Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Lozova, Kharkiv Oblast: Confirmed 1 fatality and 10 wounded due to RF attacks on railway infrastructure. Multiple RF sources (Colonelcassad, Дневник Десантника🇷🇺, Операция Z) are actively disseminating videos and reports of this attack, claiming it was the "most powerful strike" on Lozova during the "SVO" and targeted logistics, warehouses, and personnel. UA Governor Oleh Syniehubov also confirmed strikes on 6 settlements in Kharkiv Oblast. This reinforces the persistent RF targeting of UA rear-area civilian and logistics infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Chasiv Yar Axis (Donetsk Oblast): RF forces, specifically the 98th VDV Division, are conducting an intensified assault on Chasiv Yar, particularly the 'Kanal' microdistrict, and Ivanivske. This is enabled by massed FAB/KAB gliding bomb strikes. RF is also conducting supporting attacks on Bohdanivka and flanking pressure on Klishchiivka/Andriivka to fix UA units. Russian sources (TASS via Marochko) report UA forces constructing new fortifications and mining terrain along a 20km front between Soledar and Chasiv Yar, indicating strong UA defensive preparations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Avdiivka-Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): RF mechanized units have achieved a significant tactical advance, with visual confirmation (VISCONF) of forces entering the southeastern outskirts of Ocheretyne. RF forces have largely consolidated gains in Berdychi and Semenivka and are reorienting for further westward pushes. This advance threatens to unhinge UA defensive lines. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Northern Front (Kupyansk Direction): RF source WarGonzo has released a tactical map illustrating the "Kupyansk Direction" for August 5, 2025, indicating continued activity and claims of territorial control. This aligns with previous RF claims of advances on Rad'kivka and approach to Kupyansk. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - for RF claims; HIGH - for continued fighting on this axis)
• Sumy Direction: RF source WarGonzo has released a tactical map depicting the "Sumy Direction" for August 5, 2025. While specific details on military actions are not visible, this indicates RF's continued monitoring and potential intent in this sector, maintaining pressure on UA's northern border. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - for intent; HIGH - for continued monitoring/presence)
• Kursk Oblast (RF Territory): RF officer previously detailed to ASTRA reports being lured to Kursk for "award" then transferred to a "basement for refusers" in LNR, highlighting RF internal disciplinary issues and the use of harsh measures against dissenting personnel. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• No specific weather updates relevant to operations. Continued extensive drone operations by both sides indicate generally favorable conditions for aerial activity. Heavy rainfall reported in Moscow Region (130% monthly norm) has no direct operational impact on the main frontlines.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces:
  • Offensive Operations (Chasiv Yar): Main effort led by 98th VDV Division, utilizing intense aerial bombardment (FAB/KAB) and small infantry assaults. Russian sources claim UA is actively fortifying this area. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Offensive Operations (Avdiivka-Pokrovsk): Mechanized infantry exploiting a breakthrough at Ocheretyne, consolidating previous gains. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Deep Strike Capability: RF conducted a significant drone attack (46 UAVs total, 24 claimed intercepted by RF MoD over RF territory) and 1 Iskander-M ballistic missile. Confirmed massed strikes on Lozova railway infrastructure using "Geran" (Shahed) UAVs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Logistics: A video from Colonelcassad shows a well-camouflaged, underground field fueling point, emphasizing RF focus on securing and maintaining fuel supply lines for combat readiness. The intensity of strikes on Lozova indicates persistent RF efforts to disrupt UA logistics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Apparatus: RF sources (Colonelcassad, WarGonzo, Операция Z, Дневник Десантника🇷🇺, Два майора, Fighterbomber, TASS) are actively disseminating information, celebrating VDV, claiming territorial gains, highlighting logistics capabilities, and framing strikes as "retribution." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UA Forces:
  • Air Defense: Successfully intercepted/suppressed 29 out of 46 RF UAVs. The Iskander-M was not intercepted. RF sources claim their air defense intercepted 24 UA UAVs over RF territory. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Defensive Posture (Chasiv Yar/Avdiivka): Engaged in intense defensive combat against significant RF offensive thrusts. Actively establishing new fortifications and minefields between Soledar and Chasiv Yar. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Civilian Protection: Active in reporting and responding to RF attacks on civilian infrastructure (Lozova, Zaporizhzhia), with local authorities confirming widespread strikes in Kharkiv Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Fundraising: Public fundraising efforts for Pokrovsk (17 million collected) indicate strong civilian support for frontline areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Operations: UA sources (РБК-Україна, Олег Синєгубов) are reporting on the aftermath of RF strikes and confirming areas hit. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:
  • Massed Gliding Bombs (FAB/KAB): RF continues to use these munitions effectively to degrade UA defenses, especially around Chasiv Yar. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Mechanized Offensive Operations: Capable of achieving tactical breakthroughs and exploiting seams in UA defenses (Ocheretyne). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • VDV as Spearhead: RF continues to employ VDV as elite assault units for high-priority objectives (Chasiv Yar). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • UAV/Missile Strikes: Sustained capability to launch significant numbers of UAVs and ballistic missiles against UA targets, now confirmed to include "Geran" UAVs for deep strikes on logistics hubs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Logistics Concealment: Demonstrated ability to establish well-camouflaged and secure forward logistics points. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Electronic Warfare (EW): Continues to pose a threat to UA drone operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intentions:
  • Seize Chasiv Yar: This remains a primary operational objective, given the commitment of VDV and massed air support, with the intent to break through or encircle. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Unhinge Western Avdiivka Defenses: The Ocheretyne advance aims to create a wider envelopment or force a UA withdrawal from the sector, potentially seeking to cut off supply lines. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Degrade UA Logistics and Morale: Continued deep strikes on railway infrastructure (Lozova) and civilian areas aim to disrupt UA supply lines, undermine public resolve, and is framed by RF as "retribution." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Maintain Pressure on Multiple Axes: RF intends to keep UA forces stretched across several fronts (Seversk, Kupyansk, Zaporizhzhia, and potentially Sumy) to prevent force concentration. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Courses of Action (COA):
  • COA 1 (MLCOA - Consolidate Ocheretyne and Sustain Chasiv Yar Pressure): Over the next 24-48 hours, RF will prioritize consolidating gains in Ocheretyne, likely committing immediate reinforcements, while maintaining intense, though potentially not decisive, pressure on Chasiv Yar to fix UA units. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • COA 2 (MLCOA - High-Volume Deep Strikes): RF will continue to launch high-volume UAV (especially Geran) and potentially missile strikes against UA rear areas, especially targeting critical infrastructure (railways, energy) and population centers in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • COA 3 (MLCOA - Maintain Localized Offensives across Frontline): RF will continue localized assaults on other axes (Kupyansk, Seversk, Zaporizhzhia) to prevent UA redeployments and probe for new weaknesses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Renewed Emphasis on Mechanized Breakthroughs: The Ocheretyne advance, supported by the consolidation of gains in Berdychi and Semenivka, indicates a successful adaptation in exploiting tactical seams with mechanized forces, rather than solely relying on infantry-heavy assaults. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Concentration of VDV and Air Power on Chasiv Yar: The commitment of the 98th VDV Division and massed gliding bombs highlights Chasiv Yar as a concentrated, high-priority objective. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Aggressive Information Campaign for Deep Strikes: RF channels are immediately and widely disseminating information regarding strikes like Lozova, framing them as highly successful and retaliatory, indicating a coordinated information operation component to their deep strike strategy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Logistics: The video of the concealed fueling point confirms RF's ability to maintain forward fuel supply for operations, essential for mechanized advances. The sustained offensive tempo on multiple axes, including the high rate of drone and missile launches, indicates a functioning, albeit potentially strained, logistics chain. Claims of their air defense intercepting UA UAVs over RF territory suggest their own logistics nodes are under constant threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UA Logistics: The "massive attack" on Lozova railway infrastructure directly targets UA logistics, aiming to disrupt the flow of supplies to the eastern front. Sustained operations on the Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka-Pokrovsk axes will require continuous and resilient supply lines. UA efforts to fortify and mine near Chasiv Yar will aid in preserving supply routes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains effective in coordinating complex multi-domain operations, including large-scale air strikes, mechanized advances, and VDV assaults on critical objectives. Their information operations are also well-coordinated to amplify battlefield successes and justify strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UA C2 effectively coordinates air defense responses to massed attacks and maintains active defense on all critical axes. The ongoing fortification efforts near Chasiv Yar demonstrate adaptive defensive planning. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Defensive Posture (Chasiv Yar & Avdiivka-Pokrovsk): UA forces are currently engaged in critical defensive operations, facing significant pressure from RF. The advance into Ocheretyne represents a serious threat to the integrity of UA lines. UA forces are actively erecting new fortifications and mining areas between Soledar and Chasiv Yar to strengthen defensive positions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Air Defense Posture: UA air defense is active and successful in intercepting a significant number of RF UAVs, demonstrating continued capability, but is vulnerable to ballistic missiles (Iskander-M). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Civilian Resilience: Public fundraising for Pokrovsk demonstrates strong civilian support and resilience despite ongoing attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes:
  • Successful interception/suppression of 29/46 RF UAVs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Repulsion of most RF flanking attacks around Chasiv Yar (Bohdanivka, Klishchiivka/Andriivka), indicating resilient defense. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Active fortification and mine-laying efforts near Chasiv Yar to enhance defensive lines. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Setbacks:
  • RF penetration into Ocheretyne represents a significant tactical setback, threatening a wider breakthrough. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Fatalities and wounded in Lozova due to RF strikes underscore persistent vulnerability of rear areas to deep strikes, particularly against logistics infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • The Iskander-M ballistic missile strike was not intercepted. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF consolidation of gains in Berdychi and Semenivka. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Air Defense Assets: CRITICAL and URGENT need for more advanced and layered air defense systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles (e.g., Iskander-M) and mitigating the impact of massed drone attacks, especially for protecting critical infrastructure and population centers. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Counter-Offensive Reserves: Immediate allocation of tactical reserves is CRITICAL for counter-attacking and stabilizing the Ocheretyne sector to prevent a wider breakthrough. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• ISR Assets (Real-Time): High demand for real-time ISR (UAV, SIGINT) to identify RF force composition and objectives in Ocheretyne, target C2 nodes and artillery supporting Chasiv Yar, and locate FAB/KAB launch platforms. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Mine-laying Equipment: Continued requirement for rapid mine-laying capabilities to enhance newly constructed fortifications and deny RF avenues of approach, especially near Chasiv Yar. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Counter-Battery Capabilities: Need for intensified counter-battery fire against RF artillery supporting both key offensive axes, particularly given the reported increase in artillery density south of Bakhmut. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Propaganda:
  • VDV Glorification: "Fighterbomber" celebrating VDV Day and "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" soliciting VDV unit information highlight an ongoing effort to boost morale and present VDV as an elite, effective force. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Territorial Gains Exaggeration/Claim: "WarGonzo" map for Kupyansk and Sumy directions, and "Операция Z" claiming "Novoselka taken" and "Rybar" showing animated maps of advances aim to portray RF as continuously successful and gaining ground. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for intent; MEDIUM for factual accuracy).
  • Logistics Efficiency: Colonelcassad's video on concealed fueling points is a narrative designed to reassure domestic audiences about RF military effectiveness and sustainment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • "Retribution" Narrative: Colonelcassad and Операция Z framing the Lozova strike as "retribution" for UA attacks on RF railway infrastructure is a classic RF narrative aiming to justify their strikes and deter further UA action. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Political Diversions: TASS reports on tennis, Trump's threats regarding Indian trade, China-Russia cooperation, budget violations, and Telegram scams are likely attempts to fill the information space with non-war related news to distract domestic audiences or signal diplomatic engagements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • "Myrotvorets" Accusations: TASS reporting on "Kyiv putting data on two 17-year-olds in the Myrotvorets database" (from previous report) is a classic RF narrative aiming to portray Ukraine as extremist or persecutory, targeting international perception. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • "Nazi" Labelling: "Два майора" captioning a photo of UA forces with accusations of "Nazis with triangles" and "pig ears" on headwear is a derogatory and dehumanizing narrative aimed at discrediting UA forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UA Counter-Propaganda/Information Operations:
  • Damage Assessment and Civilian Casualties: "Олег Синєгубов, голова Харківської ОДА" and "РБК-Україна" immediately reporting on the Lozova attack and Kharkiv Oblast settlements hit serve to document RF war crimes and inform the public. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Air Defense Successes: Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine immediately reporting on UAV interceptions (29/46) counters RF narratives of unchallenged air dominance and boosts morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Community Mobilization: "STERNENKO" reporting on 17 million UAH collected for Pokrovsk highlights civilian resilience and unity, countering demoralizing RF narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Symbolic Messaging: The "Президентська бригада ЗСУ" sharing a photo with the caption "🔔Над частиною лунає протяжний подзвін" (A prolonged ringing bell sounds over the unit) likely serves to evoke a sense of solemnity, remembrance, or call to arms within UA forces, reinforcing unit cohesion. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Ukraine:
  • The severe civilian casualties in Lozova and the continued threat of ballistic missile strikes will undoubtedly increase public anxiety and highlight the urgent need for enhanced air defense. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • The breakthrough at Ocheretyne could be a significant blow to public morale if not contained quickly. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Air defense successes provide a morale boost, demonstrating defensive capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Community fundraising efforts show continued public support and resilience despite adversity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russia:
  • VDV celebrations and claims of territorial gains are intended to boost military and public morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Reports of internal disciplinary issues (ASTRA's report of officer sent to "basement for refusers") could subtly undermine trust in command for a segment of the population, though likely downplayed by official media. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • The focus on deep strikes on UA logistics and civilian infrastructure, framed as "retribution," aims to reassure the domestic audience that RF is responding effectively to UA actions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• RF Diplomatic Activity: The visit of the DPRK Prosecutor's delegation to Russia suggests ongoing bilateral engagement, possibly related to military-technical cooperation or legal frameworks. Nicaragua receiving Russian vaccine indicates continued outreach to Latin American partners. Russian Foreign Ministry's official response to US threats regarding Indian oil purchases indicates RF's awareness and active diplomacy to maintain economic partnerships. Chinese embassy's statement on US sanctions related to RF "SVO" support signals continued diplomatic backing for Moscow. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Impact on UA: These diplomatic developments, while not directly impacting the battlefield, signify Russia's continued efforts to forge alliances and counter international isolation. The lack of new public international support for Ukraine in this update underscores the critical need for continued diplomatic engagement to secure resources. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

• COA 1 (MLCOA - Prioritize Ocheretyne Consolidation and Exploitation): Over the next 24-48 hours, RF will commit available tactical reserves to Ocheretyne to consolidate the foothold, establish robust defensive positions, and attempt to expand the salient, particularly aiming to bypass UA fortifications to the west. This will be supported by continued artillery and air strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• COA 2 (MLCOA - Sustained High-Intensity Pressure on Chasiv Yar): RF will continue to use massed gliding bombs and VDV-led infantry assaults against Chasiv Yar, aiming to fix UA reserves and prevent their redeployment to Ocheretyne, or to achieve incremental gains. RF will also seek to counter UA fortification and mining efforts in the sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• COA 3 (MLCOA - Continued Deep Strikes on UA Infrastructure): RF will maintain a high tempo of UAV (especially Geran) and potentially missile strikes against UA rear-area critical infrastructure (railways, energy) and population centers, particularly in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts, seeking to degrade logistics and morale and to serve as "retribution" messaging. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• COA 4 (MLCOA - Localized Probing Attacks): RF will maintain localized offensive pressure on the Kupyansk and Seversk directions to stretch UA defenses and identify new weaknesses, potentially aiming to tie down UA reserves. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• COA 5 (MLCOA - Information Dominance and Justification): RF will continue to use its media apparatus to immediately publicize its successful strikes and territorial gains, while denigrating UA forces, aiming to control the information narrative domestically and internationally. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

• MDCOA 1 (Rapid Exploitation of Ocheretyne to Widen Breakthrough and Encircle): RF could achieve a rapid and deep penetration from Ocheretyne, bypassing significant UA fortified areas and threatening to encircle or cut off multiple UA defensive lines, leading to a large-scale withdrawal or collapse in the sector and opening a direct path towards Pokrovsk. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• MDCOA 2 (Coordinated Simultaneous Decisive Offensive on Chasiv Yar and a New Axis): RF could launch a decisive, large-scale armored assault on Chasiv Yar, coordinated with a renewed, significant offensive on a different axis (e.g., Kupyansk-Lyman or a cross-border thrust in Sumy region), aiming to overwhelm UA defenses and prevent effective cross-sector reinforcement, forcing a two-front operational crisis. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

• Next 24-48 Hours:

  • High Probability: RF will attempt to reinforce and expand gains in Ocheretyne.
  • High Probability: Continued intense air/artillery bombardment of Chasiv Yar, likely targeting newly identified UA fortifications.
  • High Probability: More UAV/missile strikes against UA rear areas, particularly logistics hubs.
  • Decision Points for UA:
    • CRITICAL: Immediate allocation and deployment of tactical reserves to Ocheretyne to contain the RF breakthrough and prevent further advance.
    • HIGH PRIORITY: Rapid assessment of RF force composition and intent in Ocheretyne for precise counter-measures and identifying vulnerability.
    • HIGH PRIORITY: Intensify counter-battery fires against RF artillery supporting both Chasiv Yar and Ocheretyne, leveraging newly acquired ISR.

• Next 1-2 Weeks:

  • Continued Offensive Pressure: RF will likely sustain or increase offensive tempo on key axes, potentially shifting main efforts based on the success at Ocheretyne.
  • Decision Points for UA:
    • CRITICAL: Re-evaluation of defensive lines and force posture west of Avdiivka, potentially establishing new fallback positions if Ocheretyne cannot be fully secured, or preparing for a counter-offensive to regain lost ground.
    • HIGH PRIORITY: Adaptive air defense strategy to counter the evolving threat of massed drones and ballistic missiles, incorporating lessons learned from recent strikes on Lozova.
    • HIGH PRIORITY: Strategic decision on balancing offensive operations (e.g., in Kursk) with the critical defensive requirements on the eastern front, prioritizing resources for critical defensive sectors.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Immediate Counter-Attack and Stabilization at Ocheretyne:

   • Action: Immediately commit available and suitable tactical reserves to launch a decisive counter-attack at Ocheretyne to dislodge RF forces, prevent consolidation, and restore defensive integrity. This counter-attack must be well-supported by fire. (CRITICAL PRIORITY)
   • Action: Task all available ISR assets (UAV, SIGINT, ELINT) to identify the specific units, strength, and equipment of RF forces in Ocheretyne, their logistics, and C2 nodes to inform the counter-attack and subsequent targeting. (CRITICAL ISR REQUIREMENT)

2. Reinforce and Enhance Chasiv Yar Defenses Against Massed Air Attacks and Ground Assaults:

   • Action: Prioritize the deployment of mobile, short-range air defense systems to protect forward positions, C2 nodes, and logistics in the Chasiv Yar area against FAB/KAB gliding bombs. (CRITICAL PRIORITY)
   • Action: Accelerate and expand fortification efforts between Soledar and Chasiv Yar, ensuring comprehensive minefield coverage and layered defensive positions, using engineers with priority. (HIGH PRIORITY)
   • Action: Implement advanced camouflage and concealment measures for all positions and equipment in Chasiv Yar to mitigate the impact of RF aerial reconnaissance and precision strikes. (HIGH PRIORITY)

3. Strengthen Air Defense and Early Warning for Rear Areas:

   • Action: Reallocate and deploy additional medium-to-long-range air defense systems to protect critical railway infrastructure (e.g., Lozova) and major population centers (e.g., Kharkiv, Dnipro) from ballistic missile and massed drone (Geran) attacks. Focus on hardened or redundant systems for critical nodes. (CRITICAL PRIORITY)
   • Action: Enhance real-time intelligence sharing with local authorities for immediate public alerts and ensure accessible, hardened shelters for civilian populations in areas under high threat of deep strikes. (HIGH PRIORITY)

4. Disrupt RF Logistics and C2 for Main Offensive Axes:

   • Action: Intensify targeting of RF artillery positions, identified forward command posts (CPs), and logistics hubs (e.g., fuel depots, ammunition dumps) supporting both the Chasiv Yar and Ocheretyne offensives using precision munitions. Prioritize targets based on their immediate impact on RF offensive tempo. (HIGH PRIORITY)
   • Action: Increase ISR collection on RF EW capabilities and positions to identify vulnerabilities and develop countermeasures to protect UA drone operations. (HIGH ISR REQUIREMENT)

5. Proactive Information Counter-Campaign and Morale Preservation:

   • Action: Rapidly and transparently communicate the tactical situation at Ocheretyne and Chasiv Yar to the public and international partners, highlighting the intensity of RF attacks and UA defensive efforts, while refuting RF claims of significant territorial gains and exposing RF deep strikes on civilian infrastructure. (HIGH PRIORITY)
   • Action: Leverage civilian resilience and fundraising successes (Pokrovsk) in official communications to reinforce national unity, counter demoralizing RF narratives, and maintain public support for the war effort. (HIGH PRIORITY)