facilities), coordinate strategic bomber launches (Tu-95/Tu-160 from Engels), maintain a consistent narrative across official and unofficial channels, and modify conscription policy demonstrates effective strategic C2. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Tactical C2 (Air/Ground): The continued widespread and coordinated deployment of attack UAVs and FPV drones suggests effective tactical C2 for strike missions. However, the heavy RF casualties near Novotoretske and successful UAF interdiction near Figolivka indicate either poor tactical execution or a willingness to accept high losses from RF ground commanders in certain engagements. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for strike coordination, MEDIUM for ground effectiveness).
UAF Strategic C2 (National Resilience/Diplomatic): UAF's rapid and transparent response to civilian attacks and formal designation of the conflict as a "War for Independence" demonstrate effective strategic C2. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
UAF Tactical C2 (Air Defense/Offensive Air/Ground): UAF Air Force's active monitoring and warning system, particularly for Tu-95MS/Tu-160 launches, demonstrates effective tactical C2 for air defense. The successful defense resulting in heavy RF losses near Novotoretske and the interdiction near Figolivka indicate effective tactical C2 and force employment on the ground. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. FRIENDLY FORCES
Ukrainian force posture and readiness: UAF maintains an active defensive posture, demonstrating reinforced air defense capabilities with the reported arrival of an additional IRIS-T SLM battery (from previous report). Forces are actively countering RF ground and aerial threats, inflicting heavy casualties on RF forces (Novotoretske, Figolivka), and actively responding to civilian needs after RF attacks, including the wounded in Zaporizhzhia. The active monitoring and reporting of RF UAV and strategic bomber threats across multiple oblasts illustrate a high state of air defense readiness. The formal designation of the conflict as "War for Independence" is a significant strategic communication effort. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Recent tactical successes or setbacks:
Successes: DeepStateUA's footage of heavy RF casualties and destroyed equipment near Novotoretske and the successful interdiction of RF personnel near Figolivka are significant tactical successes, demonstrating UAF's effectiveness in repelling RF assaults. The ability to identify and respond to RF air threats (UAVs and Tu-95MS/Tu-160 launches) across multiple regions shows effective defensive and resilience measures. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Setbacks: The confirmed RF drone strike on an industrial enterprise in Zaporizhzhia, reported drone strikes on "military objects" (Dobropolye), and the FPV drone attack wounding a civilian in Zaporizhzhia Raion, coupled with continued civilian infrastructure targeting (e.g., Nova Poshta in Kramatorsk), highlights ongoing vulnerabilities and the high cost of RF aggression, impacting Ukraine's economic and industrial capacity. The wounding of a 69-year-old man in Zaporizhzhia underscores the civilian impact. Explosions in Cherkasy also represent an ongoing vulnerability. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Resource requirements and constraints: The persistent and widespread RF aerial threats, now explicitly targeting industrial facilities in addition to civilian logistics, underscore the critical need for continued and expanded provision of advanced air defense systems (e.g., more IRIS-T, NASAMS, Patriot) and counter-UAS capabilities. Ongoing requirements include humanitarian aid, medical supplies for casualties, reconstruction efforts, and resources for the domestic defense industry. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Propaganda and disinformation campaigns:
RF Narratives: RF channels (TASS, Операция Z / Военкоры Русской Весны, Colonelcassad, Рыбарь) continue to promote narratives of RF ground successes (Pokrovsk), RF's defense against Ukrainian attacks (Crimea/Sevastopol), and internal RF strength (conscription policy, state control, military development plans). RF attempts to frame all strikes as targeting military objects. TASS selectively reports on US statements and claims of "positive shifts" to frame diplomatic narratives beneficial to RF, while the Russian Mission to the UN emphasizes the "unacceptability" of NATO military presence. RF milbloggers also acknowledge and dismiss incidents like the Rostov fire to manage public perception. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
UAF Counter-Narratives: Ukrainian channels (РБК-Україна, Оперативний ЗСУ, Николаевский Ванёк, 🇺🇦 Запорізька обласна військова адміністрація 🇺🇦, ✙DeepState✙🇺🇦) are highlighting RF atrocities (Kyiv damage, Zaporizhzhia industrial strike and civilian casualties, FPV drone attack on civilian vehicle), promoting national resilience (Kyiv cleanup, seeking shelter in metro), reporting on successful UAF operations (heavy RF losses near Novotoretske, Figolivka interdiction), and officially framing the conflict as a "War for Independence." Ukrainian media also highlights RF's internal incidents (Rostov fire, Novorossiysk oil spill) and airport closures. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Public sentiment and morale factors:
Ukrainian Public: The continued RF strikes on urban and industrial targets, and resulting civilian casualties (Zaporizhzhia, FPV drone attack, Cherkasy explosion), coupled with strategic bomber launches, likely fuel anger, reinforce the narrative of RF terror, and solidify the "War for Independence" narrative. Public response to air alarms (seeking shelter in metro) demonstrates a learned but resilient response. Government and local authority responses, including victim support, and cleanup efforts, are critical for maintaining morale and unity. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Russian Public: RF narratives of military success and internal stability aim to manage public perception and maintain support for the conflict. The new year-round conscription policy may generate some public unease but is presented as a necessary measure. The Rostov-on-Don fire and Volgograd airport restrictions could be morale detractors if widely perceived as external attacks or signs of internal instability, although RF milbloggers are attempting to downplay them. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
International support and diplomatic developments:
Support for Ukraine: The delivery of an additional IRIS-T SLM battery (from previous report) is a tangible and significant act of continued military support. The reported US statements by Matthew Whitaker, despite RF spin, indicate continued US commitment to supplying advanced weaponry. Chancellor Merz's statement regarding Germany being in a state of conflict with Russia suggests a strong, albeit potentially escalatory, commitment from a key European partner. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Challenges/Manipulation: RF sources (Colonelcassad, TASS, Russian Mission to UN) are attempting to create diplomatic friction by highlighting internal EU divisions (e.g., US statements regarding Trump/Putin talks) and by asserting the "unacceptability" of NATO presence in Ukrainian-controlled territories. These efforts aim to weaken international support for Ukraine. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Internal Policies Affecting International Relations: The detention of Ukrainians for deportation could have implications for human rights and international relations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 24-48 HOURS)
Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):
Imminent Massed Missile/Drone Strikes with Expanded Target Set: Given the launch of Tu-95MS and Tu-160 strategic bombers and prior widespread UAV activity, RF will likely conduct a large-scale missile and drone attack within the next 6-12 hours. The target set will be expanded to include critical industrial enterprises (especially defense-related facilities), civilian logistics hubs (e.g., other postal/delivery depots, rail hubs), energy infrastructure, and densely populated urban centers across Ukraine. Frontline and border oblasts (Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Sumy, Kherson) and deeper rear areas (Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Zhytomyr, Odesa, Cherkasy) remain at severe risk. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Intensified Information Operations on RF Successes, Diplomatic Manipulation, and Alleged Ukrainian Transgressions: RF will continue to amplify official statements and milblogger content promoting alleged RF ground victories (e.g., near Pokrovsk) and highlighting any purported Ukrainian actions that can be framed as aggression or sabotage (e.g., Crimea attacks). They will seek to degrade UAF morale and international support, leveraging instances of diplomatic friction (e.g., US statements, NATO discussions regarding presence in Ukraine). Expect continued dehumanizing rhetoric. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Continued Attritional Ground Engagements, particularly in Donetsk: RF forces will continue limited offensive actions and probing operations on key axes (e.g., Donetsk, Krasnolymansk directions), with high-cost assaults aimed at achieving incremental gains and fixing UAF forces, despite recent heavy losses. This will be coupled with artillery and FPV drone attacks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Full Implementation of Year-Round Conscription and Internal Security Measures: RF will continue implementing the year-round conscription policy to bolster its military manpower. Internal security measures, including data collection and suppression of dissent, and the detention of displaced Ukrainians, will likely intensify. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):
Sustained, Multi-Wave Massed Air/Missile Campaign Targeting Strategic Economic Centers: RF could launch an exceptionally intensive, multi-wave air/missile campaign over 24-48 hours, specifically designed to overwhelm UAF air defenses and cause catastrophic damage to multiple critical industrial, energy, and transportation hubs simultaneously, aiming to paralyze Ukraine's economy and defense-industrial base. This would likely be coupled with enhanced jamming and cyberattacks against UAF C2. The deployment of Tu-160 bombers increases the potential for a larger, more destructive strike package. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Expanded Cross-Border Ground Offensive to Divert UAF Resources from Primary Axes: RF could attempt a more significant ground incursion in a border region (e.g., Sumy or Kharkiv Oblasts), beyond typical DRG activity, involving larger, multi-echelon forces (e.g., VDV) aimed at opening a new front and forcing UAF to reallocate forces from critical main operational axes to relieve pressure on Donbas. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Increased Hybrid Operations to Incite Internal Discord and Diplomatic Isolation with False Flag Attacks: RF could further intensify hybrid operations, combining more aggressive cyberattacks against critical infrastructure, sophisticated disinformation campaigns designed to exploit public sentiment around mobilization or alleged corruption, and overt/covert sabotage to sow internal discord and undermine public trust in the Ukrainian government. They may also conduct false flag operations (e.g., targeting civilian infrastructure in border regions and blaming UAF) to frame Ukraine as a regional aggressor, escalating tensions with neighboring states. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:
Immediate (0-24 hours): Expect inbound missile strikes within hours due to Tu-95MS and Tu-160 launches. UAF will implement full-alert air defense postures across the country. Decision point for UAF to publicly acknowledge and integrate the new IRIS-T SLM battery (from previous report) into its defense network, potentially using this as a strategic communication opportunity.
Short-term (24-48 hours): Expect continued attritional ground engagements in Eastern sectors, with RF continuing to test UAF defenses despite losses. UAF will need to continue assessing the full implications of RF's evolving targeting of industrial infrastructure and adapt defensive measures, while also preparing diplomatic responses to RF-amplified narratives regarding Ukrainian aggression, detention of civilians, and internal EU/NATO divisions.
Next Week: UAF will continue to adapt to evolving RF drone and missile tactics and industrial targeting. Diplomatic efforts will continue to solidify international security guarantees, counter RF narratives on external "peacekeepers" and alleged sabotage, and manage internal EU divisions. RF will likely continue to recruit and train drone operators to sustain its aerial campaign, reinforced by new conscription policies.
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
CRITICAL:Verification of UAF 3rd Army Corps Losses on Krasnolymansk Direction. Requires urgent IMINT (satellite imagery, drone reconnaissance), SIGINT (radio intercepts, comms analysis), and HUMINT (frontline reporting, POW interrogations) to confirm or deny RF claims of battle damage and personnel status.
HIGH:Full Operational Status and Deployment Location of New IRIS-T SLM Battery. Requires discreet IMINT, SIGINT, and OSINT (monitoring of RF reactions/targeting) to understand its integration and effectiveness without compromising security.
HIGH:Nature and Scale of RF VDV Activity in Zaporizhzhia. Specific units, disposition, and operational intent (reconnaissance-in-force, limited assault, force fixation, preparation for larger incursion) remain unclear. Requires enhanced IMINT (drone, satellite), SIGINT (unit identification, movement patterns), and HUMINT.
HIGH:Verification of Estonian Mercenary Liquidation (Olev Rust) in Sumy Oblast. Requires HUMINT (foreign fighter networks, UAF records), OSINT (Estonian media, social media checks), and forensic analysis if possible.
HIGH:Detailed Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) of RF Strike on Zaporizhzhia Industrial Enterprise. What specific type of industrial enterprise was hit? What is the impact on its production capacity? Requires IMINT (drone footage, satellite imagery), OSINT (local reporting, company statements), and TECHINT (damage analysis).
HIGH:Nature and Cause of Rostov-on-Don Explosions and Fire. Was this the result of a UAF strike, sabotage, or an industrial accident? Requires IMINT (satellite imagery, drone footage if available), SIGINT (intercepts related to the event), and OSINT (local media, eyewitness accounts) to determine cause and potential military implications.
HIGH:Composition, Flight Profile, and Intended Target Sets for Current Tu-95MS/Tu-160 Launch. Requires immediate SIGINT (electronic intelligence, communications intercepts), IMINT (satellite tracking), and OSINT (flight tracking, social media) to determine number of aircraft, potential missile load, trajectory, and likely impact areas.
MEDIUM:Assessment of RF Mobile Air Defense Capabilities Against UAVs in Rear Areas (e.g., Samara, Volgograd). Requires TECHINT, IMINT (damage assessments after UAF strikes), and SIGINT (RF comms regarding air defense effectiveness) to accurately gauge RF's vulnerability to deep strikes, especially in light of airport restrictions.
MEDIUM:Detailed BDA and "Military Object" Verification for Dobropolye Strike. What exactly was hit in Dobropolye? Was it a legitimate military target as claimed by RF, or civilian/dual-use infrastructure? Requires IMINT (drone footage, satellite imagery), OSINT (local reporting), and TECHINT.
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
IMMEDIATE: Maximize Air Defense Readiness for Impending Mass Missile Strikes:
ACTION: Immediately elevate all UAF air defense assets (SAMs, interceptors, C-UAS) to maximum readiness posture nationwide. Prioritize layered defense for Kyiv, major urban centers, critical industrial facilities (especially defense-related), and key energy infrastructure. Disseminate immediate, actionable public warnings. Direct all military and critical civilian personnel to shelter.
PRIORITY: CRITICAL (IMMEDIATE)
REASONING: The confirmed launch of Tu-95MS and Tu-160 strategic bombers from Engels signals an imminent, large-scale missile attack, demanding an immediate and robust defensive response to mitigate damage and casualties.
Prioritize Layered Air Defense for Critical Industrial and Civilian Logistics:
ACTION: Following the immediate response to missile strikes, strategically deploy and integrate the newly arrived IRIS-T SLM battery into a layered air defense network, prioritizing protection for critical industrial enterprises (especially those with defense-related or dual-use capacity, like the Baykar factory), civilian logistics hubs (e.g., Nova Poshta, rail depots), energy infrastructure, and densely populated urban centers, particularly in frontline and deep rear oblasts. Develop and disseminate enhanced hardening guidance for these sites.
PRIORITY: CRITICAL
REASONING: RF has demonstrated a clear and expanding shift in targeting to civilian logistics and industrial facilities, aiming to disrupt the economy and civilian life, necessitating robust and adaptive air defense. The new IRIS-T is a high-value asset that must be effectively deployed and protected.
Intensify Counter-Information Campaign on RF Atrocities and Diplomatic Manipulation:
ACTION: Launch a robust, evidence-based counter-information campaign (STRATCOM/PSYOP) that prominently features confirmed civilian casualties (Zaporizhzhia, FPV drone attack) and damage to industrial facilities, while actively refuting RF narratives regarding "military objects" when civilian infrastructure is hit. Concurrently, strongly counter RF's attempts to exploit internal EU/NATO divisions (e.g., US statements, Hungarian stances, RF claims of "unacceptability" of NATO presence). Expose RF's dehumanizing rhetoric and its year-round conscription policy. Promote Ukraine's "War for Independence" narrative and the unity of its international partners.
PRIORITY: HIGH
REASONING: RF is using terror, diplomatic manipulation, and dehumanization as key tools of hybrid warfare. A strong counter-narrative, grounded in facts, is essential to maintain domestic morale and international support.
Enhance All-Source ISR and Reconnaissance for Frontlines and RF Rear Areas, Focusing on RF Tactical Adaptations and Long-Range Strike Assets:
ACTION: Reallocate and prioritize all-source ISR assets (IMINT, SIGINT, OSINT, HUMINT) to monitor RF force movements and tactical adaptations (e.g., ground tactics, drone operator activities) on key fronts (Krasnolymansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Kharkiv border) for any signs of escalation. Simultaneously, intensify deep ISR into RF territory to identify additional vulnerabilities in air defense networks and critical military-industrial and energy infrastructure that could be exploited by UAF long-range assets, particularly in light of the Rostov-on-Don incident and airport restrictions. Monitor closely for information on the "Svod" tactical information system and long-range bomber movements.
PRIORITY: HIGH
REASONING: Continuous, accurate intelligence on RF intentions, vulnerabilities, and tactical adaptations, as well as its C4ISR development and long-range strike capabilities, is vital for both defensive planning and effective UAF offensive deep strikes.
Bolster Border Security and Counter-Incursion Capabilities; Adapt to RF Mobilization:
ACTION: Increase deployment of mobile counter-UAS (C-UAS), EW assets, and rapid reaction forces to reinforce border security in Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv Oblasts, and along the Kherson contact line. Develop proactive interdiction strategies against DRG activity and prepare for potential larger-scale cross-border ground incursions, integrating lessons learned from RF VDV activity in other sectors. Analyze the implications of RF's year-round conscription on potential manpower surges and adapt UAF training and recruitment accordingly.
PRIORITY: HIGH
REASONING: RF's localized ground pressure in border regions, potential VDV activity, and new conscription policies necessitate a robust and agile border defense and adaptable UAF manpower strategies to prevent diversions of UAF forces from main operational axes.
