Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 021937Z AUG 25

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Southern Ukraine (Kherson Oblast): RF sources (РБК-Україна, НгП раZVедка) confirm significant damage to a bridge in Kherson from a recent strike, with accompanying video/photo evidence. This aligns with the ongoing RF campaign against Dnieper River crossings. Power outages are reported in Kherson (STERNENKO). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Southern Ukraine (Mykolaiv): RF Tu-22M3 aircraft were detected heading to launch positions in the Black Sea (Николаевский Ванёк), leading to missile warnings. An explosion was reported in Mykolaiv, and a fire subsequently broke out (РБК-Україна, Операция Z, Alex Parker Returns, Colonelcassad). Power outages are also reported in Mykolaiv Oblast (РБК-Україна, Оперативний ЗСУ). UA Air Force later issued an "all clear" for the Tu-22M3 threat, but reported a repeat Kh-22 launch (ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for threat and strike, HIGH for power outages and fire, MEDIUM for exact BDA and sequence of missile launches)
• Eastern Ukraine (Donetsk - Pokrovsk Axis): RF sources continue to emphasize the importance of Pokrovsk, with one stating that its "liberation" would mark the "final military campaign for the liberation of northern DPR" (Alex Parker Returns). This indicates continued RF focus on this axis. The previous report noted RF tactics of "total infiltration" and "sabotage in the rear" on this axis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for strategic importance, HIGH for RF offensive intent)
• Eastern Ukraine (Donetsk Airport): UA source (Оперативний ЗСУ via Кіберборошно) reiterates that infrastructure is being established at Donetsk Airport for the use of "Shahed" and "Gerbera" type UAVs with remote control. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Eastern Ukraine (Konstantinovka Direction): RF source (Colonelcassad) provides video of alleged "losses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Konstantinovka." This remains consistent with previous RF claims of targeting UA forces in this area. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - for RF claim accuracy; HIGH for RF intent to project successful targeting of UA units)
• Northeastern Ukraine (Sumy Oblast): UA Air Force and RBC-Ukraine report multiple groups of UAVs heading towards Konotop. This represents continued and focused RF drone activity in the region. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Territory (Bryansk Oblast): UA source (ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS) reports a bridge in Bryansk Oblast was significantly damaged by an FPV drone. This indicates continued Ukrainian deep strike capability into RF territory. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Occupied Territories (Makeevka, DNR): RF source (ASTRA) reports "DNR" authorities are checking all schools and kindergartens after a school was destroyed in Makeevka. This points to ongoing UA strikes in occupied territories. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• No new significant weather or environmental factors reported. Conditions remain generally conducive to continued ground and air operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces:
  • Air Assets: Continued deployment of Tu-22M3 bombers for Kh-22 strikes. Persistent and geographically focused UAV activity in Northern Ukraine. Continued use of FABs/glide bombs targeting infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ground Assets: Sustained offensive pressure in Eastern Ukraine, particularly the Pokrovsk axis, indicating a continued commitment to seize territory. RF maintains the capability to conduct "infiltration" and "sabotage" operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Operations: RF channels are actively promoting narratives of successful strikes (Mykolaiv, Kherson bridge) and strategic importance of current offensives (Pokrovsk). They are also focusing on internal Ukrainian vulnerabilities (mobilization protests, alleged unit losses). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UA Forces:
  • Air Assets: Active air defense, evidenced by the Mykolaiv threat response, though BDA on the Kh-22 is still being assessed. Continued monitoring of RF UAV movements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ground Assets: Defenses remain active and committed in Eastern Ukraine, particularly on the Pokrovsk axis. UA forces continue to demonstrate deep strike capabilities into RF territory. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Control Measures:
  • Ukraine: UA authorities are actively responding to infrastructure damage and power outages. UA military leadership continues to monitor and direct operations in critical sectors. The alleged "flight" of the "military-civilian administration of Donetsk Oblast" from Kramatorsk (Военкор Котенок) is a Russian propaganda narrative and not reflective of UA control measures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for UA response, LOW for RF "flight" claim)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:
  • Strategic Air Assets: RF retains the ability to conduct long-range, high-speed missile strikes (Kh-22) against major urban centers and critical infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Guided Aerial Bombs (FABs/UMPK): Continued and effective employment of glide bombs against fixed infrastructure, demonstrated by the Kherson bridge strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • UAVs: RF is scaling up and professionalizing its drone operations, with confirmed development of dedicated infrastructure for "Shahed" and "Gerbera" UAVs with remote control capabilities. This suggests improved targeting and operational flexibility. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ground Offensive Operations: RF continues to conduct focused ground offensives in the East, employing adaptive tactics (infiltration/sabotage) to achieve objectives, particularly on the Pokrovsk axis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Warfare: RF maintains a robust information apparatus capable of rapid dissemination of narratives and exploitation of perceived Ukrainian weaknesses (e.g., alleged mobilization protests, unit losses). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intentions:
  • Military Objectives: RF intends to continue degrading Ukrainian critical infrastructure, particularly Dnieper crossings and energy grids (Kherson, Mykolaiv power outages). They remain committed to seizing additional territory in Eastern Ukraine, with Pokrovsk identified as a key strategic objective for consolidating control over the "DPR." They aim to disrupt Ukrainian logistics and C2, and achieve localized breakthroughs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Objectives: RF aims to project an image of overwhelming military power and successful strikes, undermine Ukrainian morale by highlighting alleged losses and internal dissent (Vinnitsa mobilization protest), and legitimize their territorial claims in Eastern Ukraine. They also seek to counter UA successes and narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Sustained and Adaptive Air/Missile Campaign: The repeated targeting of Dnieper bridges and energy infrastructure, combined with focused UAV attacks on northern oblasts, demonstrates a systematic approach to infrastructure degradation and pressure on multiple axes.
• Reinforced Focus on Pokrovsk: RF information channels explicitly identifying Pokrovsk as a key strategic objective for "liberation of northern DPR" reinforces the assessment of their main effort in the East.
• Remote-Controlled UAVs: The confirmation of "remote control" capabilities for Shahed/Gerbera UAVs at Donetsk Airport implies a more sophisticated and potentially scalable approach to drone warfare, possibly enabling operations from safer distances or with reduced direct human risk at launch sites.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF continues to demonstrate the capacity for complex air operations, implying sufficient fuel and munitions for air assets. The systematic nature of infrastructure strikes suggests an organized supply chain for guided munitions.
• The reliance on crowdfunding by some RF units (mentioned in previous reports) for specific items indicates persistent, localized supply chain gaps, but does not appear to hinder major operational efforts.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains capable of coordinating multi-domain strikes (strategic aviation, UAVs, glide bombs) across wide geographical areas. The rapid propagation of BDA and propaganda narratives indicates effective information synchronization with military operations.
• The establishment of dedicated UAV infrastructure points to long-term strategic planning and C2 integration for drone warfare.
• RF appears to be leveraging internal information sources effectively to shape narratives (e.g., Vinnitsa mobilization protest, alleged UA unit losses). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Ukrainian forces maintain an active air defense posture, successfully mitigating some RF air threats.
• UA deep strike capabilities continue to operate effectively, as evidenced by the FPV drone strike on a bridge in Bryansk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces remain engaged in heavy defensive operations in the East, particularly around Pokrovsk, indicating high readiness and resolve.
• UA authorities are swiftly responding to and managing the consequences of RF infrastructure attacks (power outages, fires). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes:
  • Reported FPV drone strike on a bridge in Bryansk Oblast demonstrates continued UA asymmetric capabilities and ability to project power into RF territory. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Successful downing of some RF aerial targets, with UA Air Force issuing "all clear" for Tu-22M3 threats (though a repeat Kh-22 launch was reported, still indicates active defense). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for active defense, MEDIUM for full success)
  • Swift response by UA authorities to power outages and fires in Mykolaiv and Kherson demonstrates effective emergency management. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Setbacks:
  • Continued and significant damage to critical civilian infrastructure in Kherson (bridge, power) and Mykolaiv (strike, fire, power) by RF strikes, impacting local logistics and civilian life. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Persistent RF UAV activity towards Konotop, indicating a continued aerial threat to northern regions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF claims regarding the disappearance of a UA company from the 95th Air Assault Brigade near Yunakovka (TASS) are unverified but represent an RF information operation aimed at demoralization. (CONFIDENCE: LOW for fact, HIGH for RF intent)

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Continued urgent need for advanced air defense systems (SHORAD and layered systems) capable of countering high-speed missiles (Kh-22) and an increasingly sophisticated RF drone threat.
• Significant resources are required for rapid repair and resilience measures for damaged critical infrastructure (bridges, energy grids) to maintain civilian life and military logistics.
• Sustained supply of tactical UAVs and anti-drone capabilities is vital for frontline units to counter RF "infiltration" tactics and monitor their drone operations.
• Persistent medical support and casualty evacuation capabilities remain critical given the high intensity of fighting.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Objectives: RF channels (Военкор Котенок, ТАСС, Colonelcassad, Alex Parker Returns, НгП раZVедка, Операция Z, Fighterbomber, АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА, MoD Russia, Басурин о главном) are actively propagating narratives of:
  • Successful destruction of Ukrainian targets (Mykolaiv strike, Kherson bridge, alleged UA losses near Konstantinovka).
  • Ukrainian weaknesses and internal dissent (alleged large-scale anti-mobilization protest in Vinnitsa, "missing" UA company, "flight" of Kramatorsk administration).
  • Strategic importance of RF advances (Pokrovsk as key to "DPR liberation").
  • Legitimizing RF actions and celebrating military personnel (Putin awarding "Hero of RF" to Syrotyuk).
  • Justifying missile strikes by highlighting the "unstoppable" nature of Kh-22 missiles. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UA Objectives: UA channels (STERNENKO, Повітряні Сили ЗС України, РБК-Україна, ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS, Николаевский Ванёк, Оперативний ЗСУ, ASTRA) focus on:
  • Reporting RF aggression and consequences (strikes, power outages, fires).
  • Highlighting Ukrainian resilience and successful defense (FPV strike in Bryansk, air defense responses).
  • Countering RF disinformation (e.g., on Donetsk Airport).
  • Maintaining transparency on the situation and emergency responses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Ukrainian Public: Morale is likely impacted by the persistent missile and drone threats, and the damage to essential infrastructure. However, the demonstrated resilience of air defenses and rapid response to emergencies will help mitigate negative sentiment. News of successful deep strikes into RF territory will likely boost morale. Anti-mobilization protest in Vinnitsa, if verified, could indicate domestic pressures, but RF claims need rigorous verification. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for impact, MEDIUM for protest assessment)
• Russian Public: Public sentiment is continuously reinforced by narratives of military successes and heroic actions of commanders. Celebration of military holidays and official recognition of servicemen aim to maintain support. Reports of Ukrainian vulnerabilities are designed to bolster internal confidence. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• No new major international diplomatic developments reported in this intelligence cycle. The information environment remains dominated by military actions and associated information operations. RF narratives may aim to create a perception of Ukrainian internal instability to influence international support.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

• Sustained and Adaptive Infrastructure Degradation Campaign: RF will continue to employ Kh-22 missiles, FABs/UMPKs, and an increasing number of sophisticated UAVs (from dedicated hubs like Donetsk Airport) to systematically degrade Ukrainian critical infrastructure, focusing on Dnieper bridges, railway nodes, energy facilities, and port infrastructure. Expect intensified and potentially multi-directional UAV attacks on northern and central oblasts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intensified Eastern Offensives with Adaptive Tactics: RF will maintain and likely intensify ground offensives on the Pokrovsk, Dobropillia, and Novopavlivka axes, leveraging "infiltration" and "sabotage" tactics to bypass prepared defenses and achieve breakthroughs. This will be supported by high volumes of artillery fire and glide bomb strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Persistent Information Warfare and Demoralization Efforts: RF will continue to exploit perceived Ukrainian vulnerabilities (mobilization, alleged losses) and project their own military successes to undermine Ukrainian morale and influence international perceptions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

• Coordinated Envelopment of Avdiivka/Pokrovsk with Deep Strikes: RF could attempt a rapid, decisive operational envelopment on the Pokrovsk axis (consistent with previous Avdiivka MLCOA), concurrently with a highly coordinated, multi-wave missile and drone strike campaign targeting key logistical hubs and command nodes across the Dnieper to isolate forces and disrupt resupply. The shift of 76th VDV elements could be a feint for such a concentrated effort. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Diversionary Cross-Border Incursion with Sabotage and UAV Swarms: RF could launch a limited, highly mobile ground incursion into Sumy or Chernihiv Oblasts, primarily utilizing light infantry and special forces (supported by large swarms of remote-controlled UAVs) to conduct high-impact sabotage operations against critical infrastructure, aiming to draw Ukrainian forces away from the Eastern front and further disrupt logistics. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Expanded Use of Chemical or Obscuring Agents: While highly unlikely and a grave escalation, RF could employ chemical agents (e.g., riot control agents) in conjunction with ground assaults to dislodge Ukrainian forces from fortified positions, especially in urban environments or complex trench lines, aiming for rapid tactical gains. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

• Immediate (0-24 hours): Expect continued RF missile and UAV strikes on critical infrastructure, particularly in Southern and Northern Ukraine. Intense localized ground engagements will persist on the Pokrovsk axis. Decision Point: Prioritize air defense assets to counter current and anticipated drone/missile threats. Conduct rapid BDA on Mykolaiv strike and Kherson power outages to assess immediate impact and initiate repair plans. Reinforce counter-infiltration measures on the Pokrovsk axis.
• Short-Term (24-72 hours): RF will likely maintain high offensive pressure in the East, seeking to exploit any perceived weaknesses. The intensity of UAV operations from new infrastructure in Donetsk Airport is likely to increase. Decision Point: Evaluate the effectiveness of current air defense deployments against the evolving RF drone threat. Assess the need for tactical reinforcements to heavily contested Eastern sectors, with a focus on countering combined arms assaults and infiltration. Prioritize continued ISR and targeting of newly identified RF UAV infrastructure.
• Mid-Term (72+ hours): RF will continue to attempt to degrade Ukrainian logistics and C2 through sustained multi-domain strikes and attrition in the East. Ukraine will need to demonstrate continued adaptive defense and resilience. Decision Point: Review and adjust regional air defense deployments based on assessment of RF long-range strike patterns and an anticipated increase in drone usage. Prioritize procurement and deployment of advanced counter-UAV and EW systems, particularly those capable of jamming remote-controlled drones.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

• Air Defense & Counter-Air (PRIORITY 1):
  • Immediately assess the impact of the Kh-22 strike in Mykolaiv and the effectiveness of current air defense against this threat. Adjust deployment of high-altitude and long-range air defense systems to better cover Southern Ukrainian cities.
  • Intensify real-time ISR and targeting of RF tactical aviation (Su-34/35) identified as FAB/KAB launch platforms and reconnaissance/strike UAVs, with a focus on the new remote-controlled capabilities.
  • Prioritize offensive operations (e.g., long-range precision strikes, SOF operations) against the identified UAV infrastructure at Donetsk Airport to disrupt RF drone operations at source.
  • Accelerate deployment of mobile, short-range air defense systems (SHORAD) to protect frontline units and critical infrastructure against tactical aviation and persistent drone threats, especially in northern oblasts.
• Logistics & Infrastructure Resilience (PRIORITY 1):
  • Conduct immediate and thorough BDA of all Dnieper bridges struck. Accelerate comprehensive repair plans and fully activate robust alternative logistics routes (ferries, pontoon bridges, and bypasses) to ensure uninterrupted supply lines to Southern forces.
  • Establish rapid response teams for energy and railway infrastructure repairs, with pre-positioned equipment and materials to minimize disruption from RF strikes, particularly in Kherson and Mykolaiv. Diversify energy supply routes where possible.
• Eastern Front Reinforcement & Attrition (PRIORITY 1):
  • Allocate additional mobile reserves, including counter-infiltration teams, EW assets, and precision counter-battery capabilities, to reinforce defensive lines on the Pokrovsk, Dobropillia, and Novopavlivka axes. Develop specific tactics and training to counter RF infiltration methods.
  • Increase counter-battery fire focusing on identified RF artillery, rocket systems, and troop concentrations supporting assaults in the Pokrovsk area.
  • Expedite procurement and deployment of tactical UAVs and FPV drones to frontline units for enhanced ISR, targeting, and direct strike capabilities, specifically to counter RF infiltration tactics.
• Information Operations (PRIORITY 2):
  • Maintain transparency on the extent of infrastructure damage and progress of repair efforts to counter RF propaganda and sustain public morale.
  • Amplify Ukrainian military successes, particularly deep strikes into RF territory and successful air defense engagements, to counter RF narratives of dominance and underscore Ukrainian resilience.
  • Proactively counter RF disinformation campaigns regarding military gains and internal Ukrainian affairs (e.g., alleged mobilization protests, unit losses) with accurate and verified information.
• Intelligence Collection (PRIORITY 1):
  • Focus ISR on determining the exact units involved and the strength of RF forces on the Pokrovsk, Dobropillia, and Novopavlivka axes to anticipate their next moves, particularly focusing on identifying infiltration teams and operational reserves.
  • Verify the exact nature and scale of UAV infrastructure development at Donetsk Airport, including control systems, drone types being prepared, and their operational readiness for remote-controlled flights.
  • Conduct comprehensive BDA on all RF infrastructure strikes, particularly the Mykolaiv strike and Kherson power outage, to assess the immediate and long-term impact on logistics and energy supply.
  • Verify the RF claims regarding the anti-mobilization protest in Vinnitsa and the status of the 95th Airmobile Brigade company near Yunakovka.

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• RF Force Strength and Composition on Eastern Axes: Precise identification of RF units, their equipment, and immediate objectives around Pokrovsk, Dobropillia, and Novopavlivka, specifically details on forces engaged in "infiltration" and any new deployments.
• RF UAV Infrastructure at Donetsk Airport: Detailed imagery, SIGINT, and human intelligence to confirm the full scale of infrastructure, specific UAV types, operational readiness for remote-controlled drones, and the extent of their control range.
• Mykolaiv Strike BDA: Comprehensive assessment of the Mykolaiv strike: exact impact location, extent of damage, casualty assessment, and whether the "downed" missile contributed to the explosion or if it was a separate, successful strike. Differentiate between initial and repeat Kh-22 launches.
• Kherson Power Outage Cause: Determine if the power outage in Kherson is a direct result of military action (strike on energy infrastructure) or other operational issues.
• Verification of RF Claims: Urgent verification of the alleged large-scale anti-mobilization protest in Vinnitsa and the reported disappearance of a company from the 95th Air Assault Brigade near Yunakovka.
• RF Bridge Damage in Bryansk: Detailed BDA on the FPV drone strike on the bridge in Bryansk Oblast, assessing structural damage and its impact on RF logistics.

---

END OF REPORT