Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Ukraine General: Persistent missile and UAV threat across Ukraine.
  • Odesa Oblast: Confirmed destruction of a residential 9-story building and the Pryvoz market due to RF drone attacks. Multiple videos and photos show significant fires, structural damage, and ongoing emergency response efforts. Preliminary reports indicate civilian casualties (3 injured at Pryvoz, with total casualties from the residential building impact unknown but likely higher given the scale of damage). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for drone attack, HIGH for significant damage to market and residential building, HIGH for civilian casualties). RF sources (Colonelcassad) acknowledge "arrival" at Pryvoz market and "Operatsiya Z" (Russian Spring milbloggers) claim "massive strike on Odesa port: weapons and ammunition depots destroyed," which is unconfirmed but aligns with the targeting of port infrastructure.
  • Dnipropetrovsk Oblast: Two UAVs confirmed shot down by UAF Air Command "East" (Pvk Skhid) over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Donetsk Oblast (Pokrovsk Axis): RF sources (TASS, Marochko) claim RF forces are advancing near Redkodub and fighting for three surrounding settlements: Karpovka, Glushchenkovo, and Novy Mir. Rybar's video message explicitly claims RF capture of Novotoretskoye and advancements towards Rodinskoye, and into forest belts east of Razino. STERNENKO (Ukrainian) notes "many requests from Pokrovsk for drones," indicating heavy fighting and significant UAF engagement. TASS also reports "fights began on the southern and southwestern outskirts of Krasnoarmeysk in DNR" (referring to Pokrovsk). (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM for claims of control, HIGH for RF intent to advance and actual ground movement based on Rybar, HIGH for intensified fighting on Pokrovsk axis based on Ukrainian internal requests and RF claims).
  • Cherkasy Oblast: Seven individuals, including a child, injured from RF missile attack, reportedly with shrapnel. OPERATYVNY ZSU (Ukrainian) reports damage to a cemetery in Cherkasy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kharkiv Oblast: RF sources (Poddubny) claim "North" group continued creating a "security strip" in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts on July 23rd, reporting significant UAF losses (80 personnel, 8 units of technology in Sumy direction; 30 personnel, 3 units of technology in Kharkiv direction including BBM 'Kozak', 'Pikaly', and 5x drone launch platforms). First operational use of a FAB-3000 M-54 UMPK against a Ukrainian strongpoint in Lyptsi. While a near miss (10-15m), it caused catastrophic damage to the target structure and adjacent buildings. Positional fighting continues in Vovchansk with no significant changes to the FLOT. Kharkiv Oblast Administration (Oleg Sinegubov) reports 9 settlements struck in Kharkiv Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for FAB-3000 use and impact, LOW for verification of claimed losses or territorial gains without UAF confirmation, HIGH for RF claims and widespread strikes).
  • Zaporizhzhia Oblast: 43-year-old woman injured in Vassilyvskyi district due to hostile attack. Air raid alert lifted in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. RF Milbloggers (Voin DV) claim 35th Army artillery and drone operators continue to destroy enemy targets in "temporarily occupied" Zaporizhzhia Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for civilian injury, HIGH for RF targeting/reconnaissance).
  • Kryvyi Rih: Situation assessed as controlled as of morning 240725Z. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russia:
  • Krasnodar Krai (Sochi): Multiple videos from Ukrainian sources (Tsaplienko, Shef Hayabusa, ASTRA) show large explosions and fires, particularly in the vicinity of a "Lukoil-Yugnefteprodukt Sochinskaya oil depot" (Sochi oil depot). RF MoD (ASTRA, Dnevnik Desantnika) claims 39 Ukrainian UAVs were shot down over the Black and Azov Seas and Krasnodar Krai. Tsaplienko asks "Why are they bombing Sochi?" implying Ukrainian involvement. STERNENKO reposts videos of explosions in Adler (Sochi) with commentary "Why are they bombing Sochi? They should be bombing Russia!" (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for drone attacks and explosions/fires, HIGH for RF AD activity, MEDIUM for specific target verification, MEDIUM for claimed number of interceptions by RF). Civilian reports indicate flights to Sochi are disrupted.
  • Kursk Oblast: Russian official Khinshtein signed a resolution on payments of 195,000 rubles to residents of Kursk Oblast forced to leave homes due to property damage from Ukrainian attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Luhansk (Kremennaya): TASS (Marochko) reports a "firefight" by UAF in Kremennaya. This is likely an RF information operation or an isolated UAF raid. (CONFIDENCE: LOW for UAF aggressive action, HIGH for RF reporting).
  • Amur Oblast: A civilian An-24 passenger plane with 43 passengers (including 5 children) and 6 crew members went missing. Search and rescue operations are underway. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Internal RF Issues: RF Investigation Committee reports completion of an investigation into the supply of low-quality dry rations to RF Armed Forces. ASTRA reports on a criminal case against Baza editor-in-chief, citing a post. Khabarovsk Police warn about phone scams. These reflect internal challenges and a focus on domestic control/narrative. The State Duma proposed banning migrants from participating in underground fight clubs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• RF (Khabarovsk): Severe storm and heavy rain on 22 July. No direct military impact. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF (Amur Oblast): Taiga complicates search efforts for the missing An-24, with primary efforts from the air. This suggests challenging terrain for ground movement. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• No other new significant weather or environmental factors reported directly impacting operations within the past hour. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF: Air defense (AD) remains on high alert nationwide, actively engaging and responding to missile and UAV threats (2 UAVs shot down over Dnipropetrovsk). Emergency services are actively responding to significant civilian infrastructure damage and casualties in Odesa, Cherkasy, and Zaporizhzhia. UAF General Staff provides updated RF loss figures and situational reports (08:00 24.07.2025), noting 172 combat engagements over the past day. The 199th Air Assault Forces (DSHV) training center is actively conducting operations/training, as per their official channel. Kyiv Oblast activated a differentiated air raid alert system. Ukrainian units (e.g., "Rubizh" NGU brigade) are fundraising for equipment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RFU: Continues deep strike operations targeting Ukrainian territory with UAVs (Odesa, Zaporizhzhia) and missiles (Cherkasy, Kharkiv FAB-3000). RF is aggressively promoting claimed battlefield successes in Kharkiv/Sumy and Donetsk oblasts, with specific claims of advances on the Pokrovsk axis and "Operation Z" claiming destruction of weapon depots in Odesa. RF AD actively engaged in defending its territory against Ukrainian UAV attacks (Krasnodar Krai, Crimea). RF is conducting prisoner exchanges and launching information operations, while addressing internal issues like military supply fraud. RF milbloggers like Colonelcassad continue to highlight combat medic roles, likely for morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for general actions, MEDIUM for specific RF claimed successes until UAF confirmation, HIGH for FAB-3000 use).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:
  • Enhanced Deep Strike Capacity (UAV/Missile/GAB): RF continues to demonstrate widespread and damaging UAV (Shahed) and missile attacks against Ukrainian urban centers. The confirmed operational use of the FAB-3000 M-54 UMPK in Kharkiv signifies a substantial increase in destructive power and standoff strike capability, representing a new level of threat to fortified positions and C2 nodes. This confirms a high volume of these munitions are available for conversion and deployment. The use of shrapnel munitions in Cherkasy indicates a diverse arsenal to maximize casualty effect. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Escalated Offensive Operations (Pokrovsk Axis): RF forces have transitioned from dismounted infantry actions to larger, coordinated company-sized mechanized assaults (elements of 76th VDV Division) on the Pokrovsk axis. This demonstrates improved combined arms coordination and intent for more substantial territorial gains, reinforced by RF claims of advances on Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Persistent Offensive Pressure (Kharkiv/Sumy): RF forces claim continued creation of a "security strip" and report significant UAF losses, indicating sustained offensive pressure. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM, based on RF claims)
  • Intensified ISR/EW (Southern Axis): A significant surge in RF Orlan-10/30 and ZALA UAV sorties, coupled with intensified ELINT collection, indicates intelligence preparation of the battlespace, likely preceding a future offensive operation or deep strike campaign. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Adaptive Homeland Defense: RF claims success in downing 39 UAVs over southern Russia and the seas, demonstrating significant AD capability, even as Ukrainian sources show evidence of impacts (Sochi oil depot). However, passenger flight disruptions in Sochi indicate that AD engagements are impacting civilian operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Warfare & Domestic Control: RF leverages state media (TASS, milbloggers, Rybar, WarGonzo) to disseminate narratives of military success and internal stability (prisoner exchange, fighting internal crime/fraud, investigating military supply fraud, managing civilian impact from drone attacks). They also utilize compensation payments for affected civilians to manage public sentiment in border regions and counter Ukrainian drone attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intentions:
  • Degrade Ukrainian Combat Potential and Civilian Morale: Maintain high-tempo missile/UAV/GAB attacks to exhaust AD, disrupt logistics, and inflict casualties, particularly targeting central and eastern Ukrainian regions. The confirmed targeting of civilian infrastructure (Odesa market, residential building, Cherkasy cemetery/civilian area with shrapnel) and the use of FAB-3000 against strongpoints directly supports this intent to degrade defenses and resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Achieve Tactical Breakthroughs on Key Axes: Intensify ground operations on the Pokrovsk axis using mechanized units to achieve significant breakthroughs, potentially targeting the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka supply route and advancing on Krasnoarmeysk. Continue offensive actions in Kharkiv/Sumy to push back Ukrainian forces and establish claimed "security strips." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Pre-position for Future Offensives: Utilize intensified ISR and ELINT on the Southern Axis to identify targets and prepare for future offensive operations or deep strike campaigns. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Protect Domestic Infrastructure: Prioritize AD and counter-UAS measures to defend against Ukrainian long-range UAV attacks on its territory, particularly critical energy infrastructure (Sochi oil depot). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Manage Domestic Narrative: Continue to project an image of successful military operations and governmental care for its citizens (e.g., payments for displaced persons, prisoner exchanges, addressing corruption in military supplies), while downplaying the impact of Ukrainian strikes on RF territory and maintaining control over media narratives (Baza editor case, censorship, propaganda on "rearmament" of UAF). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Confirmed FAB-3000 Deployment: The operational use of the FAB-3000 M-54 in Kharkiv represents a significant escalation in RF tactical aviation capabilities, providing a powerful tool for destroying hardened targets at standoff ranges. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Shift to Mechanized Assaults on Pokrovsk Axis: The transition from dismounted infantry to company-sized mechanized assaults, notably involving the 76th VDV Division, indicates a move towards higher-tempo, more decisive ground operations. This suggests a re-evaluation of tactics or an increased confidence in coordinating combined arms. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intensified ISR/ELINT Ahead of Operations: The surge in UAV and ELINT activity on the Southern Axis is a clear adaptation, indicating systematic intelligence preparation of the battlespace. This points to a more structured and deliberate approach to future operations in that sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Confirmed Civilian Infrastructure Targeting in Odesa & Cherkasy (Shrapnel): Direct hits on Pryvoz market and a residential 9-story building in Odesa, and a cemetery in Cherkasy with shrapnel munitions, confirm RF's continued willingness to target civilian areas with drones/missiles, potentially aiming for psychological effect and to degrade civilian resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Sustained Drone Attacks on Critical Infrastructure within RF: Multiple video confirmations of impacts and fires at the Sochi oil depot despite RF AD claims suggest a persistent Ukrainian capability to bypass or overwhelm RF defenses in certain areas, leading to civilian air travel disruptions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Differentiated Air Raid System (Kyiv Oblast): Ukrainian adaptation to persistent threats, allowing for more localized alerts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• Munitions Access (GABs): The confirmed use of the FAB-3000 suggests a sustained, or possibly increasing, capacity for RF to produce and/or convert large-caliber bombs with UMPK kits, posing a significant challenge to UAF. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Munitions Access (UAV/Missile): Persistent and widespread missile and UAV strikes confirm continued access to these munitions for deep strike operations. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Homefront Stability Efforts: Payments to displaced Kursk residents and reports on combating internal fraud and military supply corruption suggest RF is investing resources in maintaining domestic stability and citizen loyalty, indicating an awareness of the indirect impact of conflict on the populace. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Unit-Level Sustainment (Previous Report): Continued appeals for drones by RF milbloggers (Colonelcassad, Dnevnik Desantnika) underscore potential localized equipment shortages, particularly for specialized ISR assets. The investigation into dry ration supply issues indicates awareness of logistical deficiencies at higher levels. "Dnevnik Desantnika" also explicitly requests Starlink. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• Responsive Air Operations: The continued and precise nature of UAV and missile targeting against multiple Ukrainian oblasts, and the apparent successful deployment of the FAB-3000, indicates centralized and responsive C2 for RF aerial operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ground Operations C2 (Pokrovsk): The observed shift to coordinated company-sized mechanized assaults on the Pokrovsk axis demonstrates improved tactical C2 and coordination between different combat arms elements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• ISR/ELINT Coordination: The surge in ISR and ELINT activity on the Southern Axis, coupled with an operational pause on the ground, suggests effective C2 in preparing for future operations through intelligence gathering. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Domestic Security C2: The reported repulsion of drone attacks on Krasnodar Krai and Crimea demonstrates effective local C2 and AD coordination within RF territory, despite acknowledged challenges in specific areas. The response to internal issues like fraud and military corruption suggests a functional, albeit challenged, civilian C2 structure. The search for the missing An-24 highlights standard emergency response protocols. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Air Defense (AD) Posture: Remains highly vigilant and engaged nationwide. Successful interception of 2 UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast demonstrates continued AD effectiveness. The activation of differentiated air raid alerts in Kyiv Oblast indicates adaptive measures. However, the scale of damage in Odesa and Cherkasy, and the successful impact of a FAB-3000 near Lyptsi, indicates AD saturation or gaps against persistent and evolving RF strike capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ground Forces Posture (Pokrovsk): UAF forces on the Pokrovsk axis are facing increasingly coordinated mechanized assaults. The high volume of requests for drones from Pokrovsk indicates intense engagement and the critical need for ISR/strike assets. While successfully repelling recent attacks and destroying RF armor, this shift necessitates a heightened defensive posture and readiness to counter combined arms breaches. UAF General Staff reports 172 combat engagements over the last 24 hours, indicating high intensity across the front. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Civilian Response: Civilian populations continue to respond to alerts. Emergency services are actively engaged in rescue, firefighting, and humanitarian assistance in heavily impacted areas (Odesa, Cherkasy, Zaporizhzhia). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Training & Readiness: The 199th Air Assault Forces (DSHV) training center activity indicates continued training and readiness efforts despite ongoing combat operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Resource Management: Ukrainian units (e.g., "Rubizh" NGU brigade) are actively fundraising to restore equipment, indicating ongoing resource challenges at the unit level despite external aid. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes:
  • AD Engagements: Two UAVs successfully intercepted over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Prisoner Exchange: Return of Ukrainian military personnel from captivity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Situational Control: Kryvyi Rih remains controlled. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Repulsion of Mechanized Assaults: UAF forces on the Pokrovsk axis successfully repelled at least two company-sized mechanized assaults, destroying 3x T-80 tanks and 5x BMP/BMD IFVs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Effective Counter-Offensive Operations (Sochi): Continued Ukrainian long-range UAV attacks on critical RF infrastructure (Sochi oil depot) demonstrate offensive reach and capability to inflict economic and psychological damage on RF territory. This has also led to civilian flight disruptions in Sochi. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Setbacks:
  • Civilian Casualties and Infrastructure Damage: Significant civilian casualties (7 in Cherkasy, 3+ in Odesa) and extensive damage to civilian infrastructure (Odesa residential building and market, Cherkasy cemetery, hit with shrapnel) highlight the persistent vulnerability to RF strikes and the limits of current AD coverage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • FAB-3000 Impact: The deployment and impact of the FAB-3000 near Lyptsi demonstrates a new, highly destructive threat to UAF strongpoints and hardened positions, even with near misses. This poses a significant challenge to existing defensive infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Persistent UAV Threat: Confirmed mass drone attack on Odesa and Zaporizhzhia, coupled with a general threat across Ukraine, indicates the enduring and widespread nature of this threat, requiring sustained AD effort. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Frontline Pressure (Pokrovsk): RF's shift to larger mechanized assaults indicates increased pressure on UAF defensive lines, requiring significant resources and tactical adaptation to hold ground. High volume of requests for drones from Pokrovsk indicate significant combat intensity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Critical Needs (Air Defense): Continued and expedited supply of air defense systems and interceptor missiles (especially against Shaheds and high-altitude GAB platforms) remains paramount to counter persistent RF missile, UAV, and GAB threats, particularly for urban areas and frontline strongpoints that are proving vulnerable. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Counter-GAB Defenses: Urgent requirement for effective countermeasures against large guided bombs (FAB-1500/3000), including enhanced electronic warfare (EW) capabilities to disrupt UMPK guidance, or deeper strike capabilities against launch platforms and airfields. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Anti-Armor Assets (Pokrovsk Priority): Allocation of additional anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) systems, FPV drones, and rapid deployment of scatterable mines is critical to counter the escalating mechanized threat on the Pokrovsk axis, as evidenced by high demand for drones from this sector. Unit fundraising for equipment reinforces this need. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Civilian Protection: Increased frequency and severity of civilian infrastructure damage (Odesa, Cherkasy) necessitate enhanced support for local emergency services with equipment, training, and personnel, including search and rescue capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Counter-Offensive Capability: Maintaining current UAF force posture on all axes while resisting RF advances and preparing for potential future offensive operations will require sustained Western military aid, especially precision munitions and armored vehicles. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Propaganda (Domestic): TASS continues to promote RF military successes (e.g., claimed territorial gains in Donetsk, "security strip" creation in Kharkiv/Sumy, successful AD interceptions, reconstruction efforts at Crocus City Hall, claims of "mass strike" on Odesa port destroying weapon depots) to project an image of effectiveness. The repatriation of RF soldiers is used to bolster morale and demonstrate state care. Internal reporting on fraud and social issues (e.g., declining alcoholism rates in Russia, Khabarovsk storm response, investigation into military dry rations, banning migrants from fight clubs) aims to project an image of a functioning, law-abiding state. Rybar and WarGonzo actively promote RF territorial gains on the Pokrovsk axis and present a "frontline summary." Milblogger Kotenok echoes concerns about future negotiations allowing Ukraine to rearm. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Propaganda (External/Hybrid): RF milbloggers like Poddubny disseminate unverified battlefield claims and UAF loss figures. TASS disseminates negative reports about Ukrainian leadership, citing Politico as a source, to sow discord and undermine international support for Ukraine (e.g., "Operatsiya Z" criticizing Zelenskyy over NABU powers citing Senator Graham). The claim of UAF "firefight" in Kremennaya is likely an attempt to portray UAF as aggressive in RF-controlled territory. "Voenkor Kotenok" states it's "hard to believe" Ukrainian statements, sowing distrust. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian Information: Ukrainian authorities (DSNS, Military Administrations, Operativny ZSU, Tsaplienko, RBK-Ukraina, General Staff, Oleg Sinegubov) are promptly reporting civilian casualties and infrastructure damage from RF attacks, emphasizing Russian aggression and the need for international support. UAF General Staff publishes daily RF loss statistics and combat engagement maps (172 engagements in past day). Ukrainian channels are highlighting the impact of attacks on Russian territory (Sochi oil depot, civilian flight disruptions), using internal RF commentary ("Why are they bombing Sochi?") to amplify the message. STERNENKO's call for drone donations for Pokrovsk provides real-time insight into frontline needs and reinforces Ukrainian resilience. The return of Ukrainian POWs is a significant morale boost. Daily minutes of silence are observed for fallen defenders. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Internal Dissension (Previous Report): The personal testimony from Vasily Andreyev from the Luhansk region, expressing disillusionment and perceived lack of support from RF command, could be used by Ukraine for counter-propaganda purposes to target RF morale. The public investigation into dry rations may inadvertently highlight logistics issues. Reports of RF authorities using "informers" in prisons to obtain confessions about "war conversations" reflect internal repression and potential for dissent. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Ukraine: Public remains under severe stress due to persistent air raid alerts and devastating missile/UAV/GAB threats, as evidenced by mass casualties and destruction in Odesa and Cherkasy, and the new threat of FAB-3000. This will likely increase calls for more robust air defense capabilities and international support. However, resilience remains high, as evidenced by continued emergency response, morale messaging from UAF, and the success of prisoner exchanges. The differentiated air raid alert system in Kyiv Oblast may reduce panic but also signifies a persistent threat. Daily minutes of silence unify public mourning. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russia: Public in affected areas (Krasnodar Krai, Kursk Oblast) experiences alarm due to drone attacks, leading to state-sponsored compensation programs to mitigate negative sentiment. The return of RF military personnel from captivity will be a morale boost domestically. Official messaging attempts to project stability and success, including addressing internal corruption in military supply. Civilian flight disruptions in Sochi due to drone attacks will likely increase public frustration. The missing An-24 with 49 people aboard will generate significant domestic concern. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Military Personnel: The previous report of public appeals for drones and Starlink by RF units (Dnevnik Desantnika) and the testimony from Vasily Andreyev continue to suggest potential for localized low morale and disillusionment among RF military personnel, particularly concerning logistical support and access to modern equipment. The dry rations investigation may further impact morale. The emphasis on combat medics like "Rusich" might be an attempt to bolster unit cohesion and professionalism. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• China-EU Relations (RF narrative): TASS reports on Xi Jinping's call for "foresight and correct strategic decisions" between China and EU leaders amidst global changes, likely framing RF as a stabilizing force or promoting a multi-polar world order. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for RF narrative).
• US-Ukraine Relations (RF narrative): "Operatsiya Z" milbloggers are amplifying criticism of Zelenskyy by US Senator Graham regarding NABU powers, likely aiming to sow discord between Ukraine and its Western partners. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for RF narrative).
• No other new international support or diplomatic developments reported within the past hour directly impacting the conflict, beyond the prisoner exchange. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

1. Sustained Deep Strike Campaign with Escalated Lethality: RF will continue to launch high-speed UAV (Shahed), missile, and increasingly, guided aerial bomb (GAB, including FAB-3000) attacks at key Ukrainian oblasts (e.g., Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Cherkasy, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv) to exhaust UAF AD resources, inflict maximum damage on infrastructure, and degrade civilian and military morale. Targeting of fortified strongpoints with FAB-3000 will become more frequent. RF will attempt to portray these strikes as successful targeting of military infrastructure (e.g., "weapon depots" in Odesa). Civilian areas will remain at high risk, potentially with shrapnel munitions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • INDICATORS: Continued air raid alerts across central, northern, and southern Ukraine; reports of explosions and civilian casualties in urban centers; active AD engagements; confirmation of further Shahed/missile/GAB attacks on Odesa, Zaporizhzhia, or Kharkiv. RF tactical aviation will be highly active.
2. Intensified Mechanized Offensive on Pokrovsk Axis: RF forces will continue and likely intensify coordinated company-to-battalion sized mechanized assaults in Donetsk (Pokrovsk axis, particularly around Novotoretskoye, Rodinskoye, and areas east of Razino), supported by heavy indirect fire and GABs, attempting to achieve tactical breakthroughs towards the main Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka supply route (T0504) and advance on Krasnoarmeysk. The high demand for drones from this area indicates RF pressure. RF will likely leverage captured territory for propaganda. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • INDICATORS: Increased frequency and scale of mechanized ground assaults; higher rates of armor and IFV losses on both sides; increased reports of tactical aviation activity and GAB launches in the Pokrovsk sector; RF claims of further territorial advances and continued Ukrainian appeals for drone support in this area.
3. Intelligence Preparation for Southern Offensive/Strikes: RF will sustain or increase ISR and ELINT collection over the Orikhiv-Robotyne salient and surrounding areas. This activity will likely precede standoff strikes (missile/drone) against identified UAF C2, logistics, or air defense nodes within the next 48-72 hours. A major ground offensive in this sector is less likely in this immediate timeframe but remains a mid-term possibility. RF will utilize imagery from drone operations to support information campaigns. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • INDICATORS: Continued high volume of RF ISR UAV sorties; detection of intensified ELINT signatures; subsequent increase in precision strikes in the Orikhiv sector; continued ground operational pause in this sector; RF social media accounts (e.g., Voin DV) publishing drone footage of strikes in Zaporizhzhia.
4. Enhanced Domestic Defense and Information Operations: RF will maintain and potentially enhance AD and counter-UAS measures in its border regions and deep within its territory, especially near critical infrastructure (e.g., oil depots), despite disruptions to civilian air travel. Ukrainian long-range UAV attacks on RF territory will persist. RF will continue its robust information campaigns to control the domestic narrative and counter Ukrainian successes or narratives, including addressing internal issues like military supply chain and the An-24 crash investigation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • INDICATORS: Continued reports from RF sources of successful drone interceptions; public warnings in RF cities against filming AD activities; continued Ukrainian targeting of RF logistics/industrial sites; sustained state media focus on RF successes and domestic stability, and reporting on investigations into military issues and search/rescue operations.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

1. Massed GAB/Missile Strike Overwhelming Key Defenses: RF could launch a highly coordinated and numerous ballistic/cruise missile and GAB (including FAB-3000) attack targeting multiple critical energy, transportation, or military infrastructure nodes (e.g., major barracks, large ammunition depots) across several Ukrainian oblasts simultaneously, aiming to overwhelm AD in specific sectors and cause widespread, cascading disruption. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
   • INDICATORS: Simultaneous detection of multiple missile and UAV types from various vectors; sustained waves of attacks over several hours; targeting of specific energy facilities, railway junctions, or identified UAF command posts/reserve concentrations.
2. Decisive Breakthrough on Pokrovsk Axis: RF forces could consolidate and launch a multi-battalion mechanized offensive on the Pokrovsk axis with overwhelming tactical aviation (including FAB-3000) and heavy MLRS support, aiming for a significant operational breakthrough that could cut the main Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka supply route or encircle UAF forces. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
   • INDICATORS: Massing of armor and infantry formations; pre-assault artillery and air preparation sustained for several hours; attempts to breach multiple defensive lines simultaneously; increased RF special forces activity on the ground.
3. Simultaneous Multi-Axis Offensive: RF could launch coordinated ground offensives on two or more axes (e.g., Pokrovsk and a renewed significant push in Kharkiv/Kupyansk or Southern axis) to stretch UAF reserves and prevent reinforcement, aiming for larger strategic gains. This would be a significant escalation of ground operations. (CONFIDENCE: LOW-MEDIUM)
   • INDICATORS: Confirmation of sustained multi-battalion attacks on widely separated axes; increased movement of RF operational reserves; simultaneous GAB/MLRS preparatory fires on multiple fronts.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

• Next 6-12 Hours (Until 240900Z JUL 25): High probability of continued UAV and missile threats across Ukraine, particularly in southern and central regions (Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Cherkasy) and the application of GABs in Kharkiv. Expect continued RF ground pressure and claimed advances in Donetsk and Kharkiv/Sumy Oblasts, with increased emphasis on mechanized assaults on the Pokrovsk axis. Active AD engagements and emergency responses will continue. RF AD will remain active against Ukrainian drone attacks on its territory, potentially causing further civilian air travel disruption. Intensified ISR/ELINT activity on the Southern Axis will persist. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Decision Point (UAF): Sustain AD readiness and maintain public alert systems, including the new differentiated system in Kyiv. Prioritize allocation of mobile AD assets to areas under immediate missile/UAV/GAB threat. Continue rapid response to civilian impacts. Immediately verify and counter RF claims of territorial gains in Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy. Prepare for and counter sustained mechanized assaults on the Pokrovsk axis with ATGM and FPV drone teams, specifically addressing the high demand for drones from this sector. Implement strict EMCON for units in the Orikhiv sector.
• Next 24-48 Hours (Until 260300Z JUL 25): RF will likely continue to probe Ukrainian AD with missile and UAV attacks, and increase FAB-3000 deployment in target-rich environments. Expect persistent GAB and intensified heavy MLRS deployments on eastern axes, directly supporting escalating ground operations, particularly mechanized pushes. RF will continue its information operations. The internal situation within Russia regarding drone attacks (Sochi) and domestic challenges (e.g., dry rations investigation, An-24 search) will continue to be managed by the RF state apparatus. Standoff strikes are likely on the Southern Axis following ISR. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Decision Point (UAF): Continue monitoring RF deep strike patterns and adapt AD deployment accordingly, with specific focus on GAB defense. Prepare for enhanced hardening and dispersal measures against large guided bombs and heavy MLRS. Intensify counter-information efforts to maintain public morale and cohesion, particularly regarding the severity of attacks and RF internal issues. Exploit RF unit-level logistics issues (e.g., drone/Starlink requests, dry rations investigation) in psychological operations (PSYOPs). Review and adjust defensive lines on the Pokrovsk axis to counter coordinated mechanized breakthroughs. Prepare for potential standoff strikes on the Southern Axis and adjust AD posture accordingly.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

1. RF FAB-3000 M-54 Capabilities and Deployment:
   • Gap: Current inventory and production rate of the FAB-3000 M-54 and its associated UMPK kit. Precise launch parameters (altitude, speed, range) and electronic warfare vulnerabilities. Whether there are dedicated Su-34 units or specific airfields specialized for FAB-3000 deployment.
   • Collection Requirements: SIGINT/ELINT on RF tactical aviation communications and radar signatures. IMINT/GEOINT of airfields in Belgorod, Voronezh, Kursk Oblasts for presence of Su-34s and GAB storage/loading. TECHINT on recovered FAB-3000 fragments/UMPK components. HUMINT from captured RF aircrews or defectors.
2. RF Mechanized Force Composition and Intent (Pokrovsk Axis):
   • Gap: Full order of battle, specific unit assignments (beyond 76th VDV elements), and current readiness of RF mechanized groupings on the Pokrovsk Axis. Confirmation of their logistical sustainment for prolonged, high-tempo offensive operations.
   • Collection Requirements: IMINT/GEOINT for force concentrations, movement patterns, and logistics nodes. SIGINT on RF ground unit communications. HUMINT from UAF frontline units and captured RF personnel. OSINT monitoring of RF milblogger maps (e.g., WarGonzo) for claimed territorial changes and RF force movements.
3. Objective of RF ISR/ELINT Surge (Southern Axis):
   • Gap: Is the intensified ISR collection primarily targeting UAF C2 and AD for a future deep strike campaign, or is it intelligence preparation for a ground offensive? Identification of specific target sets.
   • Collection Requirements: SIGINT to intercept RF intelligence analysis and targeting communications. ELINT to characterize RF ground-based C2 and AD systems targeted. IMINT/GEOINT for any subtle changes in RF ground force dispositions in the area. HUMINT from local populations.
4. Assessment of Odesa/Cherkasy Attack Damage and Weapon Type:
   • Gap: Full assessment of the extent of damage to the residential building and Pryvoz market in Odesa. Definitive identification of the weapon system(s) used (Shahed-136, cruise missile, ballistic missile, or combination) and their precise impact points to understand RF targeting precision and intent. Verification of RF claims regarding destruction of "weapon depots" in Odesa port. Confirmation of missile type (e.g., cluster/shrapnel munitions) used in Cherkasy.
   • Collection Requirements: Forensics by local authorities, detailed damage assessment reports. IMINT/GEOINT of strike locations. TECHINT on drone/missile fragments if available. OSINT monitoring of local eyewitness accounts and official Ukrainian statements.
5. RF Unit-Level Logistics Status and Personnel Morale:
   • Gap: The extent to which RF units are relying on non-governmental funding and supply for critical equipment (e.g., drones, EW, Starlink). Is this an isolated incident for specific units or indicative of systemic issues affecting combat effectiveness across the front? How pervasive are issues like dry ration quality reported by the RF Investigative Committee?
   • Collection Requirements: OSINT monitoring of additional RF social media channels for similar appeals. HUMINT from captured RF personnel or defectors regarding supply chain issues and unit morale. SIGINT on internal RF logistics communications.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Prioritize and Deploy Counter-GAB Capabilities: Immediately review and accelerate deployment of capabilities to counter FAB-1500/3000. This includes enhancing EW systems to disrupt UMPK guidance, and exploring options for long-range strikes (e.g., ATACMS, Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG) against RF tactical aviation airfields and maintenance facilities (Belgorod, Voronezh, Kursk Oblasts) where these bombs are likely prepared/launched.
2. Strengthen Anti-Armor Defenses on Pokrovsk Axis: Expedite the allocation of additional FPV drone teams, anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) systems, and remote mining capabilities to units defending the Pokrovsk axis. Implement dynamic, layered anti-armor defenses focusing on RF's likely avenues of approach for mechanized assaults. Conduct immediate training on countering combined arms breaches. Prioritize drone deliveries to this sector based on expressed demand.
3. Enhance Air Defense and Hardening for Urban Centers and Strongpoints: Immediately re-prioritize and deploy additional mobile Air Defense assets, particularly those effective against UAVs and high-altitude targets, to vulnerable urban centers like Odesa, Zaporizhzhia, and frontline strongpoints in Kharkiv. Implement enhanced multi-layered AD strategies to counter saturation attacks, leveraging systems like the differentiated air raid alerts. Review and strengthen hardening protocols for critical infrastructure and military strongpoints, especially against wide-area blast effects from FAB-3000.
4. Implement Aggressive OPSEC and Counter-ISR on Southern Axis: Advise all UAF units in the Orikhiv-Robotyne salient to implement strict EMCON (Emission Control) to deny RF ELINT. Aggressively task UAF counter-UAV assets and AD systems to target and neutralize RF ISR platforms (Orlan-10/30, ZALA) operating over this sector. Prepare for imminent standoff strikes against C2 and AD.
5. Intensify Civilian Protection and Emergency Response: Allocate additional resources (heavy equipment, specialized training, medical supplies, personnel) to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS), particularly for urban search and rescue, structural integrity assessments, firefighting, and mass casualty response in areas frequently targeted by missiles, UAVs, and GABs. Disseminate updated civilian protection advisories, including specific guidance on shrapnel munitions.
6. Exploit RF Vulnerabilities in Information Operations: Develop and execute a targeted information operations (IO) campaign highlighting RF's new reliance on FAB-3000 as an indicator of heavy ground losses and a failure to achieve objectives by conventional means. Simultaneously, continue IO campaigns targeting RF military personnel and their families, exploiting internal appeals for equipment (e.g., Starlink, drones), confirmed logistical issues (e.g., dry rations investigation), and perceived systemic failures in military supply to erode morale and encourage defection. Counter RF claims of civilian infrastructure as military targets by widely disseminating evidence of civilian casualties and damage. Leverage the An-24 incident and Sochi flight disruptions to highlight RF internal chaos and the consequences of their conflict for their own population.

---

// END OF REPORT //