Archived operational intelligence briefing
TIME: 301407Z JUL 25
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
1.4. Intelligence Gaps (Updated)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Intentions:
Courses of Action: RF will continue massed aerial attacks overnight, combining missiles and Shahed drones (including jet UAVs), targeting critical infrastructure and military targets deep within Ukraine, with a high likelihood of strikes on Odesa and now potentially Ochakiv due to missile threats. Ground offensives will continue to focus on the Pokrovsk and Avdiivka axes with increasing intensity, potential for operational encirclement, supported by tactical drones, heavy artillery, and new UGV deployments. The focus on the "Asian Highway" and Novohryhorivka suggests an intention to interdict key UA logistics and expand territorial control. RF will likely continue efforts to cut off supply routes to Chasiv Yar and advance on a wide front near Vovchansk. RF will continue probing attempts at Antonivsky Bridge. The "Sarmat-2" UGV will likely be employed more frequently on the Bakhmut axis to test and refine its integration with infantry assaults. RF will persist with small group tactics, despite their vulnerability to UA drones. RF will continue to use drones for tactical reconnaissance, targeting, and counter-battery fire. RF will continue to utilize mortars and TOS-1A. RF will continue to actively target high-value individual personnel with FPV drones and logistical vehicles. RF will likely attempt to repel further UA DRG incursions in LNR. RF will persist with symbolic actions like dropping flags on key infrastructure. RF will intensify cyber and sabotage operations against Western targets. RF will continue to develop and deploy robotic platforms for logistics and potential combat support. RF Special Forces will continue to pursue targets of "elite" Ukrainian drone operators. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to adapt its internal information control, including restrictions on internet services and mandating specific messengers. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to engage in joint military exercises with strategic partners like China to demonstrate and enhance military interoperability and projection. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to portray the conflict as beneficial for Ukrainian soldiers by emphasizing their alleged suffering. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to claim liquidation of high-ranking Ukrainian military personnel for propaganda purposes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will deny or downplay any claims of chemical weapons use. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to deny interference in Moldovan elections while supporting pro-Russian factions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to use national/ethnic divisions as a tool of information warfare. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to use controlled media to promote narratives of Ukrainian leadership instability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to reinforce narratives of internal stability and law and order by highlighting actions against crime and social disorder. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF is likely to continue attacking administrative buildings in Sumy Oblast to exert psychological pressure and disrupt local governance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to promote narratives of economic resilience against Western sanctions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to engage its internal security forces in maintaining public order and managing internal dissent, separately from the SVO. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will likely intensify economic pressure through trade tariffs, as indicated by Trump's announcement on India, to disrupt alliances and global trade beneficial to the West. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to disseminate high-level disinformation campaigns about internal Ukrainian political instability and leadership changes to undermine Ukrainian morale and international support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will use narratives about Ukrainian mobilization issues to sow dissent within Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to monitor and respond to natural disasters to project competence in governance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to adapt its naval doctrine and capabilities, as indicated by the discussion on "rethinking the use of warships." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to combat fake websites and phishing attempts to protect military data. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will maintain efforts to control its airspace and civilian aviation, including through regulatory measures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will leverage any perceived internal Ukrainian instability, such as the alleged "mole" in the Ukrainian Air Force, to sow distrust and undermine confidence in Western aid. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will likely intensify its censorship of VPN protocols to restrict access to independent information. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to deny claims of civilian casualties caused by its forces while blaming UA for such incidents (e.g., Vasilyevka playground). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to portray itself as a victim of external sabotage attempts, as seen in the Kuban railway arson case. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will likely use incidents like the Kubinka bus fire to reinforce narratives of either external threats or internal negligence, depending on the cause. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to showcase domestic industrial capabilities, such as EV manufacturing, to project self-sufficiency. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to disseminate propaganda aimed at discrediting NATO's logistical and operational capabilities in Europe, as seen in Basurin's claims about EU infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to produce content for morale-boosting, such as award ceremonies for military personnel. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to deploy mobile ground units, such as those on motorcycles, for specialized tasks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
3.2. Resource Requirements and Constraints
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
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