Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT

TIME: 210141Z JUL 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Ukraine General: RF is executing a large-scale, multi-wave strategic aerial assault across central, northern, and southern Ukraine. New confirmed missile threats from Tu-95MS aircraft are now targeting Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad Oblasts, and specifically Kremenсhuk and Kropyvnytskyi. Shahed UAV attacks on Kyiv continue with active AD engagement. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • UPDATE: One missile is confirmed in Poltava Oblast, course towards Pyriatyn. One cruise missile is confirmed towards Shpola. Missiles on Kropyvnytskyi are now reported to have aborted their course, diverting towards Cherkasy Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Northern Ukraine: Confirmed group of Shahed UAVs (approx. 6 currently over Kyiv, similar number inbound) are under AD engagement. Explosions in Kyiv continue, with medical teams dispatched to Darnytskyi, Dniprovskyi, and Solomianskyi districts. Kiosks are burning in Dniprovskyi district. A fire in a non-residential building in Solomianskyi district is reported. Confirmed damage to the entrance of a metro station (previously unconfirmed Lukyanivska). NEW confirmed fatality in Kyiv. NEW missile group from Chernihiv Oblast is now moving towards Kyiv Oblast. Approximately 7-8 Shahed UAVs and 5 missiles are currently targeting Kyiv. NEW confirmed ballistic missile on Kyiv. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Eastern Ukraine: Initial cruise missile group from Tu-95MS aircraft detected over Kharkiv Oblast, moving towards Poltava Oblast. RF milbloggers are gloating about Kyiv impacts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Central Ukraine: Missile group (up to 10) confirmed flying towards Myrhorod district in Poltava Oblast, then passing Poltava towards Kremenсhuk. New missile group from Sumy Oblast also moving towards Poltava Oblast. Another group of missiles from Cherkasy Oblast is now confirmed to have diverted from Kropyvnytskyi and is heading towards Zvenyhorodka, Kaniv, and Uman districts of Cherkasy Oblast, then further into Vinnytsia Oblast (Nemryriv, Trostyanets), with a general westward course. NEW reports of possible cluster munitions being used by RF. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Southern Ukraine: No new specific reports for Southern Ukraine in this update. Previous Kalibr "minus" reports remain unconfirmed.
• Russia: Temporary flight restrictions at Sheremetyevo, Vnukovo, Domodedovo, and Zhukovsky airports have been lifted. RF milbloggers continue to claim overwhelming success and mock UAF AD. NEW reports of 9 UAVs destroyed over Moscow after midnight. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intelligence Gaps: Confirmed BDA on all Kyiv impacts (Darnytskyi, Dniprovskyi, Solomianskyi districts, specific metro station damaged). Confirmation of any kinetic impacts from the missile groups in Poltava, Kremenсhuk, and the diverted groups. Exact number of missiles launched from Tu-95MS aircraft. Confirmation of cluster munition use.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Ukraine General: Night operations continue to provide low visibility, favoring RF UAV and missile saturation tactics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF:
  • Air Defense (AD): Fully engaged nationwide against a multi-vector RF aerial assault, including Tu-95MS launched cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and OWA UAVs (Shahed). AD is actively tracking multiple missile groups across Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, and Kirovohrad Oblasts, specifically Kremenсhuk and Kropyvnytskyi. Kyiv AD is actively engaging approximately 7-8 inbound Shaheds and 5 missiles, plus a new ballistic missile threat. UAF AF provides continuous updates on missile and UAV movements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Emergency Services: Medical teams dispatched to multiple districts in Kyiv (Darnytskyi, Dniprovskyi, Solomianskyi) in response to explosions and falling debris. Rescue efforts underway for confirmed fatalities and casualties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Control Measures: Nationwide air raid alerts remain active. Public warnings for shelter are ongoing in Kyiv and other threatened regions. Kyiv City Military Administration (KMVA) is providing updates on attack consequences. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RUF:
  • Deep Operations (UAV/Missile/Aviation Munitions): RF is executing a high-volume, multi-wave, multi-domain deep strike campaign. This includes:
    • Tu-95MS strategic bomber launches, with cruise missiles detected over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad Oblasts, Kremenсhuk and Kropyvnytskyi.
    • Sustained Shahed UAV attacks targeting Kyiv (~7-8 over Kyiv, ~5 missiles inbound, plus 1 ballistic missile).
    • RF milbloggers are spreading demoralizing propaganda and claiming successful strikes on Kyiv, including a sarcastic claim about "Vasilkov airfield out of chat." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Aviation: RF airports (Sheremetyevo, Vnukovo, Domodedovo, Zhukovsky) have lifted temporary restrictions, indicating a return to normal domestic air traffic following previous UAF drone activity. NEW claims of 9 UAVs destroyed over Moscow. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:
  • Strategic Drone/Missile/Aviation Munition Strikes (Sustained, Adaptive, CRITICAL VOLUME & DEPTH, Now Multi-Warhead): RF continues to demonstrate an extremely high capability for widespread, high-volume, multi-vector aerial attacks. The confirmed use of Tu-95MS strategic bombers for cruise missile launches, alongside continued massed Shahed drone attacks (approx. 7-8 on Kyiv), and the re-emergence of ballistic missile use on Kyiv indicates a sustained and robust deep strike capability. Their ability to simultaneously target Northern (Kyiv, Chernihiv), Eastern (Kharkiv), and Central (Poltava, Kremenсhuk, Kropyvnytskyi, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia) Ukraine demonstrates significant coordination and resource availability. The repeated multi-day nature of these large-scale strikes confirms robust production or stockpiles of munitions. NEW unconfirmed reports of cluster munitions suggest RF may be increasing lethality and psychological impact. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Information Warfare (Aggressive, Psychological, and Exploitative): RF continues to use its military actions to bolster its narrative. Messaging from milbloggers directly aims to terrorize the population and undermine Ukrainian morale, while simultaneously attempting to project overwhelming force and futility of Ukrainian resistance. The sarcastic claim about Vasylkiv airfield and references to "Geraniums flying in dozens" are designed to create psychological pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intentions:
  • Systemic Degradation of Ukrainian Infrastructure, Air Defense & Western Aid Logistics (PRIMARY - Deepest & Widest Expansion, Exhaustion): RF's immediate intention is to maximize damage to critical infrastructure, exhaust UAF air defense munitions, and instill widespread fear through sustained, high-intensity, multi-domain aerial campaigns. The targeting of areas like Poltava, Kremenсhuk, and the new western trajectory through Cherkasy and Vinnytsia suggests specific intent against energy infrastructure, industrial capacity, and key transportation nodes across broader central and western Ukraine. The massing of Shaheds and multiple missile types on Kyiv is intended to saturate AD in the capital. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Psychological Warfare & Demoralization: RF intends to break Ukrainian civilian morale through relentless, widespread attacks causing casualties and damage. Propaganda messaging (e.g., mocking shelter effectiveness, gloating about impacts) directly supports this. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent tactical changes or adaptations

• Geographic Expansion, Multi-Platform Coordination & Diversionary Tactics (Critical): The launch of cruise missiles from Tu-95MS concurrently with ongoing Shahed waves indicates a continued and enhanced adaptation of multi-platform, coordinated deep strikes, now focusing significant missile volume on central Ukrainian regions (Poltava, Kremenсhuk, Kropyvnytskyi) and newly extending through Cherkasy into Vinnytsia Oblast, which are key logistical and industrial hubs. The sustained multi-vector threats to Kyiv with Shaheds, and new missile threats from Sumy axis, demonstrates an adaptive strategy to probe and exploit AD gaps across Ukrainian territory. NEW missile trajectory changes (e.g., from Kropyvnytskyi to Cherkasy/Vinnytsia) indicate a sophisticated attempt to confuse and evade UAF AD. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Ballistic Missile Re-engagement on Kyiv: The re-engagement of ballistic missiles on Kyiv indicates an escalation in the type of munitions used against the capital, likely intended for rapid kinetic effect and to bypass layered AD. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Information Operations (Exploitative & Adaptive): RF has rapidly adapted its information operations to exploit UAF deep strikes on Moscow, using the lifting of airport restrictions as a propaganda point to demonstrate RF resilience, while simultaneously intensifying demoralizing rhetoric regarding strikes on Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and sustainment status

• RUF:
  • Very High Munitions Consumption (Sustained): The continued, multi-day, high-volume launches of Shaheds, and newly confirmed cruise missiles from Tu-95MS, and ballistic missiles, indicates RF's continued capacity to sustain a very high rate of munition expenditure. This suggests robust production or large stockpiles of strategic munitions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Internal Logistics (No Impact): The lifting of airport restrictions in Moscow indicates normal functioning of domestic air travel infrastructure, with no apparent military logistical impact. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Internal Incidents: Reports of a fire on a coal conveyor in Sakhalin and 5 fatalities in an Orenburg fire are likely unrelated to the conflict but indicate ongoing internal challenges for RF. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UAF:
  • Air Defense Munitions Strain (CRITICAL - EXTREME & NATIONWIDE): The sustained high-volume, multi-platform attacks, particularly the cruise missiles from Tu-95MS, ballistic missiles, and massed Shaheds on Kyiv, continue to place unprecedented and critical strain on UAF air defense munitions stockpiles. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and control effectiveness

• RUF:
  • Centralized Strategic C2 (Highly Effective & Adaptive): The coordinated launches of Tu-95MS missiles and massed Shahed waves across multiple axes, coupled with adaptive trajectory changes and ballistic missile re-engagement, demonstrate highly effective, centralized strategic C2 for deep operations. Their rapid adaptation of information operations also confirms effective C2 in the information domain. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Internal C2: The rapid lifting of flight restrictions in Moscow airports indicates effective internal C2 for civil aviation management and information dissemination. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UAF:
  • Highly Effective Air Defense C2 (Strained but Resilient): UAF AD demonstrates highly effective C2 in rapid detection, tracking, and public warning of complex, multi-speed, multi-vector threats across the entire country, including the Tu-95MS missile launches, numerous inbound UAVs, and ballistic missile threats. Continued real-time reporting from AFU and regional administrations on missile and UAV movements and AD activity confirms robust and resilient UAF C2 for air defense operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian force posture and readiness

• Posture: UAF is operating at maximum defensive posture across all air defense sectors nationwide. Ground forces maintain established defensive lines. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Readiness:
  • Air Defense: At peak readiness and fully engaged against a complex, high-volume RF aerial assault. The sustained engagement of numerous Shaheds on Kyiv and cruise missiles across central and eastern Ukraine demonstrates continuous high readiness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Overall: Readiness remains high but is under extreme and potentially unsustainable pressure due to the continuous, nationwide aerial attacks and severe AD munition consumption. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.2. Recent tactical successes or setbacks

• Successes:
  • Active Air Defense Engagements & Early Warnings (Nationwide & Adaptive): UAF AD demonstrates continuous success in tracking and warning of incoming missiles and UAVs across almost the entire country. Continued AD operations in Kyiv and against cruise missiles across various Oblasts indicate ongoing success in mitigating RF aerial attacks, despite high volume. The prompt reporting of trajectory changes aids AD effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Moscow UAV Interceptions: RF reports of 9 UAVs destroyed over Moscow after midnight indicate continued UAF capability to project force into RF territory, forcing RF to divert AD resources to homeland defense. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Setbacks:
  • CRITICAL Massed Aerial Attack (Sustained & NATIONAL Scope, Multi-Wave): Ukraine is experiencing a continuous, unprecedented multi-vector, high-volume RF aerial assault, now including Tu-95MS launched cruise missiles deep into central Ukraine and ballistic missiles on Kyiv. Confirmed explosions and fires in Kyiv's Darnytskyi, Dniprovskyi, and Solomianskyi districts, along with confirmed damage to a metro station entrance, represent ongoing significant setbacks for civilian protection and infrastructure. The NEW confirmed fatality in Kyiv is a severe setback. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Psychological Operations Impact: RF's immediate and aggressive information operations, including sarcastic claims about Vasylkiv airfield and mocking UAF AD, are designed to undermine UAF morale and confidence. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.3. Resource requirements and constraints

• Requirements:
  • Air Defense Munitions (CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE & EXPANDED, SUSTAINED): Urgent and critical requirement for interceptor missiles, particularly for countering high-volume, adaptive drone swarms, ballistic missile threats, and cruise missile threats across all affected regions. The intensity of the current attack necessitates an immediate increase in supply. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • ISR Assets (Enhanced Focus on New Strike Vectors & Diversionary Tactics): Continued high demand for real-time ISR to track RF strategic aviation, missile trajectories (especially cruise missiles from Tu-95MS and ballistic missiles), and high-volume drone movements across the newly threatened Central, Northern, and Eastern regions, particularly tracking sudden trajectory changes and diversions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Constraints:
  • Air Defense Saturation (CRITICAL): The sheer volume and adaptive nature of incoming RF attacks, now including Tu-95MS launched cruise missiles across vast areas of Ukrainian territory and ballistic missiles on Kyiv, severely risks overwhelming UAF air defenses, leading to breakthroughs and increased damage. The approximately 7-8 Shaheds inbound to Kyiv, combined with multiple missile groups and a ballistic missile, represent an immediate and severe saturation risk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Geographic Stretch (EXTREME): The nationwide expansion of deep strikes, now encompassing central Ukraine and extending into Vinnytsia Oblast with strategic missile threats, forces UAF to further disperse already severely strained AD assets, creating critical vulnerabilities across the entire country. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive domain)

4.1. Propaganda and disinformation campaigns

• RUF:
  • "Overwhelming Force" Narrative (Amplified, Sustained & Aggressive): RF continues to use its extensive aerial attacks, particularly the use of strategic bombers for cruise missile launches and ballistic missiles, to project overwhelming military superiority and inevitability of Ukrainian defeat. Milblogger commentary directly aims to terrify the population and demoralize UAF, including sarcastic claims about Vasylkiv airfield and mocking Ukrainian figures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • "Ukrainian Weakness" Narrative (Exploitative & Manipulative): RF is immediately leveraging successful impacts in Kyiv and other regions to amplify narratives of Ukrainian AD ineffectiveness, even with sarcastic or exaggerated claims, to further psychological pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • "RF Victimhood" Narrative (Counter-UAF Attacks): RF is actively reporting on UAF drone attacks on Moscow (e.g., 9 UAVs destroyed) to portray Russia as a victim and justify its ongoing military actions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UAF:
  • "Resilience and Effectiveness" Narrative (Maintaining Transparency): UAF channels (Air Force, regional administrations, Mayor Klitschko) continue to provide timely and transparent updates on missile and UAV movements and AD engagements, aiming to reassure the public and counter RF narratives of overwhelming force. The continued dispatch of emergency services reinforces a narrative of effective response. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public sentiment and morale factors

• Ukraine: Public sentiment is under extreme and unprecedented pressure due to the widespread and continuous air raid alerts, strategic missile launches from Tu-95MS, ballistic missile use, and the sheer volume of Shahed UAVs on Kyiv. Confirmed strikes and fires in Kyiv, especially with a confirmed fatality and metro station damage, will further increase anxiety and fear, significantly impacting morale in the capital. The missile threat to central Ukrainian industrial and logistical hubs, now extending westward, will cause new widespread fear in regions previously considered safer. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russia: Public sentiment is being managed by narratives of RF military success (e.g., AD intercepts over Moscow, sarcastic claims of Kyiv impacts) and portraying Russia as resilient. Milblogger commentary indicates an attempt to foster a sense of superiority and control over the conflict, reinforcing domestic support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.3. International support and diplomatic developments

• Ukraine: The widespread and intense nature of the current RF aerial attacks, especially the use of Tu-95MS and ballistic missiles, and the confirmed fatality, will likely increase international pressure for accelerated military aid, particularly advanced AD systems capable of countering cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and defending critical infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

• Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

  • Sustained Massed Aerial Attack with Adaptive Tactics, Focus on Central/Northern/Western Infrastructure (IMMEDIATE - 0-12 hours): RF will continue and likely execute additional waves of its large-scale strategic missile (cruise and ballistic) and UAV strikes. These attacks will continue to employ adaptive "chaotic movement" tactics and will prioritize deep targeting of central (Poltava, Kremenсhuk, Kropyvnytskyi, Cherkasy, Sumy), northern (Kyiv, Chernihiv), eastern (Kharkiv), and now western (Vinnytsia) Ukraine. Primary targets will remain critical infrastructure (energy, transport hubs, industrial sites), major population centers (with increased civilian casualties), and military airfields/industrial sites. The immediate objective is to severely disrupt or interdict internal Ukrainian logistics and saturate UAF AD. KAB launches will continue on frontline areas (Donetsk, Sumy, Kharkiv). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Intensified Information Offensive Leveraging "Success" and Demoralization (Concurrent): RF will continue to rapidly disseminate propaganda framing successful strikes, exaggerated UAF losses, and will increasingly seek to leverage selective or decontextualized commentary and fabricating claims to undermine UAF morale and justify their actions. They will particularly mock UAF AD capabilities in response to engagements and amplify UAF attacks on Moscow to garner domestic support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

• Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

  • Coordinated Cruise Missile/Hypersonic Strike on Critical Energy/Industrial Nodes in Central/Western Ukraine Followed by Massed UAV Wave: RF executes multiple, highly precise cruise missile (from Tu-95MS) or other hypersonic missile strikes from available platforms, specifically targeting critical energy generation/distribution, large industrial complexes, or major military resupply depots in central and now western Ukraine (e.g., Kremenсhuk refinery, major power plants in Poltava/Kirovohrad/Vinnytsia). This would be immediately followed by a new, denser wave of UAVs and conventional cruise missiles to exploit any created gaps in UAF air defense and completely disrupt energy supply or industrial output, severely impacting the war economy and civilian resilience. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

• Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

  • IMMEDIATE (0-3 hours):
    • MAXIMUM AIR DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT & ADAPTATION (NATIONWIDE INCLUSION & CENTRAL/NORTHERN/EASTERN/WESTERN INFRASTRUCTURE FOCUS): All UAF air defense assets must be on maximum alert and fully engaged against the ongoing Tu-95MS missile, ballistic missile, and massed Shahed attacks. Prioritize defense of C2 nodes, critical infrastructure (especially energy and industrial sites in Poltava, Kremenсhuk, Kropyvnytskyi, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, and Kyiv), and major population centers (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Kropyvnytskyi, Vinnytsia). Dynamic reallocation of assets based on updated threat vectors and the number of inbound missiles/Shaheds. Decision point triggered for all available AD assets given the confirmed Tu-95MS launches, ballistic missile, and numerous inbound threats. Immediate re-evaluation of AD asset deployment to prioritize protection of key industrial/energy nodes and C2 in Central, Northern, and now Western Ukraine, as well as critical population centers, accounting for missile diversions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Public Safety & Operational Security: Issue continuous and urgent public warnings, instructing civilians to seek and remain in shelters, particularly in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Kremenсhuk, Kropyvnytskyi, Cherkasy, and Vinnytsia. Ensure emergency services are pre-positioned for rapid response and casualty management. Reinforce public messaging against filming and sharing strike-related content. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • SHORT-TERM (3-24 hours):
    • BDA and Post-Strike Response (Expanded & Central/Northern/Eastern/Western Focus): Conduct rapid BDA on all affected areas, including new strike zones in Poltava, Kremenсhuk, Kropyvnytskyi (potential secondary targets), Cherkasy, Vinnytsia and all affected districts in Kyiv. Prioritize search and rescue, medical support, and immediate damage assessment for critical infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Air Defense Munitions Assessment (CRITICAL & GEOGRAPHIC): Immediate and granular assessment of air defense munitions expenditure and initiation of urgent resupply requests based on current consumption rates and the effectiveness of RF's adaptive tactics, anticipating sustained high-volume attacks across the entire country. Prioritize urgent requests for Western AD munitions, specifically addressing critical needs for exposed central, eastern, and western regions and the protection of industrial/energy assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
    • Counter-Disinformation Response: Formulate and disseminate rapid counter-narratives to RF propaganda, particularly regarding claims of UAF AD ineffectiveness and false reports of military facility destruction. Highlight UAF AD successes where confirmed. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)