Archived operational intelligence briefing
TIME: 261700Z AUG 25
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
1.4. Relevant Dempster-Shafer Beliefs (Updated)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Intentions:
Courses of Action:
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
RF:
UAF:
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)
MLCOA 1: Sustained High-Intensity Offensive in Donetsk/Zaporizhzhia with Multi-Domain Pressure on Northern/Eastern Fronts (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF forces will continue their high-intensity, attritional assaults, particularly in the Avdiivka, Konstantynivka, Siversk, and Dobropillya sectors, employing a combination of advanced armor (T-90M), massed infantry assaults ("fire roller"), and overwhelming air support (KABs). RF will sustain efforts to consolidate gains around Stepnohirsk and Plavni in Zaporizhzhia, and push into the northern outskirts of Kupiansk and Staritsa in Kharkiv Oblast, despite UAF General Staff and OSUV "Skhid" explicitly refuting claims of occupation of Zaporizhzhya and Novogeorgievka villages and UAF successfully defending against over four dozen attacks in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. The 'Shipovnik-Aero' EW system will remain active on the Southern Front. RF tactical aviation will sustain and potentially increase KAB strikes in northern Sumy Oblast and eastern Kharkiv Oblast, coupled with localized Mi-28NM attack helicopter and FPV drone operations targeting UAF infantry and high-value targets (e.g., EW systems, AN/TPQ-36 radars) in these northern and border regions. FPV drones will continue to be a primary tool for interdiction on critical UAF logistics routes, especially the M-14 Kherson-Mykolaiv highway, impacting both military and civilian targets, and actively against logistics in border regions like Kursk Oblast and the Krasnoarmeysk direction. RF will continue coordinated strikes on Ukrainian energy and military objects, as demonstrated by recent actions, including civilian water infrastructure (Trostianets). The newly announced recruitment for a UAV company indicates an intention to sustain and potentially expand drone warfare capabilities. The Ryazan gunpowder factory explosion, while a setback, will likely spur efforts to compensate for lost production, possibly through increased imports or accelerated alternative production. RF reconnaissance UAVs will increase activity near Odesa coast, northern Chernihiv, and eastern Sumy Oblasts to identify targets and cue strike assets. RF will continue to observe UAF logistics and troop movements, including those using watercraft in areas like Konstantinovka direction, to inform future targeting. Despite this sustained offensive, RF units will likely continue to experience localized logistical and medical deficiencies, as indicated by frontline appeals for supplies. RF drone strikes by the 42nd Guards Division near Orikhiv suggest continued tactical focus in Zaporizhzhia. RF will likely continue to intercept UAF communications for tactical and IO purposes.
MLCOA 2: Escalated and Diversified Information Warfare Campaign with Focus on Internal Control and Undermining Ukrainian Morale (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will intensify its multi-faceted information warfare, prioritizing internal cohesion and control while actively undermining Ukrainian morale and Western support. Domestically, this will involve continued promotion of military successes (e.g., destroyed BMPs, captured personnel, official awards, military traffic police activities), social welfare initiatives (including advocating for increased veteran payments), and national digital platforms (Max messenger), coupled with suppression of dissent through legal actions (Yandex employee, financial mules, billionaire Shtengelov, nuclear physicist Ozharovsky, administrative arrests for social media posts, blogger's wife appeal) and increased surveillance (SIM card cameras, Google app restrictions). RF MoD's public messaging on readiness for the heating period and local infrastructure projects (Suzemka school repair, Seletnya church restoration, Kherson road projects) will be a part of this effort to project stability and competence. RF will leverage cultural events to project care for its citizens (Putin's condolences for Uskov, meeting with Saldo). Externally, RF will continue to exploit perceived diplomatic friction (Poland/Starlink, Hungary/energy supplies, Poland vetoing social aid, Polish border checks for "Bandera symbols," Poland on Volyn genocide, Belgium on frozen assets), selectively leverage statements from Western figures (Trump, Merz), and promote narratives of Ukraine's instability, corruption, and the illegitimacy of its statehood (e.g., "tomb raider" nurse, torture allegations, SBU agent claims, Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra narratives, death of Vitaly Sakharuk in TCC). RF will actively deny or counter UAF deep strike successes (Ryazan gunpowder factory, Ust-Luga) while justifying its internal security measures (airport restrictions) as necessary responses to "terrorist attacks." The formal withdrawal from the Council of Europe will be framed as a necessary step to protect national interests, further signaling a disregard for international legal norms. RF IO will likely amplify Xi Jinping's congratulatory message to Ukraine to project a nuanced Chinese stance, while also leveraging China's anti-drone capabilities to highlight global drone threats. RF will attempt to dismiss UAF innovation and capabilities. RF will frame UAF deep strikes as provocations for Western aid (e.g., Estonia drone fragments) and amplify any reports of Western nations discussing troop deployment to Ukraine post-conflict. RF will continue to use discovered UAF military IDs for IO. Maria Zakharova's aggressive diplomatic rhetoric against EU diplomats and the Putin mural in Vladivostok reinforce this. Internal reports like Kadyrov's nephew's impunity will likely be downplayed or ignored in official messaging. Alex Parker Returns using derogatory language is a clear indicator of this. Colonelcassad's video on "new generation bot farms" shows sophisticated IO methods. RF "Почта России" suspending parcels to USA due to tariffs will be used to frame RF as resisting external economic pressure. TASS reporting on solar flares will be used for domestic science/tech IO, promoting RF competence. RF IO will try to exploit the captured POW's statements. "Donbas Youth Forum" will continue youth indoctrination. TASS reporting on falling red caviar prices will aim to project economic stability. Поддубный |Z|О|V| edition will amplify German Merz's statements. TASS will amplify RF envoy's statements about Putin-Trump dialogue and Tbilisi mayor's claims of Western offers for "second front." RF will also use psychological operations against captured personnel. RF will actively spread disinformation about large-scale UAF desertion to undermine UAF morale and internal cohesion. RF will continue direct and explicit refutation of UAF General Staff claims to challenge their credibility. RF will also utilize state media to report on domestic administrative events and conduct internal polls to project normalcy and confidence. RF will leverage comments on reported US security guarantees to Ukraine to reinforce their narrative of Western aggression. RF IO will continue to use the MAX messenger issue to assert administrative control over occupied territories. RF IO will highlight US tariffs on India to support narratives of Western economic aggression. The "Russian shelf" law will be presented as a measure to strengthen domestic economy.
MLCOA 3: Limited Reconnaissance-in-Force and Force Generation in Kherson, Preparing for Future Operations (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) The 49th CAA and other RF units in Kherson will continue to conduct limited reconnaissance-in-force, probing attacks along the Dnipro, and active FPV drone operations on the M-14 Kherson-Mykolaiv highway. These actions will focus on gathering intelligence, testing UAF defensive lines, and interdicting UAF logistics, including civilian transport. The primary intent is to conserve combat power, conduct force generation, and prepare the ground for either a renewed large-scale offensive or a robust defensive posture in the future, depending on the broader strategic situation. Continued investment in socio-economic development in Kherson will underscore the long-term intent to hold and integrate the region. Mash на Донбассе's aid appeal for Kherson highlights the ongoing RF focus on this region. Putin's meeting with Saldo further confirms this focus on developing and integrating Kherson.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)
MDCOA 1: Strategic Escalation via Widespread Missile/Drone Barrage and Hybrid Operations (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) In response to significant UAF deep strikes (e.g., Ust-Luga, Crimea, Ryazan gunpowder factory) or perceived Western escalation (e.g., F-16 deliveries from Belgium, German troops to Ukraine post-conflict, or the reported US offer of military planes/intelligence), RF could conduct a widespread, synchronized missile and drone barrage targeting critical Ukrainian civilian infrastructure (energy, communications, transportation) and key military-industrial facilities, potentially including renewed attempts to achieve a significant psychological impact. Concurrently, RF could activate sleeper cells or expand hybrid operations, including cyberattacks and sabotage, deeper within Ukraine or against NATO supply lines in Eastern Europe (e.g., German railway sabotage, reported Hamburg explosions). The heightened rhetoric surrounding torture could translate into documented, widespread, and systematic abuse of PoWs or civilians in occupied territories, aiming to demoralize UAF. Hungary's threat to cut electricity could be exploited by RF as part of a multi-domain attack on Ukrainian energy. The animated map of RF strikes presented by Colonelcassad could be a precursor or justification for such an escalated campaign. This could be coupled with increased military pressure on other non-NATO neighbors, such as Georgia, through renewed demands or even direct military action, in an attempt to create a "second front" or pressure on the West. The over four dozen attacks on Dnipropetrovsk Oblast could be a precursor to increased missile/drone barrage aimed at disrupting civilian life and infrastructure. RF missile attack on Trostianets, cutting off water, directly aligns with targeting civilian infrastructure and causing psychological impact. The biolabs narrative for Armenia aligns with potential hybrid operations to destabilize regional actors. New warnings for enemy reconnaissance UAVs near Odesa coast, northern Chernihiv, and eastern Sumy Oblasts could be precursors to increased, coordinated strike activity, including the use of precision missiles and drones. The reported incident of an RF serviceman burning two people alive, if indicative of widespread internal breakdown, could precipitate aggressive external actions as a diversion.
MDCOA 2: Large-Scale Breakthrough on a New Axis of Advance (LOW CONFIDENCE) While less likely given current RF logistical and personnel strain (as indicated by Военкор Котенок's video), RF could attempt a large-scale, mechanized breakthrough on an entirely new axis of advance (e.g., from Belarus towards Kyiv or from the northern border into Sumy/Chernihiv Oblasts with significant ground forces beyond current probing actions), aiming to divert UAF resources from key defensive sectors and open a new strategic front. This would require substantial, covert force generation and logistical preparation, potentially drawing on newly recruited "African Corps" personnel and the newly announced UAV company. The (explicitly refuted) claimed advances in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast could have been a precursor to such an attempt, highlighting RF's continued interest in probing new areas. The over four dozen attacks in Dnipropetropavsk Oblast, while not a breakthrough, could be testing the ground for a larger operation if UAF defenses are weakened.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
INTELLIGENCE GAPS:
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