Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: RF forces continue to apply multi-axis pressure, with primary efforts focused on gaining ground in the Donbas, particularly around Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk. The major, multi-pronged RF missile and UAV attack targeting Western, Central, and Northern Ukraine has largely concluded, with air raid alerts lifted in most oblasts, although a renewed ballistic missile threat was briefly reported and subsequently lifted. Initial Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) indicates significant damage to industrial and civilian infrastructure, including casualties in Mukachevo and Lviv, and damage to a gas storage facility in Pavlohrad. UA forces maintain defensive lines, conducting localized counter-offensives, and demonstrating effective multi-domain defense and cross-border strike capabilities.

• STRATEGIC MISSILE/UAV ACTIVITY (UPDATED): The significant wave of RF missile and UAV attacks has largely concluded.

  • Cruise Missile Trajectories (UPDATED): CRs confirmed in southern Khmelnytskyi Oblast with a western course. CRs confirmed in Ternopil Oblast with a western course, subsequently moving towards Lutsk and Lviv. CRs on Rivne Oblast moving towards Lutsk. One missile detected approaching Lviv. Last pair of CRs reported west of Haisyn (Vinnytsia Oblast) heading west towards southern Khmelnytskyi Oblast. Remainder of loitering munitions still active/tracked, including one approaching Mukachevo. Group of RF UAVs from Chernihiv Oblast now course towards Kyiv Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Ballistic Missile Activity: Ballistic missile threat on Zaporizhzhia Oblast confirmed by Fedorov (UA source). Air Force of UA reports renewed ballistic missile threat; subsequently lifted. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Impacts/Reports (UPDATED): Explosions reported in Lutsk. Rivne Oblast: Power outages reported. This could be related to current or previous RF strikes. Kherson/Zaporizhzhia: Explosions reported in occupied Crimea (Sevastopol). RF Governor claims "drills." Mukachevo airfield in Zakarpattia Oblast reported "down" (likely strike impact or severe disruption) per RF source claim. RF sources (Operatsiya Z) claim Russian Navy (VMF) is attacking Western Ukraine, suggesting sea-launched cruise missiles (Kalibr). Dnipro/Samar expected to be "loud" due to ballistic missile threat. "Zircon" on Dnipro reported as "minus" (likely intercepted or impact phase complete). Explosion heard in Sumy. Strike confirmed on a company enterprise in Mukachevo, Zakarpattia. Missile towards Chernihiv reported as "minus." Missile towards Samar/Dnipro reported as "minus." Explosions reported in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Missiles towards Zaporizhzhia reported as "minus." Repeat explosions in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Explosions heard again in Lutsk. Drone attack on Novoshakhtinsk Oil Refinery in Rostov Oblast, Russia. Air raid alerts beginning to be lifted in a number of oblasts, indicating the conclusion of the major strike wave. Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia have lifted alerts. Drone attack reflected in seven municipalities of Rostov Oblast, no casualties. Temporary shutdown of power unit #7 at Novovoronezh Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) reported, with no threat to safety. This is a domestic Russian report but could be related to nearby drone activity. Reports of drone attack on Voronezh Oblast (UA Source). Explosions confirmed in Lviv. Authorities in Mukachevo urged information silence after a drone impact. Fire in Mukachevo due to missile strike, confirmed by municipal council. 12 casualties reported in Mukachevo attack. Two strikes on Zaporizhzhia, damaging industrial infrastructure and residential buildings. No casualties reported. Photo message from Zaporizhzhia OBA shows damaged residential/industrial buildings. Gas storage facility in Pavlohrad district, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, hit and burning after RF strikes. Dnipropetrovsk OBA reports PPO shot down 18 UAVs and 2 missiles in the oblast. Bryansk Oblast Governor reports 3 enemy UAVs shot down over Bryansk Oblast. RF MoD claims 49 Ukrainian UAVs shot down overnight over various regions of Russia. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• DONBAS OBLAST (Chasiv Yar/Ivanivske Axis): RF forces (elements of 98th VDV Division) maintain a confirmed foothold in the eastern Kanal microdistrict of Chasiv Yar. Ukrainian units executed tactical withdrawal to prepared defensive positions west of the initial line of contact. Clashes persist near Toretsk, Rusyn Yar, Oleksandra-Kalynove, and Pleschiyivka. UA 93rd Brigade "Kholodnyi Yar" successfully cleared and took control of Hruzke and Vesele near Dobropillya, capturing an RF prisoner, indicating localized UA counter-offensive success and stabilization in the Dobropillya area. General Staff of Armed Forces of Ukraine reports clashes near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and towards Bondarne in the Kramatorsk direction, as well as Bila Hora and Chasiv Yar. Azov Brigade successfully repelled a powerful enemy attack and prevented consolidation in Katerynivka, Toretsk direction, contradicting previous RF claims of gains. Multiple RF sources confirm continued use of FPV drones for "clearing strongholds" and covering "assault teams" in the Krasnoarmeysk direction. Iskander-M missile strikes reported in Sloviansk and Konstantinovka, impacting civilian infrastructure and causing casualties. RF claims of "liberating" Alexandrogra (Myrnohrad) and pushing AFU out of eastern Serebryanka (DPR) are noted as RF propaganda. RF forces claim destruction of a UA M109 Paladin SPG, a FAB-3000 strike on a 14th NGU Separate Brigade PVD near Dymytrov/Myrnohrad, and an LMUR strike on a UAV C2 point near Antonivka. RF MoD claims improved position and capture of a UA stronghold west of Chasiv Yar by elements of the 299th Guards Airborne Regiment (Yug Group of Forces). RF also claims destruction of a Dutch-made BTR YPR-765. RF claims destruction of a UA temporary deployment point (PVD) in Pleschiyivka area in DNR. TASS reports RF forces destroyed a UA dugout north of Chasiv Yar with a massive strike. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• DONBAS OBLAST (Pokrovskoe Direction): RF claims a "big breakthrough" and liberation of Iskra (DNR), breakthrough into Zolotyi Kolodyaz, and advances up to 1.5km towards Sokil from Ocheretyne, threatening a key Ukrainian GLOC. UA sources report stabilization, successful destruction of enemy elements, and Ukrainian paratroopers clearing Pokrovsk of Russian DRGs. UA forces repelled enemy near Rubizhne, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Vesele, Vilne, Shakhove, Nykanorivka, and Sukhetske. Main Commander Oleksandr Syrskyi reports successful UA advances for the second consecutive day in Dobropillya and Pokrovsk directions. UA 425th Regiment "SKALA" conducted a successful offensive operation on the administrative border of Dnipropetropavsk and Donetsk Oblasts, capturing RF prisoners. RF claims of advancing into Ivankiv, Poltavka, and Zeleny Gay, and encircling Pokrovsk (Rodynske 3/4 liberated) are noted as RF information operations. UA forces, including 1st Azov Corps (ZSOU and NGU), have cleared Hruzke, Rubizhne, Novovodyane, Petrivka, Vesele, and Zolotyi Kolodyaz in Donetsk Oblast, directly countering RF claims. RF is employing TOS-1A ("Tosochka") against UA strongholds near Pokrovsk. UA 414th UAV Brigade "Birds of Madyar" continues to inflict casualties on RF in the Pokrovsk direction. TASS reports RF forces have taken a section of the highway near Sredne (DPR), claiming disruption of AFU logistics. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• DONBAS OBLAST (Toretsk Direction): UA reports capture of an RF prisoner from 150th Division by Azov units, and significant RF losses in Azov's areas. Mandatory evacuation of families with children in Druzhkivka and closure of Ukrposhta branches in Konstantinovka from August 19 suggest anticipated RF advances or increased threat. Clashes reported near Toretsk, Rusyn Yar, Oleksandra-Kalynove, and Pleschiyivka. RF 4th OMCBR continues attacks towards Delievka – Aleksandro-Shulgino and attempts to break through and consolidate in Belaya Hora. UA forces repelled enemy attacks near Druzhba, Chasiv Yar, and Bila Hora (Kramatorsk direction), and Pivnichne, Pivdenne, and Niu York (Toretsk direction). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• LUHANSK OBLAST (Siversk Direction): RF forces report combat operations with drone-guided artillery and ATGM teams. RF MoD claims destruction of AFU stronghold in Krasny Liman direction. RF aims to advance 2 km to close a "fire bag" for AFU in Kremensky forests. Russian forces reportedly broke through Ukrainian defense lines in the Lyman district. General Staff of Armed Forces of Ukraine reports clashes near Hryhorivka, Serebryanka, Siversk, Vyyimka, Fedorivka, Pereyizne and towards Siversk in the Siversk direction. RF MoD claims "liberation" of Kolodezi and Voronoye. UA 63rd Brigade utilized FPV drones to neutralize a Russian tank threatening positions east of Lyman. RF continues to report "intense combat" and "breakthrough attempts" in the Lyman direction, with RF forces actively regrouping and bringing additional forces, likely from the 8th Combined Arms Army. RF claims to have pushed AFU out of the eastern part of Serebryanka (60% under RF control). UA military personnel confirm the enemy is undertaking "dozens of attacks in one go" in the Lyman direction, confirming high intensity. RF claims "Azov" militants fled the Krasny Liman direction to Izium. TASS (RF Source) claims RF forces have pushed AFU out of several positions near Siversk, improving their tactical position. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• DNIPROPETROVSK OBLAST (Nikopolshchyna): Sustained RF artillery and FPV drone attacks on Nikopol and surrounding communities. RF claims control of all settlements at the junction of DNR and Dnipropetropavsk Oblast after liberation of Iskra. Extensive damage to civilian infrastructure in Nikopol confirmed. Ballistic missile strike on outskirts of Dnipro confirmed with damage to civilian property. Overnight drone attack on Pokrovska community, Synelnykivskyi district, caused fires at agricultural enterprises. RF MoD claims "liberation" of Voronoye in Dnipropetropavsk Oblast. RF struck Pavlohrad with a missile overnight, causing a fire. RF reconnaissance UAVs detected near Pavlohrad. RF forces liberated Novogeorgiyevka in Dnipropetropavsk Oblast (RF claimed significant advance, corroborated by multiple RF sources including video of a captured Ukrainian flag). A gas storage facility in Pavlohrad district has been hit and is on fire, representing a significant strike on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. UA reports large-scale infrastructure work in Terny, possibly related to defensive fortifications or utility repair. First missiles now in Dnipropetropavsk Oblast, course southwest. Dnipro/Samar expected to be "loud" due to ballistic missile threat. "Zircon" on Dnipro reported as "minus." Missile towards Samar/Dnipro reported as "minus." Gas storage facility in Pavlohrad district hit and burning after RF strikes. Dnipropetrovsk OBA reports PPO shot down 18 UAVs and 2 missiles in the oblast. Head of Kryvyi Rih military administration reports situation "controlled" as of morning. RF milblogger "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" posts video/photo message claiming huge fire and chemical threat in Dnipropetrovsk region due to attacked gas storage facilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• KHARKIV OBLAST (Kharkivskyi District): UA Air Force alerts for high-speed targets and KAB launches. RF claims improved position near Krasny Perviy, controlling ~6 km of road to Dvorechnaya. A substantial increase (estimated 40%) in Russian EW emissions detected in the Kharkiv sector. RF forces have started battles for taking Hlushchenkovo. Recent RF drone attacks on Kharkiv caused 7 fatalities (including a one-year-old child and a 55-year-old woman) and 17 injured (including 6 children). RF drone strike on an emergency medical vehicle in Kupyansk, injuring two people. Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Novoshakhtinsk, Rostov Oblast, Russia, causing a fire. A gas infrastructure object in Kharkiv Oblast has been attacked, according to both Ukrainian and Russian channels. CRs on intersection of Poltava and Kharkiv Oblasts, course southern. RF claims its interceptor drones in Sumy Oblast have almost completely paralyzed AFU supply lines to forward positions near Lyptsi. This is an RF information operation likely to exaggerate capabilities. RF milblogger "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" posts photo message with a glow in Kegichevsky district of Kharkiv Oblast after "Geranium" arrival. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• CHERNIHIV OBLAST: UA Air Force alerts for enemy reconnaissance UAVs, high-speed targets, and threat of strike UAVs. "Geran" (Shahed) drone strikes on a forward Ukrainian command post in Birino area confirmed. Ballistic missile impact in Honcharivske reported. RF claims destruction of a foreign mercenary legion's base. RF aviation conducted airstrikes at Krasnyy Khutir. RF reports Kinzhal strike near Desna and Geran/Gerbera strikes near Semenivka (Chernihiv Oblast). RF drone attacks caused power outages in some settlements. Explosions heard in Chernihiv. New group of RF UAVs reported entering Chernihiv Oblast from Sumy Oblast, moving southwest. Three loitering munitions approaching Chernihiv. Missile towards Chernihiv reported as "minus." Group of RF UAVs (mopeds) on Chernihiv Oblast now course towards Kyiv Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• KHERSON OBLAST (Left Bank Dnieper): UA reports destruction of an RF ammunition depot and four vehicles on the left bank. RF claims Lancet strike destroyed US M-777 howitzer and Ukrainian Bogdana SPG on right bank. Ukrainian Navy radio intercepts confirm loss of Russian Su-30SM fighter jet southeast of Snake Island. UA forces repelled 4-6 Russian army assaults. UA source claims reconnaissance units entered "Novaya Kakhovka" and are shelling enemy defenses. SBU operation detained an RF agent in Kherson Oblast who was preparing for a breakthrough of Russian DRGs to the right bank of Kherson Oblast. RF claims to have foiled attempts by Ukrainian DRGs to break through to Crimea on boats. Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) and Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) units are being recorded in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia directions. "Оперативний ЗСУ" and "РБК-Україна" (UA Sources) report GUR forces destroyed an enemy boat near Zaliznyi Port, showing video footage of the incident. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• MYKOLAIV OBLAST: RF missile hit an ancient Jewish cemetery in Pervomaisk. RF activity has increased significantly in Mykolaiv Oblast. Missile danger in Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblasts, with ballistic missile (later corrected to Smerch MLRS) targeting Bilozerka. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• ODESA OBLAST: Odesa under massive "Shahed" drone attack, with explosions heard. RF drones struck a Nova Poshta terminal and a fuel and energy infrastructure object in Odesa, and a SOCAR oil depot in Izmail, causing significant fires and impacting UA logistics. UA Air Defense destroyed 24 Shahed UAVs. Ballistic missile launches and groups of UAVs from Black Sea waters heading to Odesa Oblast. Powerful fire in Izmail after "Geran" (Shahed) activity, targeting AFU fuel arteries. One person injured from attack on Odesa Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• ZAPORIZHZHIA OBLAST: RF claims destruction of AFU ammunition depot. 583 RF strikes on 11 settlements over past day. RF reconnaissance UAVs detected in northern Zaporizhzhia Oblast. A 65-year-old woman was wounded in Polohivskyi district. Total power outage in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast due to UA UAV strikes on high-voltage lines, now restored. UA 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade is actively destroying enemy "Molniya-2" and "Zala" UAVs and "mechanical zoo" of RF. UA forces repelled 10 enemy attacks in Novopavlivka direction and 3 in Orikhiv direction. UA 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade demonstrates significant capability in drone warfare, supported by regional defense funds. UA NGU "Lazar" Special Purpose Regiment destroyed an RF S-300V air defense system by a Lancet drone in Zaporizhzhia direction. Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) and Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) units are being recorded in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia directions. Ballistic missile threat on Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Explosions reported in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Missiles towards Zaporizhzhia reported as "minus." Repeat explosions in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. RF attack on Zaporizhzhia confirmed by Fedorov. Air raid alert lifted in Zaporizhzhia. Two strikes on Zaporizhzhia, damaging industrial infrastructure and residential buildings. No casualties reported. Photo message from Zaporizhzhia OBA shows damaged residential/industrial buildings with communal services working at scene. Zaporizhzhia OBA reports one woman killed, another wounded in Polohivskyi district due to enemy attacks from three FAB strikes. Photo message from Zaporizhzhia OBA shows aftermath of fire in rural/semi-urban setting in Polohivskyi district. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• KUPYANSK AXIS: RF main effort shift with capture of Ivanivka. RF continues strikes on settlements. UA reports successful tank sorties and drone operations against RF personnel and equipment. Commander of "Achilles" Regiment Fedorenko (UA source) reports RF plans to occupy Kupyansk by August 24. RF claims forces are encircling Kupyansk and have entered Sobolevka in Kharkiv Oblast. UA forces repelled two enemy attacks near Kupyansk and Zahryzove. RF claims "Udaya Group" massively destroys AFU pickups in the Kupyansk direction. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• SUMY OBLAST: UA forces actively destroying the enemy, pushing back Russians near Oleksiivka and Yunakivka. RF claims improved tactical position near Yunakovka. RF missile strike on Sumy, hitting an educational institution. RF drone strikes on Okhtyrka community, causing 12-14 injuries (including children). UA forces are expanding their buffer zone in the Sumy region. RF information operations blame corruption for Ukrainian presence in Kursk Oblast. RF is targeting UA logistics and communications (HMMWV, pickup, UAZ, warehouse, antenna) in the Sumy area. UA 82nd Bukovynian Air Assault Brigade is liquidating RF infantry via drone operators. Russian tactical aviation launching KABs on Sumy Oblast. CRs on Sumy Oblast with a course towards Poltava Oblast. CRs crossing Sumy Oblast heading southwest (multiple groups). Explosion heard in Sumy. RF claims its interceptor drones in Sumy Oblast have almost completely paralyzed AFU supply lines to forward positions. This is an RF information operation likely to exaggerate capabilities. RF milblogger claims RF forces destroyed "Vladimir Gupalyuk," allegedly appointed by Syrsky as commander of Yunakivka defense (Sumy Oblast) on 20 AUG 25. This is an uncorroborated RF claim designed to boost morale and show effective targeting. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• POLTAVA OBLAST: Poltava and its community without electricity after massive overnight attack. RF drones attacked a gas transportation system facility and Kremenchuk oil refinery, causing extensive fires and smoke plumes. Unexploded cluster munitions found in Kremenchuk. Supply of Russian oil through "Druzhba" pipeline to Hungary and Slovakia suspended due to UA UAV attacks (reportedly resumed). Large-scale fire in Poltava Oblast from Russian shelling is still being extinguished. CR from Akhtyrka towards Poltava Oblast. CRs on northern Poltava Oblast, course western, towards Lubny. CRs on intersection of Poltava and Kharkiv Oblasts, course southern. Group of CRs from Poltava Oblast heading to Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. High-speed target on Poltava Oblast, course north. CRs on northern Poltava Oblast now heading towards north of Lubny. Two groups of CRs on Poltava Oblast heading towards Kirovohrad and Cherkasy Oblasts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• KYIV OBLAST: Car explosion in Podilskyi district, Kyiv, claimed by RF as "Ukrainian partisans" blowing up a military vehicle. Enemy UAVs attacked Kyiv Oblast overnight, damaging a hangar in Boryspil district. Multiple air raid alerts due to MiG-31K takeoffs and ballistic missile threats. Explosions heard in Kyiv amidst "Shahed" attack, confirmed by Klitschko and UA General Staff. Civilians sheltering in subway stations. RF claims "over 100 strike 'Geraniums' attacking Ukraine," including Kyiv. RF propaganda piece highlights extensive Ukrainian military cemeteries to undermine morale. Group of RF UAVs (mopeds) from Chernihiv Oblast now course towards Kyiv Oblast. Air raid alert lifted in Kyiv. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• ZAKARPATTIA OBLAST: Mukachevo airfield in Zakarpattia Oblast reported "down." Strike confirmed on a company enterprise in Mukachevo. Mukachevo authorities requested information silence after an impact, implying significant event. Fire in Mukachevo due to missile strike, confirmed by municipal council. 12 casualties reported in Mukachevo attack. Video/photo messages from RF milbloggers show fire/smoke after attack. Colonelcassad (RF milblogger) states a large industrial enterprise (Flex factory, producing electronics for AFU) was hit in Mukachevo, suffering heavy damage and fire. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• VOLYN OBLAST: Explosions reported in Lutsk. One loitering munition (moped) flying towards Lutsk from the north. Explosions heard again in Lutsk. Air Force of UA reports enemy UAV in Volyn Oblast moving towards Lutsk. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• CHERKASY OBLAST: CRs on Cherkasy Oblast in a southwest direction. Черкаська ОВА reports 6 Russian missiles and 12 UAVs destroyed overnight. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• ZHYTOMYR OBLAST: CRs are now flying north of Zhytomyr, course western. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• VORONEZH OBLAST (RUSSIAN FEDERATION): Movement of trains suspended after UAV fall in the area of stations in Voronezh Oblast. Reports of drone attack on Voronezh Oblast (UA Source). Temporary shutdown of power unit #7 at Novovoronezh Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) reported, with no threat to safety. This is a domestic Russian report but could be related to nearby drone activity. 19 trains delayed due to UAV fall in Voronezh Oblast, subsequently resumed. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• ROSTOV OBLAST (RUSSIAN FEDERATION): Drone attack reflected in seven municipalities of Rostov Oblast, no casualties. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - RF Source)

• BRYANSK OBLAST (RUSSIAN FEDERATION): Bryansk Oblast Governor reports 3 enemy UAVs shot down over Bryansk Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• CRIMEA (OCCUPIED): Residents of annexed Sevastopol reported explosions and fire overnight. RF "governor" claimed "drills." (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• No new specific weather data provided in this update. Assume previous conditions of warm, dry conditions conducive to drone operations, ground mobility, and KAB strikes. Continued dry conditions in occupied Kherson Oblast contributed to a forestry fire near Chulakivka.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: Continued offensive pressure across the eastern axis, particularly Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Lyman, with significant use of loitering munitions, KABs, and thermobaric artillery (TOS-2). Reinforcement by 76th GAAD in Zaporizhzhia suggests a defensive posture there, possibly a feint. Strategic bomber activity (Tu-95MS, Tu-160) indicates preparations for further long-range missile strikes. RF continues targeting UA C2, logistics, and energy infrastructure. The recent extensive multi-directional missile/UAV attack indicates a coordinated effort to overwhelm air defenses and strike targets deep in Western, Central, and Northern Ukraine, now including significant ballistic missile threats on Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia, and further cruise missile activity deeper into Western Ukraine. The UAV fall in Voronezh Oblast, drone activity in Rostov Oblast, and confirmed drone interceptions over Bryansk Oblast suggest ongoing cross-border drone activity by UA. RF reconnaissance aircraft (Il-20) detected in Alaska ADIZ indicates continued global intelligence gathering. RF MoD claims 49 Ukrainian UAVs shot down overnight over various regions of Russia. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• UA: Maintaining defensive lines and conducting localized counter-offensives in Dobropillya and Pokrovsk. Effective use of drones for reconnaissance, targeting, and counter-infiltration. Active counter-battery operations, including successful destruction of high-value RF AD systems. Continued efforts to clear and liberate settlements. Air defense remains challenged by massed UAV and missile attacks but reports significant intercepts, including "minus" reports for "Kalibr" and "Zircon" missiles, and several loitering munitions. Currently engaged in high-intensity air defense operations across multiple oblasts, particularly in Western, Central, and Northern Ukraine, now transitioning to post-strike assessment as air raid alerts are lifted. Ongoing internal security operations against RF agents and DRGs. Ukrainian forces continue stabilization measures in the Dobropillya direction. PPO in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast reportedly shot down 18 UAVs and 2 missiles. PPO in Khmelnytskyi Oblast was active overnight. PPO in Cherkasy Oblast shot down 6 missiles and 12 UAVs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:

  • Air/Missile: Continued high-volume use of Shahed-136/Geran-2 and "Lyutyy" loitering munitions for deep strikes on logistics and critical infrastructure (fuel depots, energy facilities), particularly effective in Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk. Ballistic missiles (Iskander-M) for high-value targets and terror strikes on urban areas (Sloviansk, Konstantinovka). Strategic bomber sorties (Tu-95MS, Tu-160) indicate capability for waves of cruise missile attacks across Ukraine. Current ongoing missile and UAV wave targeting Odesa, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Volyn, Zakarpattia, Sumy, Poltava, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, and Zhytomyr confirms sustained capability for multi-pronged strikes deep into Western, Central, and Northern Ukraine, likely from air and sea platforms, and now includes hypersonic missile launches (Zircon claim). RF is employing tactical aviation for KAB launches against Sumy Oblast. RF claims shooting down 49 UA UAVs over its territory overnight, indicating continued active air defense. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Ground: Continued reliance on mechanized assaults, supported by heavy artillery, thermobaric systems (TOS-2), and FPV drone swarms, particularly in the Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Lyman directions. Elite units (VDV, 76th GAAD) are committed to main offensive efforts and strategic defensive lines. RF demonstrates capability for unconventional infiltration tactics (motorcycles).
  • Electronic Warfare (EW): Significant increase in EW emissions, degrading UA ISR and drone effectiveness, particularly in Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka sectors.
  • Intelligence/Hybrid Warfare: Persistent attempts at deep reconnaissance and sabotage (DRGs on Dnipro right bank, attempts to infiltrate Crimea). Coordinated information operations (e.g., blaming UA for civilian casualties, fabricating UA losses, discrediting Western aid, justifying internal security crackdowns). Newly reported "narcotics smuggling" by Latin American mercenaries in Kherson/Zaporizhzhia is highly likely an RF information operation designed to discredit foreign fighters and/or create confusion regarding internal security. RF military-sport training centers continue to cultivate patriotic education and combat skills among youth, indicating a long-term investment in personnel. RF military aircraft (Il-20) conducted reconnaissance in the Alaska ADIZ, indicating ongoing intelligence gathering on NATO/US capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Intentions:

  • Primary: Seize Chasiv Yar, consolidate gains in the Donbas, particularly pushing towards Konstantinovka and Pokrovsk. Claimed capture of highway section near Sredne (DPR) aims to disrupt UA logistics.
  • Secondary: Fix UA forces in other sectors (Zaporizhzhia, Lyman, Kupyansk, Sumy) to prevent redeployment.
  • Deep Operations: Degrade Ukrainian critical infrastructure (energy, logistics, C2) across the country to undermine military and civilian resilience. The ongoing missile/UAV attack confirms this intent, with an expanded geographic scope to the far west and north, and now with the apparent use of hypersonic missiles against high-value targets.
  • Information Warfare: Shape narratives to demoralize Ukrainian population and military, sow discord among allies, and legitimize RF actions. Continue to project global power and influence (e.g., Cuba, Serbia). Discredit Western peace initiatives by claiming Ukrainian public desire for peace on RF terms. Influence Russian domestic economic perception by discussing key interest rate cuts. Increase military cooperation with China and Mongolia in civilian defense sectors to project strength and deter.

• Courses of Action (Confirmed/Observed):

  • High-intensity, attritional frontal assaults against fortified UA positions.
  • Deep strikes with UAVs and missiles (including ballistic/hypersonic) against strategic rear areas, including energy and logistics, now extending to Western, Central, and Northern Ukraine, specifically targeting industrial enterprises (Mukachevo) and possibly high-value military infrastructure (airfields).
  • Targeting of civilian infrastructure and population centers to generate terror and force displacement. RF strikes in Polohivskyi district causing casualties confirms this.
  • Extensive use of EW to blind UA ISR and deny effective drone operations.
  • Propaganda and disinformation campaigns to influence domestic and international audiences, including a focus on military-patriotic education of youth, and anti-Western narratives. Continuation of narrative that Ukraine is ready for peace on RF terms.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Increased use of TOS-2 "Tosochka" thermobaric MLRS: Confirmed in Chasiv Yar sector, indicating an intent to rapidly reduce hardened Ukrainian positions and cause mass casualties.
• "Lyutyy" loitering munition deployment: Domestically produced Shahed-136 variant with improved guidance, extending the threat to rear-area logistics hubs.
• Motorcycle infiltration attempts: Observed in Pokrovsk direction, indicating RF use of light, high-speed, low-signature elements for reconnaissance or limited assault.
• Reinforcement of defensive lines with elite units (76th GAAD): Suggests RF is preparing to repel significant UA counter-offensives on the Southern Axis, or holding a strategic reserve.
• Expanded Areal Coverage of Deep Strikes: The current multi-directional, deep-penetrating missile/UAV attack into Western, Central, and Northern Ukraine (Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Volyn, Zakarpattia, Sumy, Poltava, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, and Zhytomyr) demonstrates RF capability and intent to strike targets previously considered less vulnerable, potentially including Western supply lines or critical infrastructure in these regions. The engagement of Mukachevo (confirmed industrial site impact, previously claimed airfield) indicates a focus on military or military-industrial targets in the deep west. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Apparent use of "Zircon" hypersonic missiles: The reported launch towards Dnipro indicates a new, high-speed, and difficult-to-intercept threat being employed, likely against high-value targets. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - UA source claim, further verification needed).
• New Domestic Drone Activity by UA: Reports of drone activity and subsequent reflection in Rostov and Voronezh oblasts, including a temporary shutdown of a power unit at Novovoronezh NPP and railway disruptions, and confirmed interceptions over Bryansk Oblast indicate continued Ukrainian deep strike capabilities targeting RF domestic infrastructure and transportation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF claims its interceptor drones in Sumy Oblast have almost completely paralyzed AFU supply lines to forward positions near Lyptsi. This is an RF information operation likely to exaggerate capabilities. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• RF claims to have struck UA National Guard command at Lyptsi during a meeting with the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Shmyhal. This claim is uncorroborated by UA sources and is likely an RF information operation designed to show successful targeting of high-value UA C2. (LOW CONFIDENCE)
• RF claims to have destroyed the commander of Yunakivka defense (Sumy Oblast). This is an uncorroborated RF claim designed to boost morale and show effective targeting. (LOW CONFIDENCE)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• Ammunition: SIGINT from Kherson sector suggests localized shortages of 152mm artillery shells for some RF units (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). However, overall, RF maintains high rates of artillery and missile expenditure.
• Fuel: UA strikes on oil refineries (Novoshakhtinsk) and fuel depots (Odesa/Izmail SOCAR, Kremenchuk) indicate UA is actively targeting RF fuel supply lines or storage used by RF. The success of these strikes suggests potential localized disruptions for RF. The recent drone attack on Novoshakhtinsk Oil Refinery confirms continued UA targeting of RF logistical infrastructure. Gas storage facility in Pavlohrad district hit by RF strikes. This represents a significant strike against Ukrainian energy and logistics infrastructure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Personnel: High attrition rates on both sides. RF claims of 1.7 million UA killed/missing are part of a PSYOP (FALSE). UA reports 830 RF personnel losses in last 24h (RBC-Ukraine, Operatyvnyi ZSU), indicating continued high attrition for RF. RF internal reports show significant anti-mobilization sentiment ("18,500 people refused to fight"). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF continues to target UA C2 nodes (UAV control points, command posts), suggesting an attempt to degrade UA command and coordination. RF claims destruction of a UA PVD in Pleschiyivka area. TASS reports a video claiming destruction of a UA dugout north of Chasiv Yar. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• UA has successfully intercepted RF agents coordinating shelling and sabotage, indicating effective UA counter-intelligence. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF appears to maintain effective C2 over its units, coordinating complex multi-domain strikes (KABs, drones, missiles, ground assaults) across the front. The current coordinated missile/UAV attack across multiple oblasts, now extending to the far west and north, demonstrates effective C2 and centralized planning. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF claims it hit UA National Guard command at Lyptsi during a meeting with the Ukrainian Minister of Defense. This, if true, would demonstrate effective RF intelligence and targeting, but is uncorroborated. (LOW CONFIDENCE)
• RF sources report the general director of "Automatika" Concern, Andrey Motorko, sentenced to three years in prison, likely for corruption. This indicates ongoing internal efforts by RF to maintain discipline and control within its military-industrial complex, which can impact C2 effectiveness. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Russian military bloggers ("Dnevnik Desantnika") are posting about airborne units (56th Guards Air Assault Regiment) operating drones and discovering anti-tank mines disguised as natural debris. This suggests an ongoing focus on counter-mine operations and small-unit drone reconnaissance within RF VDV. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Defensive Resilience: UA forces are demonstrating strong defensive capabilities, repelling numerous RF assaults in key sectors (Toretsk, Lyman, Kupyansk, Sumy). Tactical withdrawals (Chasiv Yar) are to prepared defensive positions. Stabilization measures are ongoing in the Dobropillya direction. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Air Defense: Currently actively engaged in large-scale air defense operations across Odesa, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Volyn, Zakarpattia, Sumy, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, and Zhytomyr Oblasts. Success of current intercepts will be crucial, particularly against targets in Western Ukraine and high-speed ballistic/hypersonic threats. Reports of "minus" on Kalibr, Zircon, and several loitering munitions indicate some level of success in these engagements. Air raid alerts are now being lifted in several oblasts. UA Air Force warns of renewed ballistic missile threat, which was subsequently lifted. Dnipropetrovsk PPO claimed shooting down 18 UAVs and 2 missiles. Khmelnytskyi PPO was active overnight. Cherkasy PPO shot down 6 missiles and 12 UAVs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Counter-offensive Capability: Localized successes reported in Dobropillya and Pokrovsk directions (clearance of Hruzke, Vesele, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Petrivka). Successful deep strikes into RF territory (oil refineries, seaports), confirmed by the Novoshakhtinsk Oil Refinery attack, and now extending to other domestic targets (Rostov/Voronezh/Bryansk). Ukrainian GUR reports successful destruction of an enemy boat near Zaliznyi Port (Kherson Oblast), demonstrating continued naval drone or other precision strike capability in the Black Sea area. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Drone Warfare: Continued effectiveness of UA drone units for ISR, targeting, and direct engagement, including ground robotic systems. Significant fundraising for drones ("Iron Wings for Zaporizhzhia Front", "TOTAL RUSORIZ" campaign).
• Training & Morale: Continued military training, psychological preparation, and morale-boosting efforts. Strong civilian support for military through fundraising.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes:
  • Clearing Hruzke, Vesele, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Petrivka (Dobropillya/Pokrovsk).
  • Capture of RF prisoners in Dobropillya and Pokrovsk areas.
  • Successful repulsion of multiple RF assaults across various sectors.
  • Destruction of RF S-300V AD system in Zaporizhzhia direction by NGU unit.
  • Destruction of RF oil refineries (Novoshakhtinsk) and fuel depots (Odesa/Izmail, Kremenchuk). Drone attack on Novoshakhtinsk Oil Refinery.
  • Successful SBU counter-intelligence operations preventing RF DRG breakthroughs in Kherson and identifying agents coordinating attacks on Kyiv/Odesa.
  • Expanding buffer zone in Sumy region.
  • Significant number of RF UAVs and missiles intercepted (62 UAVs, 1 ballistic missile overnight).
  • UA PPO active and engaging threats in Lviv, Lutsk, Khmelnytskyi, and Cherkasy.
  • Reports of "Kalibr" cruise missiles now "minus."
  • Reports of loitering munitions on Lviv now "minus."
  • Reported "minus" on "Zircon" hypersonic missile on Dnipro. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - UA Source Claim)
  • Reported "minus" on missile towards Chernihiv.
  • Reported "minus" on missile towards Samar/Dnipro.
  • Reported "minus" on missiles towards Zaporizhzhia.
  • Damage to transportation infrastructure in Voronezh Oblast, Russia, and drone attacks in Rostov and Bryansk Oblasts, Russia, indicate successful UA long-range drone strikes on RF territory.
  • Air raid alerts being lifted in several oblasts, including Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia.
  • General Staff of AFU reports 830 RF personnel losses in past 24 hours. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Dnipropetrovsk OBA reports 18 UAVs and 2 missiles shot down. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Cherkasy OBA reports 6 missiles and 12 UAVs shot down. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • GUR reports destruction of enemy boat near Zaliznyi Port. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Setbacks:
  • Tactical withdrawal in Chasiv Yar Kanal microdistrict.
  • Continued heavy RF aerial and missile strikes on civilian infrastructure, causing significant casualties and damage (Kharkiv, Sumy, Odesa, Konstantinovka).
  • Disruption of power grid in Poltava and parts of Chernihiv/Zaporizhzhia due to RF strikes. Current power outage in Rivne Oblast.
  • Closure of civilian services (Ukrposhta in Konstantinovka) due to escalating threat.
  • Confirmed multiple explosions in Lviv and Lutsk indicate successful RF strikes despite PPO engagement. Lviv reports one casualty and two wounded, later updated to three wounded. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF claims Mukachevo airfield is "down," with confirmed strike on a company enterprise in Mukachevo, and local authorities urged information silence, implying a significant successful strike. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • 12 casualties reported in Mukachevo attack. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Two strikes on Zaporizhzhia, damaging industrial infrastructure and residential buildings. No casualties reported.
  • Gas storage facility in Pavlohrad district, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, hit and burning after RF strikes. This represents a significant loss of critical energy infrastructure for Ukraine. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • One woman killed, another wounded in Polohivskyi district, Zaporizhzhia Oblast due to enemy attacks from three FAB strikes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Air Defense: Continued and urgent need for advanced air defense systems and interceptor missiles to counter massed drone and missile attacks, especially given the scale and multi-directional nature of current strikes now extending to Western and Northern Ukraine, and the apparent use of hypersonic missiles. Priority for mobile AD assets to protect critical infrastructure and logistics routes in the west.
• Ammunition: Continued requirement for artillery ammunition to sustain high rates of fire in defensive and counter-offensive operations.
• Combat Vehicles: Loss of BTR YPR-765 and Caesar SPG indicates a continued need for Western-supplied heavy equipment and counter-battery capabilities.
• Logistics & Repair: Humanitarian and logistical response required for areas affected by widespread civilian infrastructure damage. Resources for restoration of destroyed property and equipment. Repair of damaged gas storage facilities will be a priority.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Propaganda:
  • Fabricated figures of Ukrainian losses (1.7 million killed/missing) to demoralize. Updated RF personnel loss figures by UA sources (830) will be countered by RF claims of high UA losses. RF milblogger claims destruction of UA commander in Sumy. (LOW CONFIDENCE)
  • Attempts to discredit Western aid by portraying it as financially opportunistic (Scott Bessent's "10% markup").
  • Blaming corruption for military setbacks (Kursk fortifications).
  • Portraying UA as engaging in terrorism (Bryansk DRG, railway sabotage, ambulance attack).
  • Claiming "liberation" of Ukrainian settlements and vast advances despite limited gains. Claim of disrupting UA logistics by taking highway section in DPR. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Promoting narratives of shifting Western policy and willingness for territorial concessions. TASS reports growing number of people in Ukraine willing to make peace with Russia, citing Odessa residents. This is RF IO. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Highlighting internal RF social events and policies to convey normalcy/stability (e.g., electric scooter ban, school support). TASS reporting on QR code scams and pension fraud within Russia likely falls into this category, aiming to divert attention from the conflict and project a focus on domestic issues. TASS also reports the Bank of Russia not excluding a key rate cut, aiming to project economic stability.
  • Using pejorative terms for Ukrainian units ("militants").
  • Leveraging images of Ukrainian military cemeteries to highlight losses.
  • New narrative: Accusations of "Latin American mercenaries" smuggling narcotics in Kherson/Zaporizhzhia regions under guise of aid. This is a likely attempt to demonize foreign fighters and disrupt local support. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Amplification of US domestic political narratives regarding Ukraine aid (e.g., JD Vance's statements on Trump's potential engagement with Putin).
  • RF TASS narrative regarding a Ukrainian woman facing treason charges for communicating with her godmother in Russia is likely intended to portray Ukraine as a repressive state. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF claims of VMF attacking Western Ukraine despite limited confirmed sea-launched missile impacts are an attempt to magnify their perceived capabilities and psychological impact. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF claims of US National Intelligence stopping counter-influence center targeting RF, indicating perceived success in information operations. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - RF source claim)
  • RF dissemination of military-sports training videos ("Voin" center) to emphasize patriotic education and military preparation, likely targeting domestic audiences to highlight national strength and readiness. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Vladimir Saldo's statement (Kherson Governor under RF occupation) about Russia's "generosity" leading to reconciliation with Ukraine is a clear RF propaganda effort aimed at framing Russia as a benevolent force and implying Ukrainian capitulation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • TASS report on an attempt on Metropolitan Tikhon's life, with suspects retracting confessions, is likely a domestic narrative intended to discredit internal opposition or distract from other issues. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Russian military bloggers ("Operatsiya Z") are disseminating video of a rocket launch, claiming "Russia sends unique biosatellites 'Bion' into space with animal crews." While contextually a space launch, its promotion by military sources during conflict aims to project Russian technological prowess and divert attention from military setbacks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • TASS reports on a court in Ukraine potentially sentencing a Kherson deputy for "treason" for assisting a Russian pilot, likely framing Ukraine as repressive. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • TASS reports singer "Shaman" plans to tour North Korea, an effort to highlight RF's non-Western alliances and cultural influence. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • TASS reports Cuban leader blamed US for largest drug turnover, an anti-US narrative RF consistently pushes to discredit US foreign policy. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • TASS reports Serbian Minister stated Russian gas provides energy security to Serbia during crisis, highlighting RF's role as a reliable energy partner. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • TASS reports a Serbian sniper claimed Ukrainian government treats people worse than Nazis, a direct, aggressive disinformation narrative attempting to equate UA government with Nazism. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Russian state media continues to broadcast feel-good domestic news stories (e.g., singer's concert plans) to project normalcy and deflect from the ongoing conflict. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Russian "paratrooper brotherhood" social media posts aim to boost internal morale and project an image of military cohesion. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • TASS reports Russian drone interceptors in Sumy Oblast have "almost completely paralyzed" AFU supply lines. This is a clear exaggeration and likely part of a broader psychological operation to demoralize UA forces and inflate RF capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • TASS reports a former AFU soldier claiming Polish instructor training was useless. This is an RF information operation aimed at discrediting Western military aid and training. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Colonelcassad, an RF milblogger, posts video with inflammatory caption about "cocaine fuhrer's manhunters and police" kidnapping people in Ukraine, likely referring to mobilization efforts. This is intended to sow internal discord and undermine UA authority. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • TASS reports on the dismissal of a US State Department employee after disputes over Israel/Palestine statements, which RF may leverage to highlight internal US discord. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF EMERCOM proposal for joint exercises with China and Mongolia, and MCHS intent to send specialists to Chinese drone factories, are diplomatic/information efforts to demonstrate international cooperation and technological advancement. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• UA Counter-propaganda:
  • Actively debunking RF disinformation (e.g., 1.7 million casualties). Actively reporting daily RF personnel losses (830 in past 24h).
  • Highlighting RF military blunders and poor conditions.
  • Showcasing captured RF personnel and their testimony.
  • Emphasizing humanitarian impact of RF strikes on civilians.
  • Promoting national unity and resilience through fundraising and public addresses.
  • Commemorating International Day of Remembrance and Commemoration of Victims of Terrorism, a subtle but direct counter-narrative against RF actions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Highlighting intercepted RF drones over Russia. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Ukrainian Public: High public support for military efforts (demonstrated by successful fundraising campaigns). Resilience despite continued attacks on civilian infrastructure. Concern for POWs. Ongoing missile/UAV attacks, particularly deep in Western and Northern Ukraine, will test public morale but likely reinforce resolve and underscore the need for continued international AD support. Air raid alerts lifting will bring temporary relief but underline continued threat. Calls for information silence in Mukachevo indicate a sensitivity to information that could impact local morale or provide enemy intelligence. Casualties in Mukachevo (12 wounded), Lviv (1 casualty reported, later updated to 3 wounded), Polohivskyi (1 killed, 1 wounded), and damage to civilian infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia and gas storage in Pavlohrad will likely increase public anger and resolve. Public statements from officials in Kryvyi Rih maintaining "situation controlled" aim to reassure local population. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Russian Public: Indications of anti-war sentiment and resistance to mobilization ("18,500 people refused to fight"). Localized protests against propaganda. However, state control over information remains strong. RF government is attempting to project an image of normalcy through domestic policy updates and patriotic education. RF reports on domestic crime (QR code scams, pension fraud) may also be an attempt to manage public perception and focus on internal stability. Reports of drone attacks in Rostov, Voronezh, and Bryansk, and the Novovoronezh NPP incident causing railway delays, while downplayed by RF, will likely generate some internal concern and inconvenience. RF reporting on "drills" in Sevastopol suggests an attempt to calm local fears after explosions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• US Stance: JD Vance (RF source, Politico) indicates US "minimal role" in security guarantees for Ukraine until requirements are clear; also suggested "basics of a deal" for Ukraine could be agreed before Putin-Zelenskyy meeting. This reflects continued internal US debate and potential shift in approach by elements of the US political establishment. Rubio (US Senator) will hold talks with national security advisors from Ukraine and Europe. US National Intelligence is reportedly ceasing a center for countering foreign influence, including Russia's. This could be framed by RF as a diplomatic victory. TASS reports US refusal to condemn Russia in UNSC over Georgia conflict, highlighting perceived shift in US posture. TASS reports US dismissed a State Department employee after disputes over Israel/Palestine statements. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• European Stance: Macron proposes "deterrence forces" from European militaries as security guarantees. Bloomberg reports "about 10 countries are ready to send troops to Ukraine" as part of security guarantees. However, TASS reports "serious disagreements" within NATO on mandate for such forces. Politico suggests Macron and Starmer unlikely to send troops due to political weakness (RF IO). Europe supports Trump's peace talks to reveal Kremlin's true intentions. Finland states it will not send mass troops to Ukraine, only technical personnel and experts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Peace Talks/Summit: Discussions ongoing for a potential Putin-Trump-Zelenskyy summit, with Budapest as a possible location. Trump's perceived role as a mediator is amplified by RF media. Poland is against Budapest as a venue. Politico reporting on Budapest as a potential venue for peace talks (RF source) indicates continued speculation on this topic. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• NATO: NATO Secretary General Rutte stated irreversible path for Ukraine into NATO, but membership not currently discussed; arms supplies will continue. NORAD detected and escorted Russian Il-20 military aircraft in Alaska ADIZ, indicating continued geopolitical tensions and airspace monitoring. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Arms Deals: Ukraine confirmed $90 billion arms deal with the US. Bloomberg reports Europe expects US to continue providing intelligence and equipment through European partners.
• RF Diplomacy: Lavrov asserts Russia's central role in any future collective security issues regarding Ukraine. RF strengthening ties (Iranian President in Minsk). EMERCOM proposal for joint exercises with China and Mongolia, and MCHS intent to send specialists to Chinese drone factories, are diplomatic efforts to demonstrate international cooperation and technological advancement. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• International Court: US imposed sanctions on ICC judges (RF source).
• Bolivian President Luis Arce criticized the US decision to deploy armed forces in Latin America. While not directly related to Ukraine, this highlights a broader geopolitical narrative of anti-US sentiment that RF often exploits in its international diplomacy. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Russian media highlights Cuban leader's criticism of US drug trade and Serbian minister's statement on Russian gas ensuring energy security, demonstrating RF's efforts to cultivate support and leverage anti-US sentiment globally. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• ASTRA reports Israel has begun a ground offensive in Gaza, indicating a significant development in another major international conflict that could draw global attention and resources away from Ukraine. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

• Continued Attritional Offensives (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF will maintain high-intensity, attritional frontal assaults in the Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Lyman directions, focusing on breaking through Ukrainian defenses through sheer volume of fire and manpower. Expect continued heavy use of KABs (now confirmed on Sumy axis), FPV drones, and thermobaric MLRS (TOS-2) to overwhelm UA fortifications and inflict heavy casualties. RF will likely continue to claim tactical gains and disruption of UA logistics, such as the claimed highway section near Sredne (DPR).
• Follow-on Deep Strike Campaign (HIGH CONFIDENCE): While the current multi-wave attack is concluding, RF will likely conduct follow-on massed UAV and missile strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure (energy, fuel depots, logistics hubs, industrial sites) within the next 24-48 hours. This will include continued expanded geographic scope to the far west (Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn, Zakarpattia Oblasts) and north (Sumy, Chernihiv, Poltava, Cherkasy, Zhytomyr), aiming to degrade Ukraine's military sustainment and civilian resilience, and potentially disrupt Western supply lines. Expect continued strategic bomber sorties and Kalibr launches from the Black Sea to precede major missile waves, and the continued deployment of hypersonic missiles (Zircon) against high-value targets if the current engagement is verified as a successful launch. The confirmed strike on the gas storage facility in Pavlohrad district indicates a clear intent to target energy infrastructure.
• Defensive Consolidation in South (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF will continue to reinforce and maintain a strong defensive posture in the Zaporizhzhia direction, utilizing elements like the 76th GAAD to repel any potential UA counter-offensives and fix Ukrainian forces in this sector.
• Expanded EW Operations (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF will likely increase the intensity and sophistication of its EW operations across the entire front to further degrade Ukrainian ISR, FPV drone capabilities, and C2. RF claims regarding paralyzing UA supply lines in Sumy via interceptor drones, though propaganda, suggest a continued focus on EW and counter-UAS.
• Escalated Information Operations (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF will intensify its propaganda and disinformation campaigns, particularly those aimed at undermining Ukrainian morale, discrediting Western support, and shaping international perceptions ahead of potential peace talks. Expect increased "false flag" narratives or discrediting campaigns targeting foreign volunteers and highlighting perceived diplomatic successes (e.g., Vladimir Saldo's statements, promotion of space launches, cultural diplomacy), and attempts to highlight internal Ukrainian issues (e.g., "manhunters"). They will continue to push narratives of growing Ukrainian desire for peace on RF terms.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

• Multi-axis Breakthrough (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): While the current emphasis is on the Donbas, RF could launch a highly concentrated, large-scale mechanized thrust on an unexpected axis (e.g., western Zaporizhzhia towards Orikhiv, or a renewed push from the Sumy border region further into Ukrainian territory, especially if Sumy is being softened by KABs) to create a significant diversion, forcing UA to redeploy reserves and creating an opportunity for a major breakthrough at Chasiv Yar or Pokrovsk. This would likely involve strategic deception and potentially operational-level surprise.
• Targeted Assassination/High-Value Attack (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF could attempt high-risk, high-reward operations against key Ukrainian political or military leadership figures, or critical national infrastructure nodes (e.g., specific grid control centers, national railway hubs) using precision-guided munitions or special operations forces, aiming to destabilize the Ukrainian government and disrupt national operations. The current deep missile strike into Western Ukraine, and the reported use of Zircon, increases the plausibility of targeting critical logistics hubs or military C2 nodes in these regions, or other high-value military-industrial targets. The confirmed strike on an industrial enterprise in Mukachevo, and the calls for information silence, align with this MDCOA. The uncorroborated RF claim of striking a UA National Guard command during a meeting with the Minister of Defense suggests an intent and potential intelligence capability to target high-value personnel. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• Sustained Cross-Border Pressure on Northern Front (LOW CONFIDENCE, but increasing): While a full-scale offensive remains low, the detected reconnaissance UAVs in Chernihiv/Sumy, coupled with localized ground skirmishes, KAB launches, and now drone activity targeting railway infrastructure inside Russia near the border (Voronezh, Rostov, Bryansk), indicate RF maintains the capability to escalate pressure from its border regions. A sustained, large-scale, cross-border shelling, KAB, and DRG infiltration campaign could force UA to commit significant forces to these areas, drawing them away from the main fronts. This might also be combined with new RF domestic drone activity to create a crisis on the border.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

• Next 2-6 Hours (IMMEDIATE): Active air defense engagements are largely concluded, though renewed ballistic missile threat was briefly reported. UA forces will conduct immediate post-strike damage assessment across all affected oblasts (Kyiv, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Volyn, Zakarpattia, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Zhytomyr). Emergency services will be engaged in rescue and damage control. Air defense commanders will debrief on the effectiveness of engagements, particularly against hypersonic and cruise missiles targeting Western and Northern Ukraine.
• Next 24-48 Hours: Expect continued intense fighting around Chasiv Yar, with RF attempting to consolidate their foothold and push across the canal. High likelihood of further deep strikes by UAVs and missiles across Ukraine, particularly on energy and logistics, potentially including follow-up strikes in Western and Northern Ukraine. UA leadership will need to decide on further tactical withdrawals or commitment of local reserves in Chasiv Yar and assess the full impact of strikes in the west/north on critical Western supply lines.
• Next 72 Hours: Increased air defense alerts due to strategic bomber activity. Potential for concentrated missile strikes on Kyiv, Poltava, Dnipro, and other major cities, as well as repeat strikes on targets in Western and Northern Ukraine. UA will need to assess the sustained impact on critical infrastructure and adjust resource allocation accordingly.
• Decision Points:
  • UA Readiness: UA General Staff must assess current force readiness and potential for sustained offensive/defensive operations given high attrition and resource consumption, and the strain on air defense resources from the expanded RF strike zone, especially concerning ballistic/hypersonic threats.
  • Resource Allocation: Prioritize allocation of air defense, counter-battery systems, and manpower to critical sectors, including the immediate deployment of mobile air defense to protect Western logistics hubs and critical infrastructure, and to counter increasing KAB threats on northern axes. Adapt AD asset deployment to counter high-speed ballistic/hypersonic threats.
  • International Support: Continue to press for accelerated delivery of Western aid, particularly advanced air defense systems and long-range fires, and initiate urgent discussions on additional AD requirements given the expanded RF strike range and the apparent deployment of new, faster missile types.
  • Civilian Protection: Intensify efforts for civilian evacuation from high-threat areas and reinforce shelters, especially in the newly targeted Western and Northern regions.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• Intelligence Gap: Full extent of current RF missile/UAV salvo, including precise launch locations (especially for Western and Northern strikes), types of missiles (cruise vs. ballistic/hypersonic), and precise targets of impact in Lviv, Lutsk, Mukachevo, and Dnipropetrovsk. Specifically, confirm the origin, type, and impact of the reported "Zircon" missile.
• Collection Requirement: Real-time SIGINT on RF air and missile activity, post-strike damage assessment (IMINT, OSINT) on affected infrastructure, and forensic analysis of debris. Prioritize IMINT on key infrastructure targets in Western and Northern Ukraine. Focus on identifying specific characteristics of any "Zircon" debris.
• Intelligence Gap: Confirmation of the nature and impact of explosions in occupied Crimea (Sevastopol), and verification of the RF claim of "drills."
• Collection Requirement: Task overhead IMINT and prioritize OSINT from local sources to verify reports of explosions, identify targets, and assess damage, especially at potential military targets.
• Intelligence Gap: Verification of the RF claim regarding "Latin American mercenaries smuggling narcotics" and its true intent (i.e., pure disinformation vs. cover for other activity).
• Collection Requirement: Increase HUMINT and OSINT on foreign fighter groups in Southern Ukraine and cross-reference with any verified smuggling activities. Monitor RF information channels for further propagation of this narrative.
• Intelligence Gap: Production capacity, stockpile levels, and exact guidance capabilities of the new "Lyutyy" loitering munition, and its prevalence in the current strike wave.
• Collection Requirement: Conduct forensic analysis of "Lyutyy" debris from recent strikes. Task SIGINT to monitor RF production facilities and supply chains for related components.
• Intelligence Gap: Specific triggers for RF shifting from defensive to offensive posture on any given front, particularly on the Sumy axis given the KAB strikes.
• Collection Requirement: Develop predictive models based on EW activity, troop concentrations, and logistics build-up.
• Intelligence Gap: Full extent of damage and operational impact of the UAV fall on railway infrastructure in Voronezh Oblast, Russia, and the extent of the drone attack in Rostov and Bryansk Oblasts, including any correlation to the Novovoronezh NPP power unit shutdown.
• Collection Requirement: Prioritize OSINT and IMINT on Voronezh, Rostov, and Bryansk Oblast railway lines and critical infrastructure to assess disruption levels and identify potential secondary targets. Investigate any direct link between drone activity and the NPP power unit shutdown.
• Intelligence Gap: Confirmation and details of RF claim of striking UA National Guard command with Minister of Defense at Lyptsi.
• Collection Requirement: Cross-reference RF claims with UA official statements and independent OSINT to verify the strike and its claimed target.
• Intelligence Gap: Verification of the RF claim of destroying "Vladimir Gupalyuk," alleged commander of Yunakivka defense.
• Collection Requirement: Cross-reference RF claims with UA official casualty reports and military personnel data.
• Intelligence Gap: Specific impacts of the three FAB strikes on Polohivskyi district.
• Collection Requirement: Task overhead IMINT and OSINT to identify specific targets, assess damage, and confirm weapon type.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. ACTION: Conduct immediate battle damage assessment (BDA) for all affected oblasts from the recent multi-wave missile/UAV attack, prioritizing critical infrastructure and logistics nodes in Western and Northern Ukraine. Disseminate findings rapidly to relevant commands and civilian authorities.
2. ACTION: Immediately activate all available emergency services and humanitarian response teams for rapid deployment to affected areas, with a focus on areas like Lutsk, Lviv, Mukachevo, Zaporizhzhia (especially Polohivskyi district), and Pavlohrad, where impacts and casualties have been reported. Prioritize damage assessment and initial repair efforts for the gas storage facility in Pavlohrad.
3. ACTION: Prioritize counter-battery fire against identified and suspected TOS-2 MLRS positions in the Chasiv Yar axis. Deploy counter-battery radar and precision long-range artillery to suppress this high-threat system immediately upon detection.
4. ACTION: Reinforce western approaches to Chasiv Yar with additional anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) teams and prepared defensive positions to counter expected RF mechanized pushes across the canal.
5. ACTION: Counter RF information operations immediately and forcefully, especially the new narrative regarding "Latin American mercenaries," the promotion of Russian space launches by military channels, and any further attempts to discredit foreign volunteers or Western aid. Provide transparent and factual updates to both domestic and international audiences, specifically addressing RF claims about "VMF attacks on Western Ukraine," any purported US intelligence shifts, RF propaganda regarding reconciliation, RF claims of paralyzing UA supply lines, the RF narrative about "useless Polish training," the claim of growing Ukrainian desire for peace, and the uncorroborated claim of destroying the Yunakivka commander. Directly refute the Serbian sniper's claim equating the UA government with Nazism and RF milblogger claims about "manhunters." Proactively address RF attempts to leverage US domestic political narratives or dismissals for propaganda purposes.
6. CONSIDER: Expediting requests for additional Western air defense systems and interceptor munitions, highlighting the expanded scale and persistence of RF deep strikes across the entire country, and the apparent deployment of hypersonic missiles. Prioritize rapid deployment of mobile AD to protect Western logistics routes used for military aid.
7. CONSIDER: Implement heightened security measures around critical infrastructure targets, including nuclear power plants, especially in regions bordering Russia, given the recent drone activity in Rostov, Voronezh, and Bryansk oblasts and the NPP incident.
8. CONSIDER: Review and update urban civilian shelter plans, particularly in Western and Northern Ukraine, based on the expanded RF missile strike capabilities demonstrated in this recent attack.