Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Ukraine General: Nationwide threat from RF missile and UAV attacks persists. Guided Aerial Bombs (GABs) remain a significant threat in frontline areas. RF tactical aviation activity observed in southeastern direction. UAF Air Force reports high interception rates against RF air assets. Starlink connectivity experienced outages across the entire front line, largely resolved, but some units still report impacts. Ukraine's SVR and GUR have provided President Zelenskyy with reports on RF intentions for Summer-Autumn operations. EU adopted final decision on "roaming visa-free travel" with Ukraine. Zelenskyy emphasizes the need for 1000 interceptor drones per day and support for universities in frontline regions. Lithuanian Minister of Defense has confirmed their intent to join the international initiative to procure Patriot systems for Ukraine, pledging €30 million. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine provided operational information as of 261900Z JUL 25 (22:00 local). Ukraine is reportedly 8th globally in military spending, similar to France, but less than UK and Germany.
• Odesa Oblast: Confirmed destruction of a residential building and market due to RF drone attacks, with civilian casualties. Explosion on a Ukrainian dredge ship resulted in fatalities. Enemy reconnaissance UAV detected in Black Sea waters. Three (3) new RF "moped" (Shahed) type UAVs detected in the vicinity of Snake Island, with a course towards Tatarbunary, indicating an imminent drone strike threat to Southern Odesa Oblast from the Black Sea. UAF Air Force confirms group of enemy strike drones from Black Sea towards Southern Odesa. [UPDATE]: Reports indicate "minus" for mopeds from the sea, implying successful interception or failure of the recent drone group targeting Odesa. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Dnipropetrovsk Oblast: Massive combined attack with missiles and drones confirmed, resulting in at least 2 fatalities and injuries. "Epicenter" commercial/industrial facility and a tea brand's production facility destroyed in Kamianske/Dnipro. Continuous shelling of Nikopol, Myrivska, and Marhanets communities. RF claims "Vostok" group liberated Maliyivka. Artillery shelling caused 1 fatality in Chervonohryhorivka. RF launched KAABs onto Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
• Donetsk Oblast (Pokrovsk Axis): RF claims significant advances and capture of multiple settlements (Novoekonomichne, Zverevo, Aleksandro-Kalinovo, Zelenyy Hay). RF claims "fights began on the southern and southwestern outskirts of Krasnoarmeysk" (Pokrovsk), and deep infiltration by saboteurs. Heavy shelling and GAB strikes on Pokrovsk confirmed. UAF General Staff reports numerous clashes across the axis. 2 killed, 14 injured from Russian shelling in Konstantinovka, with forced evacuation expanding. UAF successfully struck an RF HQ in Donetsk (Zasyadko mine). RF claims "fire bag" for UAF in Yuzhny quarter of Chasiv Yar, with 98th VDV claiming liberation of Shevchenko and Pivdenny micro-districts. RF introducing new 152mm "Hyacinth-K" howitzer. UAF (MURAMASA) continues successful engagements against RF ground probes on Kostiantynivka axis. UAF Air Force reports KAABs launched on Donetsk Oblast. DeepState map has been updated. A video from Chystiakove (Torez), Donetsk Oblast, shows civilians queuing for water, indicating significant infrastructure damage or supply issues.
  • RF milblogger "Voenkor Kotenok" posts a map of the Konstantinovka direction, indicating continued RF focus on this axis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF milblogger "Voenkor Kotenok" posts a map showing the Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk) direction, indicating continued RF pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Colonelcassad reports sniper operations by 299th Regiment, 98th VDV Division on the Kostiantynivka axis. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM) This indicates continued RF VDV presence and precision fire focus.
  • [UPDATE]: TASS reports RF forces advanced in Fedorivka, DNR, and consolidated positions on the eastern outskirts of the settlement. (CONFIDENCE: LOW, RF claims often exaggerated).
  • [NEW]: TASS posts video of RF "Vostok" artillery destroying UAF dugouts in DNR. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM, RF claim, but video confirms artillery strike on fortified position using aerial observation, likely drone, and thermal imaging).
• Cherkasy Oblast: RF missile attack injured multiple civilians (rising to 12) and damaged a cemetery. New threat of enemy strike UAVs from the northeast.
• Kharkiv Oblast: RF sources claim "North" group continued creating a "security strip." First operational use of a FAB-3000 M-54 UMPK against a Ukrainian strongpoint in Lyptsi. Positional fighting continues in Vovchansk. KAAB hit a multi-story building and a medical facility, causing multiple injuries (up to 17). RF drone attacks on Kharkiv confirmed. SBU detained a Russian spotter. KAABs launched on Kharkiv Oblast. UAF Air Force reports KAABs incoming on Kharkiv. Overnight, Kharkiv was attacked by 15 Shahed UAVs, 4 Guided Aerial Bombs, and 2 ballistic missiles, causing fires and damage to a sports facility and Kyivskyi District Department of Internal Affairs building. UAF reports elimination of RF regiment commander (83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, 69th Motorized Rifle Division). Russian aviation conducted airstrikes at Rusyn Yar, Mykolayivka, Rodynske, Sukhyy Yar, Biletske, Suvorove, Pokrovsk, Shakhove. Russian milbloggers (Operatsiya Z) claim intense fighting near Kupyansk, with the 27th Brigade using incendiary munitions against UAF infantry positions.
  • Explosions reported in Kharkiv, confirmed by Suspilne, Syniehubov, and Terekhov. Kyivskyi district reportedly struck by enemy UAV. "Mykolaivsky Vanok" confirms a "moped" (Shahed) strike. STERNENKO reports strike hit a civilian enterprise in Kyivskyi district that has been non-operational for several years. Syniehubov later confirms a group of strike drones in Kharkiv Oblast and a series of explosions in Kyivskyi District, attributing the attack to "Geran-2" type UAVs. Terekhov reports Kharkiv under massive drone attack, specifically mentioning a strike on Shevchenkivskyi district.
  • Video from RBC-Ukraine shows a fire in Malodanylivska community after drone strikes in Kharkiv Oblast, indicating damage and ongoing effects of the attack. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Head of Malodanylivska community reports impacts near private housing. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) This indicates continued RF targeting of civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast.
  • [UPDATE]: UAF Air Force reports movement of enemy drones from Luhansk Oblast towards Kharkiv Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Zaporizhzhia Oblast: Air raid alert for Zaporizhzhia city has been cleared, but missile danger remains for the oblast. RF Milbloggers claim RF forces "liberated Kamyanske" and are "storming Plavni, advancing further" towards Stepnohirsk. UAF Air Force reports enemy UAV heading towards Zaporizhzhia from the south. Civilian casualties confirmed (1 killed, 3 injured) from shelling/drone attacks. Two fatalities in Primorske from FPV drone attack. UAF Air Force confirms GAB launches on Zaporizhzhia Oblast. RF UAV dropped munition near Zaporizhzhia NPP. Ongoing RF attacks on Orikhiv and Huliaippole directions. Ukrainian soldiers from 7th Division appeal for drone and Starlink donations. RF MoD reports "Giatsint-B" gun neutralized a hostile UAV control post. TASS and Mash on Donbas are reporting a claimed UA drone attack on an ambulance in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, injuring a patient and driver.
  • UAF Air Force reports KAABs inbound on Zaporizhzhia Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Air raid alert for Zaporizhzhia Oblast has been cleared. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kryvyi Rih: Situation assessed as controlled. Infrastructure projects ongoing. Enemy reconnaissance UAV activity reported.
• Mykolaiv Oblast: RF drone attacks reported overnight, causing significant fires. RF milbloggers claim destruction of a Bayraktar production facility (low confidence). SBU prevented a dual terrorist act. Russian drone attacked a Norwegian humanitarian organization's base. Mykolaiv may face water disruption. DeepState posts video of successful engagements on the Kinburn Spit.
  • [NEW]: Nikolaevskiy Vanek reports "general regarding mopeds" which indicates an overall summary for Mykolaiv Oblast, likely reflecting the resolution or status of recent drone attacks in the region. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Sumy Oblast: Continuous RF drone activity (Shaheds, reconnaissance UAVs) and GAB launches. UAF repelled 25 Russian army assaults yesterday in Kursk and North Slobozhansky direction. One fatality reported near Znob-Novhorodske. DeepState reports 225th Separate Assault Battalion liberated Kindrativka, eliminating 3 RF battalions and 1 battalion commander. TASS claims UAF only remains on southern outskirts of Yunakivka. Overnight, RF launched drones, KAABs, and missiles at Shostka, causing partial power and water loss in Sumy city and district. Alleged drone attack on Sumy Oblast Administration building. UAF forces able to dislodge RF troops from Kindrativka. UAF is assaulting Oleksiyivka.
  • RF milbloggers (Operatsiya Z) claim VDV are destroying enemy infantry and artillery, advancing towards Sumy. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM) This indicates continued RF pressure in the border region and potential for localized tactical advances.
  • RBC-Ukraine reports RF strike on Sumy Oblast caused civilian casualties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) "Dva Mayora" also mentions the Sumy direction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • [NEW]: UAF Air Force reports a new group of enemy strike UAVs inbound from Bryansk Oblast towards Northern Sumy Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • [NEW]: RBC-Ukraine reports updated ISW maps show Ukrainian forces advancing in Sumy Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • [NEW]: UAF Air Force reports group of "Shaheds" in northern and central Sumy Oblast moving south. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kherson Oblast: RF claims aviation strike on a UAF HQ. GAB launch on Kherson. RF reconnaissance UAVs reported. UAF repelled 5 Russian army assaults yesterday in Kherson direction. RF dropped explosives from a drone on an ambulance crew. A 9-year-old child injured from RF shelling in Bilozerka. RF MoD reports "Giatsint-B" gun neutralized a hostile UAV control post.
  • [UPDATE]: Russian milblogger "Воин DV" claims the 37th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, 36th Army, Vostok Group of Forces, destroyed a UA vehicle in the area of Yanvarske. Video evidence shows a successful drone strike on a pickup truck. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Yanvarske is in Kherson Oblast.
  • [NEW]: Colonelcassad posts video of 20th Army UAV operators destroying a Ukrainian robotic platform. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) This indicates RF is actively targeting UA robotic systems and has the capability to do so, likely through FPV or other tactical UAVs.
• Other Eastern Axes: UAF General Staff reports numerous clashes on Kupyansk, Lyman, Siversk, Kramatorsk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka directions. RF claims advances near Kolodyazi, Yampolivka, and Dibrova (Lyman), and Holubivka (Kupyansk). Increased RF EW activity observed in Lyman direction. RF forces significantly advanced in Serebryansky forestry and took control of a pioneer camp. UAF 63rd Brigade's drone unit eliminated 23 enemy personnel near Torske.
  • DeepState posts drone footage from the 155th Brigade showing a repelled RF assault north of Shevchenko. Footage appears to show strikes on an RF vehicle and personnel. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Operatyvnyi ZSU reports significant RF losses (personnel and equipment) near Siversk. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM) This indicates successful UAF defensive operations in this sector.
• Poltava Oblast: Enemy drone fell due to AD work. Reconnaissance UAVs on border of Kharkiv and Poltava. Threat of strike UAVs from northeast. Explosions reported in Kremenchuk area, with drones neutralized. UAVs detected moving towards Myrhorod, Poltava, and Dykanka.
• Ternopil Oblast: Grenade explosion in apartment building resulted in two fatalities.
• Russia:
  • Volgograd Oblast: Flight restrictions implemented at Volgograd airport. Unconfirmed reports of explosions. RBC-Ukraine reports multiple images and videos showing explosions and fires in Volgograd Oblast. "Operatsiya Z" (Russian milblogger) claims disruption to railway electrical power due to UAV debris. CAPLIENKO_UKRAINE FIGHTS posts video of a large fire at an oil station in Volgograd following a UAV strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) This confirms a successful UA drone strike on military-logistics infrastructure.
  • [UPDATE]: "Военкор Котенок" (Russian milblogger) confirms an ongoing enemy drone attack on Volgograd, with debris from an intercepted drone falling near a railway substation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • [NEW]: ASTRA reports drone attack on electric substation near railway in Oktyabrsky settlement, Volgograd Oblast, with video showing fire. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) This confirms targeting of critical infrastructure.
  • Krasnodar Krai: Multiple videos show large explosions and fires near a "Lukoil-Yugnefteprodukt Sochinskaya oil depot." RF MoD claims 39 Ukrainian UAVs shot down. Casualties reported (2 dead, 13 injured). Damage to railway station, injuring train passengers. Armavir airfield reportedly hit.
  • Kursk Oblast: Russian official signed resolution on payments to residents forced to leave homes. Ukrainian SOF engaged Russian forces. One civilian killed by drone attack. UAF repelled 25 RF assaults yesterday. Two Ukrainian UAVs shot down. [UPDATE]: RF milblogger posts a video of an elderly man claiming to be a victim of Ukrainian military actions in Sudzhansky district, Kursk region, describing looting of property. This is likely an RF information operation aimed at justifying actions or discrediting UA forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Luhansk (Kremennaya): TASS reports "firefight" by UAF (low confidence). RF forces significantly advanced in Serebryansky forestry and took control of a pioneer camp on Lake Linevoye.
  • Rostov Oblast (Novocherkassk/Taganrog Area): Multiple explosions reported in suburbs of Taganrog and Novocherkassk due to drone attacks. Railway station building in Peschanokopskoye damaged. Two fatalities reported from a UAV attack on a vehicle.
    • Operatsiya Z reports a surgeon from Kalmykia and his brother were killed in a UAV attack in Rostov Oblast. Videos show a damaged, burned-out SUV and a fire truck responding to a fire near a field, consistent with drone attack damage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Amur Oblast: A civilian An-24 passenger plane crashed with 43 passengers and 6 crew, no survivors. Technical malfunction and human factor cited as possible causes. One black box destroyed, voice recorder accessible.
  • Rostov Oblast (Novoshakhtinsk): Burning shopping center. One firefighter died, one woman's body found.
  • Nevinnomyssk (Stavropol Krai): Multiple explosions confirmed from alleged drone attacks on Nevinnomyssky Azot industrial plant and Signal radio factory. Mayor claimed 37 impacts with no losses (low confidence on no damage).
  • Tambov Oblast: "Cotton" (explosions/fires) reported in the area of the Tambov Powder Plant after UAV attack.
  • RF Airports: Flight restrictions in various airports lifted after drone threats. Reports (News of Moscow) indicate significant disruption at Sheremetyevo airport, with numerous passengers stranded. TASS reports temporary flight restrictions at Kaluga airport. [NEW]: TASS reports temporary flight restrictions at Nizhny Novgorod and Pskov airports. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) This indicates continued UA drone activity impacting a wider range of RF air hubs.
  • Moscow Oblast: Two drones flying towards Moscow shot down. Fog with low visibility expected. Reduced swimming areas due to water quality.
  • Bryansk Oblast: Numerous enemy UAVs shot down over Bryansk Oblast. RF MoD claims 12 Ukrainian UAVs shot down over Crimea, Rostov, and Bryansk Oblasts. Two enemy UAVs of aircraft type were destroyed over Bryansk Oblast by RF MOD AD.
  • Saratov Oblast: Gas explosion in apartment building resulted in 7 fatalities and significant damage. Investigation opened.
  • Crimea: Russian milbloggers (ASTRA) report the detention of a DJ in annexed Crimea for playing a song by Verka Serduchka, with a subsequent forced "apology" video showing support for the "special military operation." This indicates tightening internal security measures and efforts to suppress pro-Ukrainian sentiment.
    • RF MoD claims 12 Ukrainian UAVs shot down over Crimea, Rostov, and Bryansk Oblasts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Lipetsk Oblast: Air alert declared across the entire Lipetsk Oblast, indicating an ongoing or anticipated UAV threat. Threat of UAV attack on Yelets, Yeletsky, Izmalkovsky, Stanovlyansky, and Dolgorukovsky districts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • [NEW]: Smolensk Oblast: RF AD forces shot down and suppressed six Ukrainian UAVs over Smolensk Oblast, as reported by the governor. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • [NEW]: Voronezh Oblast: RF sources report UA drone attacks in Voronezh Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • [NEW]: Kaluga Oblast: RF sources report UA drone attacks in Kaluga Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • [NEW]: Chelyabinsk Oblast: TASS reports 3 new figures in a large-scale embezzlement case involving the director of "Technopark" and the head of the Ministry of Transport of Chelyabinsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) This indicates ongoing internal corruption issues within the RF.
  • Other Internal RF Issues: Reports of low-quality dry rations, FSB detaining Russians for calling for military assassinations, corruption arrests of officials (Tambov Governor, Bryansk Vice-Governor, Chelyabinsk officials). Planned ban on gasoline exports. Mobilization issues (denied compensation, military police brutality). GAZ transitioning to four-day work week. Continued arrests for alleged collaboration with Ukrainian call centers. Central Bank lowered key rate to 18%. Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier potentially to be scrapped.
  • Rybar reports on the escalation on the Cambodia-Thailand border. This is a regional conflict unrelated to the immediate AOR but consumes global attention and resources. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • [NEW]: Nizhny Novgorod: A participant in a swimming event died due to health problems during the distance. While not directly military-related, it adds to the general picture of internal RF issues. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • [NEW]: Colonelcassad posts video showing what appears to be a new domestic RF USV/BEC (unmanned surface vehicle/naval drone) under development or testing. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) This indicates RF is investing in and developing its own naval drone capabilities, potentially for future Black Sea operations.
  • [NEW]: Police of Khabarovsk Krai reports a summary of weekly news, which often includes local crime and public order incidents. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) This provides a broader internal security picture for the far eastern regions of RF, though less directly relevant to the AOR.
• Regional Context (Non-Ukraine):
  • Cyprus: Uncontained wildfires and two deaths. Fire in Sudak forestry (Crimea) localized.
  • Kazakhstan (Aqtobe): Azerbaijani publication identified military personnel allegedly involved in downing an AZAL plane. Military helicopter missing in Almaty region, wreckage found.
  • Lithuania: Prepared infrastructure for additional US and NATO troops. Will allocate €30M for Patriot systems for Ukraine. Patrushev stated any military encroachment on Kaliningrad would receive a devastating response.
  • Red Sea: Distress signal regarding a vessel seizure. Syria: Rybar notes a "request from Damascus." Alleged ethnic cleansing in Es-Suwayda province. French court canceled arrest warrant for former Syrian President Assad. Terrorist attack on a courthouse in Zahedan, Iran, 5 dead, 20 injured. US liquidated a senior ISIS leader.
  • Black Sea Region: "Massive UAV raid" reported. Resumption of attacks in Black Sea. Putin states plans for modern naval forces. Naval exercises ("July Storm") ongoing. Two Majors video shows Baltic Fleet forces destroying maritime target with unmanned systems. Expected attack of underwater and conventional USVs on Novorossiysk, Anapa. NATO "practiced a strike on Crimea" (low confidence).
    • TASS reports Putin congratulated sailors and officers on Navy Day, emphasizing the development of new naval technology and nuclear submarines. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Kyiv: SBU prevented a terrorist attack. Air raid alerts announced and cleared. Israeli early warning system for air threats operational. Protests against law №12414 regarding NABU continue. Heat-related cargo movement restrictions. Combined night strike (missiles, drones) confirmed. Air raid alert due to ballistic missile threat.
• Estonia: Sounding alarm about Russia moving EW systems closer to NATO.
• New Tactical Development - Lancet Intercept: Claimed FPV drone intercepted a Russian Lancet loitering munition. (CONFIDENCE: LOW, requires verification)
• New RF Naval Commissioning: Putin participated in ceremony for raising naval ensign on 'Knyaz Pozharsky' nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.
• New US Aid Package to Ukraine: US approval of $330 million military package for Ukraine (AD, SAU). First Patriot battery and missiles from Germany arrived (3 systems transferred), Germany negotiating for more.
• Starlink Outage: Global Starlink outage largely resolved, software-related. Elon Musk allegedly ordered Starlink shutdown during 2022 counteroffensives.
• Israel-Palestine Recognition: Israel condemns France's decision to recognize Palestine. Israeli military states it has no evidence of Hamas regularly stealing UN aid, refuting prior claims.
• Internal Ukrainian Political Developments: RBC-Ukraine posts photo message with caption claiming "Retribution for the NABU and SAP anti-corruption scandal was not long in coming: the EU severely punishes Ukraine." TASS reports New York Times opinion that Zelenskyy's persecution of anti-corruption agencies negatively affected his image among Western allies. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). This indicates an active information campaign related to the recent controversy around Ukrainian anti-corruption bodies.
• Chinese UAVs: Colonelcassad posts a selection of Chinese "Caihong" (Rainbow) series drones with improved characteristics, implying their potential or current use. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM). While not directly tied to current combat, it highlights RF interest in and potential procurement of advanced UAVs.
• [UPDATE]: Colonelcassad posts a video appearing to show an RF crew engaging a UA drone. The footage is from an aircraft's targeting system, suggesting aerial engagement of a drone, possibly by another drone or manned aircraft. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• [NEW]: Western Diplomacy on Ukraine: Starmer's intent to discuss ways to end the conflict with Trump during a personal meeting, as reported by The Sunday Telegraph via TASS, signals ongoing international diplomatic efforts to find a resolution, though specifics remain unknown. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• [NEW]: Trump's Position on Ukraine: TASS reports Rubio stating Trump remains interested in a conflict resolution in Ukraine and desires concrete actions towards its conclusion. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) This indicates consistency in Trump's stated position on Ukraine, regardless of the feasibility or means of achieving such a resolution.
• [NEW]: Unrelated US Internal Event: RBC-Ukraine reports a knife attack in Michigan, US. This is irrelevant to the AOR. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• [NEW]: US Political Developments (2028 Election): TASS reports Rubio's opinion on Vance as a potential 2028 presidential candidate. This is irrelevant to the immediate AOR. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• No new significant weather or environmental factors reported. Assume continuation of recent patterns. Visibility at night may be reduced due to fog in some areas (e.g., Moscow Oblast, potentially border regions). Heat restrictions on cargo movement in Kyiv are noted.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces: Continued offensive pressure on Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, and Sumy/Northern Slobozhansky axes. Defensive posture west of Avdiivka (Ocheretyne). Renewed Black Sea fleet activity (exercises, new submarine commissioning), with evidence of domestic USV development. Intensified EW activity. New deployment of Shahed-type UAVs observed from Black Sea into Southern Odesa Oblast, though recent reports suggest these were negated. RF forces, specifically elements of the 37th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, 36th Army, Vostok Group, are actively using drones for targeted strikes in areas such as Yanvarske (Kherson Oblast). RF is launching new groups of strike UAVs from Bryansk Oblast towards Sumy Oblast, with Shaheds observed moving south through Sumy Oblast. RF tactical aviation activity is noted, indicating potential for GAB launches. RF 20th Army UAV operators are actively targeting and destroying UA robotic platforms. RF artillery, specifically "Vostok" group, is actively targeting UA fortified positions with aerial (drone) observation and thermal imaging. RF AD is actively engaged against UA drone attacks across multiple central and western oblasts (Smolensk, Voronezh, Kaluga, Volgograd). Flight restrictions in place at Nizhny Novgorod and Pskov airports indicate an active RF air defense posture in response to ongoing UA drone threats into the RF heartland.
• UAF Forces: Maintaining defensive lines and conducting counter-assaults. Reports of successful engagements near Siversk and against RF armored assaults near Vuhledar. Air defense remains active against widespread RF missile/drone attacks. DeepState map updates indicate dynamic frontlines. UAF Air Force has issued warnings for incoming drone threats, including a new warning for movement of enemy drones from Luhansk towards Kharkiv and from Bryansk towards Sumy. UAF continues to conduct deep strikes into RF territory, targeting military-logistics infrastructure (Smolensk, Voronezh, Kaluga, Volgograd, Krasnodar, Tambov, Nizhny Novgorod, Pskov). UAF has reportedly advanced in Sumy Oblast, as per ISW maps. UAF Air Force has issued a general warning regarding enemy tactical aviation activity.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities: RF continues to possess significant capabilities in long-range precision strikes (missiles, GABs), tactical aviation, and ground maneuver forces. The introduction of new EW systems near Chasiv Yar represents an enhanced capability to disrupt UAF UAS. RF continues to field new artillery (Hyacinth-K) and naval assets, including the development of domestic naval drones (USVs). RF continues to conduct massed UAV attacks, demonstrating consistent production or acquisition capacity for Shahed-type drones, and has integrated drone warfare into tactical ground operations (e.g., targeting vehicles in Kherson, robotic platforms). RF AD capabilities are actively engaged against UA drone attacks across multiple central and western oblasts (Smolensk, Voronezh, Kaluga, Volgograd, Nizhny Novgorod, Pskov). RF tactical aviation is active, indicating continued capability for airstrikes. RF internal security forces, specifically FSIN (Federal Penitentiary Service), are capable of suppressing internal dissent and coercing individuals, as seen in the Crimea incident. RF artillery units are capable of precision strikes on fortified positions using aerial guidance.
• Intentions: RF intent remains the seizure of key terrain in Eastern Ukraine, with a primary focus on Chasiv Yar and continued pressure along the Pokrovsk axis. Attacks on Ukrainian rear areas and border regions (Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa) aim to degrade UAF logistics, morale, and divert resources. Attacks on RF territory are intended to disrupt logistics, cause panic, and potentially divert AD assets. Putin's emphasis on naval development signals long-term strategic ambitions, including the fielding of naval drones. RF is intent on maintaining pressure on UA coastal regions and disrupting port operations or military facilities through continued drone attacks. RF's internal AD posture demonstrates a reactive intent to defend against UA drone attacks on RF territory. RF information operations aim to shape narratives for both domestic and international audiences, exploiting internal Ukrainian issues and amplifying perceived Ukrainian "crimes." RF tactical aviation presence suggests continued intent to conduct air support for ground operations and deep strikes. RF is also demonstrating an intent to counter UA robotic platforms on the battlefield. RF also intends to maintain tight control over its information space and suppress pro-Ukrainian sentiment, extending coercive tactics to annexed territories.
• Courses of Action (COA):
  • COA 1 (Most Likely): Intensified Ground Offensive with EW Support (Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk). RF will continue to focus major ground assaults on Chasiv Yar, supported by heavy artillery (e.g., Vostok group targeting fortified positions), GABs, and advanced EW systems to blind UAF reconnaissance and strike drones. The Pokrovsk axis will see continued attritional attacks to fix UAF forces, with RF attempting localized advances such as in Fedorivka, DNR. RF tactical UAVs will increasingly target UA robotic platforms. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • COA 2: Sustained Deep Strike Campaign with Coastal and Border Focus. RF will maintain high tempo of missile and UAV strikes against Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure (energy, military-industrial targets) to degrade national resilience and reduce UAF combat power. Focus will likely be on disrupting logistics and air defense nodes, with increased emphasis on coastal targets in Odesa and Mykolaiv Oblasts to undermine maritime resupply and morale, and continued attacks on border regions (Sumy, Kharkiv) to stretch UAF defenses. This includes continued waves of UAVs from multiple directions (Black Sea, Bryansk Oblast, Luhansk Oblast), with specific Shahed groups targeting Sumy Oblast. RF tactical aviation will remain active to deliver GABs and provide air support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • COA 3: Limited Tactical Operations on Secondary Axes and Continued Internal IO. RF will continue localized probing attacks in Sumy, Kupyansk, Lyman, Siversk, and Zaporizhzhia regions to stretch UAF defenses, fix reserves, and achieve localized gains where opportunities arise. This includes continued targeted drone strikes against UA vehicles and personnel on these axes, and specific targeting of UA robotic platforms. RF will concurrently intensify information operations to discredit Ukraine and justify its own actions, particularly focusing on alleged UA "crimes" in border regions and internal Ukrainian political divisions, and highlighting RF successes against UA advanced equipment. RF will also intensify efforts to suppress pro-Ukrainian sentiment and control information internally, especially in annexed territories like Crimea, using coercive tactics as demonstrated by the DJ incident. RF will also showcase new domestic military technology like USVs to project strength. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF Adaptations:
  • Enhanced EW Deployment: The significant increase and effectiveness of RF EW systems around Chasiv Yar is a critical tactical adaptation, directly impacting UAF's primary ISR and strike advantage (UAS). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • FAB-3000 Deployment: First operational use of FAB-3000 M-54 UMPK indicates RF willingness to deploy heavier, more destructive glide bombs, likely for fortified positions or high-value targets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Varied Assault Formations: While large armored assaults can still fail (Vuhledar), RF continues to use smaller, agile assault groups (Chasiv Yar) for probing and localized advances, suggesting adaptability at the tactical level. RF claims of advances in Fedorivka indicate continued localized pressure.
  • Sustained Massed UAV Attacks: RF maintains the capacity for and willingness to conduct massed "Shahed" attacks, particularly against southern coastal areas and now from Bryansk Oblast towards Sumy, indicating a sustained and evolving drone warfare capability with diversified launch points. New warnings regarding Shahed movement confirm this trend, with specific groups transiting Sumy Oblast.
  • Integrated Tactical Drone Use: Evidence of specific RF brigades (e.g., 37th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade) actively employing strike drones to target UA vehicles at the tactical level, indicating a decentralized, yet effective, integration of drone assets into frontline operations. The confirmed destruction of a UA robotic platform by RF 20th Army UAV operators indicates an expanding tactical target set for RF drones. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Warfare Focus: RF is increasing its efforts to collect and disseminate propaganda videos featuring alleged Ukrainian "crimes" in border regions, indicating a tactical shift in IO to directly counter Ukrainian narratives and gain international sympathy. RF is also exploiting internal corruption issues within Ukraine to discredit the government. The video from "Operatsiya Z" claiming a UA soldier shot his commander and surrendered to RF forces is a new narrative aiming to sow discord and undermine UA morale, indicating an adaptation in psychological operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Active Tactical Aviation: Consistent reports of RF tactical aviation activity, combined with GAB launches, demonstrate a sustained adaptation to use air power for deep and close support. The general alert for active RF tactical aviation indicates a continued and possibly intensified air threat.
  • Domestic USV Development: New video showing RF domestic USV development indicates an adaptation towards indigenously produced naval drones for future operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UAF Adaptations:
  • FPV Lancet Intercept (Claimed): If confirmed, the FPV drone intercepting a Lancet represents an innovative, if potentially ad-hoc, counter-UAS tactic. (CONFIDENCE: LOW, needs verification)
  • Increased Deep Strike Targeting: UAF's continued and successful drone strikes against targets deep within RF territory (Volgograd, Smolensk, Voronezh, Kaluga, Krasnodar, Tambov, Nizhny Novgorod, Pskov) demonstrate an adaptive tactical shift to disrupt RF logistics and internal stability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Localized Counter-Offensives: Reports of UA advances in Sumy Oblast indicate successful localized counter-offensive tactics, exploiting perceived RF vulnerabilities in border areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Logistics:
  • Ammunition & Fuel: Sustained high-intensity operations and deep strikes suggest a robust, though potentially strained, supply chain. The continued use of GABs indicates a stable supply of older airframes and bomb bodies for conversion.
  • Personnel Replacements: Continued offensive pushes, despite reported heavy losses, indicate RF is able to sustain personnel through mobilization or recruitment, albeit potentially with quality concerns (as implied by internal RF social issues and high-level corruption arrests in Chelyabinsk).
  • Disruptions in RF Territory: UA drone strikes on oil depots (Krasnodar), industrial plants (Nevinnomyssk), powder plants (Tambov), and railway electrical infrastructure (Volgograd, potentially also Smolensk/Voronezh/Kaluga), and now specifically an electric substation near a railway in Volgograd, directly impact RF military-industrial and energy infrastructure, potentially affecting long-term sustainment. Airport restrictions also indicate disruption. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) The new flight restrictions at Nizhny Novgorod and Pskov airports further highlight the growing impact of UA deep strikes on RF logistical and transportation networks.
• UAF Logistics:
  • Drone Requirements: Zelenskyy's call for 1000 interceptor drones per day highlights a critical, high-volume requirement for counter-UAS capabilities.
  • External Aid: New US aid ($330M) and German Patriot deliveries (3 systems transferred, more negotiated) are vital for UAF AD and combat sustainment. Lithuanian pledge for Patriot systems is a positive development.
  • Starlink: Widespread but resolved Starlink outages underscore dependence on, and vulnerability of, satellite communications.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2:
  • Centralized Planning: The synchronized missile/drone campaigns across Ukraine (as seen in animated strike maps) suggest centralized command and control for strategic strikes.
  • Tactical Coordination Issues: The Vuhledar armored assault failure, characterized by poor coordination, indicates persistent weaknesses in RF tactical C2, particularly for complex combined arms operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Border Region Control: The declaration of "red threat levels" and AD activity in multiple RF border oblasts (Lipetsk, Bryansk, Volgograd, Kaluga, Smolensk, Voronezh, Nizhny Novgorod, Pskov) demonstrates RF C2 is actively responding to cross-border threats, albeit reactively.
  • Disinformation Integration: TASS reporting on "forced mobilization" and "liberation" narratives, and milblogger content on alleged UA "crimes," indicates RF C2 is closely coordinating information operations with military movements and internal events. The immediate amplification of the Chelyabinsk corruption case by TASS suggests a C2 effort to control internal narratives around governance. The new video alleging a UA soldier shot his commander further demonstrates integrated IO.
  • Tactical Drone Integration: The specific mention of a brigade-level drone unit conducting successful strikes (e.g., 37th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade) and the 20th Army UAV operators targeting robotic platforms indicates effective tactical C2 decentralization for drone employment. RF "Vostok" artillery uses aerial observation to target UA fortified positions, indicating integrated fire control.
  • Air Activity Coordination: The general alert regarding RF tactical aviation activity implies effective C2 for air assets.
• UAF C2:
  • Adaptive Response: UAF General Staff provides regular operational updates, and local authorities react to strikes, indicating effective, decentralized command responses under pressure. UAF Air Force is rapidly issuing warnings for incoming drone threats from multiple directions, and for tactical aviation activity, including specific tracking of Shahed groups in Sumy.
  • Strategic Intelligence Integration: Zelenskyy's meeting with SVR/GUR intelligence points to ongoing strategic-level C2 and intelligence integration for future operations.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Defensive Resilience: UAF continues to hold ground against significant RF pressure in key sectors (Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk). Successful repulsion of large-scale RF assaults (Vuhledar, Siversk) demonstrates defensive capabilities remain effective.
• Air Defense Capacity: High interception rates against RF air assets demonstrate continued AD effectiveness, though massed drone/missile attacks still achieve hits and cause casualties/damage. New Patriot systems will enhance this. Recent success in negating "moped" drones from the Black Sea towards Odesa is a positive indicator. The UAF Air Force warnings indicate active monitoring and readiness to engage air threats, including specific tracking of Shahed groups.
• UAS Operational Capacity: UAF UAS remain a critical component of ISR and precision strike, despite increasing RF EW threats. The expressed need for 1000 interceptor drones highlights the priority on counter-UAS defense. UAF capabilities for deep strikes into RF territory using drones are expanding. The loss of a UA robotic platform highlights a new vulnerability to RF tactical drone capabilities, requiring adaptation.
• Personnel & Morale: While UAF successes boost morale, ongoing casualty reports (e.g., combat medic killed) and mobilization challenges (RF propaganda about TCC actions) are persistent factors. The new RF propaganda video claiming a UA soldier shot his commander is a direct attack on UA military cohesion and morale.
• Offensive Capability (Localized): Reports of UAF advances in Sumy Oblast indicate a limited but present offensive capability in specific sectors.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes:
  • Vuhledar Repulsion: Decisive defeat of a significant RF armored assault near Vuhledar, inflicting considerable materiel and personnel losses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Siversk ATK: UAF "destroyed a lot of KATSAPS along with equipment" near Siversk. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Kindrativka Liberation: 225th Separate Assault Battalion reportedly liberated Kindrativka in Sumy Oblast, indicating successful counter-offensive action. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Sumy Oblast Advance: ISW map updates confirm Ukrainian forces have advanced in Sumy Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF HQ Strike: Successful UAF strike on an RF HQ in Donetsk (Zasyadko mine). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF Commander Elimination: Elimination of RF regiment commander (83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, 69th Motorized Rifle Division). (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • RF Infrastructure Strikes: Successful and documented drone strikes against RF military-industrial and logistics infrastructure in Volgograd Oblast (railway electrical system, oil station fire, confirmed by RF sources, and now confirmed strike on electric substation near railway), Krasnodar Krai (oil depot), Nevinnomyssk (industrial plants), Tambov (powder plant), and now confirmed or reported strikes in Smolensk, Voronezh, Kaluga, Nizhny Novgorod, and Pskov Oblasts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Odesa Drone Interception: Apparent successful neutralization of "moped" type UAVs heading towards Southern Odesa from the Black Sea. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Setbacks:
  • Starlink Disruptions: Initial widespread Starlink outages, though largely resolved, exposed a critical vulnerability in communications.
  • Civilian Casualties/Infrastructure Damage: Continued widespread RF strikes on civilian targets in Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia cause significant casualties and damage.
  • Pokrovsk Axis: RF claims of significant advances and deep infiltration near Pokrovsk, if accurate, represent tactical setbacks. (CONFIDENCE: LOW-MEDIUM, RF claims often exaggerated). The RF claim of advancing in Fedorivka, DNR, if confirmed, would represent a localized setback.
  • Information Environment Challenge: The ongoing controversy around NABU/SAP and related EU reactions, combined with internal criticism from military bloggers regarding soldiers' welfare, presents a challenge to internal unity and external support. The new RF propaganda depicting a UA soldier shooting his commander is a targeted psychological setback if believed.
  • Tactical Vehicle Losses: Confirmation of a UA vehicle destroyed by RF drone in Yanvarske, Kherson Oblast, highlights the persistent threat of RF tactical drone use. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Loss of Robotic Platform: The destruction of a UA robotic platform by RF UAV operators signifies a new tactical loss and highlights RF capabilities against emerging UA battlefield technology. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Artillery Strikes on Fortified Positions: RF "Vostok" group artillery effectively destroying UA dugouts in DNR suggests successful targeting of UAF fortified positions. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Critical Need: Counter-UAS: Urgent requirement for increased interceptor drone production (1000/day target) and integrated C-UAS systems to counter RF drone and loitering munition threats, especially given enhanced RF EW capabilities and persistent Shahed attacks from multiple vectors. New focus needed on countering RF capabilities against UA robotic platforms.
• Air Defense Munitions: Sustained RF air attacks necessitate continuous supply of AD missiles. New Patriot systems are crucial, but more are needed.
• Artillery Ammunition: Continued high-intensity fighting on active fronts implies ongoing high consumption of artillery ammunition.
• EW Countermeasures: Development and deployment of UAF EW capabilities to counter new RF systems.
• Personnel Rotation/Reinforcement: Sustaining defensive lines and offensive actions requires consistent personnel replenishment and training.
• Information Warfare Capabilities: Resources to counter sophisticated RF disinformation campaigns, particularly those targeting internal Ukrainian cohesion and Western support, and those attempting to justify RF actions. This includes rapidly debunking false narratives, such as the alleged UA soldier shooting his commander.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Propaganda:
  • Victim Blaming/False Flags: TASS/Mash claim UA drone attack on an ambulance in Zaporizhzhia (CONFIDENCE: LOW - typical RF false flag narrative). TASS also claims Kyiv is "mobilizing" residents under guise of evacuation, an obvious attempt to deter cooperation with UAF.
  • Discrediting Mobilization & Undermining Morale: RF milbloggers (Colonelcassad) pushing narratives about Ukrainian "manhunters" and forced conscription (e.g., video of TCC official hitting a "draft evader"). Colonelcassad is actively promoting a video from Ukrainian military blogger "Kiyanin" criticizing Ukrainian command for not paying benefits to families of missing/killed soldiers, linking it to government corruption. This is a direct attempt to undermine UAF morale and public trust. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - active IO). This narrative aligns with long-standing RF efforts to highlight internal Ukrainian divisions and exploit perceived government weaknesses. "Operatsiya Z" is actively promoting a video claiming a UA soldier shot his commander and surrendered, a direct attempt to portray internal discord and weakness within UA forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - active IO)
  • Moral Degradation: RF promoting the "Satanists in AFU" narrative seeks to dehumanize Ukrainian forces and rally support for their "special military operation." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - active IO).
  • Exaggerated Gains: RF claims of liberating multiple settlements and deep infiltration around Pokrovsk are likely inflated to boost domestic morale and demonstrate progress. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - typical RF reporting). The new TASS claim of advancement in Fedorivka, DNR, follows this pattern. TASS video of artillery strike on dugouts will be used to show RF effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - typical RF reporting).
  • Internal Control: Detention and forced "apology" of a DJ in Crimea for playing Ukrainian music highlights the tightening of internal information control and suppression of dissenting/pro-Ukrainian sentiment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Exploiting Internal Controversies: RF state media (TASS) is rapidly amplifying negative narratives (e.g., NYT article) regarding Zelenskyy's image due to the NABU/SAP controversy, aiming to erode Western confidence and support. TASS highlighting the corruption arrests in Chelyabinsk serves as a diversionary tactic from broader internal RF issues. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - active IO).
  • Highlighting Foreign Military Assistance to RF: Colonelcassad's sharing of Chinese drone information, even if for general public, can serve to imply broader foreign military-technical cooperation.
  • Perception of RF Power: TASS reporting on a UK poll ranking Russia among the most powerful nations is a clear attempt to bolster RF's international image and perceived strength. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Fabricated Atrocities/Looting: New video from Colonelcassad depicting an elderly man claiming to be a victim of Ukrainian looting in Kursk Oblast, likely a staged narrative to garner sympathy and justify RF actions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - classic RF disinformation tactic).
  • Showcasing RF Technical Superiority: Colonelcassad's posting of the video showing a UA robotic platform destroyed by an RF drone serves to highlight RF's battlefield capabilities and demoralize UA forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). The new video of domestic RF USVs will be used to demonstrate RF's innovation and self-sufficiency in military technology. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UAF Counter-Narratives:
  • Highlighting RF Atrocities: Reports of civilian casualties, attacks on humanitarian workers, and damage to civilian infrastructure (Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv) serve to reinforce RF's image as an aggressor.
  • Showcasing RF Losses: Dissemination of videos and reports of successful UAF engagements (Vuhledar, Siversk, Volgograd strikes) directly counters RF's narratives of success and aims to degrade enemy morale. The ISW map updates on UA advances in Sumy Oblast serve to highlight UA successes.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Ukrainian Public: Resilience continues despite widespread attacks, but civilian casualties and infrastructure damage are taxing. Calls for more air defense and drones reflect public need for protection. Protests against NABU reform bill indicate internal political tensions. Internal criticism from Ukrainian military bloggers regarding welfare payments for soldiers’ families highlights a potential domestic pressure point for the UAF and government. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) The EU's perceived "punishment" over the NABU scandal (as framed by RBC-Ukraine) could impact public sentiment regarding European integration. The psychological impact of RF propaganda depicting internal UA military issues (e.g., soldier shooting commander) could be significant if not countered effectively.
• Russian Public: Indications of internal dissent and unease: low-quality dry rations, FSB detentions for "military assassinations," corruption arrests (e.g., Chelyabinsk officials, Khabarovsk Police reporting on general issues), mobilization issues (denied compensation, brutality), and general societal problems (gas explosion, factory issues, swimming event fatality). Flight restrictions and drone attacks on RF territory are increasing domestic awareness of the conflict's cost. Confirmed drone attacks on Volgograd, Smolensk, Voronezh, Kaluga, Nizhny Novgorod, and Pskov, including the railway substation, will likely increase public concern within RF and highlight the conflict's internal impact. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - based on indirect reporting).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Continued Support for Ukraine: New US aid package ($330M) and Germany's delivery of Patriot systems reinforce continued military support. Lithuania's pledge for Patriot procurement is a positive diplomatic and material development.
• EU Integration: EU decision on "roaming visa-free travel" is a symbolic step reinforcing Ukraine's European trajectory, though overshadowed by new reports of "punishment" over internal anti-corruption issues.
• NATO Posture: Estonia raising alarm about RF EW systems near NATO borders and Lithuania preparing for additional NATO troops indicates heightened vigilance and reinforced deterrence on NATO's eastern flank. Patrushev's statement regarding Kaliningrad is a direct warning to NATO.
• Broader Geopolitical Context: Unrelated conflicts (Cambodia-Thailand border, Red Sea seizures, Syria) could draw international attention and resources, potentially impacting the long-term focus on Ukraine. Israel-Palestine recognition issues also divert global diplomatic focus.
• Western Diplomatic Initiatives: Starmer's proposed meeting with Trump to discuss Ukraine conflict resolution indicates ongoing high-level diplomatic engagement from Western powers, potentially exploring different avenues for peace, which may or may not align with Ukraine's stated objectives. Trump's continued interest in "resolving" the conflict, as stated by Rubio, indicates a persistent desire for a political outcome. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF will concentrate and intensify offensive ground operations on the Chasiv Yar axis and Pokrovsk axis, supported by heavy artillery (with drone observation and thermal imaging targeting fortified positions), increased GAB employment via tactical aviation, and significant EW suppression to achieve breakthroughs and consolidate claimed territorial gains (e.g., Fedorivka). RF will also continue tactical drone strikes against UA vehicles and personnel on various axes, leveraging localized drone units, with an increased focus on targeting UA robotic platforms. Simultaneously, RF will maintain a high tempo of combined missile and UAV strikes, particularly Shahed-type drones from the Black Sea, and new waves from Bryansk Oblast, targeting Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, military command nodes, and logistics hubs across the country, with heightened focus on Odesa Oblast and other southern coastal regions, as well as Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Sumy Oblasts. Border regions, especially Sumy Oblast and Kharkiv Oblast, will experience continued probing actions and deep strikes to fix UAF forces and create a "security strip." UAF drone operations into RF territory, particularly targeting logistics and industrial sites, will likely escalate in response to the increased RF pressure on the front. RF will increase its information operations targeting internal Ukrainian cohesion and international support, possibly through fabricated narratives of Ukrainian "crimes" in border areas, showcasing RF successes against UA advanced equipment, and actively promoting narratives of internal discord within UA forces (e.g., soldier shooting commander) and displaying domestic military innovations (e.g., USVs). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF achieves a decisive breakthrough on the Chasiv Yar axis, exploiting successful EW degradation of UAF UAS capabilities and overwhelming UAF defenses through massed infantry and armored assaults, leading to significant UAF tactical withdrawals and potential collapse of a key defensive line. Concurrently, RF conducts a surge in naval activity in the Black Sea, employing advanced naval assets and potentially unconventional USVs/UUVs (including newly developed domestic models) against Ukrainian port infrastructure (Odesa, Mykolaiv) or Western maritime supply routes, aiming to establish naval dominance and isolate Ukraine from the Black Sea. This could be coupled with a coordinated, large-scale cyberattack against critical Ukrainian national infrastructure and further kinetic strikes against UA logistics in western Ukraine. The increasing threat to internal RF critical infrastructure could lead to RF escalating its retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian civilian centers. Furthermore, increased RF internal IO regarding alleged Ukrainian "crimes" and internal UA military discord could be a precursor to more aggressive RF actions in border regions, possibly including cross-border raids or limited incursions under the guise of "protecting" civilians or "restoring order." RF may also significantly escalate its efforts to neutralize UA robotic systems, degrading a key UA tactical advantage. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

• Immediate (0-24 hours): Continued intense RF missile and drone strikes targeting cities and infrastructure (Kharkiv, Dnipro, Sumy, and now southern Odesa, though recent attacks appear negated). RF tactical aviation activity will remain high. RF pressure on Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar will remain high, with RF likely preparing for a renewed major assault on Chasiv Yar, and attempting localized advances (e.g., Fedorivka). UAF will focus on immediate defensive actions and counter-battery fire, while conducting localized counter-offensives in areas like Sumy Oblast. Expect further UA drone strikes on RF territory, including potential targets in central RF, with a focus on transportation and energy infrastructure, as seen in Volgograd, Smolensk, Voronezh, Kaluga, Nizhny Novgorod, and Pskov. RF tactical drones will continue to actively hunt for and engage UA robotic platforms.
• Short-Term (24-72 hours): Expect a major RF ground assault on Chasiv Yar. UAF will be at a critical decision point regarding tactical withdrawals or committing reserves to hold ground. Continued RF efforts to consolidate defensive gains west of Avdiivka. Increased UAF long-range strikes against RF military targets and logistics in occupied territories and RF border regions. RF will likely maintain a high tempo of deep strikes, particularly against coastal regions and border areas like Sumy Oblast.
• Medium-Term (72 hours - 1 week): The outcome of the Chasiv Yar assault will significantly shape the immediate operational picture. If RF achieves substantial gains, UAF will face decisions on establishing new defensive lines and seeking additional Western aid. If UAF holds, RF may shift focus or pause to reconstitute. RF will likely continue to probe vulnerabilities in border regions and maintain pressure with deep strikes. The ongoing information campaign regarding NABU/SAP could impact the timing and nature of Western support packages. Diplomatic discussions (Starmer-Trump, Trump's ongoing interest) could begin to shape long-term international perspectives on the conflict.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• RF EW Capabilities and Tactics (Chasiv Yar): Specific models, frequencies, power output, and deployment patterns of new RF EW systems. Methods of UAF FPV drone "interception." (Collection Requirement: SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT from captured personnel).
• RF Force Generation/Morale: Granular data on the combat effectiveness and morale of RF units, particularly those recently deployed or redeployed, and the impact of internal RF issues (e.g., Chelyabinsk corruption arrests, internal unrest due to drone attacks) on military cohesion. Focus on the impact of the "Kiyanin" video narrative and the "soldier shooting commander" video on UAF troops and population, and the internal impact of increased UA drone strikes on RF territory. (Collection Requirement: HUMINT, OSINT from RF/UA social media).
• RF Strategic Air/Missile Munitions: Current inventory and production rates of key RF missile types (e.g., Kh-series, Iskander) and Shahed UAVs (domestic production vs. foreign supply) to project future strike capabilities. (Collection Requirement: OSINT from supply chain analysis, IMINT on production facilities).
• Black Sea Fleet Intentions: Detailed intelligence on the specific objectives and composition of "July Storm" naval exercises, the capabilities of the new domestic RF USVs, and the real threat of UUV/USV attacks on Novorossiysk/Anapa, and the impact of UAF anti-drone successes in Odesa. (Collection Requirement: COMINT, IMINT on naval movements, TECHINT on USV capabilities).
• Impact of Domestic Political Issues: Detailed assessment of the actual and perceived impact of the NABU/SAP controversy on Western aid and Ukrainian public support, and the most effective counter-IO strategies. (Collection Requirement: HUMINT from diplomatic channels, OSINT from Western and Ukrainian media).
• Chinese UAVs: Confirmation of RF acquisition/use of specific advanced Chinese UAV models (e.g., Caihong series) and their current deployment/intended roles in the conflict. (Collection Requirement: IMINT, TECHINT).
• RF Anti-Drone Capabilities: Specifics on RF capabilities to intercept UA drones, particularly the aerial engagement methods indicated by Colonelcassad's video, the systems used in Smolensk, Voronezh, Kaluga, Nizhny Novgorod, and Pskov, and their tactics/equipment for targeting UA robotic platforms. (Collection Requirement: TECHINT, IMINT).
• RF Border Incursion Intentions: Detailed assessment of RF intentions regarding cross-border operations from Kursk/Bryansk Oblasts into Sumy Oblast beyond current probing actions, given the increased RF IO about "Ukrainian crimes" in these areas. Specifically, what is the extent and nature of reported UA advances in Sumy Oblast. (Collection Requirement: HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT).
• RF Tactical Aviation Deployment: Current operational bases and sortie generation rates for RF tactical aviation supporting GAB launches and close air support. (Collection Requirement: IMINT, SIGINT).
• RF Artillery Precision Capabilities: Detailed assessment of the extent of RF artillery's ability to conduct precision strikes on fortified positions using aerial and thermal imaging, and whether this represents a widespread capability or isolated successes. (Collection Requirement: IMINT, TECHINT, BDA).

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Prioritize Counter-EW Operations (Chasiv Yar): Immediate allocation of dedicated SIGINT and Electronic Attack (EA) assets to the Chasiv Yar axis to identify, locate, and disrupt RF EW systems. Coordinate with international partners for rapid development/deployment of new UAF anti-EW capabilities.
2. Reinforce and Fortify (Chasiv Yar): Accelerate deployment of mobile anti-tank systems, anti-drone defenses (including man-portable systems for FPV threats), and pre-positioned ammunition stockpiles to bolster defensive lines in Chasiv Yar, anticipating the RF assault. Ensure defensive positions are hardened against observed RF artillery precision strikes.
3. Enhance Coastal and Border Air Defense: Immediately activate and reinforce air defense systems in Southern Odesa Oblast (Tatarbunary, and surrounding areas) to intercept incoming Shahed UAVs. Emphasize mobile AD units and C-UAS capabilities along the Sumy and Kharkiv border regions due to new drone threats from Bryansk/Luhansk Oblasts and continued tactical aviation activity, particularly against Shahed groups transiting Sumy Oblast.
4. Exploit RF Vulnerabilities (Vuhledar & Avdiivka):
   • Vuhledar: Conduct immediate battle damage assessment (BDA) on confirmed RF losses from the Vuhledar assault to fully understand their tactical failure. Launch targeted small-unit reconnaissance and precision strikes (e.g., FPV, mortar) against any exposed RF remnants or vulnerable positions.
   • Avdiivka: Increase targeted precision strikes (HIMARS, GMLRS, artillery) against identified RF fortification efforts and troop concentrations in Ocheretyne area during their operational pause, preventing consolidation.
5. Expand UAS Production & Innovation: Accelerate domestic production of interceptor drones and FPV drones, and invest in innovative counter-Lancet/loitering munition solutions. Ensure Starlink redundancy and explore alternative secure communication channels. Prioritize development of countermeasures and defensive tactics for UA robotic platforms against RF tactical drones.
6. Proactive Information Operations: Immediately leverage the Vuhledar success and RF internal issues (Tambov, Volgograd, Smolensk, Chelyabinsk strikes/corruption, airport restrictions in Nizhny Novgorod and Pskov) in information campaigns targeting RF forces and the Russian population to degrade morale and sow internal discord. Counter RF disinformation regarding mobilization, specifically addressing the "Kiyanin" narrative and the "soldier shooting commander" narrative, reinforcing government efforts to support soldiers' families and maintaining military cohesion. Develop clear and effective counter-narratives regarding the NABU/SAP controversy to maintain international and domestic confidence. Highlight the destruction of UA vehicles and robotic platforms by RF tactical drones as a cautionary tale for force protection, and pre-emptively expose any fabricated RF narratives about "Ukrainian crimes" in border regions. Amplify UAF successes, such as advances in Sumy Oblast, to boost domestic morale.
7. Monitor Black Sea Activity: Increase ISR over the Black Sea, particularly off the coast of Snake Island and towards Odesa Oblast, to detect and track incoming UAVs and identify any unusual RF naval movements, including testing/deployment of new domestic USVs, indicative of future operations.
8. Strategic Diplomatic Engagement: Proactively engage with international partners (e.g., UK, US) to understand and shape discussions on conflict resolution, ensuring Ukrainian interests are fully represented and supported in any future negotiations. Maintain direct lines of communication with US political figures, including those in the Trump orbit, to ensure a clear understanding of Ukraine's strategic objectives and red lines.
9. Track RF Tactical Aviation: Maintain high vigilance and deploy passive air defense sensors to track RF tactical aviation activity, particularly in areas prone to GAB launches, to provide early warning to ground units.