Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 292000Z JUL 25

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Ukraine General: Nationwide threat from RF missile and UAV attacks persists. Ukrainian air defense units, drone systems, army aviation, and mobile fire groups actively engaged enemy aerial threats across multiple oblasts. Zelenskyy states 22 killed and 85 wounded in Ukraine due to Russian shelling in the last 24 hours. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kyiv Oblast: Air raid alerts due to high-speed targets detected. Multiple civilian apartments damaged, 8 casualties including a 3-year-old child reported in Darnitsky district from a night RF attack. A downed Iranian Shahed-136 drone (Russian Geran 2) confirmed. Power outages affect ~30,000 families due to weather, potentially exacerbating issues from RF strikes. New enemy UAV detected in Makariv region. Security measures, including potential document checks, are underway in Desnyanskyi district. Zelenskyy visited a Ukrainian defense enterprise in Kyiv Oblast producing electronics and sensitive components for missiles, drones, and secure communication, with over 80% supporting defense. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Khmelnytska Oblast: Confirmed main target of enemy missile and drone trajectories overnight, with explosions reported. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Poltava Oblast: Multiple missiles flying towards Poltava Oblast. Ballistic threat to Pryluky persists. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kirovohrad Oblast: Explosions reported in Kropyvnytskyi, with fire liquidation continuing after night RF attack. UAVs detected heading for Kropyvnytskyi. Damage to State Emergency Service (DSNS) building and equipment in Kropyvnytskyi confirmed. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Dnipropetrovsk Oblast: 3 UAVs shot down overnight. Threat of aviation munitions for Synelnykivskyi district. Two casualties reported due to RF attack. Enemy reconnaissance UAVs detected. New ballistic missile threat identified for Kamenskoye, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, with a potential for a second launch. Enemy UAVs detected in eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, currently inbound towards Pavlohrad. Russian army conducted a missile strike on Kamenskoye, confirmed by ASTRA with 4 killed and 8 wounded, including a pregnant woman. Aftermath photos show significant damage to civilian structures and vehicles. RF sources claim Kamenskoye hit a military rehabilitation center. UA source Сергій Лисак / Дніпропетровська ОДА (ОВА) reports 22 people injured in Kamenskoye, including 10 medical workers, confirming significant civilian casualties and damage to medical infrastructure. RF attacked Nikopol region using artillery and FPV drones. Regional government reports over 3 billion UAH allocated for defense and security, 70% funded. UA 31st Mechanized Brigade denies RF claims of occupation of Malievka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, confirming the settlement remains under UA control. NEW: Threat of strike UAVs to Kryvyi Rih and Nikopol. High-speed target inbound to Dnipro from the south. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kherson Oblast: Enemy continues attempts to control the island zone in the Dnieper delta, maintaining intensive artillery shelling and aviation strikes. Clashes reported near Prydniprovske. UA forces repelled 5 Russian army assaults. RF sources claim repulsion of UA landing attempt on Tendrovska Spit. UA GUR special forces reportedly conducted a successful raid on Tendrovska Spit in the night of 28 JUL. UA military spokesperson complains of RF creating a "death zone" along the Dnieper on Kherson and Zaporizhzhia directions. DeepState reports drone footage showing the "utilization of Muscovites" on Kinburn Spit, indicating successful UA strikes on RF personnel/infrastructure in the area. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Eastern Axes (General): Continued ground combat reported on Kupyansk, Lyman, Siversk, Kramatorsk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka directions. RF tactical aviation active, including launches of guided aerial bombs. Continued effective UA FPV drone strikes on RF ground targets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Kramatorsk Direction: КАБs inbound. Clashes reported near Predtechyne. RF source reports Ukrainian military personnel in Konstantinovka stated to CNN about personnel shortages. RF forces reported encircling Konstantinovka. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Donetsk Oblast (General): KABs inbound. Threat of strike UAVs to Sloviansk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Siversk Direction: New map indicates RF Airborne forces active near Siversk, Serebryanka, Hryhorivka, Verkhnokamyanske, Bilohorivka. Clashes reported near Hryhorivka and towards Vyyimka. NEW: RF sources claim RF forces advancing, burning UA infantry positions near Siversk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Donetsk (Pokrovsk Axis): Situation intensely escalating. RF forces are most actively advancing, with battles begun in Dimitrov (Myrnohrad) and improved RF positions in Rodinskoye. Reconnaissance drone observed providing RF tactical intelligence on Pokrovsk. RF sources claim DRGs have entered Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk), with fire control over a road near Rodinskoye. Intense fighting confirmed by video footage. RF MoD claims liberation of Novoukrainka. RF forces entered Kolodezi, advancing towards Lyman. UA forces report two assault groups from the 63rd Mechanized Brigade attacked an enemy dugout near Torske, capturing two Russian mercenaries. RF sources claim RF forces entered Volodymyrivka (Druzhkivka direction). "Voenkor Kotenok" (RF source) reports on the Druzhkivka direction with photo messages, indicating continued RF focus on this axis. NEW: "Voenkor Kotenok" reports on the Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmiysk axis, right flank, via photo messages, indicating ongoing RF offensive. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Donetsk (Occupied): Severe water shortage in Kirovsky district. Donetsk under massive strike by UA drones, causing power outages for over 150,000 subscribers in Donetsk, Makiivka, and Yasynuvata. Damage to "Pushkinsky" Business Center and "Favorit" residential complex confirmed. Allegations of machine gun boxes being sold freely, indicating internal security breakdown. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kharkiv Oblast: Active work of UA air defense units, drone systems, army aviation, and mobile fire groups overnight. Nine settlements hit by enemy strikes. Threat of strike UAVs. Enemy reconnaissance UAVs detected. Clashes yesterday in South Slobozhansky direction near Vovchansk, Zelene, Fyholivka, Zapadne and towards Petro-Ivanivka. Kadyrov's "Zapad-AKHMAT" battalion active near Vovchansk. A group of enemy strike UAVs inbound from Belgorod Oblast. Two explosions heard in Izyum. TASS reports UA forces fled from Radkivka, Kharkiv Oblast. RF forces reportedly advancing towards the Kharkiv-Kupyansk road to cut off UA supply routes. RF army continues to encircle and storm Kupyansk, with RF sources claiming near-complete control of approaches. Kharkiv regional administration head Serhiy Syniehubov states consistent implementation of state and regional strategies supporting defense. NEW: KAB launches inbound to Kharkiv Oblast from the northeast. RF sources ("Voenkor Russkoy Vesny") claim "Groza" EW system mass burning of UA transport with militants in Kupyansk and the area, implying successful RF counter-mobility. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Sumy Oblast: Three fatalities due to RF attack. Launches of guided aerial bombs by enemy tactical aviation (KABs). Ukrainian SOF active. Enemy reconnaissance UAVs detected. Confirmed strike on the "Zvezda" ammunition plant in Shostka on 26.07. RF army has expanded its zone of control near Myropillia. Enemy UAVs from Kursk Oblast inbound. KABs incoming. A group of Shahed drones in central Sumy Oblast, moving southwest. UA forces repelled 10 Russian army assaults. Damage to a tax office building confirmed. RF sources ("Voenkor Russkoy Vesny") claim RF army advancing near Myropillia, towards Sumy. NEW: Several groups of enemy UAVs on the north of Sumy Oblast, moving south. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Chernihiv Oblast: High-speed missile detected. Explosion reported near Pryluky, Chernihiv Oblast. Enemy reconnaissance UAV detected. RF source claims Russian army struck Pryluky airbase, targeting a US "Black Hawk" UH-60 of GUR special forces. New ballistic missile threat from northeast direction. Enemy UAVs in Chernihiv Oblast. Suspilne reports an explosion in Chernihiv. Reconnaissance UAV activity in Honcharivske region. Colonelcassad (RF source) released video footage claiming two "Iskander" missile strikes on a training ground in Chernihiv Oblast, alleging up to 200 "militants" (UA personnel) were destroyed. The video shows aerial views of a training camp, storage, personnel accommodation, and then explosions. This indicates targeting of UA military training facilities. NEW: Threat of enemy strike UAVs in Chernihiv Oblast. Several groups of enemy UAVs on the north of Chernihiv Oblast, moving south. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Zaporizhzhia Oblast: Aviation munitions threat. Enemy reconnaissance UAV detected. Over 800 RF strikes in 24 hours, with RF increasing pressure on frontline territories and "hunting civilians." KABs inbound. Russian forces attacked a penitentiary facility, resulting in 16-17 killed and 35-43 wounded. RF claims liberation of Temirovka. Ukrainian 118th Brigade engaged Russian forces with artillery. AFU disrupted an RF assault, inflicting significant losses. UA military spokesperson complains of RF creating a "death zone" along the Dnieper on Kherson and Zaporizhzhia directions. Andryushchenko, advisor to Mariupol mayor, reports increased radiation background near Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) after a gust of wind. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVS) of Ukraine reports radiation levels in Zaporizhzhia Oblast are within normal limits (0.14 mSv/hr). UA Air Force reports КАБ launches by enemy tactical aviation on Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration issued a general "Attention" alert. NEW: Colonelcassad shows video of destruction of UA M777 howitzer by RF dronovody (drone operators) in Zaporizhzhia Front, implying successful RF counter-battery fire via drones. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Chernivtsi Oblast: Earthquake reported. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russia:
  • Internal Security & Cyber: Aeroflot IT systems crash, allegedly due to hackers, with recovery potentially taking up to a year. Mobile internet restricted in Tyumen, Udmurtia, and Sverdlovsk Oblasts. Moscow police fine property owners for unregistered temporary residents. FSB prevented a terrorist attack against a high-ranking military official in Rostov-on-Don. Moscow pharmacy networks ("Stolichki," "Neopharm") and "Family Doctor" clinic hacked, causing closures and potential data leaks. "Почта России" (Russian Post) website experiencing nationwide system failure due to hack. Journalist Olga Komleva sentenced to 12 years for "military fakes." Blogger Areg Shchepikhin kidnapped and held in pre-trial detention. Fire blocked workers in a Moscow construction site. Building collapse in Yekaterinburg. Gas cylinder explosion in a Volgograd correctional colony injured 4. Man arrested for throwing a smoke bomb into a bank in Pushkin, alleged to be acting on behalf of phone scammers who stole over 1 million rubles. Tajikistan issued an arrest warrant for Umendjon Saliev, a suspect in the "Crocus" terrorist attack. A professor at Plekhanov Russian University of Economics was arrested in Moscow on treason charges. RF Telegram channels report drone security alerts in Moscow, Ryazan, Rostov, Tula, Voronezh, Oryol, Lipetsk, Saratov, Tambov, and Bryansk Oblasts. ASTRA reports a stone with "foreign agent" written on it was thrown into the window of journalist Vadim Vaganov's apartment in St. Petersburg, indicating continued internal pressure on dissidents. TASS reports no people found under rockfall in Kislovodsk. NEW: ASTRA reports administrative cases opened against several teenagers in Moscow for wearing women's clothing in a monastery, indicating continued social conservatism and potential for internal social control. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Rostov Oblast: RF PVO destroyed four Ukrainian UAVs overnight. Drone attack on Salsk railway station resulted in one fatality and freight train fire, suspending train movement. Traction substation burning in Orlovsky. Two RF sappers died during UAV demining in Salsk district. Train movement resumed through Salsk. Over 50 apartments, 11 private homes, and 10 multi-apartment buildings were damaged in Salsk due to the night UAV attack. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Leningrad Oblast: One person died and three injured due to drone attack. UAV attack danger declared. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Moscow: Evacuation of "Zvezdny" shopping center. First flight from Pyongyang landed at Sheremetyevo Airport. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Bryansk Oblast: Governor reports "inhumane crimes against peaceful citizens." RF PVO shot down two Ukrainian UAVs over Smolensk Oblast. Colonelcassad reports 43 Ukrainian aircraft-type drones intercepted over Bryansk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Belgorod Oblast (RF): Civilian injured and local administration head wounded due to UA drone attacks in Shebekino. ASTRA reports a civilian killed. ASTRA also reports UAV attacks on eight settlements in Belgorod Oblast, with injuries. NEW: Lipetsk Oblast Governor reports lifting "yellow alert" level for drone threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) / Kreminna Forests: RF claims control of ~10 hectares and encircling UA forces near Shypylivka and Hryhorivka. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Kursk Oblast: Two individuals hospitalized after a UA drone attack. Fire at a gas station. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Astrakhan: Residential building section collapsed due to gas explosion. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Belarus: Unidentified UAV fell in Minsk, destroyed by EW. Belarusian Investigative Committee states UAV equipped with TNT and Ukrainian inscriptions. Lithuanian military chief states he would "like to shoot down drones over Belarus, but cannot." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Airfield Activity: British intelligence releases satellite photos showing active construction of aircraft shelters (caponiers) at Russian military airfields, including Millerovo. Colonelcassad (RF source) confirms and shares these satellite photos, indicating awareness and potential pride in the defensive construction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Regional:
  • United States: Trump states he is giving Putin a "10-day deadline" to end the war in Ukraine, or face tariffs. He further stated he would increase US oil production if tariffs on RF and trade partners disrupt global energy. Trump claims he has not received a response from Putin and calls it "a shame," stating Putin wants to continue the war. He believes the war could be easily resolved but will be prolonged. Russian military bloggers ("Voenkor Kotenok") are publicly commenting that "Trump's ultimatums will soon become a daily column," suggesting a dismissal of their seriousness within RF information space. The Mosbirzhi Index (Moscow Exchange Index) lost 0.6% after Trump's statements on the ultimatum. ASTRA and "Операция Z" (RF source) further disseminate Trump's statement on potential restrictions including "sanctions, tariffs and 'something else'," and quote him saying "Melania has sympathy for Putin," indicating continued RF interest in and potential exploitation of Trump's rhetoric. NEW: Trump's ultimatum caused oil prices (Brent) to rise by 3% to $72/barrel. TASS reports a Russian State Duma MP views Trump's ultimatum as a sign of no concrete peace plan. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • United Kingdom: USA reportedly delivered nuclear weapons to Britain. Billionaire close to Abramovich lost sanctions appeal. UK PM Starmer states UK may recognize independent Palestine in September if Israel does not take "significant steps" to end "terrible situation" in Gaza. Israeli MFA rejects this statement. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Manhattan (US): Unknown assailant opened fire, killing five, injuring six, before suicide. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • North Korea: First airline flight from Pyongyang to Moscow, Russian schoolchildren wrote to Kim Jong Un. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • China: 30 fatalities, 80,000 evacuated in Beijing due to heavy rains and flooding. Trump claims his meeting with Xi Jinping will likely occur "before the end of the year." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • France: Serious cyberattack on French defense industry (Naval Group, THALES, Dassault, Safran). Largest military data leak in history reported. NEW: Hackers reportedly stole submarine data from French defense giant Naval Group. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Germany: 150,000 Ukrainians of conscription age receive social benefits; CSU party demands cessation. Ukraine will receive 11 more IRIS-T complexes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Moldova: Intends to remove joint Russian-Moldovan "Moldovagaz" from August supply. Three opposition parties advocate for restoring relations with Russia. Moldova's President Sandu is now reportedly "against Western politicians." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Estonia: Estonian MFA summoned Russian Charge d'Affaires to protest maritime border violation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Lithuania: Alleged "Gerbera" UAVs over Lithuania. Lithuanian military chief states he would "like to shoot down drones over Belarus, but cannot." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Azerbaijan: Rybar reports "Azerbaijan arms the Armed Forces of Ukraine." NEW: Colonelcassad explicitly reports Azerbaijan is setting up serial production of 122mm and 152mm artillery shells for Ukraine at "Avia-agregat" plant in Baku, installing Lasko presses from Turkey. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Hungary: Hungarian Foreign Minister states the conflict in Ukraine will only be resolved through US-Russia agreement. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Kyiv: Strong thunderstorms and heavy rain forecasted, impacting aerial reconnaissance, drone operations, and ground mobility. Power outages affect ~30,000 families. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Rostov Oblast (RF): Fire at Salsk railway station and a traction substation in Orlovsky will impact RF logistics. Extensive fires indicate severe air quality degradation and reduced visibility. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Chernivtsi Oblast: Earthquake reported, minor disruption. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• China (Beijing): Heavy rains and flooding causing significant casualties and evacuations will divert internal resources. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Romania: Severe flooding resulting in fatalities will divert internal resources. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kursk Oblast (RF): Fire at a gas station, likely from UA strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Yekaterinburg (RF): Building collapse. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Moscow (RF): Fire at a construction site. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Astrakhan (RF): Building collapse due to gas explosion. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Zaporizhzhia Oblast: Ukrainian MVS reports radiation levels are currently normal (0.14 mSv/hr). This alleviates immediate environmental concerns regarding a radiological incident but ongoing monitoring is essential. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kislovodsk (RF): Rockfall incident, no people found under debris. While not directly impacting military operations, it indicates a localized natural hazard. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Force Dispositions:
  • Air Assets: Multiple strategic bombers (6x Tu-95MS, 2x Tu-160), MiG-31K aircraft (3x airborne), and dozens of Shahed drones posing nationwide missile threats. Tactical aviation active in Eastern and North-Eastern directions, launching KABs. RF MoD claims 74 Ukrainian UAVs shot down over Russian regions overnight. RF continues to test new optical laser drone destruction schemes. Construction of aircraft shelters (caponiers) at airfields suggests increased protection for air assets. Russian military aircraft (fighter jets) observed during training and takeoff, potentially for combat missions, with "Z" symbols. Russian media reports over 100 aerial bombs have "accidentally descended" onto Russian territory from RF aircraft since the beginning of the year. RF MoD released footage of drone operations, showing targeting of various UA assets including AQ-400 KOCA, LELEKA-100, BABA-YAGA (likely large FPV drone), HPTK, PICKUP, BBM, and AVTO. This indicates persistent RF ISR and strike capabilities against UA ground targets and drones. Colonelcassad (RF source) released a video showcasing military operations and missile strikes on various locations, highlighting claimed Ukrainian losses across "Sever", "Zapad", "Yuzhnaya", "Dnepr", and "Vostok" fronts, including personnel, armored vehicles, artillery, EW stations, command posts, ammunition depots, and air defense systems (Buk-M1, S-300). This video indicates coordinated offensive operations by Russian forces. NEW: Video shows RF drone operators destroying a UA M777 Howitzer on Zaporizhzhia Front, suggesting increased drone integration in counter-battery warfare. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ground Forces: Persistent offensive pressure on the Pokrovsk axis (Dimitrov/Myrnohrad, Rodinskoye), and in Zaporizhzhia (Kamenskoye sector). Continued attempts to control the island zone in the Dnieper delta (Kherson). Kadyrov's "Zapad-AKHMAT" battalion active near Vovchansk (Kharkiv). Claimed liberation of Temirovka and Novoukrainka. Continued use of FPV drones and KABs against civilian communities. Confirmed lodgement in Avdiivka industrial zone and new southern push. First confirmed combat deployment of "Sarmat-2" UGV near Bakhmut. RF units reportedly continue to apply small group tactics. Rybar, a prominent Russian military blogger, has released a map with photos and captions titled "Battle for the Asian Highway," indicating RF focus on a specific ground axis. This likely refers to a key supply route in Donetsk or Zaporizhzhia regions, suggesting a strategic focus on interdicting UA logistics. RF paratroopers from the 7th Airborne Division of Zaporizhzhia released a video requesting assistance for drones and Starlink systems, indicating active engagement in the Zaporizhzhia sector. NEW: Video released by "Два майора" shows military personnel inspecting and marking mortar rounds, implying preparation or calibration of ordnance, likely for specific tactical use. RF sources "Дневник Десантника" and "Операция Z" show footage of RF ground units attacking UA positions with infantry support and successful hits, with claimed destruction of a "Yaga" drone. "Два майора" shows video of individuals in military-style camouflage distributing "anti-drone screens" to "crews" and "fighter jets," suggesting defensive EW capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Control Measures:
  • Ukraine-wide Air Alert: Active due to ballistic missile threat. UA Air Force issued a general attention alert ("⚠ Увага!"). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Regional Air Alerts: Ongoing alerts and PPO activity in Kyiv, Khmelnytska, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Sumy, Chernihiv, Vinnytsia, and Belgorod (RF). RF Lipetsk Oblast Governor reports a region-wide air danger alert. Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration issued a general "Attention" alert. NEW: Lipetsk Oblast Governor reports lifting "yellow alert" level for drone threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF Internal Internet/Communication Restrictions: Mobile internet restricted in Tyumen, Udmurtia, Sverdlovsk. Push to use "Max" messenger. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Federal Level (RF Logistics): Gasoline exports restricted until August 31. 20 checkpoints on border with Ukraine to close August 1. "Главпродукт" now state-owned. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF Internal Security: Fines for unregistered tenants in Moscow. FSB prevented terror attack in Rostov-on-Don. Tajikistan declares hunt for "Crocus" terror attack suspect. NEW: Administrative cases opened against teenagers for wearing women's clothing in a monastery, indicating social control measures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Belarus (Minsk): Belarusian MoD confirms UAV destruction by EW. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ukraine (Internal Security/Border Control): SBU and National Police conducting security measures in Kyiv. Prosecutor General's Office actively investigating corruption. Cyber Police participating in international law enforcement operation "Checkmate." Ukraine blocked YouTube channels of sanctioned blogger Andriy Lugansky, indicating continued efforts to counter pro-RF propaganda. NEW: Ukraine returned another teenager from occupation after over three years. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ukraine (Government): Rada Committee voted for Zelenskyy's NABU and SAP bill after second attempt. Zelenskyy signed a bill to provide real weight and benefits for the "Cross of Military Merit" award. Zelenskyy states cabinet prepared "Contract 18-24" program to attract more motivated young soldiers for drone operations. Zelenskyy states deal finalized with partners for $400M to finance Ukrainian drone production. Zelenskyy signed and submitted to the Verkhovna Rada a bill to enhance the "Cross of Military Merit" award, making it provide real benefits and placing it high in the award hierarchy, between Hero of Ukraine and Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. UA Cabinet of Ministers seeks to attract 400 billion UAH for security and defense sector financing. Rada is reportedly ready to support Zelenskyy's NABU bill. MP Ruslan Horbenko states military salaries in the rear are planned to increase 2.5 times from 20,000 to 50,000 UAH. NEW: TASS reports there are enough votes in the Rada to support Zelenskyy's NABU and SAP bill. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Friendly Forces (Training): UA Airborne Assault Forces conduct night training. General Staff of AFU reports training on International Humanitarian Law and Operation INTERFLEX in UK. NEW: Ukrainian Ground Forces confirmed a missile strike today (29 JUL) on one of their training units, with fatalities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ukraine (Defense Industry): Zelenskyy visited a defense enterprise in Kyiv Oblast producing critical components. Dnipropetrovsk regional administration reports over 3 billion UAH allocated for defense support, 70% funded. Kharkiv regional administration confirms systemic support for defense forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:
  • Air/Missile/UAV: Capable of large-scale, coordinated missile and drone strikes (2 ballistic, 37 drones overnight), with successful hits deep within Ukraine. Confirmed Kalibr missile replenishment in Sevastopol significantly increases maritime strike threat. Demonstrated effective air defense against UA drones (74 shot down over RF regions). Continued development and testing of new UAV types (e.g., "Italmas") and counter-drone systems. Precision strike capability against personnel concentrations (LNR) and artillery (Lancet). Construction of aircraft shelters indicates long-term protection strategy for air assets. Demonstrated ability to use "combat electric scooters" for infiltration/reconnaissance, albeit vulnerable to FPV drones. RF tactical aviation capable of conducting air missions, but also exhibits significant issues with accidental bomb drops (over 100 since start of year). RF MoD video confirms high-precision targeting and destruction of various UA drones (AQ-400 KOCA, LELEKA-100, BABA-YAGA) and ground vehicles (HPTK, PICKUP, BBM, AVTO), indicating effective aerial reconnaissance and strike capabilities. Colonelcassad's video report details claimed effective strikes on UA personnel, armored vehicles, artillery, EW stations, command posts, ammunition depots, and air defense systems, highlighting a comprehensive strike capability. RF claims ability to strike UA training grounds with Iskander missiles, as seen in Chernihiv. NEW: RF drone operators demonstrate capability to destroy UA M777 Howitzer using drones. RF sources release videos depicting mass burning of UA transport in Kupyansk using "Groza" EW system, suggesting advanced EW capability for kinetic effects. RF drone footage claims destruction of a UA "Yaga" drone. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ground Forces: Persistent offensive pressure on the Pokrovsk axis, attempting operational encirclement. Achieved lodgment in Avdiivka industrial zone and launched new southern push. Demonstrated combined arms tactics with drone support (Orikhiv, Vremivka). First combat deployment of "Sarmat-2" UGV near Bakhmut indicates an evolving ground combat capability for fire support. Capability for tactical reconnaissance and precision strikes against logistics. Continued use of thermobaric MLRS (TOS-1A "Solntsepyok"). RF sources claim advances near Myropillia, towards Sumy. RF forces continue to use small group tactics. The "Battle for the Asian Highway" map suggests a specific, coordinated effort to seize control of critical ground lines of communication (GLOCs), highlighting a capability for focused offensive operations to disrupt UA logistics. NEW: RF forces demonstrate ability to mark and possibly modify mortar rounds for tactical use. RF ground forces, supported by drones, are capable of assaulting and burning UA infantry positions. RF units are being equipped with "anti-drone screens" for protection. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Cyber/EW: Demonstrated capability for disruptive cyberattacks against critical civilian infrastructure (Aeroflot, pharmacy networks, postal services). Increased sophistication of EW, including targeted GPS spoofing in Zaporizhzhia, poses a significant threat to UA PGMs and UAVs. NEW: RF claims use of "Groza" EW system to mass burn UA transport. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Internal Security: Capable of preventing terror attacks (Rostov-on-Don) and conducting widespread internal repression against perceived dissidents and "military fakes." Demonstrates ability to suppress internal dissent and control information. Actively pursuing individuals linked to terrorist acts (Crocus attack suspect). Arrest of a professor on treason charges in Moscow reinforces the RF internal security apparatus's capability to suppress perceived dissent within academic/intellectual circles. The stone with "foreign agent" thrown at a journalist's window indicates continued intimidation tactics. NEW: Imposition of administrative cases against teenagers for social behavior indicates broadening of internal social control. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Training: RF forces are actively conducting combat training for assault units, including live-fire drills and movement through trenches, suggesting an ongoing effort to improve tactical proficiency in complex environments. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Drone Operations: RF forces (specifically "Akhmat" SpN) are conducting FPV drone training, covering operational basics, battery management, and component soldering, indicating a focus on enhancing drone capabilities and operator skill. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intentions:
  • Strategic Attrition: Continue to degrade Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure through persistent long-range strikes. Increase pressure on Zaporizhzhia Oblast with high strike rates, actively targeting civilians (penitentiary facility). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF Military Success: Highlight claimed RF advances (Pokrovsk, Temirovka, Novoukrainka, Kolodezi, Avdiivka, Volodymyrivka), successful AD intercepts, and new military capabilities (UGVs, sheltered airfields) to boost domestic morale and project an image of superiority. Actively promote perceived tactical innovations (e-scooters). Continue to showcase training efforts to demonstrate military readiness and professionalism. The RF MoD video aims to demonstrate tactical dominance by showcasing successful strikes on UA assets. Colonelcassad's video report aims to highlight RF military effectiveness and claimed UA losses. NEW: RF intends to demonstrate effectiveness of drone operations in destroying UA artillery and disrupting logistics via EW (Groza). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Western Weakness/Division: Amplify dissenting voices within the EU and US (Trump statements, German CSU, Moldovan sentiment) to portray Western disunity and an impending end to the conflict on RF terms. Disseminate high-level disinformation campaigns (e.g., "secret elections" for Zelenskyy's replacement with Zaluzhny, EU kneeling to US). Highlight divergence in Western diplomatic positions (UK/Israel on Palestine). Exploit Trump's "10-day deadline" as a sign of US wavering commitment or lack of strategic coordination. Russian military bloggers dismissing Trump's ultimatums publicly suggest an intention to downplay their significance or portray them as ineffective, while the negative impact on the Moscow Exchange Index might be internally rationalized or minimized. RF state media (TASS) highlights continued US-RF cooperation in space, aiming to show areas of stability despite tensions. NEW: RF commentary on Trump's ultimatum aims to frame it as lacking a concrete peace plan, minimizing its impact while still leveraging the rhetoric to show US disarray. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • UA Weakness/Forced Mobilization: Disseminate narratives about UA forces losing combat effectiveness ("exhausted," "personnel shortages," "blocking detachments shooting fleeing soldiers"). Amplify narratives from captured UA servicemen about poor treatment of mobilized personnel within UA units (e.g., Aidar Battalion allegations) to undermine morale and trust in UA command. Actively discredit UA military leadership (Zaluzhny). NEW: RF propaganda will likely exploit the confirmed missile strike on a UA training unit to reinforce narratives of UA losses and vulnerability. RF sources (Alex Parker Returns) are using images of released UA POWs to create disinformation narratives of poor physical state, implying mistreatment or neglect. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Testing NATO: Continue probing NATO borders with aerial assets (UAVs over Lithuania, Minsk) and diplomatic provocations (Estonia, Norway). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Internal Governance: Project an image of stable internal governance and social welfare despite economic and security challenges. Address internal migration issues. The "Territory of Meanings" youth forum discussion on "What the world will be like after the SVO" is intended to promote a narrative of RF victory and a post-conflict world shaped by RF influence, aiming to boost internal morale and project future geopolitical power. Sergei Mironov's comments on utilities suggest an intention to address internal grievances. NEW: RF internal security aims to maintain social order and traditional values, as evidenced by legal action against teenagers in a monastery. Appeals for public donations for the military indicate an intention to foster public involvement and support for the conflict. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Courses of Action: RF will continue massed aerial attacks overnight, combining missiles and Shahed drones, targeting critical infrastructure and military targets deep within Ukraine, with a high likelihood of strikes on Odesa due to Kalibr replenishment. Ground offensives will continue to focus on the Pokrovsk and Avdiivka axes with increasing intensity, potential for operational encirclement, supported by tactical drones, heavy artillery, and new UGV deployments. The focus on the "Asian Highway" suggests an intention to interdict key UA logistics. RF will expand its cyber operations against critical civilian infrastructure and tighten internal information controls to manage public dissent. They will continue to test NATO's resolve with border probes and diplomatic messaging. RF will also likely increase retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian civilian and penitentiary infrastructure in response to successful UA deep strikes on RF territory. The deployment of individual "combat electric scooters" indicates a continued attempt to find low-cost, high-mobility tactical infiltration methods, despite their vulnerability. RF will leverage Trump's "10-day deadline" for internal and external information campaigns, likely framing it as inconsequential or a sign of Western weakness, while simultaneously noting its economic impact. RF will continue to use propaganda to blame Ukraine for attacks on Russian civilian areas (e.g., Belgorod) and exploit the strike on the UA training ground to demoralize UA forces. RF will continue to deploy and refine tactical EW systems, such as "Groza," to interdict UA logistics and deny drone operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Persistent Massed Aerial Attacks: Consistent large waves of mixed missile and drone attacks, with new ballistic missile launch vectors (Chernihiv towards Kyiv) and adapted drone routes (Makariv, Pavlohrad). Increased number of UA drones claimed shot down over RF territory indicates an adaptive RF air defense response to increased UA deep strikes. However, reports of RF aircraft dropping over 100 aerial bombs on their own territory suggest technical deficiencies or operational errors impacting precision strike capability. RF strike on Honcharivske training ground with Iskander missiles indicates targeting of UA military training facilities. NEW: Confirmed missile strike on a Ukrainian Ground Forces training unit today, indicating a continued and successful RF targeting of UA training infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Deep Cyber Operations & Internal Information Control: Expanded targeting of critical civilian infrastructure (pharmacy networks, postal services) in RF. Tightening of internal information controls (internet restrictions, chat transfers) and intensified propaganda efforts to control narrative surrounding domestic incidents. NEW: Use of administrative cases to enforce social norms (teenagers in monastery) indicates broadening of internal control measures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Shift in Ground Offensive Focus: Increased offensive activity across multiple Eastern axes, maintaining pressure on UA forces, particularly on the Pokrovsk axis. Significant push on Avdiivka, securing a lodgment in the industrial zone and opening a new southern axis of advance, indicating a concerted effort for tactical encirclement. First confirmed combat deployment of "Sarmat-2" UGV near Bakhmut, indicating an adaptive integration of unmanned ground systems for direct fire support. Observed deployment of individual soldiers on electric scooters ("combat self-propelled scooters") for rapid, low-signature movement and potential infiltration, indicating a new tactical adaptation for small unit mobility. RF continues to utilize small group tactics which our drones are effectively countering. RF tactical focus on the "Asian Highway" indicates an adaptive shift to targeting specific critical logistics routes. NEW: RF forces using drones for precision counter-battery fire (M777 howitzer destruction) indicates adaptive integration of ISR and strike assets. RF forces equipping personnel with "anti-drone screens" demonstrates adaptive defensive measures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Shift in Attribution Narrative for Civilian Incidents: RF is increasingly and explicitly blaming UA for civilian casualties in occupied territories and internal RF incidents (e.g., Donetsk Business Center, forest fires, Rostov railway station), likely to justify RF actions and fuel the "Ukrainian terrorist" narrative. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Targeting Civilian/Medical Infrastructure: Direct strikes on a maternity hospital (Dnipropetrovsk) and a penitentiary facility (Zaporizhzhia) indicate an adaptive shift to directly target civilian infrastructure with significant human impact, likely to cause widespread terror and demoralization. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• EW Sophistication: Marked increase in sophistication of RF EW activity, specifically targeted GPS spoofing in Zaporizhzhia, directly impacting UA PGM and UAV effectiveness. NEW: RF claims use of "Groza" EW system to mass burn UA transport, suggesting an adaptive and more destructive EW capability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Exploitation of POWs for Disinformation: Increased use of captured UA servicemen to disseminate narratives portraying poor treatment of mobilized personnel within UA units and claims of mercenaries, directly supporting RF's strategic information warfare objectives. NEW: Use of images of returned UA POWs for propaganda attempting to discredit UA personnel. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Training Emphasis: RF is actively engaging in specialized FPV drone training, signaling an adaptive focus on improving drone combat effectiveness and operator skills, which will directly impact their tactical capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• Ammunition & Fuel: Sufficient to maintain current high operational tempo. Confirmed Kalibr missile replenishment in Sevastopol. UA deep strikes on Salsk railway station (fuel tanks, locomotive) and Orlovsky substation have caused significant, albeit temporary, disruption to RF railway logistics in the Rostov Oblast. Fire at Kursk gas station suggests another localized hit. NEW: Azerbaijan's confirmed serial production of 122mm and 152mm artillery shells for Ukraine suggests potential future logistical challenges for RF artillery dominance as UA supply improves. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Personnel: Continued reliance on recruitment from penal colonies and high-paying contracts. Localized appeals for specific equipment (drones, Starlink) indicate persistent logistical needs. High losses continue for RF infantry companies (90-95% attrition in some). RF is using coercive recruitment methods ("go to SVO for resettlement"). RF propaganda now explicitly stating UA uses "blocking detachments" (zagradotryad), likely to justify RF "meat assaults" and personnel losses. RF appeals for drone donations from the public indicate some resource shortfalls. NEW: Public appeals for donations for "frontline armor" and "celebrating fighters" indicate persistent resource needs at the tactical level. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Materiel: Overall production capacity appears sufficient, with continued investment in advanced systems and drone production. RF is experiencing significant technical failures with aerial bombs (100 "accidental descents"). Naval fleet renewal project reportedly collapsed. Construction of aircraft shelters indicates ongoing investment in military infrastructure protection. NEW: Reports of "anti-drone screens" being distributed indicate a focus on counter-UAV materiel. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• Tactical Level: Demonstrated effective tactical C2 for coordinated aerial strikes and focused ground assaults with drone support. Effective counter-UAV responses are demonstrated. Integration of new UGVs (Sarmat-2) suggests adaptive tactical C2. C2 of small, rapidly moving units (e-scooter soldier) requires further assessment. RF training videos show structured tactical training, indicating efforts to maintain and improve tactical C2. The RF MoD video demonstrating precise targeting and destruction of UA assets suggests effective C2 and sensor-to-shooter links for drone operations. The coordinated focus on the "Asian Highway" implies C2 effectiveness in prioritizing and coordinating ground operations. Colonelcassad's video report, presented as official military statements, indicates a centralized tactical C2 framework disseminating information on claimed battlefield successes. NEW: Video of RF drone operators destroying a UA howitzer suggests effective sensor-to-shooter C2 at the tactical edge. Distribution of "anti-drone screens" to crews and fighter jets implies C2 efforts to implement defensive measures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Operational/Strategic Level: Centralized strategic C2 evidenced by coordinated nationwide missile/drone campaigns, significant internal security operations (FSB counter-terrorism), and diplomatic engagements. Demonstrated ability for rapid recovery from cyber incidents (Aeroflot). Strategic C2 for information warfare is highly active, including high-level disinformation campaigns. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Defensive Posture: Maintained resilient defensive posture, effectively repelling numerous RF assaults on multiple axes (Kursk/Sumy, Eastern axes). UA air defense demonstrates high effectiveness against UAVs (32/37 shot down). Forces are receiving modern EW systems. Zelenskyy signed a law strengthening the SBU. Mandatory military training for medical students indicates efforts to enhance personnel readiness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:
  • Successes: Successful air defense intercepts (32/37 UAVs, GUR intercepts 9 additional drones). Repelled 10 RF assaults in Kursk/Sumy, 5 in Kherson, 7 in South Slobozhansky, and numerous in Eastern Axes. Successful deep drone strikes on Salsk railway station, Orlovsky substation, and Kursk gas station. Successful cyber operations against RF pharmacy and postal networks, and participation in international law enforcement operation "Checkmate". Effective small unit tactics (63rd Mechanized Brigade capturing mercenaries). Successful FPV drone strike against RF soldier on electric scooter. Successful counter-intelligence preventing assassination attempts. Continued anti-corruption efforts. Boosting domestic defense production, with $400M deal for drone production. Zelenskyy enhancing "Cross of Military Merit" award, aiming to provide real benefits. Regional governments (Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv) allocate significant funds for defense. Ukrainian drone units (e.g., "Khartiya") are effectively countering RF small group tactics, demonstrating a tactical advantage. UA forces successfully used an FPV drone to destroy RF positions by striking an unexploded KAB in the Bakhmut direction, demonstrating tactical ingenuity and effective use of drones. The Ukrainian MVS confirmation that radiation levels in Zaporizhzhia are normal is a significant success in managing public and military concerns. "Підрозділ Shadow" (UA source) reports and shows video of the destruction of an RF Zala UAV, two artillery pieces, and 200 enemy personnel, indicating successful drone targeting and precision strikes. DeepState reports drone footage showing the destruction of an RF command post/observation point on Kinburn Spit. STERNENKO (UA source) reports and shows video of the destruction of two "Superkama" (likely military vehicles/targets). Blocking YouTube channels of pro-RF bloggers contributes to counter-propaganda efforts. NEW: Successful return of a teenager from occupation. Rada appears ready to support NABU bill. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Setbacks: Significant civilian casualties (22 killed, 85 wounded nationwide). Infrastructure damage (Kyiv apartments, Kropyvnytskyi DSNS, Kharkiv maternity ward, Sumy tax office). Continued intense pressure and localized territorial losses on Pokrovsk axis (Novoukrainka, Temirovka, Volodymyrivka). RF lodgment in Avdiivka industrial zone and new southern push poses significant threat to garrison. Impact of RF disinformation on international perception and internal political dynamics. Ongoing POW issues, including RF exploitation of captured personnel for propaganda. GPS spoofing in Zaporizhzhia degrading PGM/UAV effectiveness. While a Russian source claimed capture of Malievka (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast), the Ukrainian 31st Brigade denies this. A Ukrainian channel noted "very few donations" despite nearly 40k views on a fundraising appeal, indicating a potential decrease in public financial support for military efforts or fatigue. NEW: Missile strike on a Ukrainian Ground Forces training unit resulting in casualties is a significant setback. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.2. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Critical Needs: Continued high demand for effective air defense systems (particularly short- to medium-range), artillery ammunition, UAVs (including FPV drones), and EW equipment. Significant medical supplies and personnel required due to high casualties. Engineer equipment for fortification and repair is vital. UA frontline units are directly appealing for FPV drone components. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Personnel: Persistent high operational tempo and RF offensives create continuous demand for trained personnel, especially infantry. The debate regarding conscription-age Ukrainians in Germany highlights a significant manpower challenge. Efforts to attract motivated young drone operators via "Contract 18-24" program. A Ukrainian MP (Horbenko) stated there is a plan to raise salaries for military personnel in the rear to at least 50,000 UAH. This indicates recognition of the need to incentivize service and address economic concerns, but also highlights existing disparities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Financial Aid: EU funding is suspended due to the "old" NABU law, creating a critical financial constraint (potential loss of $60 billion) that impacts broader state functions and the war effort. EU demanding Ukraine preserve NABU/SAP independence. A Ukrainian channel reported a "dip in the monobase of the Russorez" (likely a fundraising platform/system) in February due to the month's shorter duration. This points to potential financial fluctuations and continued reliance on public donations, which are reportedly low despite high views. The Cabinet of Ministers wants to attract 400 billion UAH for security and defense sector financing. The Rada is reportedly ready to support Zelenskyy's NABU bill. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Logistical Shortfalls: Critical need for pickup trucks for frontline units, indicating a specific logistical constraint. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Anti-Corruption Measures: Continued internal corruption remains a constraint, diverting resources and impacting public trust and international aid. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Disinformation: Persistently frames UA attacks on RF territory as "terrorism." Actively promotes narratives of UA weakness, personnel shortages, and incompetence, now including claims of UA "blocking detachments" shooting their own fleeing soldiers. Intensively pushing narratives from captured UA servicemen alleging poor treatment of mobilized personnel within UA units (e.g., Aidar Battalion). Intensively pushing the "Western division" narrative, exemplified by the elaborate "secret elections in the Alps" story to replace Zelenskyy with Zaluzhny, and claims of EU "kneeling" to US. Continues to attribute civilian suffering in occupied territories to UA actions. Actively discredits UA military leadership. Continues to use internal polls (e.g., WhatsApp control) to reinforce paranoia and promote information hygiene from state sources. RF sources are actively attempting to exploit US domestic political statements, specifically Trump's "10-day deadline" ultimatum, to portray Western disunity or a potential shift in support for Ukraine, as well as to justify RF's continued military actions. Russian military bloggers are publicly dismissing Trump's ultimatums as a "daily column," attempting to trivialize their impact. RF state media (TASS) highlights continued US-RF cooperation in space, aiming to show areas of stability despite tensions. Colonelcassad's video claiming 200 UA personnel killed by Iskanders at a Chernihiv training ground is a clear example of RF psychological warfare, intended to inflate losses and demoralize UA forces. The "Старше Эдды" (RF source) post, arguing against drones as a self-sufficient system, suggests an attempt to counter UA drone dominance narratives. Rybar's "Results of July 29" will undoubtedly contain further RF propaganda regarding battlefield successes. NEW: Alex Parker Returns uses photos of released UA POWs to promote a narrative of RF "healing" them from "gluttony," aimed at demeaning UA personnel. TASS quotes a Russian MP dismissing Trump's ultimatum as lacking a concrete peace plan, aiming to discredit US diplomatic efforts. RF sources promoting a video claiming "Groza" EW system mass burning of UA transport in Kupyansk is a psyop to demoralize UA and inflate RF capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UA Counter-Propaganda: Immediately reports and provides visual evidence of RF atrocities and civilian casualties to counter RF claims. Exposes RF losses and POW issues, including graphic content of RF casualties. Showcases UA military resilience, professionalism, and effective small unit tactics. Highlights successful deep strikes into RF territory and cyber operations against RF civilian targets. Maintains transparency on internal corruption efforts. Actively uses drone footage of successful engagements against RF personnel (e.g., e-scooter soldier, small groups) for morale and to demonstrate effectiveness. Utilizes emotional appeals for public support (e.g., soldiers requesting drone donations), acknowledging shortfalls. Rapidly refutes false RF claims (e.g., Malievka capture) and discredits false radiation reports. Highlights official governmental efforts to support military personnel through increased benefits and salaries. UA General Staff releasing "Operational information as of 22:00" is a direct counter to RF information operations, providing official updates. "Підрозділ Shadow", DeepState, and STERNENKO releasing videos of successful RF equipment and personnel destruction directly counter RF claims of dominance. The blocking of pro-RF YouTube channels is a direct action to limit RF information influence. NEW: Prompt reporting on the missile strike on UA training unit, emphasizing fatalities, to provide transparent information. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Ukrainian Public Sentiment: High resilience despite casualties. Strong concern for POWs. Internal security concerns due to human trafficking and corruption. Boosting morale through recognition of military service (Cross of Military Merit) and focus on domestic drone production. Strong public support for frontline soldiers, as evidenced by direct appeals for donations. There is a sense of urgency and concern regarding the war's trajectory and the need for continued support, as indicated by a Ukrainian channel's "IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT" with the caption "Some f*cking mess, people..." The report of "very few donations" despite high views on fundraising suggests potential donor fatigue or a shift in public engagement, which could impact morale on the front lines if support diminishes. The announcement of potential salary increases for rear military personnel will likely be a morale booster, addressing economic concerns. NEW: Return of a teenager from occupation will boost morale. Confirmed casualties from missile strike on training unit will negatively impact morale but reinforce resolve against RF. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian Public Sentiment: General tolerance of repression. Growing economic frustration due to cyberattacks and financial restrictions. Increased fear of cross-border UA drone attacks. State efforts to bolster military morale and support for veterans. Underlying internal discord and searching for "traitors within." Concerns about migration issues highlighted by internal channels. The 0.6% drop in the Mosbirzhi Index after Trump's statements might indicate some level of economic anxiety among segments of the Russian public. The public discussions at the "Territory of Meanings" forum are intended to reinforce a positive national narrative and future outlook. The incident with the journalist's window in St. Petersburg highlights continued internal pressure and fear among critics of the regime. NEW: The rise in oil prices following Trump's statements might be viewed positively by some, while the perceived lack of a "concrete peace plan" from Trump (as stated by an RF MP) might reinforce the state narrative that RF is justified in continuing the conflict. Public appeals for donations for "frontline armor" suggest a collective effort to support the military, boosting morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Support for Ukraine: Continued military aid (Germany's IRIS-T). Diplomatic engagement (Zelenskyy-Danish PM). Sanctions synchronization against RF. Potential new military support from Azerbaijan (unconfirmed). Ukrainian Cyber Police engaging in international cooperation. NEW: Azerbaijan's confirmed serial production of artillery shells for Ukraine represents significant new military support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Challenges for Ukraine: EU funding suspended pending NABU law reform; EU explicitly demanding preservation of NABU/SAP independence. German pressure on refugee benefits. International perception of corruption. Hungarian MFA statement regarding US-Russia agreement to end conflict is concerning. Trump's "10-day deadline" for peace talks, and the lack of a Russian response, combined with his statements about potential tariffs and US oil production, create significant uncertainty and potential diplomatic pressure. Trump's broader statements ("war will be prolonged," "can be easily settled") add to the complexity. Moldova's President Sandu reportedly turning "against Western politicians" is concerning for regional stability and Western unity. NEW: French defense industry cyberattack, including submarine data theft, indicates persistent cyber threats to international partners and potential implications for future military cooperation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russian International Relations: Deepening ties with DPRK. Complex and confrontational relations with the West, coupled with attempts to control negotiation narratives. Persistent probing of NATO borders (Lithuania, Estonia, Belarus). Continued engagement in other regions (Syria, Africa). Israeli rejection of UK stance on Palestinian statehood highlights broader international diplomatic friction that RF could exploit. Russia has not responded to Trump's ultimatum, which Trump has publicly criticized, but RF military bloggers are already dismissing it as insignificant. Trump's claim that "Melania has sympathy for Putin" is being amplified by RF sources, likely to portray a softer image of Putin to a Western audience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

• MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action):
  • RF Ground Operations: RF will continue to concentrate offensive efforts on the Pokrovsk and Avdiivka axes, attempting to consolidate gains, exploit any weaknesses in Ukrainian defenses, and achieve tactical encirclement of Avdiivka. They will maintain pressure on other Eastern axes (Kupyansk, Lyman, Siversk, Kramatorsk, Toretsk, Novopavlivka) and in Zaporizhzhia (Kamenskoye sector) to fix UA reserves. Increased RF pressure around Konstantinovka and toward Sumy (Myropillia) is anticipated, with a particular focus on seizing critical logistical routes like the "Asian Highway." The "Sarmat-2" UGV will likely be employed more frequently on the Bakhmut axis to test and refine its integration with infantry assaults. RF will continue to experiment with novel tactical mobility solutions like "combat electric scooters" for small unit infiltration, despite demonstrated vulnerabilities. RF will persist with small group tactics, despite their vulnerability to UA drones. RF will continue to use drones for tactical reconnaissance, targeting, and counter-battery fire, further integrating them into combined arms operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF Air/Missile/UAV Operations: RF will conduct a large-scale aerial attack within the next 24-72 hours, almost certainly including Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea Fleet targeting Odesa's port infrastructure, in addition to continued ballistic missile and Shahed drone strikes against critical energy infrastructure, military industrial complex sites, and logistics nodes deep within Ukraine, including Kyiv. Reconnaissance UAV activity in border regions (Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv) will persist. RF will continue testing new UAV models and counter-UAV measures in combat. Accidental bomb drops by RF aircraft are likely to continue due to ongoing issues. RF will continue to leverage drone footage for information warfare purposes. RF will continue targeted strikes on UA military training grounds and active units with ballistic missiles and guided aerial bombs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF Hybrid Operations: RF will intensify cyberattacks on Ukrainian and Western civilian infrastructure, aiming for disruption and data exfiltration, while simultaneously tightening internal information and security controls within Russia, including increased arrests for perceived "treason" and intimidation of journalists, and enforcement of social norms. Disinformation campaigns aimed at delegitimizing UA leadership (e.g., Zaluzhny narratives, POW exploitation) and fostering Western disunity will remain a key component. RF will particularly leverage Trump's "10-day deadline" and lack of response from Putin to further their narrative of Western disarray or lack of commitment, publicly dismissing the ultimatums while noting economic impacts. RF will continue limited probes of NATO borders and exploit international diplomatic disagreements. Explicit calls for extreme escalation (e.g., nuclear strikes on Western Ukraine) will continue in RF state media as a means of psychological warfare. RF will continue to deflect blame for civilian casualties in border regions onto UA forces. RF will intensify efforts to secure and defend against UA deep strikes with enhanced EW systems ("Groza") and physical "anti-drone screens." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action):
  • RF Ground Offensive (Avdiivka Encirclement Success): RF launches a highly coordinated and successful combined arms offensive on the Avdiivka axis, achieving rapid and complete operational encirclement of the Avdiivka garrison. This would involve rapid consolidation of newly gained territories and pushing deeper into Ukrainian lines, potentially supported by reserves moved from other fronts, severely impacting UA defensive posture in Donetsk. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • RF Escalation (Major Radiological Incident): An intentional or accidental action by RF forces at or near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) leads to a significant release of radioactive material, causing widespread environmental contamination and forcing large-scale civilian evacuation. While current radiation levels are normal, the previous report of increased background and RF media's explicit calls for nuclear strikes heighten this risk. This would create a humanitarian catastrophe and severely complicate UA military operations in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • US Diplomatic Shift: Trump's "10-day deadline" leads to an unforeseen diplomatic or economic consequence for Ukraine, potentially disrupting international support or creating a perceived imperative for immediate peace negotiations on terms unfavorable to Ukraine, even without direct RF response. The observed drop in the Mosbirzhi Index could be an early indicator of such economic pressure, even if dismissed by RF officials. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • French Defense Industry Exploitation: The stolen submarine data from Naval Group is immediately exploited by a hostile actor (likely RF-affiliated) to compromise NATO naval operations or defense capabilities, leading to significant intelligence and operational setbacks for Western alliances and indirectly for Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:
  • Avdiivka/Pokrovsk Axis: Within the next 24-72 hours, significant decisions on reinforcements will be critical for UA to prevent potential encirclement in Avdiivka and prevent further RF deep penetration towards Myrnohrad/Rodinskoye, and to defend the "Asian Highway."
  • Air Defense (Odesa): Next 24-72 hours remain critical for defending against anticipated RF missile strikes following Kalibr replenishment in Sevastopol.
  • EU Funding: The upcoming consideration of Zelenskyy's NABU bill in the Rada is a key decision point for unblocking significant EU financial aid within the coming days/weeks.
  • ZNPP Radiological Threat: Ongoing monitoring of radiation levels near ZNPP, despite current normal readings, is a critical decision point for immediate protective measures and potential civilian evacuation if levels change.
  • Trump's Deadline: The next 10 days will be a critical period for observing US diplomatic posture and any potential economic actions that could impact the conflict's dynamics.
  • Military Salaries: The proposed increase in salaries for rear-area military personnel will require legislative action and funding, likely impacting morale and recruitment over the next weeks/months.
  • Azerbaijani Artillery Production: The next 3-6 months will be critical to observe the ramp-up of Azerbaijani artillery shell production and its impact on UA logistics and ammunition supply.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• RF Objectives on Avdiivka/Pokrovsk Axis: Specific RF military objectives beyond Rodinskoye and Myrnohrad (e.g., deeper penetration, operational encirclement of specific UA forces) are unclear. The ultimate objective of the new southern push at Avdiivka is unclear (feint vs. main effort). The precise significance and target of the "Asian Highway" offensive are unconfirmed. Requires increased HUMINT and ISR to determine RF force composition and next moves.
• RF UGV Production/Deployment: Full scale of RF UGV production (e.g., "Sarmat-2") and their planned integration into wider ground operations remains unknown. Need to identify industrial facilities and training centers. Specific ISR and C2 capabilities of "Sarmat-2" are unknown, as are its vulnerabilities to UA EW and anti-armor systems.
• RF Naval Modernization: Impact of reported collapse of RF key fleet renewal project on their Black Sea Fleet capability. Requires additional COMINT/ELINT on naval production facilities and internal reports.
• RF Personnel Mobilization: Extent of resistance to conscription within RF (e.g., "ukhilyanty" in Kharkiv) and the effectiveness of new recruitment tactics (e.g., linking housing to service) is unclear. Need to verify RF claims about "blocking detachments" and poor treatment of mobilized personnel within UA units. Requires more HUMINT from occupied territories and open-source monitoring of RF social media.
• Nature of French Cyberattack: While a cyberattack on French defense industry is confirmed, the exact perpetrators, methods, and full extent of data exfiltration or system damage are unknown. Specifically, the compromise of Naval Group submarine data needs urgent follow-up. Requires international intelligence sharing.
• Azerbaijani Support to UA: While serial production of shells is reported, the volume and timeline of deliveries from Azerbaijan to UA needs immediate verification. Requires diplomatic and intelligence follow-up.
• RF "Italmas" UAV Development: Information on the capabilities, production, and intended deployment of the "Italmas" UAV, allegedly being tested in Sumy, is extremely limited. Requires immediate collection efforts (IMINT, ELINT).
• RF Drone Interception Capability: Details of RF's "Yolka" air defense drone capabilities (range, speed, payload, effectiveness against various UAV types) are unknown. Requires IMINT and SIGINT on drone operations.
• RF Internal Security Targets: The targets and operational scope of RF's drone-interceptor units for "Putin's guards" are unclear. Requires IMINT and HUMINT for clarification.
• GPS Spoofing System Identification: The specific type and location of the sophisticated RF EW system responsible for GPS spoofing in Zaporizhzhia are still unidentified. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF "Electric Scooter" Doctrine: The scale of deployment and intended tactical doctrine for "combat electric scooters" is unclear. Requires further observation of RF small unit tactics and ISR to identify production/distribution. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Impact of Trump's Ultimatum: Immediate and long-term impact of Trump's "10-day deadline" on RF strategic decision-making, Western unity, and international support for Ukraine remains highly uncertain. Requires close monitoring of diplomatic channels and open-source statements from all involved parties, including analysis of economic indicators in RF. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• UA Public Donation Trends: The specific reasons for the reported "dip" in public donations and its broader implications for public morale and sustained support require further analysis. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• RF Claimed Losses: Independent verification of RF claims of heavy Ukrainian losses on various fronts, as reported by Colonelcassad, is required, particularly the claim of 200 UA personnel killed in Chernihiv. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• RF Internal Repression: The full scale and methodology of the "foreign agent" campaign against Russian journalists and dissidents, and the broadening of administrative cases for social behaviors (e.g., teenagers in monastery), requires further investigation into their long-term impact on social cohesion and dissent. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• RF Mortar Round Marking: The purpose and implications of RF units marking mortar rounds with blue markers require further ISR and HUMINT to determine if it indicates special ammunition, specific targeting protocols, or quality control issues. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• Effectiveness of RF "Groza" EW: Independent verification of RF claims regarding the "Groza" EW system's effectiveness in "mass burning" UA transport in Kupyansk is required. This may indicate a new, more lethal EW capability or be a propaganda exaggeration. Requires IMINT and SIGINT. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• RF "Anti-Drone Screens": Details on the specifications, deployment, and effectiveness of these new "anti-drone screens" being distributed to RF units are unknown. Requires IMINT and HUMINT. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Reinforce Avdiivka and Pokrovsk Axes: Allocate immediate tactical reserves and additional anti-armor/FPV drone units to the Avdiivka garrison to prevent encirclement, particularly bolstering the western and southern approaches. Simultaneously, reinforce critical defensive lines and potential counter-attack positions on the Pokrovsk axis to secure GLOCs into Myrnohrad and defend against advancements on Konstantinovka. Prioritize defense of key logistical routes, including the "Asian Highway." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Elevate Air Defense Readiness for Odesa: Immediately elevate the readiness state of all air defense assets in Odesa and Mykolaiv Oblasts in anticipation of imminent Kalibr missile strikes. Prioritize rapid-response mobile fire groups against Shaheds. Reassess effectiveness of ballistic missile interception. Disperse and harden critical port infrastructure where possible. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
3. Intensify Counter-Hybrid Operations:
   • Cyber: Increase defensive cyber measures for critical civilian infrastructure and government networks. Actively coordinate with international partners on threat intelligence regarding Russian cyber capabilities and TTPs, particularly following reports of arsons linked to RF and the French defense industry hack. Maintain high alert against further RF cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.
   • Information Warfare: Develop and disseminate proactive counter-narratives to expose RF disinformation, particularly regarding alleged UA weaknesses, Western disunity, fabricated narratives about Ukrainian leadership, false claims of UA "blocking detachments," the exploitation of POW statements (including the "gluttony" narrative), and the strike on UA training facilities. Immediately counter RF attempts to exploit Trump's "10-day deadline" to sow discord or imply US wavering. Leverage reports of RF casualties and internal problems (e.g., sapper deaths, economic issues, migration problems, accidental bomb drops, drone donation appeals, internal repression, social control measures) to undermine RF propaganda. Continue to highlight UA professionalism and battlefield successes (e.g., drone strikes against e-scooters and small groups, destruction of RF artillery, Zala UAVs, and command posts, return of POWs), including the tactical ingenuity of using unexploded KABs against RF positions. Rapidly refute false RF claims of territorial gains (e.g., Malievka) and false radiation reports. Continue to challenge RF narratives blaming Ukraine for civilian casualties in RF border regions. Actively promote successful UA military operations through official channels, including drone footage.
   • Counter-EW: Immediately deploy specialized signals intelligence (SIGINT) teams to the Zaporizhzhia front to identify and locate the source of sophisticated GPS spoofing emissions. Task friendly EW units to develop and implement immediate countermeasures and alternative navigation methods for PGMs and UAVs. Prioritize development of counter-measures against new RF EW systems like "Groza" if claims of kinetic effects are verified. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
4. Expedite Legislative Reforms: Prioritize the passage of Zelenskyy's NABU bill in the Rada to unblock crucial EU financial aid, demonstrating commitment to anti-corruption and ensuring continued international financial support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
5. ISR Prioritization (Enemy Capabilities):
   • Re-task ISR assets (UAVs, satellite, SIGINT, OSINT) to collect on "Italmas" UAVs in Sumy region and UGVs ("Sarmat-2") on Bakhmut axis to understand their capabilities, operational patterns, and vulnerabilities.
   • Prioritize intelligence collection on RF force composition, and reinforcement movements on Avdiivka and Pokrovsk axes, and around Konstantinovka and Myropillia, with specific attention to the "Asian Highway."
   • Initiate urgent collection requirements on RF's "Yolka" air defense drone, "Putin's guard" interceptor drones, and newly observed "anti-drone screens" to assess their capabilities and potential deployment against UA assets.
   • Monitor RF small unit tactics for further deployment of "combat electric scooters" or similar novel mobility solutions, and develop specific counter-tactics.
   • Investigate the causes and implications of over 100 accidental RF aerial bomb drops on their own territory, potentially indicating materiel, training, or operational control deficiencies.
   • Investigate the purpose and implications of RF units marking mortar rounds with blue markers.
   • Prioritize independent verification of "Groza" EW system's capabilities and claimed effects. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
6. Counter-UGV Tactics Dissemination: Immediately disseminate all available intelligence on the "Sarmat-2" UGV to frontline units on the Bakhmut axis. Prioritize ATGM and FPV drone teams to target these new systems, as their armor is likely vulnerable. Develop and share effective counter-UGV tactics based on combat experience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
7. Logistics Protection and Requirements: Implement enhanced security measures for railway infrastructure in border regions. Consider hardened shelters for critical fuel and ammunition depots. Address critical friendly materiel shortfalls, such as pickup trucks and FPV drone components, through prioritized procurement or international aid channels. Actively pursue and expedite the $400M drone production deal. Prioritize fulfillment of specific unit requests for critical equipment (e.g., drones and Starlink for Zaporizhzhia paratroopers). Monitor the progress of Azerbaijani artillery shell production and integrate potential supplies into future logistical planning. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
8. Personnel Mobilization and Training: Intensify efforts for the "Contract 18-24" program to attract and train highly motivated youth for drone operations. Continue mandatory military training for medical students. Expedite the proposed salary increases for military personnel in the rear to boost morale and retention. Intensify diplomatic efforts with Germany to manage the situation of conscription-age Ukrainian men and explore solutions that support both national defense and refugee welfare. Implement enhanced force protection measures for all training units and facilities, to mitigate risks from RF missile strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
9. Radiological Monitoring and Contingency Planning: Maintain continuous and enhanced monitoring of radiation levels around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. Develop and refine contingency plans for rapid civilian evacuation and force protection in the event of a significant radiological release. Coordinate with international agencies for independent assessment and potential humanitarian assistance. Continue to swiftly counter any false claims of elevated radiation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
10. Diplomatic Engagement with Key Partners: Actively engage with US and European partners to clarify the implications of recent statements (e.g., Trump's "10-day deadline"), ensure continued coordinated support, and address any potential misinterpretations that could be exploited by RF. Publicly reaffirm Ukrainian resilience and objectives to counter RF narratives of Western disunity or wavering commitment. Highlight any ongoing US-RF cooperation (e.g., space) to contextualize it within broader geopolitical tensions and prevent RF exploitation. Engage with France regarding the Naval Group cyberattack to assess its full implications and offer cooperation in mitigation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
11. Public Information Campaign for Donations: Initiate a public information campaign to address the reported "dip" in public donations, clarifying the critical need for continued support for frontline units and demonstrating the impact of previous contributions. Leverage positive news like the return of POWs to boost public morale and engagement. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

//END REPORT//