Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Ukraine General: Persistent missile and UAV threat across Ukraine.
  • Odesa Oblast: Confirmed destruction of a residential 9-story building and the Pryvoz market due to RF drone attacks. Multiple videos and photos show significant fires, structural damage, and ongoing emergency response efforts. Preliminary reports indicate civilian casualties (3 injured at Pryvoz, with total casualties from the residential building impact unknown but likely higher given the scale of damage). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for drone attack, HIGH for significant damage to market and residential building, HIGH for civilian casualties). RF sources (Colonelcassad) acknowledge "arrival" at Pryvoz market and "Operatsiya Z" (Russian Spring milbloggers) claim "massive strike on Odesa port: weapons and ammunition depots destroyed," which is unconfirmed but aligns with the targeting of port infrastructure. Sever.Realii also reports on the Odesa attacks. Zelenskiy / Official and Operatyvny ZSU messages confirm ongoing civilian targeting and damage in Odesa, with accompanying photo/video evidence. General Prosecutor's Office initiated investigation.
  • Dnipropetrovsk Oblast: Two UAVs confirmed shot down by UAF Air Command "East" (Pvk Skhid) over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Donetsk Oblast (Pokrovsk Axis): RF sources (TASS, Marochko) claim RF forces are advancing near Redkodub and fighting for three surrounding settlements: Karpovka, Glushchenkovo, and Novy Mir. Rybar's video message explicitly claims RF capture of Novotoretskoye and advancements towards Rodinskoye, and into forest belts east of Razino. STERNENKO (Ukrainian) notes "many requests from Pokrovsk for drones," indicating heavy fighting and significant UAF engagement. TASS also reports "fights began on the southern and southwestern outskirts of Krasnoarmeysk in DNR" (referring to Pokrovsk). MOD Russia claims Grad MLRS used to destroy an AFU stronghold in Krasnoarmeysk direction. STERNENKO reports MURAMASA (UAF unit) "fried two more motorcyclists" on Kostiantynivka axis, indicating continued UAF success against RF ground probes. Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reports RF launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (GABs) onto Donetsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM for claims of control, HIGH for RF intent to advance and actual ground movement based on Rybar, HIGH for intensified fighting on Pokrovsk axis based on Ukrainian internal requests and RF claims, HIGH for UAF successful engagements against RF personnel, HIGH for GAB use).
  • Cherkasy Oblast: Seven individuals, including a child, injured from RF missile attack, reportedly with shrapnel. OPERATYVNY ZSU (Ukrainian) reports damage to a cemetery in Cherkasy. Sever.Realii confirms 10 casualties in Odesa and Cherkasy combined, including a child. Zelenskiy / Official and Operatyvny ZSU messages confirm continued RF strikes on multi-story buildings in Cherkasy, with accompanying photo/video evidence. General Prosecutor's Office initiated investigation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kharkiv Oblast: RF sources (Poddubny) claim "North" group continued creating a "security strip" in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts on July 23rd, reporting significant UAF losses (80 personnel, 8 units of technology in Sumy direction; 30 personnel, 3 units of technology in Kharkiv direction including BBM 'Kozak', 'Pikaly', and 5x drone launch platforms). First operational use of a FAB-3000 M-54 UMPK against a Ukrainian strongpoint in Lyptsi. While a near miss (10-15m), it caused catastrophic damage to the target structure and adjacent buildings. Positional fighting continues in Vovchansk with no significant changes to the FLOT. Kharkiv Oblast Administration (Oleg Sinegubov) reports 9 settlements struck in Kharkiv Oblast. TASS (Marochko) claims RF forces "infiltrated UAF defenses near Melovoe, Kharkiv Oblast, crossed the Verkhnya Dvurechnaya river, and secured its western bank." Zelenskiy / Official and Oleg Sinegubov messages confirm continued RF strikes on Kharkiv Oblast, specifically energy infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for FAB-3000 use and impact, LOW for verification of claimed losses or territorial gains without UAF confirmation, HIGH for RF claims and widespread strikes, MEDIUM for Melovoe claim until UAF confirmation).
  • Zaporizhzhia Oblast: 43-year-old woman injured in Vassilyvskyi district due to hostile attack. Air raid alert lifted in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. RF Milbloggers (Voin DV) claim 35th Army artillery and drone operators continue to destroy enemy targets in "temporarily occupied" Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Operation Z claims RF forces "liberated Kamyanske" and are "storming Plavni, advancing further on the Zaporizhzhia front." Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration message confirms continued RF strikes on a university sports hall in Zaporizhzhia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for civilian injury, HIGH for RF targeting/reconnaissance, MEDIUM for claimed territorial gains without UAF confirmation).
  • Kryvyi Rih: Situation assessed as controlled as of morning 240725Z. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Mykolaiv Oblast: RBK-Ukraina reports "Russians attacked Mykolaiv with drones overnight." Multiple photo messages show significant fires and emergency response, indicating severe impact. Dnevnik Desantnika claims RF forces "destroyed a Bayraktar UAV production facility at the Equator factory in Mykolaiv." Zelenskiy / Official message confirms continued RF strikes on Mykolaiv Oblast. Operatyvny ZSU and Mykolaivskiy Vanok report SBU prevented a dual terrorist act near the regional TCC in Mykolaiv, apprehending FSB agents. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for drone attacks and impact, LOW for claimed target destruction without further verification, HIGH for SBU operation).
  • Sumy Oblast: Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reports an enemy UAV (Shahed, given "scooter" nickname) operating near Bilopillia, course southeast. Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine also reports RF launches of GABs onto Sumy Oblast. Dva Mayora (RF source) posts video of a strike near Kondratovka, Sumy direction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for UAV activity, HIGH for GAB use, HIGH for strike).
• Russia:
  • Krasnodar Krai (Sochi): Multiple videos from Ukrainian sources (Tsaplienko, Shef Hayabusa, ASTRA) show large explosions and fires, particularly in the vicinity of a "Lukoil-Yugnefteprodukt Sochinskaya oil depot" (Sochi oil depot). RF MoD (ASTRA, Dnevnik Desantnika) claims 39 Ukrainian UAVs were shot down over the Black and Azov Seas and Krasnodar Krai. Tsaplienko asks "Why are they bombing Sochi?" implying Ukrainian involvement. STERNENKO reposts videos of explosions in Adler (Sochi) with commentary "Why are they bombing Russia!" Civilian reports indicate flights to Sochi are disrupted. TASS reports 28 flights delayed/cancelled at Sochi airport due to flight restrictions. TASS and ASTRA confirm casualties in Krasnodar Krai from UAV attacks: "Two people died, 11 injured" according to Krasnodar Governor (Veniamin Kondratyev). Sever.Realii also reports a woman killed, increasing total to two fatalities. CyberBoroshno claims modified An-196 "Lyutyi" drones hit Sochi airport oil depot in Adler. Voenkor Kotenok directly links the attack to the conclusion of Istanbul negotiations. Operatsiya Z (RF source) confirms 2 killed, 11 injured in Krasnodar Krai from night strikes. Dnevnik Desantnika (RF source) shares video that appears to show damage/fires in Sochi, captioned "Now look at how not to do it" likely referring to UAF strikes. TASS provides further details on the night attack. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for drone attacks and widespread impact, HIGH for casualties, HIGH for flight disruptions, HIGH for RF reporting linking to Istanbul negotiations, HIGH for RF milblogger confirmation of casualties/damage).
  • Kursk Oblast: Russian official Khinshtein signed a resolution on payments of 195,000 rubles to residents of Kursk Oblast forced to leave homes due to property damage from Ukrainian attacks. «Зона СВО» published a video of Akhmat special forces visiting communication nodes in border villages of Kursk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Luhansk (Kremennaya): TASS (Marochko) reports a "firefight" by UAF in Kremennaya. This is likely an RF information operation or an isolated UAF raid. (CONFIDENCE: LOW for UAF aggressive action, HIGH for RF reporting).
  • Amur Oblast: A civilian An-24 passenger plane with 43 passengers (including 5 children) and 6 crew members went missing. Search and rescue operations are underway. Criminal case opened. TASS reports the plane went missing on approach to Tynda airport. Produced almost 50 years ago, airworthiness certificate extended to 2036. Search square defined. Two helicopters with medics prepared. TASS reports the crash site found 16km from Tynda, fuselage burning, and preliminary reports indicate no survivors. ASTRA confirms no survivors. Operatyvny ZSU, RBK-Ukraina, ASTRA confirm no survivors, burning fuselage, wreckage scattered over 0.5km. TASS reports technical malfunction and human factor as versions, investigation ongoing at Tynda airport and Angara airline. TASS later states the An-24 was technically sound before flight. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Internal RF Issues: RF Investigation Committee reports completion of an investigation into the supply of low-quality dry rations to RF Armed Forces. ASTRA reports on a criminal case against Baza editor-in-chief, citing a post. Khabarovsk Police warn about phone scams. These reflect internal challenges and a focus on domestic control/narrative. The State Duma proposed banning migrants from participating in underground fight clubs. Former Tambov Oblast Governor Maxim Egorov detained for large-scale bribery, and will be transported to Moscow. TASS reports FSB detained 9 Russians in 8 regions for calling for military assassinations. TASS and Mash on Donbas report a police officer detained in Kherson Oblast for transmitting RF troop data to Ukrainian special services. TASS provides video footage of detention of individuals suspected of calling for military assassinations. Novosti Moskvy reports "Drunk Driver" raid in Moscow 25-27 July. Sever.Realii reports activist Oleg Savvin from Kaliningrad declared insane and placed in a psychiatric hospital. Dva Mayora (RF source) supports proposal to ban purchase of military uniform from abroad, citing "possible surprises." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Cambodia-Thailand Border: Operation Z (Voenkory Russkoy Vesny) reports "fierce clashes" on the Cambodia-Thailand border. TASS and RST comment that this does not impact Russian tourists. TASS provides video footage showing aftermath of MLRS strikes in Surin province, Thailand, by Cambodian forces. Dnevnik Desantnika reports Thailand responded with an airstrike. TASS reports Russian Ambassador recommends tourists avoid border areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for clashes, HIGH for RF reporting and downplaying impact, HIGH for confirmed Thai/Cambodian military actions and Russian diplomatic response).
• Syria: Rybar notes a "request from Damascus," implying a continued RF presence and interest in the region, likely relating to their broader geopolitical objectives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• RF (Khabarovsk): Severe storm and heavy rain on 22 July. No direct military impact. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF (Amur Oblast): Taiga complicates search efforts for the missing An-24, with primary efforts from the air. This suggests challenging terrain for ground movement. Crash site found on a mountain slope, confirming complex terrain. Rescuers expect to reach crash site by sunset. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• No other new significant weather or environmental factors reported directly impacting operations within the past hour. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF: Air defense (AD) remains on high alert nationwide, actively engaging and responding to missile and UAV threats (2 UAVs shot down over Dnipropetrovsk). Emergency services are actively responding to significant civilian infrastructure damage and casualties in Odesa, Cherkasy, Zaporizhzhia, and Mykolaiv. UAF General Staff provides updated RF loss figures and situational reports (08:00 24.07.2025), noting 172 combat engagements over the past day. The 199th Air Assault Forces (DSHV) training center is actively conducting operations/training, as per their official channel. Kyiv Oblast activated a differentiated air raid alert system. Ukrainian units (e.g., "Rubizh" NGU brigade, 46th Airmobile Brigade) are fundraising for equipment. Ukrainian forces (MURAMASA) continue successful drone strikes against RF personnel (motorcyclists on Kostiantynivka axis). Coordination Staff for POWs confirmed a successful prisoner exchange, indicating ongoing efforts for personnel return. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine posts video of successful drone strikes on enemy personnel and equipment at Veseloe, Soledar, Kotlyarovka, and Miroshnichek. Operatyvny ZSU and Mykolaivskiy Vanok report SBU operation preventing dual terrorist attack in Mykolaiv, apprehending FSB agents. Zelenskiy / Official reports Russia launched 103 attack drones (mostly Shaheds) and 4 missiles overnight. Desantno-Shturmovi Viyska of the Armed Forces of Ukraine confirm return of paratroopers from captivity as part of Istanbul agreements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RFU: Continues deep strike operations targeting Ukrainian territory with UAVs (Odesa, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Sumy) and missiles (Cherkasy, Kharkiv FAB-3000, Donetsk GABs, Sumy GABs). RF is aggressively promoting claimed battlefield successes in Kharkiv/Sumy and Donetsk oblasts, with specific claims of advances on the Pokrovsk axis and "Operation Z" claiming destruction of weapon depots in Odesa. MOD Russia claims Grad MLRS use near Krasnoarmeysk. RF AD actively engaged in defending its territory against Ukrainian UAV attacks (Krasnodar Krai, Crimea), claiming 39 UAVs downed. RF is conducting prisoner exchanges and launching information operations, while addressing internal issues like military supply fraud. RF milbloggers like Colonelcassad continue to highlight combat medic roles, likely for morale. RF claims to have shot down a Ukrainian hexacopter FPV-drone with a Kalashnikov-equipped FPV-drone (TASS video). RF repair battalions (rembat) are shown creating "forward-edge transporters" (modified UAZ vehicles), highlighting adaptation and logistical support efforts. TASS claims RF drones destroy UAF UAV control points near Seversk and Konstantinovka. Colonelcassad reports 39 Ukrainian UAVs destroyed/intercepted over the Black and Azov Seas and Krasnodar Krai. Dva Mayora (RF milblogger) continues to solicit funds for drones, but also shows drone strike in Sumy region. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for general actions, MEDIUM for specific RF claimed successes until UAF confirmation, HIGH for FAB-3000 use, MEDIUM for RF FPV drone claim, HIGH for RF rembat activity, HIGH for AD engagements and claimed numbers).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:
  • Enhanced Deep Strike Capacity (UAV/Missile/GAB): RF continues to demonstrate widespread and damaging UAV (Shahed, with 103 launched last night) and missile attacks against Ukrainian urban centers (Mykolaiv confirmed hit, Odesa, Cherkasy). The confirmed operational use of the FAB-3000 M-54 UMPK in Kharkiv signifies a substantial increase in destructive power and standoff strike capability, representing a new level of threat to fortified positions and C2 nodes. This confirms a high volume of these munitions are available for conversion and deployment. The use of shrapnel munitions in Cherkasy indicates a diverse arsenal to maximize casualty effect. RF tactical aviation is also confirmed to be launching GABs on Donetsk and Sumy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Escalated Offensive Operations (Pokrovsk/Zaporizhzhia Axes): RF forces have transitioned from dismounted infantry actions to larger, coordinated company-sized mechanized assaults (elements of 76th VDV Division) on the Pokrovsk axis. This demonstrates improved combined arms coordination and intent for more substantial territorial gains, reinforced by RF claims of advances on Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk). Claimed crossing of Verkhnya Dvurechnaya river in Kharkiv Oblast indicates continued localized offensive capabilities. Operation Z claims advances in Zaporizhzhia, highlighting a potential renewed push in the south. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Persistent Offensive Pressure (Kharkiv/Sumy): RF forces claim continued creation of a "security strip" and report significant UAF losses, indicating sustained offensive pressure. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM, based on RF claims)
  • Intensified ISR/EW (Southern Axis): A significant surge in RF Orlan-10/30 and ZALA UAV sorties, coupled with intensified ELINT collection, indicates intelligence preparation of the battlespace, likely preceding a future offensive operation or deep strike campaign. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Adaptive Homeland Defense: RF claims success in downing 39 UAVs over southern Russia and the seas, demonstrating significant AD capability, even as Ukrainian sources show evidence of impacts (Sochi oil depot). However, passenger flight disruptions in Sochi indicate that AD engagements are impacting civilian operations. RF claims to have downed a UAF hexacopter using an FPV-drone with an attached Kalashnikov, showcasing an innovative, if unverified, counter-UAV tactic. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for general AD, MEDIUM for specific FPV drone claim).
  • Information Warfare & Domestic Control: RF leverages state media (TASS, milbloggers, Rybar, WarGonzo) to disseminate narratives of military success and internal stability (prisoner exchange, fighting internal crime/fraud, investigating military supply fraud, managing civilian impact from drone attacks, showing rembat activities). They also utilize compensation payments for affected civilians to manage public sentiment in border regions and counter Ukrainian drone attacks. Detention of former Tambov Governor for bribery and arrests by FSB for "assassination calls" may be presented as anti-corruption/anti-extremism efforts for domestic consumption. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intentions:
  • Degrade Ukrainian Combat Potential and Civilian Morale: Maintain high-tempo missile/UAV/GAB attacks to exhaust AD, disrupt logistics, and inflict casualties, particularly targeting central and eastern Ukrainian regions, now including Mykolaiv. The confirmed targeting of civilian infrastructure (Odesa market, residential building, Cherkasy cemetery/civilian area with shrapnel, Zaporizhzhia university sports hall) and the use of FAB-3000 against strongpoints directly supports this intent to degrade defenses and resilience. Civilian casualties in Krasnodar from UAF strikes will likely be used to justify further retaliation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Achieve Tactical Breakthroughs on Key Axes: Intensify ground operations on the Pokrovsk axis using mechanized units to achieve significant breakthroughs, potentially targeting the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka supply route and advancing on Krasnoarmeysk. Continue offensive actions in Kharkiv/Sumy to push back Ukrainian forces and establish claimed "security strips." The claimed crossing of a river in Kharkiv indicates a continued intent for localized tactical gains. RF will likely attempt to capitalize on claimed gains in Zaporizhzhia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Pre-position for Future Offensives: Utilize intensified ISR and ELINT on the Southern Axis to identify targets and prepare for future offensive operations or deep strike campaigns. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Protect Domestic Infrastructure: Prioritize AD and counter-UAS measures to defend against Ukrainian long-range UAV attacks on its territory, particularly critical energy infrastructure (Sochi oil depot), even at the cost of civilian air travel disruption and casualties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Manage Domestic Narrative: Continue to project an image of successful military operations and governmental care for its citizens (e.g., payments for displaced persons, prisoner exchanges, addressing corruption in military supplies, showing rembat ingenuity, reporting on the An-24 crash), while downplaying the impact of Ukrainian strikes on RF territory and maintaining control over media narratives (Baza editor case, censorship, propaganda on "rearmament" of UAF). The high casualty count in Krasnodar Krai from Ukrainian UAVs will necessitate increased messaging on the "costs" of the conflict and justification for retaliation. The An-24 crash investigation being framed as "technical malfunction and human factor" initially, then "technically sound," indicates an intent to deflect from systemic issues, possibly related to maintenance or aging fleet. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Confirmed FAB-3000 Deployment: The operational use of the FAB-3000 M-54 in Kharkiv represents a significant escalation in RF tactical aviation capabilities, providing a powerful tool for destroying hardened targets at standoff ranges. Its use is now confirmed on Donetsk and Sumy axes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Shift to Mechanized Assaults on Pokrovsk Axis: The transition from dismounted infantry to company-sized mechanized assaults, notably involving the 76th VDV Division, indicates a move towards higher-tempo, more decisive ground operations. This suggests a re-evaluation of tactics or an increased confidence in coordinating combined arms. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intensified ISR/ELINT Ahead of Operations: The surge in UAV and ELINT activity on the Southern Axis is a clear adaptation, indicating systematic intelligence preparation of the battlespace. This points to a more structured and deliberate approach to future operations in that sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Confirmed Civilian Infrastructure Targeting in Odesa & Cherkasy (Shrapnel) & Mykolaiv & Zaporizhzhia (University Sports Hall): Direct hits on Pryvoz market and a residential 9-story building in Odesa, and a cemetery in Cherkasy with shrapnel munitions, Mykolaiv, and the Zaporizhzhia university sports hall, confirm RF's continued willingness to target civilian areas with drones/missiles, potentially aiming for psychological effect and to degrade civilian resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Sustained Drone Attacks on Critical Infrastructure within RF: Multiple video confirmations of impacts and fires at the Sochi oil depot despite RF AD claims suggest a persistent Ukrainian capability to bypass or overwhelm RF defenses in certain areas, leading to civilian air travel disruptions and significant casualties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Differentiated Air Raid System (Kyiv Oblast): Ukrainian adaptation to persistent threats, allowing for more localized alerts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Emerging RF Counter-UAV Tactics: The reported downing of a UAF hexacopter by an FPV-drone armed with a Kalashnikov, if verified, indicates an innovative and potentially dangerous adaptation in RF counter-UAV tactics. (CONFIDENCE: LOW for widespread impact, MEDIUM for its experimental nature).
• RF Field Repair and Modification: TASS video showing "rembat" (repair battalion) modifying UAZ vehicles into "forward-edge transporters" indicates adaptation at the tactical logistics level to support frontline operations and improve mobility on difficult terrain. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Escalation of Cross-Border Attacks in Southeast Asia (RF narrative): RF reporting of MLRS strikes by Cambodian forces on Thailand, and Thai counter-airstrikes, indicates a potential intent to frame the global security environment as unstable and divert attention from Ukraine, or justify their own actions through "global chaos." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for RF narrative, HIGH for reported escalation).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• Munitions Access (GABs): The confirmed use of the FAB-3000 suggests a sustained, or possibly increasing, capacity for RF to produce and/or convert large-caliber bombs with UMPK kits, posing a significant challenge to UAF. Their employment across multiple axes (Kharkiv, Donetsk, Sumy) indicates sufficient supply for current operations. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Munitions Access (UAV/Missile): Persistent and widespread missile and UAV strikes (103 drones last night) confirm continued access to these munitions for deep strike operations. Reports of Chinese engines for drones being smuggled into Russia as "industrial refrigeration units" suggests RF is actively seeking to circumvent sanctions for drone component acquisition. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM for munition stocks, HIGH for sanction circumvention efforts).
• Homefront Stability Efforts: Payments to displaced Kursk residents and reports on combating internal fraud and military supply corruption (e.g., investigation into dry rations, detention of former Tambov Governor for bribery) suggest RF is investing resources in maintaining domestic stability and citizen loyalty, indicating an awareness of the indirect impact of conflict on the populace. The demonstration of rembat activity aims to project an image of robust military logistics. Continued internal security operations (FSB arrests for "assassination calls," "Drunk Driver" raids) reflect resource allocation to internal control. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Unit-Level Sustainment: Continued appeals for drones by RF milbloggers (Kotsnews and Dnevnik Desantnika - "Lagging behind on drones and intrigues against Hegset") underscore potential localized equipment shortages, particularly for specialized ISR assets. The investigation into dry ration supply issues indicates awareness of logistical deficiencies at higher levels. "Dnevnik Desantnika" also explicitly requests Starlink. Dva Mayora's support for banning foreign military uniform procurement indicates recognition of reliance on foreign supply. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• Responsive Air Operations: The continued and precise nature of UAV and missile targeting against multiple Ukrainian oblasts, and the apparent successful deployment of the FAB-3000, indicates centralized and responsive C2 for RF aerial operations. Claims of RF drones destroying UAF UAV control points near Seversk and Konstantinovka (TASS) suggest active counter-C2 efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ground Operations C2 (Pokrovsk): The observed shift to coordinated company-sized mechanized assaults on the Pokrovsk axis demonstrates improved tactical C2 and coordination between different combat arms elements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• ISR/ELINT Coordination: The surge in ISR and ELINT activity on the Southern Axis, coupled with an operational pause on the ground, suggests effective C2 in preparing for future operations through intelligence gathering. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Domestic Security C2: The reported repulsion of drone attacks on Krasnodar Krai and Crimea demonstrates effective local C2 and AD coordination within RF territory, despite acknowledged challenges in specific areas. The response to internal issues like fraud, military corruption, and the An-24 crash highlights a functional, albeit challenged, civilian C2 structure. The FSB detention of a police officer in Kherson suspected of intelligence transmission to Ukraine suggests RF is actively monitoring and attempting to secure its C2 and information flow within occupied territories. The SBU's operation in Mykolaiv, apprehending FSB agents planning terror attacks, highlights RF's continued use of covert networks for hybrid warfare and Ukraine's effective counter-intelligence capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Air Defense (AD) Posture: Remains highly vigilant and engaged nationwide. Successful interception of 2 UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast demonstrates continued AD effectiveness. The activation of differentiated air raid alerts in Kyiv Oblast indicates adaptive measures. However, the scale of damage in Odesa, Cherkasy, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhzhia, and the successful impact of a FAB-3000 near Lyptsi, indicates AD saturation or gaps against persistent and evolving RF strike capabilities (103 drones, 4 missiles launched overnight). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ground Forces Posture (Pokrovsk): UAF forces on the Pokrovsk axis are facing increasingly coordinated mechanized assaults. The high volume of requests for drones from Pokrovsk indicates intense engagement and the critical need for ISR/strike assets. While successfully repelling recent attacks and destroying RF armor, this shift necessitates a heightened defensive posture and readiness to counter combined arms breaches. UAF General Staff reports 172 combat engagements over the last 24 hours, indicating high intensity across the front. UAF drone units (e.g., MURAMASA, and footage from General Staff) remain effective in targeting RF ground personnel and equipment across multiple locations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Civilian Response: Civilian populations continue to respond to alerts. Emergency services are actively engaged in rescue, firefighting, and humanitarian assistance in heavily impacted areas (Odesa, Cherkasy, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv). General Prosecutor's Office has initiated investigations into drone/missile attacks, demonstrating commitment to accountability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Training & Readiness: The 199th Air Assault Forces (DSHV) training center activity indicates continued training and readiness efforts despite ongoing combat operations. The 46th Airmobile Brigade's photo post "Your determination opens the way" is a morale and readiness message. Return of paratroopers from captivity will boost morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Resource Management: Ukrainian units (e.g., "Rubizh" NGU brigade) are actively fundraising to restore equipment, indicating ongoing resource challenges at the unit level despite external aid. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Counter-Intelligence Posture: The SBU's successful operation in Mykolaiv, apprehending FSB agents planning terror attacks, demonstrates robust counter-intelligence capabilities and vigilance against hybrid threats. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes:
  • AD Engagements: Two UAVs successfully intercepted over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Prisoner Exchange: Return of Ukrainian military personnel from captivity, including paratroopers, a significant morale boost. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Situational Control: Kryvyi Rih remains controlled. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Repulsion of Mechanized Assaults: UAF forces on the Pokrovsk axis successfully repelled at least two company-sized mechanized assaults, destroying 3x T-80 tanks and 5x BMP/BMD IFVs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Effective Counter-Offensive Operations (Sochi): Continued Ukrainian long-range UAV attacks on critical RF infrastructure (Sochi oil depot) demonstrate offensive reach and capability to inflict economic and psychological damage on RF territory. This has also led to civilian flight disruptions in Sochi and significant civilian casualties (2 KIA, 11 WIA), directly impacting RF domestic stability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Drone Strikes against RF targets: RBK-Ukraine reports successful drone strikes by UAF's System of Unmanned Systems, destroying an "Msta-B" howitzer and enemy communication equipment, highlighting effective UAF ISR-strike capabilities. STERNENKO reports successful drone strikes against RF personnel (motorcyclists). General Staff footage confirms successful drone strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • SBU Counter-Terrorism Operation: Successful prevention of a dual terrorist act near the Mykolaiv TCC and apprehension of FSB agents demonstrates effective counter-intelligence and disruption of hybrid operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Setbacks:
  • Civilian Casualties and Infrastructure Damage: Significant civilian casualties (7 in Cherkasy, 3+ in Odesa, unspecified in Mykolaiv, Zaporizhzhia) and extensive damage to civilian infrastructure (Odesa residential building and market, Cherkasy cemetery, Mykolaiv urban area, Zaporizhzhia university sports hall) highlight the persistent vulnerability to RF strikes and the limits of current AD coverage, despite interceptions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • FAB-3000 Impact: The deployment and impact of the FAB-3000 near Lyptsi demonstrates a new, highly destructive threat to UAF strongpoints and hardened positions, even with near misses. This poses a significant challenge to existing defensive infrastructure. Confirmed GAB use on Donetsk and Sumy indicates a widespread threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Persistent UAV Threat: Confirmed mass drone attack on Odesa, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, and Sumy (103 drones last night), coupled with a general threat across Ukraine, indicates the enduring and widespread nature of this threat, requiring sustained AD effort. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Frontline Pressure (Pokrovsk): RF's shift to larger mechanized assaults indicates increased pressure on UAF defensive lines, requiring significant resources and tactical adaptation to hold ground. High volume of requests for drones from Pokrovsk indicate significant combat intensity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Claimed RF River Crossing (Kharkiv): The RF claim of crossing the Verkhnya Dvurechnaya river at Melovoe, if confirmed, represents a minor tactical setback. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Critical Needs (Air Defense): Continued and expedited supply of air defense systems and interceptor missiles (especially against Shaheds and high-altitude GAB platforms) remains paramount to counter persistent RF missile, UAV, and GAB threats, particularly for urban areas and frontline strongpoints that are proving vulnerable. Germany potentially transferring two Patriot systems is a positive development, but needs to be fast-tracked. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Counter-GAB Defenses: Urgent requirement for effective countermeasures against large guided bombs (FAB-1500/3000), including enhanced electronic warfare (EW) capabilities to disrupt UMPK guidance, or deeper strike capabilities against launch platforms and airfields. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Anti-Armor Assets (Pokrovsk Priority): Allocation of additional anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) systems, FPV drones, and rapid deployment of scatterable mines is critical to counter the escalating mechanized threat on the Pokrovsk axis, as evidenced by high demand for drones from this sector. Unit fundraising for equipment reinforces this need. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Civilian Protection: Increased frequency and severity of civilian infrastructure damage (Odesa, Cherkasy, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhzhia) necessitate enhanced support for local emergency services with equipment, training, and personnel, including search and rescue capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Counter-Offensive Capability: Maintaining current UAF force posture on all axes while resisting RF advances and preparing for potential future offensive operations will require sustained Western military aid, especially precision munitions and armored vehicles. Trump's reported agreement with EU for EU to pay for US-produced weaponry for Europe/Ukraine is a significant positive development, but implementation timeline is key. The issue of "Ukrzaliznytsia" tickets being hard to buy could indicate strain on civilian transportation infrastructure, possibly due to military movements or increased demand for evacuation/relocation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Propaganda (Domestic): TASS continues to promote RF military successes (e.g., claimed territorial gains in Donetsk, "security strip" creation in Kharkiv/Sumy, successful AD interceptions, reconstruction efforts at Crocus City Hall, claims of "mass strike" on Odesa port destroying weapon depots, claimed destruction of Bayraktar facility in Mykolaiv, 39 UAVs downed). The repatriation of RF soldiers is used to bolster morale and demonstrate state care. Internal reporting on fraud and social issues (e.g., declining alcoholism rates in Russia, Khabarovsk storm response, investigation into military dry rations, banning migrants from fight clubs, detention of former Tambov Governor, FSB arrests of "assassination" callers, "Drunk Driver" raids) aims to project an image of a functioning, law-abiding state. Rybar and WarGonzo actively promote RF territorial gains on the Pokrovsk axis and present a "frontline summary." Milblogger Kotenok echoes concerns about future negotiations allowing Ukraine to rearm. TASS reports RF forces shot down a UAF hexacopter using an FPV-drone with a Kalashnikov, showcasing ingenuity. RF reports casualties (2 KIA, 11 WIA) in Krasnodar from UAF drone attacks, likely to fuel victim narrative and justify retaliation. The An-24 crash investigation focuses on pilot error initially, then technical soundness, deflecting blame from systemic issues. Dva Mayora supports ban on foreign military uniform, hinting at supply issues. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Propaganda (External/Hybrid): RF milbloggers like Poddubny disseminate unverified battlefield claims and UAF loss figures. TASS disseminates negative reports about Ukrainian leadership, citing Politico as a source, to sow discord and undermine international support for Ukraine (e.g., "Operatsiya Z" criticizing Zelenskyy over NABU powers citing Senator Graham). The claim of UAF "firefight" in Kremennaya is likely an attempt to portray UAF as aggressive in RF-controlled territory. "Voenkor Kotenok" states it's "hard to believe" Ukrainian statements, sowing distrust. "Operation Z" reports "fierce clashes" on Cambodia-Thailand border, likely to distract from Ukraine or highlight global instability. The video of an interrogated police officer in Kherson is used to portray Ukraine's intelligence efforts as subversive and to showcase RF counter-intelligence success. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian Information: Ukrainian authorities (DSNS, Military Administrations, Operativny ZSU, Tsaplienko, RBK-Ukraina, General Staff, Oleg Sinegubov, Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration, Office of the General Prosecutor, Zelenskiy/Official) are promptly reporting civilian casualties and infrastructure damage from RF attacks, emphasizing Russian aggression and the need for international support (Mykolaiv attacks highlighted, Odesa, Cherkasy, Zaporizhzhia). UAF General Staff publishes daily RF loss statistics and combat engagement maps (172 engagements in past day) and highlights successful POW exchanges (confirmed by General Staff and DSHV). Ukrainian channels are highlighting the impact of attacks on Russian territory (Sochi oil depot, civilian flight disruptions, casualties in Krasnodar Krai), using internal RF commentary ("Why are they bombing Sochi!") to amplify the message. STERNENKO's call for drone donations for Pokrovsk provides real-time insight into frontline needs and reinforces Ukrainian resilience. The return of Ukrainian POWs is a significant morale boost. Daily minutes of silence are observed for fallen defenders. News of EU funding US weapons for Ukraine will likely boost morale. Operatyvny ZSU also highlights corruption concerns in Ukraine related to Western aid, attempting to address the narrative. RBK-Ukraine highlights success of UAF drone systems. SBU's prevention of terror attacks in Mykolaiv highlights effective counter-intelligence. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Internal Dissension (Previous Report): The personal testimony from RF POW Khaziev E.V. (143rd Mech. Brig.) expressing weariness, unlimited service terms, and being sent to "meat grinder" situations, could be used by Ukraine for counter-propaganda purposes to target RF morale. The public investigation into dry rations and arrest of a former governor may inadvertently highlight logistics/governance issues. Reports of RF authorities using "informers" in prisons to obtain confessions about "war conversations" reflect internal repression and potential for dissent. Kotsnews' mention of "intrigues against Hegset" (likely a reference to an internal RF drone/military production issue or figure) further highlights internal challenges. Sever.Realii reporting activist declared insane and detained reflects internal crackdown on dissent. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Ukraine: Public remains under severe stress due to persistent air raid alerts and devastating missile/UAV/GAB threats, as evidenced by mass casualties and destruction in Odesa, Cherkasy, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhzhia, and the new threat of FAB-3000. This will likely increase calls for more robust air defense capabilities and international support. However, resilience remains high, as evidenced by continued emergency response, morale messaging from UAF, and the success of prisoner exchanges. The differentiated air raid alert system in Kyiv Oblast may reduce panic but also signifies a persistent threat. Daily minutes of silence unify public mourning. News of EU funding US weapons for Ukraine will likely boost morale. Addressing corruption concerns (Operatyvny ZSU post) aims to maintain public trust regarding international aid. The SBU operation in Mykolaiv may alleviate some public fear about internal threats. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russia: Public in affected areas (Krasnodar Krai, Kursk Oblast) experiences alarm due to drone attacks, leading to state-sponsored compensation programs to mitigate negative sentiment. The return of RF military personnel from captivity will be a morale boost domestically. Official messaging attempts to project stability and success, including addressing internal corruption in military supply. Civilian flight disruptions in Sochi due to drone attacks will likely increase public frustration. The missing An-24 with 49 people aboard, and the preliminary report of no survivors, will generate significant domestic concern and mourning, despite initial attempts to attribute blame to "technical malfunction and human factor" and later claiming the plane was "technically sound." The confirmed civilian casualties (2 KIA, 11 WIA) in Krasnodar from Ukrainian UAV attacks will likely increase public anger and calls for retribution, but also potentially fear. The arrest of a former governor highlights corruption, which can be a double-edged sword for public trust, while the FSB arrests for "assassination calls" aim to demonstrate state control over dissent. The forced psychiatric treatment of an activist in Kaliningrad highlights the repressive nature of the regime and its impact on public dissent. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Military Personnel: The previous report of public appeals for drones and Starlink by RF units (Dnevnik Desantnika) and the testimony from RF POW Khaziev continue to suggest potential for localized low morale and disillusionment among RF military personnel, particularly concerning logistical support and access to modern equipment, and the indefinite nature of their service. The dry rations investigation may further impact morale. The emphasis on combat medics like "Rusich" and rembat innovation might be an attempt to bolster unit cohesion and professionalism. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• China-EU Relations (RF narrative): TASS reports on Xi Jinping's call for "foresight and correct strategic decisions" between China and EU leaders amidst global changes, likely framing RF as a stabilizing force or promoting a multi-polar world order. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for RF narrative).
• US-Ukraine Relations (RF narrative): "Operatsiya Z" milbloggers are amplifying criticism of Zelenskyy by US Senator Graham regarding NABU powers, likely aiming to sow discord between Ukraine and its Western partners. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for RF narrative).
• US-EU-Ukraine Weapons Funding: Operatyvny ZSU reports Donald Trump stating an agreement has been reached where the EU will fully pay for US-produced weaponry and equipment supplied to Europe for further distribution, including to Ukraine. This indicates significant high-level political commitment to sustained military aid to Ukraine, despite internal US political dynamics. Tsaplienko reports Trump wants to personally decide on sanctions against Russia. Germany potentially transferring two Patriot systems but contingent on US replacement is a noteworthy development. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Istanbul Negotiations: Zelenskiy/Official confirms that during the Istanbul meeting, Russia was again offered an immediate and complete ceasefire, which was met with subsequent drone and missile strikes. This confirms the low probability of a negotiated peace in the immediate term. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Southeast Asian Border Conflict: TASS and Dnevnik Desantnika reports on the escalation of clashes between Cambodia and Thailand, including MLRS strikes and retaliatory airstrikes, and the Russian ambassador advising tourists to avoid the border area. This is a significant development in global affairs but its direct impact on the Ukraine conflict is indirect, mainly providing a distraction or narrative point for RF. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for events, LOW for direct impact on Ukraine conflict).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

1. Sustained Deep Strike Campaign with Escalated Lethality: RF will continue to launch high-speed UAV (Shahed, with continued high volume), missile, and increasingly, guided aerial bomb (GAB, including FAB-3000) attacks at key Ukrainian oblasts (e.g., Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Cherkasy, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Sumy) to exhaust UAF AD resources, inflict maximum damage on infrastructure, and degrade civilian and military morale. Targeting of fortified strongpoints with FAB-3000 will become more frequent and widespread (Donetsk, Sumy confirmed). RF will attempt to portray these strikes as successful targeting of military infrastructure (e.g., "weapon depots" in Odesa, "Bayraktar factory" in Mykolaiv). Civilian areas will remain at high risk, potentially with shrapnel munitions. The confirmed casualties in Krasnodar from UAF attacks will likely fuel RF's resolve for retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian cities. RF will also continue targeted drone strikes against UAF C2 and UAV control points (e.g., Seversk/Konstantinovka). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • INDICATORS: Continued air raid alerts across central, northern, and southern Ukraine; reports of explosions and civilian casualties in urban centers; active AD engagements; confirmation of further Shahed/missile/GAB attacks on Odesa, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Sumy, or Donetsk. RF tactical aviation will be highly active. Continued RF claims of targeting UAF C2/UAV infrastructure.
2. Intensified Mechanized Offensive on Pokrovsk Axis with Probes on Other Axes: RF forces will continue and likely intensify coordinated company-to-battalion sized mechanized assaults in Donetsk (Pokrovsk axis, particularly around Novotoretskoye, Rodinskoye, and areas east of Razino), supported by heavy indirect fire and GABs, attempting to achieve tactical breakthroughs towards the main Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka supply route (T0504) and advance on Krasnoarmeysk. RF will likely leverage captured territory for propaganda. RF will continue localized probes and assaults in Kharkiv/Sumy directions, as evidenced by the claimed river crossing at Melovoe, and may also increase pressure on the Zaporizhzhia axis (Kamyanske/Plavni). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • INDICATORS: Increased frequency and scale of mechanized ground assaults; higher rates of armor and IFV losses on both sides; increased reports of tactical aviation activity and GAB launches in the Pokrovsk sector; RF claims of further territorial advances and continued Ukrainian appeals for drone support in this area. Continued RF claims of advances in Kharkiv/Sumy directions and Zaporizhzhia.
3. Intelligence Preparation for Southern Offensive/Strikes: RF will sustain or increase ISR and ELINT collection over the Orikhiv-Robotyne salient and surrounding areas. This activity will likely precede standoff strikes (missile/drone) against identified UAF C2, logistics, or air defense nodes within the next 48-72 hours. A major ground offensive in this sector is less likely in this immediate timeframe but remains a mid-term possibility. RF will utilize imagery from drone operations to support information campaigns. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • INDICATORS: Continued high volume of RF ISR UAV sorties; detection of intensified ELINT signatures; subsequent increase in precision strikes in the Orikhiv sector; continued ground operational pause in this sector; RF social media accounts (e.g., Voin DV) publishing drone footage of strikes in Zaporizhzhia.
4. Enhanced Domestic Defense and Information Operations: RF will maintain and potentially enhance AD and counter-UAS measures in its border regions and deep within its territory, especially near critical infrastructure (e.g., oil depots), despite disruptions to civilian air travel and growing civilian casualties. Ukrainian long-range UAV attacks on RF territory will persist. RF will continue its robust information campaigns to control the domestic narrative and counter Ukrainian successes or narratives, including addressing internal issues like military supply chain and the An-24 crash investigation (deflecting blame from systemic issues), portraying crackdowns on corruption (e.g., Tambov Governor arrest, FSB arrests), and showcasing military innovation (rembat, FPV-drone counter-UAV). RF will continue to use internal security operations (e.g., "Drunk Driver" raids, political detentions like Savvin) to maintain domestic control. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • INDICATORS: Continued reports from RF sources of successful drone interceptions; public warnings in RF cities against filming AD activities; continued Ukrainian targeting of RF logistics/industrial sites; sustained state media focus on RF successes and domestic stability, and reporting on investigations into military issues and search/rescue operations.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

1. Massed GAB/Missile Strike Overwhelming Key Defenses: RF could launch a highly coordinated and numerous ballistic/cruise missile and GAB (including FAB-3000) attack targeting multiple critical energy, transportation, or military infrastructure nodes (e.g., major barracks, large ammunition depots, critical railway hubs) across several Ukrainian oblasts simultaneously, aiming to overwhelm AD in specific sectors and cause widespread, cascading disruption. Given the confirmed casualties in Krasnodar and the high volume of drone launches last night, RF may be incentivized to demonstrate a more devastating retaliatory strike. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
   • INDICATORS: Simultaneous detection of multiple missile and UAV types from various vectors; sustained waves of attacks over several hours; targeting of specific energy facilities, railway junctions, or identified UAF command posts/reserve concentrations.
2. Decisive Breakthrough on Pokrovsk Axis: RF forces could consolidate and launch a multi-battalion mechanized offensive on the Pokrovsk axis with overwhelming tactical aviation (including FAB-3000) and heavy MLRS support, aiming for a significant operational breakthrough that could cut the main Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka supply route or encircle UAF forces. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
   • INDICATORS: Massing of armor and infantry formations; pre-assault artillery and air preparation sustained for several hours; attempts to breach multiple defensive lines simultaneously; increased RF special forces activity on the ground.
3. Simultaneous Multi-Axis Offensive: RF could launch coordinated ground offensives on two or more axes (e.g., Pokrovsk and a renewed significant push in Kharkiv/Kupyansk or Southern axis) to stretch UAF reserves and prevent reinforcement, aiming for larger strategic gains. This would be a significant escalation of ground operations, leveraging any claimed gains in Zaporizhzhia. (CONFIDENCE: LOW-MEDIUM)
   • INDICATORS: Confirmation of sustained multi-battalion attacks on widely separated axes; increased movement of RF operational reserves; simultaneous GAB/MLRS preparatory fires on multiple fronts.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

• Next 6-12 Hours (Until 240900Z JUL 25): High probability of continued UAV and missile threats across Ukraine, particularly in southern, central, and eastern regions (Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Cherkasy, Mykolaiv, Sumy, Donetsk) and the application of GABs in Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Sumy. Expect continued RF ground pressure and claimed advances in Donetsk and Kharkiv/Sumy Oblasts, with increased emphasis on mechanized assaults on the Pokrovsk axis. Active AD engagements and emergency responses will continue. RF AD will remain active against Ukrainian drone attacks on its territory, potentially causing further civilian air travel disruption and leading to further casualties. Intensified ISR/ELINT activity on the Southern Axis will persist. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Decision Point (UAF): Sustain AD readiness and maintain public alert systems, including the new differentiated system in Kyiv. Prioritize allocation of mobile AD assets to areas under immediate missile/UAV/GAB threat (e.g., Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia). Continue rapid response to civilian impacts. Immediately verify and counter RF claims of territorial gains in Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy, specifically the Melovoe and Kamyanske/Plavni claims. Prepare for and counter sustained mechanized assaults on the Pokrovsk axis with ATGM and FPV drone teams, specifically addressing the high demand for drones from this sector. Implement strict EMCON for units in the Orikhiv sector. Maintain heightened vigilance for hybrid threats following SBU success in Mykolaiv.
• Next 24-48 Hours (Until 260300Z JUL 25): RF will likely continue to probe Ukrainian AD with missile and UAV attacks, and increase FAB-3000 deployment in target-rich environments. Expect persistent GAB and intensified heavy MLRS deployments on eastern axes, directly supporting escalating ground operations, particularly mechanized pushes. RF will continue its information operations, likely leveraging UAF attacks on Krasnodar Krai to justify further strikes. The internal situation within Russia regarding drone attacks (Sochi) and domestic challenges (e.g., dry rations investigation, An-24 crash) will continue to be managed by the RF state apparatus. Standoff strikes are likely on the Southern Axis following ISR. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Decision Point (UAF): Continue monitoring RF deep strike patterns and adapt AD deployment accordingly, with specific focus on GAB defense. Prepare for enhanced hardening and dispersal measures against large guided bombs and heavy MLRS. Intensify counter-information efforts to maintain public morale and cohesion, particularly regarding the severity of attacks and RF internal issues. Exploit RF unit-level logistics issues (e.g., drone/Starlink requests, dry rations investigation, government corruption, POW testimonies) and internal crackdowns (e.g., Savvin case) in psychological operations (PSYOPs). Review and adjust defensive lines on the Pokrovsk axis to counter coordinated mechanized breakthroughs. Prepare for potential standoff strikes on the Southern Axis and adjust AD posture accordingly. Expedite discussions with partners on delivery timelines for US-produced weapons and the potential Patriot transfer from Germany.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

1. RF FAB-3000 M-54 Capabilities and Deployment:
   • Gap: Current inventory and production rate of the FAB-3000 M-54 and its associated UMPK kit. Precise launch parameters (altitude, speed, range) and electronic warfare vulnerabilities. Whether there are dedicated Su-34 units or specific airfields specialized for FAB-3000 deployment, and if additional airfields are being adapted for this capability.
   • Collection Requirements: SIGINT/ELINT on RF tactical aviation communications and radar signatures. IMINT/GEOINT of airfields in Belgorod, Voronezh, Kursk, Rostov, and Krasnodar Oblasts for presence of Su-34s and GAB storage/loading. TECHINT on recovered FAB-3000 fragments/UMPK components. HUMINT from captured RF aircrews or defectors.
2. RF Mechanized Force Composition and Intent (Pokrovsk/Zaporizhzhia Axes):
   • Gap: Full order of battle, specific unit assignments (beyond 76th VDV elements), and current readiness of RF mechanized groupings on the Pokrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Axes. Confirmation of their logistical sustainment for prolonged, high-tempo offensive operations. Verification of RF claim of crossing Verkhnya Dvurechnaya river at Melovoe, Kharkiv Oblast. Verification of RF claimed advances in Zaporizhzhia (Kamyanske/Plavni).
   • Collection Requirements: IMINT/GEOINT for force concentrations, movement patterns, and logistics nodes. SIGINT on RF ground unit communications. HUMINT from UAF frontline units and captured RF personnel. OSINT monitoring of RF milblogger maps (e.g., WarGonzo) for claimed territorial changes and RF force movements. Ground ISR/HUMINT to verify Melovoe and Zaporizhzhia claims.
3. Objective of RF ISR/ELINT Surge (Southern Axis):
   • Gap: Is the intensified ISR collection primarily targeting UAF C2 and AD for a future deep strike campaign, or is it intelligence preparation for a ground offensive? Identification of specific target sets and the expected timeline for RF action in this sector.
   • Collection Requirements: SIGINT to intercept RF intelligence analysis and targeting communications. ELINT to characterize RF ground-based C2 and AD systems targeted. IMINT/GEOINT for any subtle changes in RF ground force dispositions in the area. HUMINT from local populations.
4. Assessment of Odesa/Cherkasy/Mykolaiv/Zaporizhzhia Attack Damage and Weapon Type:
   • Gap: Full assessment of the extent of damage to the residential building and Pryvoz market in Odesa. Definitive identification of the weapon system(s) used (Shahed-136, cruise missile, ballistic missile, or combination) and their precise impact points to understand RF targeting precision and intent. Verification of RF claims regarding destruction of "weapon depots" in Odesa port and "Bayraktar factory" in Mykolaiv. Confirmation of missile type (e.g., cluster/shrapnel munitions) used in Cherkasy. Detailed damage assessment and weapon types used in Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia.
   • Collection Requirements: Forensics by local authorities, detailed damage assessment reports. IMINT/GEOINT of strike locations. TECHINT on drone/missile fragments if available. OSINT monitoring of local eyewitness accounts and official Ukrainian statements.
5. RF Unit-Level Logistics Status and Personnel Morale:
   • Gap: The extent to which RF units are relying on non-governmental funding and supply for critical equipment (e.g., drones, EW, Starlink). Is this an isolated incident for specific units or indicative of systemic issues affecting combat effectiveness across the front? How pervasive are issues like dry ration quality reported by the RF Investigative Committee? What is the impact of high-level arrests (e.g., former Tambov Governor) and arrests of personnel for "betrayal" on RF internal stability and morale?
   • Collection Requirements: OSINT monitoring of additional RF social media channels for similar appeals. HUMINT from captured RF personnel or defectors regarding supply chain issues and unit morale. SIGINT on internal RF logistics communications. OSINT on RF domestic media for continued reporting on corruption and its impact.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Prioritize and Deploy Counter-GAB Capabilities: Immediately review and accelerate deployment of capabilities to counter FAB-1500/3000. This includes enhancing EW systems to disrupt UMPK guidance, and exploring options for long-range strikes (e.g., ATACMS, Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG) against RF tactical aviation airfields and maintenance facilities (Belgorod, Voronezh, Kursk, Rostov, Krasnodar Oblasts) where these bombs are likely prepared/launched. Expedite discussions with Germany regarding Patriot systems.
2. Strengthen Anti-Armor Defenses on Pokrovsk/Zaporizhzhia Axes: Expedite the allocation of additional FPV drone teams, anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) systems, and remote mining capabilities to units defending the Pokrovsk and Zaporizhzhia axes. Implement dynamic, layered anti-armor defenses focusing on RF's likely avenues of approach for mechanized assaults. Conduct immediate training on countering combined arms breaches. Prioritize drone deliveries to this sector based on expressed demand.
3. Enhance Air Defense and Hardening for Urban Centers and Strongpoints: Immediately re-prioritize and deploy additional mobile Air Defense assets, particularly those effective against UAVs and high-altitude targets, to vulnerable urban centers like Odesa, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Cherkasy, and frontline strongpoints in Kharkiv and Sumy. Implement enhanced multi-layered AD strategies to counter saturation attacks, leveraging systems like the differentiated air raid alerts. Review and strengthen hardening protocols for critical infrastructure and military strongpoints, especially against wide-area blast effects from FAB-3000. Given the high number of drones launched last night, AD systems capable of high engagement rates are paramount.
4. Implement Aggressive OPSEC and Counter-ISR on Southern Axis: Advise all UAF units in the Orikhiv-Robotyne salient to implement strict EMCON (Emission Control) to deny RF ELINT. Aggressively task UAF counter-UAV assets and AD systems to target and neutralize RF ISR platforms (Orlan-10/30, ZALA) operating over this sector. Prepare for imminent standoff strikes against C2 and AD.
5. Intensify Civilian Protection and Emergency Response: Allocate additional resources (heavy equipment, specialized training, medical supplies, personnel) to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS), particularly for urban search and rescue, structural integrity assessments, firefighting, and mass casualty response in areas frequently targeted by missiles, UAVs, and GABs. Disseminate updated civilian protection advisories, including specific guidance on shrapnel munitions and shelter protocols. Continue immediate investigation of war crimes by the General Prosecutor's Office to support future accountability.
6. Exploit RF Vulnerabilities in Information Operations: Develop and execute a targeted information operations (IO) campaign highlighting RF's new reliance on FAB-3000 as an indicator of heavy ground losses and a failure to achieve objectives by conventional means. Simultaneously, continue IO campaigns targeting RF military personnel and their families, exploiting internal appeals for equipment (e.g., Starlink, drones), confirmed logistical issues (e.g., dry rations investigation, government corruption, POW testimonies on "meat grinder" deployment) and perceived systemic failures in military supply to erode morale and encourage defection. Counter RF claims of civilian infrastructure as military targets by widely disseminating evidence of civilian casualties and damage, including the recent attacks on Mykolaiv, Odesa, Cherkasy, and Zaporizhzhia. Leverage the An-24 incident (emphasizing initial conflicting RF narratives) and Sochi flight disruptions/casualties to highlight RF internal chaos and the consequences of their conflict for their own population. Actively disseminate news of significant international support (e.g., EU funding US-produced weapons, Patriot discussions) to bolster domestic and frontline morale. Address concerns about corruption regarding Western aid transparently. Leverage SBU's success in Mykolaiv to demonstrate Ukrainian vigilance and effective counter-hybrid capabilities.

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// END OF REPORT //