Nightwatch

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 051500Z AUG 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

Lozova, Kharkiv Oblast: RF "massive strike" on the railway station remains a focus of UA media. Confirmed RF "Geran-2" UAV usage. Casualties are two fatalities and 13 wounded. Photo and video evidence confirm widespread structural damage to civilian buildings and railway infrastructure. The railway station remains closed due to shelling. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Chasiv Yar Axis (Donetsk Oblast): RF forces, specifically the 98th VDV Division, continue an intensified assault on Chasiv Yar, particularly the 'Kanal' microdistrict, and Ivanivske, enabled by massed FAB/KAB gliding bomb strikes. RF is also conducting supporting attacks on Bohdanivka and flanking pressure on Klishchiivka/Andriivka to fix UA units. Russian sources claim increased "fire pressure" on the southwestern part of Konstantinovka (a critical logistics hub). Intense close-quarters combat and drone engagement are occurring within the "Siversky Donets-Donbas canal pipes." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Avdiivka-Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): RF mechanized units have achieved a significant tactical advance with visual confirmation (VISCONF) of forces entering the southeastern outskirts of Ocheretyne. RF forces have largely consolidated gains in Berdychi and Semenivka and are reorienting for further westward pushes. This advance threatens to unhinge UA defensive lines. RF reports claim forces have entered Rodynske (10-15km west of Pokrovsk), which, if verified, represents a substantial tactical gain and direct threat to Pokrovsk. UA forces are bolstering drone capabilities and conducting interdiction efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Ocheretyne advance; LOW for Rodynske claim, requiring immediate verification).
Zaporizhzhia Front: Continued localized ground engagements and significant aerial bombardment are reported. RF strikes on Zaporizhzhia Oblast have resulted in two fatalities. UA reports incoming strikes in Kherson Oblast (Sadove/Daryivka) and guided aerial bomb launches targeting Kozatske/Beryslav. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Eastern Direction (General): Active engagements persist across the broader eastern and Kharkiv axis, including Vovchansk, Kupyansk, and Donetsk/Kharkiv regions under RF guided aerial bomb attacks. RF reconnaissance and strike operations are ongoing in border areas. UA leadership maintains high-level attention to the Kharkiv region. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Bryansk Oblast (RF Territory): Continued RF internal security operations (FSB) against alleged Ukrainian saboteurs and collaborators are reported, with detentions and criminal investigations. RF Ministry of Defense air defense forces destroyed an enemy UAV over Bryansk Oblast. RF reconnaissance and strike operations are ongoing in border areas, including near Sumy Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Luhansk People's Republic (LNR): RF reports that three employees of the Svatovo water utility in LNR were killed and two wounded by a Ukrainian UAV strike. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - RF claim, requires independent verification.)
Internal RF Analysis: Reports indicate attempts by RF entities to conceal sensitive data from strategic industries (e.g., "Энергия" rocket-space corporation) due to sanctions. Civilian legal and regulatory issues are also reported (blogger deportation, debt collection, SMS mailing law). Chechen troops' performance and support are under high-level discussion, highlighting internal RF efforts to sustain military participation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for concealment; HIGH for civilian issues; HIGH for Chechnya focus).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

General weather conditions remain conducive for drone operations across the AOR. Localized rain in Donetsk may cause minor ground mobility issues but does not significantly impede aerial activity. Civilian-related environmental issues (locust infestation in Zaporizhzhia) are noted but have no direct military impact. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for drone conditions; LOW for direct military relevance of other factors).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF Forces:
- Offensive Operations: Maintaining high tempo, particularly on Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka-Pokrovsk axes. Claims of "fire pressure" on Konstantinovka and an ongoing "encirclement" of Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad indicate clear operational objectives to disrupt UA logistics. RF sources claim the "liberation of Yanvarske" (Dnipropetrovsk region), if true, would indicate a new offensive axis. Continued combined arms support and drone operations are observed. RF projections indicate a sustained high offensive tempo for 2025. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for general capability; MEDIUM for specific claims pending verification).
- Deep Strike Capability: Sustained capability to conduct massed UAV strikes (Lozova) and missile strikes (Sumy Raion), causing civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. Guided aerial bombs are actively employed in Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Kherson regions. RF is targeting UA C2/UAV control points in the rear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Mine Warfare: Demonstrated capability for remote mine-laying via UAVs, particularly anti-tank mines. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Logistics & Personnel Issues: Localized drone/Starlink requests persist for some RF units (7th VDV, Zaporizhzhia), suggesting reliance on non-governmental support. Overall logistical capacity remains sufficient for sustained offense. Corruption issues within RF military structures (Naval Radio-Technical Service) and personnel issues (discussion on "amnesty" for mobilized volunteers, "bedbugs" in military kindergartens) are noted. Sanctions impact RF strategic industries, prompting data concealment efforts. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - localized strain; HIGH - for overall capability).
- Counter-Drone Operations: Active and effective hunt for UA "Baba Yaga" and other drones, utilizing ISR and direct strikes. Ongoing internal discussion/development of counter-drone systems indicates continued investment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Internal Security Operations: Robust FSB operations targeting alleged Ukrainian agents, saboteurs, and dissidents within RF border regions and major cities (Moscow, Belgorod, Bryansk). Aggressive military recruitment/mobilization efforts, including detentions in Moscow, are ongoing. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Military Production: Continued production of T-90M tanks suggested. Strategic focus on indigenous defense technology development is declared. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
UA Forces:
- Air Defense: Continues to be effective in intercepting a significant number of RF UAVs (29/46 reported). Development of "Mongoose" jet interceptor drone for "Shaheds" is confirmed. Active air alerts indicate vigilant air defense posture. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Defensive Posture: Intense defensive combat on key axes (Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka-Pokrovsk), with active fortification and mine-laying efforts. Successful HUR special forces operations in Sumy Oblast against RF advances. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Training & Readiness: Ongoing basic and specialized training (e.g., 71st Separate Jaeger Brigade night training), and development of innovative counter-drone capabilities (FPV-PPO drones, ground robotic complexes). Fortification construction in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast for rear-area defense is ongoing. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Information Operations: Actively documenting RF damage and casualties, highlighting UA successes (e.g., drone intercepts, HUR operations), and amplifying international aid. High-level leadership engagement (Zelenskiy visits) aims to boost morale and transparency. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Civilian Logistics Issues: Persistent issues with corruption (disability/exit schemes, sand theft from "Ukrzaliznytsia") and social tensions related to mobilization (Cherkasy incident). Minor operational disruptions to railway movements are noted. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for issues).
- International Military Aid Integration: Confirmed successful delivery and upcoming arrival of NATO-funded US equipment (air defense, IFVs, artillery, ammunition) via the PURL initiative, with significant financial contributions from Northern European partners. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Internal Security Operations: SBU and National Police are active in counter-sabotage efforts (detention of RF-ordered arsonists in Kyiv Oblast, FSB agent in Kyiv). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:
- Aerial Bombardment: Sustained massed FAB/KAB and UAV strikes, including precision strikes against critical infrastructure (e.g., power substations). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Ground Maneuver: Capable of tactical breakthroughs with mechanized units (Ocheretyne) and sustained infantry assaults (Chasiv Yar, VDV). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Deep Strike: Persistent ability to strike deep into UA territory with UAVs and missiles, targeting logistics, C2, and airfield infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Mine Warfare: New capability for remote anti-tank mine-laying via UAVs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Internal Security: Robust FSB and military police apparatus for counter-intelligence, counter-sabotage, and aggressive mobilization enforcement. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Intentions:
- Seize Key Terrain: Primary intent is to capture Chasiv Yar and continue westward advance from Avdiivka to Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad, disrupting UA logistics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Degrade UA Capabilities: Continue deep strikes on logistics, C2, and energy infrastructure to weaken UA's ability to sustain operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Maintain Multi-Axis Pressure: Keep UA forces stretched across multiple fronts (Kupyansk, Seversk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson) to prevent force concentration. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Signal Escalation: The public announcement of lifting the short/medium-range missile moratorium signals a willingness to escalate capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Control Information: Dominate the information environment to justify actions, exaggerate gains, demonize UA, and suppress internal dissent. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Courses of Action (COA):
- MLCOA 1 (Prioritize Ocheretyne Consolidation and Exploitation with Logistics Disruption): RF will reinforce Ocheretyne, expand the salient, and intensify deep strikes on Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad and Konstantinovka. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- MLCOA 2 (Sustained High-Intensity Pressure on Chasiv Yar): RF will continue massed gliding bomb and VDV-led assaults on Chasiv Yar to fix UA reserves and gain incremental ground. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- MLCOA 3 (Continued High-Volume Deep Strikes on UA Infrastructure with Potential for Increased Missile Use): RF will maintain high tempo of UAV/missile strikes against UA rear areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- MLCOA 4 (Localized Probing Attacks and Border Pressure): RF will continue localized attacks across various sectors, including cross-border shelling and UAV reconnaissance in Sumy/Chernihiv, to stretch UA defenses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

Renewed Mechanized Breakthrough Emphasis: Successful exploitation of seams in UA defenses in the Ocheretyne sector with mechanized forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Remote Mine-Laying via UAVs: A new tactic for rapid and concealed minefield creation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Aggressive Information Campaign: Immediate and wide dissemination of strike successes and internal security narratives to control information. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Strategic Missile Signal: Public announcement of lifting short/medium-range missile moratorium as a strategic diplomatic signal. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Focus on UA Airfield Infrastructure: Deep strike targeting shifts to degrade UA air capabilities directly. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
Aggressive Mobilization Tactics: Increased use of forceful methods by military police for recruitment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Targeting UA Drone C2 Nodes: Specific strikes against UA drone control points in rear areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Tactical Aid Delivery: Increased use of volunteer/humanitarian aid channels for specific frontline unit supplies (tactical medicine, thermal clothing). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF Logistics: Generally sufficient to support sustained offensive operations, including deep strikes. However, localized reliance on non-governmental funding for some units' critical equipment (drones, Starlink) persists. Sanctions are impacting strategic industries, leading to attempts at data concealment. Declining oil and gas revenues (27% down year-on-year in July) represent a significant negative trend for long-term sustainment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for overall capability; MEDIUM for localized strain; HIGH for sanction impact; HIGH for declining revenues).
UA Logistics: Under constant threat from RF deep strikes (Lozova railway station closure, Sumy agricultural enterprise). Corruption in procurement and internal resource management (sand theft) remains a challenge. External military aid (PURL initiative, $500M from Northern Europe) is significant and crucial for sustainment. Continued reliance on public/volunteer funding for some critical equipment needs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for threat; HIGH for external aid; HIGH for internal challenges).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2: Highly effective in coordinating complex multi-domain operations, including large-scale air strikes, mechanized advances, VDV assaults, and internal security operations. Information operations are well-coordinated to amplify successes and justify actions. Strategic C2 apparent in missile policy changes and diplomatic engagements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
UA C2: Effectively coordinates air defense, maintains active defense on multiple axes, and implements adaptive defensive planning (fortifications, HUR operations). Proactive in counter-drone innovation and training. High-level leadership (President Zelenskyy) is actively engaged in directing strategy, supporting troops, and securing international aid. Effective counter-intelligence operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Defensive Posture: UA forces are in a critical defensive posture, particularly on the Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka-Pokrovsk axes, facing high pressure. Fortification efforts are ongoing. Successful HUR special forces operations against RF advances in Sumy Oblast demonstrate effective northern defense. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Air Defense Posture: Active and adaptive, with significant UAV interception rates and new counter-UAV system development ("Mongoose"). Continued vulnerability to ballistic missiles and massed drone attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Counter-Drone Innovation: Continues to be a strength, with tactical adaptations (FPV-PPO drones) and systematic development via platforms like Brave1. Increased direct funding for drone procurement is a positive development. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Training & Readiness: Ongoing intensive training across units to enhance combat proficiency. Efforts to integrate new technologies (ground robotic complexes) are noted. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Civilian Resilience: Strong public support through fundraising and community engagement. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Morale: While civilian support is robust, challenges persist at the individual soldier level (distress, disciplinary issues). Corruption and rising social tension related to mobilization (Cherkasy incident) pose threats to overall morale and force generation. Efforts to reintegrate AWOL personnel show progress. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - general; HIGH - for specific challenges).
International Aid Integration: Successful integration of NATO-funded US equipment is confirmed, providing crucial enhancements to UA capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:
- Successful interception/suppression of 29/46 RF UAVs.
- Development and confirmed deployment of "Mongoose" jet interceptor drone.
- Effective FPV-PPO drone use by Azov brigade.
- Repulsion of most RF flanking attacks around Chasiv Yar.
- Active fortification and mine-laying near Chasiv Yar.
- Successful HUR special forces operation in Sumy Oblast.
- Continued cross-border operations (Tatsinskaya fire).
- Confirmed +500M USD in new military aid from Sweden, Norway, Denmark for US weapons via PURL.
- SBU detentions of FSB agents and RF-ordered arsonists.
- Identification of Indian components in Russian "Shaheds" by UA intelligence.
- Return of over 29,000 AWOL personnel to military service.
Setbacks:
- RF penetration into Ocheretyne, representing a significant tactical setback.
- Fatalities (2) and wounded (13) in Lozova due to RF massed UAV strike, and continued railway station closure.
- Missile strike on Sumy Raion agricultural enterprise, causing casualties.
- RF consolidation of gains in Berdychi and Semenivka.
- Persistent RF "fire pressure" on Konstantinovka (trending to HIGH concern).
- Internal disciplinary issues, corruption in procurement/mobilization, and public resistance to mobilization (Cherkasy incident).
- New RF deep strikes reported on Starokostiantyniv and Khmelnytskyi Oblast airfield infrastructure (medium confidence).
- Material losses for units requiring public fundraising (NGU Rubizh brigade).
- Possible minor tactical setbacks from unverified RF claims (Yanvarske, Popiv Yar, captured servicemen).
- Confirmed destruction of an M113 APC by RF drone.
- Minor disruption to "Ukrzaliznytsia" train movement to Budapest.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL & URGENT: More advanced and layered air defense systems (missile and counter-UAV), especially for protecting critical infrastructure and population centers.
CRITICAL: Immediate allocation of tactical reserves to counter-attack and stabilize the Ocheretyne sector.
CRITICAL PRIORITY: Real-time ISR assets (UAV, SIGINT) to identify RF force composition, objectives, target C2/artillery, locate FAB/KAB platforms, and verify all unconfirmed RF claims (Rodynske, Yanvarske, Popiv Yar, Myrnohrad C2 strike).
HIGH PRIORITY: Rapid mine-laying capabilities and counter-battery fire against RF artillery.
CRITICAL PRIORITY: Comprehensive strategy to address public resentment towards mobilization, ensuring efficient and fair recruitment, and bolstering human resources.
HIGH PRIORITY: Robust medical & welfare logistics for frontline personnel and their families.
HIGH PRIORITY: Consistent and rapid material support/replacement for frontline units (equipment, drones, innovative technologies) via state procurement and accelerated Brave1 funding.
HIGH PRIORITY: Continued international financial resources (e.g., seized Russian assets) to supplement aid.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Propaganda: Continues to glorify VDV, exaggerate territorial gains (Yanvarske, Popiv Yar, Rodynske claims), showcase logistics efficiency, and frame strikes as "retribution." Persistent use of "Nazi" labeling and war crime accusations against UA. Actively signals strategic escalation (missile moratorium). Robust internal security narratives (FSB successes) and attempts to suppress internal dissent/economic information. Exploits Western divisions (Trump-Medvedev nuclear dispute, Trump's tariffs on India/EU). Dehumanizes UA forces ("pharmacological testing ground"). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
UA Counter-Propaganda/Information Operations: Focuses on documenting RF war crimes and civilian casualties, highlighting UA air defense successes and counter-drone innovations, promoting community mobilization and resilience. Aims for transparency on frontline operations and reports on enemy attrition. Actively highlights cross-border operations and exposes RF falsehoods/deception. Addresses internal challenges (corruption, mobilization issues) with a degree of transparency, though framed to highlight law enforcement action. Highlights RF internal issues (economic data classification, social tensions). Emphasizes international aid. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukraine: High public anxiety due to persistent RF strikes and casualties, particularly the Lozova incident and confirmed fatalities in Zaporizhzhia. The Ocheretyne breakthrough and Rodynske claim (if verified) could severely impact morale. Morale boosts from air defense successes, HUR operations, and confirmed international aid. Challenges persist with individual soldier welfare, internal corruption, and significant public resistance to mobilization (Cherkasy incident). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Russia: Morale boosted by VDV glorification and claims of territorial gains. Underlying issues of internal disciplinary problems, economic hardships (rising fuel prices, declining oil/gas revenues), and aggressive mobilization tactics are likely affecting public sentiment. Reports of "distressed soldiers" and public appeals to Putin indicate growing frustration. RF internal security campaigns (migration focus) aim to rally support. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - general; HIGH - for specific challenges).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF Diplomatic Activity: Continues to engage with non-Western partners (DPRK, Nicaragua, Malaysia, India) to counter isolation and secure military-technical cooperation. Actively influences its near abroad (Moldova). Leverages perceived Western divisions (Trump's statements) for diplomatic gain. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
UA Diplomatic Activity: Active high-level engagement (Zelenskiy visits, calls with Trump). Success in securing significant NATO-funded US military aid packages (PURL initiative, $500M from Northern Europe). Continues international legal actions against Russia (Naftogaz asset seizure). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
NATO/Western Response: Proactive deterrence (Germany's Eurofighter deployment to Poland). Continued economic pressure on RF (threat of sanctions on oil importers, EU sanctions on China for RF support). Significant military aid commitments confirmed. NATO is monitoring RF strategic signaling (missile moratorium) and Western internal debates. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

COA 1 (Prioritize Ocheretyne Consolidation and Exploitation with Logistics Disruption): RF will reinforce and expand gains in Ocheretyne, pushing towards Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad, and intensifying fire on Konstantinovka to disrupt UA logistics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
COA 2 (Sustained High-Intensity Pressure on Chasiv Yar): RF will continue massed gliding bomb and VDV-led assaults against Chasiv Yar, aiming to fix UA reserves and achieve incremental gains. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
COA 3 (Continued High-Volume Deep Strikes on UA Infrastructure with Potential for Increased Missile Use): RF will maintain a high tempo of UAV and potentially missile strikes against UA rear-area critical infrastructure and population centers, particularly in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, and Khmelnytskyi Oblasts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
COA 4 (Localized Probing Attacks and Border Pressure): RF will maintain localized offensive pressure on Kupyansk, Seversk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, and continue probing attacks/cross-border shelling in Sumy/Chernihiv. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
COA 5 (Information Dominance and Justification): RF will continue to use its media apparatus to publicize successes, denigrate UA, justify actions, and suppress internal dissent, particularly leveraging claims of territorial gains and FSB operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA 1 (Rapid Exploitation of Ocheretyne to Widen Breakthrough and Encircle with Breakthrough to Konstantinovka): RF could achieve a rapid and deep penetration from Ocheretyne, bypassing UA fortifications and threatening to encircle or cut off multiple UA defensive lines, leading to a large-scale collapse and opening a direct path towards Pokrovsk. Simultaneously, a concerted push towards Konstantinovka could sever key logistics routes. The claim of entering Rodynske significantly increases the probability of this MDCOA. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
MDCOA 2 (Coordinated Simultaneous Decisive Offensive on Chasiv Yar and a New Major Axis): RF could launch a decisive, large-scale armored assault on Chasiv Yar, coordinated with a renewed, significant offensive on a different major axis (e.g., Kupyansk-Lyman or a large-scale cross-border thrust in Sumy region), aiming to overwhelm UA defenses and prevent effective cross-sector reinforcement. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
MDCOA 3 (Escalation to Tactical Missile Strike on Key UA Strategic Asset with New Missile Types): RF could conduct a high-impact, precision missile strike using previously constrained short/medium-range missiles against a critical strategic target (e.g., major energy hub, high-level C2 facility, or port infrastructure) to test international response and demonstrate enhanced capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

Next 24-48 Hours:
- High Probability: RF will attempt to reinforce and expand gains in Ocheretyne, pushing further towards Pokrovsk or Myrnohrad, and intensifying fire on Konstantinovka. The report of RF forces entering Rodynske significantly increases the immediacy of this threat.
- High Probability: Continued intense air/artillery bombardment of Chasiv Yar, likely targeting newly identified UA fortifications and the Kanal microdistrict, coupled with VDV assaults.
- Medium Probability: Increased frequency of RF deep strikes using UAVs and potentially new missile types against UA rear-area infrastructure, including airfields.
- Decision Point: UA High Command must decide on the immediate allocation of strategic reserves to the Ocheretyne-Pokrovsk axis versus maintaining pressure on other fronts within the next 12-24 hours. The verification of the Rodynske claim is critical for this decision.

INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

URGENT: Independent, multi-source verification of RF claims of territorial gains, specifically:
- Entry into Rodynske (Avdiivka-Pokrovsk axis).
- Seizure of Popiv Yar (Chasiv Yar axis).
- "Liberation" of Yanvarske (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast).
- Capture of six UA servicemen in Serebryansky forestry.
- Confirmation of RF "massive raid" on UAV control points of the 25th brigade in Myrnohrad.
- Confirmation of RF deep strikes on Starokostiantyniv and Khmelnytskyi Oblast airfield infrastructure.
CRITICAL: Detailed ISR (SIGINT, IMINT, OSINT, HUMINT if available) on the specific composition, strength, and objectives of the RF grouping exploiting the advance into Ocheretyne, and their logistical sustainment lines.
CRITICAL: Location and readiness of RF operational reserves designated for either the Chasiv Yar or Avdiivka-Pokrovsk axes.
HIGH PRIORITY: Identification of precise locations of RF forward command posts (CPs) and fire-control centers directing the Chasiv Yar assault and coordinating FAB/KAB strikes.
HIGH PRIORITY: Assessment of the impact of declining RF oil and gas revenues on their long-term military sustainment.
ONGOING: Monitoring of RF internal security operations for indicators of broadened mobilization efforts or increased internal dissent/instability.

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