Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 112311Z AUG 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Donetsk Oblast (Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmeysk Direction): RF forces maintain significant operational focus. Previous highly contested claims of a 10km breakthrough near Dobropillya, severing the Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway, are now amplified by new RF milblogger reports (Операция Z) claiming Russian DRGs are "already on the outskirts of Dobropillya!" and that the city will "soon be encircled." These remain unverified by Ukrainian sources and are assessed as highly aggressive information warfare. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for contested claims and RF IO, MEDIUM for RF localized penetration, LOW for RF encirclement claim).
• Krasnyy Lyman Direction: RF sources continue to claim advances in Kolodezi, indicating ongoing localized combat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Svatove-Kreminna Axis: Concentrated elements from at least three RU Motor Rifle Regiments west of Svatove, coupled with a change in EW tactics to localized "EW bubbles" over advancing assault groups, continue to indicate an imminent major RF combined arms assault (within 24-48 hours). Probing attacks and assaults southwest of Kreminna, including VDV and BARS-13 elements, are confirmed. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Sumy Oblast: UA General Staff reports the liberation of two villages. UA Air Force reports ongoing UAV activity (towards Terny) and issues an air raid alert for Sumy city. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Mykolaiv Oblast: UA Air Force reports a "high-speed target" heading towards Mykolaiv, specifically north of Ochakiv in the direction of Berezanka. Unverified local reports (Николаевский Ванёк) claim "Smerch" MLRS activity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for UA Air Force report, MEDIUM for local MLRS claim).
• Other Fronts: No significant changes to previously reported battlefield geometry or key terrain control in Toretsk, Yablonovka, Konstantinovka, Kramatorsk/Sloviansk, Shandrigholovo, Torske, Sieversk, Novopavlivka, Kleban-Byk, Semenivka, Novokhatske, Katerynivka/Fedorivka, Kryvonosivka, Shakhove, Oleshky, Bilozerske, Kupyansk, Chernihiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, or Kherson Oblasts. A multi-pronged ground offensive into northern Kharkiv Oblast, securing positions in Strilecha, Krasne, Pylna, and Borysivka, and probing attacks towards Lyptsi and Vovchansk, remains a key development.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Kamchatka Volcano: Ash cloud from Klyuchevskaya Sopka volcano in Kamchatka (Far East Russia) has risen to 10 km above sea level. Recent reports indicate the number of aftershocks has reduced threefold and are no longer felt. This is an environmental event with no direct impact on military operations in Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Yaroslavl Industrial Fire: TASS reports a large-scale fire (4,500 sq. meters) at a manufacturing enterprise in Yaroslavl, Russia. This is an internal Russian incident with no direct impact on Ukrainian military operations, though it could impact Russian industrial output. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• No other new significant weather or environmental factors affecting operations beyond those previously reported.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• Ukrainian Forces: UA General Staff and regional commands continue to refute RF claims of significant breakthroughs (e.g., Dobropillya). UA forces are actively engaged in combat, demonstrating resilience, and have achieved localized success in Sumy Oblast. UA Air Force continues to issue widespread air raid alerts in response to RF aircraft launches (MiG-31K) and UAV/missile threats, indicating maintained air defense control and vigilance. Current reports indicate UAV detected in Sumy Oblast and a high-speed target in Mykolaiv Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian Forces: RF forces are maintaining their offensive posture in key areas, particularly the contested Donetsk front (Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmeysk) and the confirmed multi-pronged offensive in Kharkiv. The concentration of forces and new EW tactics along the Svatove-Kreminna axis remain indicative of an imminent major offensive. RF air defense measures ("Kovyor" plans, temporary flight restrictions at airports) continue to be implemented in response to UA drone activity over Russian territory. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:
  • Ground Offensive Capabilities: RF retains the capability to launch localized ground assaults and probing attacks, particularly in the Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmeysk direction. The new claims of DRG presence on Dobropillya outskirts suggest either highly aggressive reconnaissance or a significant psychological operation, but confirm continued RF intent to penetrate. The confirmed presence of concentrated forces and adapted EW tactics (localized "EW bubbles") west of Svatove indicates robust ground offensive capabilities and the capacity for tactical surprise in that sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for capabilities, MEDIUM for DRG claims, HIGH for EW adaptation).
  • Air-to-Ground Capabilities: RF continues to employ massed UAV strikes (Shaheds/Geraniums) and glide bombs. Current UAV activity in Sumy Oblast (towards Terny) and a "high-speed target" in Mykolaiv Oblast confirm ongoing aerial attack capabilities. Unverified MLRS activity in Mykolaiv, if confirmed, indicates a continued ability to use long-range precision or area-saturation fires. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for aerial attacks, MEDIUM for MLRS).
  • Information Warfare Capabilities: RF demonstrates highly developed information warfare capabilities, immediately amplifying unverified battlefield claims (e.g., Dobropillya breakthrough and encirclement) to sow panic and demoralize Ukrainian forces and public. They are also adept at leveraging international political developments (Trump-Putin summit) to frame narratives favorable to their objectives and undermine support for Ukraine, including pushing narratives of Ukraine's "softening" position on territorial concessions. RF milbloggers are actively spreading images claiming to show Ukrainian anti-personnel mines and depicting UA mobilization as forced and chaotic ("ухилянт"), likely to frame UA as indiscriminately using prohibited weapons or to undermine UA's recruitment efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intentions:
  • Secure Donetsk Oblast: RF's primary intention remains the full capture of Donetsk Oblast, with aggressive advances towards Pokrovsk and Konstantinovka. The intense pressure around Dobropillya aims to cut critical supply lines to the Donbas front. New claims regarding Dobropillya encirclement are intended to create a sense of imminent collapse. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Operational Fixing Action (Kharkiv/Svatove-Kreminna): The Kharkiv offensive is intended to draw and fix Ukrainian strategic reserves. The impending offensive along the Svatove-Kreminna axis aims to seize territory and potentially create a deeper operational advantage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Influence International Diplomacy & Legitimize Actions: RF intends to leverage the upcoming Trump-Putin summit to normalize relations with the US, push for a peace settlement on their terms (potentially including "territorial exchanges"), and weaken international support for Ukraine. New reports (TASS) claiming Ukraine may "soften" its position on territorial concessions are part of this campaign. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Degrade UA Capabilities and Morale: Continued strikes against military targets and infrastructure, combined with aggressive information operations (e.g., "political prisoners" and battlefield exaggerations), aim to attrit UA forces, disrupt their C2 and logistics, and undermine their morale and public support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF:
  • Escalated Information Operations on Breakthroughs: Immediate and widespread claims of significant breakthroughs (e.g., Dobropillya) on social media, now including claims of DRG presence on the outskirts and imminent encirclement, indicate an escalated tactical adaptation to create a psychological effect and pressure UA defenses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Leveraging International Summits for IO (Territorial Concessions): RF is actively using the upcoming Trump-Putin summit to push narratives of Ukraine considering "territorial exchanges," aimed at influencing international opinion and demoralizing Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • EW Tactics Evolution (Svatove): Shift from broad-area jamming to localized "EW bubbles" over advancing assault groups indicates a refinement in EW tactics to support offensive operations and mitigate UA UAS effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Mines/Mobilization as IO: Spreading images/warnings about Ukrainian anti-personnel mines and depicting chaotic mobilization (Colonelcassad) could be new tactical adaptations to frame UA as violating conventions or to instill internal dissent/fear regarding mobilization. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• UA:
  • Continued Rapid Counter-Narrative Deployment: UA forces continue to demonstrate rapid and explicit refutation of RF breakthrough claims (e.g., Dobropillya), actively communicating with frontline units and OSUV commands to provide real-time counter-disinformation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Localized Offensive Operations (Sumy): The liberation of two villages in Sumy Oblast indicates UA's capability to conduct localized offensive or counter-offensive operations beyond the main defensive axes, forcing RF to react. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Persistent Air Defense Vigilance: Continued detection and tracking of various aerial threats (UAVs, high-speed targets) and rapid issuance of air raid alerts demonstrate adaptive air defense posture. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF: Logistical preparations for offensives on the Svatove-Kreminna and Chasiv Yar axes are ongoing, as evidenced by observed logistical convoys and ammunition depot build-ups. Increased movement of logistical convoys carrying fuel and ammunition has been observed moving west from Starobilsk towards the Svatove front. However, reliance on milblogger fundraising for equipment (as noted in previous reports) indicates persistent tactical-level logistical gaps. The industrial fire in Yaroslavl, if it affects military production, could have long-term sustainment implications, but is unlikely to have immediate battlefield impact. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• UA: UA logistics continue to rely on a combination of state support and significant volunteer contributions for equipment. Efforts to streamline military procurement (e.g., simplified pickup truck purchases) and address mobilization enforcement (online fine payments) suggest ongoing adaptations to sustain the force. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF: RF C2 appears effective in coordinating the multi-pronged Kharkiv offensive and preparing for the Chasiv Yar/Svatove offensives. Their rapid and coordinated information operations around perceived battlefield successes (Dobropillya), the Trump-Putin summit (including "territorial concession" narratives), and the coordinated official communication regarding "political prisoners" and "mobilization chaos," demonstrate a sophisticated and centralized approach to information control. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UA: UA C2 is demonstrating strong responsiveness in countering RF information operations regarding battlefield breakthroughs. The immediate and consistent refutation of RF claims (e.g., Dobropillya) by General Staff and OSUV commands indicates effective internal communication and a unified command narrative. Continued widespread air raid alerts and specific UAV/missile tracking also demonstrate effective C2 for civilian protection and air defense. The report of liberated villages in Sumy suggests effective operational control for localized offensives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Defensive Resilience: Ukrainian forces maintain a resilient defensive posture across all active fronts, successfully repelling numerous RF assaults. The rapid and unified response to RF claims of a major breakthrough near Dobropillya demonstrates strong resolve and effective communication from frontline units to higher command. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Localized Offensive Capability: The reported liberation of two villages in Sumy Oblast confirms UA's capability to conduct localized offensive operations, indicating not solely a defensive posture across all sectors. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• High Alert: UA forces are on high alert for anticipated RF offensives, particularly in the Svatove-Kreminna and Chasiv Yar sectors. Air defense forces remain vigilant against continuous RF aerial threats, as evidenced by current UAV tracking in northern oblasts and high-speed targets in the south. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Contested Breakthrough): The intense RF pressure and localized penetrations near Dobropillya, even if not a full front collapse, represent a significant tactical challenge and force UA to commit resources to contain the situation. The contradictory reports highlight the intensity of the struggle and the difficulty in obtaining definitive, real-time ground truth. New RF claims of DRG presence on the outskirts further complicate the assessment and elevate the psychological pressure. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Success (Counter-IO): UA's rapid and coordinated counter-narrative to RF claims of a Dobropillya breakthrough is a significant success in the information domain, preventing widespread panic and maintaining morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Success (Localized Offensive): The liberation of two villages in Sumy Oblast is a tactical success, demonstrating UA's ability to push back RF forces and regain territory. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Success (Air Defense): Continued detection and tracking of RF UAVs and high-speed targets across Ukraine indicate maintained air defense situational awareness and responsiveness, mitigating the impact of RF aerial attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Urgent Need for ISR & Counter-EW: The dynamic situation around Dobropillya and the adapted EW tactics on the Svatove-Kreminna axis highlight an urgent requirement for enhanced ISR capabilities to achieve definitive real-time ground truth and for more resilient and effective counter-EW systems. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Continued Air Defense Assets: Ongoing large-scale RF aerial attacks necessitate a sustained and enhanced supply of air defense systems and munitions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Aggressive Amplification and Escalation: RF sources (Операция Z) are now explicitly claiming Russian DRGs are "already on the outskirts of Dobropillya!" and that the city will "soon be encircled," which is a significant escalation of battlefield disinformation aimed at creating panic and demoralizing UA forces and public. They are also heavily leveraging the upcoming Trump-Putin summit to push narratives of Ukraine's "softening" position on territorial concessions (TASS), aiming to undermine international support and domestic resolve. RF milbloggers (Colonelcassad) are also circulating images of anti-personnel mines and depicting chaotic Ukrainian mobilization ("ухилянт"), aiming to frame UA as using prohibited weapons or to sow domestic dissent regarding mobilization. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UA Robust Counter-IO and Proactive Messaging: Ukrainian sources (РБК-Україна, UA Air Force) are issuing rapid and direct counter-narratives to the RF breakthrough claims, citing frontline sources and OSUV statements to provide a more accurate picture of the contested but controlled situation. UA General Staff proactively reported the liberation of villages in Sumy Oblast, demonstrating agency and positive developments. UA leadership is also maintaining a clear and consistent diplomatic message regarding peace terms and Ukraine's role. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• International Legal & Diplomatic Pressure: Denmark's warning to the US against a hasty peace with Putin without Ukraine (РБК-Україна) indicates strong diplomatic pressure from allies to ensure Ukraine's voice is central to any peace talks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Ukrainian Public: Initial reports of a "breakthrough" likely caused concern, but the rapid counter-narrative from official UA sources is likely mitigating widespread panic. The news of liberated villages in Sumy Oblast will provide a morale boost. Continued public support for the military remains strong, but vigilance regarding RF information operations, especially those related to territorial concessions, is crucial. Public awareness of ongoing drone and missile threats, as indicated by air raid alerts, contributes to a state of vigilance. RF attempts to depict chaotic mobilization could impact public perception, but are likely to be largely dismissed by those familiar with the volunteer efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian Public: RF information control remains tight. The amplification of battlefield "successes" and "breakthroughs" (especially the Dobropillya claims) aims to boost domestic morale. The discussions surrounding the Trump-Putin summit, framed as a major diplomatic victory and potential for territorial gains, will further bolster public sentiment. The "political prisoner" and "Ukrainian mine use" narratives, and "mobilization chaos" depictions, are aimed at reinforcing the domestic perception of Ukraine as an oppressive and dangerous state. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Trump-Putin Summit Dominates Narrative: The confirmed upcoming meeting between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin is a major geopolitical event. RF is actively working to frame this summit as a pivotal moment for normalizing relations with the US and dictating peace terms, including the concept of "territorial exchanges" and claims that Ukraine may "soften" its position. This creates a diplomatic challenge for Ukraine and its allies. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Counter-Summit Diplomacy: Denmark's public warning to the US against a hasty peace without Ukraine highlights the international effort to manage the narrative and ensure Ukraine's interests are protected ahead of the summit. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• RF Diplomacy: RF Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov expressed hope that the Putin-Trump meeting would give impetus to normalizing Russia-US relations, indicating RF's diplomatic objective. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UA Diplomatic Counter-Efforts: UA continues high-level diplomatic engagement to ensure its voice is heard and to counter narratives that might undermine its position or international support. This includes direct refutation of claims regarding "territorial concessions." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

• Continued High-Intensity Pressure on Donetsk Fronts with Escalated IO: RF will maintain and likely intensify ground assaults in the Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmeysk direction, particularly around Dobropillya, attempting to consolidate any localized penetrations and pressure UA defenses to break. This will be accompanied by an even more aggressive information campaign claiming encirclement or imminent capture, aimed at degrading UA morale and confusing the information space. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Launch of Major Offensive on Svatove-Kreminna Axis: Within the next 24-48 hours, RF will initiate a large-scale ground offensive along the Svatove-Kreminna line, utilizing concentrated forces and localized EW bubbles to achieve tactical surprise and breakthroughs. The main effort will likely target the seam between Ukrainian units defending the P-66 highway, with supporting efforts from the Kreminna area. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Sustained Deep Strike Campaign: RF will continue massed UAV and missile attacks across Ukraine, with an emphasis on interdicting UA logistics and degrading military-industrial targets. UAV activity in northern oblasts and high-speed targets in southern oblasts confirm this ongoing threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Aggressive Information Operations Post-Summit: RF will intensify its propaganda around the Trump-Putin summit outcomes, pushing narratives of a forced peace settlement for Ukraine and exploiting any perceived diplomatic shifts to demoralize UA, including emphasizing alleged "territorial concessions." They will also continue to push narratives, such as "political prisoners," "Ukrainian mine use," and "mobilization chaos" to undermine international legitimacy and internal cohesion. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

• Exploitation of Psychological Vulnerability & Encirclement Attempt: RF succeeds in creating widespread panic among the Ukrainian public and military by exploiting real or fabricated breakthroughs (e.g., Dobropillya) and leveraging the Trump-Putin summit's outcomes. Simultaneous with this, actual RF DRG presence and localized penetrations around Dobropillya could be rapidly reinforced, leading to a legitimate, albeit limited, encirclement attempt of forward UA elements, forcing a significant tactical withdrawal and creating a wider operational gap. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Successful Feint & Decisive Main Effort Elsewhere: The Svatove offensive is a more elaborate feint than currently assessed. RF will rapidly shift a significant portion of its newly concentrated forces to a different, currently less active axis (e.g., a renewed thrust towards Kupyansk or even deeper into Sumy Oblast, potentially exploiting current UAV reconnaissance in that area and recent UA success there) after drawing UA reserves to Svatove, achieving significant operational surprise and breakthrough. The sophisticated EW employment could be used to mask this larger maneuver effectively. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Precision Strike on Key Infrastructure in Southern Ukraine: The "high-speed target" reported in Mykolaiv could be a precursor to a precision strike on critical port infrastructure or military targets in the Mykolaiv region, aiming to disrupt logistics or significantly degrade naval/coastal defense capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

• Immediate (0-12 hours): Continued intense combat and escalated information operations regarding the Dobropillya area. Ongoing UAV/missile activity requiring air defense response in northern and southern oblasts. Decision point for UA: Maintain robust counter-IO, ensure clear and consistent messaging from official channels, and continue active air defense responses. Verify RF DRG claims near Dobropillya.
• Within 24-48 hours: High probability of a major RF ground offensive on the Svatove-Kreminna axis. Decision point for UA: Deployment of specific counter-EW measures and tactical adjustments for UAS operations in the affected sector, and readiness of mobile reserves.
• Over the next 72 hours: Direct and sustained RF information operations following the Trump-Putin summit, specifically on "territorial concessions." Decision point for UA: Develop and execute a comprehensive communication strategy to manage expectations, counter disinformation, and maintain international and domestic support, explicitly refuting false claims.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• Dobropillya Breakthrough & DRG Verification: Definitive, real-time multi-source verification (IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT from ground reports) of the exact extent of any RF penetrations around Dobropillya, the status of the Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway, and crucially, the veracity of RF claims regarding DRG presence on the outskirts and imminent encirclement. This is the most critical immediate intelligence gap.
• Full Scope of EW Deployment & Impact: Detailed intelligence on the specific locations, operational ranges, and technical capabilities of all new RF EW systems on the Svatove-Kreminna axis, and their actual impact on encrypted military communications, beyond just UAS links.
• RF Intent for Sumy Oblast: Determine if current UAV activity in Sumy is purely reconnaissance for future strike targeting, or a precursor to ground operations, potentially exploiting the recent UA gains there.
• "High-Speed Target" in Mykolaiv: Origin, type, and intended target of the "high-speed target" reported by UA Air Force in Mykolaiv Oblast. Confirmation of MLRS activity type (e.g., Smerch) and precise impact locations.
• Impact of Trump-Putin Summit (Private Details): Detailed analysis of the private discussions and agreements made during the Trump-Putin summit, and their immediate and long-term implications for US and international policy regarding Ukraine.
• UA Reserve Force Status: Detailed assessment of Ukrainian strategic reserve readiness and deployment after recent commitments to Kharkiv and potential future commitments to Svatove/Chasiv Yar.
• RF Mines & Mobilization IO – Intent and Capabilities: Confirm the type and deployment method of anti-personnel mines shown by RF milbloggers, and whether this represents a new or expanded RF tactic, or is primarily an information operation. Assess the impact of RF mobilization IO on UA recruitment efforts.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Tactical/Operational:
   • Urgent Dobropillya Verification & Counter-DRG Operations: Immediately task all available ISR assets to conduct continuous surveillance of the Dobropillya-Konstantinovka axis to confirm or deny the extent of RF advances, the status of key transportation routes, and especially the presence and activity of RF DRGs. Allocate special operations forces for counter-DRG operations if confirmed. Prioritize rapid reporting from frontline units.
   • Svatove Offensive Readiness & EW Countermeasures: Prepare frontline units on the Svatove-Kreminna axis for a major ground assault. Emphasize counter-EW training and tactics, particularly for UAS operators (dispersal, non-GPS nav, alternative comms). Rapidly deploy active and passive countermeasures against RF EW systems. Pre-position mobile anti-tank and air defense assets.
   • Air Defense & Reconnaissance in Northern and Southern Oblasts: Maintain heightened air defense readiness in Sumy, Chernihiv, and Mykolaiv Oblasts based on ongoing UAV/missile activity. Prioritize targeting of these reconnaissance assets to deny RF intelligence collection and prevent further incursions. Investigate the recently liberated Sumy villages for intelligence value. Investigate Mykolaiv high-speed target.
   • Minefield Awareness: Issue immediate warnings to frontline troops regarding potential new RF anti-personnel mine tactics, if verified.
2. Strategic/Information Warfare:
   • Proactive Diplomatic Outreach & Counter-Summit Messaging: Maintain intensive diplomatic engagement with international partners, emphasizing Ukraine's unwavering stance on territorial integrity and the necessity of Ukraine's participation in any peace negotiations. Clearly articulate Ukraine's expectations and red lines regarding the Trump-Putin summit. Be prepared to immediately and unequivocally refute any narratives of "territory exchange" or imposed peace deals as illegal and immoral, leveraging support from allies like Denmark.
   • Reinforce Strategic Communications: Ensure a robust and immediate information response mechanism is in place to counter RF disinformation, especially regarding battlefield claims (e.g., Dobropillya encirclement) and the Trump-Putin summit outcomes. Proactively highlight UA successes like the Sumy village liberation. Directly counter RF narratives on "mobilization chaos" with positive messaging about recruitment and volunteer efforts.
   • Highlight RF Internal Discrepancies & War Crimes: Continue to expose the gap between RF's official narratives of strength and their documented internal logistical shortcomings (e.g., reliance on milblogger fundraising). Proactively counter RF narratives about "political prisoners" or other human rights violations by providing factual information and highlighting RF's own human rights abuses and potential violations of international law (e.g., if anti-personnel mines are confirmed to be illegally deployed).
3. Collection Requirements:
   • SIGINT: Focus on intercepting RF tactical and operational communications related to Dobropillya and Svatove, particularly regarding troop movements, logistical flows, EW system activation, specific UAV/missile flight paths/targets in northern and southern oblasts, and any communications related to DRG operations.
   • IMINT/GEOINT: Acquire high-resolution satellite and aerial imagery of the Dobropillya-Konstantinovka axis, the Svatove-Kreminna front, and the Mykolaiv coastal area to detect new fortifications, troop concentrations, the extent of any territorial changes, and the exact locations of new EW systems. Additionally, obtain imagery of drone/missile launch sites and observed flight paths in Sumy/Chernihiv/Mykolaiv regions. Focus IMINT on areas around the liberated Sumy villages and confirmed impact sites in Mykolaiv.
   • HUMINT: Task collection efforts to gather intelligence on RF unit morale, particularly within newly deployed formations and those sustaining high casualties. Seek information on RF internal planning and intentions regarding the Trump-Putin summit and its aftermath, and their strategy for leveraging "political prisoner," "mine use," and "mobilization chaos" narratives. Seek ground truth from frontline units regarding the Dobropillya situation.

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END OF REPORT