Archived operational intelligence briefing
RPT SITREP TIME: 261400Z AUG 25
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: Russian Federation (RF) forces maintain high-intensity offensive pressure in the Avdiivka sector, employing T-90M tanks and "fire roller" tactics, heavily supported by tactical aviation delivering KABs in Northern Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia. RF also claims advances in the Konstantynivka direction and occupation of two settlements in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Zaporizhzhya and Novogeorgievka). Pressure persists near Klishchiivka (Bakhmut Axis). Significant RF offensive pressure is reported in the Siversk direction, including the Serebryansky forest. RF claims advances near Staritsa in Kharkiv Oblast and entry into the northern outskirts of Kupiansk. The 'Shipovnik-Aero' EW system on the Southern Front (Zaporizhzhia axis) remains a significant threat to Ukrainian UAV operations. UAF deep strikes are confirmed against railway infrastructure in occupied Crimea (Dzhankoy and Krasnogvardiyse) and a substation near Urozhayne, significantly impacting RF logistics. An oil refinery fire in Novoshakhtinsk (Rostov Oblast), likely due to a UAF drone strike, was extinguished after five days. The Novatek gas condensate processing plant in Ust-Luga port has suspended operations after a UAV strike. UAF drone activity continues over Bryansk Oblast, Lipetsk Oblast (alerts lifted), the Black Sea, Volgograd Oblast (repelled, but with damage, restrictions lifted), and Leningrad Oblast (over 10 UAVs shot down over two districts). UAF deep strike drone fragments were also found in Estonia, having flown towards Russia. RF MOD claims 43 Ukrainian UAVs intercepted and destroyed over RF regions and the Black Sea, with an additional 8 over Crimea. UAF Air Force reports 47 enemy UAVs shot down/suppressed out of 59 launched. RF MOD reports Russian forces are actively attacking the M-14 Kherson-Mykolaiv highway, likely with FPV drones. UAF Air Force issues new KAB warnings for northern Sumy Oblast and eastern Kharkiv Oblast, as well as northern Donetsk Oblast. RF reports localized FPV drone operations in Sumy/Chernihiv border regions. An explosion occurred at the Elastic gunpowder factory in Ryazan Oblast. UAF tactical successes include the capture of 11 RF personnel, including GRU special forces, near Pokrovsk. SBU exposed an illegal border crossing scheme in Odesa Oblast. SBU also exposed a 16-year-old saboteur preparing railway sabotage in Khmelnytskyi Oblast. Temporary airport restrictions have been implemented and then lifted in Kazan, Pskov, Nizhny Novgorod, Nizhnekamsk, and Pulkovo (St. Petersburg) due to drone threats, indicating expanding air defense concerns deeper into RF territory. Diplomatically, the next Ramstein meeting is announced for September 9th in London. UAF has showcased a "Long Neptune" missile. Germany has pledged €9bn in annual support, and Czechia has delivered over 1.5 million artillery shells. Belgium is ready to participate in a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. RF Foreign Minister Lavrov's letter on Russia's withdrawal from the Council of Europe has been delivered. Reports indicate China's President Xi Jinping congratulated Ukraine on Independence Day for the first time since the full-scale war.
NEW OBSERVATIONS (Since Last SITREP):
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
1.4. Relevant Dempster-Shafer Beliefs (Updated)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Intentions:
Courses of Action:
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
RF:
UAF:
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)
MLCOA 1: Sustained High-Intensity Offensive in Donetsk/Zaporizhzhia with Multi-Domain Pressure on Northern/Eastern Fronts (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF forces will continue their high-intensity, attritional assaults, particularly in the Avdiivka, Konstantynivka, and Siversk sectors, employing a combination of advanced armor (T-90M), massed infantry assaults ("fire roller"), and overwhelming air support (KABs). We will see continued efforts to consolidate recent gains, including in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Zaporizhzhya, Novogeorgievka), and push into the northern outskirts of Kupiansk and Staritsa in Kharkiv Oblast. The 'Shipovnik-Aero' EW system will remain active on the Southern Front, significantly degrading UAF UAV operations. RF tactical aviation will sustain and potentially increase KAB strikes in northern Sumy Oblast and eastern Kharkiv Oblast, coupled with localized Mi-28NM attack helicopter and FPV drone operations targeting UAF infantry and high-value targets (e.g., EW systems, AN/TPQ-36 radars) in these northern and border regions. FPV drones will continue to be a primary tool for interdiction on critical UAF logistics routes, especially the M-14 Kherson-Mykolaiv highway, impacting both military and civilian targets, and actively against logistics in border regions like Kursk Oblast. RF will continue coordinated strikes on Ukrainian energy and military objects, as demonstrated by recent actions.
MLCOA 2: Escalated and Diversified Information Warfare Campaign with Focus on Internal Control and Undermining Ukrainian Morale (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will intensify its multi-faceted information warfare, prioritizing internal cohesion and control while actively undermining Ukrainian morale and Western support. Domestically, this will involve continued promotion of military successes, social welfare initiatives (including advocating for increased veteran payments), and national digital platforms (Max messenger), coupled with suppression of dissent through legal actions (Yandex employee, financial mules, billionaire Shtengelov) and increased surveillance (SIM card cameras, Google app restrictions). RF MoD's public messaging on readiness for the heating period and local infrastructure projects (Suzemka school repair) will be a part of this effort to project stability and competence. Externally, RF will continue to exploit perceived diplomatic friction (Poland/Starlink, Hungary/energy supplies), selectively leverage statements from Western figures (Trump), and promote narratives of Ukraine's instability, corruption, and the illegitimacy of its statehood (e.g., "tomb raider" nurse, torture allegations, SBU agent claims, Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra narratives). RF will actively deny or counter UAF deep strike successes while justifying its internal security measures (airport restrictions) as necessary responses to "terrorist attacks." The formal withdrawal from the Council of Europe will be framed as a necessary step to protect national interests, further signaling a disregard for international legal norms in wartime. RF IO will likely amplify Xi Jinping's congratulatory message to Ukraine to project a nuanced Chinese stance, while also leveraging China's anti-drone capabilities to highlight global drone threats. RF will attempt to dismiss UAF innovation and capabilities. RF will frame UAF deep strikes as provocations for Western aid (e.g., Estonia drone fragments) and amplify any reports of Western nations discussing troop deployment to Ukraine post-conflict. RF will continue to use discovered UAF military IDs for IO.
MLCOA 3: Limited Reconnaissance-in-Force and Force Generation in Kherson, Preparing for Future Operations (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) The 49th CAA and other RF units in Kherson will continue to conduct limited reconnaissance-in-force, probing attacks along the Dnipro, and active FPV drone operations on the M-14 Kherson-Mykolaiv highway. These actions will focus on gathering intelligence, testing UAF defensive lines, and interdicting UAF logistics, including civilian transport. The primary intent is to conserve combat power, conduct force generation, and prepare the ground for either a renewed large-scale offensive or a robust defensive posture in the future, depending on the broader strategic situation. Continued investment in socio-economic development in Kherson will underscore the long-term intent to hold and integrate the region.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)
MDCOA 1: Strategic Escalation via Widespread Missile/Drone Barrage and Hybrid Operations (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) In response to significant UAF deep strikes (e.g., Ust-Luga, Crimea) or perceived Western escalation (e.g., F-16 deliveries), RF could conduct a widespread, synchronized missile and drone barrage targeting critical Ukrainian civilian infrastructure (energy, communications, transportation) and key military-industrial facilities, potentially including renewed attempts to achieve a significant psychological impact. Concurrently, RF could activate sleeper cells or expand hybrid operations, including cyberattacks and sabotage, deeper within Ukraine or against NATO supply lines in Eastern Europe (e.g., German railway sabotage). The heightened rhetoric surrounding torture could translate into documented, widespread, and systematic abuse of PoWs or civilians in occupied territories, aiming to demoralize UAF. Hungary's threat to cut electricity could be exploited by RF as part of a multi-domain attack on Ukrainian energy.
MDCOA 2: Large-Scale Breakthrough on a New Axis of Advance (LOW CONFIDENCE) While less likely given current RF logistical and personnel strain, RF could attempt a large-scale, mechanized breakthrough on an entirely new axis of advance (e.g., from Belarus towards Kyiv or from the northern border into Sumy/Chernihiv Oblasts with significant ground forces beyond current probing actions), aiming to divert UAF resources from key defensive sectors and open a new strategic front. This would require substantial, covert force generation and logistical preparation, potentially drawing on newly recruited "African Corps" personnel. The claimed advances in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast could be a precursor to such an attempt.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
INTELLIGENCE GAPS:
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