Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 301907Z JUL 25

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Ukraine General: Nationwide missile and UAV threat from RF persists. New group of strike UAVs detected in Chernihiv Oblast moving towards Northern Kyiv Oblast, while others are spreading to Western Ukraine. A new group of strike UAVs is reported in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, heading northwest. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kharkiv Oblast: КАBs inbound. RF conducted missile strike on a suburb of Kharkiv (Vasyshcheve), resulting in fires and 8 casualties, including rescue workers. RF forces are reportedly advancing towards the Kharkiv-Kupyansk road. Oleg Synyehubov, Head of Kharkiv Regional State Administration, confirms significant damage to civilian structures due to suspected ballistic missile strikes. RF claims powerful strike on UA Armed Forces warehouse in Kharkiv Oblast. RF Special Forces "AKHMAT" Group "Bati" operating in Kharkiv direction, claiming to have found and destroyed a Ukrainian fortified bunker with personnel. RF MoD reports 44th Army Corps assault detachments demining logistics routes in Kharkiv direction. Дневник Десантника🇷🇺 video shows RF forces moving through a wooded area with defensive structures, possibly near Kharkiv. RF sources claim the destruction of Ukrainian militants and military equipment in the buffer zone of Kharkiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts. Unconfirmed report of RF FAB-1500 strike on UA positions in Kupyansk direction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Donetsk (Pokrovsk Axis): RF forces are the most actively advancing, with battles begun in Dimitrov (Myrnohrad) and improved RF positions in Rodinskoye. Intense fighting confirmed by video footage. RF sources claim significant advancement towards Volodymyrivka, effectively "pinching" Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk. UA 55th Separate Artillery Brigade reports facing shortages of trained personnel and technical means. Water supply to four cities in Donetsk Oblast will be reduced. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Chasiv Yar Direction: Дневник Десантника🇷🇺 video shows FPV drone targeting, likely by RF forces, of a moving target. UA drone successfully targeted RF SA-13 'Gopher' SAM system, a fortified position/dugout, and a 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzer. First confirmed operational deployment of the Shipovnik-Aero mobile EW complex. 50% increase in Lancet strikes targeting UA artillery and logistics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Siversk Direction: 10th Separate Mountain Assault Brigade (10th OGShBr) successfully repelled an enemy assault, destroying 13 motorcycles. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Sumy Oblast: Russians continue to assault with small infantry groups. Enemy UAVs detected in Chernihiv Oblast moving towards Sumy Oblast. KAB launches on Sumy Oblast. Russia struck Sumy Oblast administration building for the third time in three days. RF sources claim most combat-ready Ukrainian units are being redeployed from Zaporizhzhia to Sumy Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Zaporizhzhia Oblast: RF KABs confirmed inbound for Zaporizhzhia Oblast. RF is conducting an active campaign to recruit local residents for service in occupation forces. RF sources claim UA shelling of a children's playground in Vasilyevka, injuring two children. Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration reports continued RF attacks on civilian infrastructure in Orikhiv, Hulyaypole, and Kamianske. RF 7th Airborne Division in Zaporizhzhia direction appealing for drone and Starlink donations due to enemy EW. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Nikopolshchyna): Enemy attacked Nikopolshchyna with FPV drones and artillery. Воин DV claims 14th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade destroyed a UA armored vehicle and truck in Dibrova and Novoselovka (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast). New group of strike UAVs detected heading northwest. RF issuing appeals to UA forces in Alexandrovgrad, Chervonoye, Yanvarskoye, Kamyshevakha, Iskra. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kherson Oblast: Ukrainian engineering troops have cleared nearly 3,000 hectares of mines. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kirovohrad Oblast: Threat of enemy strike UAVs from the south. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kyiv Oblast: New group of strike UAVs in Chernihiv Oblast moving towards Northern Kyiv Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Western Ukraine: Air raid alert due to strike UAVs gradually spreading to Western Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russia:
  • Belgorod Oblast: Residents of Krasnoyaruzhsky district will be evicted from temporary accommodation points starting August 1st, despite ongoing shelling and complaints. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Bryansk Oblast: Video shows an explosion on a body of water, possibly a mine or artillery impact, claimed to be in Bryansk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Internal Security: FSB detained teenagers in Kuban region allegedly involved in railway arsons. Ministry of Education and Science official detained in Ingushetia on suspicion of embezzlement. Russian Federal Air Transport Agency annulled the certificate of Irkutsk airline "Angara" for aircraft maintenance. One of the leaders of the banned RDK, Kiryushchenko, заочно arrested on terrorism charges. Comic Dmitry Khrustalev removed from flight for disorderly conduct. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Colonel Mikhail Lebedev reportedly killed in Ukraine. Ex-mayor from Kostroma region, convicted of corruption, joined war and claims he was framed. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kamchatka Region: Five earthquakes (M5.0-M6.0) occurred on Kamchatka within 10 minutes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Naval Development (Black Sea): Turkey is on the path to regional leadership in integrating unmanned platforms into its Navy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Military Strikes (UA Training Grounds): RF claims powerful strikes on UA training grounds and troop concentrations since early 2025, including a training ground in Goncharovka. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Kharkiv Oblast: Continued RF strikes cause fires and damage. Synyehubov warns of impending severe weather. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Donetsk/Luhansk (Occupied): Ongoing fires in fields, likely due to shelling or military activities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• General Conditions: Continued operations in adverse weather conditions (rain affecting visibility). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kamchatka (RF Far East): Five earthquakes in Kamchatka (M5.0-M6.0) could impact infrastructure and resource allocation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Force Dispositions:
  • Air Assets: RF continues KAB launches on Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. New groups of strike UAVs (Shaheds) identified in Chernihiv and Sumy Oblasts moving south, and a group in Chernihiv Oblast moving north towards Kyiv. Strike UAVs also detected spreading towards Western Ukraine and in Kirovohrad Oblast. A new group of Shaheds detected in Dnipropetrovsk heading northwest. RF is actively using FPV drones in Dnipropetrovsk (Nikopolshchyna) and Chasiv Yar directions, with new MoD Russia video showing FPV drone targeting of UA armor and positions. RF FAB-1500 strike reported in Kupyansk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ground Forces: Persistent offensive pressure on the Pokrovsk axis, with claimed advancements towards Volodymyrivka. RF small infantry group assaults in Sumy Oblast. RF Special Forces "AKHMAT" Group "Bati" operating in Kharkiv direction. RF 44th Army Corps assault detachments conducting demining in Kharkiv direction. RF is engaged in recruitment campaigns for local residents in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast. RF VDV units appealing for drone and Starlink support due to UA EW. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Control Measures: RF Ministry of Justice added Alexei Navalny's book to extremist materials list. Patriarch Kirill called for migration policy adjustments. Davankov proposes mandatory verification for foreigners on dating sites. Russia blocked access to Speedtest. МОБИЛИЗАЦИЯ | Новости | Срочники implies new policy/pressure on employers to hire military personnel. Leonid Slutsky accuses Moldovan President Sandu of repression. Colonelcassad alleges VPN usage is only for pedophiles. "Initial military training" is being introduced in schools. TASS reports EC head promised Trump impossible terms for tariff deal. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF Ambassador to Italy explained that Italy should clarify its role in worsening relations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF Rostic's (fast food) encountered a brief IT infrastructure failure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF sources are openly soliciting cryptocurrency donations for "special units" at the front. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF Ministry of Education and Science aims to align university and college budget places with economic personnel needs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) "Lesta" (gaming company) is being nationalized, with a new CEO from internet services (VKontakte) appointed, raising concerns about efficiency. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Friendly Forces (UA):
  • Government & Internal Security: Ukrainian Prime Minister Shmyhal states that 90% of mobilization is proceeding normally. The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers has not yet appointed a new director for the Bureau of Economic Security (BEB). Rada is set to vote on a crucial bill regarding NABU and SAP tomorrow. Coordination Staff for Treatment of Prisoners of War held a meeting with families of captured and missing National Guard servicemen in Lviv. Office of the Prosecutor General reports ongoing efforts against corruption. General Staff of UA Armed Forces emphasizes quality of training as priority. Syrisky demands maximum transfer of UA Armed Forces training underground. Syrisky announces updated Basic General Military Training (BZVP) program is now 51 days long. 25-year-old conscripts, even without prior service or BZVP, will be granted "soldier or sailor in reserve" status without TCC & SP call-up. This is confirmed by РБК-Україна. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) КМВА highlights World Central Kitchen's support for Kyiv. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) President Zelensky discusses GUR operations (details unpublicized) and successful cooperation with US partners on defense contracts and drone technology. He also confirmed receiving "several good reports" from the Chief of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine regarding "some of our operations." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Military Action: Ukrainian "Predator" Brigade recruitment advertisements. Film "Road of Death" made about a Ukrainian GUR MO special forces operation in the Orikhiv direction. Successful FPV drone strikes by the 66th Separate Mechanized Brigade. Ukrainian engineering troops cleared nearly 3,000 hectares of mines in Kherson Oblast. Successful shootdown of 5 RF reconnaissance UAVs by "WU Samurai" unit. UA drone targeting RF SA-13 'Gopher' SAM system, a fortified position/dugout, and a 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzer. "BULAVA" unit of Separate Presidential Brigade used a drone with a grenade launcher for the first time. STERNENKO reports young benefactor raised 10,000 UAH for "Shahedorez" (Shahed cutter drone). A video shows Ukrainian soldiers using a drone to deliver a grenade, destroying an enemy position when no other options were available. A new 16th Army Corps is being created to defend Kharkiv Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) 10th OGShBr successfully repelled an RF assault on the Siversk direction, destroying 13 motorcycles. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Ukrainian forces are actively seeking support for excavators for the 42nd Separate Mechanized Brigade to rapidly equip positions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Border Control: Ukrainian border guards in Odesa detained an individual attempting to flee Ukraine disguised as a woman. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Civilian Support: Protests related to NABU powers renewed in Kyiv and other cities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:
  • Air/Missile/UAV: Capable of large-scale KAB launches and persistent drone operations, including FAB-1500 with UMPK. Capable of deploying reconnaissance UAVs and conducting FPV drone attacks, including those with thermobaric warheads. Capable of launching large numbers of Shahed (Geran) UAVs from multiple directions, now reaching northern Kyiv and Western Ukraine, as well as northwest from Dnipropetrovsk. Capable of employing S-400 ZRK missiles for ground strikes. RF can claim destruction of UA vehicles and personnel via drone strikes. MoD Russia releasing FPV drone footage of targeting. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ground Forces: Capable of sustained offensive operations, particularly on the Pokrovsk axis, utilizing small infantry groups, special forces, and now resuming company-sized mechanized assaults. Capable of demining logistics routes. Capable of large-scale mechanized assaults despite losses. Capable of using motorcycles for infantry assault. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Electronic Warfare (EW): Demonstrated advanced EW capabilities with the first operational deployment of the Shipovnik-Aero system near Chasiv Yar, designed to target UAV C2 links. This is a significant threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Operations: Highly capable of generating and disseminating false flag narratives and controlling internal information space. Capable of exploiting internal Ukrainian issues (mobilization, corruption, protests) for propaganda. Capable of blaming external actors for internal issues. RF will use internal security incidents to reinforce narratives of stability. RF capable of portraying Western disunity. RF is also using crypto donations to fund special units. RF military bloggers (e.g., Fighterbomber, Два майора) actively engaging in psychological operations and disinformation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intentions:
  • Strategic Attrition: Continue to degrade Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure through persistent KAB and drone strikes, including administrative buildings. Inflict heavy casualties on UA personnel at training grounds. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Territorial Expansion: Maintain and intensify ground pressure on the Pokrovsk axis, aiming for a decisive breakthrough towards Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk. Continue probing actions in Sumy Oblast and utilizing special forces in Kharkiv. Focus on clearing fortified positions and securing logistics routes. Renewed mechanized assaults indicate intent to achieve tactical breakthroughs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Warfare/Propaganda: Continuously blame UA for civilian casualties and disseminate propaganda discrediting Ukraine and its armed forces. Portray Ukraine as corrupt and its leadership as illegitimate. Undermine international support for Ukraine, specifically targeting military aid. Promote narratives of their own advances and Ukrainian losses. Seek to influence US foreign policy through narrative manipulation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Internal Control & Militarization: Consolidate control over information space within Russia. Bolster military personnel through recruitment in occupied territories and introduce military training in schools. Align higher education with military/economic needs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Geopolitical Positioning: Position Russia as a stable power, critique perceived Western aggression, and reinforce geopolitical alliances (e.g., Syria). Promote anti-dollar narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Courses of Action: RF will continue massed aerial attacks, primarily with KABs (including FAB-1500) and Shahed UAVs, now extending to Northern Kyiv Oblast and Western Ukraine, as well as northwest from Dnipropetrovsk. Ground offensives will persist on the Pokrovsk axis, likely with further mechanized assaults, and probing actions in Sumy Oblast. RF will continue to utilize drones for reconnaissance and targeting, including demining support, and increase Lancet strikes, leveraging new EW systems. RF will intensify information warfare campaigns, including false flag operations, direct appeals for crypto donations, and targeted psychological operations via military bloggers. RF will further integrate military training into civilian education, align education with military/economic needs, and continue efforts to exploit and control internal dissent and criminal activity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Intensified Air/Missile Strikes on Kharkiv & Zaporizhzhia, and Expansion Westward: Continued KAB launches on Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia (Vasyshcheve with 8 casualties). New waves of Shahed UAVs (Geran) detected spreading to Northern Kyiv and Western Ukraine, and a new group heading northwest from Dnipropetropvsk. First reported FAB-1500 strike on Kupyansk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Aggressive Ground Maneuvers (Pokrovsk & Avdiivka): Ongoing "intensely escalating" situation on the Pokrovsk axis, with RF advancements and claims of "pinching" Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk. RF has resumed company-sized mechanized assaults in the Ocheretyne direction (Avdiivka axis) after a period of infantry-only assaults. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Electronic Warfare Deployment (Chasiv Yar): First confirmed operational deployment of the Shipovnik-Aero mobile EW complex near Chasiv Yar. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Increased Loitering Munition Use (Chasiv Yar): 50% increase in Lancet strikes targeting UA artillery and logistics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Enhanced FPV Drone Payloads: Increasing reports of RF FPV drones equipped with thermobaric warheads. MoD Russia showcasing FPV drone targeting of various UA vehicles and positions. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Small Infantry Group Assaults (Sumy): RF's continued use of small infantry groups for assaults in Sumy Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Special Forces in Kharkiv: Deployment of "Akhmat" special forces for direct assault and bunker clearing. RF MoD reports 44th Army Corps conducting demining operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Information Warfare Focus on Child Abduction & Leadership: GUR MO's release of "legal evidence" of Russian abduction of Ukrainian children, prompting adaptive RF responses. RF propaganda adapting to target specific Ukrainian leadership figures (e.g., Zaluzhny) and exploit domestic issues. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Propagandistic Attribution of Incidents: Immediate and false attribution of incidents to UA by RF sources (e.g., Bryansk lake explosion, UA drone "defection," playground attack). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Targeting Infrastructure and Communications: Drone attacks on communication antennas and systems. RF shelling also targets civilian infrastructure and emergency services. RF actions impacting water supply in Donetsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Reconnaissance UAVs in Northern Regions: Continued adaptive ISR efforts along the northern border. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Recruitment in Occupied Territories: RF actively recruiting local residents in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Underground Training for UA Forces: Syrisky's directive to move UA training underground. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Simplified Conscription for 25-Year-Olds (UA): Ministry of Defense's decision to grant "soldier/sailor in reserve" status to 25-year-olds without prior service. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian Drone with Grenade Launcher: UA's "BULAVA" unit employing a drone with a grenade launcher for the first time; another video shows innovative use of drones to deliver grenades when no other option. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• New UA Formation: Creation of the 16th Army Corps specifically for Kharkiv defense. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Forced Evictions in Belgorod: RF moving to evict residents from temporary shelters in Krasnoyaruzhsky district. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Military Blogger Activity: Increased use of military bloggers to disseminate PSYOPS and collect donations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Appeals to UA Forces: RF issuing specific appeals to UA forces in certain settlements, potentially indicating a softening effort prior to ground assaults. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• Ammunition & Fuel: RF's continued KAB (including FAB-1500) and Shahed launches, artillery use, and FPV drone attacks indicate continued availability of munitions. Increased Lancet activity indicates sufficient supply. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Personnel: Ukraine is actively addressing personnel needs through recruitment campaigns and public messaging about mobilization, and new policies for 25-year-old conscripts. RF continues internal control efforts, recruiting in occupied territories, and introducing military training in schools. RF sources claim redeployment of UA forces from Zaporizhzhia to Sumy, indicating a potential strain on UA resources or a shift in focus. Captured RF soldier testimony suggests significant personnel attrition in some units. STERNENKO reports a critical shortage of air defense interceptors for Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Reports of Russian Colonel Mikhail Lebedev killed and convicted ex-mayor joining war indicate ongoing personnel losses and attempts to replenish ranks. RF VDV units appealing for drone/Starlink, suggesting supply issues or demand outstripping official provision. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Materiel: UA forces are effectively using Bozena 5 demining systems. RF's ability to field S-400 for ground strikes and new EW systems like Shipovnik-Aero indicates continued production or access to advanced materiel. Reports of thermobaric FPV drone warheads indicate adaptation in munitions. UA forces are employing drones with grenade launchers. UA units are actively soliciting support for heavy equipment (excavators). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF MoD showcasing FPV drone operations, suggesting high availability and integration. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• Tactical Level (RF): Effective tactical C2 for reconnaissance and strike missions, including drone operations and special forces assaults. Coordinated alleged strikes on UA training grounds. Coordinated mechanized assaults. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF MoD actively publishing FPV drone footage, suggesting centralized control over these assets for propaganda and operational purposes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Operational/Strategic Level (UA): Ongoing governmental C2 over anti-corruption reforms and economic security. Effective information operations C2. Efforts to maintain control over public narrative and mobilization. Functional C2 structure for addressing issues related to military personnel. Strong military C2 over force generation and readiness, including the formation of new corps. Adaptable C2 in managing personnel (25-year-olds). Strategic C2 over military and diplomatic efforts. Effective tactical C2 and coordination of advanced drone capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Operational/Strategic Level (RF): Centralized strategic C2 over internal information space, social policies, and international narratives. Strategic C2 over long-term societal militarization, including education policy. Regulatory C2 over the aviation sector. Strategic C2 for international military cooperation (S-400 to Iran). Effective C2 over information operations to exploit Western vulnerabilities. C2 over internal population management (forced returns to shelled areas in Belgorod). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Nationalization of "Lesta" and appointment of a new CEO indicates state-level intervention in strategic industries. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Defensive Posture: UA forces are maintaining defensive posture in Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. UA Air Defense active against UAVs. UA forces continue to hold main defensive line along Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal in Chasiv Yar. 47th Mechanized Brigade successfully engaged and repelled a significant Russian mechanized assault northwest of Ocheretyne. UA forces are detecting and tracking multiple waves of Shahed UAVs across various oblasts. New 16th Army Corps created for Kharkiv defense. 10th OGShBr successfully repelled an enemy assault on the Siversk direction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Offensive Operations: Ukrainian GUR MO special forces conducting successful operations, as acknowledged by President Zelensky. 66th Separate Mechanized Brigade's FPV drone operations demonstrate active offensive capabilities. Ukrainian soldiers demonstrating innovative drone use in close combat. UA forces effectively employing drones to target RF armored assets. UA units (Shadow, BULAVA) conducting successful drone-based engagements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Readiness: Recruitment campaigns indicate efforts to maintain and build force readiness. Institutional support for military families. Mine clearance operations in Kherson Oblast increasing readiness. General Staff's emphasis on training quality and Syrisky's directives reflect proactive measures to enhance readiness. Extended 51-day basic general military training. New simplified reserve status for 25-year-olds confirmed. Agreements with US on weapons signify continued efforts to enhance readiness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:
  • Successes: GUR MO obtained legal evidence of Russian child abduction. Film "Road of Death" highlights successful GUR MO special forces operation. NABU/SAP bill moving forward. Effective FPV drone strikes. Destruction of an RF tank. 3,000 hectares of mines cleared in Kherson Oblast. Successful apprehension of a draft dodger. Exposure of corruption in "Forests of Ukraine" State Enterprise. 47th Mechanized Brigade repelled a major RF mechanized assault, destroying 8 MBTs and 14 IFVs/APCs. Shootdown of 5 RF reconnaissance UAVs. UA drone units successfully targeted RF SA-13, 2S1 Gvozdika, and engaged RF assault troops. President Zelensky highlighted successful GUR operations and agreements with the US on weapons. Innovative drone use by soldiers. Creation of 16th Army Corps. 10th OGShBr repelled an enemy assault, destroying 13 motorcycles. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Setbacks: Continued KAB strikes (Vasyshcheve, 8 casualties) and ground advancements by RF on Kharkiv and Pokrovsk axes. Ukrainian 55th Separate Artillery Brigade facing shortages of trained personnel and technical means. Ongoing vacancy of BEB director position. RF shelling of civilian infrastructure in Ochakiv, Orikhiv, and Hulyaypole. RF use of S-400 missiles for ground strike and Shahed UAVs in Sumy/Kharkiv/Kirovohrad/Dnipropetrovsk. Deployment of Shipovnik-Aero EW system presents a new and significant threat. Potential for heavy personnel attrition in high-risk operations. SAPO head's skepticism about anti-corruption reforms. Reported shortage of interceptors for Shaheds (1.4). Reduced water supply to four cities in Donetsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Warning of severe weather in Kharkiv Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.2. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Critical Needs: Shortages in trained personnel and technical means for 55th Separate Artillery Brigade. Continuous demand for military personnel. Immediate resupply of ATGM systems and FPV drones to Avdiivka axis. Urgent need for more air defense assets (interceptors for Shaheds). Urgent need for excavators for rapid position-equipping for units like 42nd OMBr. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Financial Aid: Pending NABU/SAP bill vote crucial for unblocking EU financial aid. Continued need for external military aid (US agreements). US senators proposing European-funded weapon fund for Kyiv. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Anti-Corruption Measures: Continued delay in appointing BEB director. Ongoing anti-corruption efforts highlight persistent challenge. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Disinformation: RF continues to push narratives blaming Ukraine for civilian casualties (playground in Vasilyevka), civilian infrastructure attacks (Vasyshcheve), and false flag incidents (Bryansk lake, "defected drone"). Actively producing videos showcasing perceived Ukrainian losses (e.g., "destruction of Ukrainian militants" in buffer zones). Exploiting internal Ukrainian issues (mobilization, corruption, protests) and discrediting Ukrainian leadership and institutions (e.g., Zaluzhny "gay photos" narrative). Promoting internal control and stability in Russia (e.g., forced returns to shelled Belgorod areas). Using diplomatic channels to discredit neighboring governments. Amplifying internal US political instability (e.g., Trump's comments on BRICS and dollar). Claiming high UA losses at training centers. Spreading disinformation about Ukraine training "Latin American criminals." Actively soliciting crypto donations for "special units" at the front. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF military bloggers actively disseminating PSYOPS, claiming UA forces are "officially ordered to lie in graves" and portraying civilian deaths from unexploded ordnance as "fish going." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UA Counter-Propaganda: GUR MO's release of legal evidence of Russian child abductions. Ukrainian officials countering negative narratives about mobilization. Recruitment campaigns serving as counter-propaganda. Film "Road of Death" highlighting UA operational successes. Transparently addressing corruption issues. Direct engagement with families of POWs. Reporting on RF attacks on civilian infrastructure. Oleksandr Vilkul's daily briefings. STERNENKO's reporting on successful drone shootdowns. President Zelensky's public statements on GUR successes and weapon agreements. Promoting innovative drone usage. Highlighting the creation of new defensive units like the 16th Army Corps. Appeals for critical equipment (excavators). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Ukrainian Public Sentiment: Morale impacted by continued RF strikes and ground advancements. Shortages in frontline units. Outrage over child abductions reinforcing resolve. Public support for recruitment. Trust maintained through government engagement with POW families. Mixed sentiment regarding corruption issues. Morale boosted by successful defense against mechanized assaults. Concern over high casualties in some operations and shortage of interceptors. Negative impact from water supply reductions. Public support for fundraising efforts for military equipment remains strong. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian Public Sentiment: RF government attempting to control public discourse. Public concerns about social issues (migration, forced returns to conflict zones in Belgorod). False flag operations aiming to generate fear. "Fine for not hiring a serviceman" policy. Narratives about alleged corruption in Ukraine intended to lower public support for the war. Internal security actions used to project state strength. Introduction of military training in schools aims to normalize militarism. Appeals for public crypto donations indicate some level of public participation/support for specific military efforts. Reports of military losses (Colonel Lebedev) and appeals from frontline units (VDV drone request) could impact morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Support for Ukraine: GUR MO's evidence of child abductions likely strengthening international support. Continued demining efforts a factor for international aid. NABU/SAP bill vote critical for EU financial aid. Successful defense reinforces military effectiveness. Germany's procurement plans indirectly indicate continued Western military spending. President Zelensky's agreements with the US strong signal of continued support. Senator Lindsey Graham's statements reinforce US commitment. US Senators propose European-funded weapon fund for Kyiv. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Challenges for Ukraine: Ongoing vacancy of BEB director signaling potential delays in economic reforms. Reported shortages in 55th Separate Artillery Brigade highlighting persistent need for assistance. RF disinformation linking Ukraine to international crime could erode international trust. Shortage of Shahed interceptors raising concerns. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian International Relations: RF attempting to shape international narratives by accusing Ukraine of "terrorism." Actively suppressing internal dissent to project stability abroad. Blocking Speedtest signifying move towards digital isolation. Discrediting neighboring governments. Reinforcing geopolitical alliances (Syria). Highlighting Turkish naval uncrewed systems. Portraying Western disunity. Temporary deployment of S-400 to Iran. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF Ambassador to Italy clarifying Italy's role in worsening relations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Trump's comments on BRICS and trade policy (Brazil tariffs) are being amplified by RF state media to suggest Western disunity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

• MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action):
  • RF Ground Operations: RF will maintain high offensive pressure on the Pokrovsk axis, attempting to consolidate gains and will likely conduct further mechanized assaults towards Prohres within the next 24-48 hours, attempting to "pinch" Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk. They will likely continue to probe Ukrainian defenses along other Eastern axes (e.g., Sumy Oblast, Siversk direction) with small infantry groups and utilize special forces in Kharkiv. RF will attempt a tactical crossing of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal in Chasiv Yar, leveraging EW effects from the Shipovnik-Aero system. RF will continue recruitment efforts in occupied territories and demining logistics routes in Kharkiv direction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF Air/Missile/UAV Operations: RF will continue daily KAB strikes (including FAB-1500) on Kharkiv (including suburbs like Vasyshcheve), Zaporizhzhia, and other frontline regions. Expect continued, potentially larger, waves of Shahed (Geran) UAVs targeting urban and industrial centers in Kharkiv, Sumy, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk (northwest trajectory), and now extending to Northern Kyiv Oblast and Western Ukraine. RF will continue repeated strikes on administrative buildings. Drone reconnaissance and targeting will remain pervasive, with an adaptive focus on destroying Ukrainian vehicles, infrastructure, and personnel, increasing Lancet strikes. FPV drone and artillery attacks will persist in Dnipropetrovsk region. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF Hybrid Operations: RF will intensify information warfare, including false flag operations and narratives aimed at discrediting Ukraine's mobilization efforts and international image. Internal repression and information control measures will continue to tighten within Russia, including forced returns of residents to conflict zones. RF will likely amplify domestic issues, such as migration, through state-controlled media. RF will continue to attempt to destabilize neighboring states politically. RF will continue militarizing its society, including through education and control of key industries like gaming. RF will continue to solicit public (crypto) donations for specific military units to supplement state funding and demonstrate public support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action):
  • RF Breakthrough on Pokrovsk Axis: RF achieves a decisive breakthrough on the Pokrovsk axis, leading to a rapid collapse of Ukrainian defenses and significant territorial gains, compromising Ukraine's defensive integrity in the east. This breakthrough could be exacerbated by the effectiveness of renewed mechanized assaults. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Massive Civilian Casualty Event in Kharkiv/Zaporizhzhia/Kyiv: RF conducts a highly destructive and targeted missile/KAB/Shahed strike on a high-density civilian area, resulting in a large number of casualties and overwhelming local emergency services. The recent strike on Vasyshcheve indicates a willingness to target civilian areas, and expanded Shahed range increases risk to Kyiv and Western Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Successful Canal Crossing (Chasiv Yar) under EW Cover: RF forces successfully establish a significant bridgehead across the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal under the cover of the Shipovnik-Aero EW system, leading to the rapid outflanking or encirclement of UA defenders. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Expanded Hybrid Attacks in NATO: Building on recent arrests in Poland, RF-affiliated actors execute a large-scale, coordinated cyber and physical sabotage campaign against critical infrastructure in multiple NATO countries, leading to widespread disruptions and a direct challenge to NATO's collective security. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:
  • Pokrovsk Axis: Critical decisions on reinforcements and defensive lines are required within the next 24-72 hours, especially in light of claimed RF advances and resumed mechanized assaults. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kharkiv/Zaporizhzhia/Sumy/Kirovohrad/Kyiv/Western Ukraine/Dnipropetrovsk Air Defense: Continued vigilance and rapid response by UA air defense units are critical within the next 24-48 hours against anticipated KAB launches and escalating Shahed UAV attacks. Prioritize rapid damage assessment and civilian protection protocols. Immediately address critical interceptor shortages. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • NABU/SAP Bill Vote: The Rada vote on the NABU and SAP bill tomorrow (31 JUL) is a crucial decision point. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Warfare Response: Ukraine's ability to effectively counter RF disinformation will be critical over the next 24-72 hours. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • BEB Director Appointment: The delay in appointing the BEB director requires resolution within the next few days to weeks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • 55th Separate Artillery Brigade Support: Addressing the reported personnel and technical shortages is a critical support decision point within the next week. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Northern Border Air Defense: UA Air Defense in Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts requires heightened readiness and proactive engagement of enemy UAVs within the next 24-48 hours. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Chasiv Yar Defenses & EW Countermeasures: Immediate ISR tasking and rapid development/dissemination of tactical guidance for drone operators against Shipovnik-Aero EW are critical within the next 24 hours. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Avdiivka Materiel Resupply: Immediate resupply of ATGM systems and additional FPV drones to the 47th Mechanized Brigade and adjacent units is critical within the next 12-24 hours. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Underground Training Implementation: Accelerated implementation of Syrisky's directive for underground training will be critical for long-term force protection. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • 25-Year-Old Conscript Integration: Effective and rapid integration of the newly formalized 25-year-old conscript reserve into training and deployment is critical within the next 1-2 weeks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Donetsk Water Supply: Ukrainian authorities must immediately assess and plan for mitigation of water supply cuts to the four cities in Donetsk Oblast within the next 24-48 hours. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kharkiv Defense (16th Army Corps): Rapid operationalization and equipping of the newly formed 16th Army Corps is a critical decision point for Kharkiv's long-term defense over the next few weeks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Siversk Defense: Continuous monitoring and support for the 10th OGShBr in defending against RF mechanized/motorized assaults. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• RF Objectives on Pokrovsk Axis: Specific RF military objectives beyond Rodinskoye and Myrnohrad, and the true extent of the claimed "pinching" movement, are unclear. (Requires increased HUMINT and ISR.) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF UGV Production/Deployment: Full scale of RF UGV production and their planned integration into wider ground operations remains unknown. (Need to identify industrial facilities and training centers.) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Naval Modernization: Impact of reported collapse of RF key fleet renewal project on their Black Sea Fleet capability. (Requires additional COMINT/ELINT.) Specifics of "ULAQ KAMA" USV procurement/development by Turkey and potential impact on Black Sea naval balance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Personnel Mobilization: Extent of resistance to conscription within RF and the effectiveness of new recruitment tactics is unclear. Effectiveness of local recruitment in occupied territories. Specifics of "Initial military training" curriculum in schools. Actual impact of nationalization on Russian gaming companies' technical capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Nature of French Cyberattack: Exact perpetrators, methods, and full extent of data exfiltration or system damage are unknown. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Azerbaijani Support to UA: The volume and timeline of deliveries from Azerbaijan to UA needs immediate verification. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF "Italmas" UAV Development: Information on the capabilities, production, and intended deployment of the "Italmas" UAV is extremely limited. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Drone Interception Capability: Details of RF's "Yolka" air defense drone capabilities are unknown. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Internal Security Targets: The targets and operational scope of RF's drone-interceptor units for "Putin's guards" are unclear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• GPS Spoofing System Identification: The specific type and location of the sophisticated RF EW system responsible for GPS spoofing in Zaporizhzhia are still unidentified. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF "Electric Scooter" Doctrine: The scale of deployment and intended tactical doctrine for "combat electric scooters" is unclear. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Impact of Trump's Ultimatum: Immediate and long-term impact of Trump's "10-day deadline" on RF strategic decision-making, Western unity, and international support for Ukraine remains highly uncertain. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• UA Public Donation Trends: The specific reasons for the reported "dip" in public donations and its broader implications for public morale and sustained support require further analysis. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• RF Claimed Losses: Independent verification of RF claims of heavy Ukrainian losses on various fronts, specifically the Goncharovka training ground strike, and claimed destruction of forces in buffer zones. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• RF Internal Repression: The full scale and methodology of the "foreign agent" campaign against Russian journalists and dissidents, and the broadening of administrative cases for social behaviors, requires further investigation. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• RF Mortar Round Marking: The purpose and implications of RF units marking mortar rounds with blue markers require further ISR and HUMINT. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• Effectiveness of RF "Groza" EW: Independent verification of RF claims regarding the "Groza" EW system's effectiveness in "mass burning" UA transport in Kupyansk is required. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• RF "Anti-Drone Screens": Details on the specifications, deployment, and effectiveness of these new "anti-drone screens" being distributed to RF units are unknown. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• RF FPV Drone Usage (Kherson): Specifics on RF FPV drone models, C2, and counter-measures employed against UA EW in the Kherson sector are unknown. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• Polish Abrams Operational Issues: The nature and extent of "serious operational problems" with Polish Abrams tanks are unclear. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• RF Fiber-Optic Drone Capabilities: The full operational capabilities, range, and deployment doctrine of these fiber-optic drones are unknown. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Mexican Cartel Disinformation: The origin and specific intent behind the "Mexican cartel" disinformation narrative require further investigation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Belgorod Oblast Governor's Report: The specific content and implications of the Belgorod Oblast Governor's latest report, particularly regarding forced returns to shelled areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Specifics of TCC/ARMA Corruption Cases: The full details of their alleged corruption and the extent of their impact on mobilization/resource management are unclear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kharkiv Damage Assessment: The full extent of damage and precise number of casualties in Kharkiv's Shevchenkivskyi district and Vasyshcheve needs further confirmation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kamenskoye Casualties: The precise number of fatalities in Kamenskoye. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Internal Internet/Communication Restrictions: The full scope and impact of growing demand for wired internet in Russia due to mobile internet interruptions during UAV attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Donetsk Fire Extent: The full extent of the strong fire in Kuibyshevsky district of Donetsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Drone Activity (Low over Russia): The specific reasons for RF claiming lower drone activity over Russian regions overnight. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Severo-Kurilsk Damage: Independent verification of "no destruction" claim in Severo-Kurilsk and reconciliation with earlier reports. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Zakaharova's Condemnations: The full impact and reception of Maria Zakharova's strong condemnations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Polish Officials Discrediting: The specific context and target of the "Басурин о главном" photo message. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian Defense Reforms (Aug 1 Changes): The specific impact of changes from August 1. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kamchatka Earthquake/Tsunami Impact (RF Far East): Extent of long-term recovery resource allocation. Specifics on damage to "Alaid" fish processing plant and vessel moorings. Broader impact on other affected areas. Full assessment of anticipated M7.5 aftershocks. Full impact of cancellation of flights to Severo-Kurilsk. Specific environmental impact of Klyuchevskaya Sopka volcano eruption. Impacts and response measures in Easter Island. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Mariupol Radiation Levels: Continued monitoring of environmental parameters in occupied territories. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian Ballistic Missile Capabilities: Specific technical or deployment details of Ukrainian ballistic missiles. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF EW System Capabilities (Chasiv Yar): The precise effective range, targetable frequency bands, and operational cycle of the newly deployed Shipovnik-Aero EW system. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Enemy Reserves (Avdiivka): The composition, strength, and readiness of the Russian second-echelon forces staged behind the Ocheretyne line of contact. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Losses in Kupyansk: Independent verification of RF claims of striking Ukrainian PVD in Kupyansk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Military Recruitment Effectiveness in Occupied Territories: The actual success rate, methods used, and number of local recruits joining RF occupation forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Drone Payload Type (Chasiv Yar): The specific type of munition used by RF FPV drones in Chasiv Yar. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Impact of Shelling on Ochakiv/Orikhiv Civilian Infrastructure: Full damage assessment and immediate humanitarian impact. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Military Helicopter Details: Specifics on the type, unit, and mission of the helicopter observed near the border. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Strike on 169th Training Center: Independent verification of casualties and damage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Details of "Island" Operations: Specific location of the "island" operations, the units involved, and the full scope of casualties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Effectiveness of UA Navy Recruitment: Initial success and challenges. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Alleged Syrian Racket: Specifics of the alleged racketeering activities and individuals involved. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Impact of Simplified Conscription for 25-Year-Olds (UA): The practical implementation, perceived fairness, and actual impact on force generation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UA 45th OABr FPV Drone Effectiveness: Independent verification of the effectiveness of the 45th Separate Artillery Brigade's FPV drone operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Specifics of UK ATC Failure: The precise technical cause, full extent of the disruption, and timeline for resolution. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Railway Arson Detentions: The specific evidence linking the detained teenagers to railway arsons. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UA BULAVA Drone with Grenade Launcher Effectiveness: The operational effectiveness and tactical implications. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Donetsk Water Supply Shortage Cause: The direct cause of the water supply reduction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Actual Strength & Readiness of 16th Army Corps: Beyond its formation, the timeline for its full operational capability and resource allocation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Cryptocurrency Donation Effectiveness: The volume of crypto funds raised and their direct impact on frontline units. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Casualties (Colonel Lebedev): Full details surrounding the death of Colonel Mikhail Lebedev and its impact on RF command structures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Motivation (Convicted Ex-Mayor): The true motivations behind the ex-mayor's deployment and his claims of being "framed." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Motorcycle Assault Doctrine: The specific doctrine and scale of using motorcycles in infantry assaults, as seen near Siversk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Reinforce Eastern Fronts: Prioritize immediate deployment of additional artillery, armored vehicles, and infantry reinforcements to the Pokrovsk axis, particularly to support the 55th Separate Artillery Brigade. Prepare for and repel anticipated major mechanized assaults towards Prohres. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Enhance Air Defense in All Threatened Regions: Increase density of short- to medium-range air defense systems in Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Kirovohrad, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Western, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts to defend against persistent KAB (including FAB-1500) and escalating Shahed UAV strikes. Immediately address critical shortage of Shahed interceptors. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
3. Counter-Disinformation Operations: Immediately launch a coordinated counter-propaganda campaign to disseminate GUR MO's legal evidence of Russian child abductions. Actively refute RF false flag narratives regarding civilian casualties and fabricated incidents. Counter RF narratives on internal issues and actively disseminate information about RF targeting of civilian infrastructure. Expose RF's reliance on public cryptocurrency donations as a sign of their resource constraints. Directly counter RF military blogger PSYOPS and narratives about Ukrainian leadership. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
4. Accelerate NABU/SAP Reform: Urge Rada to promptly pass the NABU and SAP bill to unblock crucial EU financial aid. Actively counter RF propaganda designed to undermine confidence in these reforms. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
5. Address BEB Director Vacancy: Expedite appointment of qualified director for the Bureau of Economic Security to ensure effective management of anti-corruption efforts and financial stability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
6. Personnel and Equipment Assessment: Conduct urgent assessment of 55th Separate Artillery Brigade's specific personnel and technical means shortages and implement a rapid resupply and training program. Leverage successful FPV drone tactics and prioritize provision of excavators for rapid entrenchment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
7. Monitor RF Internal Policy Shifts: Closely monitor RF's internal policies (migration, internet control, military support, militarization of education, forced returns to conflict zones, nationalization of industries) to anticipate potential impacts on social stability, resource allocation, and military recruitment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
8. ISR Focus on RF Drone Ops and EW: Intensify ISR collection on RF drone operations and their capabilities, especially the increased Lancet activity and FAB-1500 strikes. Prioritize SIGINT and IMINT tasking to locate and characterize the Shipovnik-Aero EW system. Develop and disseminate immediate tactical guidance for drone operators on potential countermeasures (e.g., alternative frequencies, revised flight paths). Prioritize targeting of this EW asset. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
9. Prepare for Mechanized Assaults (Avdiivka Axis): Prioritize immediate resupply of ATGM systems (Javelin, Stugna-P) and additional FPV drones to the 47th Mechanized Brigade and adjacent units. Anticipate another major mechanized assault towards Prohres within the next 24-48 hours. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
10. Strengthen Chasiv Yar Defenses: Maintain robust defensive posture along the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal. Anticipate RF attempts to cross the canal, likely using EW effects. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
11. Northern Border Defensive Posture: Maintain heightened vigilance and readiness against reconnaissance and strike UAVs in Chernihiv and Sumy Oblasts. Increase border patrol effectiveness against draft evasion attempts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
12. Sustain Mine Clearance Operations: Continue and expand mine clearance efforts, particularly in regions like Kherson Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
13. Investigate S-400 Ground Strikes: Conduct immediate forensic analysis of impact sites from alleged S-400 ZRK ground strikes to confirm munition type and assess threat profiles. Monitor RF S-400 deployment patterns. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
14. Implement Underground Training: Rapidly implement Syrisky's directive to transfer military training underground. Review and update 51-day BZVP program. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
15. Integrate 25-Year-Old Conscripts: Expedite full integration of newly formalized 25-year-old conscript reserve pool into training and deployment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
16. Address Donetsk Water Shortages: Ukrainian authorities must immediately assess full impact of water supply reductions and implement emergency water distribution plans. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
17. Expedite 16th Army Corps Readiness: Accelerate the formation, equipping, and training of the newly created 16th Army Corps to bolster Kharkiv's defenses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
18. Support Siversk Defenses: Provide immediate support to 10th OGShBr to maintain their defensive successes against RF assaults, including materiel and personnel. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)