Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 280600Z AUG 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: The Russian Federation (RF) continues a large-scale, multi-domain air offensive, demonstrating a significant escalation in the scope and lethality of attacks targeting critical infrastructure and civilian areas across central, northern, and western Ukraine. Kyiv remains under severe, sustained attack involving ballistic missiles (Iskander-M), Shahed UAVs, Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles (MiG-31K launch confirmed), Kh-101 cruise missiles (confirmed launches), and reports of "decoys" and "Gerber." Confirmed impacts and significant damage in Kyiv now include an office building, a shopping center, residential buildings, educational facilities, and numerous vehicles. The casualty count has tragically risen to 4 fatalities and over 20 injured, including children. UAF deep strike operations into RF territory continue to be effective, confirmed to include multiple oil refineries and railway infrastructure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) New reports confirm the widespread nature of fires in Kyiv, necessitating the deployment of aviation for suppression. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) The air raid alert for Kyiv has now been lifted. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Central/Northern Ukraine (Expanded Air Threat - Intensified and Lethal):

  • Kyiv Oblast: Confirmed 3x missile impacts in Vyshhorod Raion. Kyiv city has sustained severe and significant impacts. The Kyiv Military Administration (KMA) confirms multiple damage locations in Shevchenkivskyi, Darnytskyi, Dniprovskyi, and Solomianskyi districts. A kindergarten is reported ablaze in Darnytskyi district due to an attack. Multiple apartment fires are reported in a Kyiv high-rise, and a 5-story building is significantly damaged. Tragically, 4 fatalities and over 20 injured individuals (including two children) are now confirmed in Kyiv. A training institution has also been damaged, and an auto parking lot is on fire. In Dniprovskyi district, 7 vehicles are reported on fire across two locations. In Shevchenkivskyi district, 9 vehicles are reported on fire. A residential building in Holosiivskyi district has been damaged, with KMA confirming significant damage at several locations, including residential buildings, a fire, and at least 10 houses with broken windows. An office building in Obolonskyi district has been damaged. A shopping center in central Kyiv has been hit. Astra and Operativni ZSU provide imagery and video confirming significant destruction to residential buildings and widespread fires in Kyiv following RF attacks, corroborating the rising casualty figures. Aviation (helicopters/aircraft) have been deployed for firefighting efforts in Kyiv. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Kyiv/Zhytomyr Oblasts: High-speed targets detected moving towards Zhytomyr Oblast, with UAVs confirmed targeting Zhytomyr city. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Chernihiv Oblast: High-speed targets detected moving towards Chernihiv city. Kh-101 cruise missiles confirmed entering via Sumy Oblast towards Chernihiv Oblast, moving southwest. Multiple groups of UAVs detected in Chernihiv Oblast moving southwest. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Ballistic Missile Threat: Monitoring channels warn of ballistic missile threat from both northern and southern directions. Kyiv is confirmed under ballistic missile attack with preliminary assessment of 4x Iskander-M from Bryansk Oblast, and further ballistic missile launches from Voronezh Oblast towards Kyiv. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Mass UAV Attack: Approximately 80 UAVs reported in Ukrainian airspace, with new reports indicating movement towards Kolomyia (Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast) and Zhytomyr city. Four reactive Shaheds reported approaching Kyiv, with one high-speed target on Vasilkiv. UAVs are reported over the right bank of Kyiv. UAF Air Force re-iterates UAV threat to Kyiv, and also reports UAVs approaching Starokostiantyniv and Bila Tserkva. UAVs detected past Brovary towards Kyiv. UAVs currently on course for Vasylkiv. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Kinzhal Missile Threat: A MiG-31K, carrier of the Kinzhal aeroballistic missile, has taken off and monitoring channels reported potential Kinzhal launches. KMA explicitly states "Kinzhal" used in current attack. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Cruise Missile Threat: Monitoring channels report possible Kh-101 cruise missile launches from RF strategic aviation (Tu-95), leading to a nationwide missile threat alert. Air Force confirms groups of Kh-101 cruise missiles on the border of Sumy and Chernihiv Oblasts moving southwest. Subsequent confirmation of Kh-101s moving from Sumy to Poltava Oblast, then towards Cherkasy Oblast. Cruise missiles confirmed en route to Kaniv, then from Cherkasy Oblast to Kirovohrad Oblast. Group of cruise missiles on eastern Kyiv Oblast moving west. Cruise missiles on Cherkasy Oblast moving west. Group of cruise missiles confirmed heading directly for Kyiv, then another group towards Vinnytsia Oblast, then another group on northern Vinnytsia Oblast moving west, and another missile from the south towards Vasylkiv, and finally one towards Starokostiantyniv. Cruise missiles from Vinnytsia Oblast now entering Khmelnytskyi Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Air Alert Status: The air raid alert for Kyiv has been lifted as of 280333Z AUG 25. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Implication: The multi-layered, multi-directional attack on Kyiv with ballistic missiles, UAVs, confirmed Kinzhal/Kh-101 assets, and potentially "decoys" represents a severe, sustained escalation in both complexity and intent. The tragic escalation in civilian casualties (now 4 fatalities and over 20 injured, including children) and confirmed civilian infrastructure damage (kindergarten, residential buildings, educational facility, office building, shopping center, private vehicles) underscores the indiscriminate nature and psychological intent of RF targeting, aiming to inflict terror and maximize societal disruption. The expansion to western vectors (Kolomyia, Starokostiantyniv, Bila Tserkva, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi) continues to stress UAF air defenses and force broader area protection. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Donetsk Direction (Pleshcheyevka/Western LNR): RF 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) scouts, supported by an Orlan-30 UAV (439th Rocket Artillery Brigade), detected two UAF dugouts near Pleshcheyevka, destroyed by Krasnopol-M2 PGM. RF (TASS, Marochko) claims Kyiv has intensified attacks on the western LNR front, over 20 km wide. This suggests either a UAF probing attack or a counter-narrative from RF following heavy strikes on Kyiv. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

  • Kharkiv Oblast: RF 'Colonelcassad' reports TOS (Thermobaric Artillery System) use by "Severyan" forces to burn UAF positions in Kharkiv Oblast. This is unverified but indicates continued RF use of heavy thermobaric systems. (LOW CONFIDENCE)

• Zaporizhzhia Oblast: Explosions reported in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. RF MoD (TASS) claims artillery from "Dnipro" group hit UAF defensive positions in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, releasing video of a 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzer. UAF Air Force reports a UAV from the south heading towards Zaporizhzhia city. Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration confirms Russians attacked an enterprise in the city, causing a fire. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• RF Internal (Volgograd Oblast): Reports of a strike on Petrov Val railway station in Volgograd Oblast, confirmed by Governor. This indicates continued UAF deep strike activity against RF logistics. RF sources confirm movement suspended at a station in Volgograd Oblast due to UAV debris, causing possible passenger train delays. "Оперативний ЗСУ" confirms transport and logistics infrastructure under massive attack in Volgograd Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• RF Internal (Oil Refineries): UAF sources, independent OSINT (ASTRA), and social media reports confirm UAV attacks and significant fires at Afipsky (Krasnodar Krai) and Novokuibyshevsky (Samara Oblast) oil refineries. These are major industrial facilities, and the scale of the fires suggests substantial damage and disruption. ASTRA further emphasizes the ongoing large-scale fire at Novokuibyshevsk and provides video of the presumed moment of attack on the Kuybyshevsky (Novokuibyshevsky) refinery in Samara. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• RF Internal (Airports): Temporary flight restrictions imposed in Sochi, Saratov, Samara airports. Rosaviatsiya reports restrictions lifted in Saratov, Sochi, and Volgograd airports. Temporary restrictions introduced in Kazan airport. Rosaviatsiya now reports restrictions lifted in Kazan and Samara airports. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• RF Internal (Rostov Oblast): RF reports drone attack repelled in Kamensky, Millerovsky, and Chertkovsky districts of Rostov Oblast. TASS reports UAV fragments fell on a house roof in a village in Rostov Oblast, leading to the evacuation of 89 people due to detonation threat. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Western Ukraine (Lviv Oblast Border): Video shows young men (18-22 years old) being denied exit at the Rava-Ruska border crossing. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Night Operations: The ongoing UAV and missile attacks occurred primarily at night, continuing to challenge UAF night-capable air defense assets and increasing the difficulty of target acquisition for both sides. RF strategic aviation likely launched cruise missiles during optimal night conditions to maximize range and penetration. The large-scale fires in RF oil refineries are highly visible at night, increasing their public impact. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF:
  • Air/Missile Operations: RF is conducting a massive, multi-domain air campaign involving approximately 80 UAVs, ballistic missiles (Iskander-M) from northern (Bryansk, Voronezh Oblasts) and southern vectors, targeting Kyiv Oblast (Vyshhorod Raion), Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, Kolomyia, Starokostiantyniv, Bila Tserkva, and now Confirmed Kh-101 cruise missiles entering via Sumy/Chernihiv and moving towards Poltava, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, and back towards Kyiv and Vasylkiv. The current attack on Kyiv involved multiple ballistic missiles, multiple waves of UAVs, with a MiG-31K (Kinzhal carrier) active, and confirmed Kh-101 launches. KMA also reports use of "decoys" and "Gerber." (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Ground Forces (Donetsk/Zaporizhzhia/Western LNR): RF forces continue coordinated reconnaissance-strike operations, effectively using UAVs for target acquisition and precision-guided artillery (Krasnopol-M2) to destroy UAF fortified positions in Donetsk. RF also claims successful artillery strikes on UAF defensive positions in Zaporizhzhia. RF claims Kyiv has intensified attacks in Western LNR, indicating a possible defensive reaction or pre-emptive shaping operation by RF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Internal Security/Air Defense: RF claims to have repelled drone attacks in Rostov Oblast. The evacuation of 89 people due to UAV fragments in Rostov Oblast, and temporary flight restrictions in Kazan and Samara (though now lifted), indicate active internal air defense and security measures are being stressed and adapting to ongoing UAF deep strikes. TASS also promotes new Russian EW system "KVERTOP-K-12700" at an exhibition, potentially signaling efforts to improve counter-UAV capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Information Operations: TASS continues to promote domestic social narratives and attempts to elevate the political significance of a potential Putin-Trump meeting. TASS is also pushing content on an American professor (Mearsheimer) being added to "Myrotvorets" to discredit Ukrainian institutions. TASS also reports a poll supporting a ban on state service for "relocants" (Russians who left the country), aiming to reinforce loyalty. "НгП раZVедка" is rapidly propagating immediate, often exaggerated claims of successful strikes on Kyiv and Koziatyn, attempting to undermine confidence in UAF air defenses and threatening Kinzhal strikes, and also attempting to shift blame for damage to civilian infrastructure onto UAF air defense. "НгП раZVедка" also explicitly states "We will polish them with cruise missiles" after reporting on the initial Kyiv attacks. Colonelcassad is promoting thermobaric strikes in Kharkiv and features footage of an RF sniper. "Операция Z" is disseminating reports of Hungary suing the EU Council and promoting its channel in national messenger MAX. TASS claims that UAF leadership has removed the 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade from the Sumy direction due to heavy losses from RF missile strikes, including commanders. TASS also attempts to discredit UAF by claiming UAF forces held mobilized personnel in pits for weeks in Kharkiv Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• UAF:
  • Air Defense Posture: UAF maintains a high state of air defense readiness, actively tracking and reporting incoming UAVs, ballistic missiles, and now confirmed Kinzhal/Kh-101 missiles across multiple oblasts, including new trajectories towards Poltava, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, and critically, a group now heading for Kyiv. Air defense is confirmed active in Kyiv, with initial reports of engagement and multiple explosions. The air raid alert for Kyiv has been lifted. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Deep Strike Operations: Evidence of strikes on Petrov Val railway station (Volgograd Oblast) and Afipsky/Novokuibyshevsky oil refineries (Krasnodar Krai / Samara Oblast) indicates UAF or pro-Ukrainian forces continue to conduct effective deep strike/sabotage operations against RF logistics and energy infrastructure. Operativni ZSU provides video confirming significant fires at these refineries. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Border Control: Heightened border control measures at the Lviv Oblast border (Rava-Ruska) restricting exit for young men (18-22) suggest ongoing mobilization efforts or preventative measures against illegal border crossings. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Information Operations: "Повітряні Сили ЗС України", "КМВА", and "РБК-Україна" continue to provide critical, timely public alerts regarding aerial threats and initial damage reports, including confirmed increased casualties (now over 20 injured, 4 dead) and specific impacts in Kyiv. RBC Ukraine also reports that aviation is involved in extinguishing fires in Kyiv. "ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS" and "STERNENKO" are rapidly reporting on the successful UAF deep strikes on RF oil refineries while condemning RF attacks on Ukrainian cities and highlighting the human cost. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:
  • Large-Scale, Coordinated Multi-Domain Air Attack with Expanded Munition Set, Lethality, and Deception: RF has demonstrated the capability to conduct simultaneous mass UAV and ballistic missile (Iskander-M) attacks from multiple directions, across wide geographic areas, now further enhanced by the confirmed active presence and probable launch of a MiG-31K (Kinzhal carrier), confirmed Kh-101 cruise missile launches from strategic aviation (Tu-95), and the use of "decoys" and "Gerber" (false targets). This represents a highly complex, multi-layered attack designed to overwhelm and bypass UAF air defenses. The increased casualty count (4 fatalities, over 20 injured) and extensive damage underscore the lethality and indiscriminate nature. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Precision Reconnaissance-Strike Complex (Confirmed Ground Ops): RF maintains the capability to effectively integrate UAVs (Orlan-30) for reconnaissance and target designation with precision-guided artillery (Krasnopol-M2) to accurately destroy UAF fixed positions in Donetsk. Video evidence from TASS confirms RF ability to use 2S1 Gvozdika howitzers for striking UAF defensive positions in Zaporizhzhia. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Internal Air Defense (Stressed): RF demonstrates a capability to detect and repel drone attacks on its own territory, but confirmed fall of UAV fragments and subsequent evacuations highlight continued vulnerabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Intentions:
  • Overwhelm UAF Air Defenses and Degrade Critical Infrastructure/Military Targets (Strategic) and Civilian Morale (Psychological) with Maximum Impact and Deception: The primary intention of the current large-scale, multi-layered air campaign is to inflict maximum damage on Ukraine's energy and other critical infrastructure, disrupt military command and control, deplete UAF air defense munitions, and exert severe psychological pressure on the civilian population, particularly in Kyiv. The confirmed 4 fatalities and over 20 injured (including children) in Kyiv indicate an intent to maximize terror and psychological impact on the civilian population. Targeting the capital region with a full spectrum of air assets suggests an intent to expand psychological pressure and identify new vulnerabilities. The confirmed strikes on civilian buildings (kindergarten, residential, office building, shopping center), an educational facility, and numerous vehicles in Kyiv suggest either deliberate targeting to maximize terror, or indiscriminate targeting as a result of a highly complex and saturation attack, which now includes deception tactics. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Maintain Ground Pressure and Attrition (Operational/Tactical): RF intends to continue relentless ground offensive pressure, particularly in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia, using precision fires and reconnaissance to degrade UAF strongholds and facilitate localized advances. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Shape Information Environment (Cognitive): RF intends to boost domestic morale, project military strength, distract from the human and material costs of the conflict, and justify actions in occupied territories. RF's immediate propaganda claims of successful "massive" strikes in Kyiv and Koziatyn are intended to amplify fear and sow doubt about UAF air defense effectiveness, and to immediately blame UAF air defense for any civilian damage. New efforts to highlight potential high-level diplomatic engagements (Putin-Trump) are intended to project RF as a significant global player. The targeting of a respected US academic (Mearsheimer) on "Myrotvorets" is intended to discredit Ukrainian institutions. The TASS poll on "relocants" aims to reinforce loyalty and penalize dissent. Claims of UAF troop withdrawals and poor treatment of mobilized personnel aim to degrade UAF morale and effectiveness. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Courses of Action (COA) Currently Observed:
  • Coordinated Multi-Vector, Multi-Munition Air Assault with Deception: RF is employing a highly coordinated air assault using ballistic missiles (Iskander-M), Shahed UAVs, confirmed high-value assets like Kinzhal and Kh-101 missiles, and "decoys"/"Gerber." This aims to overwhelm UAF air defenses through saturation, varied threat profiles, and deception. The ongoing nature of the attack confirms this COA. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Targeting Critical Infrastructure and Railways (Expanded Civilian Impact): The reported damage to railway infrastructure in Vinnytsia Oblast, the repeat strike on Petrov Val railway station, and confirmed impacts on civilian residential buildings, a kindergarten, an educational institution, an office building, a shopping center, and numerous vehicles in Kyiv, with increased casualties, confirm RF's ongoing intent to disrupt Ukrainian logistics and energy supply, and maximize psychological impact. The attack on an enterprise in Zaporizhzhia further highlights this intent. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Recent tactical changes or adaptations

• Sustained and Escalated Full-Spectrum Air Attack on Kyiv with Confirmed Advanced Missiles, Deception Munitions, and Increased Lethality: The most significant adaptation is the rapid, sustained escalation to include confirmed Kinzhal (from MiG-31K) and Kh-101 (from Tu-95) missiles in the current, prolonged attack on Kyiv and other regions, in addition to ballistic missiles, UAVs, and new reports of "decoys" and "Gerber" munitions. This demonstrates RF's willingness to commit its most advanced and scarce long-range strike assets against the capital and other key targets, representing a major increase in the complexity and danger of the air campaign. The tragic increase in civilian fatalities (4) and injuries (over 20) is a critical adaptation in the lethality and humanitarian impact of these strikes, indicating a more indiscriminate or terror-focused approach. The inclusion of "decoys" signals a deliberate attempt to expend UAF air defense munitions and overwhelm tracking systems. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Expanded Geographic Scope of Air Campaign (Confirmed and Sustained): The confirmed targeting of Kolomyia (Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast), Starokostiantyniv, Bila Tserkva, and newly identified trajectories of Kh-101s towards Poltava, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, and now Khmelnytskyi Oblasts represents a significant geographical expansion of the RF multi-domain air campaign into western and central Ukraine. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Deliberate/Indiscriminate Targeting of Civilian Infrastructure in Kyiv Resulting in High Casualties: The confirmed strikes on a kindergarten, residential buildings, a training institution, an office building, a shopping center, and numerous civilian vehicles in Kyiv, resulting in 4 fatalities and over 20 injuries, indicate either a deliberate targeting of civilian areas to maximize terror, or a significant lack of precision, or indiscriminate targeting. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Persistent Counter-UAF Deep Strike Disinformation and Allied Discord Attempts, with New Domestic Narrative: RF channels are immediately attempting to shift blame for civilian casualties and damage in Kyiv to UAF air defense. New TASS narratives attempt to frame potential high-level diplomatic engagements as globally significant, and to discredit Ukrainian institutions. A new domestic propaganda push to ban "relocants" from state service aims to reinforce loyalty. TASS also disseminates new claims regarding UAF troop losses and poor treatment of mobilized soldiers. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.3. Logistics and sustainment status

• RF Munitions Production/Availability (Sustained): The ability to launch such a large-scale, complex, and sustained air attack suggests RF maintains substantial production and/or acquisition capacity for these high-value munitions, despite previous intelligence suggesting depletion. This volume and diversity indicates a significant commitment of resources to this offensive. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF Energy/Logistics Vulnerabilities (Confirmed and Exploited): The confirmed successful UAV attacks on the Afipsky and Novokuibyshevsky oil refineries, in addition to the repeat strike on Petrov Val railway station, demonstrate significant and increasing vulnerabilities in RF's internal energy and logistics infrastructure to UAF deep strike capabilities. These are high-value targets, and the scale of the fires suggests substantial impact. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF Air Defense for Internal Territory (Stressed): Flight restrictions in Sochi, Saratov, Samara, and Kazan previously implied RF maintained sufficient internal air defense assets and readiness. The lifting of these restrictions in some areas suggests RF assesses the immediate threat has passed. However, the confirmation of UAV debris causing railway delays in Volgograd, the reported repulsion of drone attacks in Rostov Oblast, and the fall of UAV fragments resulting in 89 evacuations in Rostov, suggests the underlying threat persists and RF internal air defense assets are being stretched. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.4. Command and control effectiveness

• RF Coordinated Multi-Domain Strikes (Highly Effective): The simultaneous, multi-vector, and prolonged nature of the UAV and ballistic missile attacks across a wider geographic area, now compounded by confirmed Kinzhal and Kh-101 strikes on Kyiv and other oblasts, with new coordinated trajectories, and the use of "decoys"/"Gerber" munitions, demonstrates highly effective, centralized command and control for complex multi-domain operations and deception tactics. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF Tactical C2: The successful reconnaissance-strike mission near Pleshcheyevka and the claimed artillery strikes in Zaporizhzhia indicate robust C2 integration between RF intelligence assets (UAVs) and artillery units. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• UAF Agile Air Defense C2 (Severely Stressed): UAF Air Force's rapid issuance of alerts for both UAVs, ballistic missiles, and now confirmed Kinzhal and Kh-101 missiles across multiple oblasts, including new threats to Kyiv, and reports of "decoys" and "Gerber," indicates an agile and responsive C2 system for air defense. However, the sustained and complex nature of the attack, with its increased number and diversity of threats, including deception munitions, is now severely stressing this system and its resources. The continuing movement of cruise missile groups across multiple oblasts necessitates constant, rapid adaptation of air defense posture. The lifting of the air alert in Kyiv indicates successful C2 in managing the immediate threat. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

• Ukrainian force posture and readiness: UAF maintains a high state of air defense readiness across northern, central, and now western regions under active multi-domain attack, particularly in Kyiv where air defense is engaged against ballistic missiles, UAVs, Kinzhal, and Kh-101 missiles, and also contending with "decoys" and "Gerber." Ground forces continue to hold defensive lines in critical sectors while also conducting deep strike operations. Border control measures are enhanced, indicating ongoing efforts to manage internal security and potentially mobilization. Firefighting aviation has been deployed in Kyiv to combat widespread fires, demonstrating a rapid civilian emergency response capability. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Recent tactical successes or setbacks:
  • Successes: UAF air defense is actively tracking and reporting incoming threats, providing timely public warnings and engaging targets over Kyiv. UAF or pro-Ukrainian deep strike operations continue to successfully target RF logistics (Petrov Val railway station) and, significantly, RF critical energy infrastructure (Afipsky and Novokuibyshevsky oil refineries, causing major fires confirmed by multiple sources and with video evidence). The air alert in Kyiv has been lifted, indicating the immediate aerial threat has passed or been neutralized. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Setbacks: RF has launched an unprecedented, large-scale combined UAV, ballistic missile, Kinzhal, and Kh-101 attack, now also including "decoys"/"Gerber" and with a renewed focus on Kyiv. This has resulted in significant damage to critical infrastructure, including a kindergarten, a training institution, an office building, a shopping center, and residential buildings in Kyiv, and tragically, at least 4 confirmed civilian fatalities and over 20 casualties. Numerous private vehicles have also been destroyed or damaged in Kyiv. The expanded targeting to Kolomyia, Starokostiantyniv, Bila Tserkva, Poltava, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, and Khmelnytskyi represents a new and broader challenge to UAF's air defense architecture across Ukraine. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Resource requirements and constraints: The current multi-domain air campaign, involving a large number of UAVs, ballistic missiles, Kinzhal, and Kh-101 across expanded vectors, including repeated ballistic and cruise missile strikes and high-value missile threats on Kyiv, and the use of "decoys"/"Gerber," necessitates urgent and continuous replenishment of all air defense munitions. This is especially critical for mobile systems to counter Shahed-type drones, and for higher-tier systems to intercept ballistic missiles and Kinzhals (which are exceedingly difficult to intercept) and Kh-101s. The ability to counter precision artillery (Krasnopol-M2) and RF tactical aviation remains a critical requirement. The expanded geographical scope into western and central Ukraine will further strain existing air defense assets, requiring rapid reallocation and potentially exposing other areas. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

• Propaganda and disinformation campaigns:
  • RF Domestic/External: TASS is pushing non-military, domestic content to divert public attention and now attempts to elevate the political significance of a potential Putin-Trump meeting. TASS is also working to discredit Ukrainian institutions by highlighting the "Myrotvorets" listing of US academic John Mearsheimer. TASS also reports a poll supporting a ban on state service for "relocants." "НгП раZVедка" is immediately claiming a "massive Iskander strike" on Kyiv and success in Koziatyn, attempting to amplify the perceived effectiveness of RF strikes, sowing panic, and eroding confidence in UAF air defenses. Crucially, RF channels (e.g., "НгП раZVедка") are immediately attempting to attribute civilian damage in Kyiv to UAF air defense activity (e.g., "ПеПеО ушатало ещё одну многобудку в Позняках") to deflect blame and sow mistrust in UAF capabilities, intensifying this narrative with the rising civilian casualties. TASS is also claiming the 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade has been withdrawn from Sumy due to heavy losses and that UAF is mistreating mobilized soldiers in Kharkiv. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF: "Повітряні Сили ЗС України", "КМВА", and "РБК-Україна" continue to provide critical, timely threat alerts, and are now sharing immediate, confirmed reports of damage, tragically increased casualties (now over 20 injured, 4 dead), and specific impacts in Kyiv. RBC Ukraine also reports the deployment of aviation for firefighting efforts. "ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS" and "STERNENKO" are rapidly reporting on the successful UAF deep strikes on RF oil refineries while also highlighting the severity of RF attacks on civilian targets in Kyiv and the human cost. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Public sentiment and morale factors: The large-scale, multi-domain air attacks, particularly those targeting the Kyiv region with a full spectrum of RF missile capabilities (ballistic, confirmed Kinzhal, Kh-101, decoys/Gerber) and resulting in confirmed impacts on residential buildings, an educational facility, an office building, a shopping center, and tragically, 4 confirmed civilian fatalities and over 20 casualties, will inevitably strain public morale. The repeated ballistic and cruise missile attacks on Kyiv, resulting in impacts and medical calls, will significantly test public resilience in the capital. Transparent communication from UAF authorities regarding air defense actions, damage, and repair efforts is paramount. RF propaganda aims to instill fear and project strength, and its multi-pronged information efforts must be actively countered, especially the attempts to blame UAF for civilian damage, which is a malicious and dangerous narrative in light of civilian deaths. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• International support and diplomatic developments: RF's efforts to divert attention through sensational international news (e.g., Hungary vs. EU) and newly, to project diplomatic influence by framing potential high-level US-RF meetings as historically significant, and discrediting Ukrainian institutions via "Myrotvorets" listings, and now reinforce loyalty through domestic polls, may attempt to diminish the focus on Ukraine. The ongoing military actions, particularly the intensified air campaign and its expansion to western/central Ukraine and the commitment of high-value Kinzhal/Kh-101 assets and deception munitions, will likely prompt renewed calls for increased international military aid, especially advanced air defense systems capable of intercepting these sophisticated threats. UAF deep strikes on RF oil refineries demonstrate an ongoing capability to strike RF critical infrastructure, which will likely generate further debate and discussion among international partners regarding the implications for escalation and the need to bolster Ukrainian offensive capabilities. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

• MLCOA 1: Continued and Sustained Complex Multi-Domain Air Campaign with Full-Spectrum Munitions, Deception, and Civilian Targeting (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF will continue to launch successive, coordinated waves of Shahed-type UAVs, ballistic missiles (Iskander-M), and utilize Kinzhal and Kh-101 cruise missiles, along with "decoys" and "Gerber," to further deplete UAF air defense munitions, cause widespread, cascading disruptions to critical infrastructure, and degrade UAF military capabilities. The focus will remain on Kyiv and central/northern Ukraine, with continued probing of western oblasts to test defenses and identify new vulnerabilities, and to force broader UAF air defense deployment. The intent is to maintain pressure, force UAF to expend high-value interceptors, and exert psychological pressure through attacks on civilian infrastructure, aiming to increase casualties and terror. This includes continued targeting of civilian residential areas, educational facilities, office buildings, shopping centers, and vehicles, increasing the likelihood of civilian casualties and societal disruption. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• MLCOA 2: Intensified Ground Assaults in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia with Integrated Fires (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF forces will maintain relentless ground offensive pressure on the Pokrovsk and Avdiivka axes, heavily supported by UAV-guided precision artillery (Krasnopol-M2) and glide bombs, aiming for localized territorial gains and further degradation of UAF defensive lines. RF will also continue artillery and UAV operations in Zaporizhzhia, targeting enterprises and defensive positions. The reported use of TOS systems in Kharkiv indicates a willingness to employ devastating, area-effect weapons to clear UAF positions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• MLCOA 3: Persistent and Diversified Information Operations (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF information channels will persist in amplifying sensationalist international news, promoting their tactical successes and claims of strikes against Ukrainian targets, pushing narratives of humanitarian engagement and internal stability, and actively discrediting Ukraine and its allies to distract from ongoing aggression and shape domestic and international perceptions. This includes highlighting judicial actions in occupied territories to project control and immediately claiming exaggerated success for current strikes to demoralize the Ukrainian population. A key aspect will be continued and intensified efforts to blame UAF air defense for civilian damage and casualties in Kyiv and other cities, despite clear evidence of RF targeting. TASS will continue to use narratives of RF's global diplomatic significance to bolster domestic morale and to attempt to discredit Ukrainian institutions, and use domestic polls to reinforce internal loyalty. RF will also continue to propagate claims of UAF troop losses and withdrawals, and poor treatment of mobilized personnel. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

• MDCOA 1: Focused Strategic Strike on Kyiv C2/Government Hubs with Massed Kinzhal/Ballistic Missiles and Deception (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF conducts a highly coordinated, large-scale ballistic missile and Kinzhal strike, augmented by a higher volume of "decoys," specifically targeting key UAF command and control centers, government facilities, or major military installations within Kyiv, aiming to severely disrupt leadership, operational effectiveness, and create a significant psychological shock. The current multi-layered attack on Kyiv, including confirmed Kinzhal and Kh-101 presence and confirmed civilian impacts, along with "decoys," could be a prelude or an attempt to soften defenses for such a strike, exploiting any confusion. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• MDCOA 2: Strategic Cyber-Kinetic Attack on National Grid Coupled with Sabotage (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF executes a highly coordinated cyberattack specifically targeting Ukraine's energy grid SCADA systems, synchronized with physical UAV/missile strikes across multiple vectors (including new western routes and military-critical nodes), and potentially supported by internal sabotage cells, aiming to cause a widespread, prolonged national grid collapse, particularly as winter approaches. The previous attack on an enterprise in Zaporizhzhia indicates a continued focus on such targets. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• MDCOA 3: Tactical Breakthrough in Donetsk with Massed Armor and Air Support (LOW CONFIDENCE): RF commits substantial reserves of armored forces to achieve a rapid, localized breakthrough on a key Donetsk axis, attempting to exploit UAF defensive vulnerabilities or air defense saturation to create a significant operational advantage, potentially supported by limited, high-value air support if UAF air defenses are sufficiently suppressed. (LOW CONFIDENCE)

5.3. Timeline estimates and decision points

• Next 0-6 Hours (IMMEDIATE): The immediate, intense phase of multi-domain air attacks on Kyiv has concluded with the lifting of the air alert. However, the residual threat from potential remaining munitions or unannounced follow-on strikes remains. Emergency services are actively engaged in Kyiv, with aviation deployed for firefighting, indicating the scale of the damage. Expect continued search and rescue operations and initial damage assessments. Decision Point: UAF must conduct thorough post-strike analysis, maintain heightened vigilance, and prioritize rapid response and recovery efforts in Kyiv and other affected oblasts. Medical and emergency services must continue mass casualty protocols and fire suppression efforts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Next 24-48 Hours: Continued RF aerial attacks and ground pressure in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia. Intelligence efforts to assess the full scope of damage from current strikes, particularly in Kyiv (with a detailed accounting of casualties, now over 20 injured, 4 dead, and damage to residential buildings/vehicles/office/shopping center), Vinnytsia, Poltava, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, and Khmelnytskyi, will be critical, as will the impact of UAF deep strikes on RF logistics (Petrov Val) and, crucially, the Afipsky and Novokuibyshevsky oil refineries (with emphasis on the ongoing nature of the Novokuibyshevsky fire). Decision Point: UAF must conduct rapid Battle Damage Assessments (BDAs) for all strikes, especially in Kyiv and Koziatyn, and prioritize repair efforts for damaged critical infrastructure. International partners must expedite delivery of advanced air defense munitions and long-range counter-air systems, especially those capable of intercepting ballistic missiles, Kinzhals, and cruise missiles. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Next 72 Hours - 1 Week: RF will continue to assess the effectiveness of its multi-domain air campaign and adapt tactics, potentially responding to the oil refinery strikes. UAF deep strike operations will likely persist. Information warfare will remain highly active, with RF amplifying narratives of civilian damage caused by UAF air defense. Decision Point: UAF and its allies must maintain a unified information front, actively countering RF propaganda, particularly sophisticated disinformation efforts attempting to erode Western unity and portray leaders as ineffective, and specifically addressing the false narrative that UAF air defense causes civilian damage, especially in light of the confirmed child fatality and injuries, and damage to residential areas. Review internal border control policies regarding exit for young men to balance security with public sentiment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

1. Full BDA of Current RF Mass Air Campaign on Kyiv and Western/Central Ukraine (Specific Impacts, Casualties, and Effects): Comprehensive Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) for all new RF UAV/ballistic missile/Kinzhal/Kh-101 strikes, including specific critical infrastructure targets hit in Kyiv (Shevchenkivskyi, Darnytskyi, Dniprovskyi, Solomianskyi, Holosiivskyi, Obolonskyi districts), detailed confirmation of kindergarten, training institution, residential building (including Holosiivskyi), office building, shopping center, and extensive vehicle impacts, precise count and demographics of all casualties (fatalities and injured, especially children - now over 20 injured, 4 dead), military targets affected, projected repair timelines, and cascading effects on civilian services and military capabilities. This is particularly critical for understanding the full impact of the multi-missile ballistic and cruise missile strikes on the capital, damage from falling debris on residential buildings, and newly targeted western/central regions (Starokostiantyniv, Bila Tserkva, Poltava, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Vasylkiv). (CRITICAL)
2. Kinzhal Missile Launch, Target, and Impact Confirmation and Effectiveness: Confirmation of Kinzhal launch from the MiG-31K, its exact trajectory, intended target, and impact location/effectiveness. Assessment of UAF air defense performance against this specific threat, and verification of KMA reports of Kinzhal use. (CRITICAL)
3. Kh-101 Cruise Missile Trajectory and Target Confirmation: Detailed trajectory analysis for confirmed Kh-101 launches, number of missiles, specific targets engaged, and effectiveness, particularly for those heading towards Kyiv, Vasylkiv, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Starokostiantyniv, Poltava, Cherkasy, and Kirovohrad Oblasts. (CRITICAL)
4. BDA of Afipsky and Novokuibyshevsky Oil Refinery Strikes: Detailed Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) of the UAV strikes on the Afipsky and Novokuibyshevsky oil refineries, with specific focus on the ongoing nature of the Novokuibyshevsky fire. Quantify the extent of damage, estimated production loss, and the timeline for repairs. Assess the impact on RF fuel supply to military and civilian sectors, particularly for the southern operational area. (CRITICAL)
5. Nature and Effectiveness of RF "Decoys" / "Gerber" Munitions: What specific types of "decoys" and "Gerber" munitions were used in the Kyiv attack? How effective were they in confusing UAF air defenses, and did they lead to the expenditure of high-value interceptors on non-lethal targets? What are their signatures? (HIGH)
6. RF Internal Air Defense Effectiveness and UAV Threat in Rostov/Kazan/Samara: Detailed assessment of the nature and number of drones involved in the Rostov Oblast attacks and the specific means by which they were "repelled," especially considering the 89 evacuations. Assess the impact of flight restrictions in Kazan and Samara and their implications for RF air defense and internal security, especially now that they are lifted. (HIGH)
7. Iskander-M Target Specificity and Effectiveness in Kyiv (from Voronezh Oblast): Detailed assessment of the actual targets of the new Iskander-M missiles from Voronezh Oblast. Were they aimed at specific military/government C2 nodes, critical infrastructure, or were they area saturation attacks? What was the success rate of UAF air defense against this ballistic wave? (HIGH)
8. Vinnitsya Oblast Strike Verification and BDA: Independent verification of RF claims regarding railway destruction in Koziatyn (Vinnytsia Oblast). If verified, a full BDA of targets hit and assessment of UAF air defense posture in that region is required, particularly regarding any specific military or logistics targets. (HIGH)
9. RF Claims of Kyiv Intensified Attacks in Western LNR, 110th Brigade Losses, and Mobilized Personnel Treatment: Independent verification of RF claims regarding intensified UAF attacks in Western LNR, the withdrawal and losses of the 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade from Sumy, and the alleged mistreatment of mobilized personnel in Kharkiv Oblast. What is the scale and intent of any UAF activity in this sector? Is this a genuine UAF operation or an RF information operation to justify defensive maneuvers or distract from other frontlines or to degrade UAF morale? (MEDIUM)
10. Impact of Hungarian Legal Action, New RF Diplomatic Narratives, and "Relocant" Poll on EU/Ukraine Support: Assess the likely short-term and long-term impact of Hungary's legal challenge to the EU Council regarding frozen RF assets, combined with new RF efforts to frame high-level diplomatic engagements (e.g., Putin-Trump meetings) as globally significant, the "Myrotvorets" listing of a US academic, and the new TASS poll regarding "relocants," on the cohesion of EU support for Ukraine and future financial aid packages, and internal RF stability. (MEDIUM)

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Maximize Layered Air Defense for Kyiv, Central, and Strategic Assets against Full-Spectrum Threat with Deception:
   • ACTION: Immediately prioritize and surge all available mobile air defense assets, including MANPADS, to Kyiv, Boryspil, Brovary, Starokostiantyniv, Bila Tserkva, Poltava, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, and Vasylkiv districts to counter the ongoing, complex ballistic missile, UAV, Kinzhal, Kh-101 attacks, and mitigate the effect of "decoys" and "Gerber." Establish forward-deployed observer posts and rapid response teams.
   • ACTION: Urgently redeploy existing higher-tier air defense systems (e.g., Patriot, SAMP/T) or their munitions from less critical sectors to bolster Kyiv's and other strategic cities' defense against ballistic, Kinzhal, and cruise missile threats. Prioritize defense of Starokostiantyniv due to its strategic airbase significance.
   • ACTION: Task ISR assets (SIGINT, HUMINT, OSINT) to identify likely RF ballistic missile launch sites in Bryansk/Voronezh Oblasts and strategic bomber airfields/launch areas to enable pre-emptive or retaliatory strikes. Monitor MiG-31K flights and Tu-95 activity meticulously for early warning. Prioritize signature analysis for "decoys" and "Gerber" to develop countermeasures.
   • ACTION: Urgently communicate to international allies the critical need for additional higher-tier air defense systems and munitions, specifically those capable of intercepting hypersonic (Kinzhal) and advanced cruise missiles (Kh-101), emphasizing the immediate and escalating threat to the capital and the confirmed civilian impacts, including child fatalities and injuries, and damage to educational facilities, residential areas, office buildings, and shopping centers. Highlight the RF use of deception munitions.
2. Rapid Battle Damage Assessment and Emergency Response in Kyiv and Affected Oblasts:
   • ACTION: Conduct immediate and comprehensive BDAs across Kyiv's affected districts, particularly Darnytskyi, Shevchenkivskyi, Solomianskyi, Dniprovskyi, Holosiivskyi, and Obolonskyi, to identify specific damage to critical infrastructure, military targets, and civilian residential buildings (including the kindergarten and training institution), office buildings, shopping centers, and numerous vehicles. Prioritize emergency services and repair crews, with special emphasis on search and rescue operations for confirmed casualties (now over 20 injured, 4 dead), particularly children. Coordinate the use of aviation for effective firefighting.
   • ACTION: Enhance medical and rescue capabilities in Kyiv and affected oblasts, particularly in the districts with confirmed impacts, anticipating further casualties and damage from the ongoing attacks. Implement mass casualty protocols.
   • ACTION: Rapidly assess damage to railway infrastructure in Vinnytsia Oblast and initiate emergency repairs to minimize disruption to logistics. Assess damage to the enterprise in Zaporizhzhia and its impact on the local economy or military support.
3. Enhance Counter-Reconnaissance and Counter-Battery Fire in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv:
   • ACTION: Task ISR assets (SIGINT, drones, counter-UAV systems) to actively disrupt RF Orlan-30 operations and other reconnaissance platforms in the Donetsk direction (Pleshcheyevka area), Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv Oblast.
   • ACTION: Prioritize targeting of RF 152mm howitzers (Msta-B) and 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers and their ammunition depots within range of the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia axes, particularly those identified using Krasnopol-M2 munitions, to degrade their precision strike capability.
   • ACTION: Monitor for and actively suppress RF TOS systems in Kharkiv and other frontline areas to mitigate their devastating effect on UAF positions.
4. Sustain and Expand Deep Strike Operations Against RF Logistics and Infrastructure:
   • ACTION: Based on the confirmed repeat success of the Petrov Val railway strike and the significant impacts on Afipsky and Novokuibyshevsky oil refineries, identify and prosecute new vulnerable nodes in RF's railway, logistics, and, crucially, energy (oil refining) network, particularly in regions used for supplying frontline forces, to continue disrupting RF sustainment efforts and internal economic stability. Exploit the ongoing nature of fires, such as in Novokuibyshevsk, with persistent strikes if feasible.
   • ACTION: Exploit intelligence gaps related to RF internal airspace (Volgograd, Rostov, Kazan, Samara) to identify potential new targets or vulnerabilities for long-range UAV operations and to assess the effectiveness of previous UAF deep strikes, despite the lifting of official restrictions in some areas and RF claims of repelling attacks.
5. Counter RF Information Warfare and Maintain Public Trust:
   • ACTION: Issue immediate, transparent, and accurate public communications regarding the attacks on Kyiv, UAF air defense actions, and damage assessments, explicitly rebutting RF propaganda (e.g., claims of no air defense, massive success, "Kinzhal threats," false claims of UAF attacks in LNR). Crucially, actively counter RF disinformation that attempts to blame UAF air defense for civilian damage and casualties (now over 20 injured, 4 dead, including children), providing clear evidence of RF targeting, especially in light of the confirmed child fatality and injuries and damage to residential areas, office buildings, shopping centers, and vehicles. Highlight the deliberate and indiscriminate nature of RF targeting and its use of deception munitions. Address RF claims regarding the 110th Brigade and treatment of mobilized personnel with factual rebuttals.
   • ACTION: Monitor and assess the impact of border control measures in Lviv Oblast on public sentiment and internal stability. Ensure communication regarding these policies is clear and consistent.
   • ACTION: Develop and disseminate counter-narratives to the RF propaganda regarding Hungary's lawsuit, and to new RF narratives attempting to frame potential high-level diplomatic engagements as globally significant, and the discrediting of Ukrainian institutions via "Myrotvorets" listings, and the poll regarding "relocants," emphasizing the broader unity of international support for Ukraine and the legality of using frozen RF assets for reconstruction.

END REPORT