Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 120311Z AUG 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Kharkiv Oblast (Northeastern): Ukrainian Air Force reports Russian Federation (RF) tactical aviation launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) towards northeastern Kharkiv Oblast. This marks a new area of KAB employment beyond Donetsk and Sumy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Zaporizhzhia Oblast: Ukrainian Air Force reports RF tactical aviation launches of KABs towards Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Air raid alerts are active. This is an escalation from previous alerts that only indicated psychological impact. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Donetsk Oblast (Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmeysk Direction): RF forces continue intense pressure with UAVs and KABs. Confirmed UAV (Shaheds/Geraniums) activity in the Kramatorsk/Sloviansk/Dobropillia direction. RF tactical aviation launching KABs on Donetsk Oblast remains a threat. TASS reporting "destruction of a firing point" indicates continued RF claims of localized gains. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for general activity; MEDIUM for specific TASS claim without independent verification).
• Svatove-Kreminna Axis: Continued force concentration with at least three RF Motor Rifle Regiments (MRR) consolidating west of Svatove, supported by VDV and BARS detachments. Probing attacks and assaults southwest of Kreminna are observed, indicating an imminent offensive. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Stavropol, Russia: Multiple drone attacks previously reported on AO «Монокристалл» factory (synthetic sapphire production) with confirmed emergency response. No new updates in this window, but previous damage assessments hold. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - attacks and emergency response confirmed; MEDIUM - target identified; MEDIUM - UA responsibility inferred).
• Sumy Oblast: UA Air Force previously reported KAB launches by RF tactical aviation on northern Sumy Oblast. No new updates in this window. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Dnipropetrovsk Oblast: New RF UAV previously observed in southeastern Dnipropetropetrovsk Oblast, moving north/north-west. No new updates in this window. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Penza Oblast, Russia: "Plan Kover" (Carpet Plan - a general aviation safety measure, often for drone/airborne threats) introduced, and Penza airport has temporarily suspended flights. This indicates potential drone activity or heightened security concerns within RF territory. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - restrictions confirmed; MEDIUM - cause inferred).
• Saratov, Russia: Temporary flight restrictions previously imposed at Saratov airport remain in effect without clarification. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - restrictions confirmed; LOW - cause inferred).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• RF Internal Industrial Impact: Confirmed fire and damage to AO «Монокристалл» factory in Stavropol could impact RF microelectronics industrial capacity in the long term. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - emergency response confirmed; MEDIUM - extent of impact).
• RF Internal Airspace Disruption: Flight restrictions at Penza and Saratov airports indicate localized disruptions to RF internal air traffic, likely due to drone activity or heightened security. This could affect internal military logistics movements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• Ukrainian Forces: Maintaining active and adaptive air defense across multiple oblasts, including newly targeted Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia. Air defense systems are under increasing strain due to expanded KAB attack zones. Conducting effective deep strikes and counter-armor operations as evidenced by the reported destruction of a T-72 and field depot by the 14th Separate Mechanized Brigade. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces: Maintaining and intensifying offensive posture in key areas, utilizing combined UAVs and KABs in Donetsk, Sumy, and now Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia. Shifting EW tactics in Svatove-Kreminna. Continued force concentration indicates preparation for a major ground offensive. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:
  • Air-to-Ground/Missile Capabilities: Sustained and diversified aerial attack capabilities with UAVs and KABs. KAB employment now confirmed across a wider geographic area (Donetsk, Sumy, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ground Offensive Capabilities: Significant force concentration (at least three MRRs) west of Svatove, supported by VDV and BARS, indicating readiness for a major ground offensive. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Electronic Warfare (EW) Capabilities: Demonstrating advanced and adaptive EW tactics, specifically localized "EW bubbles" to protect advancing assault groups, degrading UA UAS effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Warfare Capabilities: RF continues aggressive PSYOPS and internal narrative control, amplifying "victories" (TASS video, Colonelcassad's "frontline moments"), fabricating narratives (UA desertion claims), and discrediting UA. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intentions:
  • Degrade UA Defensive Capabilities & Target Key Hubs: Continued intent to damage critical infrastructure, C2 nodes, and defensive positions in Donetsk (Kramatorsk/Sloviansk/Dobropillia), and now explicitly extending this intent to Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia via KABs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Initiate Major Offensive in Svatove-Kreminna: Clear intent to launch a decisive ground offensive to seize Ukrainian positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Maintain Pressure Across Multiple Axes: Aerial activity across multiple oblasts stretches UA air defenses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Project Internal Stability & Undermine Ukrainian Resolve: TASS celebrating military "heroes" and circulating POW "mistreatment" narratives aims to boost RF morale and demoralize UA. New TASS claims of 120,000 UA desertions aim to erode public trust and international support. Colonelcassad's "frontline moments" with a puppy are designed to humanize RF soldiers and garner internal sympathy/support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF:
  • Expanded KAB Targeting: KAB launches now confirmed against northeastern Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia Oblast, indicating a broader application of this weapon system. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Refined EW Tactics: Shift from broad jamming to localized "EW bubbles" over advancing assault groups to protect against UA UAS in Svatove-Kreminna. This is a significant tactical adaptation directly impacting UA ISR. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Intensified Ground Preparation (Svatove-Kreminna): Force concentration, increased logistical movements, and coordinated probing attacks underscore imminent ground offensive. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Warfare Adaptation (Direct Disinformation & Intimidation): Rapid dissemination of alleged UA desertion figures and publicizing search warrants for UA-affiliated individuals alongside alleged "victories." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• UA:
  • Continued Deep Strike Capability (Stavropol): Reported drone attacks on Stavropol, confirmed by ASTRA video of emergency response, demonstrate continued deep strike capability. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • Effective Anti-Armor/Field Depot Strikes: Confirmed destruction of a T-72 tank and a field ammunition depot by UA drones (14th Separate Mechanized Brigade) demonstrates effective tactical targeting and destruction capability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Continued Air Defense Vigilance: UA Air Force and regional administrations demonstrate rapid detection and warning capabilities, including for Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF: Continued multi-pronged aerial attacks indicate a robust, albeit strained, logistical network. Increased movement of logistical convoys towards the Svatove front indicates sustainment preparations for offensive operations. Damage to AO «Монокристалл» factory (synthetic sapphire), confirmed by ASTRA video, could impact future RF high-tech military production, representing a potential long-term logistical vulnerability. The temporary flight restrictions at Penza and Saratov airports might indicate localized disruption to internal air transport, but no broad impact on logistics yet. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for current operations; MEDIUM for long-term impact of Stavropol strike; LOW for Penza/Saratov impact).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF: C2 demonstrates continued effectiveness in coordinating multi-domain attacks and sophisticated psychological operations. The re-direction of UAVs mid-flight, shift in EW tactics, and coordinated ground force preparations suggest flexible and effective C2. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• UA: UA C2 remains highly effective in real-time air defense coordination and rapid reporting of aerial threats and internal RF incidents. Demonstrated effective C2 in coordinating drone strikes against RF ground assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• High Alert & Responsive Air Defense: UA forces are on high alert and demonstrating strong responsiveness to multi-vectored aerial threats, including ongoing alerts in Zaporizhzhia and new KAB threats in Kharkiv. Air defense resources are increasingly stretched. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Proactive Deep Strike Capability: Reported drone attacks on Stavropol, confirmed by ASTRA, confirm a continued capability to conduct offensive operations deep into RF territory. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Effective Tactical UAS Operations: Demonstrated capability to effectively employ UAS for target acquisition and destruction against armored vehicles and logistics targets (T-72 and field depot by 14th Separate Mechanized Brigade). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Defensive Resilience (Donetsk): UA forces continue to maintain a resilient defensive posture in Donetsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Defensive Preparations (Svatove-Kreminna): UA forces are preparing for the anticipated major RF ground offensive. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Deep Strike): Reported drone attacks on Stavropol, confirmed by ASTRA, represent a significant tactical success against RF industrial capacity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Success (Tactical Strikes): Confirmed destruction of a T-72 tank and a field ammunition depot by UA drones is a significant tactical success, degrading RF combat power and logistics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Success (Air Defense Adaptability): Rapid identification and warning of UAV re-tasking towards Kramatorsk/Sloviansk/Dobropillia and new KAB threats to Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setback (Increased KAB Threat): Confirmed launches of KABs in Donetsk, Sumy, and now Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia, expanding the area of impact and strain on air defense. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setback (Continued Aerial Threat Volume): Ongoing multi-directional UAV and KAB activity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setback (EW Degradation of UAS): RF's new EW tactics, creating "EW bubbles" in Svatove-Kreminna, are actively degrading UA UAS effectiveness, impacting ISR and fire-control. This is a critical tactical setback requiring immediate adaptation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Enhanced Layered Air Defense: Urgent need for enhanced layered air defense systems capable of intercepting KABs and swarms of UAVs across expanded threat areas (Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk). This includes immediate resupply of interceptor munitions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Counter-EW Capabilities and UAS Adaptation: Immediate and critical need for counter-EW capabilities and adaptive UAS tactics (dispersal, alternative navigation, frequency hopping, anti-radiation drones) to counter RF's new localized EW bubbles, particularly in the Svatove-Kreminna sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• ISR for Deep Strike Battle Damage Assessment (BDA): Urgent need for ISR assets to confirm the extent of damage to AO «Монокристалл» factory in Stavropol and assess the impact of KAB strikes on Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Reserve Allocation: Strategic decision on allocation of reserves to counter the anticipated Svatove-Kreminna offensive while maintaining defensive posture in other critical sectors. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Persistent Battlefield Disinformation: TASS's video of alleged destruction of a "firing point" and their claims of over 120,000 UA desertions since the beginning of the year are examples of direct battlefield disinformation and morale manipulation, aimed at demoralizing UA forces and public, and potentially influencing international perception. TASS's reporting of Denys Maidanov being on a Ukrainian wanted list is likely part of a broader RF effort to discredit and intimidate individuals associated with Ukraine. Colonelcassad's sharing of "frontline moments" (e.g., puppy with tactical gear) is a common tactic to humanize RF soldiers and soften the image of the conflict for a domestic audience, building empathy and support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• RF Internal Narrative Control: TASS celebrating 30+ "Heroes of the RF" from the Air Force aims to boost internal morale and project success. The previous video of the alleged freed POW ("Fortuna") describing mistreatment and electric shocks is a clear propaganda piece designed to demonize UA forces and incite hatred. The МВД warning about QR code scams appears to be a standard public service announcement, but its timing might be opportunistic to project internal order amidst external events. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• UA Robust Counter-IO and Diplomatic Messaging: РБК-Україна's reporting on Putin agreeing to meet Trump due to "pressure" (from Hegseth) is a UA effort to frame RF actions as reactive and pressured, rather than strong. The sharing of drone footage showing successful strikes against RF targets (T-72 and field depot) serves to boost domestic morale and demonstrate UA military effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Ukrainian Public: Direct targeting of Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia, alongside Kramatorsk/Sloviansk/Dobropillia, keeps vigilance high and increases anxiety in these regions. Reports of drone attacks inside Russia, especially on industrial targets like Stavropol, and successful tactical strikes against RF military hardware (T-72, field depot) likely boost morale and confidence in UA capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Public: State-controlled media's framing of military "heroes" and alleged UA POW mistreatment/desertions aims to maintain domestic support and justify the conflict. Drone attacks in Penza, Saratov, and Stavropol will likely cause concern and potentially undermine the narrative of a contained conflict, even as state media confirms emergency responses. The "humanizing" content (e.g., puppy) aims to reinforce positive sentiment amidst conflict realities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Trump-Putin Summit Narrative: РБК-Україна's report on Putin feeling "pressure" to meet Trump (Hegseth's view) indicates Ukrainian efforts to counter the RF narrative that such a meeting would legitimize RF or signify weakness from the West. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

• Major Ground Offensive on Svatove-Kreminna Axis: The anticipated major ground offensive along the Svatove-Kreminna line remains highly likely within the next 24-48 hours. This will be supported by localized EW "bubbles" and probing attacks. The main effort will likely target the seam between Ukrainian units defending the P-66 highway, with supporting efforts from the Kreminna area. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intensified Multi-Domain Strikes on Eastern & Southern Hubs: RF will continue to concentrate and increase multi-domain strikes (UAVs, KABs, potentially ballistic missiles) directly on Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, Dobropillia, and other critical logistical/C2 hubs in Donetsk Oblast, AND will expand KAB usage against Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Continued Diversionary Aerial Attacks & Internal Disruption: RF will likely continue diversionary aerial attacks on other oblasts (Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy) and further internal drone strikes (like Penza/Saratov/Stavropol) to stretch UA air defenses and disrupt RF internal stability/logistics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Aggressive Information Operations: RF will continue to utilize its propaganda apparatus, amplifying "victories" (e.g., TASS video of "firing point," Colonelcassad's "frontline moments"), fabricating UA desertion claims, and leveraging figures like Scott Ritter to demoralize UA and influence international perceptions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

• Breakthrough on Kramatorsk/Sloviansk Axis with Sustained Air Superiority: RF achieves a decisive breakthrough on the Kramatorsk/Sloviansk axis, exploiting degraded UA air defenses, allowing for rapid ground force exploitation and potential collapse of the eastern front. This would be enabled by RF shifting more tactical aviation and KAB resources to support this specific breakthrough. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Simultaneous Major Offensives with Coordinated Deep Strikes and EW Overmatch: RF launches simultaneous major ground offensives on both the Svatove-Kreminna axis and the Pokrovsk-Kramatorsk axis, while conducting highly effective, coordinated deep missile/UAV strikes that severely degrade UA national C2 and critical infrastructure, combined with widespread EW that neutralizes UA UAS capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• False Flag Operation to Justify Escalation: RF stages a significant "false flag" event within its territory (potentially involving claimed UA attacks on civilian targets or critical infrastructure, potentially involving the QR code scam narrative as a precursor for a cyber false flag) to justify a new, more aggressive phase of the conflict, potentially including mass mobilization or use of non-conventional weapons. (CONFIDENCE: LOW - but possible given propaganda patterns and recent internal alerts).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

• Immediate (0-12 hours): Continued high alert for multi-vectored aerial threats, especially KABs and UAVs in Donetsk (Kramatorsk/Sloviansk/Dobropillia direction), Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and ongoing activity in Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy. Decision point for UA: Prioritize air defense resource allocation to areas under KAB threat, conduct immediate BDA for Stavropol strike, and prepare for potential RF escalation in response to UA tactical successes (T-72/depot destruction).
• Within 24-48 hours: High probability of a major RF ground offensive on the Svatove-Kreminna axis, utilizing new EW tactics. Increased RF ground pressure in Donetsk with continued aerial support. Decision point for UA: Activation of operational reserves and pre-positioned counter-assault forces to meet the Svatove offensive, robust defense of Kramatorsk/Sloviansk approaches, and immediate adaptation of UAS tactics to counter localized EW.
• Over the next 72 hours: Direct and sustained RF information operations, likely intensifying narratives of "UA collapse," fabricating desertion statistics, and presenting "Russian victory" narratives. Decision point for UA: Execution of a comprehensive communication strategy to manage expectations, explicitly refute false claims (e.g., desertion figures, Yablonovka "liberation"), and address the implications of new PSYOPS content, maintaining strong international and domestic support.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• Impact of Stavropol Drone Attack: Definitive, multi-source Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) for the AO «Монокристалл» factory, including estimated duration of disruption and specific products affected. Confirmation of UA responsibility. Status of "Neptune" factory.
• Full Scope of KAB Threat: Detailed intelligence on specific types of KABs, guidance systems, ranges, and primary airbases/aircraft involved, particularly concerning the expansion to Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia.
• RF Ground Force Intentions (Kramatorsk/Sloviansk/Dobropillia): Definitive intelligence on specific ground forces (unit identification, strength, disposition) preparing for or engaged in direct assaults towards these cities.
• Effectiveness of New RF EW Tactics: Precise capabilities, range, and operational impact of newly deployed RF EW systems (e.g., Shipovnik-Aero) on various UA communication and ISR systems beyond UAS, and whether they can be effectively targeted.
• RF Reserve Forces: Location and readiness of RF operational reserves behind the Svatove-Kreminna front line, and their potential deployment axes.
• Penza/Saratov Airport Disruption: Confirmed cause of temporary flight restrictions at Penza and Saratov airports (drone activity, internal security, or other).
• UA Desertion Claims: Independent verification and counter-analysis of RF claims regarding large-scale UA desertions.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Tactical/Operational:
   • Prioritize Air Defense for Eastern & Southern Strategic Hubs: Immediately re-task and deploy additional air defense systems, especially those capable of intercepting KABs and swarms of UAVs, to enhance layered coverage for Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, Dobropillia, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and surrounding critical infrastructure. Prioritize rapid resupply of interceptor munitions.
   • Counter-EW and UAS Adaptation (CRITICAL): Implement immediate tactical countermeasures against RF's localized EW bubbles in the Svatove-Kreminna sector. This includes dispersing UAS launch/recovery sites, utilizing alternative non-GPS navigation, frequency hopping, and training operators to identify EW bubble edges for flanking ISR. Prioritize procurement and deployment of anti-radiation drones and loitering munitions capable of targeting RF EW systems.
   • Maximize ISR for Stavropol BDA & KAB Strike Assessment: Task all available ISR assets (HUMINT, OSINT, IMINT) to gather and verify information on the damage to the AO «Монокристалл» factory in Stavropol. Simultaneously, increase ISR coverage over Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia to assess the impact and identify patterns of KAB strikes.
   • Svatove Offensive Readiness (IMMEDIATE): Maintain and reinforce maximum readiness for the anticipated major RF ground offensive on the Svatove-Kreminna axis. Reinforce positions, prepare counter-battery fires, and ensure mobile reserves are poised for rapid response, emphasizing counter-EW tactics and proactive targeting of identified EW systems. Commanders must brief their units on the latest EW tactics employed by the enemy.
   • Exploit Tactical Successes: Capitalize on the successful destruction of the T-72 and field depot by the 14th Separate Mechanized Brigade. Analyze the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used and disseminate best practices across other units for similar targeting opportunities.
2. Strategic/Information Warfare:
   • Aggressive Counter-PSYOPS Campaign (Targeted & Rapid): Conduct immediate analysis of new RF PSYOPS content, particularly the alleged POW testimonial, Yablonovka "liberation" video, and desertion claims. Develop and disseminate comprehensive, multi-platform counter-narratives exposing RF's use of fabricated content, reaffirming Ukraine's adherence to international law, highlighting its deep strike capabilities against legitimate RF targets, and directly refuting false statistics. Utilize humor where appropriate to discredit absurd claims. Proactively counter attempts to humanize RF forces (e.g., puppy photos) by focusing on their aggression.
   • Proactive Diplomatic Messaging (Countering RF Narratives): Maintain continuous, high-level diplomatic engagement to proactively counter RF narratives (e.g., Trump-Putin summit framing) that attempt to legitimize RF aggression or undermine international support for Ukraine. Emphasize Ukraine's unwavering stance on territorial integrity and adherence to international law regarding POWs.
   • Public Awareness Campaign (Deep Strike & Tactical Impact): Disseminate verified information regarding successful deep strikes into RF territory (e.g., Stavropol) and confirmed destruction of RF military assets (T-72, field depot) to boost public morale and demonstrate Ukraine's capacity to strike back, while cautioning against unverified claims and potential RF false flag operations.
3. Collection Requirements:
   • IMINT/GEOINT: Acquire immediate, high-resolution satellite imagery of the AO «Монокристалл» factory in Stavropol, and Penza/Saratov airports to assess damage and confirm industrial/transportation impact. Continue IMINT on Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Svatove-Kreminna fronts for ground truth and to identify RF EW system deployment, KAB launch sites/aircraft, and ground force dispositions.
   • SIGINT: Focus on intercepting RF tactical and operational communications related to KAB targeting and launch coordination across all newly affected areas. Prioritize monitoring of RF internal communications regarding the production and dissemination of new psychological operations. Increase monitoring of RF drone C2 networks in the Donetsk sector and new areas of UAV/KAB activity (Kharkiv/Zaporizhzhia), as well as dedicated monitoring of RF EW system frequencies and their effects on UA systems, particularly in the Svatove-Kreminna sector.
   • HUMINT: Task collection efforts to gather intelligence on RF unit morale, especially in light of internal PSYOPS and potential impacts of deep strikes. Seek information on RF's broader strategy for leveraging propaganda and diplomatic events for their objectives. Gather ground truth from frontline units regarding the Kramatorsk/Sloviansk/Dobropillia situation and specific RF ground force dispositions. Actively seek independent verification of alleged UA desertions.

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END OF REPORT