Sitrep 2025-08-25 19:34:38

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 251933Z AUG 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: Russian Federation (RF) forces continue their intensified offensive in the Avdiivka sector, employing T-90M tanks and "fire roller" tactics. The newly confirmed deployment of the 'Shipovnik-Aero' EW system on the Southern Front poses a significant, evolving threat to Ukrainian UAV operations. Force rotations in Kherson persist, indicating reconstitution. RF is actively using KABs (guided aerial bombs) in Northern Donetsk, affecting terrain. UAF has announced the next Ramstein meeting for September 9th in London and has publicly showcased a "Long Neptune" missile. RF internal issues include Sberbank app removal, increased casualties at an industrial plant, and continued drone-related restrictions in border regions. The information environment remains highly contested, with both sides leveraging domestic and international events.
- New Additions:
  - Avdiivka Axis (Northern Donetsk): RF tactical aviation is launching KABs in Northern Donetsk, directly impacting the area of the Avdiivka offensive. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - Southern Front (Zaporizhzhia): The 'Shipovnik-Aero' EW system continues to be a primary threat to UAF UAVs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - Kherson Axis: Force rotation of exhausted RF units with fresh elements from 49th Combined Arms Army (CAA) continues, indicating reconstitution of combat power. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - RF Rear Area Air Defense: Targeted placement of Pantsir-S1 systems to protect critical C2 and logistics hubs is ongoing. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
  - Herson Oblast Civilian Targeting: RF forces continue to terrorize civilians, dropping grenades from drones on a man walking his dog, resulting in injuries to both. This is confirmed by UAF sources (БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - Cyber Operation: UAF (Оперативний ЗСУ) reports an ongoing cyber operation #OHRD (photo message with email screenshot). (HIGH CONFIDENCE for UAF claim, LOW for specific details without content).
  - RF USV Training: Colonelcassad reports on RF forces studying unmanned surface vessels (USVs) at the "VOIN" Center. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - RF Captured Weaponry: Воин DV reports on a captured C7NLD rifle. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - RF Fuel Price Hike Investigations: TASS reports FAS is investigating price gouging, indicating continued fuel supply issues. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - RF Airport Restrictions: TASS reports temporary restrictions on aircraft operations at Volgograd airport, possibly due to security concerns or technical issues. STERNENKO further highlights drone safety concerns in multiple RF border regions (Volgogradskaya, Bryanskaya, Belgorodskaya, Orlovskaya, Kaluzhskaya, Smolenskaya, Kursk regions) and occupied Donetsk/Crimea, indicating widespread drone activity impacting RF's internal airspace control. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for operational impact, MEDIUM for security concern/cause).
  - RF IO - Politician Rehabilitation Attempt: Военкор Котенок reports a pro-Azerbaijani lobby attempting to "rehabilitate" Sergey Markov, an "foreign agent" political scientist. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - Turkish-RF Economic Competition: РБК-Україна reports Turkey is displacing Russia in the Eurasian market due to a new railway. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  - RF IO - Markaryan Case Amplification: Операция Z and Военкоры Русской Весны continue to amplify the Arsen Markaryan case. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  - RF IO - Woody Allen Defense: TASS reports Woody Allen responding to Ukrainian criticism. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  - RF Imagery (Zaporizhzhia): Два майора posts imagery related to the Zaporizhzhia direction. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for imagery, LOW for specific content without analysis).
  - RF Sberbank App Removal: TASS reports "Sberbank Assets Online" for iPhone is no longer available on App Store. This indicates ongoing Western sanctions impacting RF financial sector. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - Next Ramstein Meeting: Оперативний ЗСУ reports the next Ramstein meeting will be held on September 9th in London. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - UAF "Long Neptune" Missile Display: ASTRA shows a video of a new "Long Neptune" cruise missile being launched. This indicates UAF's continued development of long-range strike capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - RF Casualties at Industrial Plant: ASTRA reports the number of victims from an explosion at the Elastic plant in Ryazan Oblast has increased to 28. This suggests an industrial accident, possibly linked to military production, or a successful UAF long-range strike. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for casualties, MEDIUM for cause).
  - RF Claims on Kharkiv Direction: Colonelcassad claims Akhmat Spetsnaz group "Canada" eliminated two enemy vehicles and an ammo depot near Ambarne in Kharkiv direction. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE for RF claim).
  - Explosions in Makiivka: STERNENKO and ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS report and show videos of explosions in occupied Makiivka. This indicates successful UAF strikes in occupied territory. (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  - Poland Drone Incident: РБК-Україна reports Polish MFA suggests a Russian drone that exploded near Lublin might have flown from Ukraine. This is a concerning development for cross-border incidents. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
  - UAF Discussion on Youth Travel Restrictions: ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS reports discussions on allowing youth (18-22) to travel abroad. This reflects internal societal discussions related to mobilization. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - RF IO - Poland/Bandera Symbolism: НгП раZVедка reports Kyiv threatens Poland's president over a proposal to ban Bandera symbolism. This highlights ongoing diplomatic friction between Ukraine and Poland. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - RF IO - Trump on US UAV Experience: TASS quotes Trump on US specialists studying UAV combat experience in Ukraine. This is an RF IO attempt to leverage Western political figures. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The ongoing deployment of the 'Shipovnik-Aero' system represents a persistent "electromagnetic weather" threat on the Southern Front, significantly impacting UAF UAV operations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF drone safety measures and airport restrictions across multiple border regions and occupied territories (Volgograd, Bryansk, Belgorod, Orlov, Kaluga, Smolensk, Kursk, Donetsk, Crimea) indicate a heightened awareness of aerial threats, likely from UAF UAVs, shaping the operational environment in RF border areas. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
The continued use of KABs by RF tactical aviation in Northern Donetsk suggests conditions are favorable for air-delivered precision munitions, despite potential UAF air defense. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Industrial accidents (Ryazan) or potential strikes on such targets have broader economic and potentially military-industrial impacts beyond immediate weather. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Fuel shortages and price gouging in RF, exacerbated by UAF deep strikes, represent an economic environmental factor impacting RF logistics and public morale. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF:
- Offensive Pressure: RF forces are conducting a severe, coordinated assault at Avdiivka using T-90M tanks and "fire roller" tactics, supported by KABs. Pressure is maintained near Klishchiivka (Bakhmut Axis) with VDV elements. Continued probing and potential reconstitution for offensive action are noted in Kherson. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- EW Capability: Significant enhancement of EW capabilities on the Southern Front with the 'Shipovnik-Aero' system, posing a direct threat to UAF UAVs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Air Defense: Targeted deployment of Pantsir-S1 systems to protect rear-area C2 and logistics hubs. Widespread drone safety measures indicate active internal air defense postures. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
- Logistics & Sustainment: Fuel price gouging and FAS investigations (TASS) indicate ongoing internal logistical challenges, likely exacerbated by UAF deep strikes. The increased casualties at the Elastic plant could impact industrial/military production or be a result of UAF long-range targeting. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Information Operations (IO):
  - Continued dehumanization of Ukrainians (БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС video showing drone attack on civilian). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - Amplification of legal actions against dissidents (Markaryan case by Операция Z, Военкоры Русской Весны, Alex Parker Returns). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - Propaganda promoting RF capabilities (USV training by Colonelcassad) and exploiting international cultural figures (Woody Allen by TASS), and Western political figures (Trump by TASS). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - Internal messaging focusing on domestic issues (Moscow school tour by Новости Москвы, TASS reports on fuel prices) while leveraging patriotic narratives ('Russia - a country of heroes' by Akhmat SpN). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - Attempts to "rehabilitate" "foreign agents" (Sergey Markov by Военкор Котенок) indicating complex internal political influence operations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - Exploitation of diplomatic friction (Poland/Bandera symbolism by НгП раZVедка). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Tactical Adaptation: Studying captured Western weapons (C7NLD by Воин DV) indicates an attempt to understand and potentially counter UAF equipment. Claims of success in Kharkiv direction by Akhmat SpN. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Command and Control: The coordinated Avdiivka assault, KAB deployment, and targeted EW/AD assets indicate functional C2. However, the Sberbank app removal indicates a vulnerability in digital infrastructure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for military C2, MEDIUM for overall digital resilience).
UAF:
- Cyber Operations: Active engagement in cyber operations (#OHRD by Оперативний ЗСУ). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Defensive Resilience: Successful repulsion of VDV attacks near Klishchiivka (Bakhmut) demonstrates strong defensive posture. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Civilian Protection Efforts: Continued monitoring and reporting of RF atrocities against civilians (БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС) emphasizes UAF's role in documenting war crimes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Deep Strike Capability: Continuing to disrupt RF logistics through drone strikes on oil refineries (from previous SITREP). Successful strikes in Makiivka confirmed. Showcase of "Long Neptune" indicates continued development of long-range capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- International Engagement: Ongoing diplomatic efforts (Ramstein meeting announced) and internal discussions on societal issues (youth travel). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Airspace Monitoring: Air Force of UAF actively issuing KAB warnings for Northern Donetsk. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.4. Relevant Dempster-Shafer Beliefs (Updated)

RF Offensive Action (Avdiivka): Use of T-90M tanks and "fire roller" tactics. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF EW Deployment (Southern Front): 'Shipovnik-Aero' system. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Force Rotation (Kherson): 49th CAA units. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Air Defense Enhancement: Pantsir-S1 systems for rear C2/logistics. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
RF War Crimes/Civilian Targeting: Drone attack on civilian in Kherson. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
UAF Cyber Operation: #OHRD. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for operation, LOW for specific impact).
RF USV Counter/Development: Studying USVs at "VOIN" Center. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Weapon Exploitation: Captured C7NLD rifle. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Economic Impact: Fuel price gouging investigations by FAS. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Air Operations Disruption: Volgograd airport restrictions. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
RF Internal Politics/IO: Attempted rehabilitation of Sergey Markov. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Geopolitical Shift: Turkey displacing RF in Eurasian market. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Internal Control/IO: Amplification of Markaryan case. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF IO/Normalization: Woody Allen response to criticism. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Imagery: Два майора (Zaporizhzhia). (HIGH CONFIDENCE for imagery, LOW for content).
RF Sberbank App Removal: "Sberbank Assets Online" removed from App Store. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Next Ramstein Meeting: September 9th in London. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
UAF "Long Neptune" Missile: Displayed launch. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Industrial Casualties: 28 victims at Elastic plant in Ryazan. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Claims Kharkiv Direction: Akhmat SpN eliminating vehicles/ammo near Ambarne. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE for claim)
Explosions in Makiivka: Confirmed by UAF sources. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Poland Drone Incident: Polish MFA speculates RF drone from Ukraine. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
UAF Youth Travel Discussion: Debates on allowing 18-22 year olds to travel abroad. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF IO - Poland/Bandera: Kyiv threatens Polish president over Bandera symbolism ban. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF IO - Trump on US UAV Experience: TASS quotes Trump. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF KAB Usage (Northern Donetsk): Air Force of UAF issues warnings. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF Internal Drone Restrictions: Drone safety concerns in multiple RF border regions and occupied territories. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:
- Escalated Offensive Ground Operations: Demonstrated capability to conduct complex, high-intensity assaults using advanced armor (T-90M), coordinated tactics ("fire roller"), and air support (KABs) at Avdiivka. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Advanced EW Warfare: Confirmed deployment of 'Shipovnik-Aero' system on Southern Front demonstrates RF's increasing sophistication in countering UAF UAVs, posing a significant threat to ISR and strike assets. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Force Reconstitution: Ability to rotate exhausted units with fresh, combat-capable elements (49th CAA in Kherson) indicates sustained force generation capacity. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Adaptive Air Defense: Targeted deployment of Pantsir-S1 to protect key rear assets shows an adaptation to UAF deep strike threats. Widespread internal drone restrictions underscore enhanced short-range air defense and counter-drone measures. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
- Continued Terror/War Crimes: Demonstrated capability and willingness to target civilians directly with drones in occupied territories. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- USV Counter/Development: RF is actively studying USVs, suggesting a capability to analyze threats and potentially develop their own. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Information Warfare & Internal Control: RF maintains a robust IO apparatus, leveraging internal legal actions, external political figures, and cultural/diplomatic events to shape narratives, suppress dissent, and attempt to normalize its international standing, while also exploiting diplomatic friction. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Air-Delivered Precision Munitions: Effective use of KABs in active offensive sectors, indicating continued aerial strike capabilities despite UAF air defense. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Intentions:
- Achieve Decisive Tactical Breakthroughs: The Avdiivka assault, with T-90M, "fire roller" tactics, and KAB support, signals a clear intent to achieve a significant territorial gain or encirclement. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Degrade UAF ISR and Strike Capabilities: The deployment of 'Shipovnik-Aero' is intended to directly counter UAF's effective UAV and FPV drone operations on critical axes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Reconstitute and Prepare for Future Operations: Force rotations in Kherson indicate an intent to restore combat effectiveness for either defensive or renewed offensive actions in that sector. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Protect Key Rear Areas: Deployment of Pantsir-S1 and widespread drone safety measures demonstrate intent to mitigate the impact of UAF deep strikes on C2, logistics, and internal security. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
- Dehumanize and Terrorize Ukrainian Population: Continued drone attacks on civilians in Kherson aim to demoralize the population and sow fear. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Maintain and Reinforce Internal Control: Continued prosecution of "dissident" bloggers (Markaryan) and the general suppression of alternative narratives reinforces RF's authoritarian control. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Challenge Western Alliances and Influence: Attempts to use cultural figures (Woody Allen), Western political figures (Trump), and geopolitical developments (Turkey-Eurasian market) to project a counter-narrative to Western unity and influence, and to exploit diplomatic friction (Poland). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Courses of Action:
- MLCOA 1: Sustain High-Intensity Breakthrough Attempt at Avdiivka with Integrated Air and EW Support Across Other Fronts: RF will maintain and intensify the coordinated "fire roller" assault at Avdiivka, committing significant resources (T-90M, concentrated artillery, KABs) to achieve a breakthrough. Concurrently, they will continue probing attacks in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk, maintain pressure around Bakhmut with high-quality units (VDV), and conduct limited reconnaissance-in-force in Kherson as newly rotated units integrate. The 'Shipovnik-Aero' EW system will be used to suppress UAF UAV operations on the Southern Front, and RF will continue to utilize tactical aviation for KAB strikes on exposed UAF positions. Civilian targeting in contested areas (e.g., Kherson) will persist. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - Indicators: Sustained high rate of artillery fire and armored advances at Avdiivka. Continued reports of drone activity and localized ground engagements in Zaporizhzhia/Dnipropetrovsk, with significant UAV jamming. Persistent VDV attacks in Bakhmut. Reconnaissance-in-force from Kherson. Daily RF MOD reports of successful offensive actions. Continued drone attacks on civilians in frontline areas. Increased KAB strikes in Northern Donetsk.
- MLCOA 2: Expand and Optimize EW Shield on Critical Sectors, Coupled with Adaptive Air Defense and Internal Drone Restrictions: RF will seek to expand the operational area of the 'Shipovnik-Aero' system and deploy additional EW assets to create a more comprehensive anti-UAV screen on the Southern Front, aiming to blind UAF ISR and neutralize FPV drone threats. This will be coupled with continued adaptive air defense postures, including further deployment of systems like Pantsir-S1 to protect vulnerable logistical and C2 nodes. RF will maintain and potentially expand internal drone safety zones and airport restrictions in border regions to counter UAF UAV incursions, impacting civilian and potentially military air traffic. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - Indicators: Increased reports of UAV jamming and loss of signal on the Southern Front. Identification of additional 'Shipovnik-Aero' deployments. Fewer successful UAF deep strikes in key areas (if EW proves highly effective). Visual confirmation of more localized air defense systems protecting critical infrastructure. RF claims of disrupting UAF drone activity. Extended or more stringent internal drone bans.
- MLCOA 3: Intensify Multi-Domain Information Warfare to Undermine Ukrainian Resolve and Western Support, with Increased Focus on US Political Figures, Diplomatic Divides, and Extreme Nationalist Narratives, while managing internal dissent: RF will aggressively exploit diplomatic friction (Poland/Bandera issue), alleged Ukrainian corruption, and internal Ukrainian societal challenges (youth travel debate). RF will also extensively leverage statements from Western political figures (e.g., Donald Trump on nuclear arms reduction or US UAV experience) to create narratives of Western disunity, question the nature of the conflict, and portray RF as a peace-seeking actor, while simultaneously employing dehumanizing propaganda. RF will tighten internal control over information and education, and promote narratives of its own military successes, humanitarian efforts, and global influence, while deflecting attention to other international crises and internal domestic issues. The "Sberbank Assets Online" app removal will be framed as Western aggression, and the Elastic plant explosion casualties will be minimized or blamed on external factors. RF-aligned IO will continue to foster non-Western solidarity against perceived Western "genocides." The reported fuel price investigations will be carefully managed to avoid internal dissent but may be leveraged to blame Western sanctions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  - Indicators: Immediate and widespread amplification of Polish-Ukrainian diplomatic issues, extensive coverage and selective quoting of Donald Trump's statements by RF media, continued focus on "humanitarian" actions, promotion of RF internal stability, opportunistic leveraging of Western political discourse, and increased use of dehumanizing rhetoric. Continued narratives of US/Europe "blaming Ukraine" for sabotages. Continued highlighting of internal Ukrainian security failures. Increased use of domestic civilian events for IO. Amplification of discriminatory internal policies and further suppression of independent educational/informational platforms. RF-aligned IO attempting to build non-Western solidarity. Careful framing of domestic economic issues, possibly blaming external factors. Framing of app removal as Western economic warfare. Minimal or vague reporting on industrial accidents.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF:
- Avdiivka Escalation: Shift from attritional tactics to a coordinated breakthrough attempt using advanced tanks (T-90M), combined arms ("fire roller") tactics, and KAB air support. This represents a significant tactical adaptation aiming for rapid gains. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Advanced EW Deployment: Introduction of 'Shipovnik-Aero' system on the Southern Front is a direct adaptation to counter UAF UAV superiority, indicating RF is learning and responding to UAF's effective use of drones. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Targeted Air Defense: Deployment of Pantsir-S1 to protect specific rear-area assets and widespread internal drone restrictions are adaptations to mitigate UAF deep strike effectiveness and internal drone threats. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
- Force Reconstitution: Implementing systematic unit rotations (Kherson) to regenerate combat power. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- USV Counter-measures/Development: Actively studying USVs indicates an adaptation to the maritime threat posed by UAF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Exploitation of Captured Equipment: Analyzing captured Western weapons (C7NLD) to gain insights into UAF capabilities and potentially develop countermeasures. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Air-to-Ground Coordination: Increased use of KABs in direct support of ground offensives in key sectors (Northern Donetsk). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
UAF:
- Cyber Warfare Adaptation: Ongoing #OHRD cyber operation demonstrates UAF's continued adaptation to the multi-domain conflict. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Resilient Defense: Continued success in repelling VDV assaults (Bakhmut) shows strong defensive adaptations against elite RF units. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Monitoring and Documentation of War Crimes: Immediate reporting of RF drone attacks on civilians (БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС) is a critical adaptation for documentation and international accountability. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Deep Strike Effectiveness & Development: Sustained disruption of RF oil refining capacity (previous SITREP) and confirmed strikes in Makiivka demonstrate UAF's ability to adapt and maintain effective long-range strike capabilities. The public display of "Long Neptune" suggests further development. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Strategic Engagement: Announcement of the next Ramstein meeting and internal discussions on societal resilience (youth travel) demonstrate adaptive strategic engagement. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Air Threat Warning: Rapid issuance of KAB warnings by UAF Air Force is an adaptation to active RF air threats. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF:
- Fuel Supply Issues: Investigations into fuel price gouging by FAS (TASS) highlight persistent fuel supply disruptions and potential shortages, directly linked to UAF deep strikes on oil refineries. This impacts both military and civilian logistics. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Logistical Strain for Offensive: The "fire roller" tactic at Avdiivka, along with KAB usage, is ammunition-intensive and will place significant strain on logistics, requiring efficient supply lines which are vulnerable to UAF interdiction. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Rear Area Protection: Deployment of Pantsir-S1 systems indicates RF is prioritizing protection of its logistical nodes due to UAF deep strike threats. Widespread drone restrictions indicate a general concern for internal logistical security. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
- Industrial Production Strain: Increased casualties at the Elastic plant in Ryazan indicate potential issues within military-industrial complex facilities, impacting sustainment capacity, or successful UAF long-range targeting. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for casualties, MEDIUM for cause/impact).
- Resupply via Rotation: Force rotations in Kherson indicate a structured approach to resupply personnel and equipment, though the quality of replacements remains a factor. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
UAF:
- Strategic Impact on RF Logistics: Continued successful deep strikes on RF oil refineries are having a tangible impact on RF's ability to sustain its forces. Confirmed strikes in Makiivka further demonstrate this capability. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Cyber Operations Impact: The #OHRD cyber operation by UAF may target RF logistical or C2 networks, further disrupting their sustainment. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
- Importance of International Aid: The upcoming Ramstein meeting remains crucial for UAF to secure the necessary materiel to counter RF escalations, especially the Avdiivka assault and the new EW threat. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Long-Range Strike Sustainment: Display of "Long Neptune" suggests UAF is building its indigenous long-range strike capabilities, reducing reliance on external sources for some high-value munitions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF:
- Avdiivka C2: The coordinated "fire roller" assault with T-90M tanks, and integrated KAB support at Avdiivka indicates effective C2 at the operational and tactical levels for this specific, complex operation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- EW and AD C2: Deployment of the 'Shipovnik-Aero' EW system, targeted Pantsir-S1 systems, and widespread internal drone restrictions demonstrate functional C2 for defensive, electronic warfare, and internal security asset allocation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Internal Control C2: Continued, consistent messaging regarding internal repression (Markaryan case), exploitation of international political events, and rapid responses to internal incidents (fuel prices, industrial accidents) showcases robust, centralized C2 over information operations and domestic policy. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Logistical C2 Challenges: The FAS investigation into fuel price gouging and the Sberbank app removal suggest ongoing issues or vulnerabilities within the RF C2 that affect the efficient and equitable distribution of resources and digital resilience. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Air C2: Coordinated KAB strikes in Northern Donetsk indicate effective C2 between tactical aviation and ground units. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
UAF:
- Cyber C2: The ongoing #OHRD cyber operation highlights effective C2 in the cyber domain. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Defensive C2: Successfully repelling VDV attacks at Bakhmut, documenting RF war crimes in Kherson, and active air warnings demonstrate effective tactical C2 and communication. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Strategic Targeting C2: UAF's continued impactful deep strikes on RF oil refineries and successful strikes in Makiivka indicate effective strategic C2 and intelligence integration for target selection and execution. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Strategic Communications C2: Announcement of Ramstein and public display of "Long Neptune" demonstrate effective strategic communication and C2. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

High Alert (Avdiivka): UAF forces at Avdiivka are on high alert, facing a severe, coordinated RF assault with armor, artillery, and KABs. Their ability to hold defensive lines against T-90M tanks and "fire roller" tactics is critical and demonstrates immediate readiness. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Persistent Defensive Posture: UAF maintains strong defensive lines at Bakhmut, successfully repelling VDV attacks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Advanced Cyber Capabilities: Active engagement in cyber operations (#OHRD) showcases a modern, multi-domain force posture. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Anti-UAV Preparedness: UAF units on the Southern Front are immediately adapting to the new 'Shipovnik-Aero' EW threat, highlighting their readiness to counter emerging RF capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Strategic Offensive Readiness: Sustained deep strike capabilities (oil refineries, Makiivka) and the display of "Long Neptune" demonstrate UAF's readiness for and ongoing development of long-range offensive operations against RF logistics and strategic targets. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Adaptation to Air Threats: Rapid issuance of KAB warnings indicates a prepared and responsive air defense posture for tactical aviation threats. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Societal Mobilization Readiness: Internal discussions about youth travel restrictions reflect a proactive approach to managing human resources for national defense. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:
- Defense at Bakhmut: Successfully repulsed VDV attacks near Klishchiivka. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Cyber Operations: Active #OHRD cyber operation reported. (HIGH CONFIDENCE for operation).
- Strategic Deep Strikes: (from previous SITREP) Ukrainian attacks on 10 RF oil refineries have disrupted 17% of RF refining capacity. Confirmed successful strikes in Makiivka. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Long-Range Missile Development: Public display and launch of the "Long Neptune" missile indicates successful indigenous arms development. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- International Diplomatic Progress: Announcement of the next Ramstein meeting in London, signaling continued international support. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Setbacks:
- Avdiivka Assault: RF's intensified, coordinated assault at Avdiivka, employing T-90M tanks, "fire roller" tactics, and KABs, presents an immediate, severe challenge to UAF defensive positions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- New EW Threat: The deployment of 'Shipovnik-Aero' on the Southern Front is a significant setback for UAF UAV operations, requiring immediate mitigation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Continued Civilian Targeting: RF drone attacks on a civilian in Kherson highlight the persistent threat to non-combatants in occupied territories. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Cross-Border Incident: Polish MFA speculating on a Russian drone from Ukraine near Lublin is a concerning development, potentially complicating international relations. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
- Diplomatic Friction: The issue of Bandera symbolism with Poland creates diplomatic friction during a critical period. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and Armor: Urgent requirement for additional ATGMs and counter-armor capabilities at Avdiivka to counter T-90M tanks and "fire roller" tactics. Reinforcement with UAF armor is also critical. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Counter-EW Capabilities: Immediate requirement for ELINT and SIGINT assets to locate and identify parameters of 'Shipovnik-Aero' systems. Need for EW-resistant UAVs, alternative communication methods, and possibly SEAD/DEAD capabilities to neutralize the threat. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Air Defense (Mobile & Integrated): Increased demand for mobile air defense systems, particularly short-range, to protect frontline units and rear-area assets from increased RF drone activity and tactical aviation (KABs). Integration with early warning systems for KABs is critical. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Cyber Defense/Offense: Continued investment in cyber capabilities is essential to maintain initiatives like #OHRD and to defend against RF cyberattacks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Ammunition & Logistics: High-tempo fighting at Avdiivka will rapidly consume ammunition. Continued international logistical support is critical to sustain defensive operations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Information Warfare Assets: Robust capacity to immediately counter RF dehumanization propaganda, expose war crimes, and navigate diplomatic frictions (e.g., Poland) is continuously required. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Long-Range Strike Systems: Continued development and acquisition of systems like "Long Neptune" are vital for strategic deterrence and maintaining pressure on RF deep logistics. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Propaganda:
- Dehumanization & Atrocities: The drone attack on a civilian in Kherson (БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС) is a direct demonstration of RF's deliberate policy of terrorizing and dehumanizing Ukrainians. While reported by UAF, this act itself is part of RF's psychological warfare. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Internal Control & Legitimacy: Continued amplification of the Markaryan case (Операция Z, Военкоры Русской Весны, Alex Parker Returns) and the attempt to "rehabilitate" Sergey Markov (Военкор Котенок) are internal IO tactics to enforce state narratives, suppress dissent, and influence public perception of internal political figures. The Sberbank app removal will be framed as Western aggression, and the Ryazan plant casualties will be minimized or externally blamed. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Military Glorification & False Claims: RF will continue to promote any perceived successes at Avdiivka (e.g., "Otvazhnye" claims near Pokrovsk by Операция Z) and glorify their military capabilities (e.g., USV studies by Colonelcassad) while downplaying UAF deep strike successes (Makiivka) and internal issues (fuel price investigations, industrial accidents). Colonelcassad's claims in Kharkiv direction serve this purpose. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Normalization & Counter-Narratives: TASS reporting on Woody Allen's response aims to normalize cultural ties with RF and discredit Ukrainian diplomatic efforts. Leveraging Trump's statements on US UAV experience (TASS) aims to inject pro-RF narratives into Western discourse. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Economic Blame Game: RF state media will carefully frame the fuel price hike investigations, likely blaming external factors (sanctions) rather than UAF deep strikes. The Sberbank app removal will be attributed to Western sanctions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Exploiting Diplomatic Friction: НгП раZVедка's report on Kyiv threatening Poland's president over Bandera symbolism aims to sow discord between allies and portray Ukraine as an unreliable partner. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
UAF Counter-Propaganda:
- Exposing War Crimes: BУТУСОВ ПЛЮС's immediate reporting of the Kherson drone attack is crucial for documenting RF atrocities and galvanizing international condemnation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Highlighting Cyber Successes: Оперативний ЗСУ's report on #OHRD aims to demonstrate UAF's multi-domain capabilities and maintain morale. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Emphasizing RF Weaknesses: Reports of RF fuel price investigations and the Turkey-Eurasian market shift (РБК-Україна) serve to highlight RF's internal economic vulnerabilities and declining international influence. Confirmed strikes in Makiivka demonstrate RF's inability to secure occupied territory. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Demonstrating Self-Reliance & Deterrence: The public display of the "Long Neptune" missile serves as a powerful message of UAF's growing capabilities and deterrence. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Reinforcing International Support: The announcement of the Ramstein meeting reinforces the message of continued international solidarity. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Addressing Internal Debates: Open discussions on youth travel (ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS) signal a commitment to democratic process and transparency. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian Public Sentiment:
- Resilience under Attack: The intensified RF assault on Avdiivka, coupled with KAB strikes, will test public resilience, but effective defense will bolster morale. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Outrage at Atrocities: The drone attack on a civilian in Kherson will likely generate widespread outrage and reinforce determination to resist. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Confidence in UAF Capabilities: Successes in cyber operations, continued effective deep strikes (Makiivka), and the "Long Neptune" reveal will maintain public confidence in UAF's ability to fight effectively. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Impact of EW Threat: The new EW threat on the Southern Front, if unmitigated, could cause concern regarding UAF's ISR capabilities. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
- Diplomatic Friction Concerns: The issues with Poland (Bandera symbolism, drone incident) could cause concern about international unity, though likely tempered by strong overall support. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
- Internal Policy Debates: Discussions on youth travel restrictions reflect sensitive societal issues that need careful management to maintain public trust. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Russian Public Sentiment:
- Morale Boost from Avdiivka (if successful): Any perceived breakthrough or significant gain at Avdiivka will be heavily amplified by state media to boost morale, along with claims of successes in Kharkiv. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Discontent over Fuel Prices: Investigations into fuel price gouging will likely increase public discontent and expose economic vulnerabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Suppression of Dissent: The Markaryan case and other internal control measures are designed to suppress alternative viewpoints and maintain an appearance of unity. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Nationalist Reinforcement: Continued propaganda and dehumanization will reinforce nationalist sentiment among hardliners, while potentially alienating others. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Impact of Airport Restrictions/Drone Safety: Unexplained airport restrictions (Volgograd) and widespread drone safety concerns (STERNENKO) can lead to public anxiety or speculation about internal security. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
- Economic Impact of Sanctions: The Sberbank app removal will be a tangible reminder of Western sanctions, potentially fueling anti-Western sentiment or internal frustration. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Industrial Accident Concerns: The increased casualties at the Elastic plant could cause concern about worker safety or industrial reliability. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Support for Ukraine:
- Increased Urgency for Aid: The escalation at Avdiivka, the new EW threat, and the proven success of UAF long-range strikes (Makiivka, "Long Neptune") will likely intensify calls for increased and expedited international military aid, especially ATGMs, counter-EW capabilities, and air defense, ahead of the Ramstein meeting. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Condemnation of War Crimes: The drone attack on a civilian in Kherson will generate renewed international condemnation of RF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Ramstein Meeting: The announced September 9th Ramstein meeting in London is a critical diplomatic event for reinforcing and coordinating international support. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Diplomatic Friction/Challenges:
- RF's Counter-Influence Efforts: RF's attempts to use cultural figures (Woody Allen), Western political figures (Trump), and influence operations (Sergey Markov) aim to undermine international support for Ukraine and normalize RF's position. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Economic Realignments: The report on Turkey displacing RF in Eurasian markets highlights ongoing geopolitical and economic shifts that could impact RF's strategic partnerships. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Polish-Ukrainian Tensions: The Bandera symbolism issue and the drone incident near Lublin create diplomatic friction with a key ally, requiring careful management to prevent further deterioration. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Russian Diplomatic Posture:
- Projecting "Normalcy" amidst Conflict: RF continues to engage in cultural diplomacy, internal political maneuvering, and leveraging Western political discourse to project an image of normalcy and control, despite military escalations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Diversionary Tactics: RF may attempt to deflect attention from battlefield setbacks or internal issues by highlighting international cultural events, diplomatic efforts with non-Western partners, or by amplifying diplomatic friction with Ukraine's allies. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Anti-Western Rhetoric: The Sberbank app removal and fuel price issues will be leveraged to fuel anti-Western sentiment and justify RF actions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Withdrawal from International Agreements: TASS reporting on the government proposing to denounce another convention with the Council of Europe indicates a continued RF disengagement from international legal frameworks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

Sustain High-Intensity Breakthrough Attempt at Avdiivka with Integrated Air and EW Support Across Other Fronts: RF will maintain and intensify the coordinated "fire roller" assault at Avdiivka, committing significant resources (T-90M, concentrated artillery, KABs) to achieve a breakthrough. Concurrently, they will continue probing attacks in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk, maintain pressure around Bakhmut with high-quality units (VDV), and conduct limited reconnaissance-in-force in Kherson as newly rotated units integrate. The 'Shipovnik-Aero' EW system will be used to suppress UAF UAV operations on the Southern Front, and RF will continue to utilize tactical aviation for KAB strikes on exposed UAF positions. Civilian targeting in contested areas (e.g., Kherson) will persist. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Indicators: Sustained high rate of artillery fire and armored advances at Avdiivka. Continued reports of drone activity and localized ground engagements in Zaporizhzhia/Dnipropetrovsk, with significant UAV jamming. Persistent VDV attacks in Bakhmut. Reconnaissance-in-force from Kherson. Daily RF MOD reports of successful offensive actions. Continued drone attacks on civilians in frontline areas. Increased KAB strikes in Northern Donetsk.
Expand and Optimize EW Shield on Critical Sectors, Coupled with Adaptive Air Defense and Internal Drone Restrictions: RF will seek to expand the operational area of the 'Shipovnik-Aero' system and deploy additional EW assets to create a more comprehensive anti-UAV screen on the Southern Front, aiming to blind UAF ISR and neutralize FPV drone threats. This will be coupled with continued adaptive air defense postures, including further deployment of systems like Pantsir-S1 to protect vulnerable logistical and C2 nodes. RF will maintain and potentially expand internal drone safety zones and airport restrictions in border regions to counter UAF UAV incursions, impacting civilian and potentially military air traffic. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Indicators: Increased reports of UAV jamming and loss of signal on the Southern Front. Identification of additional 'Shipovnik-Aero' deployments. Fewer successful UAF deep strikes in key areas (if EW proves highly effective). Visual confirmation of more localized air defense systems protecting critical infrastructure. RF claims of disrupting UAF drone activity. Extended or more stringent internal drone bans.
Intensified Multi-Domain Information Warfare to Undermine Ukrainian Resolve and Western Support, with Increased Focus on US Political Figures, Diplomatic Divides, and Extreme Nationalist Narratives, while managing internal dissent: RF will aggressively exploit diplomatic friction (Poland/Bandera issue), alleged Ukrainian corruption, and internal Ukrainian societal challenges (youth travel debate). RF will also extensively leverage statements from Western political figures (e.g., Donald Trump on nuclear arms reduction or US UAV experience) to create narratives of Western disunity, question the nature of the conflict, and portray RF as a peace-seeking actor, while simultaneously employing dehumanizing propaganda. RF will tighten internal control over information and education, and promote narratives of its own military successes, humanitarian efforts, and global influence, while deflecting attention to other international crises and internal domestic issues. The "Sberbank Assets Online" app removal will be framed as Western aggression, and the Elastic plant explosion casualties will be minimized or blamed on external factors. RF-aligned IO will continue to foster non-Western solidarity against perceived Western "genocides." The reported fuel price investigations will be carefully managed to avoid internal dissent but may be leveraged to blame Western sanctions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Indicators: Immediate and widespread amplification of Polish-Ukrainian diplomatic issues, extensive coverage and selective quoting of Donald Trump's statements by RF media, continued focus on "humanitarian" actions, promotion of RF internal stability, opportunistic leveraging of Western political discourse, and increased use of dehumanizing rhetoric. Continued narratives of US/Europe "blaming Ukraine" for sabotages. Continued highlighting of internal Ukrainian security failures. Increased use of domestic civilian events for IO. Amplification of discriminatory internal policies and further suppression of independent educational/informational platforms. RF-aligned IO attempting to build non-Western solidarity. Careful framing of domestic economic issues, possibly blaming external factors. Framing of app removal as Western economic warfare. Minimal or vague reporting on industrial accidents. Continued denunciations of Council of Europe conventions.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

Massed Breakthrough Offensive with Deep Exploitation in Donetsk/Kharkiv, Supported by Integrated Air and EW Attacks: RF successfully achieves a decisive breakthrough in Avdiivka or another critical sector (e.g., Pokrovsk, Kupiansk) through overwhelming force, including heavy armor (T-90M), new "fire roller" tactics, concentrated air support (KABs, UMPKs), and effective EW to degrade UAF C2 and ISR. This breakthrough is swiftly exploited by follow-on mechanized forces, aiming to encircle a large UAF grouping, seize major urban centers, or disrupt a critical supply artery. The newly deployed 'Shipovnik-Aero' and Pantsir-S1 systems indicate RF's enhanced capability to clear and protect its operational areas. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
- Indicators: Significant, verified RF territorial gains on Avdiivka or other key axes, reports of UAF units being outflanked or encircled, overwhelming RF air superiority in specific sectors, widespread communication degradation among UAF frontline units, and a sustained, high volume of RF deep strikes against UAF reserves and logistical hubs.
Coordinated Strategic Strike Package on Kyiv/Western Ukraine Targeting C2, Critical Infrastructure, and Key Western Aid Logistics, potentially leveraging new missile systems: RF conducts a multi-vector, simultaneous missile and drone attack, potentially including "Long Neptune" (if acquired from partners or reverse-engineered by RF) or other advanced long-range systems, targeting key Ukrainian governmental C2, air defense nodes, and critical infrastructure (e.g., energy, transport hubs, particularly rail lines used for Western aid) in Kyiv and major Western Ukrainian cities. This aims to decapitate leadership, severely degrade Ukraine's ability to wage war, disrupt the flow of international aid, and create conditions for political concessions. The Volgograd airport restrictions and widespread drone safety concerns could be a precursor to broader air defense activations for such an attack, with the Ryazan industrial plant casualties potentially indicating a failed RF attempt or a target of a UAF counter-strike. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
- Indicators: Unusually high concentration of RF long-range strike assets (ballistic missile launchers, strategic bomber sorties), intelligence indicating potential external transfers of advanced strike platforms, a sudden, widespread communication blackout in major Ukrainian cities preceding attacks, and confirmed damage to critical infrastructure, particularly rail hubs in Western Ukraine.
Hybrid Escalation Targeting NATO Member States with Extreme Nationalist Justification and Active Measures to Destabilize Neighboring Countries: RF conducts a series of overt or covert hybrid operations (e.g., severe cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, political interference, or direct border provocations) against one or more NATO member states, particularly those bordering Ukraine (e.g., Poland, Baltic states), leveraging narratives of "protecting Russian speakers" or "countering Nazism." This aims to test NATO's Article 5 resolve, create strategic diversion, and fracture Western unity. This would likely be accompanied by intensified RF IO leveraging extreme nationalist rhetoric (e.g., "nationality-recognizing cameras" in St. Petersburg, dehumanizing rhetoric against Ukrainians and specific accusations against NATO members) to justify aggressive actions. The ongoing economic competition with Turkey (via new railway) could also escalate into broader economic warfare or attempts to destabilize the South Caucasus. The drone incident near Lublin, Poland, if confirmed as RF origin, would be a significant precursor to this MDCOA. (LOW CONFIDENCE, but high impact)
- Indicators: Specific intelligence of RF GRU/FSB activity targeting critical infrastructure in NATO countries, overt threats or increased military posturing along NATO borders, and a significant escalation of RF rhetoric directly threatening NATO, especially through overtly nationalist and discriminatory channels. Evidence of RF-backed destabilization efforts in countries bordering Russia and Ukraine, or those economically competing with RF. (The Polish diplomatic friction, while significant, is currently being leveraged for IO, not direct military provocation. However, the explicit threat by Alex Parker Returns against Poland is a concerning precursor, and the St. Petersburg camera reports suggest an internal move towards more extreme justification). Clear evidence of RF drone activity in NATO airspace.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

Near-Term (Next 24-72 hours):
- Avdiivka & Eastern Front Offensive: Expect continuous, high-intensity RF assaults at Avdiivka, with substantial use of armor, artillery, and KABs. UAF units must maintain robust defenses, absorb initial shocks, and execute tactical counterattacks where feasible. Decision point for UAF to commit immediate operational reserves or reallocate defensive assets to critical breakthrough points. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Southern Front EW Threat: Expect an immediate and significant impact on UAF UAV operations on the Southern Front due to 'Shipovnik-Aero'. UAF must rapidly adapt UAV tactics, employ EW countermeasures, or initiate SEAD/DEAD operations against the system. Decision point for UAF to implement updated UAV TTPs and prioritize ELINT collection for targeting. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- RF Civilian Targeting/War Crimes: Continued RF drone attacks on civilians, particularly in Kherson Oblast. Decision point for UAF to rapidly document and disseminate evidence of these atrocities to international bodies and to bolster local air defense and early warning systems for civilian protection. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Information Environment Battle: RF IO will immediately leverage any perceived success at Avdiivka, continue to spread dehumanization propaganda, and exploit diplomatic frictions (Poland). UAF must have rapid and coordinated counter-IO strategies to maintain public and international confidence, specifically addressing these battlefield developments and exposing RF war crimes. Decision point to issue strong, unified statements on domestic and international challenges. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Poland Drone Incident: UAF should immediately gather all available intelligence on the Lublin drone incident and communicate transparently with Polish authorities to avoid RF exploitation of potential misunderstandings. Decision point for UAF to share data with NATO allies to clarify drone origins. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Mid-Term (Next 1-2 Weeks):
- Resource Mobilization (Ramstein): The "Ramstein" meeting on September 9th is a critical decision point for international partners to confirm consistent military and financial aid. UAF leadership will need to prioritize requests for ATGMs, counter-EW systems, mobile air defense, and KAB-hardened air defense, articulating the urgency due to Avdiivka's escalation and the new EW threat. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Strategic Adaptation & Counter-EW Operations: UAF needs to continually adapt to RF EW and drone warfare tactics. Decision point for UAF to finalize targeting strategies for high-value RF EW assets, integrating all available ISR and strike capabilities. Evaluation of the effectiveness of #OHRD cyber operations against RF C2 and logistical networks will be critical. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
- Kherson Operational Picture: The integration of the 49th CAA in Kherson will likely lead to increased reconnaissance-in-force or limited probing attacks. Decision point for UAF to adjust defensive posture and reinforce surveillance along the Dnipro. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
- Economic & Geopolitical Shifts: Monitoring the impact of UAF deep strikes on RF fuel prices, the ongoing Turkey-RF economic competition, and the impact of Western sanctions (Sberbank app) will be crucial. Decision point for UAF to leverage these developments in international diplomacy and IO. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Long-Range Strike Deployment: Following the "Long Neptune" display, a decision point for potential deployment or further testing could be within this timeframe, impacting RF deep logistics. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
- Managing Diplomatic Tensions: UAF will need to actively engage in diplomacy to de-escalate tensions with Poland over historical symbolism and the drone incident, preventing RF from exploiting these divisions. Decision point to implement a diplomatic strategy to address these issues. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

Recommendations

Immediate Reinforcement for Avdiivka and Counter-Armor Operations:
- PRIORITY ONE: Immediately redeploy ATGM teams, additional infantry, and if feasible, UAF armor assets to the Avdiivka sector to counter the T-90M-led "fire roller" assaults and KAB strikes.
- Task all available ISR (including drones with advanced optics) to maintain continuous surveillance on RF troop movements, staging areas, artillery positions, and KAB launch platforms around Avdiivka to provide real-time targeting data.
- Prioritize artillery, FPV drone, and precision strike assets against identified RF armor concentrations, command vehicles, KAB launch sites (if static), and ammunition resupply points supporting the Avdiivka offensive.
Neutralize 'Shipovnik-Aero' EW System and Adapt UAV Operations:
- PRIORITY ONE: Task ELINT and SIGINT platforms (airborne, ground-based, and space-based if available) to rapidly pinpoint the precise location, operational parameters, and vulnerabilities of the 'Shipovnik-Aero' systems on the Southern Front.
- Develop and immediately disseminate updated UAV TTPs to all operators, focusing on EW-resistant flight profiles, alternative navigation methods, and secure communication protocols.
- Prioritize SEAD/DEAD operations against identified 'Shipovnik-Aero' systems using available long-range precision strike assets.
Proactive and Robust Information Operations to Counter Dehumanization and RF Narratives:
- Develop and execute an immediate, coordinated information campaign explicitly exposing and condemning RF's war crimes against civilians (e.g., Kherson drone attack), emphasizing their barbarity to international audiences.
- Amplify UAF's defensive successes (e.g., repelling VDV at Bakhmut), cyber operations (#OHRD), and strategic strike capabilities (Makiivka, "Long Neptune") to boost domestic morale and demonstrate capabilities.
- Proactively counter RF narratives on fuel shortages by linking them directly to UAF deep strikes on oil refineries, highlighting the strategic impact of UAF operations.
- Leverage economic friction (Turkey-RF railway, Sberbank app removal) and RF internal issues (fuel price investigations, Markaryan arrest, Ryazan industrial accident) to undermine RF's image of stability and strength.
- Actively manage diplomatic narratives regarding Poland, providing transparent information on cross-border incidents and engaging in constructive dialogue on historical issues.
Maximize "Ramstein" Outcomes for Critical Capabilities:
- Ensure UAF delegation is fully prepared for the September 9th "Ramstein" meeting, clearly articulating urgent requirements for ATGMs, advanced counter-EW systems, mobile short-range air defense (capable of intercepting KABs and drones), and EW-hardened UAVs.
- Provide compelling evidence of the impact of current deep strikes and the immediate threats (Avdiivka, 'Shipovnik-Aero') to secure expedited delivery of high-priority systems.
Enhanced Rear-Area Security and Logistics Protection:
- Increase surveillance (UAV, HUMINT) of RF-occupied Kherson Oblast to detect further troop movements or offensive preparations by the 49th CAA.
- Re-evaluate and update targeting packages for RF rear-area logistics hubs and C2 nodes, incorporating the increased air defense threat from Pantsir-S1 systems. Integrate SEAD/DEAD planning as a precursor to deep strikes.
Cyber-Warfare Initiative:
- Continue and, where possible, expand cyber operations like #OHRD to disrupt RF C2, logistics, and information networks, particularly those supporting offensive operations at Avdiivka and EW activities on the Southern Front.
Indigenous Long-Range Strike Development and Deployment:
- Continue rapid development and testing of systems like "Long Neptune" to increase Ukraine's independent long-range strike capabilities, enhancing deterrence and strategic options.

END REPORT

Situation Report