Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 220600Z JUL 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Ukraine General: Nationwide air raid alerts for missile threats have been lifted. Localized Shahed UAV threats persist for Lviv Oblast, Southern Ukraine, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Samarskyi, Kamianskyi districts, also Eastern Dnipropetrovsk, heading NW), and Kharkiv Oblast. Confirmed civilian casualties: Ivano-Frankivsk (4), Kyiv (9 injured, 1 fatality), Chernivtsi (4), Zaporizhzhia (2), Dnipropetrovsk (2), Sloviansk (4), and Kherson (7 injured). Total confirmed fatalities are 13, with multiple injuries. Rescue and emergency services are actively engaged across multiple oblasts, including Kyiv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Kherson. Confirmed civilian infrastructure damage in Odesa due to RF UAV attack, including administrative building, vehicles, and windows blown out in residential buildings. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Northern Ukraine (Kyiv Oblast): Continued Air Defense (AD) engagement against Shahed UAVs over Kyiv. Kinetic impacts on residential buildings in the Shevchenkivskyi district and "Lvivskyi Kvartal" residential complex, causing structural damage and fires. A commercial building and Lukyanivska metro station entrance also sustained damage. One fatality and nine injuries reported in Kyiv. Firefighters and emergency services are actively engaged; kindergarten fire confirmed. Visuals confirm extensive damage to kiosks and commercial facades. Lukyanivska metro station has fully restored operations. OBA reports consequences in two Kyiv Oblast districts. PS ZSU spokesman Ihnat reports over fifteen direct hits on various objects in Kyiv overnight. Colonelcassad reports three Kinzhal hypersonic missile impacts on enemy targets in Kyiv on 21 July 2025, with video showing multiple explosions and fires in an urban area at night, and claims a direct hit on a Ukrainian kamikaze drone production facility in Kyiv. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Eastern Ukraine: Initial cruise missile group detected over Kharkiv Oblast, moving towards Poltava Oblast. Kharkiv's Kyivskyi district hit by 12 UAV strikes overnight. RF milblogger "Воин DV" claims bomber strikes on UAF forward positions in Yanvarskyi supporting 36th Army advance. New group of RF UAVs reported from Luhansk Oblast moving towards Kharkiv Oblast. Kharkiv Oblast governor, Oleg Sinegubov, confirms strikes on Kharkiv city and 10 settlements. DeepState reports RF advances in Vilne Pole, Andriivka, Popovy Yar, and near three other villages in Donetsk Oblast. MoD Russia provides video claiming liberation of Popov Yar. RF milbloggers claim a new RF front opened in Kharkiv Oblast, aiming to stretch UAF reserves. Russian military operations confirmed near Belaya Gora in Donetsk region, with claims of capturing foreign weapons and its significance for logistics to Kostiantynivka. Colonelcassad shares map showing continued positional changes on the front line. UAF National Guard "Khartia" brigade drone operators claimed destruction of nearly a platoon of Russian occupiers in Kharkiv Oblast. A tractor driver was blown up by a mine in Balakliia community, Kharkiv Oblast. At least 54 settlements in Kharkiv Oblast affected by enemy strikes over the past week. STERNENKO claims Border Guard Service 'Phoenix' detachment holding back Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast. Liveuamap Source reports recent clashes at Lyman, Sieversk, Kramatorsk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Huliaipole, and Kherson directions. Ukrainian forces repelled 23 Russian army assaults at Kursk and North Slobozhansky (Sumy) direction. FPV drone strike on Russian UAZ-452 ('Bukhanka') vehicle confirmed. Perovske, Zolochiv community, Kharkiv Oblast, shelled. DeepState reports liquidation of RF sabotage groups in Pokrovsk. RF milbloggers claim RF DRG activity in Pokrovsk, with video suggesting an ambush on a UAF vehicle. Threat of aviation munitions for Donetsk and Sumy oblasts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • New Event (Kharkiv Oblast): TASS reports RF forces advanced near Starytsia, Kharkiv Oblast, dislodging UAF units from several positions. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Central Ukraine: Missile group (up to 10) towards Myrhorod district, then passing Poltava towards Kremenсhuk. New missile group from Sumy Oblast also moved towards Poltava Oblast. Another group from Cherkasy Oblast diverted from Kropyvnytskyi, heading towards Zvenyhorodka, Kaniv, and Uman districts, then into Vinnytsia Oblast (Nemryriv, Trostyanets), with a general westward course. Kryvyi Rih reports "situation controlled." Aftermath of attacks in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast confirmed. TASS claims RF forces used FABs against UAF reserve positions in Ivanivka, Dnipropetrovets Oblast. New threat of strike UAVs for Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Samarskyi, Kamianskyi districts). UAV reported on Poltava Oblast, heading southwest. Threat of enemy strike UAVs in Zolotoniskyi and Cherkaskyi districts of Cherkasy Oblast. One fatality in Vinnytsia from 16 July strike. Explosions in Kropyvnytskyi and Kryvyi Rih amid ballistic missile threat. High-speed target on Kropyvnytskyi. Kirovohrad Oblast attacked by ballistic missiles. Nikopol district attacked by artillery, MLRS "Grad," and FPV drones. НгП раZVедка reports on aftermath of strike on preparatory camp in Kropyvnytskyi. UAV threat reported in Eastern Dnipropetrovsk, heading northwest. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Western Ukraine: Cruise missiles confirmed from Vinnytsia Oblast to Khmelnytskyi Oblast. Main group in southern Khmelnytskyi Oblast, then entered Ternopil Oblast, Chernivtsi Oblast (AD engaging, 4 fatalities confirmed), and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast (explosions, damage, casualties). Kinzhal hypersonic missile launched from MiG-31K tracked towards Starokostiantyniv, then Ternopil/Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts, with confirmed explosions and casualties. Mayor of Ivano-Frankivsk confirmed infrastructure damage. Three Shahed UAVs approaching Ivano-Frankivsk reported intercepted. Damage to kindergarten and university in Lviv. Damaged residential buildings (20 private houses) in Kamianets-Podilskyi district, Khmelnytskyi Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Southern Ukraine: New Shahed UAVs detected in Black Sea, heading towards Pivdenne/Koblevo (8 inbound). RF strike on Vasylivskyi district, Zaporizhzhia Oblast, resulted in 2 fatalities, 1 wounded. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast reports 7 UAVs shot down. Missile threat active for Zaporizhzhia Oblast. UAF 44th Artillery Brigade successfully targeted an RF 2A65 Msta-B. Colonelcassad claims missile strike on Ukrainian gas platform in Black Sea. Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration provides video of drones provided as aid. TASS reports parts of a downed UAF UAV fell on a kindergarten and Ministry of Emergency Situations in Berdyansk. Launches of KABs in Zaporizhzhia Oblast confirmed. UAV threat for Kherson, Zaporizhzhia (Nikopolskyi district), and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts from the south. 4 new Shahed UAVs from Zaporizhzhia Oblast heading towards Pavlohrad. New groups of Shahed UAVs from Black Sea heading towards Mykolaiv and Odesa Oblasts. Odesa Oblast AD engaged 10 Shahed UAVs over Black Sea; 12 Shahed UAVs confirmed approaching Odesa from the sea. Explosions heard in Odesa. CONFIRMED CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE IN ODESA DUE TO RF UAV ATTACK. RBC-Ukraine provides photo evidence of significant civilian infrastructure damage in Odesa following the recent RF UAV attack, including destroyed vehicles, debris, and extensive damage to an administrative building and nearby residential properties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Update: New video evidence from RBC-Ukraine and Operatyvnyi ZSU further confirms the extensive damage to civilian infrastructure in Odesa, showing burned cars and a damaged residential building, indicating significant kinetic effects in a populated urban area. Firefighters are actively engaged in response. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • New Event (Herson Oblast): TASS reports on Russian Group "Dnepr" UAV calculation with FPV drones destroying a Ukrainian D-20 howitzer on the right bank of Kherson Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • New Event (Mariupol): TASS reports that the Mariupol port is operating with sufficient staff for current workload, despite being understaffed according to official schedule. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russia: Temporary flight restrictions at Sheremetyevo, Vnukovo, Domodedovo, and Zhukovsky airports have been lifted. Restrictions also lifted at Nizhny Novgorod airport. RF milbloggers gloat about Kyiv impacts, claiming "precision" of strikes. Moscow Mayor Sobyanin claims 18 UAVs shot down over Moscow; RF MoD claims 23 UAVs over Moscow, and a total of 74 Ukrainian UAVs destroyed overnight. Falling UAV debris on railway station in Rostov Oblast delayed over 50 passenger trains. Fire at Kamianolomni railway station, Rostov Oblast confirmed. Belgorod governor reports 2 civilian injuries from UAF UAV attack. Flooding reported in Moscow streets. Fires reported in Rostov and Moscow oblasts after UAV hits. TASS reports a Moldovan national detained in Ryazan confessed to transmitting data on RF Armed Forces to Kyiv. TASS reports a man detained in St. Petersburg for collecting information on RF MoD facilities. TASS reports RF MoD claims 14 Ukrainian UAVs shot down over Kaluga, Bryansk, Tula, and Oryol Oblasts. Crimean Bridge queue reached 2000 vehicles. TASS reports RF MoD claims 25 Ukrainian UAVs shot down over RF regions between 16:00 and 22:00 MSK, with 12 over Rostov Oblast and 8 over Bryansk Oblast. Memorial for 5-year old boy in Kursk indicates civilian casualties. Millerovo military airfield in Rostov Oblast attacked by drones, causing explosions/fires. Temporary flight restrictions at Saratov airport have been lifted. Kaluga airport has lifted temporary restrictions. TASS reports foreigners can enter RF without RuID registration. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Update (Samara): Rosaviatsiya reports that restrictions have been lifted at Samara airport. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • New Event (Rostov-on-Don): TASS reports a UAV attack was repelled in Rostov-on-Don, Millerovo, Donetsk (Rostov Oblast), and Azov district, with no casualties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Sumy Oblast: RF conducted a strike on Sumy community's Kovpakivskyi district. Two explosions heard, likely from KABs, impacting residential area and causing damage to apartment building. Three injured, now increased to 12. Emergency services on site. 5 multi-story buildings, a shopping center, and 18 cars damaged. Threat of aviation munitions for Donetsk and Sumy oblasts. Colonelcassad reports "Anvar" unit operating in the border areas of Sumy and Chernihiv Oblasts, providing drone footage of UAF positions, including trenches, dugouts, personnel, and a communication tower, indicating continued RF reconnaissance and targeting efforts in these border regions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Ukraine General: Night operations continue to provide low visibility, favoring RF UAV and missile saturation tactics. Kharkiv Oblast expects worsening weather (heavy rains, thunderstorms), which could impact ground operations and visibility. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russia: Heavy rainfall in Moscow Oblast indicates adverse weather conditions within RF territory, potentially impacting logistics or internal movements. Bridge collapse in Moscow region due to heavy rains confirmed, cutting off villages. Significant flooding confirmed in Moscow. TASS reports 15 "Tavriya" trains delayed in communication with Crimea. Train delays at Paveletsky Station due to weather. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF:
  • Air Defense (AD): Fully engaged nationwide against a multi-vector RF aerial assault, including Tu-95MS launched cruise missiles (24 confirmed), ballistic missiles, Kinzhal hypersonic missiles from MiG-31K, and OWA UAVs (Shahed, 426 confirmed). AD actively tracked multiple missile groups across Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, Chernivtsi, and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts. Kyiv AD actively engaged approximately 10 inbound Shaheds and multiple missiles. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast AD shot down 7 UAVs. President Zelenskyy reports UAF AD destroyed over 20 missiles and the "overwhelming majority" of drones (344 of 623 total aerial targets). Southern Defense Forces report 18 Shaheds destroyed in their operational zone. New group of RF UAVs reported from Luhansk Oblast towards Kharkiv. Air Force reports 224 targets shot down/suppressed, with 203 UAVs not reaching targets due to loss of localization/REB. Germany to provide 5 Patriot systems and ammunition. Norway ready to provide significant additional funding for Ukraine's air defense. UAF AF reports UAV threat for Kharkiv Oblast. Sili Oborony Pivdnya Ukraїny video shows Ukrainian soldiers operating a ZU-23 anti-aircraft gun mounted on a truck countering Russian Shahed drones in Mykolaiv area, claiming over 30 air targets neutralized. Николаевский Ванёк reports "minus" on Shahed UAVs ("mopeds") for now. Air Defense is active in Odesa, engaging Shahed UAVs from the Black Sea. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Emergency Services: Medical teams dispatched to multiple districts in Kyiv and other affected oblasts. Rescue efforts underway for confirmed fatalities and casualties. Firefighters actively engaged. Minister of Internal Affairs reports 15 fires due to Russian shelling, 13 liquidated. KMVA confirms rescue and emergency work ongoing nationwide. Cleanup and emergency services are working in Sumy. Confirmed images and videos from RBC-Ukraine and Operatyvnyi ZSU show State Emergency Service (DSNS) personnel actively engaged in firefighting and damage assessment operations in Odesa following RF UAV attacks. This confirms a high level of preparedness and response capability from Ukrainian emergency services. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Control Measures: Nationwide air raid alerts for missile threats lifted, localized drone alerts persist. Public warnings for shelter ongoing. Kyiv City Military Administration (KMVA) providing updates; metro red line partially suspended, Lukyanivska station now fully reopened. Temporary changes to Kyiv bus/trolleybus routes. Cabinet of Ministers officially reorganized ministries. Brig. Gen. Hennadiy Shapovalov appointed new commander of UAF Ground Forces. President Zelenskyy addressed Ukrainian diplomats on protecting Ukrainian life and inflicting pain on Russia. Ukraine plans to open four new embassies. Zelenskyy states new negotiations with Russia planned for Wednesday in Istanbul. Odesa Oblast Military Administration calls for residents to take shelter due to incoming Shaheds. ZAPORIZHZHIYA OBLAST MILITARY ADMINISTRATION HAS LIFTED AIR RAID ALERT. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Security Services: SBU and OGP conducting special operation to "neutralize Russian influence on NABU." Detention of NABU detective head (Ruslan Magamedrasulov) suspected of aiding RF and doing business in RF confirmed. Court ordered detention of MP from banned OPZZh party (Fedir Khristenko) suspected of being FSB agent. Over 70 searches conducted. SBU initiated comprehensive check on adherence to state secrets legislation in SAP. General Director of "Forests of Ukraine" served suspicion for illegal enrichment. General Director of "Rostec" and assistant to aggressor state leadership notified of suspicion. Detention of NABU elite unit "D-2" employee suspected of spying for Russian special services confirmed. President Zelenskyy emphasized need for legal architecture to hold Russia accountable for war. Ukraine returned a teenager forcibly taken from Mariupol to Russia. G7 Ambassadors alarmed by NABU scandal. Ukrainian police helped neutralize pro-Russian hacker network NoName057(16). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Foreign Volunteers: 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade "Magura" claims 2,000 Colombians fighting in its ranks. TASS claims UAF deployed a platoon of "Latin American mercenaries" to Aleksandrovgrad, DNR. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Resource Requirements: UAF National Guard's "Rubizh" brigade crowdfunding for "destroyed property and equipment." Zelenskyy emphasizes need for increased domestic production of weapons and drones (50% within six months). Hundreds of agreements with partners for weapon supply, joint production, and investments. Ukraine needs $6 billion to cover gap in weapons procurement for current year. Britain transferred $200 million of $940 million in air defense assets and artillery shells. Urgent fundraiser for drones for UAF 32nd Steel Brigade. French companies ready to start drone production in Ukraine. Canada will allocate $14.6 million USD for maintenance of Ukrainian tanks and finance Ukrainian defense industry through "Danish model." Canada will allocate $15 million for Leopard 2 tank repairs. NATO can provide additional funding for Ukrainian army, specifically for military motivation and drones. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Training: UAF 61st OMBr tank crews conducting rigorous training. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • UAF 63rd Mechanized Brigade reports liquidation of 33 RF personnel. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • New Event (Chernihiv): Colonelcassad reports and provides video of TCC (Territorial Recruitment Center) personnel in Chernihiv violently detaining a man in handcuffs, forcefully bringing him to the ground. This indicates continued, aggressive mobilization efforts and potential for public discontent. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • New Event (UK Sanctions): The UK has introduced new sanctions against 135 tankers belonging to Russia's "shadow fleet." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RUF:
  • Deep Operations (UAV/Missile/Aviation Munitions): RF executing high-volume, multi-wave, multi-domain deep strike campaign. Included Tu-95MS strategic bomber launches (24 cruise missiles), sustained Shahed UAV attacks (426 total OWA UAVs), and re-engagement of MiG-31K for Kinzhal hypersonic missile launches against Western Ukraine (Starokostiantyniv, Ivano-Frankivsk) and now Kyiv (3 Kinzhals). Colonelcassad claims a direct hit on a Ukrainian kamikaze drone production facility in Kyiv. TASS claims RF forces used FABs against UAF reserve positions in Ivanivka, Dnipropetrovets Oblast. Повітряні Сили ЗС України reports KABs on Donetsk Oblast. RF milbloggers gloating about Kyiv impacts, claiming "precision" of strikes. Alex Parker Returns claims missile strike on Black Sea platform. Воин DV shares FPV drone footage claiming successful neutralization of multiple UAF equipment. НгП раZVедка provides summary of "Night strike of retribution." MoD Russia claims grouped strike with high-precision long-range air, ground, and sea-based weapons against Ukrainian military-industrial complex enterprises and military airfield infrastructure. Alex Parker Returns video shows damaged McDonald's restaurant and bank in Kyiv. Liveuamap Source reports Russian aviation conducted airstrikes in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. Воин DV provides video footage of "FABing" by 11th Guards Army Air Force and Air Defense. TASS video shows FPV drone strike destroying UAF BMP-3. Alex Parker Returns explicitly states intent to use "Geranium" (Shaheds) on frontline due to scaled production. MoD Russia video shows Kub loitering munitions, detailing capabilities and warhead size. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Aviation: RF airports lifted temporary restrictions. Moscow Mayor Sobyanin claims 18 UAVs destroyed over Moscow; RF MoD claims 23 UAVs over Moscow region and 74 total UAVs destroyed over RF territory. "Воин DV" claims bomber strikes in Yanvarskyi. TASS confirms Vnukovo airport resumed normal operations. TASS reports RF MoD claims 14 Ukrainian UAVs shot down over Kaluga, Bryansk, Tula, and Oryol Oblasts. Millerovo military airfield in Rostov Oblast attacked by drones, causing explosions/fires. Temporary flight restrictions implemented at Saratov airport. Kaluga airport has lifted temporary restrictions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ground Operations (Popov Yar, Bila Hora claim, Malaya Tokmachka claim): RF Ministry of Defense claims ground forces liberated "Popov Yar." Leonid Sharov claims destruction of UAF M113 BTR and Akatsiya SPG, inflicting over 240 personnel losses in Kupiansk, Lyman, and Kupyansk directions. RF sources claim establishment of bridgehead near Guyevo (Kursk Oblast). TASS claims "liberation of Bila Hora" to cut UAF supply route. DeepState reports RF advances in Vilne Pole, Andriivka, Popovy Yar, and near three other villages in Donetsk Oblast. MoD Russia provides video of servicemen from 102nd Motorised Rifle Regiment on Popov Yar. RF milbloggers claim RF has opened a new front in Kharkiv Oblast. Дневник Десантника🇷🇺 shares thermal imagery video indicating activity on Chasiv Yar direction. Басурин о главном video confirms Russian military operations near Belaya Gora, claiming capture of foreign weapons. Воин DV video claims destruction of UAF 2S1 Gvozdika. Liveuamap Source provides multiple photo messages of clashes at Lyman, Sieversk, Kramatorsk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Huliaipole, and Kherson directions. Liveuamap Source reports Ukrainian forces repelled 23 Russian army assaults at Kursk and North Slobozhansky(Sumy) direction. Colonelcassad claims a Russian breakthrough in Malaya Tokmachka, Zaporizhzhia Oblast. MoD Russia video shows T-72B3M tank crew destroying AFU stronghold near Zeleny Gai. STERNENKO video reports Border Guard Service 'Phoenix' detachment holding back Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast. Colonelcassad claims assault troops of 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade advancing in Bila Hora area. Сили оборони Півдня України video shows drone operators conducting reconnaissance of camouflaged enemy positions. Генеральний штаб ЗСУ video shows FPV drone strike on Russian military vehicle. Операция Z (Военкоры Русской Весны) [Video message] shows military vehicles advancing, one exploding. Операция Z (Военкоры Русской Весны) [Video message] Caption: ‼️🇷🇺🏴‍☠️ Наши ДРГ уже в Покровске! - кадры одной из засад на машину ВСУ (Video shows occupants under fire from inside a vehicle). DeepState reports liquidation of RF sabotage groups in Pokrovsk. COLONELCASSAD HAS PUBLISHED MULTIPLE PHOTOS WITH CAPTIONS "MOMENTS OF THE SVO. FRONTLINE DAYS." LIKELY FROM RF GROUND OPERATIONS. Colonelcassad claims enemy is complaining about RF using lightweight 107-mm MLRS "Type-75" from North Korea. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • New Event (Kharkiv Oblast): TASS reports RF forces advanced near Starytsia, Kharkiv Oblast, dislodging UAF units from several positions. This is an unverified RF claim. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• «Зона СВО» video of an individual speaking in Russian, addressing a controversial figure and criticizing their alleged lack of combat experience and slander, suggesting internal RF information operations. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Control Measures: RF maintained temporary flight restrictions, now being lifted. RF actively promoting narrative of successful counter-UAV measures. RF Prime Minister Mishustin announced ~180 billion rubles for border crossing point repairs and openness to investments from "friendly countries." Moldovan national detained for transmitting data on RF Armed Forces to Kyiv. State Duma committee recommended bill introducing administrative liability for digital platform operators. Man detained in St. Petersburg for collecting information on RF MoD facilities. Colonelcassad shares a photo of a monument dedicated to "Hitler's allies" in Moldova, accompanied by text criticizing it, indicating RF efforts to leverage historical narratives to influence regional politics and public opinion in Moldova. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • New Event (Naval Operations): "Операция Z" reports the Russian warship "Boykiy" (Steregushchiy class) escorted the tanker "General Skobelev" and the dry cargo ship "Sparta" from the Baltic Sea through the North Sea and English Channel to the Atlantic. Both escorted vessels were previously noted for transporting Russian military equipment from Syria. This demonstrates RF's continued naval presence and sustainment of overseas operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Territory (Internal Security): An individual in military-style clothing, possibly a captured RF serviceman, is shown blindfolded and bound. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.4. Recent Additions and Updates

• Odesa Damage (Confirmed): Photo evidence from RBC-Ukraine and ASTRA confirms extensive civilian infrastructure damage in Odesa following the recent RF UAV attack, including administrative buildings, vehicles, and residential properties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Updated: New video evidence from RBC-Ukraine and Operatyvnyi ZSU further confirms the extensive damage to civilian infrastructure in Odesa, showing burned cars and a damaged residential building, indicating significant kinetic effects in a populated urban area. Firefighting operations are actively underway. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Border Operations (Sumy/Chernihiv): Colonelcassad reports and provides drone footage of "Anvar" unit operations in the border areas of Sumy and Chernihiv Oblasts, targeting UAF positions and communication infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Information Warfare (POW Interrogation): TASS publishes a video message featuring a captured Ukrainian soldier, Yevgeny Popelyshkin (225th Separate Assault Regiment), who reportedly states his commander insulted soldiers for not knowing routes in Sumy Oblast. This is a clear RF information operation aiming to undermine UAF morale and command effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Internal RF Political/Social Dynamics: TASS reporting on the in absentia charging of a blogger for promoting terrorism in Dagestan indicates RF's continued focus on internal social policy and counter-extremism within its borders. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Iranian Diplomatic Posture: RBC-Ukraine reports Iran is willing to engage in indirect negotiations with the US regarding a new nuclear deal. This indicates Iran's continued diplomatic activity amidst broader geopolitical tensions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• New RF Kinetic Claim (Kherson): TASS reports a successful FPV drone strike by RF's "Dnepr" Group on a Ukrainian D-20 howitzer in Kherson Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• New RF Internal Control (Samara): Rosaviatsiya reports lifting flight restrictions at Samara airport, demonstrating RF's continued efforts to normalize internal transportation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• New UAF Mobilization Tensions (Chernihiv): Colonelcassad reports on a violent detention by TCC personnel in Chernihiv, suggesting continued friction and potential for public unrest regarding mobilization efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• New Diplomatic Commentary (Gaza): TASS reports on Israeli advisor Dmitri Gendelman's negative comments regarding a joint statement by 25 FMs on a Gaza ceasefire. This is geopolitical context but not directly military intelligence for Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• New RF Drone Attack Report (Rostov): TASS reports a UAV attack was repelled in Rostov-on-Don, Millerovo, Donetsk (Rostov Oblast), and Azov district, with no casualties. This is a new confirmed RF counter-UAV action. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• New RF Civilian Testimonial (Kursk): Colonelcassad provides a video of an RF citizen, Zorin Vladimir Nikolaevich, claiming to be a victim of UAF shelling in Rubanyshchina, Kursk Oblast. This is an information operation designed to garner sympathy and portray Ukraine as targeting civilians. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• German Domestic Preparedness (Propaganda): RBC-Ukraine publishes photo messages with captions suggesting Germany is preparing for a "Putin attack" and might mobilize women and pensioners for truck duty. This appears to be a UAF or pro-Ukrainian information operation aimed at emphasizing the perceived threat from RF and encouraging international resolve/aid, potentially exaggerated for effect. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• New RF Ground Claim (Kharkiv): TASS reports RF forces advanced near Starytsia, Kharkiv Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• New RF Port Operations (Mariupol): TASS reports Mariupol port operating, albeit understaffed, indicates continued RF effort to normalize and utilize occupied Ukrainian infrastructure for logistical or economic purposes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• New UK Sanctions: UK imposes new sanctions on 135 tankers of Russia's shadow fleet. This is an international development directly impacting RF's economic and logistical capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• New RF Naval Activity: "Операция Z" reports Russian warship "Boykiy" escorting two transport vessels previously used for military equipment from Syria, demonstrating RF's global naval reach and sustainment of military logistics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:
  • Strategic Drone/Missile/Aviation Munitions Strikes (Sustained, Adaptive, CRITICAL VOLUME & DEPTH, Now Multi-Warhead, WIDE GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE, Hypersonic Threat Resurfaced, Enhanced Saturation, FAB Use, NEW KINZHAL ON KYIV, Continued KAB use, ADAPTED SHAHDED USE): RF continues to demonstrate an extremely high capability for widespread, high-volume, multi-vector aerial attacks. The confirmed use of Tu-95MS strategic bombers for cruise missile launches (24 missiles), alongside continued massed Shahed drone attacks (426 total), and the re-engagement of MiG-31K for Kinzhal ballistic missile use indicates a sustained and robust deep strike capability. Their ability to simultaneously target Northern, Eastern, Central, and significantly Western Ukraine demonstrates coordination and resource availability. The confirmed use of X-101 with cluster munition warheads in Chernivtsi represents an escalation in lethality. The claimed use of FABs on UAF reserves in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast indicates continued air-to-ground precision strike capability. Colonelcassad reports three Kinzhal hypersonic missile impacts on enemy targets in Kyiv on 21 July 2025, confirming the capability to use hypersonic missiles against the capital. Colonelcassad also claims a direct hit on a Ukrainian kamikaze drone production facility in Kyiv. MoD Russia video shows Kub loitering munitions, detailing capabilities and warhead size. RF continues to push Shahed UAVs into Zaporizhzhia Oblast, with 4 reportedly heading towards Pavlohrad, and new groups from Black Sea towards Mykolaiv and Odesa Oblasts, demonstrating an adaptive capability to launch from various vectors and spread out attacks. The confirmed civilian infrastructure damage in Odesa indicates RF willingness to hit urban centers without specific military targets, or a failure of precision targeting. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Tactical Drone Capabilities (Enhanced): The reported destruction of a UAF D-20 howitzer in Kherson by an RF FPV drone ("Tuman") demonstrates RF's continued and effective tactical integration of drones for precision engagements against UAF artillery assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Warfare (Aggressive, Psychological, and Exploitative): RF continues to use its military actions to bolster its narrative. Messaging from milbloggers directly aims to terrorize the population and undermine Ukrainian morale, while simultaneously attempting to project overwhelming force and futility of Ukrainian resistance. Dissemination of claimed UAF equipment losses (e.g., Bradley BMP) and drone losses ("Baba Yaga" drones) further reinforce this narrative. RF state media leverages UAF drone attacks on Russian territory to portray Russia as a victim and justify its actions. RF sources promote narratives of internal corruption and social friction within Ukraine. Propaganda focuses on internal RF stability and development. Continued use of historical revisionism. Claims of ground advances (Popov Yar, Bila Hora, Malaya Tokmachka, Starytsia) and effective DRG ambushes in contested areas (Pokrovsk) are heavily publicized. RF milbloggers employ cynical/mocking language to demoralize Ukrainian audiences. RF attempts to exploit perceived US weakness in drone tactics. Internal RF information operations counter perceived "traitors." RF channels publish content projecting public support. TASS actively uses claimed UAF POW statements to portray desertion and low morale within Ukrainian ranks. RF is attempting to leverage historical monuments in Moldova to portray Ukraine as allied with Nazis. TASS is utilizing statements by Donald Trump regarding potential US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities to highlight US belligerence and justify its own actions (indirectly). TASS is now actively promoting civilian news, such as Russia's representation at an international music contest, likely to normalize the information environment and divert attention from military operations. The publication of a POW interrogation video by TASS (Yevgeny Popelyshkin) indicates RF's continued and adaptable capability to exploit captured personnel for psychological operations, aiming to sow discord and undermine UAF command effectiveness. RF will continue to leverage civilian testimonials, as seen from Kursk Oblast, to portray itself as a victim of Ukrainian aggression and to justify its military actions to its domestic audience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Artillery Systems (New): Colonelcassad's claim of the use of 107-mm MLRS "Type-75" from North Korea indicates a continued and potentially expanding capability to field new or additional artillery systems, potentially supplied by external actors. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Border Operations: The identified "Anvar" unit operating in Sumy/Chernihiv border regions demonstrates RF's persistent capability for localized reconnaissance and targeting operations, likely to identify and interdict UAF positions, especially communication and defensive structures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Legal Measures & Internal Control: TASS reporting on the in absentia charging of a blogger for promoting terrorism in Dagestan indicates RF's continued capability and willingness to use legal mechanisms to control internal narratives and suppress perceived extremist content. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Counter-UAV Capabilities: The successful repulsion of UAV attacks in Rostov-on-Don, Millerovo, Donetsk (Rostov Oblast), and Azov district indicates RF's continued capability to defend against UAF drone incursions, though the scale of each incident is not specified. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Port Operations in Occupied Territories: The continued operation of Mariupol port, even if understaffed, demonstrates RF's capability to restore and utilize critical infrastructure in occupied territories for logistics and economic purposes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Naval Projection: The escort operation by the Steregushchiy-class corvette "Boykiy" demonstrates RF's capability to project naval power and secure logistical routes beyond its immediate maritime borders, supporting broader geopolitical interests and military sustainment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:
  • Geographic Expansion into Western Ukraine, Multi-Platform Coordination & Diversionary Tactics (CRITICAL - Including Hypersonic Missile & Cluster Munitions, New FAB Use, NEW KINZHAL ON KYIV, Continued KAB use, ADAPTED SHAHDED USE): Expansion of strategic missile strikes deep into Western Ukraine concurrently with Shahed waves, and re-engagement of Kinzhal hypersonic missiles from MiG-31K targeting deep Western Ukraine and now Kyiv, indicates continued and enhanced adaptation of multi-platform, coordinated deep strikes. Confirmed use of X-101 with cluster munition warheads in Chernivtsi is a critical tactical adaptation. Claimed use of FABs on UAF reserves suggests expansion of precision aviation strikes into central Ukraine beyond frontline areas. Colonelcassad reports three Kinzhal hypersonic missile impacts on enemy targets in Kyiv on 21 July 2025. Colonelcassad's claim of a direct hit on a Ukrainian kamikaze drone production facility in Kyiv confirms tactical adaptation to target UAF domestic defense production. RF has adapted to use KABs against Sumy. Continued use of strike UAVs against Eastern Dnipropetrovsk (Samarivskyi district), Poltava Oblast, Donetsk, and Kharkiv Oblasts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Increased Shahed Volume on Kyiv, Southern Ukraine, and now Kharkiv: Increase in Shahed UAVs targeting Kyiv, emergence of new Shahed groups in Black Sea towards Southern Ukraine, and new groups towards Kharkiv indicates intent to increase saturation. New Shahed threat for Dnipropetrovsk indicates continued spread of drone activity. Alex Parker Returns explicitly states intent to use "Geraniums" (Shaheds) on the frontline due to increased production. Further Shahed activity now reported heading towards Pavlohrad from Zaporizhzhia Oblast and new groups inbound to Mykolaiv/Odesa, indicating RF's continued adaptive use of UAVs for widespread and sequential attacks. The confirmed civilian infrastructure damage in Odesa highlights continued adaptive targeting by RF UAVs against urban centers in the south. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ballistic Missile Re-engagement on Kyiv and Hypersonic Missile on Western Ukraine and NOW Kyiv: Re-engagement of ballistic missiles on Kyiv and use of Kinzhal hypersonic missile on Ivano-Frankivsk and now Kyiv indicates escalation in munitions used against capital and far-western Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Operations (Exploitative & Adaptive): RF adapted its information operations to exploit UAF deep strikes on Moscow, using lifting of airport restrictions as propaganda, while intensifying demoralizing rhetoric. RF state media disseminating video of claimed ground operations and drone intercept claims. RF milbloggers adapting to exploit non-military events for propaganda. RF is adapting its internal propaganda to address perceived issues and maintain support, including through cultural events and promoting civilian services during disruptions. RF is highlighting US statements on Iran to justify its own geopolitical positioning. Introduction of civilian normalization narratives (music contest) to divert attention. The rapid dissemination of the captured UAF soldier's statement by TASS demonstrates RF's immediate adaptation of new opportunities for psychological warfare. The deployment of civilian testimonials about alleged UAF shelling in border regions is a new adaptation for RF information operations, aimed at generating sympathy and justifying actions to its domestic audience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • "Disunity within Ukraine" Narrative: "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" attempts to project internal disunity within Russian society by stating "Разрозненность общества у нас зашкаливает, многие ведут себя как рагули из соседней б/украины." Alex Parker Returns posts video related to TCC and Romani people, attempting to sow discord. RF claims Ukraine has run out of cemetery space. Координаційний штаб з питань поводження з військовополоненими video discusses how Russia uses propaganda to sow discord within Ukrainian society. Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦 [Video message] claims to show TCC bus fleeing an attack by Romani people. The dissemination of footage showing a violent TCC detention in Chernih by Colonelcassad indicates RF's continued and immediate adaptation to exploit internal Ukrainian social tensions, particularly related to mobilization, to sow discord and undermine public trust in Ukrainian authorities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • "RF Stability and Development" Narrative (Internal): Mishustin's statements on airport modernization and border crossing point repairs aim to project an image of internal stability and long-term development. News about fining crypto payments in 2026 attempts to project long-term economic planning. TASS reports FIDE allowing Russian women's chess team to compete under FIDE flag. Kadyrov_95 [Video message] documents a religious event in Chechnya, projecting internal stability and cultural/religious harmony. ASTRA reports that Sheremetyevo Airport has labeled as "fakes" videos showing crowds of passengers in terminals after recent disruptions. Colonelcassad reports for the first time in a long time, he used a Russian Railways train. TASS is promoting ease of entry for foreigners into RF without RuID registration. TASS proposing to return compensation to teachers for methodological literature is a continued adaptive measure to address internal social issues and promote stability. The lifting of flight restrictions at Samara airport and Kaluga airport is a further example of RF's adaptive strategy to normalize internal conditions despite ongoing conflict. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • New Artillery Systems: The claimed deployment of 107-mm MLRS "Type-75" from North Korea suggests a tactical adaptation to bolster artillery capabilities or compensate for losses, potentially indicating a widening of RF's military supply network. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Persistent Border Reconnaissance: The active deployment of the "Anvar" unit on the Sumy/Chernihiv border, utilizing drones for reconnaissance and targeting, demonstrates a sustained tactical adaptation for identifying and disrupting UAF border defenses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Rapid Counter-UAV Response: The reported successful repulsion of UAV attacks in Rostov-on-Don and other areas indicates RF's adaptive capability to rapidly respond to and mitigate drone threats against its territory. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Exploitation of Occupied Infrastructure: The continued operation of Mariupol port, reported by TASS, demonstrates RF's adaptive strategy to quickly integrate and utilize captured Ukrainian infrastructure for its own logistical and economic benefit. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Sustained Naval Logistics: The escort of military cargo vessels by a warship through international waters demonstrates RF's adaptive use of its navy to sustain military operations or transport equipment globally, despite international sanctions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Enemy Logistics and Sustainment Status

• Rail Logistics Disruption: UAF drone attack on Kamianolomni railway station in Rostov Oblast caused a fire and delayed over 50 trains, indicating a significant, albeit temporary, disruption to RF rail logistics. RF is actively working to restore normal operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Air Transport Disruption: UAF drone attacks caused repeated temporary closures of Moscow airports and led to numerous flight cancellations and delays. RF is actively working to restore normal civilian air traffic, exemplified by the recent lifting of restrictions at Samara and Kaluga airports. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Internal Infrastructure Vulnerability (Weather): Heavy rainfall in Moscow and a bridge collapse highlight internal infrastructure vulnerabilities to adverse weather, which could indirectly impact military logistics if severe. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Resource Requirements: RF continues to rely on civilian donations for certain equipment ("vehicle kits" for frontline units), indicating ongoing but manageable sustainment needs. The reported use of North Korean 107-mm MLRS "Type-75" suggests RF is willing and able to source military equipment from international partners, potentially to address specific materiel shortfalls or diversify supply. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Maritime Logistics (Occupied Territories): The reported operation of Mariupol port indicates RF's ability to establish and utilize maritime logistics in occupied territories, potentially supporting resupply efforts for Southern fronts or for economic exploitation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Global Naval Logistics: The escort operation of military cargo vessels through the Baltic Sea, North Sea, English Channel, and Atlantic demonstrates RF's sustained capability to move military equipment globally via sea, circumventing land-based logistical challenges. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Impact of UK Sanctions: New UK sanctions against 135 RF "shadow fleet" tankers aim to disrupt RF's oil export revenues, which directly impact RF's ability to finance its war efforts and sustain its military-industrial complex. The long-term impact on fuel supply for military operations will need to be monitored. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

• Centralized Deep Strike Coordination: The multi-vector, multi-platform nature of the recent aerial assault demonstrates effective centralized C2 for strategic-level operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Tactical Drone Integration: Continued effective integration of FPV and reconnaissance drones for tactical kinetic effects (e.g., against UAF equipment and personnel and now confirmed D-20 howitzer) and border reconnaissance indicates effective C2 at the unit level. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Information Operations C2: The rapid and consistent dissemination of RF narratives across various milblogger and state media channels, now including immediate exploitation of POWs and violent TCC detentions, indicates a highly centralized and effective C2 over information operations. The coordinated push of civilian-focused news (music contest, teacher compensation, airport normalization, civilian testimonials, Mariupol port operations) by TASS indicates well-managed C2 over state media narratives for domestic audiences. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Internal Security Operations C2: The successful detention of alleged Ukrainian intelligence agents and the internal NABU operation suggest effective counter-intelligence C2 within RF. The in absentia charging of a blogger for promoting terrorism demonstrates RF's ability to maintain C2 over legal mechanisms for internal security. The swift reporting on repelling drone attacks in Rostov and other areas indicates effective C2 for internal air defense and immediate information dissemination. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Adaptation to Civilian Disruptions: RF authorities (e.g., Moscow Mayor, Minister of Transport) demonstrate effective C2 in managing civilian disruptions from UAF drone attacks and adverse weather, including rapid lifting of flight restrictions and coordination of recovery efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ground Operations C2: Liveuamap Source reports multiple clashes across various axes, indicating coordinated ground operations C2, even if localized. The claimed advances near Starytsia, if verified, would point to effective localized ground C2 and targeting. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Naval C2: The coordinated escort of military cargo vessels from the Baltic Sea to the Atlantic demonstrates effective C2 for projecting naval power and supporting logistics over extended distances. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• New Leadership Appointment: Appointment of Brig. Gen. Hennadiy Shapovalov as new commander of UAF Ground Forces, while a friendly force action, reflects an adaptive C2 in response to operational needs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian force posture and readiness

• Air Defense (AD) Posture (Strained but Effective): UAF AD remains fully engaged and highly effective, with 224 targets destroyed and 203 UAVs suppressed, demonstrating a robust response to the multi-domain RF aerial assault. This, however, comes at a critical cost to interceptor stockpiles. The engagement across a vast geographic area, including successful interceptions over Chernivtsi and Kyiv, confirms nationwide coverage and readiness. The deployment of mobile AD units (ZU-23 on trucks) in Mykolaiv demonstrates tactical adaptation and continued readiness for drone threats. AD active in Odesa against incoming Shaheds. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ground Forces Posture (Defensive & Adaptive, localized offensive capability): UAF ground forces are primarily in a defensive posture, particularly in the Eastern and Southern axes, repelling multiple RF assaults (23 on Kursk/Sumy axis). Training activities (61st OMBr tank crews) indicate continued efforts to maintain combat readiness. Confirmed capture of 5 RF personnel in Kursk Oblast (if verified) indicates successful tactical engagements by UAF forces on the border. GUR's claimed use of ground robots and drone operators conducting deep logistics interdiction demonstrates an adaptive and innovative posture. Border Guard Service 'Phoenix' detachment holding back RF advances in Donetsk Oblast indicates continued localized ground resistance and readiness. UAF 63rd Mechanized Brigade reports liquidation of 33 RF personnel via drone operations, indicating an active offensive posture at the tactical level. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Internal Security Readiness (Active Counter-Intelligence): The large-scale SBU/OGP operation against NABU employees, including the detention of a senior detective suspected of aiding RF, indicates a high state of internal security readiness and a proactive stance against Russian influence. Ukrainian police also helped neutralize pro-Russian hacker network NoName057(16). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Overall Readiness (Sustained by External Aid and Domestic Focus): Ukraine's overall military readiness is sustained by a combination of continued international military aid (e.g., Patriot systems, Canadian tank repairs), as well as a critical focus on increasing domestic weapons and drone production, as articulated by President Zelenskyy. The ongoing discussions for additional NATO funding (5% increase) also contribute to long-term readiness planning. High morale and defiance observed. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Emergency Services Readiness: The swift and effective response by DSNS (State Emergency Service) personnel, including firefighters, to the extensive civilian infrastructure damage in Odesa demonstrates a high level of readiness and capability in managing large-scale emergency situations resulting from RF attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.2. Recent tactical successes or setbacks

• Tactical Successes:
  • High AD Interception Rate: UAF AD successfully intercepted or suppressed 224 aerial targets by fire and 203 UAVs through REB. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Deep Strike on RF Logistics: Successful UAF UAV strike on Kamianolomni railway station in Rostov Oblast, causing significant disruption to RF rail logistics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Targeted RF AD Destruction: Successful UAF drone strike on an RF S-400 (92N6E MLRS) system in Belgorod Oblast, significantly degrading RF AD capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Innovative Tactical Deployments: Confirmed deployment of UAF GUR ground robots in combat (Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions) and successful use of ground drones for medical evacuation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Deep Logistics Interdiction: UAF drones demonstrating capability to cut deep RF logistics (30-40km behind lines) and create kill zones. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Counter-battery Success: UAF 44th Artillery Brigade successfully targeted and destroyed an RF 2A65 Msta-B howitzer. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF Personnel Losses: UAF 63rd Brigade claiming extensive RF personnel losses through drone strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Liquidation of RF Sabotage Groups: DeepState reports liquidation of RF sabotage groups in Pokrovsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Cyber Security Success: Ukrainian police helped neutralize pro-Russian hacker network NoName057(16). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Repatriation: Ukraine returned a teenager forcibly taken from Mariupol to Russia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kinetic Impact on RF Military Airfield: Successful drone attack on Millerovo military airfield in Rostov Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Emergency Response Effectiveness: Confirmed rapid and effective response by State Emergency Service (DSNS) to large-scale civilian infrastructure damage in Odesa. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Tactical Setbacks:
  • Widespread Civilian Casualties and Damage: RF deep strikes resulted in 13 confirmed fatalities and numerous injuries across multiple oblasts. Significant damage to civilian infrastructure confirmed. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • AD Munitions Expenditure: High rate of AD engagements indicates critical expenditure of interceptor munitions, contributing to urgent $6 billion procurement gap. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Continued RF Aerial Penetration: Despite high interception rates, RF missiles and drones continue to penetrate UAF AD, causing kinetic effects, including Kinzhal impacts on Kyiv and Western Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Unconfirmed RF Ground Advances: RF claims of opening new front in Kharkiv, breakthroughs in Malaya Tokmachka, and capturing Bila Hora, if verified, would represent significant tactical setbacks. RF claim of advances near Starytsia, Kharkiv Oblast, if verified, would also be a setback. (CONFIDENCE: LOW for breakthroughs, MEDIUM for new front, MEDIUM for Starytsia)
  • Increased Risk to Western Aid Corridors: RF's expanded deep strike targeting of Western Ukraine directly threatens key logistics corridors for international military aid. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Putyvl Community Drone Strike: Civilian infrastructure in Putyvl community (Sumy Oblast) struck by RF drones. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • UAF Drone Losses: ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS reports enemy shooting down more Ukrainian reconnaissance drones. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Internal Civilian Friction (Mobilization): Unconfirmed report of "Gypsies attacking a TCC bus" points to social friction. The Chernihiv TCC incident further highlights the potential for public discontent regarding mobilization. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • RF DRG Ambush in Pokrovsk: Colonelcassad video confirms an ambush by RF DRG on a UAF pickup truck in Pokrovsk, with visible injuries. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • KAB Strike on Sumy: RF strike on Sumy with KABs resulted in damage and 12 civilian injuries. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Loss of UAF Robotic Platform: Colonelcassad video shows a UAF robotic platform targeted and likely destroyed by an RF drone. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Civilian Risk in Zaporizhzhia Evacuation: TASS reports late evacuation notices in Zaporizhzhia Oblast from UAF may put civilians in active combat zones. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Odesa Civilian Infrastructure Damage: Confirmed civilian infrastructure damage in Odesa due to RF UAV attack, as shown in new photo and video evidence. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Loss of D-20 Howitzer (Kherson): TASS reporting on the destruction of a UAF D-20 howitzer by RF FPV drones in Kherson Oblast represents a tactical loss of an artillery piece. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.3. Resource requirements and constraints

• Critical Air Defense Munitions: Most urgent requirement is accelerated resupply of AD interceptors, especially for ballistic and hypersonic missile defense. Reported $6 billion procurement gap highlights this. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Drones and Counter-Drone Capabilities: Ongoing urgent requirement for more drones (FPV and reconnaissance) for UAF units. Complementary REB means are critical. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Domestic Production Capabilities: President Zelenskyy's directive to increase Ukraine's share of domestic weapons production to 50% within six months indicates strategic shift. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• International Financial Support: Continued and increased international financial support is vital, especially for AD systems and maintenance of armored vehicles. NATO's potential additional funding is significant. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Logistical Security: Increased targeting of Western Ukraine implies growing need for enhanced security and hardening of logistical corridors. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Personnel Motivation/Well-being: Zelenskyy's emphasis on financial motivation suggests recognized need to boost morale and retention. The TCC incidents highlight the need for continued oversight of mobilization practices to maintain public support and morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Financial Resources for Defense Procurement: Stated need for $6 billion is a direct and pressing financial constraint. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Aid for Civilian Casualties: Recent KAB strike on Sumy and UAV strike on Odesa highlights ongoing need for humanitarian aid and resources for civilian recovery. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive domain)

4.1. Propaganda and disinformation campaigns

• Russian Federation (RF) Narratives:
  • Overwhelming Force & Ukrainian Weakness: RF amplifying scale of aerial attacks, especially Kinzhal strikes on Kyiv, to create sense of overwhelming force and demoralize Ukrainian population. Claims of UAF equipment and drone losses, now including a D-20 howitzer. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF Victimhood: RF state media leveraging UAF drone attacks on Russian territory to portray Russia as victim of "Ukrainian aggression" and justify actions. Amplified by TASS reporting on memorial for 5-year old boy in Kursk. The new civilian testimonial from Kursk Oblast is a direct effort to portray RF as a victim of Ukrainian aggression and elicit sympathy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Internal Ukrainian Disunity/Corruption: RF sources heavily promoting narratives of internal corruption (NABU scandal) and social friction (e.g., TCC and Romani incident). The release of the POW interrogation video is a direct attempt to amplify perceived internal disunity and undermine UAF command credibility by portraying commanders as abusive and soldiers as demoralized. The dissemination of footage showing violent TCC detentions is a direct and immediate RF information operation to exacerbate internal social tensions regarding mobilization in Ukraine, aiming to erode public trust and readiness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF Stability & Development: Propaganda focuses on internal stability, economic resilience, and infrastructural development to project normalcy. TASS promotion of Russia's participation in international cultural events (Intervision) aims to normalize the perception of Russia for both domestic and international audiences. TASS proposal to return compensation to teachers for methodological literature is an ongoing effort to promote internal stability and public welfare, presenting RF as a caring state. The lifting of flight restrictions at Samara and Kaluga airport is further used to project normalization. The reporting on Mariupol port operations, emphasizing its functionality despite staffing levels, is another attempt to normalize the situation in occupied territories and project RF's administrative capacity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Historical Revisionism: Continued use of historical narratives to justify actions and demonize Ukraine. RF leveraging monument in Moldova to portray Ukraine as allied with Nazis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • "RF Tactical Success": Claims of ground advances (Popov Yar, Bila Hora, Malaya Tokmachka, Starytsia), effective DRG ambushes (Pokrovsk), and now confirmed artillery destruction by FPV drones heavily publicized. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Cynical/Demoralizing: RF milbloggers frequently employ cynical or mocking language. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Exploiting Perceived US Weakness: RF milbloggers attempting to exploit perceived "slow adoption" of advanced drone tactics by US military. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Internal RF Dissident Counter-Narrative: RF milbloggers actively countering perceived "traitors." (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Projection of Public Support: RF channels publishing content designed to project widespread public support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Exploiting UAF POW Narratives: TASS actively using claimed UAF POW statements to portray desertion and low morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Satirical Content on Azerbaijani Leadership: Some RF milbloggers using satirical content targeting Azerbaijani leadership. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
  • Global Power Dynamics: TASS is exploiting Donald Trump's statements about potential US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities to highlight US aggression and implicitly justify Russia's own actions against Ukraine as a response to perceived Western threats. TASS reporting on Israeli advisor's negative comments regarding Gaza ceasefire further demonstrates RF's intent to highlight global disunity and perceived Western hypocrisy/ineffectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ukrainian (UAF) / Pro-Ukrainian Narratives:
  • German Domestic Preparedness: RBC-Ukraine's photo messages about Germany preparing for a "Putin attack" by potentially drafting women/pensioners for logistics duties appears to be a UAF or pro-Ukrainian information operation. This is likely intended to underscore the broad threat posed by Russia to European security and to encourage continued/increased international support for Ukraine, potentially by emphasizing that the conflict has wider implications and could demand greater sacrifices from NATO allies. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Highlighting RF Atrocities: The immediate release of video and photo evidence by RBC-Ukraine and Operatyvnyi ZSU of civilian infrastructure damage and ongoing firefighting operations in Odesa aims to highlight RF's targeting of civilians and generate international condemnation and support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • UK Sanctions Effectiveness: Reporting on new UK sanctions against RF's "shadow fleet" tankers is a narrative promoting the effectiveness of international pressure against RF. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public sentiment and morale factors

• Ukraine:
  • Resilience & Determination: Despite casualties and damage, public and official sentiment remains determined. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Concerns over Mobilization: Unverified report of "TCC bus attack" and the verified violent TCC detention in Chernihiv point to growing social friction and a potential for public backlash against mobilization efforts. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Internal Security & Trust: NABU scandal and G7 ambassadors' concern could negatively impact public trust. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Motivation for Military Personnel: Zelenskyy's emphasis on financial motivation suggests continued attention needed. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • High Morale: Visual evidence supports high morale among Ukrainian military personnel. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Impact of KAB/UAV Strikes: KAB strikes on urban centers like Sumy and UAV attacks on Odesa will continue to cause fear and distress and potentially strain local resources. The visible damage in Odesa, amplified by local mayor photos and new video evidence, will negatively impact local public morale and trust. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Risk to Civilians in Zaporizhzhia: RF reporting on late evacuation notices could generate negative public sentiment towards UAF. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russia:
  • Controlled Narrative: Public sentiment heavily influenced by state-controlled media emphasizing RF "victories." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Impact of UAV Attacks: Reports of airport closures, train delays, and internal incidents from UAF drone attacks likely cause inconvenience and frustration. TASS report on memorial for 5-year old boy in Kursk aims to generate sympathy. The new civilian testimonial from Kursk Oblast is specifically designed to reinforce public sentiment of victimhood and justify continued conflict. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Mixed Morale Signals (Military): Interview with 35th Marine Brigade soldier criticizing leadership suggests underlying discontent. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Internal Frictions: Public backlash in Sevastopol against Kadyrov's portrait and VK blocking of critical groups indicate underlying social and political frictions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Normalization of Losses: Continued reporting on military casualties normalizes losses for the Russian public. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Impact of Arrests on Public Opinion: Detentions of alleged Ukrainian intelligence agents are used to demonstrate internal security effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Normalization of Foreign Entry: TASS report on simplified entry for foreigners without RuID registration aims to portray normalcy and openness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Emphasis on cultural achievements (Intervision) attempts to boost public morale and divert from war-related stress. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Focus on Domestic Issues: TASS reporting on legislative proposals (e.g., teacher compensation) signals attention to public welfare, aiming to maintain a sense of stability and address domestic concerns amidst ongoing conflict. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Mariupol Port Operations: Reporting on the operational status of Mariupol port, aiming to demonstrate successful integration of occupied territories and improve public perception of RF's administrative effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.3. International support and diplomatic developments

• Support for Ukraine (Strong, but Resource-Dependent):
  • Continued Military Aid: 29th Ramstein meeting yielded commitments for 5 Patriot systems (Germany/US), Canadian financial support, ammunition rounds, and drone funding. UK launching 50-day campaign. Norway ready to provide additional AD funding. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Diplomatic Engagement: Ukraine actively engaging in international diplomacy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Negotiation Developments: Zelenskyy's confirmation of new negotiations with Russia in Istanbul on 23/24 July indicates active diplomatic efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Accountability Focus: Ukraine's continued push for Special Tribunal reinforces diplomatic objective. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Concerns over NABU Scandal: G7 Ambassadors expressing alarm over NABU scandal could impact future aid. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • German Domestic Preparedness Narrative: The RBC-Ukraine photo message regarding Germany's preparedness potentially being tied to a "Putin attack" is a pro-Ukrainian narrative aimed at bolstering international resolve and support. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • New UK Sanctions: The UK's new sanctions on RF's "shadow fleet" tankers demonstrate continued and adaptive international pressure on Russia, specifically targeting its economic lifeblood. This action reinforces international support for Ukraine through economic warfare. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Support for Russia (Limited, but Stable):
  • Iran Military Cooperation: Continued military cooperation between Iran and Russia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Economic Cooperation: Hungary's discussions with Serbia on oil pipeline for Russian oil indicate continued economic cooperation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • China's Stance: China's statement about "decisive measures" can be interpreted by RF as continued diplomatic backing. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Diplomatic Dialogue (Selective): Russia maintains diplomatic engagement with "friendly countries" and is willing to engage in negotiations with Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Resilience to Sanctions: Russia managing impact of sanctions and adapting to economic pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Speculation on Putin-Trump Meeting: Continued speculation in RF media about Putin-Trump meeting projects future high-level diplomatic relevance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Iran's Stance on US Negotiations: Iran's statement to TASS that it is "not ready for direct negotiations with the US" reinforces narrative of united front against perceived Western pressure. TASS is amplifying Donald Trump's statements about potential US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, likely to frame the US as aggressive and unpredictable on the international stage. RBC-Ukraine's report that Iran is open to indirect negotiations with the US on a new nuclear deal provides a nuanced perspective on Iran's diplomatic stance, potentially indicating a degree of flexibility despite public rhetoric, and will be monitored for implications on broader geopolitical alignments. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Cultural Diplomacy: RF's promotion of participation in international music contests (Intervision) can be viewed as an attempt to project an image of normalcy and cultural engagement on the international stage, potentially aiming to soften its image. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • North Korean Military Aid: The reported use of 107-mm MLRS "Type-75" from North Korea (DPRK) indicates that RF continues to draw upon a limited but persistent network of international military support, circumventing sanctions and expanding its materiel base. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Diplomatic Disagreement (Gaza): TASS reporting on Israeli advisor's rejection of the 25-country FM statement on Gaza ceasefire illustrates ongoing international disunity, which RF can leverage to portray a fracturing Western-led order. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

5.1. Most likely enemy courses of action (MLCOA)

• Sustained Multi-Domain Deep Strike Campaign: RF will continue its high-volume, multi-vector aerial assault using Shaheds, cruise missiles (from Tu-95MS), and ballistic missiles, including Kinzhals, against critical infrastructure and urban centers across Ukraine, with a particular focus on Kyiv and Western logistics hubs. The aim is to deplete UAF AD, disrupt logistics, and exert psychological pressure. Expect sustained Shahed activity in Southern Oblasts, including Mykolaiv and Odesa, and further probes into Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava. Expect continued aviation munitions threats to Donetsk and Sumy oblasts. The confirmed damage in Odesa suggests continued willingness to directly target and terrorize urban populations in the South with UAVs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Continued Ground Attrition in Donbas: RF will maintain relentless, attritional ground assaults across the Eastern axis (Lyman, Sieversk, Kramatorsk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka), likely attempting to leverage any perceived advances (Popov Yar, Bila Hora, Poltavka) to achieve tactical breakthroughs, even if localized. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Probing and Shaping Operations on Northern/Southern Axes: RF will continue reconnaissance-in-force, localized ground assaults, and drone/KAB strikes in Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts (including areas like Starytsia), and along the Zaporizhzhia front (Malaya Tokmachka, Kamyanske), to fix UAF reserves, identify weaknesses, and create conditions for potential larger-scale offensives. Expect continued drone reconnaissance and targeting by units like "Anvar" in border regions of Sumy and Chernihiv. Expect continued tactical FPV drone strikes against UAF artillery and equipment, as demonstrated in Kherson. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intensified Information Operations: RF will continue to heavily propagandize its claimed successes (ground gains, AD effectiveness, Kinzhal strikes, D-20 destruction, Mariupol port operations), exploit internal Ukrainian issues (NABU scandal, mobilization friction amplified by TCC incidents, POW narratives, and civilian testimonials from border regions), and frame itself as a victim of "Ukrainian aggression" to manage domestic sentiment and influence international perceptions. Expect RF to leverage US statements on Iran and international disagreements on conflicts like Gaza to further its narrative of Western aggression and disunity. Expect an increase in normalization propaganda (e.g., cultural events, economic updates, social welfare proposals, airport normalization) for domestic consumption to counter war fatigue. The immediate use of a captured UAF soldier for propaganda indicates this will be a continued and adaptive tactic. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Negotiation as Information Warfare: RF will likely use the upcoming Istanbul negotiations primarily as an information operation to signal a willingness for dialogue while continuing kinetic operations, potentially aiming to portray Ukraine as unwilling or unreasonable if talks falter. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Increased Counter-UAV Measures in RF Territory: RF will continue to attempt to intercept UAF drones over its territory, with reported success rates for smaller UAVs, as demonstrated by the recent repelling of attacks in Rostov and other areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Continued Use of Diverse Artillery Systems: RF will likely continue to deploy and utilize a variety of artillery systems, including potentially newly sourced ones like the North Korean 107-mm MLRS "Type-75", to sustain fire support for ground operations and target UAF positions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Sustained Naval Logistics and Presence: RF will continue to use its naval assets for global logistics, including escorting cargo vessels, and maintaining a presence in strategic waterways to support its military and economic interests. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5.2. Most dangerous enemy courses of action (MDCOA)

• Coordinated Multi-Front Offensive with Strategic Deep Strike (CATACLYSMIC): RF conducts a synchronized, large-scale ground offensive on multiple axes, most dangerously combining a major thrust into Sumy and/or Kharkiv Oblasts (committing operational reserves) with an exploitation of the claimed breakthrough in Malaya Tokmachka (Zaporizhzhia Oblast). This offensive would be coordinated with a sustained, exceptionally high-volume multi-domain deep strike campaign designed to fully deplete UAF AD and interdict all major Western aid logistics corridors, aiming for a rapid collapse of UAF defensive lines on multiple, non-contiguous fronts. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Chemical/Biological Weapon Use (ESCALATORY, LOW PROBABILITY): Although low probability, the RF claim of Ukraine using toxic chemicals to the OPCW could be a flag for a false flag operation, where RF could use such weapons and blame Ukraine, leading to a massive escalation. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• Targeted Assassination/Disruption of UAF Leadership (HYBRID): Exploiting internal security concerns (NABU scandal) or leveraging DRG capabilities, RF conducts a high-profile assassination or significant disruption operation against key UAF military or political leadership (e.g., General Shapovalov, President Zelenskyy) to sow chaos and cripple C2. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
• Targeted Strike on High-Value Military Airfields/Bases in Ukraine (ESCALATORY): Given the confirmed UAF deep strike on Millerovo, RF may retaliate with a concentrated, high-precision strike using Kinzhals and cruise missiles against a key UAF military airfield or command center in Ukraine, beyond simply a "defense industrial complex" target, aiming to significantly degrade UAF air or C2 capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Exploitation of Civilian Evacuation Issues: RF attempts to exploit any perceived UAF missteps in civilian evacuation, particularly in Zaporizhzhia, to create humanitarian crises or demoralize the population. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Direct Naval Interdiction of Maritime Aid/Trade: RF Black Sea Fleet directly interdicts or attacks commercial vessels in the Black Sea, escalating naval warfare and severely impacting Ukraine's maritime trade and aid routes. This would be a high-risk move with significant international repercussions but could be an MDCOA if RF seeks to completely choke off Ukrainian maritime access. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)

5.3. Timeline estimates and decision points

• Immediate (Next 24-48 hours):
  • Aerial Strikes: High probability of continued, albeit potentially smaller, RF missile and drone strikes. UAF AD will remain heavily engaged. Expect sustained Shahed activity in Southern and Eastern Oblasts, particularly targeting Odesa and Mykolaiv regions. Expect aviation munitions threats to Donetsk and Sumy.
  • Ground Probes: RF will continue probing attacks and reconnaissance-in-force on all axes, especially Kharkiv (including Starytsia), Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia, to confirm or deny claimed tactical gains. This includes continued border operations by units like "Anvar" and tactical FPV drone strikes against UAF assets.
  • Negotiations: The announced Istanbul negotiations on 23/24 July are a critical diplomatic event to monitor for any shifts in RF posture or demands. Decision points for UAF will revolve around the tenor and outcome of these talks.
  • Cyber Attacks: Continued RF cyber activity is likely given the neutralization of the NoName057(16) network, indicating continued intent to disrupt UAF infrastructure.
  • Retaliatory Strikes: Increased probability of RF retaliatory deep strikes following the Millerovo airfield attack.
  • Information Operations: RF will continue to use POW statements and other narratives to try and undermine UAF morale. Expect increased normalization propaganda from RF state media and a continued focus on domestic social policy. Expect immediate and widespread dissemination of content related to TCC incidents and civilian testimonials from border regions. Expect RF to continue highlighting its control and functionality of occupied infrastructure like Mariupol port.
  • RF Counter-UAV: RF will continue to actively repel UAF drone attacks on its territory and will report successes for domestic consumption.
• Short Term (Next 3-7 days):
  • Offensive Escalation: If RF assesses UAF AD capabilities are sufficiently degraded or reserves are fixed, they may commit additional ground forces for a larger-scale offensive in Kharkiv/Sumy or attempt to exploit the claimed Malaya Tokmachka breakthrough more fully.
  • Western Aid Impact: The rate of Western aid delivery, particularly AD munitions, will be critical. Decision points for international partners to accelerate deliveries will be influenced by the ongoing intensity of RF strikes.
  • Impact of UK Sanctions: Monitor initial RF response and market adjustments to the new UK sanctions on "shadow fleet" tankers; assess immediate impact on oil exports.
• Medium Term (Next 1-2 weeks):
  • Sustainment of Operations: Both sides will face significant sustainment challenges, particularly for munitions and personnel. UAF's ability to rapidly scale domestic production and secure additional international funding will be critical.
  • Information Environment Volatility: The information environment will remain highly contested, with both sides intensifying propaganda and counter-propaganda efforts.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• RF Northern Grouping Reserves (Priority 1): Detailed and verifiable intelligence on the composition, strength, and staging of RF operational reserves in Belgorod/Kursk Oblasts. Collection Requirement (CR): IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT assets focused on training areas, logistics nodes, and troop concentrations in RF border regions. Emphasis on identifying new unit deployments or activation.
• Verification of RF Breakthrough at Malaya Tokmachka (Priority 2): Definitive, real-time ground truth regarding the claimed RF tactical breakthrough in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. CR: IMINT (high-resolution satellite imagery, commercial satellite intelligence), UAV ISR, forward deployed HUMINT for ground observation and contact reports. Specific focus on troop movements, defensive line integrity, and BDA of claimed objectives.
• BDA on Western Logistics and Kyiv (Priority 3): Comprehensive BDA of all kinetic impacts in Western Oblasts and Kyiv, specifically assessing damage to rail/road networks, storage facilities, and identified defense industry sites. CR: Post-strike IMINT (drone and satellite), HUMINT (EOD reports, local civilian networks), OSINT (social media, local news).
• RF AD/REB Effectiveness & Intentions (Priority 4): Assess the full extent of RF AD/REB capabilities to counter UAF drones, especially reconnaissance assets. Understand the strategic intent behind RF's continued high-volume deep strikes, including target prioritization and adaptation. CR: SIGINT on RF AD/REB emissions, COMINT for RF C2 communications, exploited UAF drone telemetry data, BDA of RF AD/REB systems by UAF strikes.
• Internal RF Military Morale (Priority 5): Collect more widespread intelligence on RF personnel morale beyond isolated incidents, particularly within units actively engaged in offensive operations. CR: HUMINT (POW interrogations, defectors), OSINT (milblogger discussions, soldier social media activity), COMINT (intercepted internal communications).
• Verification of RF DRG Activity in Pokrovsk (Priority 6): Confirm the extent and success of claimed RF DRG ambushes or infiltration in Pokrovsk. CR: HUMINT (local reports, captured personnel interrogations), IMINT (surveillance footage, post-incident analysis).
• Damage Assessment of Millerovo Airfield (Priority 7): Detailed BDA of damage to Millerovo military airfield (runways, aircraft, hangars, fuel depots). CR: IMINT (satellite, commercial satellite), HUMINT (local reporting, insider information).
• RF Response to Millerovo Attack (Priority 8): Monitor RF military and political responses to the Millerovo airfield attack, particularly any indications of escalation in retaliation. CR: OSINT (RF official statements, milbloggers), SIGINT (RF C2 communications).
• Verification of Russian drone capabilities: Identify specific types and capabilities of RF drones observed in the Colonelcassad video (e.g., "BABA-YAGA" details, "Kozak," "Paladin," "URAL-4320" targeting). CR: Exploited drone footage analysis, wreckage analysis, technical intelligence. (Priority 9)
• Confirmation of UAF Robotic Platform Destruction (Priority 10): Verify the destruction of the UAF robotic platform claimed by Colonelcassad. CR: Post-engagement BDA, analysis of RF drone footage, UAF unit reports.
• Verification of RF "Harpy" Drone (Priority 11): Identify the characteristics, capabilities, and operational deployment of the "Harpy" drone referenced by Colonelcassad. CR: Analysis of video footage, RF milblogger commentary, and technical intelligence on similar platforms.
• Monitoring of Southern UAV Activity (Priority 12): Track new Shahed UAV groups from Zaporizhzhia Oblast towards Pavlohrad and from the Black Sea towards Mykolaiv/Odesa Oblasts. CR: Air Force updates, local reporting, AD engagement data, SIGINT on UAV control signals.
• Assessment of civilian presence in Zaporizhzhia combat zones (Priority 13): Verify RF claims regarding delayed UAF evacuation efforts and the risk to civilians in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. CR: HUMINT (local civilian reports), OSINT (local media, social media monitoring), UNHCR/aid organization reports.
• Odesa Damage Assessment (Priority 14): Conduct immediate BDA of civilian infrastructure damage in Odesa following the UAV attack. CR: Local reporting, satellite imagery, public photographic/video evidence.
• Verification of North Korean MLRS Type-75 Deployment (Priority 15): Confirm the presence, quantity, and operational deployment of North Korean 107-mm MLRS "Type-75" systems within RF forces, particularly in frontline areas. CR: IMINT (satellite, tactical UAV imagery), HUMINT (POW interrogations, local sources), OSINT (RF milblogger content, identification of unique munition types).
• Monitoring of Aviation Munitions Threats to Donetsk/Sumy (Priority 16): Track specific types and frequency of aviation munitions (e.g., KABs, unguided bombs) being used against Donetsk and Sumy oblasts. CR: Air Force updates, local reporting, BDA, SIGINT on RF aviation activity.
• RF POW Exploitation (Priority 17): Monitor all RF official and milblogger channels for further releases of POW interrogations or statements. Analyze content for new intelligence regarding UAF unit dispositions, morale, or C2 issues. CR: OSINT (TASS, RF milbloggers), HUMINT (cross-reference with POW interrogations).
• RF Border Unit Activities (Priority 18): Increased focus on drone reconnaissance and ground activities by RF units operating in the Sumy and Chernihiv border regions (e.g., "Anvar" unit), specifically their targeting priorities (UAF positions, communication infrastructure, civilian areas). CR: IMINT (UAV imagery, satellite), SIGINT (RF unit communications), HUMINT (local reports, cross-border intelligence).
• Iran's Stance on US Negotiations (Priority 19): Monitor the implications of Iran's stated willingness for indirect negotiations with the US on a new nuclear deal. CR: OSINT (international media, diplomatic statements), HUMINT (diplomatic intelligence).
• Chernihiv TCC Incident Verification (Priority 20): Investigate the violent TCC detention incident in Chernihiv reported by Colonelcassad, verify details, and assess the broader impact on public sentiment and recruitment. CR: HUMINT (local sources), OSINT (local social media and news, cross-reference with UAF official statements).
• Verification of D-20 Howitzer Destruction (Priority 21): Verify the RF claim of destroying a UAF D-20 howitzer in Kherson Oblast via FPV drone. CR: UAF unit reports, BDA, IMINT (UAV imagery analysis from both sides).
• RF Civilian Testimonial Verification (Priority 22): Investigate and verify the claims made by RF citizen Zorin Vladimir Nikolaevich regarding UAF shelling in Rubanyshchina, Kursk Oblast. CR: HUMINT (local sources on the Ukrainian side of the border), IMINT (satellite imagery for damage assessment), OSINT (cross-reference with local Ukrainian news/reports regarding shelling in that area).
• German Preparedness Narrative (Priority 23): Monitor the origin and propagation of the RBC-Ukraine photo messages regarding German preparedness for a "Putin attack" involving women and pensioners. Assess whether this is an isolated piece of propaganda or part of a wider campaign. CR: OSINT (media analysis, social media tracking across various languages), HUMINT (diplomatic and public sentiment monitoring in Germany).
• Verification of RF Advance near Starytsia, Kharkiv Oblast (Priority 24): Confirm the veracity and extent of RF ground advances claimed by TASS near Starytsia. CR: IMINT (high-resolution satellite imagery, UAV ISR), HUMINT (local ground reports, UAF unit reports).
• Mariupol Port Activity Assessment (Priority 25): Monitor the volume and nature of cargo traffic through Mariupol port. CR: IMINT (satellite imagery of port activity, vessel tracking), OSINT (local shipping news, commercial port data).
• Impact of UK Sanctions on RF Maritime Logistics (Priority 26): Assess the immediate and projected impact of new UK sanctions on RF "shadow fleet" tankers on RF oil exports and overall maritime logistics. CR: OSINT (shipping intelligence reports, market analysis, news on tanker movements), HUMINT (industry contacts).
• RF Naval Activity in Baltic/North Sea/Atlantic (Priority 27): Monitor RF naval deployments and transit activities in international waters for frequency, vessel types, and cargo. CR: IMINT (satellite imagery, maritime surveillance), OSINT (naval tracking data, shipping news).

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Prioritize ISR on Critical Ground Axes and RF Airfields:
   • Immediately re-task all available IMINT and SIGINT assets to monitor RF forces in Belgorod and Kursk Oblasts for signs of massing and offensive preparations, especially given claims of a new Kharkiv front and advances near Starytsia.
   • Direct all tactical UAV assets and ground reconnaissance elements to the Malaya Tokmachka sector in Zaporizhzhia to confirm or deny the claimed RF breakthrough and assess the integrity of UAF defensive lines.
   • Allocate additional ISR to Pokrovsk direction to verify claimed RF DRG activity and UAF counter-operations.
   • Conduct immediate IMINT and OSINT on Millerovo military airfield to assess battle damage and operational impact, following up on the latest RF report of repelled attacks in the area.
   • Increase ISR on Sumy and Chernihiv border regions, with specific attention to RF drone reconnaissance flights and ground activity by units like "Anvar," to identify potential infiltration or shaping operations.
   • Verify destruction of UAF D-20 howitzer in Kherson and assess the broader impact of RF FPV drone capabilities against UAF artillery.
   • Monitor Mariupol port activity to understand its role in RF logistics and economic exploitation.
   • Enhance maritime surveillance of RF naval activities in international waters, particularly those involving cargo vessels.
2. Expedite AD Munitions & Capabilities:
   • Urge international partners to immediately accelerate deliveries of all committed AD interceptors, with specific emphasis on systems capable of countering Kinzhal and other ballistic threats. Leverage the critical $6 billion funding gap in discussions.
   • Prioritize deployment of newly committed Patriot systems to protect key logistics hubs in Western Ukraine and high-value targets in Kyiv.
   • Implement mobile AD and REB solutions for frontline areas and vulnerable logistics routes to mitigate the increased Shahed and tactical aviation threat.
   • Enhance AD coverage and readiness in Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts given new Shahed threats and confirmed damage in Odesa.
3. Harden and Disperse Critical Assets:
   • Review and update plans for the rapid dispersal and hardening of mobile AD systems, C2 nodes, and critical logistics assets, particularly in Kyiv and Western Ukraine, in anticipation of continued precision strikes.
   • Enhance physical security and deception measures around known military-industrial complex sites, military airfields, and key civilian infrastructure to mitigate the risk of targeted Kinzhal or cruise missile strikes.
4. Strengthen Internal Security & Public Trust:
   • Conduct a transparent internal investigation into the NABU scandal to reassure international partners and Ukrainian public about commitment to rule of law.
   • Develop robust counter-propaganda campaigns to address RF narratives of Ukrainian disunity and weakness, particularly regarding mobilization efforts (addressing the Chernihiv TCC incident directly and transparently), POW narratives (e.g., refuting claims of abusive commanders, highlighting prisoner treatment discrepancies), and civilian testimonials from border regions. This should include direct messaging on successful RF hacker network neutralization and highlight strong UAF morale.
   • Provide clear and consistent public information on the aftermath of RF strikes, including civilian casualties and damage, to counter RF disinformation and maintain public morale.
   • Address civilian evacuation concerns in Zaporizhzhia Oblast with timely and transparent information and measures.
   • Expedite BDA and recovery efforts in Odesa and provide public updates to maintain morale and counter RF narratives, emphasizing the targeting of civilian infrastructure.
   • Monitor and, if appropriate, counter new pro-Ukrainian narratives, such as the German preparedness message, ensuring they align with strategic communication objectives without inadvertently creating undue alarm among the populace.
5. Leverage Diplomatic Avenues:
   • Utilize the upcoming Istanbul negotiations to clearly articulate Ukraine's defensive posture and demand a cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of forces, while simultaneously pushing for prisoner exchanges and humanitarian corridors.
   • Continue active diplomatic engagements to secure long-term military and financial support, emphasizing the critical role of sustained aid in countering RF's multi-domain aggression.
   • Inform international partners about the confirmed use of North Korean MLRS and advocate for stronger international sanctions and controls on DPRK military exports.
   • Monitor and assess Iran's evolving diplomatic posture, particularly regarding US negotiations, for any potential shifts in broader geopolitical alignments that could impact the conflict.
   • Be prepared to counter RF narratives that leverage international disagreements (e.g., Gaza ceasefire statements) to portray global instability or justify their own actions.
   • Emphasize and coordinate with partners on the impact of sanctions on RF's economic and military capabilities, particularly highlighting the effect of new sanctions on RF's "shadow fleet."