Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 280027Z AUG 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: RF continues a large-scale, multi-domain air offensive, with approximately 80 UAVs and ballistic missiles targeting critical infrastructure across central, northern, and western Ukraine. Ground operations in Donetsk remain high-intensity. UAF is engaged in active air defense while simultaneously conducting deep strike operations into RF territory. New intelligence indicates ongoing UAV threats in western (Kolomyia) and central (Zhytomyr) Ukraine, alongside continued temporary flight restrictions in RF internal airports (Samara). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Central/Northern Ukraine (Expanded Air Threat - Intensified):
  • Kyiv Oblast (Vyshhorod Raion): Reports of 3x missile impacts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Kyiv/Zhytomyr Oblasts: High-speed target detected on northern Kyiv Oblast, moving towards Zhytomyr Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Confirmed UAVs now targeting Zhytomyr city. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Chernihiv Oblast: High-speed target detected in Chernihiv Oblast, moving towards Chernihiv city. NEW: Another high-speed target detected on northern Chernihiv Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Ballistic Missile Threat: Monitoring channels warn of ballistic missile threat from both northern and southern directions, specifically mentioning Iskander-M launches. NEW: Kyiv is confirmed under ballistic missile attack. KMA confirms consequences in Shevchenkivskyi, Darnytskyi, and Dniprovskyi districts, with falling debris in Desnyanskyi district. Multiple powerful explosions reported in Kyiv. Preliminary assessment suggests 4x Iskander-M from Bryansk Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Mass UAV Attack: Approximately 80 UAVs are reported in Ukrainian airspace, with new reports indicating movement towards Kolomyia (Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast) and Zhytomyr city. NEW: Groups of UAVs confirmed moving from Chernihiv Oblast to Kyiv Oblast (Boryspil, Brovary districts), with one group past Brovary towards Kyiv. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Vinnitsya Oblast (Koziatyn): Pro-RF sources claim Koziatyn has received "hit after hit" for an hour, alleging approximately 20 impacts and no UAF air defense response in the region. This is an unverified RF claim. (LOW CONFIDENCE)
  • Implication: This signifies a sustained and dynamic RF air campaign, pushing into new western vectors (Kolomyia) while maintaining pressure on central regions. The aim remains to overwhelm UAF air defenses and degrade infrastructure. The current strikes on Kyiv, involving both ballistic missiles and UAVs, represent a significant, multi-pronged attack on the capital. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Donetsk Direction (Pleshcheyevka): RF 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) scouts, supported by an Orlan-30 UAV (439th Rocket Artillery Brigade), detected two UAF dugouts near Pleshcheyevka. These were subsequently destroyed by a Krasnopol-M2 precision-guided munition fired by a 152mm 2A65 Msta-B howitzer from the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Guards Combined Arms Army). This demonstrates continued RF reconnaissance-strike complex effectiveness against UAF fixed positions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF Internal (Volgograd Oblast): Reports of a strike on Petrov Val railway station in Volgograd Oblast. This, coupled with previous railway sabotage in Komi Republic, indicates continued UAF or pro-Ukrainian deep strike activity against RF logistics. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• RF Internal (Airports): Temporary flight restrictions imposed in Sochi, Saratov, and now Samara airports. This indicates an expanding scope of potential UAV threats or air defense activity in RF airspace, likely in response to UAF deep strike capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Western Ukraine (Lviv Oblast Border): Video shows young men (18-22 years old) being denied exit at the Rava-Ruska border crossing, suggesting heightened mobilization or border control measures. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Night Operations: The ongoing UAV and missile attacks are occurring at night, continuing to challenge UAF night-capable air defense assets and increasing the difficulty of target acquisition for both sides. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF:
  • Air/Missile Operations: RF is conducting a massive, multi-domain air campaign involving approximately 80 UAVs and ballistic missiles (Iskander-M) from northern and southern vectors, targeting Kyiv Oblast (Vyshhorod Raion), Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, and now additionally Kolomyia. NEW: The current attack on Kyiv involves multiple ballistic missiles (preliminarily 4x Iskander-M from Bryansk Oblast) and multiple waves of UAVs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Ground Forces (Donetsk): RF forces continue coordinated reconnaissance-strike operations, effectively using UAVs for target acquisition and precision-guided artillery (Krasnopol-M2) to destroy UAF fortified positions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Information Operations: TASS continues to promote domestic social narratives (school uniforms, Polish ex-minister incident) to distract, while "Операция Z" and "Военкоры Русской Весны" propagate unverified claims of strikes near Kyiv and Vinnytsia, and promote narratives of state treason trials in occupied territories, to shift focus and maintain internal control. NEW: TASS also engaging in narratives about "historical memory" to reinforce national identity. Pro-RF "НгП раZVедка" is claiming successful strikes in Koziatyn (Vinnitsya) and a "massive Iskander strike" on Kyiv, attempting to undermine confidence in UAF air defenses. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Internal Security: Flight restrictions in Sochi, Saratov, and Samara suggest internal RF air defense measures are active and possibly expanded, responding to UAF deep strike threats. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• UAF:
  • Air Defense Posture: UAF maintains a high state of air defense readiness, actively tracking and reporting incoming UAVs and ballistic missiles across multiple oblasts, including newly threatened areas like Kolomyia and currently Kyiv. KMA confirms air defense operations in Kyiv. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Deep Strike Operations: Evidence of a strike on Petrov Val railway station in Volgograd Oblast indicates UAF or pro-Ukrainian forces continue to conduct effective deep strike/sabotage operations against RF logistics. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
  • Border Control: Heightened border control measures at the Lviv Oblast border (Rava-Ruska) restricting exit for young men (18-22) suggest ongoing mobilization efforts or preventative measures against illegal border crossings. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Information Operations: "Повітряні Сили ЗС України" and "РБК-Україна" continue to provide critical, timely public alerts regarding aerial threats. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:
  • Large-Scale, Coordinated Multi-Domain Air Attack: RF has demonstrated the capability to conduct simultaneous mass UAV and ballistic missile (Iskander-M) attacks from multiple directions, across wide geographic areas including Kyiv, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr, and now extending to Ivano-Frankivsk (Kolomyia). NEW: The current attack on Kyiv shows RF's ability to launch multiple ballistic missiles simultaneously into the capital, followed by drone waves, testing UAF layered defenses. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Precision Reconnaissance-Strike Complex: RF maintains the capability to effectively integrate UAVs (Orlan-30) for reconnaissance and target designation with precision-guided artillery (Krasnopol-M2) to accurately destroy UAF fixed positions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Information Dominance & Distraction (Internal & External): RF consistently utilizes state-controlled media (TASS) to disseminate distracting domestic content and pro-war channels ("Операция Z," "Военкоры Русской Весны", "НгП раZVедка") to spread unverified international news, claim tactical successes, and promote narratives of internal security/treason trials, thereby shaping narratives and diverting attention from the conflict in Ukraine. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Intentions:
  • Overwhelm UAF Air Defenses and Degrade Critical Infrastructure/Military Targets (Strategic): The primary intention of the current large-scale air campaign is to further degrade Ukraine's energy infrastructure, disrupt military command and control, and deplete UAF air defense munitions by launching a complex, multi-layered attack. Targeting the capital region and western routes suggests an intent to expand psychological pressure and identify new vulnerabilities. The renewed, intense ballistic missile attack on Kyiv specifically aims to inflict maximum damage and psychological impact on the capital, and potentially target government or military C2 nodes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF claims of striking targets near Kyiv and Vinnytsia reinforce this intent to project strategic reach. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Maintain Ground Pressure and Attrition (Operational/Tactical): RF intends to continue relentless ground offensive pressure, particularly in Donetsk, using precision fires and reconnaissance to degrade UAF strongholds and facilitate localized advances. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Shape Information Environment (Cognitive): RF intends to boost domestic morale, project military strength, distract from the human and material costs of the conflict, and justify actions in occupied territories by promoting specific narratives and sensationalized external news. Narratives of "treason" trials in occupied LNR demonstrate an intent to enforce control and deter resistance. RF's immediate propaganda claims of successful "massive" strikes in Kyiv and Koziatyn (Vinnitsya) are intended to amplify fear and sow doubt about UAF air defense effectiveness. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Recent tactical changes or adaptations

• Expanded Geographic Scope of Air Campaign: The confirmed targeting of Kolomyia (Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast) represents a significant geographical expansion of the RF multi-domain air campaign into western Ukraine, likely testing UAF air defenses in new regions and seeking new vulnerabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Escalated and Complex Air Campaign: The simultaneous launch of approximately 80 UAVs and ballistic missiles (Iskander-M) from multiple vectors represents a significant escalation and adaptation in RF's air campaign, moving beyond previous "waves" to more complex, multi-layered attacks. This aims to saturate and bypass UAF air defense systems. NEW: The direct, multi-missile ballistic attack on Kyiv, immediately followed by drone groups approaching the capital, demonstrates an increased complexity and intensity of attacks on the strategic center. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Continued Refinement of Reconnaissance-Strike: The demonstrated success of Orlan-30 UAVs with Krasnopol-M2 munitions highlights a continuous refinement and effective integration of RF reconnaissance and precision strike capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.3. Logistics and sustainment status

• RF Munitions Production/Availability: The ability to launch such a large-scale, complex air attack (approx. 80 UAVs plus multiple ballistic missiles, and new Iskander launches into Kyiv) suggests RF maintains substantial production and/or acquisition capacity for these munitions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF Air Defense for Internal Territory: Flight restrictions in Sochi, Saratov, and Samara imply RF maintains sufficient internal air defense assets and readiness to respond to perceived threats, likely from UAF deep strike operations, and that these threats are perceived to be expanding geographically within RF territory. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.4. Command and control effectiveness

• RF Coordinated Multi-Domain Strikes: The simultaneous and multi-vector nature of the UAV and ballistic missile attacks across a wider geographic area, including the coordinated ballistic and drone attack on Kyiv, demonstrates effective, centralized command and control for complex multi-domain operations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF Tactical C2: The successful reconnaissance-strike mission near Pleshcheyevka indicates robust C2 integration between RF intelligence assets (UAVs) and artillery units. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• UAF Agile Air Defense C2: UAF Air Force's rapid issuance of alerts for both UAVs and ballistic missiles across multiple oblasts, including new threats to Kolomyia and Zhytomyr, and currently for Kyiv, indicates an agile and responsive C2 system for air defense. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

• Ukrainian force posture and readiness: UAF maintains a high state of air defense readiness across northern, central, and now western regions under active multi-domain attack, particularly in Kyiv where air defense is engaged against ballistic missiles and UAVs. Ground forces continue to hold defensive lines in critical sectors while also conducting deep strike operations. Border control measures are enhanced, indicating ongoing efforts to manage internal security and potentially mobilization. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Recent tactical successes or setbacks:
  • Successes: UAF air defense is actively tracking and reporting incoming threats, providing timely public warnings. UAF or pro-Ukrainian deep strike operations continue to successfully target RF logistics (Petrov Val railway station). UAF air defenses are actively engaged against ballistic missiles and UAVs over Kyiv. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Setbacks: RF has launched an unprecedented, large-scale combined UAV and ballistic missile attack, which will likely result in further damage to critical infrastructure and military targets, forcing UAF to expend valuable air defense munitions and potentially causing civilian casualties and disruptions. Missile impacts in Vyshhorod Raion are concerning. The expanded targeting to Kolomyia represents a new challenge to UAF's air defense architecture in western Ukraine. Direct impacts have occurred in Shevchenkivskyi, Darnytskyi, and Dniprovskyi districts of Kyiv, with falling debris in Desnyanskyi district, indicating successful RF penetration of some defensive layers and resulting in casualties (medical teams dispatched). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Resource requirements and constraints: The current multi-domain air campaign, involving a large number of UAVs and ballistic missiles across expanded vectors, including repeated ballistic strikes on Kyiv, necessitates urgent and continuous replenishment of all air defense munitions, particularly for mobile systems to counter Shahed-type drones and for higher-tier systems to intercept ballistic missiles. The ability to counter precision artillery (Krasnopol-M2) and RF tactical aviation remains a critical requirement. The expanded geographical scope into western Ukraine will strain existing air defense assets. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

• Propaganda and disinformation campaigns:
  • RF Domestic/External: TASS is pushing non-military, domestic content (school uniforms, historical memory, social contracts) to divert public attention. "Операция Z" and "Военкоры Русской Весны" are reporting unconfirmed, sensational international news (Israeli special forces in Damascus), claiming strikes on "enemy objects" near Kyiv and Vinnytsia (which aligns with RF's overall intent for the air campaign), and highlighting judicial actions against alleged "treason" in occupied territories. NEW: "НгП раZVедка" is immediately claiming a "massive Iskander strike" on Kyiv and success in Koziatyn, attempting to amplify the perceived effectiveness of RF strikes and potentially sow panic or erode confidence in UAF air defenses. Colonelcassad is promoting a narrative of mistreatment of RF servicemen in Ukrainian captivity, likely for internal consumption to justify actions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF: "Повітряні Сили ЗС України" and "РБК-Україна" continue to provide critical, timely threat alerts, ensuring public awareness and facilitating civilian safety, which is crucial for maintaining public trust and morale during intense air attacks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Public sentiment and morale factors: The large-scale, multi-domain air attacks, particularly those targeting the Kyiv region and other civilian areas, and now expanding to the west, will inevitably strain public morale. The repeated ballistic missile attacks on Kyiv, resulting in impacts and medical calls, will significantly test public resilience in the capital. Transparent communication from UAF authorities regarding air defense actions, damage, and repair efforts is paramount. RF propaganda aims to instill fear and project strength, and its multi-pronged information efforts must be actively countered. The denial of exit for young men at the Lviv border could cause domestic unrest or concern. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• International support and diplomatic developments: RF's efforts to divert attention through sensational international news may attempt to diminish the focus on Ukraine. The ongoing military actions, particularly the intensified air campaign and its expansion to western Ukraine, will likely prompt renewed calls for increased international military aid, especially advanced air defense systems. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

• MLCOA 1: Continued and Sustained Complex Multi-Domain Air Campaign with Expanding Geographic Scope (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF will continue to launch successive, coordinated waves of Shahed-type UAVs and ballistic missiles (Iskander-M), varying vectors and target sets to further deplete UAF air defense munitions, cause widespread, cascading disruptions to critical infrastructure, and degrade UAF military capabilities. The focus will likely remain on central and northern Ukraine, but with continued probing of western oblasts (e.g., Ivano-Frankivsk, Vinnytsia) to test defenses and identify new vulnerabilities. Expect continued, multi-layered attacks on Kyiv and other major population centers in the coming hours/days, leveraging the combined effect of ballistic missiles and UAVs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• MLCOA 2: Intensified Ground Assaults in Donetsk with Integrated Fires (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF forces will maintain relentless ground offensive pressure on the Pokrovsk and Avdiivka axes, heavily supported by UAV-guided precision artillery (Krasnopol-M2) and glide bombs, aiming for localized territorial gains and further degradation of UAF defensive lines. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• MLCOA 3: Persistent and Diversified Information Operations (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF information channels will persist in amplifying sensationalist international news, promoting their tactical successes and claims of strikes against Ukrainian targets, pushing narratives of humanitarian engagement and internal stability, and actively discrediting Ukraine and its allies to distract from ongoing aggression and shape domestic and international perceptions. This includes highlighting judicial actions in occupied territories to project control. Expect immediate and amplified RF propaganda claiming significant damage from current strikes, particularly on Kyiv, to demoralize Ukrainian population and justify actions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

• MDCOA 1: Strategic Cyber-Kinetic Attack on National Grid Coupled with Sabotage (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF executes a highly coordinated cyberattack specifically targeting Ukraine's energy grid SCADA systems, synchronized with physical UAV/missile strikes across multiple vectors (including new western routes and military-critical nodes), and potentially supported by internal sabotage cells, aiming to cause a widespread, prolonged national grid collapse. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• MDCOA 2: Focused Ballistic Missile Strike on Key UAF C2/Logistics Hubs (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF shifts its primary ballistic missile targeting to specific, high-value UAF command and control centers, major logistics hubs, or forward operating bases, aiming to severely disrupt UAF operational effectiveness and significantly degrade its ability to sustain frontline units. The current ballistic attacks on Kyiv may be a precursor or attempt to probe defenses for such a strike. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• MDCOA 3: Tactical Breakthrough in Donetsk with Massed Armor (LOW CONFIDENCE): RF commits substantial reserves of armored forces, including the limited T-90A deployments, to achieve a rapid, localized breakthrough on a key Donetsk axis, attempting to exploit UAF defensive vulnerabilities or air defense saturation to create a significant operational advantage. (LOW CONFIDENCE)

5.3. Timeline estimates and decision points

• Next 0-6 Hours (IMMEDIATE): Ongoing UAV and ballistic missile threats, particularly in central, northern, and western oblasts (Kolomyia, Zhytomyr), with Kyiv as a primary target. High probability of further energy/water supply disruptions and potential damage to military infrastructure and civilian casualties. Decision Point: UAF must maintain maximum air defense vigilance, prioritizing mobile units for critical infrastructure and military installations, adapting to new attack vectors and the combined UAV/ballistic missile threat, particularly over Kyiv. Civilians must remain in shelters during alerts. Medical and emergency services must be on high alert in Kyiv. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Next 24-48 Hours: Continued RF aerial attacks and ground pressure in Donetsk. Intelligence efforts to assess the full scope of damage from current strikes will be critical, as will the impact of UAF deep strikes on RF logistics (Petrov Val). Decision Point: UAF must conduct rapid Battle Damage Assessments (BDAs) for all strikes, especially in Kyiv, and prioritize repair efforts for damaged critical infrastructure. International partners must expedite air defense munitions and long-range counter-air systems, especially those capable of intercepting ballistic missiles. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Next 72 Hours - 1 Week: RF will continue to assess the effectiveness of its multi-domain air campaign and adapt tactics. UAF deep strike operations will likely persist. Information warfare will remain highly active. Decision Point: UAF and its allies must maintain a unified information front, actively countering RF propaganda, particularly sophisticated disinformation efforts attempting to erode Western unity and portray leaders as ineffective. Review internal border control policies regarding exit for young men to balance security with public sentiment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

1. Full BDA of Current RF Mass Air Campaign on Kyiv and Western Ukraine (Specific Impacts and Effects): Comprehensive Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) for all new RF UAV/ballistic missile strikes, including specific critical infrastructure targets hit in Kyiv (Shevchenkivskyi, Darnytskyi, Dniprovskyi, Desnyanskyi districts), military targets affected, projected repair timelines, and cascading effects on civilian services and military capabilities. This is particularly critical for understanding the full impact of the multi-missile ballistic strike on the capital and newly targeted western regions. (CRITICAL)
2. Iskander-M Target Specificity and Effectiveness in Kyiv: Detailed assessment of the actual targets of the Iskander-M missiles in Kyiv. Were they aimed at specific military/government C2 nodes, critical infrastructure, or were they area saturation attacks? What was the success rate of UAF air defense against this ballistic wave? (HIGH)
3. Vinnitsya Oblast Strike Verification and BDA: Independent verification of RF claims regarding 20 impacts in Koziatyn (Vinnitsya Oblast) and alleged lack of UAF air defense response. If verified, a full BDA of targets hit and assessment of UAF air defense posture in that region is required. (MEDIUM)
4. UAV Group Trajectories and Target Sets from Chernihiv: Further intelligence on the precise flight paths, suspected launch locations, and intended targets of the UAV groups moving from Chernihiv Oblast towards Kyiv (Boryspil, Brovary). (MEDIUM)
5. Impact of Petrov Val Railway Strike: Detailed BDA of the strike on Petrov Val railway station in Volgograd Oblast. Assess the quantifiable impact on RF internal rail logistics, resupply efforts to the front, and the specific units or cargo affected. (MEDIUM)
6. RF Internal Airspace Restrictions (Sochi/Saratov/Samara): Specific intelligence on the reasons behind the temporary flight restrictions in Sochi, Saratov, and Samara airports. Is this in response to actual UAF UAV penetration or heightened alert levels for perceived threats? Understanding the spatial and temporal correlation of these restrictions is key to identifying potential new UAF deep strike capabilities or RF vulnerabilities. (MEDIUM)

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Intensify Layered Air Defense for Kyiv and Critical Infrastructure:
   • ACTION: Immediately prioritize and surge all available mobile air defense assets to Kyiv, Boryspil, and Brovary districts to counter the ongoing, complex ballistic missile and UAV attacks. Establish forward-deployed observer posts and rapid response teams.
   • ACTION: Urgently redeploy existing higher-tier air defense systems (e.g., Patriot, SAMP/T) or their munitions from less critical sectors to bolster Kyiv's defense against ballistic threats.
   • ACTION: Task ISR assets to identify likely RF ballistic missile launch sites in Bryansk Oblast and UAV launch/assembly areas to enable pre-emptive or retaliatory strikes.
   • ACTION: Urgently communicate to international allies the critical need for additional higher-tier air defense systems and munitions, emphasizing the immediate threat to the capital and the escalating complexity of RF's air campaign.
2. Rapid Battle Damage Assessment and Emergency Response:
   • ACTION: Conduct immediate and comprehensive BDAs across Kyiv's affected districts to identify specific damage to critical infrastructure, military targets, and civilian areas. Prioritize emergency services and repair crews.
   • ACTION: Enhance medical and rescue capabilities in Kyiv, particularly in the affected districts, anticipating further casualties and damage.
3. Enhance Counter-Reconnaissance and Counter-Battery Fire in Donetsk:
   • ACTION: Task ISR assets (SIGINT, drones, counter-UAV systems) to actively disrupt RF Orlan-30 operations and other reconnaissance platforms in the Donetsk direction (Pleshcheyevka area).
   • ACTION: Prioritize targeting of RF 152mm howitzers (Msta-B) and their ammunition depots within range of the Donetsk axes, particularly those identified using Krasnopol-M2 munitions, to degrade their precision strike capability.
4. Sustain and Expand Deep Strike Operations Against RF Logistics and Infrastructure:
   • ACTION: Based on the success of the Petrov Val railway strike, identify and prosecute new vulnerable nodes in RF's railway and logistics network, particularly in regions used for supplying frontline forces, to continue disrupting RF sustainment efforts.
   • ACTION: Exploit intelligence gaps related to RF internal airspace restrictions (Sochi/Saratov/Samara) to identify potential new targets or vulnerabilities for long-range UAV operations and to assess the effectiveness of previous UAF deep strikes.
5. Counter RF Information Warfare and Maintain Public Trust:
   • ACTION: Issue immediate, transparent, and accurate public communications regarding the attacks on Kyiv, UAF air defense actions, and damage assessments to counter RF propaganda (e.g., claims of no air defense, massive success) and sustain public morale.
   • ACTION: Monitor and assess the impact of border control measures in Lviv Oblast on public sentiment and internal stability. Ensure communication regarding these policies is clear and consistent.

END REPORT