Archived operational intelligence briefing
RPT SITREP TIME: 261233Z AUG 25
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
1.4. Relevant Dempster-Shafer Beliefs (Updated)
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)
Sustained Offensive in Donetsk/Zaporizhzhia with Expanded Air Operations (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF will continue its high-tempo, combined arms assault in the Avdiivka sector, employing T-90M tanks and "fire roller" tactics, heavily supported by KABs. Simultaneously, expect persistent probing and localized offensive actions across the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia axes (Konstantynivka, Orikhiv, Huliaipole, Novopavlivka, Toretsk, Kramatorsk, Sieversk, Lyman, Kupyansk, and South Slobozhansky directions). The 'Shipovnik-Aero' EW system will be fully utilized on the Southern Front to suppress UAF UAV capabilities. RF tactical aviation will increase KAB strikes in northern Sumy Oblast and eastern Kharkiv Oblast, supporting localized Mi-28NM and armed drone operations against UAF infantry and high-value targets (e.g., AN/TPQ-36 radar) in these northern sectors. RF FPV drones will continue to interdict UAF movements and logistics, particularly on the M-14 Kherson-Mykolaiv highway. RF will seek to consolidate any local gains, such as around Plavni.
Intensified Multi-Domain Information Warfare (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF will escalate its information warfare campaigns, employing a multi-faceted approach to erode Ukrainian and Western resolve. This includes:
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)
Deep Tactical Encirclement and Operational Exploitation (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): Following a successful tactical breakthrough at Avdiivka or another key sector (e.g., Kupiansk-Svatove axis), RF forces (potentially including newly reconstituted units from Kherson) could rapidly exploit the breach to achieve a wider operational encirclement of UAF forces. This could involve a rapid advance aimed at cutting off critical supply lines or isolating a significant UAF grouping. Such an operation would be characterized by a high tempo, combined arms integration (armor, artillery, air, EW), and potentially new multi-domain tactics.
Expanded Hybrid Warfare Campaign against Critical Infrastructure in NATO/EU (LOW-MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): Building on previous "sabotage" incidents (Nord Stream, German railway), RF could launch a more extensive, deniable hybrid campaign targeting critical civilian and military infrastructure within NATO/EU countries. This could involve cyber attacks, physical sabotage by proxies, or heightened intelligence gathering against energy grids, transportation networks, or military logistics hubs. The aim would be to create internal instability, disrupt supply lines to Ukraine, and test NATO's Article 5 response threshold.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
END REPORT
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