Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Ukraine General: Persistent missile and UAV threat across Ukraine.
  • Odesa Oblast: Confirmed destruction of a residential 9-story building and the Pryvoz market due to RF drone attacks. Multiple videos and photos show significant fires, structural damage, and ongoing emergency response efforts. Preliminary reports indicate civilian casualties (3 injured at Pryvoz, with total casualties from the residential building impact unknown but likely higher given the scale of damage). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for drone attack, HIGH for significant damage to market and residential building, HIGH for civilian casualties). RF sources (Colonelcassad) acknowledge "arrival" at Pryvoz market. Further images from ASTRA and RBK-Ukraina confirm widespread debris, significant structural collapse in the residential building, and ongoing emergency services operations.
  • Dnipropetrovsk Oblast: Two UAVs confirmed shot down by UAF Air Command "East" (Pvk Skhid) over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Donetsk Oblast (Pokrovsk Axis): RF sources (TASS, Marochko) claim RF forces are advancing near Redkodub and fighting for three surrounding settlements: Karpovka, Glushchenkovo, and Novy Mir. Rybar's video message explicitly claims RF capture of Novotoretskoye and advancements towards Rodinskoye, and into forest belts east of Razino. This indicates sustained and expanding ground operations. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM for claims of control, HIGH for RF intent to advance and actual ground movement based on Rybar).
  • Cherkasy Oblast: Seven individuals, including a child, injured from RF missile attack. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kharkiv Oblast: RF sources (Poddubny) claim "North" group continued creating a "security strip" in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts on July 23rd, reporting significant UAF losses (80 personnel, 8 units of technology in Sumy direction; 30 personnel, 3 units of technology in Kharkiv direction including BBM 'Kozak', 'Pikaly', and 5x drone launch platforms). First operational use of a FAB-3000 M-54 UMPK against a Ukrainian strongpoint in Lyptsi. While a near miss (10-15m), it caused catastrophic damage to the target structure and adjacent buildings. Positional fighting continues in Vovchansk with no significant changes to the FLOT. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for FAB-3000 use and impact, LOW for verification of claimed losses or territorial gains without UAF confirmation, HIGH for RF claims).
  • Zaporizhzhia Oblast: 43-year-old woman injured in Vassilyvskyi district due to hostile attack. Air raid alert lifted in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kryvyi Rih: Situation assessed as controlled as of morning 240725Z. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russia:
  • Krasnodar Krai (Sochi): Multiple videos from Ukrainian sources (Tsaplienko, Shef Hayabusa, ASTRA) show large explosions and fires, particularly in the vicinity of a "Lukoil-Yugnefteprodukt Sochinskaya oil depot" (Sochi oil depot). RF MoD (ASTRA) claims 39 Ukrainian UAVs were shot down over the Black and Azov Seas and Krasnodar Krai. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for drone attacks and explosions/fires, HIGH for RF AD activity, MEDIUM for specific target verification, MEDIUM for claimed number of interceptions by RF).
  • Kursk Oblast: Russian official Khinshtein signed a resolution on payments of 195,000 rubles to residents of Kursk Oblast forced to leave homes due to property damage from Ukrainian attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Khabarovsk: City administration declares state of emergency due to severe storm and heavy rain on 22 July. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for natural disaster, NO MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE).
  • Krasnogorsk: Restoration work on "Crocus City Hall" facade underway. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for civilian reconstruction, NO MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• RF (Khabarovsk): Severe storm and heavy rain on 22 July. No direct military impact. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• No other new significant weather or environmental factors reported directly impacting operations within the past hour. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF: Air defense (AD) remains on high alert nationwide, actively engaging and responding to missile and UAV threats (2 UAVs shot down over Dnipropetrovsk). Emergency services are actively responding to significant civilian infrastructure damage and casualties in Odesa and Zaporizhzhia. UAF General Staff provides updated RF loss figures and situational reports (08:00 24.07.2025). The 199th Air Assault Forces (DSHV) training center is actively conducting operations/training, as per their official channel. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RFU: Continues deep strike operations targeting Ukrainian territory with UAVs (Odesa, Zaporizhzhia) and missiles (Cherkasy, Kharkiv FAB-3000). RF is aggressively promoting claimed battlefield successes in Kharkiv/Sumy and Donetsk oblasts, with specific claims of advances on the Pokrovsk axis. RF AD actively engaged in defending its territory against Ukrainian UAV attacks (Krasnodar Krai, Crimea). RF is conducting prisoner exchanges and launching information operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for general actions, MEDIUM for specific RF claimed successes until UAF confirmation, HIGH for FAB-3000 use).
• RF (Domestic Security): RF Ministry of Internal Affairs reports increased fraud targeting students and applicants. Khabarovsk Police warn about phone scams. These reflect internal challenges. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:
  • Enhanced Deep Strike Capacity (UAV/Missile/GAB): RF continues to demonstrate widespread and damaging UAV (Shahed) and missile attacks against Ukrainian urban centers. The confirmed operational use of the FAB-3000 M-54 UMPK in Kharkiv signifies a substantial increase in destructive power and standoff strike capability, representing a new level of threat to fortified positions and C2 nodes. This confirms a high volume of these munitions are available for conversion and deployment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Escalated Offensive Operations (Pokrovsk Axis): RF forces have transitioned from dismounted infantry actions to larger, coordinated company-sized mechanized assaults (elements of 76th VDV Division) on the Pokrovsk axis. This demonstrates improved combined arms coordination and intent for more substantial territorial gains. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Persistent Offensive Pressure (Kharkiv/Sumy): RF forces claim continued creation of a "security strip" and report significant UAF losses, indicating sustained offensive pressure. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM, based on RF claims)
  • Intensified ISR/EW (Southern Axis): A significant surge in RF Orlan-10/30 and ZALA UAV sorties, coupled with intensified ELINT collection, indicates intelligence preparation of the battlespace, likely preceding a future offensive operation or deep strike campaign. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Adaptive Homeland Defense: RF claims success in downing 39 UAVs over southern Russia and the seas, demonstrating significant AD capability, even as Ukrainian sources show evidence of impacts (Sochi oil depot). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Warfare & Domestic Control: RF leverages state media (TASS, milbloggers, Rybar) to disseminate narratives of military success and internal stability (prisoner exchange, fighting internal crime/fraud). They also utilize compensation payments for affected civilians to manage public sentiment in border regions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intentions:
  • Degrade Ukrainian Combat Potential and Civilian Morale: Maintain high-tempo missile/UAV/GAB attacks to exhaust AD, disrupt logistics, and inflict casualties, particularly targeting central and eastern Ukrainian regions. The confirmed targeting of civilian infrastructure (Odesa market, residential building) and the use of FAB-3000 against strongpoints directly supports this intent to degrade defenses and resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Achieve Tactical Breakthroughs on Key Axes: Intensify ground operations on the Pokrovsk axis using mechanized units to achieve significant breakthroughs, potentially targeting the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka supply route. Continue offensive actions in Kharkiv/Sumy to push back Ukrainian forces and establish claimed "security strips." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Pre-position for Future Offensives: Utilize intensified ISR and ELINT on the Southern Axis to identify targets and prepare for future offensive operations or deep strike campaigns. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Protect Domestic Infrastructure: Prioritize AD and counter-UAS measures to defend against Ukrainian long-range UAV attacks on its territory, particularly critical energy infrastructure (Sochi oil depot). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Manage Domestic Narrative: Continue to project an image of successful military operations and governmental care for its citizens (e.g., payments for displaced persons, prisoner exchanges), while downplaying the impact of Ukrainian strikes on RF territory. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Confirmed FAB-3000 Deployment: The operational use of the FAB-3000 M-54 in Kharkiv represents a significant escalation in RF tactical aviation capabilities, providing a powerful tool for destroying hardened targets at standoff ranges. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Shift to Mechanized Assaults on Pokrovsk Axis: The transition from dismounted infantry to company-sized mechanized assaults, notably involving the 76th VDV Division, indicates a move towards higher-tempo, more decisive ground operations. This suggests a re-evaluation of tactics or an increased confidence in coordinating combined arms. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intensified ISR/ELINT Ahead of Operations: The surge in UAV and ELINT activity on the Southern Axis is a clear adaptation, indicating systematic intelligence preparation of the battlespace. This points to a more structured and deliberate approach to future operations in that sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Confirmed Civilian Infrastructure Targeting in Odesa: Direct hits on Pryvoz market and a residential 9-story building in Odesa confirm RF's continued willingness to target civilian areas with drones, potentially aiming for psychological effect and to degrade civilian resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Sustained Drone Attacks on Critical Infrastructure within RF: Multiple video confirmations of impacts and fires at the Sochi oil depot despite RF AD claims suggest a persistent Ukrainian capability to bypass or overwhelm RF defenses in certain areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• Munitions Access (GABs): The confirmed use of the FAB-3000 suggests a sustained, or possibly increasing, capacity for RF to produce and/or convert large-caliber bombs with UMPK kits, posing a significant challenge to UAF. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Munitions Access (UAV/Missile): Persistent and widespread missile and UAV strikes confirm continued access to these munitions for deep strike operations. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Homefront Stability Efforts: Payments to displaced Kursk residents and reports on combating internal fraud suggest RF is investing resources in maintaining domestic stability and citizen loyalty, indicating an awareness of the indirect impact of conflict on the populace. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Unit-Level Sustainment (Previous Report): Continued appeals for drones by RF milbloggers (Colonelcassad) underscore potential localized equipment shortages, particularly for specialized ISR assets. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• Responsive Air Operations: The continued and precise nature of UAV and missile targeting against multiple Ukrainian oblasts, and the apparent successful deployment of the FAB-3000, indicates centralized and responsive C2 for RF aerial operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ground Operations C2 (Pokrovsk): The observed shift to coordinated company-sized mechanized assaults on the Pokrovsk axis demonstrates improved tactical C2 and coordination between different combat arms elements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• ISR/ELINT Coordination: The surge in ISR and ELINT activity on the Southern Axis, coupled with an operational pause on the ground, suggests effective C2 in preparing for future operations through intelligence gathering. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Domestic Security C2: The reported repulsion of drone attacks on Krasnodar Krai and Crimea demonstrates effective local C2 and AD coordination within RF territory, despite acknowledged challenges in specific areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Air Defense (AD) Posture: Remains highly vigilant and engaged nationwide. Successful interception of 2 UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast demonstrates continued AD effectiveness. However, the scale of damage in Odesa and Cherkasy, and the successful impact of a FAB-3000 near Lyptsi, indicates AD saturation or gaps against persistent and evolving RF strike capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ground Forces Posture (Pokrovsk): UAF forces on the Pokrovsk axis are facing increasingly coordinated mechanized assaults. While successfully repelling recent attacks and destroying RF armor, this shift necessitates a heightened defensive posture and readiness to counter combined arms breaches. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Civilian Response: Civilian populations continue to respond to alerts. Emergency services are actively engaged in rescue, firefighting, and humanitarian assistance in heavily impacted areas (Odesa, Cherkasy, Zaporizhzhia). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Training & Readiness: The 199th Air Assault Forces (DSHV) training center activity indicates continued training and readiness efforts despite ongoing combat operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes:
  • AD Engagements: Two UAVs successfully intercepted over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Prisoner Exchange: Return of Ukrainian military personnel from captivity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Situational Control: Kryvyi Rih remains controlled. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Repulsion of Mechanized Assaults: UAF forces on the Pokrovsk axis successfully repelled at least two company-sized mechanized assaults, destroying 3x T-80 tanks and 5x BMP/BMD IFVs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Setbacks:
  • Civilian Casualties and Infrastructure Damage: Significant civilian casualties (7 in Cherkasy, 3+ in Odesa) and extensive damage to civilian infrastructure (Odesa residential building and market) highlight the persistent vulnerability to RF strikes and the limits of current AD coverage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • FAB-3000 Impact: The deployment and impact of the FAB-3000 near Lyptsi demonstrates a new, highly destructive threat to UAF strongpoints and hardened positions, even with near misses. This poses a significant challenge to existing defensive infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Persistent UAV Threat: Confirmed mass drone attack on Odesa and Zaporizhzhia, coupled with a general threat across Ukraine, indicates the enduring and widespread nature of this threat, requiring sustained AD effort. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Frontline Pressure (Pokrovsk): RF's shift to larger mechanized assaults indicates increased pressure on UAF defensive lines, requiring significant resources and tactical adaptation to hold ground. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Critical Needs (Air Defense): Continued and expedited supply of air defense systems and interceptor missiles (especially against Shaheds and high-altitude GAB platforms) remains paramount to counter persistent RF missile, UAV, and GAB threats, particularly for urban areas and frontline strongpoints that are proving vulnerable. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Counter-GAB Defenses: Urgent requirement for effective countermeasures against large guided bombs (FAB-1500/3000), including enhanced electronic warfare (EW) capabilities to disrupt UMPK guidance, or deeper strike capabilities against launch platforms and airfields. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Anti-Armor Assets: Allocation of additional anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) systems, FPV drones, and rapid deployment of scatterable mines is critical to counter the escalating mechanized threat on the Pokrovsk axis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Civilian Protection: Increased frequency and severity of civilian infrastructure damage (Odesa) necessitate enhanced support for local emergency services with equipment, training, and personnel, including search and rescue capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Counter-Offensive Capability: Maintaining current UAF force posture on all axes while resisting RF advances and preparing for potential future offensive operations will require sustained Western military aid, especially precision munitions and armored vehicles. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Propaganda (Domestic): TASS continues to promote RF military successes (e.g., claimed territorial gains in Donetsk, "security strip" creation in Kharkiv/Sumy, successful AD interceptions, reconstruction efforts at Crocus City Hall) to project an image of effectiveness. The repatriation of RF soldiers is used to bolster morale and demonstrate state care. Internal reporting on fraud and social issues (e.g., declining alcoholism rates in Russia, Khabarovsk storm response) aims to project an image of a functioning, law-abiding state. Rybar actively promotes RF territorial gains on the Pokrovsk axis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Propaganda (External/Hybrid): RF milbloggers like Poddubny disseminate unverified battlefield claims and UAF loss figures. TASS disseminates negative reports about Ukrainian leadership, citing Politico as a source, to sow discord and undermine international support for Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian Information: Ukrainian authorities (DSNS, Military Administrations, Operativny ZSU, Tsaplienko, RBK-Ukraina, General Staff) are promptly reporting civilian casualties and infrastructure damage from RF attacks, emphasizing Russian aggression and the need for international support. UAF General Staff publishes daily RF loss statistics. Ukrainian channels are highlighting the impact of attacks on Russian territory (Sochi oil depot). Sternenko's "Death to Russians!" message indicates continued strong anti-RF sentiment within Ukraine. UAF official channels (DSHV) highlight troop training and morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Internal Dissension (Previous Report): The personal testimony from Vasily Andreyev from the Luhansk region, expressing disillusionment and perceived lack of support from RF command, could be used by Ukraine for counter-propaganda purposes to target RF morale. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Ukraine: Public remains under severe stress due to persistent air raid alerts and devastating missile/UAV/GAB threats, as evidenced by mass casualties and destruction in Odesa and Cherkasy, and the new threat of FAB-3000. This will likely increase calls for more robust air defense capabilities and international support. However, resilience remains high, as evidenced by continued emergency response and morale messaging from UAF. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russia: Public in affected areas (Krasnodar Krai, Kursk Oblast) experiences alarm due to drone attacks, leading to state-sponsored compensation programs to mitigate negative sentiment. The return of RF military personnel from captivity will be a morale boost domestically. Official messaging attempts to project stability and success. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Military Personnel: The previous report of public appeals for drones by RF units and the testimony from Vasily Andreyev continue to suggest potential for localized low morale and disillusionment among RF military personnel, particularly concerning logistical support. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• China-EU Relations (RF narrative): TASS reports on Xi Jinping's call for "foresight and correct strategic decisions" between China and EU leaders amidst global changes, likely framing RF as a stabilizing force or promoting a multi-polar world order. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for RF narrative).
• No other new international support or diplomatic developments reported within the past hour directly impacting the conflict, beyond the prisoner exchange. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

1. Sustained Deep Strike Campaign with Escalated Lethality: RF will continue to launch high-speed UAV (Shahed), missile, and increasingly, guided aerial bomb (GAB, including FAB-3000) attacks at key Ukrainian oblasts (e.g., Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Cherkasy, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv) to exhaust UAF AD resources, inflict maximum damage on infrastructure, and degrade civilian and military morale. Targeting of fortified strongpoints with FAB-3000 will become more frequent. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • INDICATORS: Continued air raid alerts across central, northern, and southern Ukraine; reports of explosions and civilian casualties in urban centers; active AD engagements; confirmation of further Shahed/missile/GAB attacks on Odesa, Zaporizhzhia, or Kharkiv. RF tactical aviation will be highly active.
2. Intensified Mechanized Offensive on Pokrovsk Axis: RF forces will continue and likely intensify coordinated company-to-battalion sized mechanized assaults in Donetsk (Pokrovsk axis, particularly around Novotoretskoye, Rodinskoye, and areas east of Razino), supported by heavy indirect fire and GABs, attempting to achieve tactical breakthroughs towards the main Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka supply route (T0504). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • INDICATORS: Increased frequency and scale of mechanized ground assaults; higher rates of armor and IFV losses on both sides; increased reports of tactical aviation activity and GAB launches in the Pokrovsk sector; RF claims of further territorial advances.
3. Intelligence Preparation for Southern Offensive/Strikes: RF will sustain or increase ISR and ELINT collection over the Orikhiv-Robotyne salient and surrounding areas. This activity will likely precede standoff strikes (missile/drone) against identified UAF C2, logistics, or air defense nodes within the next 48-72 hours. A major ground offensive in this sector is less likely in this immediate timeframe but remains a mid-term possibility. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • INDICATORS: Continued high volume of RF ISR UAV sorties; detection of intensified ELINT signatures; subsequent increase in precision strikes in the Orikhiv sector; continued ground operational pause in this sector.
4. Enhanced Domestic Defense and Information Operations: RF will maintain and potentially enhance AD and counter-UAS measures in its border regions and deep within its territory, especially near critical infrastructure (e.g., oil depots). Ukrainian long-range UAV attacks on RF territory will persist. RF will continue its robust information campaigns to control the domestic narrative and counter Ukrainian successes or narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
   • INDICATORS: Continued reports from RF sources of successful drone interceptions; public warnings in RF cities against filming AD activities; continued Ukrainian targeting of RF logistics/industrial sites; sustained state media focus on RF successes and domestic stability.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

1. Massed GAB/Missile Strike Overwhelming Key Defenses: RF could launch a highly coordinated and numerous ballistic/cruise missile and GAB (including FAB-3000) attack targeting multiple critical energy, transportation, or military infrastructure nodes (e.g., major barracks, large ammunition depots) across several Ukrainian oblasts simultaneously, aiming to overwhelm AD in specific sectors and cause widespread, cascading disruption. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
   • INDICATORS: Simultaneous detection of multiple missile and UAV types from various vectors; sustained waves of attacks over several hours; targeting of specific energy facilities, railway junctions, or identified UAF command posts/reserve concentrations.
2. Decisive Breakthrough on Pokrovsk Axis: RF forces could consolidate and launch a multi-battalion mechanized offensive on the Pokrovsk axis with overwhelming tactical aviation (including FAB-3000) and heavy MLRS support, aiming for a significant operational breakthrough that could cut the main Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka supply route or encircle UAF forces. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
   • INDICATORS: Massing of armor and infantry formations; pre-assault artillery and air preparation sustained for several hours; attempts to breach multiple defensive lines simultaneously; increased RF special forces activity on the ground.
3. Simultaneous Multi-Axis Offensive: RF could launch coordinated ground offensives on two or more axes (e.g., Pokrovsk and a renewed significant push in Kharkiv/Kupyansk or Southern axis) to stretch UAF reserves and prevent reinforcement, aiming for larger strategic gains. This would be a significant escalation of ground operations. (CONFIDENCE: LOW-MEDIUM)
   • INDICATORS: Confirmation of sustained multi-battalion attacks on widely separated axes; increased movement of RF operational reserves; simultaneous GAB/MLRS preparatory fires on multiple fronts.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

• Next 6-12 Hours (Until 240900Z JUL 25): High probability of continued UAV and missile threats across Ukraine, particularly in southern and central regions (Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Cherkasy) and the application of GABs in Kharkiv. Expect continued RF ground pressure and claimed advances in Donetsk and Kharkiv/Sumy Oblasts, with increased emphasis on mechanized assaults on the Pokrovsk axis. Active AD engagements and emergency responses will continue. RF AD will remain active against Ukrainian drone attacks on its territory. Intensified ISR/ELINT activity on the Southern Axis will persist. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Decision Point (UAF): Sustain AD readiness and maintain public alert systems. Prioritize allocation of mobile AD assets to areas under immediate missile/UAV/GAB threat. Continue rapid response to civilian impacts. Immediately verify and counter RF claims of territorial gains in Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy. Prepare for and counter sustained mechanized assaults on the Pokrovsk axis with ATGM and FPV drone teams. Implement strict EMCON for units in the Orikhiv sector.
• Next 24-48 Hours (Until 260300Z JUL 25): RF will likely continue to probe Ukrainian AD with missile and UAV attacks, and increase FAB-3000 deployment in target-rich environments. Expect persistent GAB and intensified heavy MLRS deployments on eastern axes, directly supporting escalating ground operations, particularly mechanized pushes. RF will continue its information operations. The internal situation within Russia regarding drone attacks (Sochi) and domestic challenges will continue to be managed by the RF state apparatus. Standoff strikes are likely on the Southern Axis following ISR. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Decision Point (UAF): Continue monitoring RF deep strike patterns and adapt AD deployment accordingly, with specific focus on GAB defense. Prepare for enhanced hardening and dispersal measures against large guided bombs and heavy MLRS. Intensify counter-information efforts to maintain public morale and cohesion. Exploit RF unit-level logistics issues in psychological operations (PSYOPs). Review and adjust defensive lines on the Pokrovsk axis to counter coordinated mechanized breakthroughs. Prepare for potential standoff strikes on the Southern Axis and adjust AD posture accordingly.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

1. RF FAB-3000 M-54 Capabilities and Deployment:
   • Gap: Current inventory and production rate of the FAB-3000 M-54 and its associated UMPK kit. Precise launch parameters (altitude, speed, range) and electronic warfare vulnerabilities. Whether there are dedicated Su-34 units or specific airfields specialized for FAB-3000 deployment.
   • Collection Requirements: SIGINT/ELINT on RF tactical aviation communications and radar signatures. IMINT/GEOINT of airfields in Belgorod, Voronezh, Kursk Oblasts for presence of Su-34s and GAB storage/loading. TECHINT on recovered FAB-3000 fragments/UMPK components. HUMINT from captured RF aircrews or defectors.
2. RF Mechanized Force Composition and Intent (Pokrovsk Axis):
   • Gap: Full order of battle, specific unit assignments (beyond 76th VDV elements), and current readiness of RF mechanized groupings on the Pokrovsk Axis. Confirmation of their logistical sustainment for prolonged, high-tempo offensive operations.
   • Collection Requirements: IMINT/GEOINT for force concentrations, movement patterns, and logistics nodes. SIGINT on RF ground unit communications. HUMINT from UAF frontline units and captured RF personnel.
3. Objective of RF ISR/ELINT Surge (Southern Axis):
   • Gap: Is the intensified ISR collection primarily targeting UAF C2 and AD for a future deep strike campaign, or is it intelligence preparation for a ground offensive? Identification of specific target sets.
   • Collection Requirements: SIGINT to intercept RF intelligence analysis and targeting communications. ELINT to characterize RF ground-based C2 and AD systems targeted. IMINT/GEOINT for any subtle changes in RF ground force dispositions in the area. HUMINT from local populations.
4. Assessment of Odesa Attack Damage and Weapon Type:
   • Gap: Full assessment of the extent of damage to the residential building and Pryvoz market in Odesa. Definitive identification of the weapon system(s) used (Shahed-136, cruise missile, ballistic missile, or combination) and their precise impact points to understand RF targeting precision and intent.
   • Collection Requirements: Forensics by local authorities, detailed damage assessment reports. IMINT/GEOINT of strike locations. TECHINT on drone/missile fragments if available. OSINT monitoring of local eyewitness accounts.
5. RF Unit-Level Logistics Status and Personnel Morale:
   • Gap: The extent to which RF units are relying on non-governmental funding and supply for critical equipment (e.g., drones, EW). Is this an isolated incident for specific units or indicative of systemic issues affecting combat effectiveness across the front?
   • Collection Requirements: OSINT monitoring of additional RF social media channels for similar appeals. HUMINT from captured RF personnel or defectors regarding supply chain issues and unit morale. SIGINT on internal RF logistics communications.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Prioritize and Deploy Counter-GAB Capabilities: Immediately review and accelerate deployment of capabilities to counter FAB-1500/3000. This includes enhancing EW systems to disrupt UMPK guidance, and exploring options for long-range strikes (e.g., ATACMS, Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG) against RF tactical aviation airfields and maintenance facilities (Belgorod, Voronezh, Kursk Oblasts) where these bombs are likely prepared/launched.
2. Strengthen Anti-Armor Defenses on Pokrovsk Axis: Expedite the allocation of additional FPV drone teams, anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) systems, and remote mining capabilities to units defending the Pokrovsk axis. Implement dynamic, layered anti-armor defenses focusing on RF's likely avenues of approach for mechanized assaults. Conduct immediate training on countering combined arms breaches.
3. Enhance Air Defense and Hardening for Urban Centers and Strongpoints: Immediately re-prioritize and deploy additional mobile Air Defense assets, particularly those effective against UAVs and high-altitude targets, to vulnerable urban centers like Odesa, Zaporizhzhia, and frontline strongpoints in Kharkiv. Implement enhanced multi-layered AD strategies to counter saturation attacks. Review and strengthen hardening protocols for critical infrastructure and military strongpoints.
4. Implement Aggressive OPSEC and Counter-ISR on Southern Axis: Advise all UAF units in the Orikhiv-Robotyne salient to implement strict EMCON (Emission Control) to deny RF ELINT. Aggressively task UAF counter-UAV assets and AD systems to target and neutralize RF ISR platforms (Orlan-10/30, ZALA) operating over this sector. Prepare for imminent standoff strikes against C2 and AD.
5. Intensify Civilian Protection and Emergency Response: Allocate additional resources (heavy equipment, specialized training, medical supplies, personnel) to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS), particularly for urban search and rescue, structural integrity assessments, firefighting, and mass casualty response in areas frequently targeted by missiles, UAVs, and GABs. Disseminate updated civilian protection advisories.
6. Exploit RF Vulnerabilities in Information Operations: Develop and execute a targeted information operations (IO) campaign highlighting RF's new reliance on FAB-3000 as an indicator of heavy ground losses and a failure to achieve objectives by conventional means. Simultaneously, continue IO campaigns targeting RF military personnel and their families, exploiting internal appeals for equipment and perceived systemic failures in military supply to erode morale.

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// END OF REPORT //