Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 300707Z JUL 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Ukraine General: Nationwide threat from RF missile and UAV attacks persists, with 22 killed and 85 wounded reported in the last 24 hours. Ukrainian air defense units, drone systems, army aviation, and mobile fire groups actively engaged enemy aerial threats. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kyiv Oblast: Air raid alerts due to high-speed targets. Multiple civilian apartments damaged in Darnitsky district, 8 casualties including a 3-year-old child reported. A downed Iranian Shahed-136 drone (Russian Geran 2) confirmed. New enemy UAV detected in Makariv region. Threat of strike UAVs for Kyiv Oblast (Vyshhorod district). Security measures, including potential document checks, are underway in Desnyanskyi district. Zelenskyy visited a Ukrainian defense enterprise in Kyiv Oblast producing electronics and sensitive components for missiles, drones, and secure communication, with over 80% supporting defense. Power outages affect ~30,000 families due to weather, potentially exacerbating issues from RF strikes. UA forces observed a minute of silence. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Khmelnytska Oblast: Confirmed main target of enemy missile and drone trajectories overnight, with explosions reported. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Poltava Oblast: Multiple missiles flying towards Poltava Oblast. Ballistic threat to Pryluky persists. Threat of strike UAVs to Poltava Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kirovohrad Oblast: Explosions reported in Kropyvnytskyi, with fire liquidation continuing after night RF attack. UAVs detected heading for Kropyvnytskyi. Damage to State Emergency Service (DSNS) building and equipment in Kropyvnytskyi confirmed. Threat of strike UAVs to Kirovohrad Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Dnipropetrovsk Oblast: 3 UAVs shot down overnight. Threat of aviation munitions for Synelnykivskyi district. Two casualties reported due to RF attack. Enemy reconnaissance UAVs detected. New ballistic missile threat identified for Kamenskoye, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, with a potential for a second launch. Russian army conducted a missile strike on Kamenskoye, confirmed by ASTRA with 4 killed and 8 wounded, including a pregnant woman. Ukrainian sources now report 3 killed in Kamenskoye, with 22 injured including 10 medical workers. Damage to civilian structures, vehicles, and medical infrastructure is significant. RF sources claim Kamenskoye hit a military rehabilitation center. Enemy UAVs detected in eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, inbound towards Pavlohrad. Russian drone attack confirmed on Pavlohrad, damaging railway station, tracks, and contact network. RF attacked Nikopol region using artillery and FPV drones. Regional government reports over 3 billion UAH allocated for defense and security, 70% funded. UA 31st Mechanized Brigade denies RF claims of occupation of Malievka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, confirming the settlement remains under UA control, though DeepState reports RF advance near Malievka. Threat of strike UAVs to Kryvyi Rih and Nikopol. High-speed target inbound to Dnipro from the south. UAVs reported on northern-western course in eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Explosions heard in Pavlohrad. RF Colonelcassad disseminating propaganda featuring a purported captured Ukrainian soldier from Pavlohrad, Ilya Kukarin. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kherson Oblast: Enemy continues attempts to control the island zone in the Dnieper delta, maintaining intensive artillery shelling and aviation strikes. Clashes reported near Prydniprovske. UA forces repelled 5 Russian army assaults. RF sources claim repulsion of UA landing attempt on Tendrovska Spit. UA GUR special forces reportedly conducted a successful raid on Tendrovska Spit in the night of 28 JUL. UA military spokesperson complains of RF creating a "death zone" along the Dnieper on Kherson and Zaporizhzhia directions. DeepState reports drone footage showing the "utilization of Muscovites" on Kinburn Spit. RF forces are employing up to 250 FPV drones per day in the Kherson area. Missile threat to Kherson and Mykolaiv Oblasts. High-speed target inbound to Ochakiv. UA source Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦 reports Russian attempts to cross the railway part of Antonivsky Bridge. UA military channel reports video regarding 34th Brigade of Coastal Defense, highlighting lack of cover, supply, and logistics for operations on the left bank. TASS reports RF security services claim "people in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions are forming groups to fight against TCC," likely a propaganda narrative. Ukrainian Air Force reports activity of reconnaissance UAVs in Kherson Oblast, with means for their interception engaged. Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦 provides an update regarding a previous "pidarskogo video" (derogatory term for Russian video) with additional details, stating: "🫡🇺🇦Regarding this fing video - there were indeed just fing many drops... Hell. Most of the fighters who were swimming managed to escape." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Eastern Axes (General): Continued ground combat reported on Kupyansk, Lyman, Siversk, Kramatorsk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka directions. RF tactical aviation active, including launches of guided aerial bombs (KABs). Continued effective UA FPV drone strikes on RF ground targets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Kramatorsk Direction: КАБs inbound. Clashes reported near Predtechyne. RF source reports Ukrainian military personnel in Konstantinovka stated to CNN about personnel shortages. RF forces reported encircling Konstantinovka. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Donetsk Oblast (General): KABs inbound. Threat of strike UAVs to Sloviansk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Siversk Direction: New map indicates RF Airborne forces active near Siversk, Serebryanka, Hryhorivka, Verkhnokamyanske, Bilohorivka. Clashes reported near Hryhorivka and towards Vyyimka. RF sources claim RF forces advancing, burning UA infantry positions near Siversk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Chasiv Yar Direction: TASS reports RF forces completely control approaches to Chasiv Yar, cutting off UA supply routes. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Donetsk (Pokrovsk Axis): Situation intensely escalating. RF forces are most actively advancing, with battles begun in Dimitrov (Myrnohrad) and improved RF positions in Rodinskoye. Reconnaissance drone observed providing RF tactical intelligence on Pokrovsk. RF sources claim DRGs have entered Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk), with fire control over a road near Rodinskoye. Intense fighting confirmed by video footage. RF MoD claims liberation of Novoukrainka. RF forces entered Kolodezi, advancing towards Lyman. UA forces report two assault groups from the 63rd Mechanized Brigade attacked an enemy dugout near Torske, capturing two Russian mercenaries. RF sources claim RF forces entered Volodymyrivka (Druzhkivka direction). Rybar reports on "Battles for the heights near Alekseevka and the liberation of Dachnoye." Ukrainian DShV reports on operations in the Pokrovsk direction, including drone footage of damaged structures and successful engagements against targets. Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦 shares photo messages indicating significant destruction in Pokrovsk, similar to Toretsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Donetsk (Occupied): Severe water shortage in Kirovsky district. Donetsk under massive strike by UA drones, causing power outages for over 150,000 subscribers in Donetsk, Makiivka, and Yasynuvata. Damage to "Pushkinsky" Business Center and "Favorit" residential complex confirmed. Allegations of machine gun boxes being sold freely, indicating internal security breakdown. Strong fire reported in Kuibyshevsky district of Donetsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kharkiv Oblast: Active work of UA air defense units, drone systems, army aviation, and mobile fire groups overnight. Nine settlements hit by enemy strikes. Threat of strike UAVs. Enemy reconnaissance UAVs detected. Clashes yesterday in South Slobozhansky direction near Vovchansk, Zelene, Fyholivka, Zapadne and towards Petro-Ivanivka. Kadyrov's "Zapad-AKHMAT" battalion active near Vovchansk. A group of enemy strike UAVs inbound from Belgorod Oblast. Two explosions heard in Izyum. TASS reports UA forces fled from Radkivka, Kharkiv Oblast. RF forces reportedly advancing towards the Kharkiv-Kupyansk road to cut off UA supply routes. RF army continues to encircle and storm Kupyansk. KAB launches inbound to Kharkiv Oblast from the northeast. RF sources claim "Groza" EW system mass burning of UA transport in Kupyansk. UAV detected inbound to Kharkiv from the east. Fires and casualties in Kharkiv due to night RF attack, with 3 injured in Shevchenkivskyi district. Drone debris fall confirmed. Another explosion in Slobidskyi district. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Sumy Oblast: Three fatalities due to RF attack. Launches of guided aerial bombs by enemy tactical aviation (KABs). Ukrainian SOF active. Enemy reconnaissance UAVs detected. Confirmed strike on the "Zvezda" ammunition plant in Shostka on 26.07. RF army has expanded its zone of control near Myropillia. Enemy UAVs from Kursk Oblast inbound. A group of Shahed drones in central Sumy Oblast, moving southwest. UA forces repelled 10 Russian army assaults. Damage to a tax office building confirmed. RF sources claim RF army advancing near Myropillia, towards Sumy. Several groups of enemy UAVs on the north of Sumy Oblast, moving south. UA FPV drone operators from "Kryla do pekla" unit conducted a series of successful FPV ambushes against enemy personnel. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Chernihiv Oblast: High-speed missile detected. Explosion reported near Pryluky, Chernihiv Oblast. Enemy reconnaissance UAV detected. RF source claims Russian army struck Pryluky airbase, targeting a US "Black Hawk" UH-60 of GUR special forces. New ballistic missile threat from northeast direction. Enemy UAVs in Chernihiv Oblast. Suspilne reports an explosion in Chernihiv. Reconnaissance UAV activity in Honcharivske region. Colonelcassad (RF source) released video footage claiming two "Iskander" missile strikes on a training ground in Chernihiv Oblast, alleging up to 200 "militants" (UA personnel) were destroyed. UA sources (STERNENKO) confirm the strike, noting a pattern of RF hitting training centers 50km+ from the border/line of contact. UA Ground Forces report 3 killed, 18 wounded from missile strike on training facility. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Zaporizhzhia Oblast: Aviation munitions threat. Enemy reconnaissance UAV detected. Over 800 RF strikes in 24 hours. Russian forces attacked a penitentiary facility, resulting in 16-17 killed and 35-43 wounded. RF claims liberation of Temirovka. Ukrainian 118th Brigade engaged Russian forces with artillery. AFU disrupted an RF assault, inflicting significant losses. UA military spokesperson complains of RF creating a "death zone" along the Dnieper on Kherson and Zaporizhzhia directions. Andryushchenko, advisor to Mariupol mayor, reports increased radiation background near Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) after a gust of wind, though Ukrainian MVS reports radiation levels are normal (0.14 mSv/hr). UA Air Force reports КАБ launches by enemy tactical aviation. Colonelcassad shows video of destruction of UA M777 howitzer by RF dronovody. RF sources claim RF 64th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, 35th Army Group "Vostok" destroying UA personnel and materiel near Huliaipole. Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration observes a minute of silence. Panel discussion held in Zaporizhzhia on World Day Against Trafficking in Persons. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russia:
  • Internal Security & Cyber: Aeroflot IT systems crash, allegedly due to hackers, with recovery potentially taking up to a year. Mobile internet restricted in Tyumen, Udmurtia, and Sverdlovsk Oblasts. Demand for wired internet grows due to mobile internet interruptions during UAV attacks. Moscow police fine property owners for unregistered temporary residents. FSB prevented a terrorist attack against a high-ranking military official in Rostov-on-Don. Moscow pharmacy networks ("Stolichki," "Neopharm") and "Family Doctor" clinic hacked, causing closures and potential data leaks. "Почта России" website experiencing nationwide system failure due to hack. Journalist Olga Komleva sentenced to 12 years for "military fakes." Blogger Areg Shchepikhin kidnapped. Fire blocked workers in a Moscow construction site. Building collapse in Yekaterinburg. Gas cylinder explosion in a Volgograd correctional colony injured 4. Man arrested for throwing a smoke bomb into a bank in Pushkin. Tajikistan issued an arrest warrant for Umendjon Saliev, a suspect in the "Crocus" terrorist attack. A professor at Plekhanov Russian University of Economics arrested on treason charges. RF Telegram channels report drone security alerts in Moscow, Ryazan, Rostov, Tula, Voronezh, Oryol, Lipetsk, Saratov, Tambov, and Bryansk Oblasts. ASTRA reports a stone with "foreign agent" written on it was thrown into the window of journalist Vadim Vaganov's apartment in St. Petersburg. TASS reports two Russian citizens received 15 and 17 years in prison for collecting data on Russian Ministry of Defense facilities. Over 4,000 Russian users complained of a failure in the Steam platform. Chechen authorities temporarily suspended several charities collecting money for Palestinians. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Rostov Oblast: RF PVO destroyed four Ukrainian UAVs overnight. Drone attack on Salsk railway station resulted in one fatality and freight train fire, suspending train movement. Traction substation burning in Orlovsky. Two RF sappers died during UAV demining in Salsk district. Train movement resumed through Salsk. Over 50 apartments, 11 private homes, and 10 multi-apartment buildings were damaged in Salsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Leningrad Oblast: One person died and three injured due to drone attack. UAV attack danger declared. A fire involving cardboard and household waste (1,200 sq. meters) in Lepsari village. Roof of burning warehouse collapsed over 600 sq. meters. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Moscow: Evacuation of "Zvezdny" shopping center. First flight from Pyongyang landed at Sheremetyevo Airport. Images and videos from Moscow show construction of a new Olympic complex. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Bryansk Oblast: Governor reports "inhumane crimes against peaceful citizens." RF PVO shot down two Ukrainian UAVs over Smolensk Oblast. Colonelcassad reports 43 Ukrainian aircraft-type drones intercepted over Bryansk Oblast. TASS reports three Ukrainian UAVs shot down over Bryansk Oblast overnight. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Belgorod Oblast (RF): Civilian injured and local administration head wounded due to UA drone attacks in Shebekino. ASTRA reports a civilian killed and UAV attacks on eight settlements with injuries. ASTRA reports a UAV attacked a multi-story residential building at Shchorsa, 8M in Belgorod, with damage consistent with a drone strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) / Kreminna Forests: RF claims control of ~10 hectares and encircling UA forces near Shypylivka and Hryhorivka. TASS reports "Zapad" Grouping destroyed a deeply buried Ukrainian Armed Forces command post in LNR. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Kursk Oblast: Two individuals hospitalized after a UA drone attack. Fire at a gas station. Two Ukrainian UAVs shot down over Kursk Oblast. ASTRA reports 19-year-old communication company employee killed in FPV drone attack on Karyzh village, Glushkovsky district. RF source "Voenkor Kotenok" claims "ВСУ попытались атаковать Курчатов, где расположена Курская АЭС." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Astrakhan: Residential building section collapsed due to gas explosion. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Belarus: Unidentified UAV fell in Minsk, destroyed by EW. Belarusian Investigative Committee states UAV equipped with TNT and Ukrainian inscriptions. Lithuanian military chief states he would "like to shoot down drones over Belarus, but cannot." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Airfield Activity: British intelligence releases satellite photos showing active construction of aircraft shelters (caponiers) at Russian military airfields, including Millerovo. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Samara Oblast: Six residential buildings caught fire in Pridorozhny village, Samara Oblast, covering approx. 1,000 sq. meters. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Tula Oblast: Three Ukrainian UAVs neutralized. Three Ukrainian UAVs shot down over Tula Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kamchatka, Sakhalin (RF Far East): TASS reports a strong earthquake of magnitude 7.1, then 7.9, then 8.7, now confirmed 8.8, occurred in Kamchatka. Tsunami threat declared on Avacha Bay coast and Severo-Kurilsk, leading to evacuations. Residents of Sakhalin returned home. No destruction in Severo-Kurilsk reported by operational services. Port Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky working normally. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Regional:
  • United States: Trump states he is giving Putin a "10-day deadline" to end the war in Ukraine, or face tariffs. He further stated he would increase US oil production if tariffs on RF and trade partners disrupt global energy. Trump claims he has not received a response from Putin and calls it "a shame." He believes the war could be easily resolved but will be prolonged. US State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce states the US has considered all negative consequences of potential secondary sanctions against Russia. Ukraine expects to sell drones to the US and purchase the latest American weaponry (Stefanchuk). Head of Roskosmos, Bakanov, visited NASA Johnson Space Center. Trump will allow Ukrainians in the US to remain until the end of hostilities. US Treasury warned China that continued purchase of Russian oil will lead to significant tariffs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • United Kingdom: USA reportedly delivered nuclear weapons to Britain. UK PM Starmer states UK may recognize independent Palestine in September if Israel does not take "significant steps" to end "terrible situation" in Gaza. Israeli MFA rejects this statement. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Manhattan (US): Unknown assailant opened fire, killing five, injuring six, before suicide. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • North Korea: First airline flight from Pyongyang to Moscow, Russian schoolchildren wrote to Kim Jong Un. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • China: 30 fatalities, 80,000 evacuated in Beijing due to heavy rains and flooding. Trump claims his meeting with Xi Jinping will likely occur "before the end of the year." China rejected US ultimatum on Russian oil. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • France: Serious cyberattack on French defense industry (Naval Group, THALES, Dassault, Safran). Largest military data leak in history reported. Hackers reportedly stole submarine data from French defense giant Naval Group. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Germany: 150,000 Ukrainians of conscription age receive social benefits; CSU party demands cessation. Ukraine will receive 11 more IRIS-T complexes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Moldova: Intends to remove joint Russian-Moldovan "Moldovagaz" from August supply. Three opposition parties advocate for restoring relations with Russia. Moldova's President Sandu is now reportedly "against Western politicians" but also believes Moldova could join the EU by 2028. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Estonia: Estonian MFA summoned Russian Charge d'Affaires to protest maritime border violation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Lithuania: Alleged "Gerbera" UAVs over Lithuania. Lithuanian military chief states he would "like to shoot down drones over Belarus, but cannot." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Azerbaijan: Rybar reports "Azerbaijan arms the Armed Forces of Ukraine." Colonelcassad explicitly reports Azerbaijan is setting up serial production of 122mm and 152mm artillery shells for Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Hungary: Hungarian Foreign Minister states the conflict in Ukraine will only be resolved through US-Russia agreement. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Gaza: Colonelcassad reports a Palestinian detonated a heavy Namer BMP by throwing a mine into a hatch, and displays video of a damaged Merkava tank. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Poland: Colonelcassad reports Poland facing serious operational problems with recently acquired 366 US Abrams tanks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Syria: "Операция Z" (RF source) disseminates "Voenkor Russkoy Vesny" content alleging continued control of Syria by a secret "committee" of terrorist leaders. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Chernivtsi Oblast (UA): Earthquake reported, minor disruption. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Romania: Severe flooding resulting in fatalities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Finland: President A. Stubb: Ukraine is doing well, the war must continue - Russia must be forced to the negotiating table. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Kyiv: Strong thunderstorms and heavy rain forecasted, impacting aerial reconnaissance, drone operations, and ground mobility. Power outages affect ~30,000 families. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Rostov Oblast (RF): Fire at Salsk railway station and a traction substation in Orlovsky will impact RF logistics. Extensive fires indicate severe air quality degradation and reduced visibility. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Leningrad Oblast (RF): Large fire (1,200 sq. meters) involving cardboard and household waste in Lepsari village. Roof collapse (600 sq. meters). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Chernivtsi Oblast: Earthquake reported, minor disruption. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• China (Beijing): Heavy rains and flooding causing significant casualties and evacuations will divert internal resources. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Romania: Severe flooding resulting in fatalities will divert internal resources. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kursk Oblast (RF): Fire at a gas station, likely from UA strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Yekaterinburg (RF): Building collapse. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Moscow (RF): Fire at a construction site. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Astrakhan (RF): Building collapse due to gas explosion. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Zaporizhzhia Oblast: Ukrainian MVS reports radiation levels are currently normal (0.14 mSv/hr). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kamchatka, Sakhalin (RF Far East):
  • Significant earthquakes (M7.1, M7.9, M8.5, updated to M8.8) and resulting tsunami threats and evacuations. Strong aftershocks (up to M7.5) will continue for at least a month.
  • Port Severo-Kurilsk and "Alaid" fish processing plant flooded by tsunami wave, with vessels torn from moorings.
  • Residents of Sakhalin returned home. No destruction in Severo-Kurilsk reported by operational services. Port Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky working normally. Communication restored in Kamchatka. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Force Dispositions:
  • Air Assets: Multiple strategic bombers (6x Tu-95MS, 2x Tu-160), MiG-31K aircraft (3x airborne), and dozens of Shahed drones posing nationwide missile threats. Tactical aviation active in Eastern and North-Eastern directions, launching KABs on Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts. RF MoD claims 74 Ukrainian UAVs shot down over Russian regions overnight. RF continues to test new optical laser drone destruction schemes. Construction of aircraft shelters (caponiers) at airfields suggests increased protection for air assets. RF MoD released footage of drone operations, showing targeting of various UA assets including AQ-400 KOCA, LELEKA-100, BABA-YAGA, HPTK, PICKUP, BBM, and AVTO. Colonelcassad's video report details claimed effective strikes on UA personnel, armored vehicles, artillery, EW stations, command posts, ammunition depots, and air defense systems. RF drone operators demonstrate capability to destroy a UA M777 Howitzer using drones. RF sources release videos depicting mass burning of UA transport in Kupyansk using "Groza" EW system. RF drone footage claims destruction of a UA "Yaga" drone. RF forces are employing up to 250 FPV drones per day in the Kherson area. Colonelcassad's new video shows Lancet UAVs detecting and liquidating enemy equipment in 15 minutes. Воин DV provides video of 11th Guards Army Air Force and Air Defense bombers using FABs to destroy UA temporary deployment points (PVD) near Iskra. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ground Forces: Persistent offensive pressure on the Pokrovsk axis (Dimitrov/Myrnohrad, Rodinskoye), and in Zaporizhzhia (Kamenskoye sector). Achieved lodgement in Avdiivka industrial zone and launched new southern push. First combat deployment of "Sarmat-2" UGV near Bakhmut. RF units reportedly continue to apply small group tactics. Rybar highlights "Battle for the Asian Highway" focus. RF paratroopers from the 7th Airborne Division of Zaporizhzhia released a video requesting assistance for drones and Starlink systems. Video released by "Два майора" shows military personnel inspecting and marking mortar rounds. RF sources "Дневник Десантника" and "Операция Z" show footage of RF ground units attacking UA positions. RF sources (Триколор / SpN Akhmat) show RF soldiers preparing and firing mortar rounds. RF sources claim RF 64th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, 35th Army Group "Vostok" destroying UA personnel and materiel near Huliaipole. MoD Russia video shows 'Zapad Group of Forces' Grad MLRS crews engaging clusters of AFU manpower in LNR. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Control Measures:
  • Ukraine-wide Air Alert: Active due to ballistic missile threat and UAV activity. UA Air Force issued a general attention alert and continues providing updated information on enemy strike UAV movements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF Internal Internet/Communication Restrictions: Mobile internet restricted in Tyumen, Udmurtia, Sverdlovsk. Demand for wired internet growing. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Federal Level (RF Logistics): Gasoline exports restricted until August 31. 20 checkpoints on border with Ukraine to close August 1. "Главпродукт" now state-owned. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF Internal Security: Fines for unregistered tenants in Moscow. FSB prevented terror attack in Rostov-on-Don. Tajikistan declares hunt for "Crocus" terror attack suspect. Administrative cases opened against teenagers for social behavior. Two Russian citizens sentenced for collecting data on RF MoD facilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ukraine (Internal Security/Border Control): SBU and National Police conducting security measures in Kyiv (Desnyanskyi district). Prosecutor General's Office actively investigating corruption, including former TCC head. Cyber Police participating in international law enforcement operation "Checkmate." Ukraine blocked YouTube channels of sanctioned blogger Andriy Lugansky. Ukraine returned another teenager from occupation. SBU counterintelligence detained three RF spotters. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ukraine (Government): Rada Committee voted for Zelenskyy's NABU and SAP bill after second attempt. Zelenskyy signed a bill to provide real weight and benefits for the "Cross of Military Merit" award. Zelenskyy states cabinet prepared "Contract 18-24" program to attract more motivated young soldiers for drone operations. Zelenskyy states deal finalized with partners for $400M to finance Ukrainian drone production. UA Cabinet of Ministers seeks to attract 400 billion UAH for security and defense sector financing. MP Ruslan Horbenko states military salaries in the rear are planned to increase 2.5 times. Head of ARMA, Olena Duma, has resigned. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Friendly Forces (Training): UA Airborne Assault Forces conduct night training. General Staff of AFU reports training on International Humanitarian Law and Operation INTERFLEX in UK. Ukrainian Ground Forces confirmed a missile strike on one of their training units (Chernihiv), with fatalities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ukraine (Defense Industry): Zelenskyy visited a defense enterprise in Kyiv Oblast producing critical components. Dnipropetrovsk regional administration reports over 3 billion UAH allocated for defense support, 70% funded. Kharkiv regional administration confirms systemic support for defense forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.4. Intelligence Gaps (Updated)

• RF Attack on Kursk (Kurskaya NPP): The nature and extent of the alleged UA drone attack on Kurchatov, specifically targeting the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (Kurskaya NPP), remains unconfirmed. Requires immediate verification via IMINT, SIGINT, and OSINT from independent sources. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Claims of Resistance to TCC in Occupied Territories: The veracity and scale of TASS's claim regarding "groups fighting TCC" in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts need independent verification. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kamchatka Earthquake/Tsunami Impact (RF Far East): Comprehensive assessment of damage to military/dual-use infrastructure, casualties, and resource diversion implications. While residents returned and ports operate, extent of long-term recovery resource allocation remains a gap. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Intent for Novohryhorivka: The extent of RF forces' advance towards Novohryhorivka in Zaporizhzhia Oblast after liberating Temirovka, and their immediate tactical objectives, remain unconfirmed. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• RF Propaganda on "Qatari Wahhabis": The origin, specific intent, and target audience for the highly inflammatory "Qatari Wahhabis" narrative, particularly its focus on "radicalization of Islam in Russia," are unclear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Claims on Chasiv Yar: The veracity of TASS's claim that RF forces completely control approaches to Chasiv Yar and have cut off UA supply routes requires immediate independent verification via IMINT, SIGINT, and HUMINT. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Claims on Vovchansk Advance: The veracity and scale of TASS's claim that RF forces are advancing near Vovchansk on a 20 km front requires immediate independent verification via IMINT, SIGINT, and HUMINT. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Jet UAV Capabilities: Specific models, ranges, payloads, and intended tactics of the "jet UAVs" reportedly used by RF in the northern direction are unknown. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF UGV Production/Deployment: Full scale of RF UGV production (e.g., "Sarmat-2") and their planned integration into wider ground operations remains unknown. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Naval Modernization: Impact of reported collapse of RF key fleet renewal project on their Black Sea Fleet capability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Personnel Mobilization: Extent of resistance to conscription within RF and the effectiveness of new recruitment tactics is unclear. Need to verify RF claims about "blocking detachments" and poor treatment of mobilized personnel within UA units. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Nature of French Cyberattack: While a cyberattack on French defense industry is confirmed, the exact perpetrators, methods, and full extent of data exfiltration or system damage are unknown. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Azerbaijani Support to UA: The volume and timeline of deliveries of 122mm and 152mm artillery shells from Azerbaijan to UA needs immediate verification. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF "Italmas" UAV Development: Information on the capabilities, production, and intended deployment of the "Italmas" UAV, allegedly being tested in Sumy, is extremely limited. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Drone Interception Capability: Details of RF's "Yolka" air defense drone capabilities (range, speed, payload, effectiveness against various UAV types) are unknown. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Internal Security Targets: The targets and operational scope of RF's drone-interceptor units for "Putin's guards" are unclear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• GPS Spoofing System Identification: The specific type and location of the sophisticated RF EW system responsible for GPS spoofing in Zaporizhzhia are still unidentified. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF "Electric Scooter" Doctrine: The scale of deployment and intended tactical doctrine for "combat electric scooters" is unclear. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Impact of Trump's Ultimatum: Immediate and long-term impact of Trump's "10-day deadline" on RF strategic decision-making, Western unity, and international support for Ukraine remains highly uncertain. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• UA Public Donation Trends: The specific reasons for the reported "dip" in public donations and its broader implications for public morale and sustained support require further analysis. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• RF Claimed Losses: Independent verification of RF claims of heavy Ukrainian losses on various fronts, as reported by Colonelcassad and the "Zapad" Grouping, is required, particularly the claim of 200 UA personnel killed in Chernihiv and the destruction of numerous UA quadcopters/control points. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• RF Internal Repression: The full scale and methodology of the "foreign agent" campaign against Russian journalists and dissidents, and the broadening of administrative cases for social behaviors, requires further investigation into their long-term impact on social cohesion and dissent. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• RF Mortar Round Marking: The purpose and implications of RF units marking mortar rounds with blue markers require further ISR and HUMINT. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• Effectiveness of RF "Groza" EW: Independent verification of RF claims regarding the "Groza" EW system's effectiveness in "mass burning" UA transport in Kupyansk is required. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• RF "Anti-Drone Screens": Details on the specifications, deployment, and effectiveness of these new "anti-drone screens" being distributed to RF units are unknown. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• RF FPV Drone Usage (Kherson): While volume (250/day) is reported, specifics on RF FPV drone models, C2, and counter-measures employed against UA EW in the Kherson sector are unknown. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• Polish Abrams Operational Issues: The nature and extent of "serious operational problems" with Polish Abrams tanks are unclear. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• RF Fiber-Optic Drone Capabilities: The full operational capabilities, range, and deployment doctrine of these fiber-optic drones are unknown. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Mexican Cartel Disinformation: The origin and specific intent behind the "Mexican cartel" disinformation narrative require further investigation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kamenskoye Casualties: The precise number of fatalities in Kamenskoye is still fluid, with initial reports of 4 killed from ASTRA and later 3 from Ukrainian sources. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian General Staff Losses Visual: The full content of the Ukrainian General Staff's visual representation of enemy losses, specifically the detailed breakdown of equipment types and personnel figures, is not available for direct analysis within the provided text. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• "Operational Z" and "Ugolok_Sitha" Photo Compilation Content: While identified as propaganda, the specific content of the photo compilation, including types of equipment, personnel, and any identifiable locations, is not detailed in the provided text. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• STERNENKO's "Situation" Photo: The exact visual content of STERNENKO's "This is the situation now" photo message is not provided. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• WarGonzo German Propaganda Visuals: Detailed analysis of the images shared by WarGonzo regarding "German absurdity" to identify specific propaganda themes and effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Trump's Concessions to China Specifics: The precise nature of Trump's reported concessions to China and the specific trade deals involved are unclear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Rybar Estonian Euros to Chisinau Visuals: Obtain and analyze the photo message accompanying Rybar's report on "Estonian Euros flying to Chisinau" for any additional context or indicators of financial flows. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Phone Scam Impact: Further assessment of the scale and impact of phone scams on the Russian population, and any potential links to state-sponsored or criminal groups affecting internal security. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Fighterbomber Helicopter Video Details: The type of military helicopter, the specific unit, and the operational context of the video showing a dog inside are unclear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС Captured RF Personnel Video: The specific unit of the captured RF assault troops, the exact location of the capture, and the full extent of the engagement shown in the video are unclear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Dnevnik Desantnika Kursk Photo Details: The specific agricultural machinery shown and its relevance to military operations or the deployment of RF forces in Kursk Oblast is unclear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:
  • Air/Missile/UAV: Capable of large-scale, coordinated missile and drone strikes (78 drones launched, including jet UAVs; ballistic missiles), with successful hits deep within Ukraine. Confirmed Kalibr missile replenishment in Sevastopol significantly increases maritime strike threat. Demonstrated effective air defense against UA drones (51/78 claimed shot down/suppressed by UA; 74 claimed shot down over RF regions). Continued development and testing of new UAV types and counter-drone systems (fiber-optic drones targeting crews). Precision strike capability against personnel concentrations (LNR training ground via Iskander), artillery (Lancet), and logistics (Pavlohrad railway). Construction of aircraft shelters indicates long-term protection strategy. High FPV drone usage (250/day in Kherson). RF MoD video confirms high-precision targeting of various UA drones and ground vehicles. Heavy flamethrower systems (TOS-1A 'Solntsepyok') used in LNR for engaging manpower and thwarting rotation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ground Forces: Persistent offensive pressure on the Pokrovsk axis (Dimitrov/Myrnohrad, Rodinskoye), and in Zaporizhzhia (Kamenskoye sector, Huliaipole). Achieved lodgement in Avdiivka industrial zone and launched new southern push. First combat deployment of "Sarmat-2" UGV near Bakhmut indicates an evolving ground combat capability for fire support. Capability for tactical reconnaissance and precision strikes against logistics. Continued use of small group tactics. Focus on "Asian Highway" implies specific effort to interdict UA logistics. RF paratroopers active in Zaporizhzhia sector. Effective mortar employment (with morale messaging). Claims of advances near Myropillia, towards Sumy, Chasiv Yar, and Vovchansk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intentions:
  • Strategic Attrition: Continue to degrade Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure through persistent long-range strikes. Increase pressure on Zaporizhzhia Oblast, actively targeting civilians (penitentiary facility, medical infrastructure). RF claims of a UA attempt to attack the Kursk NPP suggest a potential RF intention to justify future RF strikes on Ukrainian critical infrastructure, including nuclear facilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF Military Success: Highlight claimed RF advances (Pokrovsk, Temirovka, Novoukrainka, Kolodezi, Avdiivka, Volodymyrivka, Huliaipole, Novohryhorivka, Chasiv Yar, Vovchansk, Alekseevka, Udachnoye, Malievka, Iskra), successful AD intercepts, and new military capabilities (UGVs, sheltered airfields, Lancet drones, fiber-optic drones) to boost domestic morale and project an image of superiority. Actively promote perceived tactical innovations (e-scooters). Continue to showcase training efforts to demonstrate military readiness and professionalism. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Western Weakness/Division: Amplify dissenting voices within the EU and US (Trump statements, German CSU, Moldovan sentiment) to portray Western disunity and an impending end to the conflict on RF terms. Disseminate high-level disinformation campaigns (e.g., "secret elections" for Zelenskyy's replacement with Zaluzhny, EU kneeling to US, "Mexican cartel in AFU"). Exploit Trump's "10-day deadline" as a sign of US wavering commitment. Highlight divergence in Western diplomatic positions (UK/Israel on Palestine). Exploit Polish Abrams tank issues. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • UA Weakness/Forced Mobilization: Disseminate narratives about UA forces losing combat effectiveness ("exhausted," "personnel shortages," "blocking detachments shooting fleeing soldiers"). Amplify narratives from captured UA servicemen about poor treatment of mobilized personnel (Ilya Kukarin) to undermine morale and trust in UA command. Actively discredit UA military leadership (Zaluzhny). Exploit confirmed missile strike on a UA training unit. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Testing NATO: Continue probing NATO borders with aerial assets (UAVs over Lithuania, Minsk) and diplomatic provocations (Estonia). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Internal Governance: Project an image of stable internal governance and social welfare despite economic and security challenges. Address internal migration issues. Demonstrate resilience to natural disasters (Kamchatka/Sakhalin earthquakes, tsunami response). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Expand Military Partnerships: Plan to sign a military cooperation agreement with Benin signals an RF intention to expand its military and geopolitical influence, particularly in Africa. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Courses of Action: RF will continue massed aerial attacks overnight, combining missiles and Shahed drones (including jet UAVs), targeting critical infrastructure and military targets deep within Ukraine, with a high likelihood of strikes on Odesa and now potentially Ochakiv due to missile threats. Ground offensives will continue to focus on the Pokrovsk and Avdiivka axes with increasing intensity, potential for operational encirclement, supported by tactical drones, heavy artillery, and new UGV deployments. The focus on the "Asian Highway" and Novohryhorivka suggests an intention to interdict key UA logistics and expand territorial control. RF will continue efforts to cut off supply routes to Chasiv Yar and advance on a wide front near Vovchansk. RF will continue probing attempts at Antonivsky Bridge. The "Sarmat-2" UGV will likely be employed more frequently on the Bakhmut axis to test and refine its integration with infantry assaults. RF will persist with small group tactics, despite their vulnerability to UA drones. RF will continue to use drones for tactical reconnaissance, targeting, and counter-battery fire. RF will continue to utilize mortars and TOS-1A. RF will continue to actively target high-value individual personnel with FPV drones. RF will continue localized advances such as that observed near Malievka and Iskra. RF will likely attempt to repel further UA DRG incursions in LNR. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Persistent Massed Aerial Attacks: Consistent large waves of mixed missile and drone attacks, with new ballistic missile launch vectors (Chernihiv towards Kyiv) and adapted drone routes (Makariv, Pavlohrad, Kharkiv). Increased number of UA drones claimed shot down over RF territory indicates an adaptive RF air defense response. RF strike on Honcharivske training ground with Iskander missiles and confirmed missile strike on a Ukrainian Ground Forces training unit today, indicating a continued and successful RF targeting of UA training infrastructure. RF is exhibiting a consistent pattern of striking UA training grounds around 50km from the border/LOD. RF FPV drones now confirmed to directly target and kill civilians in border regions (Kursk Oblast). The confirmed drone attack on Pavlohrad railway infrastructure shows an adaptive focus on disrupting logistics. Use of jet UAVs indicates capability upgrade. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Deep Cyber Operations & Internal Information Control: Expanded targeting of critical civilian infrastructure (pharmacy networks, postal services) in RF. Tightening of internal information controls (internet restrictions, chat transfers) and intensified propaganda efforts to control narrative surrounding domestic incidents. Use of administrative cases to enforce social norms. Severe prison sentences for data collection on RF MoD facilities. Growing demand for wired internet in Russia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Shift in Ground Offensive Focus: Increased offensive activity across multiple Eastern axes, particularly on the Pokrovsk axis. Significant push on Avdiivka, securing a lodgment in the industrial zone and opening a new southern axis of advance. First confirmed combat deployment of "Sarmat-2" UGV near Bakhmut. Observed deployment of individual soldiers on electric scooters for rapid, low-signature movement. RF tactical focus on the "Asian Highway." RF forces using drones for precision counter-battery fire. RF forces equipping personnel with "anti-drone screens." Increased daily FPV drone usage. RF claims of completely controlling approaches to Chasiv Yar and advancing near Vovchansk. RF attempts to cross Antonivsky Bridge. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Shift in Attribution Narrative for Civilian Incidents: RF is increasingly and explicitly blaming UA for civilian casualties in occupied territories and internal RF incidents (e.g., Donetsk Business Center, Rostov railway station, Kursk FPV drone fatality), likely to justify RF actions and fuel the "Ukrainian terrorist" narrative. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Targeting Civilian/Medical Infrastructure: Direct strikes on a penitentiary facility (Zaporizhzhia) and damage to medical facilities (Kamenskoye) and railway (Pavlohrad) indicate an adaptive shift to directly target civilian infrastructure with significant human impact. Confirmed civilian casualties in Kamenskoye and Kharkiv reinforce this adaptive targeting. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• EW Sophistication: Marked increase in sophistication of RF EW activity, specifically targeted GPS spoofing in Zaporizhzhia. RF claims use of "Groza" EW system to mass burning UA transport. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Exploitation of POWs for Disinformation: Increased use of captured UA servicemen to disseminate narratives portraying poor treatment of mobilized personnel within UA units (Ilya Kukarin). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Training Emphasis: RF is actively engaging in specialized FPV drone training. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• New Anti-Drone Capabilities: Observed use of fiber-optic drones to strike enemy hexacopter crews. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Internal Crisis Management: RF's immediate and coordinated response to the natural disaster in the Far East (Kamchatka/Sakhalin), including deployment of regional headquarters and hotlines, demonstrates an adaptive capacity for internal crisis management. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• Ammunition & Fuel: Sufficient to maintain current high operational tempo. Confirmed Kalibr missile replenishment in Sevastopol. UA deep strikes on Salsk railway station (fuel tanks, locomotive) and Orlovsky substation have caused significant, albeit temporary, disruption to RF railway logistics in the Rostov Oblast. Fire at Kursk gas station suggests another localized hit. Azerbaijan's confirmed serial production of 122mm and 152mm artillery shells for Ukraine suggests potential future logistical challenges for RF artillery dominance as UA supply improves. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Personnel: Continued reliance on recruitment from penal colonies and high-paying contracts. Localized appeals for specific equipment (drones, Starlink) indicate persistent logistical needs. High losses continue for RF infantry companies (90-95% attrition in some). RF is using coercive recruitment methods. RF propaganda now explicitly stating UA uses "blocking detachments." Ukrainian General Staff (and Operatyvnyi ZSU) report an additional 890 RF personnel eliminated in the last 24 hours (total losses over 471,000), which, if accurate, indicates significant and sustained personnel losses impacting RF sustainment. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Materiel: Overall production capacity appears sufficient, with continued investment in advanced systems and drone production. RF is experiencing significant technical failures with aerial bombs (100 "accidentally descended"). Naval fleet renewal project reportedly collapsed. Construction of aircraft shelters indicates ongoing investment in military infrastructure protection. Reports of "anti-drone screens" being distributed indicate a focus on counter-UAV materiel. Ukrainian sources report significant daily RF equipment losses (tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, AD systems, aircraft, UAVs), indicating a sustained materiel attrition rate for RF. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• Tactical Level: Demonstrated effective tactical C2 for coordinated aerial strikes and focused ground assaults with drone support. Effective counter-UAV responses are demonstrated. Integration of new UGVs (Sarmat-2) suggests adaptive tactical C2. C2 of small, rapidly moving units (e-scooter soldier) requires further assessment. RF training videos show structured tactical training. Coordinated focus on the "Asian Highway" implies C2 effectiveness in prioritizing ground operations. MoD Russia video demonstrates C2 and sensor-to-shooter links for drone operations. Tactical C2 evident for TOS-1A deployment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Operational/Strategic Level: Centralized strategic C2 evidenced by coordinated nationwide missile/drone campaigns, significant internal security operations (FSB counter-terrorism), and diplomatic engagements. Demonstrated ability for rapid recovery from cyber incidents (Aeroflot). Strategic C2 for information warfare is highly active. Continued US-RF cooperation in space indicates areas where strategic C2 enables interaction despite broader conflict. RF central government appears to be effectively coordinating responses to major natural disasters in its Far East, demonstrating a functioning crisis management C2 at the strategic level. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Defensive Posture: Maintained resilient defensive posture, effectively repelling numerous RF assaults on multiple axes (Kursk/Sumy, Eastern axes, Kherson). UA air defense demonstrates high effectiveness against UAVs (51/78 shot down/suppressed). Forces are receiving modern EW systems. Zelenskyy signed a law strengthening the SBU. Mandatory military training for medical students indicates efforts to enhance personnel readiness. Kryvyi Rih reports controlled situation. Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces (DShV) are actively operating on the Pokrovsk direction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:
  • Successes: Successful air defense intercepts (51/78 UAVs). Repelled numerous RF assaults. Successful deep drone strikes on Salsk railway station, Orlovsky substation, and Kursk gas station. Successful cyber operations against RF pharmacy and postal networks, and participation in international law enforcement operation "Checkmate." Effective small unit tactics (63rd Mechanized Brigade capturing mercenaries, two UA soldiers capturing RF assault troops). Successful FPV drone strike against RF soldier on electric scooter. Successful counter-intelligence preventing assassination attempts. Continued anti-corruption efforts (TCC head, ARMA head resignation). Boosting domestic defense production, with $400M deal for drone production. Zelenskyy enhancing "Cross of Military Merit" award. Regional governments allocate significant funds for defense. Ukrainian drone units effectively countering RF small group tactics. UA forces successfully used an FPV drone to destroy RF positions by striking an unexploded KAB. Ukrainian MVS confirmation that radiation levels in Zaporizhzhia are normal. "Підрозділ Shadow" reports destruction of an RF Zala UAV, two artillery pieces, and 200 enemy personnel. DeepState reports drone footage showing the destruction of an RF command post/observation point on Kinburn Spit. STERNENKO reports destruction of two "Superkama." Blocking YouTube channels of pro-RF bloggers. Prompt reporting on missile strike on UA training unit. SBU reports on detained RF spotters. UA FPV drone operators ("Kryla do pekla") successfully ambushed RF personnel in Sumy Oblast. Stefanchuk's statement on Ukraine's drone export potential. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Setbacks: Significant civilian casualties (22 killed, 85 wounded nationwide). Infrastructure damage (Kyiv, Kropyvnytskyi, Kharkiv, Sumy, Kamenskoye, Pavlohrad). Continued intense pressure and localized territorial losses on Pokrovsk axis (Novoukrainka, Temirovka, Volodymyrivka, Alekseevka, Udachnoye, Iskra). RF lodgment in Avdiivka industrial zone and new southern push poses significant threat to garrison. Impact of RF disinformation on international perception and internal political dynamics. Ongoing POW issues. GPS spoofing in Zaporizhzhia degrading PGM/UAV effectiveness. A Ukrainian channel noted "very few donations" despite nearly 40k views on a fundraising appeal, indicating potential decrease in public financial support. Missile strike on a Ukrainian Ground Forces training unit resulting in casualties (3 killed, 18 wounded). STERNENKO highlights a recurring pattern of RF striking UA training grounds. An RF FPV drone strike on a Ukrainian SOF specialist indicates a successful targeting of high-value personnel. Renewed drone strikes on Kharkiv resulted in further explosions and 3 civilian casualties. DeepState reports RF advances near Malievka. Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦's video and accompanying text on the 34th Brigade of Coastal Defense, indicating logistical failures and casualties on the left bank operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.2. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Critical Needs: Continued high demand for effective air defense systems (particularly short- to medium-range), artillery ammunition, UAVs (including FPV drones), and EW equipment. Significant medical supplies and personnel required due to high casualties. Engineer equipment for fortification and repair is vital. UA frontline units directly appealing for FPV drone components. The "Rubizh" brigade's fundraising efforts highlight specific needs for replacing destroyed property and equipment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Personnel: Persistent high operational tempo and RF offensives create continuous demand for trained personnel, especially infantry. The debate regarding conscription-age Ukrainians in Germany highlights a significant manpower challenge. Efforts to attract motivated young drone operators via "Contract 18-24" program. Proposed salary increases for military personnel in the rear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Financial Aid: EU funding suspended due to "old" NABU law, creating a critical financial constraint (potential loss of $60 billion). EU demanding Ukraine preserve NABU/SAP independence. A Ukrainian channel reported a "dip in the monobase of the Russorez" (fundraising platform). The Cabinet of Ministers wants to attract 400 billion UAH for security and defense sector financing. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Logistical Shortfalls: Critical need for pickup trucks for frontline units. The call for "urgent intervention from higher leadership" regarding supply for the 34th Brigade highlights significant logistical constraints for offensive operations on the left bank. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Anti-Corruption Measures: Continued internal corruption remains a constraint, diverting resources and impacting public trust and international aid. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Disinformation: Persistently frames UA attacks on RF territory as "terrorism." Actively promotes narratives of UA weakness, personnel shortages, and incompetence, now including claims of UA "blocking detachments" shooting their own fleeing soldiers. Intensively pushing narratives from captured UA servicemen (Ilya Kukarin) alleging poor treatment of mobilized personnel. Intensively pushing the "Western division" narrative, exemplified by "secret elections in the Alps" story to replace Zelenskyy with Zaluzhny, and claims of EU "kneeling" to US. Continues to attribute civilian suffering in occupied territories to UA actions. Actively discredits UA military leadership. Actively attempting to exploit US domestic political statements (Trump's "10-day deadline," new tariffs on India, Melania's sympathy for Putin) to portray Western disunity or a potential shift in support for Ukraine. RF state media (TASS) highlights continued US-RF cooperation in space. Colonelcassad's video claiming 200 UA personnel killed by Iskanders at a Chernihiv training ground. RF sources promoting a video claiming "Groza" EW system mass burning of UA transport in Kupyansk. Colonelcassad explicitly pushes a narrative on "Losses of personnel of the armed formations of Ukraine (AFU)." Rybar's "New Voices of a New World Order" conferences aim to build international coalitions that align with RF's geopolitical vision. "Mexican cartel militants" joining AFU narrative. Colonelcassad's report on Polish Abrams tanks operational problems. TASS is amplifying Netanyahu's statements accusing UK PM Starmer of "encouraging Hamas terrorism." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UA Counter-Propaganda: Immediately reports and provides visual evidence of RF atrocities and civilian casualties to counter RF claims. Exposes RF losses and POW issues, including graphic content of RF casualties. Showcases UA military resilience, professionalism, and effective small unit tactics. Highlights successful deep strikes into RF territory and cyber operations against RF civilian targets. Maintains transparency on internal corruption efforts (ARMA head resignation). Actively uses drone footage of successful engagements against RF personnel. Utilizes emotional appeals for public support. Rapidly refutes false RF claims (e.g., Malievka capture, Mexican cartel in AFU, false radiation reports). Highlights official governmental efforts to support military personnel. UA General Staff releasing "Operational information as of 22:00." "Підрозділ Shadow", DeepState, and STERNENKO releasing videos of successful RF equipment and personnel destruction. Blocking of pro-RF YouTube channels. Prompt reporting on the missile strike on UA training unit. SBU reports on detained RF spotters. UA FPV drone footage from Sumy Oblast. Stefanchuk's statement on Ukraine's drone export potential. RPK-Ukraine and UA Air Forces are providing real-time updates on drone and missile threats. CyberBoroshno's "IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT" on railway logistics damage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Ukrainian Public Sentiment: High resilience despite casualties. Strong concern for POWs. Internal security concerns due to human trafficking and corruption. Boosting morale through recognition of military service and focus on domestic drone production. Strong public support for frontline soldiers, but reports of "very few donations" despite high views suggests potential donor fatigue. Proposed salary increases for military personnel will likely be a morale booster. Return of a teenager from occupation will boost morale. Confirmed casualties from missile strike on training unit will negatively impact morale but reinforce resolve. Kamenskoye declared a Day of Mourning. The constant minute of silence acknowledgements reflect a national commitment to remembrance. Challenges faced by the 34th Brigade of Coastal Defense highlight frustration with C2 and logistical issues. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian Public Sentiment: General tolerance of repression. Growing economic frustration due to cyberattacks and financial restrictions. Increased fear of cross-border UA drone attacks. State efforts to bolster military morale and support for veterans. Underlying internal discord and searching for "traitors within." Concerns about migration issues. Drop in Mosbirzhi Index might indicate economic anxiety. Public appeals for donations for "frontline armor." Large-scale non-combat incidents like fire in Leningrad Oblast might impact public confidence. Construction of new leisure facilities in Moscow intended to project normalcy. Major earthquakes and tsunami threats in the Far East could temporarily shift public focus away from the conflict, but also test government's response. The fatal FPV drone attack on a civilian in Kursk Oblast is likely to increase fear in border regions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Support for Ukraine: Continued military aid (Germany's IRIS-T). Diplomatic engagement (Zelenskyy-Danish PM). Sanctions synchronization against RF. Azerbaijan's confirmed serial production of artillery shells for Ukraine represents significant new military support. US State Department acknowledging assessment of secondary sanctions. Stefanchuk's statement on selling UA drones to the US and purchasing US weapons points to potential deepening of defense cooperation. Trump's statement allowing Ukrainians to remain in the US until the end of hostilities. Moldova's President Sandu states Moldova could join EU by 2028. US Senator Richard Blumenthal publicly calling for accelerated sanctions against Putin. US Treasury warning China about continued Russian oil purchases. Finnish President Stubb supports continued war to force Russia to negotiations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Challenges for Ukraine: EU funding suspended pending NABU law reform. German pressure on refugee benefits. International perception of corruption. Hungarian MFA statement regarding US-Russia agreement to end conflict is concerning. Trump's "10-day deadline" for peace talks, and the lack of a Russian response, combined with his statements about potential tariffs and US oil production, create significant uncertainty and potential diplomatic pressure. French defense industry cyberattack, including submarine data theft. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian International Relations: Deepening ties with DPRK. Complex and confrontational relations with the West, coupled with attempts to control negotiation narratives. Persistent probing of NATO borders (Lithuania, Estonia, Belarus). Continued engagement in other regions (Syria, Africa, Benin). Israeli rejection of UK stance on Palestinian statehood highlights broader international diplomatic friction that RF could exploit. Russia has not responded to Trump's ultimatum. China rejected US ultimatum on Russian oil. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

• MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action):
  • RF Ground Operations: RF will continue to concentrate offensive efforts on the Pokrovsk and Avdiivka axes, attempting to consolidate gains and achieve tactical encirclement of Avdiivka. They will maintain pressure on other Eastern axes (Kupyansk, Lyman, Siversk, Kramatorsk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka) and in Zaporizhzhia (Novohryhorivka, Kamenskoye, Huliaipole sectors) to fix UA reserves. Increased RF pressure around Konstantinovka and toward Sumy (Myropillia) is anticipated, with a particular focus on seizing critical logistical routes like the "Asian Highway." RF will likely continue efforts to cut off supply routes to Chasiv Yar and advance on a wide front near Vovchansk. RF will continue probing attempts at Antonivsky Bridge, intensifying fire on UA personnel attempting river crossings. The "Sarmat-2" UGV will likely be employed more frequently on the Bakhmut axis. RF will persist with small group tactics. RF will continue to use drones for tactical reconnaissance, targeting, and counter-battery fire. RF will continue to utilize mortars and TOS-1A. RF will continue to actively target high-value individual personnel with FPV drones. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF Air/Missile/UAV Operations: RF will conduct a large-scale aerial attack within the next 24-72 hours, almost certainly including Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea Fleet targeting Odesa's port infrastructure and potentially Ochakiv, in addition to continued ballistic missile and Shahed drone strikes (including the newly reported jet UAVs) against critical energy infrastructure, military industrial complex sites, and logistics nodes deep within Ukraine, including Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk. Reconnaissance UAV activity in border regions will persist. RF will continue testing new UAV models and counter-UAV measures in combat. Accidental bomb drops by RF aircraft are likely to continue. RF will continue targeted strikes on UA military training grounds and active units. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF Hybrid Operations: RF will intensify cyberattacks on Ukrainian and Western civilian infrastructure while simultaneously tightening internal information and security controls within Russia. Disinformation campaigns aimed at delegitimizing UA leadership and fostering Western disunity will remain a key component. RF will particularly leverage Trump's "10-day deadline" to further their narrative of Western disarray. RF will continue limited probes of NATO borders and exploit international diplomatic disagreements. RF will deflect blame for civilian casualties in border regions onto UA forces. RF will intensify efforts to secure and defend against UA deep strikes with enhanced EW systems. RF will continue to use internal law enforcement actions to project an image of internal stability. RF will intensify efforts to sow internal religious and ethnic discord within Russia via disinformation. RF will continue efforts to expand military partnerships, such as with Benin. RF will leverage its response to the Kamchatka/Sakhalin natural disaster to project competence and resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action):
  • RF Ground Offensive (Avdiivka Encirclement Success): RF launches a highly coordinated and successful combined arms offensive on the Avdiivka axis, achieving rapid and complete operational encirclement of the Avdiivka garrison. This would involve rapid consolidation of newly gained territories and pushing deeper into Ukrainian lines, severely impacting UA defensive posture in Donetsk. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • RF Escalation (Major Radiological Incident): An intentional or accidental action by RF forces at or near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) leads to a significant release of radioactive material, causing widespread environmental contamination and forcing large-scale civilian evacuation. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • US Diplomatic Shift: Trump's "10-day deadline" leads to an unforeseen diplomatic or economic consequence for Ukraine, potentially disrupting international support or creating a perceived imperative for immediate peace negotiations on terms unfavorable to Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • French Defense Industry Exploitation (NATO Compromise): The stolen submarine data from Naval Group is immediately exploited by a hostile actor (likely RF-affiliated) to compromise NATO naval operations or defense capabilities, leading to significant intelligence and operational setbacks for Western alliances and indirectly for Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:
  • Avdiivka/Pokrovsk/Chasiv Yar/Vovchansk Axes: Within the next 24-72 hours, significant decisions on reinforcements will be critical for UA to prevent potential encirclement in Avdiivka and prevent further RF deep penetration towards Myrnohrad/Rodinskoye, and to defend against advancements on Konstantinovka, Novohryhorivka, Chasiv Yar, and Vovchansk.
  • Air Defense (Odesa/Kyiv/Mykolaiv/Pavlohrad/Kharkiv/Sumy/Zaporizhzhia): Next 24-72 hours remain critical for defending against anticipated RF missile and drone strikes (including jet UAVs) following Kalibr replenishment in Sevastopol and continued Shahed activity.
  • EU Funding: The upcoming consideration of Zelenskyy's NABU bill in the Rada is a key decision point for unblocking significant EU financial aid within the coming days/weeks.
  • ZNPP Radiological Threat: Ongoing monitoring of radiation levels near ZNPP is a critical decision point for immediate protective measures.
  • Trump's Deadline: The next 10 days will be a critical period for observing US diplomatic posture and any potential economic actions.
  • Military Salaries: Proposed salary increases will impact morale and recruitment over the next weeks/months.
  • Azerbaijani Artillery Production: The next 3-6 months will be critical to observe the ramp-up of Azerbaijani artillery shell production.
  • Training Ground Security: Immediate review and implementation of adaptive security measures at UA training facilities is critical within the next 48-72 hours.
  • Moldova EU Accession: Moldova's 2028 EU accession timeline sets a new geopolitical marker.
  • Kamchatka/Sakhalin Disaster Response: Immediate response to the earthquakes and tsunami will be critical over the next 24-72 hours, particularly how RF manages civilian evacuations, infrastructure repair, and communication outages. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • 34th Brigade of Coastal Defense Operational Assessment: Calls for "urgent intervention" indicate that challenges require immediate assessment and decision-making within the next 24-48 hours. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• RF Objectives on Avdiivka/Pokrovsk Axis: Specific RF military objectives beyond Rodinskoye and Myrnohrad (e.g., deeper penetration, operational encirclement of specific UA forces) are unclear. Requires increased HUMINT and ISR. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF UGV Production/Deployment: Full scale of RF UGV production ("Sarmat-2") and their planned integration into wider ground operations remains unknown. Need to identify industrial facilities and training centers. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Naval Modernization: Impact of reported collapse of RF key fleet renewal project on their Black Sea Fleet capability. Requires additional COMINT/ELINT. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Personnel Mobilization: Extent of resistance to conscription within RF and the effectiveness of new recruitment tactics is unclear. Need to verify RF claims about "blocking detachments" and poor treatment of mobilized personnel within UA units. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Nature of French Cyberattack: Exact perpetrators, methods, and full extent of data exfiltration or system damage are unknown. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Azerbaijani Support to UA: The volume and timeline of deliveries from Azerbaijan to UA needs immediate verification. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF "Italmas" UAV Development: Information on the capabilities, production, and intended deployment of the "Italmas" UAV is extremely limited. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Drone Interception Capability: Details of RF's "Yolka" air defense drone capabilities are unknown. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Internal Security Targets: The targets and operational scope of RF's drone-interceptor units for "Putin's guards" are unclear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• GPS Spoofing System Identification: The specific type and location of the sophisticated RF EW system responsible for GPS spoofing in Zaporizhzhia are still unidentified. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF "Electric Scooter" Doctrine: The scale of deployment and intended tactical doctrine for "combat electric scooters" is unclear. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Impact of Trump's Ultimatum: Immediate and long-term impact of Trump's "10-day deadline" on RF strategic decision-making, Western unity, and international support for Ukraine remains highly uncertain. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• UA Public Donation Trends: The specific reasons for the reported "dip" in public donations and its broader implications for public morale and sustained support require further analysis. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• RF Claimed Losses: Independent verification of RF claims of heavy Ukrainian losses on various fronts. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• RF Internal Repression: The full scale and methodology of the "foreign agent" campaign against Russian journalists and dissidents, and the broadening of administrative cases for social behaviors, requires further investigation. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• RF Mortar Round Marking: The purpose and implications of RF units marking mortar rounds with blue markers require further ISR and HUMINT. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• Effectiveness of RF "Groza" EW: Independent verification of RF claims regarding the "Groza" EW system's effectiveness in "mass burning" UA transport in Kupyansk is required. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• RF "Anti-Drone Screens": Details on the specifications, deployment, and effectiveness of these new "anti-drone screens" being distributed to RF units are unknown. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• RF FPV Drone Usage (Kherson): Specifics on RF FPV drone models, C2, and counter-measures employed against UA EW in the Kherson sector are unknown. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• Polish Abrams Operational Issues: The nature and extent of "serious operational problems" with Polish Abrams tanks are unclear. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• RF Fiber-Optic Drone Capabilities: The full operational capabilities, range, and deployment doctrine of these fiber-optic drones are unknown. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Mexican Cartel Disinformation: The origin and specific intent behind the "Mexican cartel" disinformation narrative require further investigation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Belgorod Oblast Governor's Report: The specific content and implications of the Belgorod Oblast Governor's latest report are missing. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Specifics of TCC/ARTA Corruption Cases: While the arrests/resignations of the former TCC head and ARMA head are confirmed, the full details of their alleged corruption and the extent of their impact on mobilization/resource management are unclear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kharkiv Damage Assessment: The full extent of damage and precise number of casualties in Kharkiv's Shevchenkivskyi district from the night attack needs further confirmation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kamenskoye Casualties: The precise number of fatalities in Kamenskoye is still fluid, with initial reports of 4 killed from ASTRA and later 3 from Ukrainian sources. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Internal Internet/Communication Restrictions: The full scope and impact of growing demand for wired internet in Russia due to mobile internet interruptions during UAV attacks, and its potential impact on military/civilian communications. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Donetsk Fire Extent: The full extent of the strong fire in Kuibyshevsky district of Donetsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Drone Activity (Low over Russia): The specific reasons for RF claiming lower drone activity over Russian regions overnight, contrasting with large drone attacks on Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Severo-Kurilsk Damage: The TASS claim of "no destruction" in Severo-Kurilsk despite earlier reports of tsunami impact on port and processing plant, requires independent verification. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Zakaharova's Condemnations: The full impact and reception of Maria Zakharova's strong condemnations of Lviv mayor's proposal and US actions in Palestine within Russian and international information spaces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Polish Officials Discrediting: The specific context and target of the "Басурин о главном" photo message on "Polish panov" (Polish lords/gentlemen) and their alleged inability to think. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian Defense Reforms (Aug 1 Changes): The specific impact of changes from August 1 (fines, multi-card payments, "Diia" tickets) on Ukrainian society and economy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Reinforce Avdiivka, Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, and Vovchansk Axes: Allocate immediate tactical reserves and additional anti-armor/FPV drone units to the Avdiivka garrison to prevent encirclement. Reinforce critical defensive lines on the Pokrovsk axis to secure GLOCs into Myrnohrad and defend against advancements on Konstantinovka and Novohryhorivka. Prioritize defense of Chasiv Yar and Vovchansk to prevent RF from cutting off key supply routes and gaining significant territorial advantages in the north. Implement measures to prevent/counter RF probing attempts at Antonivsky Bridge, and prepare for high-intensity fire on personnel attempting river crossings. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Elevate Air Defense Readiness for Odesa, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Pavlohrad, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia: Immediately elevate the readiness state of all air defense assets in these oblasts in anticipation of imminent Kalibr missile, ballistic missile, and Shahed drone strikes (including new jet UAVs), and KAB launches. Prioritize rapid-response mobile fire groups against Shaheds. Reassess effectiveness of ballistic missile interception. Disperse and harden critical port infrastructure where possible. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
3. Intensify Counter-Hybrid Operations:
   • Cyber: Increase defensive cyber measures for critical civilian infrastructure and government networks. Actively coordinate with international partners on threat intelligence regarding Russian cyber capabilities. Maintain high alert against further RF cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. Investigate the Steam platform outage for potential links to hostile cyber activity.
   • Information Warfare: Develop and disseminate proactive counter-narratives to expose RF disinformation, particularly regarding alleged UA weaknesses, Western disunity, fabricated narratives about Ukrainian leadership, false claims of UA "blocking detachments," exploitation of POW statements (including Ilya Kukarin's personal history), the strike on UA training facilities, RF claims of UA losses (including the specific 51/78 shot down/suppressed drone claim), the newly observed "Mexican cartel in AFU" narrative, RF exploitation of UK's Online Safety Act, and claims of internal resistance to TCC in occupied territories. Immediately counter RF attempts to exploit Trump's "10-day deadline," his new tariff statements against India, Zakharova's statements against the US on Palestine, US Senator Blumenthal's call for sanctions, the "Father Evgeniy" interview claiming UA war crimes, and the "Qatari Wahhabis" narrative. Leverage reports of RF casualties and internal problems (e.g., sapper deaths, economic issues, accidental bomb drops, drone donation appeals, internal repression, social control measures, natural disasters in RF Far East) to undermine RF propaganda. Continue to highlight UA professionalism and battlefield successes (e.g., drone strikes against e-scooters and small groups, destruction of RF artillery, Zala UAVs, and command posts, return of POWs, Trump's statement on allowing Ukrainians to stay in US, successful DShV operations in Pokrovsk, capturing RF assault troops). Rapidly refute false RF claims of territorial gains and false radiation reports. Continue to challenge RF narratives blaming Ukraine for civilian casualties in RF border regions, especially any claims regarding the Kursk NPP, and the FPV drone fatality in Kursk Oblast. Actively promote successful UA military operations through official channels. Highlight successful SBU counter-intelligence efforts. Emphasize Ukraine's growing defense industry capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Counter-EW: Immediately deploy specialized signals intelligence (SIGINT) teams to the Zaporizhzhia front to identify and locate the source of sophisticated GPS spoofing emissions. Task friendly EW units to develop and implement immediate countermeasures and alternative navigation methods for PGMs and UAVs. Prioritize development of counter-measures against new RF EW systems like "Groza" if claims of kinetic effects are verified. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
4. Expedite Legislative Reforms: Prioritize the passage of Zelenskyy's NABU bill in the Rada to unblock crucial EU financial aid, demonstrating commitment to anti-corruption and ensuring continued international financial support. Address any remaining concerns to facilitate the necessary reforms. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
5. ISR Prioritization (Enemy Capabilities):
   • Re-task ISR assets (UAVs, satellite, SIGINT, OSINT) to collect on "Italmas" UAVs and the newly reported "jet UAVs" in Sumy region and UGVs ("Sarmat-2") on Bakhmut axis to understand their capabilities, operational patterns, and vulnerabilities.
   • Prioritize intelligence collection on RF force composition, and reinforcement movements on Avdiivka and Pokrovsk axes, and around Konstantinovka, Myropillia, Novohryhorivka, Chasiv Yar, and Vovchansk, with specific attention to the "Asian Highway."
   • Initiate urgent collection requirements on RF's "Yolka" air defense drone, "Putin's guard" interceptor drones, newly observed "anti-drone screens," and the recently deployed fiber-optic drones.
   • Monitor RF small unit tactics for further deployment of "combat electric scooters."
   • Investigate the causes and implications of over 100 accidental RF aerial bomb drops on their own territory.
   • Investigate the purpose and implications of RF units marking mortar rounds with blue markers.
   • Prioritize independent verification of "Groza" EW system's capabilities and claimed effects.
   • Focus ISR on RF FPV drone models, C2, and counter-measures employed against UA EW in the Kherson area, given the high reported usage.
   • Seek further information on the operational issues with Polish Abrams tanks.
   • Immediately verify the claim of a UA drone attack on the Kursk NPP, collecting all available IMINT, SIGINT, and OSINT. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Investigate details of the collected data that led to severe sentences for two Russians, focusing on the nature of the "objects of the Ministry of Defense." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Initiate urgent collection requirements on the specific FPV drone model and payload used in the strike on the UA SOF specialist. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Verify the veracity and scale of TASS's claim regarding "groups fighting TCC" in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Conduct immediate damage assessment in Shevchenkivskyi district, Kharkiv, including the burning vehicle. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Investigate the cause and full impact of the Steam platform outage in Russia, including potential cyber origins. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
   • Monitor RF response to the Kamchatka/Sakhalin earthquakes and tsunami threats, assessing resource allocation and any impact on military operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Review the Bryansk Crocus video evidence to assess any actionable intelligence. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Assess the implications of Milonov's proposal regarding historical symbols on RF internal policies. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Increase ISR on RF military training exercises, particularly those focusing on urban/close-quarters combat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Monitor the situation in Syria, specifically any alleged "secret committee" control. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Investigate the specific sources and intent behind the "Qatari Wahhabis" disinformation campaign. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Analyze the propaganda video featuring Ilya Kukarin for specific psychological warfare techniques and potential future exploitation patterns. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Verify the veracity of RF claims regarding controlling approaches to Chasiv Yar and advancing near Vovchansk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Assess the impact of the tsunami on military and dual-use infrastructure in Severo-Kurilsk and other affected coastal areas in RF Far East. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Acquire and analyze the full report from the Belgorod Oblast Governor. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Corroborate Ukrainian General Staff's reported RF equipment losses through IMINT and OSINT where possible. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
   • Detailed analysis of the visual content of Colonelcassad's "Z - in the zone of the Special Military Operation" photo compilation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Confirmation of RF attempts to cross railway part of Antonivsky Bridge (reconnaissance, infiltration). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Rationale for fines for feeding pigeons in Moscow. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
   • Precise number of fatalities in Kamenskoye (4 vs 3). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Detailed analysis of the video and photo content from Operatyvnyi ZSU regarding the Kamchatka earthquake aftermath. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Verify the extent of RF advance near Malievka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Investigate the precise visual content of "Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦" video for detailed damage assessment and context on Donbas conditions, as well as the friendly fire claim. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Investigate the precise visual content of "ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS" image on Trump's refugee statement for any additional contextual details. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Investigate the precise visual content of "ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS" image on Mexican cartels for any specific visual cues that might inform the narrative. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Investigate the precise visual content of "Басурин о главном" "Day in History" image for any subtle messages or unit affiliations beyond propaganda value. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Investigate the precise visual content of "АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА" video for terrain features, unit identification, and specific activities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Investigate the precise visual content of "Fighterbomber" photo for any discernible military content or context. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Investigate the specific FPV drone model, payload, and precise target of the attack on Karyzh village, Kursk Oblast, that resulted in a civilian fatality. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Full visual and textual analysis of Генеральний штаб ЗСУ (General Staff of AFU) map images for the Novopavlivskyi and Siversk directions to discern specific operational details, troop movements, or changes in control. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Detailed analysis of the content of the RBK-Україна "Headlines for the night" graphic to extract all specific news items and their implications. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Determine the full impact and any potential strategic implications of the FBI having the full video recording made in prison on the night of Epstein's death. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
   • Acquire and analyze the full content of the "Два майора" photo message summarizing Rybar's statements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Acquire and analyze the full operational information contained in the "Сили оборони Півдня України" photo message for the Southern direction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Assess the economic and social implications of the increased demand for "Labubu" greeting services in RF. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
   • Verify the specifics of the Ukrainian DRG's attempt to retake a road section in LNR. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Verify Kamchatka earthquake magnitude (8.7 vs 8.8) and tourist impact. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Full content and tactical implications of the video from Воин DV regarding the FAB strikes on Iskra and the advance of the 29th Army. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Full content and tactical implications of the video from Десантно-штурмові війська ЗС України on the Pokrovsk direction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Full content of the photos from Олег Синєгубов, голова Харківської ОДА regarding RF strikes on Kharkiv. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Full content of the photo messages from Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦 regarding Pokrovsk and its similarity to Toretsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Full content and context of the video and photo messages from Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦 regarding the 34th Brigade of Coastal Defense and operations on the left bank. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Full content and context of the photo messages from РБК-Україна regarding the drone attack on Pavlohrad. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Full content and context of the photo messages from Старше Эдды regarding apartment sales in St. Petersburg. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Full content and context of the photo messages from КМВА (Київська міська військова адміністрація) and Оперативний ЗСУ regarding the minute of silence. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Specific implications of the video message from Дневник Десантника🇷🇺 about the 7th Airborne Division's request for drones and Starlink. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Full details and implications of the video from 🇺🇦 Запорізька обласна військова адміністрація 🇺🇦 on the minute of silence. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Full content and context of the photo messages from РБК-Україна regarding the "Rubizh" brigade fundraising. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • WarGonzo German Propaganda Visuals: Detailed analysis of the images shared by WarGonzo regarding "German absurdity." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Trump's Concessions to China Specifics: The precise nature of Trump's reported concessions to China and the specific trade deals involved. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • STERNENKO's "Situation" Photo Content: Obtain and analyze the visual content of STERNENKO's "This is the situation now" photo message. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Rybar Estonian Euros to Chisinau Visuals: Obtain and analyze the photo message accompanying Rybar's report on "Estonian Euros flying to Chisinau." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • RF Phone Scam Impact: Further assessment of the scale and impact of phone scams on the Russian population. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Fighterbomber Helicopter Video Details: The type of military helicopter, the specific unit, and the operational context of the video. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС Captured RF Personnel Details: The specific unit of the captured RF assault troops, the exact location of the capture, and the full extent of the engagement shown in the video. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • Dnevnik Desantnika Kursk Photo Details: The specific agricultural machinery shown and its relevance to military operations or the deployment of RF forces in Kursk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
6. Counter-UGV Tactics Dissemination: Immediately disseminate all available intelligence on the "Sarmat-2" UGV to frontline units on the Bakhmut axis. Prioritize ATGM and FPV drone teams to target these new systems. Develop and share effective counter-UGV tactics based on combat experience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
7. Logistics Protection and Requirements: Implement enhanced security measures for railway infrastructure in border regions. Consider hardened shelters for critical fuel and ammunition depots. Address critical friendly materiel shortfalls (pickup trucks, FPV drone components) through prioritized procurement or international aid. Actively pursue and expedite the $400M drone production deal. Prioritize fulfillment of specific unit requests for critical equipment (e.g., drones and Starlink for Zaporizhzhia paratroopers). Monitor the progress of Azerbaijani artillery shell production. Monitor the impact of the natural disaster in Russia's Far East on RF's internal logistics and resource availability for the war effort. Address logistical challenges highlighted by the 34th Brigade of Coastal Defense. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
8. Personnel Mobilization and Training: Intensify efforts for the "Contract 18-24" program to attract and train highly motivated youth for drone operations. Continue mandatory military training for medical students. Expedite the proposed salary increases for military personnel in the rear. Intensify diplomatic efforts with Germany to manage the situation of conscription-age Ukrainian men. Implement enhanced force protection measures for all training units and facilities, to mitigate risks from RF missile strikes. Develop and implement adaptive security protocols for training grounds, considering RF's identified pattern of striking targets ~50km from the border/LOD. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
9. Radiological Monitoring and Contingency Planning: Maintain continuous and enhanced monitoring of radiation levels around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. Develop and refine contingency plans for rapid civilian evacuation and force protection in the event of a significant radiological release. Coordinate with international agencies for independent assessment. Continue to swiftly counter any false claims of elevated radiation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
10. Diplomatic Engagement with Key Partners: Actively engage with US and European partners to clarify the implications of recent statements (e.g., Trump's "10-day deadline," US tariffs against India, US Treasury warning China, Senator Blumenthal's call for sanctions, Trump's concessions to China), ensure continued coordinated support, and address any potential misinterpretations. Publicly reaffirm Ukrainian resilience and objectives to counter RF narratives of Western disunity. Highlight any ongoing US-RF cooperation (e.g., space) to contextualize it. Engage with France regarding the Naval Group cyberattack to assess its full implications and offer cooperation. Engage with Azerbaijan to confirm volume and timeline of artillery shell production and deliveries. Engage with Benin to understand the nature and scope of the planned military cooperation agreement with Russia. Counter WarGonzo's propaganda on "German absurdity" and Kotsnews' "NATO mistakes" narrative. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
11. Public Information Campaign for Donations: Initiate a public information campaign to address the reported "dip" in public donations, clarifying the critical need for continued support for frontline units and demonstrating the impact of previous contributions. Leverage positive news like the return of POWs and successful tactical operations to boost public morale and engagement. Reinforce calls for public donations as a vital component of the war effort. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
12. Address Internal Morale Issues: Counter the impact of RF propaganda targeting Ukrainian morale, including the exploitation of captured soldiers. Provide direct support and communication to frontline units regarding POW issues. Monitor and address potential morale impacts from repeated air raid alerts in regions like Zaporizhzhia and the Kamenskoye civilian fatalities. Continue to highlight RF's destructive impact on Donbas civilians and infrastructure (e.g., Pokrovsk). Ensure transparent and timely communication regarding operational challenges and setbacks (e.g., challenges faced by 34th Brigade of Coastal Defense). Acknowledge and manage public sentiment regarding heavy RF fire during river crossings. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
13. Review Urban Planning Ordinances: Assess if the new fines for feeding pigeons in Moscow indicate a broader trend of tightening urban control measures in RF cities that could have implications for internal security or public sentiment. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
14. Assess Implications of Ukrainian Reforms: Monitor the implementation and public reception of the August 1 changes in Ukraine, particularly regarding fines, multi-card payments, and "Diia" tickets, to understand their overall impact on civilian life and any potential for disruption or benefit to the war effort. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)