Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 122111Z AUG 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Chernihiv Oblast: UAF Air Force continues to report several groups of strike UAVs moving through Chernihiv Oblast in a westward direction. RF source Дневник Десантника🇷🇺 reiterates claims of "enemy manpower destroyed in Chernihiv Oblast training center." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for UA tracking; MEDIUM for RF BDA claim, pending verification).
• Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Nikopolshchyna, Marhanetska, Myrivska, Chervonohryhorivska, Pokrovska Hromadas): Ukrainian Serhii Lysak / Dnipropetrovsk Oblast State Administration reports Russian forces continue to attack Nikopolshchyna with artillery and FPV drones, impacting the district center and designated hromadas, causing significant damage to civilian infrastructure including residential buildings. This indicates continued RF targeting of civilian areas across the Dnieper River. Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦 shares photo messages captioned "😡🇺🇦 Тепер у Павлограді...", suggesting a recent strike or incident in Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for attack and civilian damage; MEDIUM for Pavlohrad BDA, pending verification).
• Sumy Oblast: UAF Air Force reports enemy reconnaissance UAV activity and repeated launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs). A new group of strike UAVs is moving through Sumy Oblast in a southwestward direction. БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС reports discovery of Russian occupants' chevrons, indicating direct engagement. ASTRA reports a UAV attack in Unecha, Bryansk Oblast, near the "Druzhba" oil pipeline pumping station (previously attacked on 06 AUG). This indicates continued deep strike attempts into RF territory from or over Sumy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for KABs and UAV activity in Sumy; HIGH for Unecha attack; HIGH for direct engagement with RF personnel).
• Kharkiv Oblast (Vovchansk): Оперативний ЗСУ (UA source) provides video showing combat operations in Vovchansk by 34th Mechanized Battalion, 57th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade, depicting close contact engagements, destroyed basements, and TM-62 mines. UAF Air Force reports enemy reconnaissance UAV activity and high-speed targets in eastern Kharkiv Oblast, on a westward course, with a specific threat of strike UAVs in Kharkivskyi district. RBK-Ukraina reports explosions in Izium. UAF Air Force reports Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) launched from Donetsk Oblast towards Northern Kharkiv Oblast. RF sources (TASS, MoD Russia, Два майора, Операция Z, Alex Parker Returns, Поддубный |Z|О|V| edition) continue to claim the "Kyiv regime is preparing a provocation" to foil upcoming US-Russia talks, specifically mentioning a "provocative strike on one of the densely populated residential areas in Kharkiv Oblast." Старше Эдды (RF source) claims two Iskander missile strikes two days prior targeted an Azov training camp in Kharkiv Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for ongoing combat, KAB strikes, UAV activity, and RF narrative dissemination; MEDIUM for Azov training camp BDA, HIGH for RF claim).
• Donetsk Oblast (Rodinskoye, Kolodezi, Krasnoarmeysk-Dobropilye, Pokrovske, Bilozerske, Yablonovka, Katerynivka, Kleban Byk, Dzerzhynsk, Hryhorivka, Vyyimka, Toretsk, Bila Hora, Scherbynivka, Stupochky, Stepanivka, Rusyn Yar, Konstantynivka, Mykhailivka, Siversk): UAF Air Force reports continued launches of guided aerial bombs (KABs) on Donetsk Oblast. STERNENKO reports KAB strikes on Bilozerske, killing two. Оперативний ЗСУ (UA source) provides new thermal imaging footage of "destruction of an entire platoon of Putin's assault troops in the Pokrovsk direction," showing multiple personnel and a vehicle being targeted by drone-dropped munitions. This confirms intense engagements and UA drone effectiveness. RF source Операция Z (Военкоры Русской Весны) claims the "103rd regiment is advancing towards Konstantynivka, destroying AFU infantry" with drone footage showing aerial reconnaissance over a damaged urban environment, artillery strikes, and trench systems with Ukrainian flags/markings. This indicates continued RF ground pressure and use of combined arms. Операция Z also amplifies Ukrainian General Staff's report that "Russia concentrated 110,000 military personnel on the Pokrovsk direction," attempting to downplay UA's refutation of breakthroughs and emphasize the sheer scale of RF forces. Colonelcassad (RF source) provides video claiming a single drone drop destroyed a Mitsubishi L200 pickup and a Ukrainian robotic platform. STERNENKO (UA source) reports a successful strike on another BM-21 Grad MLRS. TASS and RF MoD sources claim destruction of a Croatian MLRS (BM-35 Tornado-S, or similar) near Konstantynivka. Colonelcassad claims "Опорники у Предтечино под контролем РФ" (Strongholds near Predtechino under RF control). RF source WarGonzo claims "current situation in Pokrovsk-Dimitrov sector. Encirclement and breakthrough" with a map. Два майора shares a map captioned "Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk)." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for KAB strikes, UA drone effectiveness, continued heavy clashes, and RF pressure on Pokrovske/Krasnoarmeysk and Dobropillya directions; HIGH for UAF refutation of major breakthroughs; HIGH for confirmed large-scale RF force concentration; HIGH for RF claims of advances and BDA; MEDIUM for RF control over Predtechino strongholds; HIGH for WarGonzo/Два майора narrative dissemination).
• Zaporizhzhia Oblast: UAF Air Force reports new launches of KABs by enemy tactical aviation on Zaporizhzhia. Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration reports 24 casualties from the latest enemy attack. UA and RF sources continue to report a fire in the area of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), with RF sources immediately blaming UA. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for KAB launches, civilian casualties, and ZNPP fire; LOW for confirmed cause of ZNPP fire; HIGH for RF blame-shifting).
• Kherson Oblast (Left Bank): Nikolaevskiy Vanek (UA source) reports KAB launches on Kherson, and later specifies both KABs impacted Sadove/Nikolske. A new message from Nikolaevskiy Vanek reports "2 прихода" (2 arrivals/strikes), likely referring to continued KAB impacts or other munitions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for KAB launches and impacts).
• Central Russia (Moscow Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Kuban, Crimea, Anapa, Gelendzhik, Samara, Ulyanovsk, Kursk, Tatarstan, Orenburg, Stavropol, Ukhta, Dzerzhinsk (Nizhny Novgorod Oblast), Oryol Oblast, Izhevsk, Nizhnekamsk, Belgorod, Tambov, Ryazan, Republic of Mordovia, Yaroslavl, Bryansk Oblast (Unecha)): ASTRA reports a UAV attack in Unecha, Bryansk Oblast, near the "Druzhba" oil pipeline pumping station (previously attacked on 06 AUG), with video showing distant orange light and explosions. Оперативний ЗСУ also shares video of a "підпал" (arson/fire) in Bryansk Oblast. This confirms continued UA deep strike capabilities. TASS reports US State Department refusal to call Trump-Putin meeting "negotiations on Ukraine." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for UA deep strikes in RF territory; HIGH for TASS reporting on US State Department statement).
• Black Sea/Snake Island/Gas Rigs: Ukrainian GUR Head, Lt. Gen. Budanov, inspected positions on Snake Island and offshore gas production "rigs" in the Black Sea, confirming continued Ukrainian presence and ISR/security operations in these strategic maritime areas. Два майора (RF source) implies a RF strike on a tower near Snake Island where GUR personnel were reportedly observed, stating "Today at dawn, ours will demonstrably destroy this tower where he checked his people." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for UA activity; MEDIUM for RF intent/claim of BDA, pending verification).
• Siversk Direction: БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС (Ukrainian source) reports "SIGNUM" battalion (53rd Separate Mechanized Brigade) drone operators repelled a Russian mechanized assault near Siversk, destroying two BTR-82s, two tanks with mine trawls, and a Niva vehicle. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Starobilsk (Luhansk Oblast, Temporarily Occupied Territory): Оперативний ЗСУ (UA source) reports a successful strike on a truck carrying ammunition at a gas station in temporarily occupied Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast. Video and photo evidence support the claim of a large explosion and smoke plumes. ASTRA (RF source) claims two fatalities from a UA drone strike on a gas station in Starobilsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for strike; HIGH for visual confirmation; MEDIUM for claimed fatalities from RF source).
• Kyiv Oblast: КМВА (Kyiv City Military Administration) reports the Kyiv Defense Council cannot convene due to the co-chairman (Mayor) being on vacation, highlighting a lapse in critical C2. Air raid siren in Kyiv due to ballistic missile threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• New video from Bryansk Oblast indicates continued night operations and explosions, with orange glow illuminating clouds, suggesting continued dry conditions conducive to fire. Previously noted dry riverbed conditions may still impact ground maneuverability. The fire/smoke at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) continues to be reported. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for general conditions; MEDIUM for localized environmental impacts; HIGH for ZNPP fire, cause unknown).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• Ukrainian Forces: UAF maintains defensive posture, responding to RF advances and deep strikes. SBU's detention of a spy highlights active counter-intelligence. Successful drone operations (WORMBUSTERS 414th UAV Brigade, Fenix group, 3rd Mechanized Battalion, 22nd Separate Mechanized Brigade (Kharkiv), "SIGNUM" battalion, 53rd Separate Mechanized Brigade (Siversk), 210th Separate Assault Regiment (Stepnohirsk), Оперативний ЗСУ (Starobilsk strike, Pokrovsk direction), Presidential Brigade (Svatove)) and ATGM strikes (63rd Brigade) demonstrate continued tactical effectiveness. UAF Air Force issues KAB threat warnings and tracks high-speed targets. Combat battalions will receive 7 million UAH for weapons. Continued drone attacks on RF territory (Tatarstan, Orenburg, Stavropol, Dzerzhinsk, Bryansk Oblast (Unecha)) demonstrate UA deep strike capabilities. UAF General Staff reports 36 enemy UAVs shot down/suppressed. UAF General Staff reports 1st Azov Corps occupied defense line in Dobropillya-Kramatorsk direction. Southern Defense Forces destroyed a Buk-M3 SAM system. GUR Head Budanov's inspection of Snake Island and offshore gas rigs confirms continued Ukrainian presence and security operations in the Black Sea. UAF has explicitly refuted recent claims of significant RF breakthroughs near Pokrovsk and Dobropillya. Генеральний штаб ЗСУ announces a simplified procedure via 'Armiya+' for soldiers to return from Unauthorized Absence (Sych) until 30 AUG. Zelenskyy acknowledges reports from the military on the Dobropillya-Pokrovsk direction and states steps have been taken to correct the situation. Оперативний ЗСУ (UA source) reports that on the Pokrovsk direction, the occupiers have concentrated a grouping of over 110,000 personnel. UAF Air Force issues new KAB launches for Zaporizhzhia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces: RF continues offensive operations in Eastern Ukraine (Kupyansk, Pokrovske directions, explicit claims of deep breakthroughs towards Dobropillya/Krasnoarmeysk-Udachne, Annovka, Predtechino, Konstantynivka, Mykhailivka, Siversk). Deep strikes (KABs on Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy; claims of drone control points on Dnieper/Katerynivka/Dzerzhinsk/Konstantynivka, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia; UAV attacks into Bryansk Oblast). Colonelcassad shares a new video captioned "Танковый рок-н-ролл от #1_танковой_армии" showcasing Russian tanks in action, likely for propaganda purposes. RF MoD claimed strikes on a Ukrainian military-industrial complex enterprise and production workshops for long-range drones. RF MOD claimed 6 guided aerial bombs and 179 drones shot down/suppressed overall, and 9 Ukrainian drones shot down over Tatarstan. RF source Операция Z (Военкоры Русской Весны) claims "103 полк наступает к Константиновке, уничтожая пехоту ВСУ" supported by drone footage showing active engagements. RF is actively engaging in intelligence collection (spy in Dnipropetrovsk) and recruitment propaganda (5.5 million rubles offer). RF is formally recognizing and compensating personnel involved in "defending" border regions and Crimea. RF is consolidating military cooperation with Belarus ("Zapad-2025"). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for continued RF operations and propaganda; MEDIUM for specific RF BDA claims; HIGH for new tank propaganda video).
• Central Frontlines (General): Оперативний ЗСУ (UA source) videos show Ukrainian soldiers appealing for equipment donations, indicating continued strain on logistical resources for frontline units, and highlight soldiers serving for two years without rotation, citing broken transport vehicles. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.4. Previous Intelligence Summary (Chasiv Yar Axis): The previous INTSUM (0700Z 18-MAR-2024) focused on an imminent, large-scale RF assault on Chasiv Yar, with concentration of VDV units, new EW deployment, and S-300 repositioning for ground-strike roles. RF secured a foothold in eastern Ivanivske and conducted probing attacks on Chasiv Yar. RF used TOS-1A and increased drone overwatch, with increased reliance on small assault groups supported by FPV drone swarms. These elements are consistent with ongoing RF tactical adaptations and force concentrations observed on other axes, particularly the current large-scale concentration on the Pokrovsk axis. The identified new EW system and S-300 repositioning would have had a significant impact on UA operations in the Chasiv Yar sector if materialized as predicted. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.5. Control Measures (Relevant to Current Situation):

• RF: Continued widespread mobile internet shutdowns in internal regions. Formal recognition/compensation for border defenders. Consolidation of military cooperation (Zapad-2025). Promotion of internal normalcy events. Increased social control measures. Continued efforts to consolidate control in occupied territories. Tambov terrorism arrest demonstrates continued internal security control measures. Proposed ban on calls in WhatsApp and Telegram. Russia's Military Intelligence (GRU) publicly launched a Telegram bot (@Russian_GRU_bot) as part of a "Russian World" project, emphasizing secure communication for intelligence gathering. Bailiffs offer to 'write off' debts for a contract for the 'SVO'," a new incentive control measure for recruitment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• UA: Allocation of 7M UAH to battalions for weapons. "Contract 18-24" expansion for drone operators. Simplified Sych return procedure. Zelenskyy's directive to simplify border crossing for youth (up to 22 years). Increased student scholarships. Active anti-corruption efforts. Ongoing support for military families. Diplomatic engagement (Erdoğan, Czech FM, Romanian President, Dutch PM, Qatar). Real-time KAB warnings. Syvryskyi's important decision on Pokrovsk direction. Ukraine's humanitarian operations successfully returned a mother and four children from occupation. Zelenskyy reports new agreements with Netherlands concerning drones. Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦 highlights Starlink satellite connection via smartphone. New scholarship payouts for NMT graduates. Zelenskyy states "steps to correct the situation" have been taken on Dobropillya-Pokrovsk direction. Kyiv City Military Administration publicly reports air raid siren due to ballistic threat, demonstrating effective real-time C2 in air defense warning. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:
  • Offensive Maneuver (Eastern Front): RF maintains high capability for localized ground assaults, particularly in Donetsk Oblast (Pokrovske, Konstantynivka). The new video from Оперативний ЗСУ detailing "destruction of an entire platoon of Putin's assault troops on the Pokrovsk direction" indicates RF's continued use of assault groups despite heavy losses, underscoring their persistent offensive capability. RF source Операция Z (Военкоры Русской Весны) claiming "103rd regiment is advancing towards Konstantynivka, destroying AFU infantry" indicates continued capability for coordinated ground advances. Colonelcassad's new "Танковый рок-н-ролл от #1_танковой_армии" video showcases modern tanks in operation, emphasizing continued armored maneuver capabilities. The confirmed concentration of over 110,000 personnel on the Pokrovsk direction significantly enhances RF's offensive maneuver capability in that sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Deep Strike (UAV/Missile/KAB): Continued use of KABs on Donetsk, Sumy, and now Zaporizhzhia confirms persistent capability. ASTRA reports a new UAV attack in Unecha, Bryansk Oblast, near an oil pipeline, demonstrating continued long-range drone strike capability into RF territory. RF air assets reinforce airpower capability (e.g., Su-34 video, new Su-34 deliveries, Fighterbomber video of Hind helicopter). The current ballistic missile threat to Kyiv highlights persistent capability for long-range precision strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Counter-Intelligence & Internal Security: Robust internal security capabilities demonstrated by alleged prevention of terror attack in Moscow Oblast, Oryol arson detention, and widespread mobile internet shutdowns. Conviction related to Kursk airport coordinates further highlights internal security focus. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Warfare/Recruitment: Active recruitment campaigns leveraging financial incentives (5.5 million rubles offer, debt relief for SVO contracts) and patriotic appeals. Renewed claims of significant breakthroughs (e.g., 7km, 10-15km wide) on the Donetsk front are a key part of this ongoing narrative. RF continues to push the narrative that the Kyiv regime is preparing a "provocation" in Kharkiv to foil upcoming US-Russia talks, demonstrating a pre-emptive blame-shifting capability. TASS reports US State Department refusal to call Trump-Putin meeting "negotiations on Ukraine," indicating RF's capability to shape the narrative of international diplomatic events. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Counter-UAV/AD: RF MOD claims shooting down 6 guided aerial bombs and 179 drones overall, including 9 over Tatarstan. Widespread mobile internet shutdowns as a counter-drone measure. TASS report of "Rubikon" FPV drones shot down Ukrainian 'Leleka-LR' and 'Shark-M' reconnaissance drones by ramming them, which indicates a new, aggressive, and potentially effective counter-UAV tactic. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intentions:
  • Advance in Donetsk Oblast: Primary intention remains to push westwards through Donetsk Oblast, aiming for strategic objectives. The claims of "103rd regiment advancing towards Konstantynivka" and the continued concentration of 110,000+ personnel on the Pokrovsk direction clearly signify an intent for a major offensive push in that area. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Degrade UA Capabilities: Continued deep strikes on various targets, including claimed drone control points, training centers, drone production facilities, and now railway infrastructure, aim to disrupt Ukraine's war-fighting capabilities. The new KAB launches on Zaporizhzhia reinforce this. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Maintain Pressure on Multiple Fronts: Probing and fixing UA forces along various axes (Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv borders, Dnieper) to prevent redeployment of reserves. The continued UAV attacks in Bryansk Oblast indicate RF's intent to counter UA deep strikes near their border. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Control Information Space & Justify Actions: Promote its version of events, including alleged Moscow Oblast terror plot and military successes, to portray Ukraine as a terrorist state and rally domestic support. New veteran status reinforces this. Widespread mobile internet shutdowns aim to control information. The pre-emptive blame-shifting regarding Kharkiv "provocation" and the TASS report on US State Dept. refusing to call the summit "Ukraine talks" illustrate this intent. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF:
  • Increased Tank Propaganda: New "Танковый рок-н-ролл от #1_танковой_армии" video indicates a renewed focus on showcasing armored capabilities for morale and propaganda. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Aggressive Offensive Tactics on Pokrovsk Direction: The alleged "destruction of an entire platoon of Putin's assault troops" suggests continued use of human wave or highly aggressive assault tactics, despite heavy losses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Pre-emptive Blame-Shifting for Kharkiv: Explicit claims by multiple RF sources that Kyiv is preparing a "provocation" in Kharkiv to foil US-Russia talks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Shaping Diplomatic Narratives: TASS reporting on the US State Department's refusal to frame the Trump-Putin meeting as "negotiations on Ukraine" indicates an adaptation to shape international perception of high-level diplomatic engagements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Continued Deep Strikes into Russia: The repeated UAV attacks on Unecha, Bryansk Oblast, targeting infrastructure suggests an adaptation to persistent deep strike threats. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• UA:
  • Effective Drone Counter-Offensives: New video showing "destruction of an entire platoon of Putin's assault troops on the Pokrovsk direction" highlights continued and effective use of drones for close air support and personnel attrition. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Persistent Deep Strikes into RF Territory: Continued UAV attacks in Bryansk Oblast (Unecha) demonstrate persistent capability and intent to strike deep into RF. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Active Defense of Key Terrain: Continued heavy fighting in Vovchansk indicates robust and resilient defensive operations in urban environments. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Timely KAB Threat Warnings: UAF Air Force continues to provide real-time KAB warnings, demonstrating an adaptive system for civilian protection. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF: Dnevnik Десантника🇷🇺 video appeal for drones and Starlink, citing inability to effectively counter enemy without them, indicates critical equipment shortages and logistical gaps at the tactical unit level. Два майора's appeal for "Frontline armor" for legal entities highlights RF's reliance on crowd/civilian funding for military equipment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for unit-level equipment shortages; HIGH for reliance on civilian support).
• UA: 7 million UAH allocated to combat battalions for weapons. Ukraine plans to receive ~1.8 million artillery shells from Czech initiative by year-end, indicating significant international logistical support. Rheinmetall's dissatisfaction with the pace of factory construction in Ukraine indicates challenges in scaling up domestic defense production. Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦 reports that "wheels" (likely logistical supplies, such as vehicle tires) arrived in Donbas in the evening, confirming successful logistical sustainment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for current sustainment; MEDIUM for long-term domestic production challenges; HIGH for successful resupply).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF: C2 demonstrates continued ability to coordinate deep strikes and targeted artillery/drone strikes. Colonelcassad's new tank video indicates C2 over military propaganda. The immediate and coordinated RF messaging regarding the Kharkiv "provocation" and the Trump-Putin summit reflects effective strategic C2 in information operations. The public appeal for drones and Starlink by RF soldiers directly to "Dnevnik Desantnika" continues to suggest a significant bypass of formal military procurement and logistical C2 channels, indicating C2 failures at the lower tactical level. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for strategic/informational C2; MEDIUM for tactical logistics C2 issues).
• UA: C2 actively issues threat warnings and conducts counter-intelligence. Successful drone strikes on the Pokrovsk direction demonstrate effective tactical C2 and ISR integration. Allocation of funds to battalions indicates responsive central C2. Deployment of Azov Corps indicates adaptive strategic C2. The simplified Sych return procedure shows responsive C2 to manpower issues. Kyiv City Military Administration reports the Kyiv Defense Council cannot convene due to the co-chairman (Mayor) being on vacation, highlighting a lapse in critical C2 at the city level. UAF Air Force new KAB launch warnings for Zaporizhzhia show effective C2 in air defense. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for strategic/tactical C2; MEDIUM for city-level C2, based on reported lapse).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Defensive Posture: UAF maintains a defensive posture across the front lines, particularly in Donetsk, facing a confirmed concentration of over 110,000 RF personnel on the Pokrovsk direction. Оперативний ЗСУ (UA source) provides new video showing combat and destruction of an RF platoon on the Pokrovsk direction, indicating active and effective defensive engagements despite heavy pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Active Counter-Intelligence: SBU detention of a spy and exposure of UOC (MP) clerics. UAF SBU Head Vasyl Malyuk details successful counter-intelligence efforts in the "Pautyna" operation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Tactical Drone and ATGM Effectiveness: Units like "WORMBUSTERS 414th UAV Brigade," 63rd Brigade, Fenix group, 40th Separate Coastal Defense Brigade's "Orion" unit, 3rd Mechanized Battalion, 22nd Separate Mechanized Brigade, "SIGNUM" battalion, 53rd Separate Mechanized Brigade, 210th Separate Assault Regiment, and mobile fire groups demonstrate high proficiency. "Shahedoriz" project's success (212 targets shot down) highlights systematic and effective counter-UAS readiness. Presidential Brigade's successful drone operations on Svatove direction. Оперативний ЗСУ (UA source) new video on Pokrovsk direction confirms continued high effectiveness of drone operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Air Defense Vigilance: UAF Air Force actively monitoring and issuing warnings for Russian aviation threats, including KABs on Sumy, Donetsk, Kherson, and now Zaporizhzhia. The ballistic missile threat to Kyiv confirms immediate air defense readiness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Force Generation for Drone Operations: Expansion of "Contract 18-24" for drone operators. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Strategic Deployment of Elite Units: Deployment of 1st Azov Corps to Dobropillya-Kramatorsk direction signifies high readiness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Artillery Sustainment: Secured significant artillery shell supply from Czech initiative. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Manpower Management: Active efforts to address Unauthorized Absence (Sych) through simplified procedures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Logistical Resupply: Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦 reports that "wheels" (likely logistical supplies, such as vehicle tires) arrived in Donbas in the evening, indicating readiness and success in logistical resupply. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Counter-Intelligence): SBU detention of a spy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Success (Tactical Strike/Defense): Successful drone strike by "WORMBUSTERS 414th UAV Brigade" near Pokrovske. 63rd Brigade's ATGM strike near Lyman. Fenix group's destruction of a tank near Konstantynivka. Оперативний ЗСУ (UA source) new video on Pokrovsk direction showing "destruction of an entire platoon of Putin's assault troops" is a significant tactical success against ground forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Success (Deep Strikes): Drone attacks in Tatarstan, Orenburg, Stavropol, Dzerzhinsk. Destruction of TRILK-10 "Skala" radar in Crimea. New UAV attack in Unecha, Bryansk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Success (Counter-UAV): UAF General Staff reports shooting down/suppressing 36 enemy UAVs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Success (Information Warfare): UAF effectively refuting RF claims of significant breakthroughs near Pokrovsk and Dobropillya. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Success (Artillery Logistics): Secured significant artillery shell supply from Czech initiative. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Success (Logistical Resupply): Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦 reports "wheels" arrived in Donbas, indicating successful resupply. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setback (Civilian Casualties/Damage): Continued strikes on Zaporizhzhia (24 injured), KAB strikes on Bilozerske (2 fatalities), and explosions in Izium. New KAB launches reported on Zaporizhzhia by UAF Air Force. Nikolaevskiy Vanek reports "2 прихода" in Kherson. Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦 shares photo messages captioned "😡🇺🇦 Тепер у Павлограді...", suggesting a recent strike or incident in Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast that caused damage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for civilian casualties/damage; MEDIUM for Pavlohrad BDA).
• Setback (City-level C2 Lapses): Kyiv Defense Council unable to convene due to Mayor's vacation indicates a lapse in critical city-level C2. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Challenge (RF Propaganda/Terrorism Claims): Well-orchestrated RF narrative around alleged Moscow Oblast terror plot, Oryol arson, Kursk airport conviction, and Tambov arrest. Persistent RF claims of breakthroughs in Donetsk despite UA refutation. RF efforts to discredit UA military via propaganda. New RF claims of a "provocation" in Kharkiv. TASS reporting on US State Dept. refusing to call the summit "Ukraine talks." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Air Defense Assets: Continued threat of KABs and aviation-launched munitions necessitates robust and mobile air defense systems. The ballistic missile threat to Kyiv highlights the critical and immediate need for ballistic missile defense assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• UAS & Counter-C2 Protection: Measures to protect drone control points and communication links from RF artillery and EW are increasingly critical. The new RF tactic of ramming reconnaissance drones necessitates additional resources for ISR drone protection. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Information Warfare Capabilities: Sustained and adaptive information warfare capabilities are required to counter aggressive Russian propaganda, especially new narratives attempting to dictate peace terms or sow discord with allies. This is significantly amplified by the new RF claims regarding Kharkiv "provocation" and the framing of the Trump-Putin summit. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Manpower and Equipment for Donetsk Front (CRITICAL): Continued support in terms of manpower, ammunition, and equipment to withstand "significantly superior enemy forces," especially on the Pokrovsk axis due to the sheer volume of concentrated RF forces. The appeal from UA frontline soldiers for vehicle repair also highlights critical equipment and sustainment needs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Protection of Critical Infrastructure: Robust protection of logistics nodes and now, critical civilian infrastructure for heating season. The ZNPP incident, regardless of cause, highlights the extreme vulnerability of this critical infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Artillery Ammunition: Despite the Czech initiative, sustained high-volume combat requires continuous and diverse sources of artillery ammunition. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Tactical Unit-Level Equipment: The direct appeal from RF soldiers for drones and Starlink highlights the critical need for constant replenishment and provision of essential modern combat equipment at the lowest tactical levels. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Accelerated Domestic Defense Production: Challenges in accelerating the pace of new defense factory construction. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Internal Cohesion/Morale: RF continues to use alleged terror plots to rally domestic support. New "Танковый рок-н-ролл от #1_танковой_армии" video serves to boost military morale and project strength. Kadyrov_95's video of a search operation for a missing child, while civilian, may be intended to project a caring leadership and focus on internal matters, distracting from military setbacks or projecting normalcy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• RF Claims of UA Weakness/Terrorism: RF pushes narrative of Ukraine resorting to "terrorism" and being in a "hopeless situation." RF source Операция Z (Военкоры Русской Весны) continues to claim "103 полк наступает к Константиновке, уничтожая пехоту ВСУ." RF continues its pre-emptive blame-shifting for a "provocation" in Kharkiv to foil US-Russia talks. TASS reports US State Department refusal to call Trump-Putin meeting "negotiations on Ukraine," attempting to diminish Ukraine's role in the diplomatic landscape. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• UA Counter-Narratives & Transparency: UA channels report on Russian aggression and SBU successes. UA highlights Russian weaknesses and internal issues. Оперативний ЗСУ (UA source) new video on Pokrovsk direction, showing "destruction of an entire platoon of Putin's assault troops," serves as a direct counter to RF claims of advances and UA weakness. DeepState's map update suggests active monitoring and public reporting of the frontline. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Geopolitical Narratives: TASS frames the potential Trump-Putin meeting as not being "negotiations on Ukraine," attempting to control the international narrative around the summit. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Ukrainian Public: Civilian casualties will fuel resolve. SBU successes will be a morale boost. Оперативний ЗСУ (UA source) new video on Pokrovsk direction depicting RF losses is a significant morale boost for both military and public. DeepState's map update reinforces public engagement with real-time information. The ongoing ballistic missile threat to Kyiv causes public fear but also reinforces the need for resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Public: Continued drone attacks and security incidents within RF territory (Unecha, Bryansk Oblast) will erode sense of internal security and may cause anxiety. Kadyrov_95's video regarding a missing child's search may generate public sympathy and distract from the war. Colonelcassad's new tank video likely aims to boost morale and project military might. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• International Public Opinion: The TASS report on the US State Department's refusal to frame the Trump-Putin meeting as "negotiations on Ukraine" attempts to shape international perception regarding Ukraine's diplomatic agency. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• High-Level Diplomatic Engagement: Discussions around potential Trump-Putin meeting highlight high-stakes diplomatic maneuvering. TASS reports US State Department refusal to call Trump-Putin meeting "negotiations on Ukraine." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Economic Impact of Sanctions/Geopolitics: RBK-Ukraina reporting on Russia losing oil revenues by almost 20% indicates continued economic pressure on RF. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

• Continued Offensive in Donetsk Oblast with Aggressive Information Warfare: RF will maintain high pressure and conduct offensive operations along the Donetsk axis, focusing on seizing key terrain and achieving tactical breakthroughs towards Pokrovske and Konstantynivka, supported by the concentration of over 110,000 personnel in this sector. This will include continued indiscriminate FAB/KAB strikes (on Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Donetsk, Kherson), and localized tactical advances supported by drones and FPVs. RF will continue to explicitly claim significant advances (e.g., "103rd regiment advancing to Konstantynivka"), regardless of ground truth, to demoralize Ukrainian forces and public, and influence international perception. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Persistent Deep Strikes into Ukraine & RF Airspace Defense: RF will continue to utilize KABs, UAVs, and ballistic missiles to target military infrastructure, logistics hubs, training units, and drone production facilities in Ukrainian rear areas, as well as civilian targets (e.g., Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Kharkiv, Nikopolshchyna, Horlivka, Kremenchuk, Pavlohrad). New KAB launches on Zaporizhzhia reinforce this pattern. Concurrently, RF will maintain high air defense readiness across its western and central territories, leading to dynamic flight restrictions and interception attempts against UA drones. UA will continue its deep strikes into RF territory (e.g., Unecha, Bryansk Oblast). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Sustained Indirect Fire on Civilian Areas and UA Drone Infrastructure: RF will continue to employ artillery, mortars, and FPV drones against Ukrainian civilian population centers near the front lines and along the Dnieper River. Targeted strikes on UA drone control points and efforts to thwart UA rotations will continue. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Aggressive Information Warfare & Recruitment with Focus on Territorial Concessions: RF will intensify efforts to shape narratives, particularly regarding UA losses and the futility of resistance, while attempting to undermine international support for Ukraine. They will amplify claims suggesting Ukraine is ready to concede territory and explicitly push narratives demanding "gestures of goodwill" from UA for peace talks. RF will continue its pre-emptive blame-shifting for any incidents, specifically highlighting Ukraine's alleged provocation in Kharkiv to foil US-Russia talks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

• Decisive Breakthrough in Donetsk Oblast (Pokrovske/Kramatorsk Direction): RF achieves a rapid, decisive breakthrough along the Krasnoarmeysk-Dobropillye axis, leading to the collapse of a significant UAF defensive sector and enabling rapid exploitation towards Pokrovske/Kramatorsk, potentially reaching the Dnipro-Sloviansk-Kramatorsk highway. The confirmed concentration of over 110,000 RF personnel and continued aggressive offensive operations and propaganda in this area underscore the critical nature of this threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Large-Scale Coordinated Deep Strike on Critical Infrastructure: RF conducts a coordinated, multi-wave attack (missiles and drones) on critical Ukrainian energy infrastructure or major logistics hubs across several oblasts, aiming to severely disrupt military and civilian support capabilities ahead of winter. This could be coupled with a physical assault on a key training facility to further degrade force generation. New KAB launches on Zaporizhzhia and the ballistic missile threat to Kyiv elevate this threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

• Immediate (0-12 hours): Continued high alert for RF deep strikes (KABs on Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Sumy, Kherson; ballistic missile threat to Kyiv) and indirect fire across all active fronts and border areas. Intensified ground engagements are likely along the Donetsk axis, particularly around Pokrovske and Konstantynivka. Decision point for UA: Immediate verification and rapid public response to new RF claims of major breakthroughs in Donetsk. Enhance security measures for drone control points. Monitor high-speed targets for escalation. Initiate rapid analysis of new RF propaganda efforts targeting UA personnel and institutions and exploiting inter-ally tensions. Continue to promote civilian morale and resilience through public initiatives. Conduct immediate BDA for any new strikes. Address the lapse in Kyiv Defense Council C2. Monitor and adapt to potential impact of proposed RF ban on Telegram/WhatsApp calls. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Within 24-48 hours (until 141941Z AUG 25): RF will intensify ground operations in Donetsk Oblast, consistent with the MLCOA. NATO online meeting on Ukraine will convene, requiring diplomatic engagement and clear messaging from UA. Decision point for UA: Defensive adjustments and potential commitment of additional tactical reserves based on confirmed RF main effort and any achieved breakthroughs, especially on the Pokrovsk axis due to the sheer volume of concentrated RF forces. Maintain robust communication with international partners regarding RF information operations. Monitor and prepare for direct implications of the Putin-Trump summit in Anchorage, especially regarding any joint statements on Ukraine or proposals. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Over the next 72 hours (until 151941Z AUG 25): Sustained RF deep strikes into Ukrainian territory and continued RF air defense responses to UA drone attacks. RF will continue aggressive information warfare campaigns, particularly focusing on narratives of territorial concessions and internal security threats. Decision point for UA: Assess the effectiveness of current air defense measures against RF deep strikes (especially KABs and high-speed targets) and continue to adjust deep strike tactics to overcome RF air defenses. Maintain a unified and strong counter-narrative against RF propaganda, especially regarding claimed territorial losses in Donetsk and any suggestions of concessions. Reassess strategic reserve deployments based on initial RF offensive outcomes.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• Specifics of RF Objectives and Scale in Svatove-Kreminna: Precise timing, main effort axis, depth of penetration, and full scale of supporting RF forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• BDA for Dnieper/Katerynivka/Dzerzhinsk/Konstantynivka Drone Control Point Strikes: Independent verification and BDA. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• BDA for Honcharivske and Kropyvnytskyi Training Center Strikes: Independent verification and BDA, including personnel casualties. BDA for claimed Chernihiv Oblast training center strike. BDA for claimed Azov training camp strike in Kharkiv Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Tactical Situation in Pokrovske-Dobropillya area: Independent, confirmed verification of RF claims of 10-15km breakthroughs and UAF retreats, particularly the claimed 20km and 7km advances, as well as the new ASTRA/Операция Z claims and the reported advances to Annovka. Confirmation of UA refutations with ground truth. Independent ground truth verification of WarGonzo's claims of encirclement and breakthrough in Pokrovsk-Dimitrov. Independent ground truth verification of the "Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk)" map shared by Два майора. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Full Scope of RF EW Capabilities and Countermeasures: Detailed intelligence on specific capabilities and operational range of new RF EW systems and their impact on various UA communication and ISR systems, beyond UAS. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Verification of Moscow Oblast Terror Plot and Oryol Arson: Independent verification of details, identity, and true affiliations of detained individuals/teenagers. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Full Details of "Zapad-2025" Exercises: Detailed scenarios, participating units, and specific objectives, particularly implications for offensive capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intentions and Capabilities of Ilan Shor in Moldova: Further intelligence on true intentions and capabilities, and extent of Russian backing. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Effectiveness of UA Deep Strikes into RF: Detailed BDA for drone attacks in Tatarstan, Orenburg, Stavropol, Dzerzhinsk, Izhevsk, Nizhnekamsk, and other RF internal targets, including the repeated strikes on the "Shahed" terminal in Tatarstan. BDA for the drone attack in Arzamas, specifically confirming the target and origin of the UAV. BDA for the SBU drone strikes on airfields in Kursk, Oryol, Ryazan, and Engels. BDA for the drone groups reported in Chernihiv Oblast moving westward and Sumy Oblast moving southwestward. BDA for the Kremenchuk ballistic missile threat. BDA for Pavlohrad incident. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). BDA for Unecha, Bryansk Oblast, UAV attack. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• BDA of Kozak Armored Vehicle: Independent verification and BDA. Specifically, BDA of the BMP claimed by Colonelcassad in Sumy, and MaxxPro/Kozak claimed by TASS near Siversk. BDA of the BMP claimed by Presidential Brigade near Svatove. BDA for the vehicle claimed destroyed by 36th Army on the Dnipropetrovsk border. BDA for equipment and infantry destroyed near Vyyimka. BDA of the RF ammunition truck strike in Starobilsk. BDA of the claimed UA tank destruction in Zaporizhzhia by Воин DV. BDA of claimed Geran-2 strike on 4th NGU Brigade in Zolotyy Kolodyaz. BDA of the Mitsubishi L200 pickup and robotic platform claimed by Colonelcassad. BDA for damage to civilian infrastructure in Nikopolshchyna. BDA for the claimed UA drone strike on Horlivka civilians. BDA for the claimed 2 fatalities from a UA drone strike on Starobilsk gas station. BDA for the claimed destruction of RF EW station and BM-35 Tornado-S MLRS by RF drones. BDA for UA strike on BM-21 Grad MLRS. BDA for claimed destruction of Croatian MLRS by RF drones near Konstantynivka. Independent verification and BDA of the drone strike on the private house in Novostroyevka-Pervaya village, Grayvoron district, Belgorod Oblast, including the number and status of casualties and confirmation of the drone's origin, is critical. BDA on the claimed enemy warehouse destruction in Zaporizhzhia direction is required. BDA for the claimed attack on ambulance medics in Horlivka. BDA for the RF tank destroyed by 81st Airmobile Brigade. BDA for Russian TOS-1A destroyed by 3rd Assault Brigade. BDA for the MAXXPRO and M113 vehicles claimed destroyed by MoD Russia drone footage. BDA for the T-72B3M and T-90M training footage, assessing any new protection features or tactical adaptations. BDA for the destroyed French VAB APC claimed by Colonelcassad. BDA for the UA armored vehicle south of Maliivka claimed by Colonelcassad. BDA for the new video of RF "destruction of an entire platoon of Putin's assault troops on the Pokrovsk direction," for personnel and vehicle losses. BDA for the RF "103rd regiment advancing towards Konstantynivka, destroying AFU infantry" drone footage, including exact BDA and locations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). BDA for the US FPV drone shooting down a UAV with a Claymore mine, confirming type of drone shot down and effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). BDA for combat and destruction in Vovchansk, including TM-62 mines, verifying their impact. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). BDA for the claimed RF strike on a tower near Snake Island. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Extent and Impact of RF Mobile Internet Shutdowns: Detailed analysis of geographic areas and specific times of mobile internet shutdowns, and assessment of effectiveness vs. public impact, including the impact on financial transactions in Crimea. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Scope and Impact of RF Unit-Level Equipment Shortages: Further intelligence on the extent of equipment gaps (e.g., drones, Starlink) within RF tactical units, and whether these are isolated incidents or widespread systemic issues. Specifically, the needs articulated by UA soldiers appealing for donations (Оперативний ЗСУ). Independent verification of the necessity and impact of the "Frontline armor" fundraising appeal by Два майора. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Impact of Rheinmetall factory construction delays: Full assessment of the causes and consequences of the delays in factory construction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Severity and impact of tick-borne disease in Moscow Oblast: Monitor public health information for escalation or impact on military readiness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Cause and Extent of ZNPP Fire: Immediate, independent verification of the cause of the fire/smoke at or near ZNPP, its precise location within the plant, and any potential radiological or environmental impact. This is a critical intelligence gap. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

• ACTION: Immediately task all available ISR assets (SIGINT, IMINT, OSINT) to verify and monitor the tactical situation on the Pokrovsk-Konstantynivka axis, with particular focus on RF claims of advances and encirclement, and the large force concentration. Prioritize real-time imagery analysis to confirm or refute claimed breakthroughs and assess the integrity of Ukrainian defensive lines. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• ACTION: Disseminate immediate, clear, and verified information to the Ukrainian public regarding the actual situation on the Pokrovsk front, directly countering RF disinformation campaigns about breakthroughs and UAF collapse. Emphasize UAF defensive successes and resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• ACTION: Enhance defensive preparations and reinforce units along the Pokrovsk-Konstantynivka axis, committing additional tactical reserves if confirmed RF breakthroughs materialize. Focus on robust anti-tank and anti-personnel defenses, anticipating continued RF assault tactics with heavy drone support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• ACTION: Maintain maximum air defense readiness in Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Sumy, and other high-risk areas for ballistic missile and KAB strikes. Prioritize the protection of critical civilian infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• ACTION: Continuously monitor RF information channels for further pre-emptive blame-shifting operations (e.g., Kharkiv "provocation") and prepare rapid, coordinated counter-narratives with international partners. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• ACTION: Engage immediately with the US State Department and other key allies to clarify the US position on the Trump-Putin meeting, specifically addressing the TASS report that it will not be "negotiations on Ukraine." Reiterate Ukraine's position that no decisions about Ukraine will be made without Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• ACTION: Prioritize intelligence collection on RF unit-level equipment shortages, particularly for drones and Starlink, to inform UA tactical planning and exploit identified vulnerabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• ACTION: Conduct immediate, independent investigation into the cause and extent of the ZNPP fire, and coordinate with international nuclear safety organizations (IAEA) for transparent reporting to mitigate public anxiety and counter RF disinformation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• ACTION: Continue and expand counter-UAS capabilities, specifically adapting to the new RF tactic of ramming reconnaissance drones. Develop and implement new TTPs to counter this threat and protect ISR assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• ACTION: Continue to conduct deep strikes into RF territory (e.g., Unecha, Bryansk Oblast) to disrupt logistics and reduce RF offensive capabilities, while strictly adhering to rules of engagement to minimize civilian harm. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• ACTION: Address the reported lapse in Kyiv Defense Council C2 by ensuring critical leadership continuity and contingency planning for major events or absences. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• REQUEST: International partners to provide additional advanced air defense systems (especially for ballistic missile defense), and counter-battery radars, to protect civilian populations and critical infrastructure from RF deep strikes and artillery. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

---

END OF REPORT