Southern Ukraine (Kherson): Multiple Russian (Tsaplienko_Ukraine Fights, Operatyvny ZSU, Colonelcassad, Дневник Десантника🇷🇺, Два майора) and Ukrainian sources confirm a significant Russian strike on a bridge in Kherson connecting the Korabelny district to the main city. RF sources claim a FAB-3000 glide bomb with UMPK was used. Video evidence shows a large explosion and significant damage. This bridge is a critical local logistical artery. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Eastern Ukraine (Donetsk):
Chasiv Yar: Ukrainian forces (Tsaplienko_Ukraine Fights) continue to refute Russian claims of seizing Chasiv Yar, stating "they lie in plain sight." This confirms ongoing, fierce contestation for the city. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Hryhorivka (Donetsk): RF (TASS) claims Southern Group of Forces artillery and drone operators destroyed two UA UAV control posts near Hryhorivka. Video evidence provided shows target acquisition and strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for RF claim of strike; MEDIUM for confirmed BDA without UA verification)
General Donetsk: UA 30th Separate Mechanized Brigade reports destroying a fuel truck, 3 motorcycles, a "bukhanka" (UAZ-452 van), and an RF occupier in Donetsk Oblast. This indicates active UA tactical engagements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Northeastern Ukraine (Donetsk/Kharkiv): Ukrainian Air Force reports groups of RF strike UAVs in the Sloviansk and Novoselivka areas of Donetsk Oblast, and near Staryi Saltiv in Kharkiv Oblast. This indicates continued RF drone reconnaissance and potential strike activity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
RF Territory (Belgorod Oblast): Russian source (ASTRA) reports Ukrainian forces struck Belgorod Oblast, causing damage to residential buildings. Images show damaged structures and smoke. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
RF Territory (Bryansk, Sevastopol, Moscow):
Previous report on Bryansk bridge damage by UA forces remains.
Internal Russian news reports detention of a previously wanted individual in Moscow (Военкор Котенок) and Russian school children winning international informatics olympiad (Новости Москвы). These are domestic non-military events. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
No new significant weather or environmental factors reported. Conditions generally conducive to continued ground and air operations.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF Forces:
Air Assets: Confirmed use of FAB-3000 glide bombs (Kherson). Continued deployment of strike UAVs (Donetsk, Kharkiv). RF MoD video showcases UGV capabilities for "saving lives" and "front-line" operations (likely propaganda/demonstration). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Ground Assets: Artillery and drone operators remain active (Hryhorivka). RF claims advances towards Iskra on the Southern-Donetsk direction, with leaflet drops on enemy positions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for claim of advance; MEDIUM for BDA on leaflet effectiveness)
Information Operations: RF continues active propaganda, celebrating VDV Day (Два майора, WarGonzo), showcasing military successes (bridge destruction, UAV control post destruction), and promoting UGV technology. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
UA Forces:
Anti-Drone Capabilities: Ukrainian National Guard (Бутусов ПЛЮС) forms a new anti-UAV platoon. Ukrainian forces are producing modified 5.45mm and 7.62mm ammunition for anti-drone warfare (Оперативний ЗСУ - Forpost, Kramatorsk Border Detachment). This indicates a strong focus on countering RF drone threats. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Offensive Actions: UA 30th Separate Mechanized Brigade demonstrates successful tactical engagements in Donetsk. UA forces are conducting strikes into RF territory (Belgorod). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Counter-Information: Ukrainian media continues to directly refute RF claims (Chasiv Yar) and highlight RF actions (Kherson bridge strike). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Control Measures:
Ukraine: Focus on developing specific anti-drone measures. Continued active defense and limited counter-offensive actions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
RF: Sustained offensive operations and robust information campaigns. Public celebration of VDV Day. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Glide Bomb Strikes: RF has demonstrated the capability to deploy heavy glide bombs (FAB-3000) against critical infrastructure, significantly impacting logistical routes. This represents a continued escalation in air-delivered precision/area munitions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
UAV Operations: RF maintains robust capabilities for both reconnaissance and strike UAVs, evidenced by widespread drone activity and targeted strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Artillery and UAV Coordination: RF demonstrates effective combined arms tactics by using drones for target acquisition and BDA for artillery strikes against targets such as UAV control posts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Information Warfare & PSYOPS: Highly capable in psychological operations, including leaflet drops to induce surrender and coordinated messaging across multiple channels to disseminate narratives of success and Ukrainian failures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Intentions:
Military Objectives: RF intends to continue degrading Ukrainian logistics and infrastructure, particularly targeting bridges and supply routes in critical areas like Kherson. They aim to achieve localized territorial gains (e.g., Iskra on Southern-Donetsk axis) and attrit UA forces, especially through concentrated air and artillery strikes. RF will continue high-value aerial threats to disrupt UA operations and civilian life. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Information Objectives: RF intends to:
Demonstrate overwhelming firepower and technological superiority (FAB-3000, UGVs).
Undermine UA morale through highlighting losses and perceived failures (Avdiivka context from previous report, although not directly re-iterated here).
Boost domestic morale and cohesion, especially among military personnel (VDV Day celebration).
Discredit UA government and military leadership. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status
The confirmed use of FAB-3000 indicates a capability to produce or access these large munitions and deliver them, suggesting continued, albeit possibly strained, aerial ordnance supply. The deployment of advanced UGVs (even if for propaganda) indicates continued investment in military technology. RF logistics appear capable of sustaining high-intensity operations on key axes. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 remains effective in coordinating complex strikes involving glide bombs and artillery with ISR assets. Information operations are well-coordinated, with rapid dissemination of claims and video evidence across various channels, often with a clear propaganda agenda. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
3. FRIENDLY FORCES
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Adaptability to Drone Threat: Ukrainian forces are actively adapting to the pervasive RF drone threat by creating specialized anti-UAV units and developing custom ammunition, demonstrating high readiness and innovation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Defensive Resilience: UA forces continue to hold key defensive lines (Chasiv Yar), actively refuting RF propaganda regarding territorial gains. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Offensive Capabilities: Ukrainian units are conducting successful tactical engagements against RF ground forces and logistics in Donetsk Oblast, showcasing continued offensive capability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Counter-Information: UA forces are actively engaged in countering RF disinformation, maintaining credibility and morale through direct refutations and highlighting RF atrocities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Successes:
Development and deployment of specialized anti-drone capabilities (new platoon, custom ammunition).
Successful tactical engagements against RF ground forces and logistics (30th OMBR in Donetsk).
Continued strong defense at Chasiv Yar, denying RF advances. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Successful strikes into RF territory (Belgorod Oblast). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Setbacks:
Significant damage to critical infrastructure (Kherson bridge) by a heavy RF glide bomb, impacting local logistics and civilian movement. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Continued RF drone activity necessitating widespread air defense alerts and resource expenditure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Civilian casualties reported in Belgorod Oblast as a consequence of UA strikes into RF territory (as reported by ASTRA), potentially increasing internal RF support for conflict. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:
RF Objectives: Continue to project military might and success (FAB-3000 strike on Kherson bridge, destruction of UA UAV CPs, UGV demonstration), celebrate military holidays (VDV Day) to boost internal morale, and falsely claim territorial gains (Chasiv Yar) to demoralize UA. RF also frames UA strikes on RF territory as unprovoked aggression. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
UA Objectives: Actively counter RF disinformation regarding territorial control, highlight RF use of heavy ordnance against civilian infrastructure, and demonstrate UA adaptability and resolve in countering drone threats. UA also continues to expose internal RF issues (detentions, corruption). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:
Ukrainian Public: Will likely be impacted by the destruction of the Kherson bridge, a key local artery. Continued adaptation to drone threats and internal anti-corruption efforts are crucial for maintaining morale and trust. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Russian Public: RF information campaigns aim to maintain high morale by showcasing military effectiveness and national pride (VDV Day). Reports of Ukrainian strikes on RF territory will be used to reinforce narratives of external threat and justify military actions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
International Support and Diplomatic Developments:
Western Support: Russian channels continue to amplify Western statements (e.g., UK FM on war duration) to shape international perception of the conflict's longevity and costs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
The use of heavy glide bombs (FAB-3000) by RF against civilian infrastructure will likely draw international condemnation and may influence discussions on further military aid to Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):
Continued Deep Strikes with Glide Bombs: RF will continue to employ large glide bombs (FAB-1500/3000) against critical Ukrainian infrastructure, logistics nodes, and fortifications, particularly targeting bridges and strongpoints on active fronts to degrade defensive capabilities and disrupt supply lines. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Intensified Drone Operations: RF will sustain and potentially increase its use of reconnaissance and strike UAVs across the front, focusing on targeting Ukrainian command posts, artillery positions, and logistics, and probing for weaknesses in air defense. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Sustained Ground Pressure & Information Warfare: RF will maintain pressure on key axes (e.g., Chasiv Yar, Southern-Donetsk direction) with localized ground assaults, supported by artillery and psychological operations (e.g., leaflet drops) to induce surrender or demoralization. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):
Coordinated Infrastructure Campaign: RF could launch a coordinated series of high-precision strikes using glide bombs and potentially cruise missiles against multiple key bridges and transportation hubs across a wider operational area (e.g., targeting Dnipro bridges or critical railway junctions) to severely impede Ukrainian logistical movements. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
Concentrated Air Assault with Ground Offensive: RF could attempt to combine intense aerial bombardment (including glide bombs) with a rapid, large-scale ground assault (potentially involving VDV or other elite units) on a critical urban objective, aiming for a decisive breakthrough and encirclement. (Previous Avdiivka context remains relevant here). (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:
Immediate (0-24 hours): Expect continued RF drone activity and localized ground assaults on contested fronts. Further targeted strikes on infrastructure are probable. Decision Point: Prioritize real-time ISR on RF air activity and drone launch sites to enable rapid air defense responses.
Short-Term (24-72 hours): RF will likely assess the impact of the Kherson bridge strike and may attempt similar strikes on other critical infrastructure. UA will continue to adapt anti-drone tactics. Decision Point: Evaluate the resilience of remaining infrastructure and adjust logistics plans to mitigate further strikes. Expedite procurement/production of anti-drone ammunition.
Mid-Term (72+ hours): RF will seek to exploit any logistical disruptions caused by infrastructure damage. UA will need to reinforce defensive lines and accelerate counter-measures against new RF threats. Decision Point: Strategic messaging to international partners highlighting RF targeting of civilian infrastructure to bolster support for air defense systems.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS
Air Defense & Counter-Drone (PRIORITY 1):
Immediately assess the vulnerability of other critical bridges and transportation infrastructure to large glide bomb attacks. Prioritize active and passive defenses for these assets.
Expedite the deployment of newly formed anti-UAV platoons and ensure sufficient supply of specialized anti-drone ammunition and jammers to frontline units.
Increase ISR on RF glide bomb launch platforms and airfields to provide early warning.
Implement immediate contingency plans for alternative logistics routes in the Kherson region and other areas vulnerable to bridge strikes.
Review and reinforce repair capabilities for critical infrastructure.
Information Warfare (PRIORITY 1):
Proactively disseminate information and video evidence regarding the destruction of the Kherson bridge by RF, emphasizing the targeting of civilian infrastructure. Use this to highlight RF war crimes and advocate for increased international support.
Continue to directly refute RF claims of territorial gains (e.g., Chasiv Yar) with verifiable evidence.
Maintain aggressive counter-battery fire against identified RF artillery and mortar positions, and especially against known or suspected UAV control posts.
Force Protection (PRIORITY 2): Enhance protective measures for troops and civilians against persistent drone threats, including increased use of electronic warfare and shelters.
7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
FAB-3000 Deployment: Confirm the frequency, delivery methods, and specific impact of FAB-3000 type bombs. Are these mass-produced or limited in quantity?
Kherson Bridge BDA: Conduct detailed BDA on the Kherson bridge to assess the extent of damage and estimated repair timeline. Is it a full collapse or partial damage? What is the impact on civilian and military traffic?
RF UAV Capabilities: Assess the new RF "Leningradsky Rubish" hexacopter's operational capabilities (range, payload, stealth) and intended role. Is it for reconnaissance or strike?
RF Anti-Drone Measures: Collect intelligence on RF's own anti-drone capabilities and tactics to identify vulnerabilities in UA drone operations.
Iskra Advance: Corroborate RF claims of advance towards Iskra on the Southern-Donetsk axis with independent ISR, identifying specific units involved and the depth of penetration.
Belgorod Strikes: Confirm the type of munitions used by UA in the Belgorod Oblast strike and assess the RF response, including any increases in air defense or security measures.
