Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT

TIME: 210600Z AUG 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• DONETSK OBLAST (Chasiv Yar/Ivanivske Axis): RF forces (elements of 98th VDV Division) maintain a confirmed foothold in the eastern Kanal microdistrict of Chasiv Yar. Ukrainian units executed tactical withdrawal to prepared defensive positions west of the initial line of contact. Clashes persist near Toretsk, Rusyn Yar, Oleksandra-Kalynove, and Pleschiyivka. UA 93rd Brigade "Kholodnyi Yar" successfully cleared and took control of Hruzke and Vesele near Dobropillya, capturing an RF prisoner, indicating localized UA counter-offensive success and stabilization in the Dobropillya area. General Staff of Armed Forces of Ukraine reports clashes near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and towards Bondarne in the Kramatorsk direction, as well as Bila Hora and Chasiv Yar. Azov Brigade successfully repelled a powerful enemy attack and prevented consolidation in Katerynivka, Toretsk direction, contradicting previous RF claims of gains. Multiple RF sources confirm continued use of FPV drones for "clearing strongholds" and covering "assault teams" in the Krasnoarmeysk direction. Iskander-M missile strikes reported in Sloviansk and Konstantinovka, impacting civilian infrastructure and causing casualties. RF claims of "liberating" Alexandograd (Myrnohrad) and pushing AFU out of eastern Serebryanka (DPR) are noted as RF propaganda. RF forces claim destruction of a UA M109 Paladin SPG, a FAB-3000 strike on a 14th NGU Separate Brigade PVD near Dymytrov/Myrnohrad, and an LMUR strike on a UAV C2 point near Antonivka. RF MoD claims improved position and capture of a UA stronghold west of Chasiv Yar by elements of the 299th Guards Airborne Regiment (Yug Group of Forces). RF also claims destruction of a Dutch-made BTR YPR-765. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• DONETSK OBLAST (Pokrovskoe Direction): RF claims a "big breakthrough" and liberation of Iskra (DNR), breakthrough into Zolotyi Kolodyaz, and advances up to 1.5km towards Sokil from Ocheretyne, threatening a key Ukrainian GLOC. UA sources report stabilization, successful destruction of enemy elements, and Ukrainian paratroopers clearing Pokrovsk of Russian DRGs. UA forces repelled enemy near Rubizhne, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Vesele, Vilne, Shakhove, Nykanorivka, and Sukhetske. Main Commander Oleksandr Syrskyi reports successful UA advances for the second consecutive day in Dobropillya and Pokrovsk directions. UA 425th Regiment "SKALA" conducted a successful offensive operation on the administrative border of Dnipropetropavsk and Donetsk Oblasts, capturing RF prisoners. RF claims of advancing into Ivankiv, Poltavka, and Zeleny Gay, and encircling Pokrovsk (Rodynske 3/4 liberated) are noted as RF information operations. UA forces, including 1st Azov Corps (ZSOU and NGU), have cleared Hruzke, Rubizhne, Novovodyane, Petrivka, Vesele, and Zolotyi Kolodyaz in Donetsk Oblast, directly countering RF claims. RF is employing TOS-1A ("Tosochka") against UA strongholds near Pokrovsk. UA 414th UAV Brigade "Birds of Madyar" continues to inflict casualties on RF in the Pokrovsk direction. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• DONETSK OBLAST (Toretsk Direction): UA reports capture of an RF prisoner from 150th Division by Azov units, and significant RF losses in Azov's areas. Mandatory evacuation of families with children in Druzhkivka and closure of Ukrposhta branches in Konstantinovka from August 19 suggest anticipated RF advances or increased threat. Clashes reported near Toretsk, Rusyn Yar, Oleksandra-Kalynove, and Pleschiyivka. RF 4th OMCBR continues attacks towards Delievka – Aleksandro-Shulgino and attempts to break through and consolidate in Belaya Hora. UA forces repelled enemy attacks near Druzhba, Chasiv Yar, and Bila Hora (Kramatorsk direction), and Pivnichne, Pivdenne, and Niu York (Toretsk direction). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• LUHANSK OBLAST (Siversk Direction): RF forces report combat operations with drone-guided artillery and ATGM teams. RF MoD claims destruction of AFU stronghold in Krasny Liman direction. RF aims to advance 2 km to close a "fire bag" for AFU in Kremensky forests. Russian forces reportedly broke through Ukrainian defense lines in the Lyman district. General Staff of Armed Forces of Ukraine reports clashes near Hryhorivka, Serebryanka, Siversk, Vyyimka, Fedorivka, Pereyizne and towards Siversk in the Siversk direction. RF MoD claims "liberation" of Kolodezi and Voronoye. UA 63rd Brigade utilized FPV drones to neutralize a Russian tank threatening positions east of Lyman. RF continues to report "intense combat" and "breakthrough attempts" in the Lyman direction, with RF forces actively regrouping and bringing additional forces, likely from the 8th Combined Arms Army. RF claims to have pushed AFU out of the eastern part of Serebryanka (60% under RF control). UA military personnel confirm the enemy is undertaking "dozens of attacks in one go" in the Lyman direction, confirming high intensity. RF claims "Azov" militants fled the Krasny Liman direction to Izium. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• DNIPROPETROVSK OBLAST (Nikopolshchyna): Sustained RF artillery and FPV drone attacks on Nikopol and surrounding communities. RF claims control of all settlements at the junction of DNR and Dnipropetropavsk Oblast after liberation of Iskra. Extensive damage to civilian infrastructure in Nikopol confirmed. Ballistic missile strike on outskirts of Dnipro confirmed with damage to civilian property. Overnight drone attack on Pokrovska community, Synelnykivskyi district, caused fires at agricultural enterprises. RF MoD claims "liberation" of Voronoye in Dnipropetropavsk Oblast. RF struck Pavlohrad with a missile overnight, causing a fire. RF reconnaissance UAVs detected near Pavlohrad. RF forces liberated Novogeorgiyevka in Dnipropetropavsk Oblast (RF claimed significant advance, corroborated by multiple RF sources including video of a captured Ukrainian flag). A gas storage facility in Pavlohrad district has been hit and is on fire, representing a significant strike on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. UA reports large-scale infrastructure work in Terny, possibly related to defensive fortifications or utility repair. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• KHARKIV OBLAST (Kharkivskyi District): UA Air Force alerts for high-speed targets and KAB launches. RF claims improved position near Krasny Perviy, controlling ~6 km of road to Dvorechnaya. A substantial increase (estimated 40%) in Russian EW emissions detected in the Kharkiv sector. RF forces have started battles for taking Hlushchenkovo. Recent RF drone attacks on Kharkiv caused 7 fatalities (including a one-year-old child and a 55-year-old woman) and 17 injured (including 6 children). RF drone strike on an emergency medical vehicle in Kupyansk, injuring two people. Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Novoshakhtinsk, Rostov Oblast, Russia, causing a fire. A gas infrastructure object in Kharkiv Oblast has been attacked, according to both Ukrainian and Russian channels. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• CHERNIHIV OBLAST: UA Air Force alerts for enemy reconnaissance UAVs, high-speed targets, and threat of strike UAVs. "Geran" (Shahed) drone strikes on a forward Ukrainian command post in Birino area confirmed. Ballistic missile impact in Honcharivske reported. RF claims destruction of a foreign mercenary legion's base. RF aviation conducted airstrikes at Krasnyy Khutir. RF reports Kinzhal strike near Desna and Geran/Gerbera strikes near Semenivka (Chernihiv Oblast). RF drone attacks caused power outages in some settlements. Explosions heard in Chernihiv. New group of RF UAVs reported entering Chernihiv Oblast from Sumy Oblast, moving southwest. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• KHERSON OBLAST (Left Bank Dnieper): UA reports destruction of an RF ammunition depot and four vehicles on the left bank. RF claims Lancet strike destroyed US M-777 howitzer and Ukrainian Bogdana SPG on right bank. Ukrainian Navy radio intercepts confirm loss of Russian Su-30SM fighter jet southeast of Snake Island. UA forces repelled 4-6 Russian army assaults. UA source claims reconnaissance units entered "Novaya Kakhovka" and are shelling enemy defenses. SBU operation detained an RF agent in Kherson Oblast who was preparing for a breakthrough of Russian DRGs to the right bank of Kherson Oblast. RF claims to have foiled attempts by Ukrainian DRGs to break through to Crimea on boats. Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) and Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) units are being recorded in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia directions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• MYKOLAIV OBLAST: RF missile hit an ancient Jewish cemetery in Pervomaisk. RF activity has increased significantly in Mykolaiv Oblast. Missile danger in Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblasts, with ballistic missile (later corrected to Smerch MLRS) targeting Bilozerka. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• ODESA OBLAST: Odesa under massive "Shahed" drone attack, with explosions heard. RF drones struck a Nova Poshta terminal and a fuel and energy infrastructure object in Odesa, and a SOCAR oil depot in Izmail, causing significant fires and impacting UA logistics. UA Air Defense destroyed 24 Shahed UAVs. Ballistic missile launches and groups of UAVs from Black Sea waters heading to Odesa Oblast. Powerful fire in Izmail after "Geran" (Shahed) activity, targeting AFU fuel arteries. One person injured from attack on Odesa Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• ZAPORIZHZHIA OBLAST: RF claims destruction of AFU ammunition depot. 583 RF strikes on 11 settlements over past day. RF reconnaissance UAVs detected in northern Zaporizhzhia Oblast. A 65-year-old woman was wounded in Polohivskyi district. Total power outage in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast due to UA UAV strikes on high-voltage lines, now restored. UA 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade is actively destroying enemy "Molniya-2" and "Zala" UAVs and "mechanical zoo" of RF. UA forces repelled 10 enemy attacks in Novopavlivka direction and 3 in Orikhiv direction. UA 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade demonstrates significant capability in drone warfare, supported by regional defense funds. UA NGU "Lazar" Special Purpose Regiment destroyed an RF S-300V air defense system by a Lancet drone in Zaporizhzhia direction. Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) and Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) units are being recorded in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia directions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• KUPYANSK AXIS: RF main effort shift with capture of Ivanivka. RF continues strikes on settlements. UA reports successful tank sorties and drone operations against RF personnel and equipment. Commander of "Achilles" Regiment Fedorenko (UA source) reports RF plans to occupy Kupyansk by August 24. RF claims forces are encircling Kupyansk and have entered Sobolevka in Kharkiv Oblast. UA forces repelled two enemy attacks near Kupyansk and Zahryzove. RF claims "Udaya Group" massively destroys AFU pickups in the Kupyansk direction. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• SUMY OBLAST: UA forces actively destroying the enemy, pushing back Russians near Oleksiivka and Yunakivka. RF claims improved tactical position near Yunakovka. RF missile strike on Sumy, hitting an educational institution. RF drone strikes on Okhtyrka community, causing 12-14 injuries (including children). UA forces are expanding their buffer zone in the Sumy region. RF information operations blame corruption for Ukrainian presence in Kursk Oblast. RF is targeting UA logistics and communications (HMMWV, pickup, UAZ, warehouse, antenna) in the Sumy area. UA 82nd Bukovynian Air Assault Brigade is liquidating RF infantry via drone operators. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• POLTAVA OBLAST: Poltava and its community without electricity after massive overnight attack. RF drones attacked a gas transportation system facility and Kremenchuk oil refinery, causing extensive fires and smoke plumes. Unexploded cluster munitions found in Kremenchuk. Supply of Russian oil through "Druzhba" pipeline to Hungary and Slovakia suspended due to UA UAV attacks (reportedly resumed). Large-scale fire in Poltava Oblast from Russian shelling is still being extinguished. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• KYIV OBLAST: Car explosion in Podilskyi district, Kyiv, claimed by RF as "Ukrainian partisans" blowing up a military vehicle. Enemy UAVs attacked Kyiv Oblast overnight, damaging a hangar in Boryspil district. Multiple air raid alerts due to MiG-31K takeoffs and ballistic missile threats. Explosions heard in Kyiv amidst "Shahed" attack, confirmed by Klitschko and UA General Staff. Civilians sheltering in subway stations. RF claims "over 100 strike 'Geraniums' attacking Ukraine," including Kyiv. RF propaganda piece highlights extensive Ukrainian military cemeteries to undermine morale. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• No new specific weather data provided in this update. Assume previous conditions of warm, dry conditions conducive to drone operations, ground mobility, and KAB strikes. Continued dry conditions in occupied Kherson Oblast contributed to a forestry fire near Chulakivka.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: Continued offensive pressure across the eastern axis, particularly Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Lyman, with significant use of loitering munitions, KABs, and thermobaric artillery (TOS-2). Reinforcement by 76th GAAD in Zaporizhzhia suggests a defensive posture there, possibly a feint. Strategic bomber activity (Tu-95MS, Tu-160) indicates preparations for further long-range missile strikes. RF continues targeting UA C2, logistics, and energy infrastructure.
• UA: Maintaining defensive lines and conducting localized counter-offensives in Dobropillya and Pokrovsk. Effective use of drones for reconnaissance, targeting, and counter-infiltration. Active counter-battery operations, including successful destruction of high-value RF AD systems. Continued efforts to clear and liberate settlements. Air defense remains challenged by massed UAV and missile attacks but reports significant intercepts. Ongoing internal security operations against RF agents and DRGs.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:

  • Air/Missile: Continued high-volume use of Shahed-136/Geran-2 and "Lyutyy" loitering munitions for deep strikes on logistics and critical infrastructure (fuel depots, energy facilities), particularly effective in Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk. Ballistic missiles (Iskander-M) for high-value targets and terror strikes on urban areas (Sloviansk, Konstantinovka). Strategic bomber sorties (Tu-95MS, Tu-160) indicate capability for waves of cruise missile attacks across Ukraine.
  • Ground: Continued reliance on mechanized assaults, supported by heavy artillery, thermobaric systems (TOS-2), and FPV drone swarms, particularly in the Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Lyman directions. Elite units (VDV, 76th GAAD) are committed to main offensive efforts and strategic defensive lines. RF demonstrates capability for unconventional infiltration tactics (motorcycles).
  • Electronic Warfare (EW): Significant increase in EW emissions, degrading UA ISR and drone effectiveness, particularly in Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka sectors.
  • Intelligence/Hybrid Warfare: Persistent attempts at deep reconnaissance and sabotage (DRGs on Dnipro right bank, attempts to infiltrate Crimea). Coordinated information operations (e.g., blaming UA for civilian casualties, fabricating UA losses, discrediting Western aid, justifying internal security crackdowns).

• Intentions:

  • Primary: Seize Chasiv Yar, consolidate gains in the Donbas, particularly pushing towards Konstantinovka and Pokrovsk.
  • Secondary: Fix UA forces in other sectors (Zaporizhzhia, Lyman, Kupyansk, Sumy) to prevent redeployment.
  • Deep Operations: Degrade Ukrainian critical infrastructure (energy, logistics, C2) across the country to undermine military and civilian resilience.
  • Information Warfare: Shape narratives to demoralize Ukrainian population and military, sow discord among allies, and legitimize RF actions.

• Courses of Action (Confirmed/Observed):

  • High-intensity, attritional frontal assaults against fortified UA positions.
  • Deep strikes with UAVs and missiles against strategic rear areas, including energy and logistics.
  • Targeting of civilian infrastructure and population centers to generate terror and force displacement.
  • Extensive use of EW to blind UA ISR and deny effective drone operations.
  • Propaganda and disinformation campaigns to influence domestic and international audiences.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Increased use of TOS-2 "Tosochka" thermobaric MLRS: Confirmed in Chasiv Yar sector, indicating an intent to rapidly reduce hardened Ukrainian positions and cause mass casualties.
• "Lyutyy" loitering munition deployment: Domestically produced Shahed-136 variant with improved guidance, extending the threat to rear-area logistics hubs.
• Motorcycle infiltration attempts: Observed in Pokrovsk direction, indicating RF use of light, high-speed, low-signature elements for reconnaissance or limited assault.
• Reinforcement of defensive lines with elite units (76th GAAD): Suggests RF is preparing to repel significant UA counter-offensives on the Southern Axis, or holding a strategic reserve.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• Ammunition: SIGINT from Kherson sector suggests localized shortages of 152mm artillery shells for some RF units (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). However, overall, RF maintains high rates of artillery and missile expenditure.
• Fuel: UA strikes on oil refineries (Novoshakhtinsk) and fuel depots (Odesa/Izmail SOCAR, Kremenchuk) indicate UA is actively targeting RF fuel supply lines or storage used by RF. The success of these strikes suggests potential localized disruptions for RF. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Personnel: High attrition rates on both sides. RF claims of 1.7 million UA killed/missing are part of a PSYOP (FALSE). UA reports 1190 RF personnel losses in last 24h, indicating continued high attrition for RF. RF internal reports show significant anti-mobilization sentiment ("18,500 people refused to fight"). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF continues to target UA C2 nodes (UAV control points, command posts), suggesting an attempt to degrade UA command and coordination.
• UA has successfully intercepted RF agents coordinating shelling and sabotage, indicating effective UA counter-intelligence. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF appears to maintain effective C2 over its units, coordinating complex multi-domain strikes (KABs, drones, missiles, ground assaults) across the front.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Defensive Resilience: UA forces are demonstrating strong defensive capabilities, repelling numerous RF assaults in key sectors (Toretsk, Lyman, Kupyansk, Sumy). Tactical withdrawals (Chasiv Yar) are to prepared defensive positions.
• Counter-offensive Capability: Localized successes reported in Dobropillya and Pokrovsk directions (clearance of Hruzke, Vesele, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Petrivka). Successful deep strikes into RF territory (oil refineries, seaports).
• Drone Warfare: Continued effectiveness of UA drone units for ISR, targeting, and direct engagement, including ground robotic systems. Significant fundraising for drones ("Iron Wings for Zaporizhzhia Front", "TOTAL RUSORIZ" campaign).
• Training & Morale: Continued military training, psychological preparation, and morale-boosting efforts. Strong civilian support for military through fundraising.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes:
  • Clearing Hruzke, Vesele, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Petrivka (Dobropillya/Pokrovsk).
  • Capture of RF prisoners in Dobropillya and Pokrovsk areas.
  • Successful repulsion of multiple RF assaults across various sectors.
  • Destruction of RF S-300V AD system in Zaporizhzhia direction by NGU unit.
  • Destruction of RF oil refineries (Novoshakhtinsk) and fuel depots (Odesa/Izmail, Kremenchuk).
  • Successful SBU counter-intelligence operations preventing RF DRG breakthroughs in Kherson and identifying agents coordinating attacks on Kyiv/Odesa.
  • Expanding buffer zone in Sumy region.
  • Significant number of RF UAVs and missiles intercepted (62 UAVs, 1 ballistic missile overnight).
• Setbacks:
  • Tactical withdrawal in Chasiv Yar Kanal microdistrict.
  • Continued heavy RF aerial and missile strikes on civilian infrastructure, causing significant casualties and damage (Kharkiv, Sumy, Odesa, Konstantinovka).
  • Disruption of power grid in Poltava and parts of Chernihiv/Zaporizhzhia due to RF strikes.
  • Closure of civilian services (Ukrposhta in Konstantinovka) due to escalating threat.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Air Defense: Continued need for advanced air defense systems to counter massed drone and missile attacks, especially given the scale of recent RF strikes (93 drones, 2 Iskander-M missiles).
• Ammunition: Continued requirement for artillery ammunition to sustain high rates of fire in defensive and counter-offensive operations.
• Combat Vehicles: Loss of BTR YPR-765 and Caesar SPG indicates a continued need for Western-supplied heavy equipment and counter-battery capabilities.
• Logistics & Repair: Humanitarian and logistical response required for areas affected by widespread civilian infrastructure damage. Resources for restoration of destroyed property and equipment (RBC-Ukraine).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Propaganda:
  • Fabricated figures of Ukrainian losses (1.7 million killed/missing) to demoralize.
  • Attempts to discredit Western aid by portraying it as financially opportunistic (Scott Bessent's "10% markup").
  • Blaming corruption for military setbacks (Kursk fortifications).
  • Portraying UA as engaging in terrorism (Bryansk DRG, railway sabotage, ambulance attack).
  • Claiming "liberation" of Ukrainian settlements and vast advances despite limited gains.
  • Promoting narratives of shifting Western policy and willingness for territorial concessions.
  • Highlighting internal RF social events and policies to convey normalcy/stability.
  • Using pejorative terms for Ukrainian units ("militants").
  • Leveraging images of Ukrainian military cemeteries to highlight losses.
• UA Counter-propaganda:
  • Actively debunking RF disinformation (e.g., 1.7 million casualties).
  • Highlighting RF military blunders and poor conditions.
  • Showcasing captured RF personnel and their testimony.
  • Emphasizing humanitarian impact of RF strikes on civilians.
  • Promoting national unity and resilience through fundraising and public addresses.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Ukrainian Public: High public support for military efforts (demonstrated by successful fundraising campaigns). Resilience despite continued attacks on civilian infrastructure. Concern for POWs.
• Russian Public: Indications of anti-war sentiment and resistance to mobilization ("18,500 people refused to fight"). Localized protests against propaganda. However, state control over information remains strong.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• US Stance: JD Vance (RF source, Politico) indicates US "minimal role" in security guarantees for Ukraine until requirements are clear; also suggested "basics of a deal" for Ukraine could be agreed before Putin-Zelenskyy meeting. This reflects continued internal US debate and potential shift in approach by elements of the US political establishment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• European Stance: Macron proposes "deterrence forces" from European militaries as security guarantees. Bloomberg reports "about 10 countries are ready to send troops to Ukraine" as part of security guarantees. However, TASS reports "serious disagreements" within NATO on mandate for such forces. Politico suggests Macron and Starmer unlikely to send troops due to political weakness (RF IO). Europe supports Trump's peace talks to reveal Kremlin's true intentions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Peace Talks/Summit: Discussions ongoing for a potential Putin-Trump-Zelenskyy summit, with Budapest as a possible location. Trump's perceived role as a mediator is amplified by RF media. Poland is against Budapest as a venue. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• NATO: NATO Secretary General Rutte stated irreversible path for Ukraine into NATO, but membership not currently discussed; arms supplies will continue.
• Arms Deals: Ukraine confirmed $90 billion arms deal with the US. Bloomberg reports Europe expects US to continue providing intelligence and equipment through European partners.
• RF Diplomacy: Lavrov asserts Russia's central role in any future collective security issues regarding Ukraine. RF strengthening ties (Iranian President in Minsk).
• International Court: US imposed sanctions on ICC judges (RF source).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

• Continued Attritional Offensives (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF will maintain high-intensity, attritional frontal assaults in the Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Lyman directions, focusing on breaking through Ukrainian defenses through sheer volume of fire and manpower. Expect continued heavy use of KABs, FPV drones, and thermobaric MLRS (TOS-2) to overwhelm UA fortifications and inflict heavy casualties.
• Sustained Deep Strike Campaign (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF will continue massed UAV and missile strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure (energy, fuel depots, logistics hubs), particularly in the Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, and Poltava Oblasts, aiming to degrade Ukraine's military sustainment and civilian resilience. Expect strategic bomber sorties to precede major missile waves.
• Defensive Consolidation in South (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF will continue to reinforce and maintain a strong defensive posture in the Zaporizhzhia direction, utilizing elements like the 76th GAAD to repel any potential UA counter-offensives and fix Ukrainian forces in this sector.
• Expanded EW Operations (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF will likely increase the intensity and sophistication of its EW operations across the entire front to further degrade Ukrainian ISR, FPV drone capabilities, and C2.
• Escalated Information Operations (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF will intensify its propaganda and disinformation campaigns, particularly those aimed at undermining Ukrainian morale, discrediting Western support, and shaping international perceptions ahead of potential peace talks.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

• Multi-axis Breakthrough (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): While the current emphasis is on the Donbas, RF could launch a highly concentrated, large-scale mechanized thrust on an unexpected axis (e.g., western Zaporizhzhia towards Orikhiv, or a renewed push from the Sumy border region further into Ukrainian territory) to create a significant diversion, forcing UA to redeploy reserves and creating an opportunity for a major breakthrough at Chasiv Yar or Pokrovsk. This would likely involve strategic deception and potentially operational-level surprise.
• Targeted Assassination/High-Value Attack (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF could attempt high-risk, high-reward operations against key Ukrainian political or military leadership figures, or critical national infrastructure nodes (e.g., specific grid control centers, national railway hubs) using precision-guided munitions or special operations forces, aiming to destabilize the Ukrainian government and disrupt national operations.
• Cross-Border Offensive into Western Ukraine (LOW CONFIDENCE): While currently assessed as low, the reported Kinzhal launches towards western Ukraine and the claim of "reparations reached Lutsk" (though low confidence for veracity) represent a dangerous capability. A sustained long-range strike campaign targeting critical infrastructure in western Ukraine (logistics hubs for Western aid, key railway junctions, or command centers) could severely hamper Ukraine's ability to receive and distribute foreign assistance.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

• Next 24-48 Hours: Expect continued intense fighting around Chasiv Yar, with RF attempting to consolidate their foothold and push across the canal. High likelihood of further deep strikes by UAVs and missiles across Ukraine, particularly on energy and logistics. UA leadership will need to decide on further tactical withdrawals or commitment of local reserves in Chasiv Yar.
• Next 72 Hours: Increased air defense alerts due to strategic bomber activity. Potential for concentrated missile strikes on Kyiv, Poltava, and other major cities. UA will need to assess the sustained impact on critical infrastructure and adjust resource allocation accordingly.
• Decision Points:
  • UA Readiness: UA General Staff must assess current force readiness and potential for sustained offensive/defensive operations given high attrition and resource consumption.
  • Resource Allocation: Prioritize allocation of air defense, counter-battery systems, and manpower to critical sectors.
  • International Support: Continue to press for accelerated delivery of Western aid, particularly air defense and long-range fires.
  • Civilian Protection: Intensify efforts for civilian evacuation from high-threat areas and reinforce shelters.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• Intelligence Gap: Full extent of RF TOS-2 deployment and operational patterns in the Chasiv Yar sector.
• Collection Requirement: Task ISR assets (SIGINT, IMINT) to actively monitor for TOS-2 signatures and deployment areas, prioritizing rapid geolocation for counter-battery targeting.
• Intelligence Gap: Production capacity, stockpile levels, and exact guidance capabilities of the new "Lyutyy" loitering munition.
• Collection Requirement: Conduct forensic analysis of "Lyutyy" debris from recent strikes. Task SIGINT to monitor RF production facilities and supply chains for related components.
• Intelligence Gap: Composition, training, and readiness levels of RF reserves (beyond 76th GAAD) and their potential deployment axes.
• Collection Requirement: Enhance HUMINT and OSINT on RF domestic mobilization, training camps, and troop movements within Russia, especially towards border regions.
• Intelligence Gap: Confirmation of the extent of RF artillery ammunition shortages in southern sectors and potential impact on sustained operations.
• Collection Requirement: Prioritize SIGINT on RF logistics communications in the Kherson/Zaporizhzhia sectors. Conduct IMINT on ammunition storage sites.
• Intelligence Gap: Specific triggers for RF shifting from defensive to offensive posture on any given front.
• Collection Requirement: Develop predictive models based on EW activity, troop concentrations, and logistics build-up.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. ACTION: Immediately activate all available active air defense systems (including mobile assets) and enhance readiness across all oblasts, particularly Kyiv, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa, in anticipation of a multi-wave missile and UAV attack, given the airborne strategic bombers. Prioritize defense of energy infrastructure and major urban centers.
2. ACTION: Prioritize counter-battery fire against identified and suspected TOS-2 MLRS positions in the Chasiv Yar axis. Deploy counter-battery radar and precision long-range artillery to suppress this high-threat system immediately upon detection.
3. ACTION: Reinforce western approaches to Chasiv Yar with additional anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) teams and prepared defensive positions to counter expected RF mechanized pushes across the canal.
4. ACTION: Maintain heightened vigilance for reconnaissance UAVs in Chernihiv and Sumy Oblasts, as they may precede further KAB or missile strikes. Actively engage and disrupt these platforms.
5. ACTION: Conduct thorough damage assessments of all hit critical infrastructure (gas storage, fuel depots, power substations) to determine operational impact and guide repair efforts. Expedite contingency plans for fuel and energy supply.
6. ACTION: Disseminate public advisories regarding persistent missile and drone threats, emphasizing shelter procedures. Support local administrations in providing humanitarian assistance to affected populations in Kharkiv, Sumy, and Konstantinovka.
7. CONSIDER: Leveraging ongoing diplomatic discussions to reinforce the message of international condemnation of RF attacks on civilian infrastructure and the need for enhanced air defense support to Ukraine.
8. CONSIDER: Proactively engaging in PSYOPs to counter RF disinformation campaigns regarding Ukrainian casualties and Western aid, maintaining a consistent and truthful narrative to both domestic and international audiences.

//END REPORT//