Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT

TIME: 120730Z JUL 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Ukraine General: Russian Federation (RF) strategic aerial attack persists with extreme volume, depth, and expanded geographic scope, now definitively including almost all western and central oblasts. Confirmed new threats of aviation-launched munitions for Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. Confirmed: Fatalities (4) and injuries (10) in Chernivtsi Oblast due to enemy drone and missile attack (4x Shahed, 1x Missile). Two civilian fatalities in Zaporizhzhia Oblast due to enemy shelling remain confirmed. New reports confirm damage in Kirovohrad Oblast from drone attacks. Threat of aviation-launched munitions identified for Odesa Oblast. NEW: Zelenskyy reports 26 cruise missiles and 597 drones (over half Shaheds) launched across Ukraine from Kharkiv/Sumy to Lviv/Bukovina. Over 20 missiles and majority of drones neutralized. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Western Ukraine: Continued massed drone and missile attacks on Lviv, with confirmed non-residential building roof fire (200 sq m) in Zaliznychnyi District and residential damage on Metropolitan Andrey Street. Mayor Sadovyi confirms multiple explosions. A children's kindergarten in Lviv was damaged by drone attack, alongside other buildings. RF milbloggers (Операция Z) claim "Elektron" factory in Lviv was struck. Confirmed impacts in Lutsk from drones and missiles, with OVA confirming a private residential building "practically destroyed." Video confirms active firefighting operations in Lutsk residential area from night attack. Confirmed: Fires in Lviv have been extinguished by State Emergency Service (SES) with 6 units and 55 personnel involved. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Confirmed: Chernivtsi has confirmed explosions from missile and drone strikes, with civilian fatalities and injuries and damage to residential buildings, shops, an administrative building, and vehicles in Chernivtsi city and Storozhynets community. RBK-Ukraine provides visual confirmation of widespread damage to civilian buildings and vehicles in Chernivtsi. Operatyvnyi ZSU also provides video confirming the extent of damage and emergency response in Chernivtsi. NEW: ASTRA reports 6 injured in Lviv night attack, including an 11-year-old boy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Colonelcassad posts video purporting to show "Elektron" factory in Lviv after missile/drone strike, indicating smoke plume. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). "Дневник Десантника" claims strike on "resort Bukovel". (CONFIDENCE: LOW for veracity, HIGH for RF claim). NEW: RBK-Ukraine reports three buildings of Lviv Polytechnic damaged. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Central/Eastern Ukraine: Multiple explosions confirmed in Kharkiv city, with Mayor Terekhov confirming a strike on a residential area in the Kyivskyi District. UAVs reported inbound to Kharkiv, with at least four strikes confirmed in Kyivskyi District, one hitting a garage, causing two civilian casualties. KAB launches from tactical aviation confirmed on Donetsk Oblast and Sumy Oblast. Kyiv region has sounded the "all clear." Dnipropetrovsk (Synelnykove Raion) also faces new aviation munition threats. PVO successfully downed 10 UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. In Cherkasy Oblast, 20 drones and 1 missile were downed overnight with no casualties reported. Kryvyi Rih reports controlled situation. Confirmed smoke plumes over Kharkiv after morning KAB and UAV strikes. Serhiy Lysak (Dnipropetrovsk OVA) confirms KAB strikes on Velykomykhailivska community, Synelnykove Raion in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast this morning. RBK-Ukraine reports increased casualties from the TCC shelling in Poltava, indicating previous damage there. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: ASTRA reports two fatalities in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast from morning shelling. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Key Terrain Implications: The nationwide aerial assault continues to directly threaten and impact critical Western aid logistics, particularly rail networks, and military/industrial sites, alongside civilian population centers. The dynamic and adaptive targeting (e.g., Kamianets-Podilskyi, Rohstyn, Khotin, Yampil, Zboriv, Berestechko, Chernivtsi airport, Lviv "Elektron" factory, now Velykomykhailivska in Dnipropetrovsk, and Lviv Polytechnic) aims to stretch UAF AD and interdict aid flows into Ukraine. RF milblogger video claims of identifying Ukrainian forces in locations like 'Khutor Mikhailovsky,' 'Berilovka,' 'Glukhov,' and 'Rozhkovichi' imply ongoing reconnaissance against Ukrainian positions, possibly in border regions of Sumy or Kharkiv, or deeper within Ukrainian territory. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Ukraine General: Night operations continue, with low visibility favoring RF UAV and missile saturation tactics. Moscow media reports "Egyptian nights" (hot weather) until Monday, which does not directly affect Ukrainian operations but may imply similar conditions for RF forces in southern Ukraine and logistical strains. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF:
  • Air Defense (AD): Fully engaged across an expanding and unprecedented number of oblasts, now specifically including Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Lutsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, and Odesa, alongside Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv. New threats in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia (aviation munitions). UAF AF continues to provide continuous updates on UAV and missile concentrations and movement directions, demonstrating effective Command and Control (C2) and public warning systems. Successful AD engagements reported in Chernivtsi, Bila Tserkva, and now successful negations of UAVs approaching Lviv and Lutsk. "Mykolaiv Vanek" reports "minus" for mopeds on Kharkiv, indicating successful AD engagements there. A reconnaissance UAV is reported over Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv Oblasts, with potential AD work. AD confirmed to have destroyed 10 enemy UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Confirmed: 20 drones and 1 missile were downed over Cherkasy Oblast. Additionally, Rivne Oblast reports AD operations overnight. Southern Ukraine Defense Forces report 34 Shahed-131/136 UAVs destroyed in their operational zone in the past day, indicating continued high volume of intercepts in the south. NEW: Zelenskyy states over 20 missiles and "overwhelming majority" of 597 drones were neutralized. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Poland has raised fighter jets due to the intensity of the RF attack, indicating the scale of the threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia have issued all-clears, indicating localized AD success, though new threats have emerged for Dnipropetropetrovsk and Odesa. NEW: Air Force of Ukraine confirms 344 targets were shot down. Operatyvnyi ZSU reports 344/623 targets shot down, with 258 "locationally lost." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Ground Forces: Maintaining defensive posture on the northern border (Kharkiv, Sumy) and eastern axis (Donetsk). Russian MoD engineers of "Southern Grouping of Forces" reported clearing roads of UXO and preparing for transport of wounded and supplies to forward positions, likely in Southern Axis (e.g., Zaporizhzhia or Kherson), indicating active ground operations. The Ukrainian Navy's reported disposition includes 11 vessels (RF) in the Black Sea (including 3 Kalibr carriers, 10-16 missiles), 1 vessel in the Azov Sea (no missiles), and 3 vessels in the Mediterranean Sea (no missiles). This indicates a potential continued threat from Black Sea naval assets. RBK-Ukraine reports UAF is holding pressure in the east and south, reflecting General Staff data. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade "Magura" posts video of ground drone evacuation, indicating UAF adaptation to battlefield conditions and force protection. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) NEW: BUTUSOV PLUS reports 1st Brigade of Operational Purpose, National Guard, destroyed a North Korean 107-mm MLRS Type 75 with an FPV drone in Kupiansk direction, Kharkiv Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RUF:
  • Deep Operations (UAV/Missile/KAB/Aviation Munitions): Sustained, high-volume, multi-vector drone and missile attack continues, now extending even further west into Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts, and now deeper into central Ukraine targeting Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, and Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts with high-speed targets. New aviation munition threats against Dnipropetrovsk (Synelnykove Raion). Confirmed tactical aviation KAB launches on Sumy and Donetsk Oblasts, and Kharkiv. Confirmed explosions in Kharkiv from air attacks, with multiple drone impacts in Kyivskyi District, causing civilian casualties. CONFIRMED: Chernivtsi Oblast confirmed struck by 4x Shahed drones and 1x missile, resulting in 4 fatalities and 10 injuries, and significant damage to civilian infrastructure. RF milbloggers are increasingly aggressive in their rhetoric, celebrating hits and mocking UAF AD effectiveness, specifically boasting about striking Chernivtsi airport and Lviv. "Два майора" (Two Majors) milblogger posts imagery of "night strikes on the enemy" and a video of a drone strike on a vehicle, indicating continued precision targeting capabilities and propaganda efforts. Colonelcassad shares drone reconnaissance footage highlighting Ukrainian positions and equipment, including a blue van, in areas such as 'Khutor Mikhailovsky,' 'Berilovka,' 'Glukhov,' and 'Rozhkovichi,' indicating active ISR and targeting. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Colonelcassad also posted video of what is claimed to be the "destruction of a Ukrainian PVD" (Temporary Deployment Point) by the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, consistent with ongoing attacks on Ukrainian positions. Confirmed: RF MoD claims 33 Ukrainian drones shot down over Russian regions overnight, including 16 over Bryansk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). RF milbloggers claim 560-700 Shaheds/decoys and 15+ Kh-101 cruise missiles were launched in the recent mass attack, indicating perceived high volume of RF fire. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM for veracity, HIGH for RF perception of volume). Basurin on the main posts video of a Russian MoD official inspecting military firearms (RPK-16, sniper rifles) implying readiness or ongoing procurement. Colonelcassad posts video of smoke rising from Lviv (purportedly Elektron factory) at 04:35 AM local, corroborating earlier reports of strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Poddubny |Z|O|V| edition claims night strikes targeted military-industrial complex (MIC) factories in Lviv and Lutsk, and Yavoriv military training ground. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM). "Дневник Десантника" claims strikes hit Ukrainian MIC, airfields, and energy infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM). NEW: Air Force of Ukraine reports launch of guided aerial bombs by enemy tactical aviation in eastern Kharkiv Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) NEW: Alex Parker Returns posts video of an X-101 missile arrival in Chernivtsi with cluster munitions. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM for cluster munitions, HIGH for X-101 strike claim) NEW: Kotsnews claims strike on Lviv production of missile guidance systems. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Ground Forces (Northern/Eastern/Southern Axes): Confirmed KAB and UAV strikes on Kharkiv suggest ongoing preparatory fires for potential ground operations. RF milblogger claims regarding liquidation of a Ukrainian SSO commander and group in Sumy Oblast, indicating active ground engagement or infiltration attempts along the border. Russian MoD engineers supporting "Southern Grouping" indicating active logistical support for offensive or defensive operations. TASS reports a senior operator from the 40th Separate Guards Marine Brigade claiming UAF forces on the Sumy direction are not properly camouflaging personnel and equipment, indicating RF reconnaissance activity and perceived UAF vulnerabilities in that sector. CONFIRMED: TASS claims Assault groups of the 425th Separate Assault Regiment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, urgently transferred from training grounds in Lviv Oblast to Kharkiv Oblast, have been withdrawn from the area of Melove to Khatnie due to losses. TASS also reports a senior officer of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment, "Oraz," claiming 90% of UAF equipment in the Sumy direction is NATO-supplied. TASS claims Russian artillery (Grad) destroyed approx. 20 UAF soldiers in Sumy Oblast. "Два майора" posts video of Marine Corps servicemen appealing for funds for technical and communication equipment for "Sumy direction," indicating resource needs and a focus on that sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). "АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА" posts drone footage of a vehicle being struck and destroyed, with crosshairs visible, implying a successful RF tactical strike, possibly against UAF assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: MoD Russia posts video of 25th Combined Arms Army assault detachments undergoing intensive combat training in LPR. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) NEW: Воин DV posts video of FAB strike by 11th Guards Army VVS and PVO on Kamyshevakha, claiming 5th Army Grouping "Vostok" is advancing in that area. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Information Warfare/Propaganda: RF milbloggers continue to propagate claims of UAF AD inefficiency and mock Ukrainian efforts, alongside TASS reports on tactical advances and now fabricating claims of foreign troop involvement in Russian territory. Russian channels are overtly boasting about hits and calling for "closing the Ukraine project," and specifically target Chernivtsi airport in their rhetoric. "Два майора" continues its aggressive psychological operations, boasting about "meeting the dawn in nature while beating Khokhols" and posting mocking imagery. TASS continues to propagate messages of resilience in Belgorod, reporting 380km border as "stably difficult." TASS also released videos regarding damaged housing in Belgorod and reconstruction efforts, emphasizing local authorities' control and accountability for restoration work. Colonelcassad showcases a large transport drone (DJI FlyCart 100), implying its potential for military use, likely in logistical support for ground operations or payload delivery, though DJI maintains it is for civilian use. TASS also reports North Korea's Foreign Minister declaring "unconditional support" for Russia's policy on protecting territorial integrity, a likely attempt to project international legitimacy. TASS quotes Tucker Carlson suggesting US citizenship revocation for Americans fighting in Ukraine, aiming to deter foreign volunteers and sow discord. Colonelcassad shares a video on Chinese hypersonic missile development, subtly implying RF access to similar or advanced technologies. A new TASS video of Lavrov meeting with the North Korean Foreign Minister reinforces the narrative of diplomatic engagement and potential for military cooperation, despite the lack of specific details from the video itself. A new TASS report on Saudi Arabia's readiness to cooperate on rare earth metals seeks to project economic strength and new partnerships. Confirmed: Colonelcassad video shows a Russian officer (Emmanuil Davydov, 106th Guards Airborne Division) claiming participation in repelling a large Ukrainian attack near Kursk, emphasizing valor and unit cohesion. Lavrov confirms RF had no reason to refuse DPRK "help" in "special operation," calling it "sincere solidarity." Lavrov also announces plans to resume sea communication with DPRK. Operatyvnyi ZSU directly quotes Lavrov on the DPRK initiative for military participation in Kursk, reinforcing the claim of North Korean involvement. WarGonzo milblogger claims RF forces set a record for attacking western Ukrainian targets, reinforcing "overwhelming force" narrative. RF Governor Gladkov states schools and kindergartens in Shebekino (Belgorod Oblast) are being covered with nets for protection against Ukrainian drone attacks, a public measure reinforcing the narrative of Ukrainian aggression against Russian civilians. "Дневник Десантника" milblogger posts a video appealing for donations for a DJI Mavic 3 Pro drone, demonstrating a continued need for tactical ISR assets at the unit level despite claimed large-scale operations. TASS reports State Duma will consider a bill to tighten responsibility for foreign agents, indicating further internal crackdown aligned with wartime narrative control. Colonelcassad posts an infographic on US DTRA's GBU-57 bunker busters, discussing their effectiveness against Iranian nuclear sites, possibly to subtly project Russian knowledge of Western capabilities or to question their efficacy. Военкор Котенок claims US/UK strategists are scanning Russian rear areas for thousands of kilometers, detecting radars, AD systems, and troop movements, and states that strikes are gradually moving deeper into "mainland" Russia. This indicates a recognition of Ukrainian deep strike capabilities and an attempt to portray Russia as under widespread attack. Воин DV (Warrior DV) quotes Trump on the scheme of US weapons supplies to Ukraine via NATO, aiming to frame NATO as bearing the financial burden, potentially influencing domestic US sentiment. "Дневник Десантника" claims Russian hackers breached the main UAF combat operations program, indicating ongoing cyber warfare claims. (CONFIDENCE: LOW for veracity, HIGH for claim). "Операция Z" propagates a Financial Times claim that Trump views Zelenskyy as the main obstacle to peace, aimed at undermining Ukrainian leadership. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). "Fighterbomber" comments that Russian generals have "returned their lampases" (a sign of rank/authority), implying a restoration or increase in their status/power. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). ASTRA reports Russia and Belarus will create AI based on "traditional values," likely a propaganda effort to project technological unity and a moral high ground. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). "АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА" posts "Strictly according to the law" as a standalone message, possibly related to internal RF discipline or a response to UAF actions. (CONFIDENCE: LOW). Colonelcassad posts a fundraising appeal for "consumables for training against enemy drones," suggesting ongoing efforts to improve counter-UAS capabilities at the tactical level. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: Новости Москвы posts a seemingly unrelated article about sleep and weight loss, potentially a filler or an attempt to appear as a general news source. (CONFIDENCE: LOW relevance). NEW: Рыбарь provides a general "Morning Summary," and a photo message on "France in Arctic," indicating attempts to diversify content and discuss broader geopolitical issues. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for observation, LOW for direct tactical relevance). NEW: Дневник Десантника posts emotional video about a 5-year-old child's death in Kursk, attributing it to UAF strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for RF propaganda intent, LOW for independent verification of UAF culpability). NEW: Alex Parker Returns posts videos titled "For the Hague" and "Morning confusion in Lviv. May good prevail!", indicating intent to document alleged UAF war crimes and gloat over Lviv strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for RF propaganda intent).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:
  • Strategic Drone/Missile/Aviation Munition Strikes (Sustained, Adaptive, Critically Deepening & Expanding Western/Central/Southern Reach, Multi-Wave, HIGH VOLUME): RF continues to demonstrate an unprecedented capability for widespread, high-volume, multi-vector UAV and missile attacks, now penetrating even deeper into western Ukraine, including Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts, and now extending into central Ukraine (Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad Oblasts) and southern Odesa Oblast with high-speed targets. New aviation munition threats against Dnipropetrovsk (Synelnykove Raion). CONFIRMED: Specific attack on Chernivtsi Oblast with 4x Shahed drones and 1x missile, causing fatalities and significant damage. The "chaotic movement" reported, and dynamic targeting of varied locations (e.g., Kamianets-Podilskyi, Rohstyn, Yampil, Zboriv, Berestechko) indicates an adaptive strategy to challenge UAF AD. Confirmed missile launches following UAV saturation, and the identification of "another wave" of cruise missiles, indicates a sophisticated and coordinated multi-platform deep strike. KAB launches from tactical aviation on Sumy, Donetsk, and now Kharkiv Oblasts confirm a multi-layered aerial attack. RF naval presence in the Black Sea with Kalibr carriers (3 vessels, 10-16 missiles) maintains a standoff strike capability. RF milbloggers claim 560-700 Shaheds/decoys and 15+ Kh-101 cruise missiles were launched, indicating a perceived mass saturation capability. Basurin on the Main video implies inspection or fielding of new Russian small arms (RPK-16, sniper rifles), suggesting ongoing modernization or resupply of infantry. NEW: Zelenskyy's report of 26 cruise missiles and 597 drones confirms RF's ability to launch very high volumes of both missile and drone attacks simultaneously and nationwide. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Colonelcassad's video of smoke over Lviv, combined with milblogger claims, reinforces RF's ability to successfully strike targets deep in Western Ukraine, including industrial/military sites. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: Alex Parker Returns' video claiming X-101 strike with cluster munitions on Chernivtsi, if verified, indicates a capability for more indiscriminate and severe targeting. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Ground Maneuver (Northern/Eastern/Southern Axes): Confirmed KAB and UAV strikes on Kharkiv indicate preparatory fires for potential ground operations. RF milbloggers' claims of SSO liquidation in Sumy Oblast indicate active reconnaissance or limited ground engagements along the border. TASS's bizarre claim of North Korean involvement in Kursk "liberation" indicates RF's intent to project strength and perhaps justify future actions along the northern border. MoD reports on Southern Grouping engineers indicate ongoing ground operations requiring logistical support. New TASS reporting on UAF camouflage deficiencies in Sumy direction suggests active RF reconnaissance and potential for exploitation. Colonelcassad's video showing destruction of a Ukrainian PVD by 20th MRD indicates tactical level ground and air cooperation for targeting. CONFIRMED: TASS claims the withdrawal of 425th Separate Assault Regiment of UAF from Melove to Khatnie due to losses in Kharkiv Oblast. TASS claims Russian artillery destroyed approx. 20 UAF soldiers in Sumy Oblast. "Два майора" fundraising video for Marine Corps on Sumy direction highlights continued active engagement and resource needs in that area. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). "АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА" video of a vehicle strike demonstrates RF's tactical ground-support capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: MoD Russia's video of 25th Combined Arms Army training in LPR indicates ongoing force generation and readiness for offensive operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) NEW: Воин DV's video of FAB strike in Kamyshevakha and claim of 5th Army Grouping "Vostok" advance indicates continued tactical air-ground coordination for localized pushes. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Information Warfare (Sophisticated, Adaptive & Aggressive): RF continues to employ sophisticated information operations, including selectively using tactical video claims (e.g., drone strike on vehicle from "Два майора", 'Anwar Detachment' drone footage, destruction of Ukrainian PVD by 20th MRD, Russian officer recounting combat near Kursk), administrative actions (TASS videos on Belgorod housing reconstruction, Gladkov on Shebekino drone protection nets), direct mockery of UAF AD effectiveness, fabricating claims about foreign troop involvement, and utilizing external commentators to bolster its narrative. They are openly boasting about hits and calling for Ukraine's "closure." The TASS report on North Korea's support and Tucker Carlson's statements are part of this. Colonelcassad's focus on Chinese hypersonic tech aligns with the "overwhelming force" narrative. The Lavrov meeting video is used to project diplomatic influence. Lavrov's explicit statements about DPRK "help" and resuming sea communication reinforce narrative of bilateral military support and economic ties. TASS report on tightening "foreign agent" legislation indicates increasing internal information control. "Дневник Десантника" claim of UAF program hack attempts to degrade UAF confidence and project RF cyber capability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). "Операция Z" promoting Trump's perceived view of Zelenskyy as an obstacle to peace aims to create divisions and undermine Ukrainian leadership. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). ASTRA's report on Russia/Belarus AI initiative projects technological advancement and shared values. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: The emotional video of a child's death in Kursk (Дневник Десантника) is a clear attempt to demonize UAF actions and garner sympathy domestically/internationally. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) NEW: Alex Parker Returns' "For the Hague" videos attempt to frame UAF actions as war crimes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Heavy Transport Drone Potential (DJI FlyCart 100): While nominally civilian, RF's milblogger "Colonelcassad" showcasing the DJI FlyCart 100 with its 80kg payload capacity and rapid recharge suggests potential RF interest in using such platforms for resupply, reconnaissance, or even improvised munitions delivery, particularly in contested forward areas. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • Counter-UAS: RF capabilities in C-UAS are demonstrated by the claimed destruction of a Starlink terminal in Huliaipole direction by a 35th Army drone operator. This indicates ongoing efforts to degrade Ukrainian communication and intelligence capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Colonelcassad's fundraising appeal for "consumables for training against enemy drones" suggests ongoing efforts to improve practical C-UAS skills and resource them. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Unit-level resource appeal: "Дневник Десантника" milblogger's video appeal for a DJI Mavic 3 Pro drone indicates that, despite strategic-level capabilities, individual Russian units may still face resource limitations, especially for advanced tactical equipment. This is further corroborated by "Два майора" appeal for the Marine Corps. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intentions:
  • Systemic Degradation of Ukrainian Infrastructure, Air Defense & Western Aid Logistics (PRIMARY - Deepest & Widest Expansion): The immediate intention is to maximize damage to critical civilian and military infrastructure, exhaust UAF air defense munitions, and instill widespread fear through a sustained, high-intensity, multi-domain aerial campaign. The expansion to Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, and Odesa Oblasts specifically aims to stretch UAF AD assets to their absolute limit, directly threaten critical logistics routes for Western aid and key central military/industrial targets, and cause maximum psychological impact. New threats to Dnipropetrovsk further expand this intent. The "chaotic movement" and dynamic targeting indicate an intent to overwhelm and confuse UAF AD. Specific targeting rhetoric from milbloggers regarding Chernivtsi airport and Lviv "Elektron" factory highlights this. Poddubny |Z|O|V| edition claims targets were MIC factories and military training grounds, corroborating intent to degrade Ukrainian warfighting capacity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: Claims of striking Lviv Polytechnic and missile guidance system production reinforces intent to degrade Ukrainian scientific/industrial base and military capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Create Pressure on Northern Border (Kharkiv/Sumy Oblast): RF intends to establish or expand ground presence in border regions, specifically to create a new axis of pressure, potentially fix UAF forces, or open new lines of advance into Kharkiv/Sumy Oblasts. KAB and UAV launches on Kharkiv and KAB launches on Sumy support this. The claimed liquidation of SSO in Sumy further indicates active ground probing/engagement. The TASS report on North Korean involvement in Kursk, while false, shows an intent to bolster the narrative of RF's northern defense/offense. The TASS report on UAF camouflage deficiencies in Sumy direction indicates ongoing reconnaissance and intent to exploit perceived weaknesses. Colonelcassad's video of a Ukrainian PVD destruction by the 20th MRD suggests an intent to target Ukrainian forward command and logistical points in these areas. Claim of 20 UAF soldiers destroyed by Grad in Sumy indicates continued active targeting and intent to inflict casualties in this sector. "Два майора" fundraising for "Sumy direction" Marines indicates persistent RF ground efforts in this sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: MoD Russia's training video of assault detachments signals intent to maintain and enhance ground offensive capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Degrade Ukrainian Drone Capabilities & Communications: RF intends to directly counter and degrade Ukrainian heavy-lift and tactical strike drone capabilities, particularly those operating in the Kharkiv sector and near border regions, and to deny critical communication means such as Starlink. "Два майора" video showing a drone strike on a vehicle indicates continued targeting of UAF assets. Colonelcassad's 'Anwar Detachment' video highlights RF's ongoing ISR and targeting of Ukrainian positions using drones. The claimed destruction of a Starlink terminal supports this intent. Colonelcassad's fundraising for C-UAS training consumables reinforces intent to enhance anti-drone capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Consolidate Narrative of Territorial Control and Military Supremacy: RF aims to project an image of overwhelming military strength and legitimate control over occupied territories, both domestically and internationally, through its large-scale strikes, administrative actions (TASS videos on Belgorod housing reconstruction, Gladkov's statements on drone protection nets), and aggressive propaganda. The TASS report on North Korea's support and Tucker Carlson's statements are part of this. Colonelcassad's focus on Chinese hypersonic tech aligns with the "overwhelming force" narrative. The Lavrov meeting video is used to project diplomatic influence. Lavrov's explicit statements about DPRK "help" and future sea communication further amplifies the narrative of an expanding alliance against Western influence. TASS report on tightening "foreign agent" legislation indicates increasing internal information control. "Дневник Десантника" claim of UAF program hack attempts to undermine UAF operational capabilities and boost RF cyber image. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). "Fighterbomber" comment on generals' lampases implies an intent to project stability and strength within the RF military hierarchy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). ASTRA's report on Russia/Belarus AI based on "traditional values" attempts to frame RF as a technological and moral leader. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: The emotional video about a child's death in Kursk and "For the Hague" videos serve to frame Ukraine as a war criminal and garner domestic support for RF actions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Complete Seizure of Chasiv Yar: TASS claims RF forces almost completely control Chasiv Yar (only one district left). This indicates a renewed or intensified intent to finalize the capture of this strategically important town. KAB launches on Donetsk support this. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM for veracity of claim, HIGH for intent).

2.2. Recent tactical changes or adaptations

• RUF:
  • Geographic Expansion of UAV/Missile/Aviation Munitions Strikes (CRITICAL - Deeper West & Central, Including New Regions and Specific Logistic Hubs, and Odesa): The further extension of UAV threats to Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts, coupled with new high-speed missile threats to previously less impacted areas like Kamianets-Podilskyi, Rohstyn, Yampil, Zboriv, Berestechko, and Chernivtsi, and new aviation munition threats to Dnipropetrovsk and Kirovohrad, and aviation munition threats to Odesa Oblast, indicates RF's intent to stretch UAF AD resources to their breaking point, isolate Western aid routes, impact civilian morale across the entire breadth of Ukraine, and target key central military/industrial sites. The overt boasting by milbloggers about targeting Chernivtsi airport and Lviv "Elektron" factory highlights this specific focus on logistics and military-industrial complex targets. RF milbloggers claiming 560-700 Shaheds/decoys and 15+ Kh-101s further emphasizes the scale of their saturation attacks. Zelenskyy's statement confirming 26 missiles and 597 drones validates the massive, nationwide scale of the recent attack. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Poddubny |Z|O|V| edition claiming MIC factories and Yavoriv polygon were hit indicates a continued adaptation to target high-value military-related sites. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: Claims of X-101 with cluster munitions on Chernivtsi (Alex Parker Returns) is a severe adaptation, indicating an intent to maximize damage and civilian casualties in a previously less targeted deep western region. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM) NEW: Kotsnews claim of targeting missile guidance systems production in Lviv indicates an adaptation to specifically target components of Ukrainian defense industry. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Coordinated UAV/Missile/KAB Wave (Confirmed Execution & Multi-Wave): The confirmed launch of strategic missiles following the UAV saturation, along with the detection of "new waves" of cruise missiles, and KAB launches on Sumy, Donetsk, and Kharkiv, indicates a clear coordinated multi-platform deep strike strategy to maximize AD confusion and penetration. Zelenskyy's report explicitly confirms 26 cruise missiles and 597 drones launched simultaneously, demonstrating a coordinated multi-domain strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Northern Border Probing/Bridgehead Establishment (Confirmed Air Support for Kharkiv & KABs for Sumy, and Reconnaissance Claims): The TASS report regarding a bridgehead near Guyevo for a push into Sumy Oblast, supported by KAB launches on Sumy and confirmed explosions/UAVs inbound to Kharkiv, and now claims of SSO liquidation in Sumy, suggests a new or intensified ground maneuver component on the northern border, likely complementing the deep strikes. The TASS report on UAF camouflage deficiencies in Sumy direction further corroborates active RF reconnaissance and targeting focus in that area. Colonelcassad's video shows detailed drone reconnaissance of potential UAF positions in border regions. Colonelcassad's footage of Ukrainian PVD destruction by the 20th MRD indicates ongoing targeted ground action in forward positions. TASS claims the withdrawal of 425th Separate Assault Regiment of UAF due to losses in Kharkiv Oblast, suggesting successful RF pressure. TASS claims Russian artillery destroyed approx. 20 UAF soldiers in Sumy Oblast. "Два майора" fundraising for Marine Corps on "Sumy direction" reflects a continued emphasis on ground operations and the need for ongoing support in this area. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: Mod Russia's training video of 25th Combined Arms Army indicates ongoing adaptation for offensive ground operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Aggressive Information Operations & Direct Boasting (Targeting Western Aid & Fabricating Alliances): Immediate mocking of UAF AD effectiveness, explicit statements about "closing the Ukraine project" and "preludes are over," and specifically boasting about hits in Lviv and Chernivtsi airport indicate a real-time, aggressive information warfare component integrated with their physical strikes, designed to maximize psychological impact and portray successful interdiction of Western aid. The false TASS report regarding North Korean involvement and use of Tucker Carlson's comments are new escalations of this, aiming to legitimize Russian border actions, project international support, and deter foreign volunteers. "Два майора" showcasing drone strike footage reinforces this. The Lavrov/DPRK meeting video is part of this. New TASS videos regarding Belgorod reconstruction aim to project administrative control and resilience in border regions. Confirmed: Colonelcassad's video featuring a Russian officer recounting combat near Kursk is a direct and targeted propaganda piece to bolster morale and portray successful defense against UAF. Lavrov's open acknowledgement of DPRK "help" and plans for maritime communication with DPRK further amplifies the narrative of an expanding alliance against Western influence. Gladkov's statements on Shebekino drone protection nets are a new adaptation to highlight the civilian impact of Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory. RF milblogger War Reporter Kotenok's statement regarding US/UK strategic scanning of Russian rear areas and deep strikes indicates a new internal narrative adapting to deeper Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory, acknowledging the threat while attempting to frame it within a larger 'proxy war' context. RF milblogger Воин DV (Warrior DV) quoting Trump on NATO funding for Ukraine aid is an adaptation to frame Western support as a burden on allies, aiming to create divisions. "Дневник Десантника" claims of UAF program hack are an adaptation to portray RF cyber superiority and undermine UAF morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). "Операция Z" pushing Trump's alleged views on Zelenskyy is an adaptation to sow political discord. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). "Fighterbomber" commenting on generals' lampases indicates an adaptation to bolster internal military morale and prestige. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Colonelcassad's fundraising for C-UAS training is an adaptation to improve a specific capability against a persistent threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: The emotional video of a child's death in Kursk is a significant adaptation to leverage human tragedy for propaganda, aiming to discredit UAF and rally domestic support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) NEW: Alex Parker Returns' "For the Hague" videos and accompanying text are an adaptation to directly accuse UAF of war crimes and gather evidence for international legal action, a new, more direct approach to information warfare. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Claims of Chasiv Yar Near-Capture: TASS report suggests RF is intensifying efforts to fully capture Chasiv Yar, likely as a psychological victory and to open further avenues of advance, supported by KAB launches on Donetsk. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • Logistical Reinforcement in Southern Axis: Russian MoD engineers conducting demining and road preparation in the Southern Grouping of Forces area indicates active logistical adaptation to support ongoing or future ground operations in that sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Targeting Ukrainian Communications: Confirmed destruction of a Starlink terminal by RF drone operator shows an adaptation to target specific, critical Ukrainian communication infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• UAF:
  • Real-time Threat Awareness and Dissemination (Maintaining, Adapting to New Routes and Targets, Including Odesa and Rivne): UAF AF continues to demonstrate high-level, real-time threat detection and dissemination capabilities for incoming UAVs and missiles, including detailed movement patterns and the immediate expansion of warning zones into new western, central, and southern regions (Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Lutsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, and Odesa), and now new aviation munition threats for Dnipropetrovsk. AD confirmed active in Lutsk, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk (10 UAVs downed), Cherkasy (20 UAVs, 1 missile downed), and Rivne. Public messaging from Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia on air raid all-clears, and from Kharkiv on UAV activity and impacts, indicates robust and responsive public warning systems. Video shows active firefighting response in Lutsk and Lviv. Video shows smoke over Kharkiv after KAB/UAV strikes, demonstrating UAF immediate BDA. Southern Ukraine Defense Forces reporting 34 Shahed UAVs downed indicates very high AD response in the south. Zelenskyy's official statement provides immediate, comprehensive data on the scale of RF attack and UAF AD effectiveness, demonstrating high transparency and rapid information dissemination. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Poland's decision to scramble fighter jets indicates the severity and scale of the RF attack, highlighting the scale of the threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: Air Force of Ukraine and General Staff of UAF's immediate and high-volume reporting of 344 targets downed (out of 623 total targets, with 258 "locationally lost") indicates highly effective, transparent, and rapid BDA and public communication, an adaptation to the high volume of RF attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Poland Fighter Jet Scramble: Poland's decision to scramble fighter jets indicates the severity and scale of the RF aerial threat, highlighting a coordinated international response to RF aggression near NATO borders. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Warning Against Content Filming: Chernivtsi OVA's warning against filming/sharing content of strikes indicates an active counter-intelligence/security measure to deny RF BDA and propaganda material. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Personnel Loss Reporting (Transparent): General Staff of UAF and RBK-Ukraine reporting estimated RF personnel losses (1070 over 24 hours) demonstrates continued operational transparency and a counter-narrative to RF claims of dominance. The "Штірліц" channel's post of a "successfully demobilized" RF soldier reinforces this messaging. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Nationwide Minute of Silence: The daily 09:00 national minute of silence, specifically in Zaporizhzhia, indicates a coordinated and sustained effort to memorialize fallen defenders and maintain public resolve. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Official Confirmation of German Long-Range Missiles: Ukrainian General-Major Christian Freuding confirms that the first German-funded long-range missiles for Ukraine will arrive by the end of July. This is a critical public confirmation of future offensive capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Reporting on Foreign Volunteer Casualties: RBK-Ukraine's report of a Hungarian volunteer fatality indicates a commitment to transparent reporting, even of sensitive information, likely for public awareness and international relations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ground Drone Evacuation: 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade "Magura" showcasing a ground drone for evacuation indicates an adaptation to improve force protection and rapid casualty extraction in contested environments. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Precision FPV Strikes: BUTUSOV PLUS's report of 1st Brigade of Operational Purpose destroying a North Korean MLRS with an FPV drone in Kupiansk highlights UAF's continued adaptation and effectiveness in using FPV drones for precision strikes against high-value enemy assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and sustainment status

• RUF:
  • VERY High Munitions Consumption (Sustained & Critically Expanded, Multi-Wave, Including Odesa): The continued massed drone attacks, now covering an even wider and deeper area, including central and southern Ukraine (Odesa), confirm RF's capacity to sustain high rates of UAV and missile deployment. The "chaotic movement" tactic further implies a sufficient inventory to afford less efficient (but more challenging to intercept) flight profiles. Confirmed strategic missile launches, KAB launches, new waves, and new aviation munition threats reinforce this assessment. Naval assets with Kalibr missiles also contribute to this inventory. Confirmed: 33 Ukrainian drones reportedly shot down by RF MoD, including 16 over Bryansk Oblast, indicating sustained RF air defense munition consumption and ongoing Ukrainian deep strike capabilities. RF milblogger claims of 560-700 Shaheds/decoys and 15+ Kh-101 cruise missiles indicates a perception of overwhelming munition availability, whether accurate or not. Военкор Котенок's comment on US/UK strategic scanning for Russian AD systems and the movement of strikes deeper into Russia implies a high rate of AD system activity and potential for attrition, which would stress Russian AD logistics. Zelenskyy's report of 26 missiles and 597 drones confirms extremely high munition expenditure in a single night. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Northern Axis Logistical Support: Increased rail logistics into Belgorod Oblast (previous report) supports the TASS claim of a bridgehead for Sumy operations and ongoing strikes on Kharkiv, indicating continued capacity to supply forward ground operations. The showcasing of DJI FlyCart 100 by a milblogger, while speculative, suggests an interest in augmenting forward logistics or special payload delivery. Unit-level appeal for drones suggests some logistical gaps or a desire for higher-end tactical equipment at the lowest echelons. "Два майора" fundraising appeal for the Marine Corps on the Sumy direction indicates that while strategic logistics may be robust, unit-level tactical equipment and consumables remain a challenge, necessitating grassroots support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Southern Axis Logistical Support: Russian MoD engineers actively clearing roads and preparing for transport in the Southern Grouping of Forces area indicates robust logistical support for ongoing ground operations in that sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• UAF:
  • Air Defense Munitions Strain (CRITICAL - EXTREME & NATIONWIDE, Including Odesa): The current massed drone and missile strikes, now extending to almost the entire country, continue to place unprecedented strain on UAF air defense munitions stockpiles. The expanded area of operations (Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, and Odesa) severely exacerbates this strain and risks critical AD gaps, particularly for key Western aid logistics and critical central infrastructure. Southern Ukraine Defense Forces reporting 34 Shahed UAVs destroyed indicates very high munition expenditure in that sector. Zelenskyy's report of neutralizing "over 20 missiles and overwhelming majority of 597 drones" implies massive expenditure of AD munitions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: Air Force of Ukraine's report of 344 targets shot down (out of 623 total targets) explicitly confirms the high rate of AD munition consumption and the challenge of unidentified/lost targets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Long-Range Missile Supply (Upcoming): German General-Major Christian Freuding confirms that the first German-funded long-range missiles for Ukraine will arrive by the end of July. This indicates a future enhancement to UAF strike capabilities but highlights a current constraint until delivery. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). STERNENKO's fundraising post for 46.5 million UAH for fiber-optic FPV drones indicates ongoing critical need for tactical drone assets and successful grassroots fundraising efforts to meet these needs, highlighting a potential gap in official procurement or a desire for rapid acquisition. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.4. Command and control effectiveness

• RUF:
  • Centralized Strategic C2 (Highly Effective & Adaptive): The coordinated, high-volume, multi-vector drone and missile attack, incorporating adaptive tactics and significantly expanded geographic scope into the far west, central, and southern Ukraine (Odesa), continues to demonstrate highly effective, centralized strategic C2 for deep operations. Their information operations are also tightly controlled and rapidly deployed. The ability to launch multi-wave attacks further confirms effective C2. Basurin on the Main's video of an MoD official inspecting weapons, despite showing no clear context, implies high-level oversight and C2 in Russian military procurement or readiness. Zelenskyy's report confirms a highly coordinated nationwide attack involving both missiles and drones, underscoring effective RF strategic C2. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ground C2 (Northern Axis, Eastern Axis & Southern Axis): The claim of establishing a bridgehead, if accurate, suggests effective C2 for tactical ground operations in border regions. The TASS claim about Chasiv Yar control also indicates coordinated C2 for offensive ground operations. RF milblogger claims of SSO liquidation in Sumy also indicate effective tactical C2 for border engagements. The Russian MoD report on engineer work in the Southern Grouping of Forces suggests effective C2 for logistical support in active ground zones. The TASS report on UAF camouflage issues in Sumy direction, if accurate, suggests effective RF reconnaissance and targeting C2. Colonelcassad's drone footage and video of Ukrainian PVD destruction also indicate effective ISR and tactical C2. The claimed destruction of a Starlink terminal also indicates effective C2 for drone operations and targeting. TASS report on Grad strike on UAF in Sumy, citing a deputy commander, indicates localized tactical C2 effectiveness for indirect fire targeting. "Два майора" fundraising appeal from Marine Corps personnel, despite its localized nature, indicates ongoing tactical level operations and the continued need for resources which are managed within the C2 structure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: MoD Russia's training video suggests maintained C2 over assault detachments and their training regimens. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• UAF:
  • Highly Effective Air Defense C2 (Strained, Adapting to New Routes and Targets): Rapid detection, tracking, and public warning of incoming threats across multiple oblasts, including specific drone and missile movement updates and immediate expansion of alerts to all newly affected Western, central, and southern regions (Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Lutsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, and Odesa), and now including new aviation munition threats for Dnipropetrovsk. Public messages from Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Zaporizhzhia authorities illustrate effective C2 for public warning. AD success in Dnipropetrovsk, with 10 UAVs downed, and Cherkasy, with 20 UAVs and 1 missile downed, underscores effective localized C2 and response. Video of active fire and rescue operations in Lviv and Lutsk further demonstrates effective emergency response C2. The daily minute of silence in Zaporizhzhia and other regions indicates effective national-level C2 for morale and public engagement. Southern Ukraine Defense Forces reporting 34 Shahed UAVs destroyed indicates effective AD C2 in the south, handling high threat volumes. However, this C2 system is now operating under extreme pressure due to the national scope of the threat and the need to constantly adapt to new missile/UAV trajectories and target sets. Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine's immediate warning of "enemy tactical aviation activity in the eastern direction" demonstrates real-time C2 and threat awareness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Zelenskyy's official statement on the number of missiles/drones launched and intercepted, delivered hours after the attack, shows highly effective and centralized C2 for BDA and public communication at the highest level. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: Air Force of Ukraine and General Staff of UAF's detailed reporting of 344 targets downed (out of 623 total targets) indicates highly effective and transparent C2 for BDA and public messaging. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian force posture and readiness

• Posture: UAF is currently operating at maximum defensive alert against a complex, multi-domain RF aerial attack across almost the entire country. Ground forces maintain defensive lines, including on the northern border, Eastern, and Southern Axes. Naval forces maintain defensive posture in the Black Sea and Azov Sea, monitoring RF naval assets. RBK-Ukraine reports UAF is holding pressure in the east and south.
• Readiness:
  • Air Defense: At peak readiness and fully engaged. Systems are being critically tested by the volume, complexity, and now nationwide geographic scope of the current RF attacks, particularly the "chaotic movement" of UAVs and the confirmed multi-wave missile attacks. AD is confirmed active in Lutsk, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk, with successful negation of some UAVs reported. AD in Dnipropetrovsk successfully downed 10 UAVs. Confirmed: 20 drones and 1 missile downed over Cherkasy Oblast. Rivne Oblast AD active overnight. "Mykolaiv Vanek" reports successful "minus" for mopeds in Kharkiv, indicating ongoing AD effectiveness there. Southern Ukraine Defense Forces confirm 34 Shahed UAVs destroyed, indicating high readiness and effectiveness in the south. Zelenskyy's report of "over 20 missiles and overwhelming majority of 597 drones" neutralized demonstrates high readiness and effectiveness of UAF AD despite the overwhelming volume. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: Air Force of Ukraine and General Staff of UAF's report of 344 targets downed (out of 623) confirms high readiness and high rate of engagement, but also points to the scale of the threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Counter-UAS: Active in countering RF drones and responding to RF C-UAS efforts. Successful engagements confirmed near Bila Tserkva, Chernivtsi, Lviv, Lutsk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Cherkasy, and in the southern operational zone (34 Shaheds). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: BUTUSOV PLUS video confirms 1st Brigade of Operational Purpose, National Guard's successful FPV strike against a North Korean MLRS, demonstrating high C-UAS readiness and precision strike capability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Emergency Services: Fully engaged in response to widespread aerial attacks, as evidenced by firefighting operations in Lviv and Lutsk, and significant response to the Chernivtsi attack. RBK-Ukraine and Operatyvnyi ZSU provide visual confirmation of DSNS operations in Chernivtsi, demonstrating their active engagement and capacity. Zelenskyy's photo series features DSNS personnel responding to strikes, visually reinforcing their readiness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ground Forces: The 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade "Magura" video on ground drone evacuation showcases adaptive force protection measures and readiness to operate in contested forward areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Overall: Readiness remains high but under immense and unsustainable pressure due to sustained, nationwide aerial attacks, severe resource consumption, and the desperate need to extend AD coverage across the entire country. The upcoming delivery of German-funded long-range missiles will enhance readiness in the mid-term. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent tactical successes or setbacks

• Successes:
  • Active Air Defense Engagements & Early Warnings (Nationwide & Adaptive, including Cherkasy and Rivne): Ongoing successful interceptions of RF UAVs (e.g., Bila Tserkva, Chernivtsi, Lviv, Lutsk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk - 10 UAVs downed, Cherkasy - 20 UAVs, 1 missile downed, Rivne AD active, Southern Operational Zone - 34 Shaheds downed) and timely public warnings across critical areas, now including Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, and Odesa. The ability to identify "chaotic movement" and provide detailed tracking indicates strong ISR and C2. AD confirmed active in Lutsk, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Cherkasy. Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia "all clears" indicate successful AD engagements. Kryvyi Rih reports controlled situation. Video confirms fire and rescue services successfully extinguishing fires in Lviv and Lutsk and responding to Chernivtsi. Zelenskyy's statement confirming neutralization of "over 20 missiles and overwhelming majority of 597 drones" is a major AD success against an unprecedented attack. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: Air Force of Ukraine and General Staff of UAF reporting 344 targets shot down (out of 623) confirms widespread AD success against a massive attack. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Destruction of RF TOS-1A (Previous Report): Confirmed destruction of a high-value RF TOS-1A system near Vovchansk indicates successful UAF counter-battery and precision strike capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Poland Scrambles Jets: The immediate response of Polish air forces to the intensity of the RF attack underscores international awareness and potential for collaborative defense measures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Operational Security Measures: Chernivtsi OVA's proactive public message regarding not filming strikes is a tactical success in counter-BDA and information warfare. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • RF Personnel Losses: General Staff of UAF reports 1070 RF personnel losses, indicating continued effectiveness of UAF ground forces and attrition of RF manpower. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Confirmation of US Aid Resumption: Ukrainian President Zelenskyy's statement confirms the official resumption of US weapons supply, a critical strategic success for UAF. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Upcoming Long-Range Missile Delivery: Confirmation from Germany about the delivery of long-range missiles by end-July indicates a significant future tactical success for UAF deep strike capabilities. General-Major Christian Freuding confirms German-funded long-range missile delivery, reinforcing the message of sustained international support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • National Minute of Silence: The implementation of a daily minute of silence demonstrates a national-level commitment to memorialization and sustained resolve. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Successful Fundraising for Tactical Assets: STERNENKO's report of 46.5 million UAH raised for fiber-optic FPV drones highlights strong public support and initiative in acquiring needed tactical capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ground Drone Evacuation: 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade "Magura" video showcases successful adaptation of ground drones for combat zone evacuation, improving force protection and casualty management. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Destruction of North Korean MLRS: BUTUSOV PLUS reporting the destruction of a North Korean Type 75 MLRS by a UAF FPV drone in Kupiansk indicates a successful precision strike against a rare and dangerous enemy asset, demonstrating effective C-UAS and intelligence. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setbacks:
  • CRITICAL Massed Aerial Attack (Sustained, Adaptive & NATIONAL Scope, Multi-Wave, including Odesa): Ukraine is currently under an unprecedented multi-vector, high-volume RF aerial assault, which is proving highly adaptable with "chaotic movement" tactics and has now expanded into virtually all western regions, central Ukraine, and southern Odesa Oblast, posing extreme risk to infrastructure and population centers, particularly critical Western aid logistics and central industrial/military targets. Explosions in Khmelnytskyi, Hostomel, Lutsk (private house destroyed, video confirms severe damage and firefighting), Lviv (with fire and residential damage, multiple districts impacted, kindergarten damaged, video confirms firefighting operations, RF claims "Elektron" factory struck), Chernivtsi (with explosions, 4 fatalities, 10 injured, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure, visual confirmation of damage), Kharkiv (residential strike confirmed, multiple drone impacts including a garage fire, causing 2 civilian casualties), Kirovohrad Oblast (damage reported), and fatalities in Zaporizhzhia Oblast confirm significant impacts. KAB strikes confirmed on Velykomykhailivska community, Synelnykove Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. RBK-Ukraine reports increased casualties from TCC shelling in Poltava, indicating previous setback. ASTRA reports 6 injured in Lviv, including an 11-year-old boy, indicating civilian casualties from the strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Tsaplienko_Ukraine Fights confirms two dead, four seriously wounded in Chernivtsi. The video shows direct impact on residential building. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: ASTRA reports two fatalities in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast from morning shelling, confirming additional civilian losses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) NEW: RBK-Ukraine confirms damage to three buildings of Lviv Polytechnic. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • RF C-UAS Effectiveness & Communications Interdiction: RF's ability to successfully engage Ukrainian "Baba-Yaga" drones and new claims of Ka-52 engagements indicate a growing challenge to UAF's organic drone capabilities, particularly in the Kharkiv sector and near border regions. "Два майора" video of a drone strike on a vehicle suggests continued RF counter-drone and precision strike capabilities. Colonelcassad's 'Anwar Detachment' video highlights RF's drone-based ISR capabilities, which contribute to their targeting effectiveness. Colonelcassad's video of Ukrainian PVD destruction by 20th MRD suggests successful RF targeting of Ukrainian forward positions. Confirmed destruction of a Starlink terminal indicates RF's ability to degrade critical UAF communication. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • Northern Border Pressure: RF's claim of establishing a bridgehead for a push into Sumy Oblast, if verified, represents a new area of concern and potential for resource diversion. KAB launches on Sumy and Kharkiv, and claims of SSO liquidation in Sumy, indicate sustained pressure. TASS reporting on UAF camouflage deficiencies in Sumy direction indicates RF is actively looking to exploit weaknesses. TASS claims the withdrawal of 425th Separate Assault Regiment of UAF due to losses in Kharkiv Oblast, suggests UAF setbacks in the north. TASS claim of 20 UAF soldiers destroyed by Grad in Sumy highlights continued pressure and reported tactical losses. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM). Russian soldier's video (БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС) detailing lack of basic equipment like body armor and helmets, forcing self-purchase, indicates significant logistical/resource constraints impacting morale and combat effectiveness at the unit level for RF, potentially allowing UAF to exploit this. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). (Note: This is an RF setback reported via a Ukrainian channel, confirming the content of the message itself).
  • Chasiv Yar Pressure: TASS claims indicate very strong RF pressure on Chasiv Yar, suggesting potential for an imminent capture or significant withdrawal. KAB launches on Donetsk reinforce this pressure. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • Civilian Casualties: Two civilians confirmed injured in Kharkiv from morning attacks, four fatalities and ten injured in Chernivtsi Oblast, and two fatalities confirmed in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, underscore the direct human cost of the sustained RF aerial campaign. ASTRA reports 6 injured in Lviv, including an 11-year-old, directly confirming civilian impact. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Tsaplienko_Ukraine Fights confirms 2 dead, 4 critically wounded in Chernivtsi, further detailing civilian casualties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: Two fatalities reported in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Loss of Foreign Volunteer: RBK-Ukraine reports the death of a Hungarian volunteer, a setback for UAF personnel strength and international support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource requirements and constraints

• Requirements:
  • Air Defense Munitions (CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE & EXPANDED, SUSTAINED, INCLUDING ODESA): Sustained critical requirement for interceptor missiles, particularly for countering high-volume, adaptable drone swarms and high-speed threats. This remains the top priority, with an urgent and drastically increased need for coverage across all western, central, and southern regions (including Odesa), especially targeting key logistics hubs for Western aid and critical central military/industrial targets, and now newly affected Dnipropetrovsk and Kirovohrad. Zelenskyy's report confirms massive daily expenditure, underscoring immediate and ongoing critical need for AD munitions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: Air Force of Ukraine and General Staff of UAF's detailed report on targets downed (344/623) confirms the critical, immediate, and extremely high rate of AD munition expenditure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • C-UAS Capabilities (Enhanced): Enhanced requirement for advanced C-UAS systems, including electronic warfare (EW) and kinetic interceptors, to counter RF's evolving drone tactics (e.g., FPV-on-drone) and its own C-UAS efforts, particularly in Kharkiv/Sumy, for countering precision strikes like the one shown by "Два майора" and Colonelcassad, and for protecting critical communication infrastructure like Starlink.
  • ISR Assets (Enhanced Focus on Western Logistics, Central Infrastructure, Southern Ports & Northern/Eastern/Southern Border): Continued high demand for real-time ISR to track RF strategic aviation, missile trajectories, and high-volume drone movements, particularly to identify potential follow-on waves, understand their adaptive flight profiles across the expanded target area, and CRITICALLY monitor for threats to Western aid logistics and railway networks, as well as critical central military/industrial sites, including newly identified targets such as Chernivtsi airport and rail hubs in Volyn/Rivne/Ternopil/Khmelnytskyi, and new aviation munition threats to Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, and Odesa. New requirement for focused ISR on the northern border, specifically Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts, to verify and track any RF bridgehead or ground advance and KAB launch points, and to assess reported UAF camouflage deficiencies. Continued ISR focus on Chasiv Yar and Eastern Axis for ground truth. New requirement for ISR on Southern Axis engineering activity.
• Constraints:
  • Air Defense Saturation (CRITICAL): The sheer volume and adaptive nature of incoming RF attacks, now impacting the vast majority of Ukrainian territory, is severely risking the overwhelming of UAF air defenses, leading to breakthroughs and increased damage, especially with the extended geographic reach and the ongoing multi-wave missile attacks. Zelenskyy's statement confirms the unprecedented scale of the attack, highlighting the continued critical strain on AD. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Personnel Fatigue (SEVERE): Continuous high-intensity air defense operations across virtually all oblasts place immense strain on UAF personnel.
  • Geographic Stretch (EXTREME): The nationwide expansion of deep strikes forces UAF to further disperse already severely strained AD assets, creating critical vulnerabilities across the entire country, particularly for vital Western supply lines and central infrastructure. Potential ground pressure on the northern border (Kharkiv/Sumy) and intensified pressure on Chasiv Yar would further exacerbate this.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive domain)

4.1. Propaganda and disinformation campaigns

• RUF:
  • "Overwhelming Force" Narrative (Amplified, Sustained & Aggressive): The visible, large-scale drone and missile attacks, now reaching virtually all of Ukraine, continue to be used as direct psychological operations. This is further amplified by RF milblogger claims of tactical successes (e.g., FPV-C-UAS engagements, Ka-52 drone shootdown, SSO liquidation in Sumy, destruction of Ukrainian PVD by 20th MRD, Starlink destruction, 20 UAF soldiers destroyed by Grad in Sumy, "АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА" vehicle strike video), the strategic use of external commentary (e.g., Tucker Carlson's statements), and direct mockery of UAF AD ("spent a third of their ammunition on decoys," "PVO u etikh lvov nikakoe"). New messages are overtly boasting about hits in Lviv, using phrases like "preludes are over," and calling for "closing the Ukraine project," and specifically targeting Chernivtsi airport and Lviv "Elektron" factory. The "Два майора" milblogger's image and video posts on "night strikes" and a drone strike on a vehicle serve to propagate this narrative of Russian effectiveness and dominance. The TASS report on property nationalization reinforces a narrative of permanent territorial control, while the prisoner exchange video aims to demonstrate care for their personnel. The claim of near-full control of Chasiv Yar also serves this narrative. The most extreme new example is Lavrov's fabricated claim of North Korean military involvement in Kursk, designed to project an "overwhelming," even international, support for RF border operations. TASS reports North Korea's FM declaring unconditional support for Russia's policy on protecting territorial integrity, explicitly legitimizing the invasion and occupation. The Lavrov/DPRK meeting video, while without specific military content, serves as a visual reinforcement of diplomatic ties. A TASS report on Saudi Arabia's readiness to cooperate on rare earth metals seeks to project economic strength and new partnerships. Confirmed: Colonelcassad video featuring a Russian officer recounting successful defense against a large Ukrainian attack near Kursk is a direct push to show RF military valor and effectiveness. WarGonzo's claim of RF setting a record for attacking western Ukrainian targets reinforces the narrative of overwhelming RF capability and reach. Gladkov's statements on schools and kindergartens in Shebekino (Belgorod Oblast) are covered with nets for protection against Ukrainian drone attacks, a public measure reinforcing the narrative of Ukrainian aggression against Russian civilians. TASS reports State Duma considering stricter laws for "foreign agents", serving to tighten internal information control and suppress dissent related to the conflict. War Reporter Kotenok's claim of deep US/UK strategic scanning for Russian AD systems and the movement of strikes deeper into Russia indicates a new internal narrative adapting to deeper Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory, acknowledging the threat while attempting to frame it within a larger 'proxy war' context. Воин DV (Warrior DV) quoting Trump on the scheme of US weapons supplies to Ukraine via NATO, aiming to frame NATO as bearing the financial burden, potentially influencing domestic US sentiment. Poddubny |Z|O|V| edition and "Дневник Десантника" directly claim strikes on Ukrainian MIC, airfields, and energy, reinforcing military effectiveness and strategic targeting. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). "Дневник Десантника" claims Russian hackers breached the main UAF combat operations program, attempting to sow doubt about UAF cyber security and operational effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). "Операция Z" propagates the FT report that Trump considers Zelenskyy an obstacle to peace, aimed at undermining Ukrainian political support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). "Fighterbomber" commenting on generals' lampases reinforces a narrative of strengthened military leadership. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). ASTRA's report on Russia/Belarus AI initiative aims to project technological prowess and future capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: Alex Parker Returns' videos "For the Hague" and "Morning confusion in Lviv. May good prevail!" explicitly aim to document alleged UAF war crimes and gloat over Lviv strikes, amplifying the "overwhelming force" and "Ukrainian weakness" narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) NEW: Дневник Десантника's video on the child's death in Kursk is a potent emotional appeal designed to demonize UAF actions and rally domestic support, fitting the "overwhelming force" and "legitimacy of occupation/defense" narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) NEW: Kotsnews claims of targeting missile guidance systems production in Lviv reinforces RF precision strike claims and military effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • "Legitimacy of Occupation" Narrative (Reinforced): The formal move to take damaged property in occupied regions onto the RF balance sheet is a clear legal and information maneuver to legitimize their claims over these territories, disregarding international law. Russian MoD video on Southern Grouping engineers clearing roads reinforces this, showing "normal" military logistics in contested areas. New TASS videos explicitly addressing damaged housing in Belgorod and outlining restoration efforts by local authorities serve to normalize conditions in border regions and emphasize administrative control. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: MoD Russia's training video in LPR reinforces the narrative of the LPR as integrated into Russian military training grounds and overall control. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • "Ukrainian Weakness" Narrative: RF milbloggers directly mock UAF AD, claiming they waste munitions on decoys and are ineffective against current attacks, aiming to sow doubt about UAF capabilities and demoralize the population. This is highly visible in messages concerning Lviv airport and now Chernivtsi airport. "НгП раZVедка" provides mocking visual 'evidence' of impacts. A new TASS video claims UAF forces are not camouflaging personnel or equipment on the Sumy direction, aiming to portray UAF as undisciplined and vulnerable. CONFIRMED: TASS reports UAF assault regiment withdrawn due to losses from Kharkiv, and claims 90% of UAF equipment in Sumy is NATO-supplied, both aiming to portray UAF weakness and dependence on foreign aid. TASS claim of 20 UAF soldiers destroyed in Sumy further aims to highlight UAF tactical losses. "Дневник Десантника" claiming hack of UAF main program directly feeds into this narrative of UAF weakness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: RF milbloggers highlighting high numbers of "locationally lost" Shaheds (Оперативний ЗСУ screenshot) may be used to imply that a high percentage of Ukrainian targets were hit or that UAF AD is ineffective at tracking all incoming threats, reinforcing the "Ukrainian weakness" narrative despite large interception numbers. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • "Shared Burden" Narrative (Belgorod): TASS's interview with Governor Gladkov portraying regional officials sharing the same conditions as residents aims to foster solidarity and resilience in border regions under Ukrainian fire, while subtly legitimizing the conflict. His reporting on a "stably difficult" 380km border suggests ongoing threat but implies RF resilience. The new TASS videos on Belgorod housing restoration, featuring Governor Gladkov, directly support this narrative by showing the authorities actively managing the impact on civilians. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Promoting New Technologies for War: Colonelcassad's posts on the DJI FlyCart 100 drone aim to highlight RF's access to advanced technologies and their potential military application, further contributing to the "overwhelming force" narrative. His video on Chinese hypersonic missile development serves a similar purpose, implicitly linking Russia to advanced military capabilities. His recent drone reconnaissance video of Ukrainian positions reinforces RF's advanced ISR capabilities. Colonelcassad's infographic on GBU-57 bunker busters and the DTRA's assessment of their effectiveness in Iran, while seemingly unrelated, could serve to subtly question the efficacy of Western advanced munitions or project RF intelligence on such systems. ASTRA's report on Russia/Belarus AI initiative aims to project technological prowess and future capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Western Internal Divisions Narrative: TASS reports on Tucker Carlson's claims about the US government and the Epstein case, seeking to amplify internal dissent and distrust within Western countries. The specific quote on revoking citizenship for Americans fighting in Ukraine aims to deter foreign volunteers and create internal division in Western societies. ASTRA's report on Tucker Carlson's citizenship revocation suggestion directly fuels this narrative. "Операция Z" propagating Trump's alleged views on Zelenskyy and peace efforts seeks to exploit and amplify Western political divisions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• UAF:
  • Transparency and Resilience (Maintaining & Countering RF BDA): Immediate public warnings and continuous updates on air defense operations aim to maintain public trust and foster resilience, countering RF's psychological pressure. The image of Kyiv metro as a shelter reinforces the civilian impact and the need for public safety. Chernivtsi OVA's warning against filming strikes is a direct counter-propaganda measure. Public updates from Kharkiv OVA regarding UAV activity and impacts maintain transparency and report civilian casualties. Mayor Sadovyi's immediate reports on Lviv impacts and Lutsk OVA/Mayor reports on destroyed residential buildings emphasize the civilian impact of RF strikes. The Ukrainian Navy's public report on maritime situation highlights transparency on threats. The General Staff and RBK-Ukraine reporting of high RF personnel losses (1070) serves as a direct counter-narrative to RF claims of military dominance and bolsters Ukrainian morale. The "Штірліц" channel's posts on RF personnel losses directly support this counter-narrative. Dnipropetrovsk and Kryvyi Rih official reports on AD activity and local situation being controlled maintain transparency and manage public expectations. CONFIRMED: Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration (OVA) reports two civilian fatalities, maintaining transparency regarding casualties. Lviv authorities report kindergarten damage. Chernivtsi officials confirm 4 fatalities and 10 injured, and significant civilian damage. Video from Lutsk and Lviv showing active fire and rescue operations emphasizes civilian impact and Ukrainian emergency response. The daily 09:00 national minute of silence, as seen in Zaporizhzhia and other regions, is a powerful and unified national-level information campaign to commemorate losses and maintain morale. Zelenskyy's official statement providing aggregate numbers of missiles/drones launched and intercepted, alongside images of civilian damage and emergency response, provides transparent, real-time information to maintain public trust and highlight RF aggression. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Оперативний ЗСУ's video from HUR with a direct message of retribution and intelligence action ("For every war crime... just retribution") serves as a strong psychological operation aimed at both RF and domestic audiences. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС publishing a video of a disgruntled Russian soldier complaining about lack of equipment serves as a potent counter-propaganda piece, highlighting RF internal issues. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: Office of the Prosecutor General documenting consequences of RF attacks on civilian cities is a direct counter-propaganda effort aimed at highlighting RF war crimes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Financial Fundraising for Defense: STERNENKO's post about 46.1 million (likely UAH) out of 50 million for "death to Russians" indicates active public fundraising and strong resolve, directly countering RF aggression. STERNENKO updates to 46.5 million UAH raised for fiber-optic FPV, demonstrating sustained public engagement and successful fundraising for tactical assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Highlighting Civilian Impact: RBK-Ukraine publishes multiple photos and videos from Chernivtsi responders, explicitly showing the devastation of civilian infrastructure and the response of emergency services. This directly counters RF claims of precision targeting military objects and underscores the human cost. ASTRA reporting 6 injured in Lviv, including an 11-year-old, and Tsaplienko_Ukraine Fights video of Chernivtsi strike impact with casualties, directly reinforces the civilian impact narrative. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: ASTRA reporting two fatalities in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and RBK-Ukraine reporting damage to Lviv Polytechnic, further highlight civilian impact and damage to non-military targets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Reporting on US Aid & German Missiles: RBK-Ukraine and ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS (Chaplienko_Ukraine Fights) highlight the upcoming delivery of German-funded long-range missiles, boosting morale and signaling continued Western support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Reporting on Foreign Volunteer Casualties: RBK-Ukraine reporting the death of a Hungarian volunteer maintains transparency and acknowledges international support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public sentiment and morale factors

• Ukraine: Public sentiment is under extreme and unprecedented pressure due to the widespread air raid alerts and the exceptional volume, adaptive nature, and now nationwide geographic reach of incoming aerial threats. The image of Kyiv metro as a shelter highlights the direct impact on civilian life and the need for immediate protective measures. Mayor Sadovyi's comments on multiple explosions in Lviv and the direct destruction of residential buildings in Lutsk will significantly impact public morale and sense of security, particularly in Western regions previously less affected. The confirmed civilian casualties in Kharkiv and fatalities in Zaporizhzhia and Chernivtsi, and damage in Kirovohrad and Lviv kindergarten damage further compound this. UAF's transparency, active air defense engagements (e.g., 10 UAVs downed in Dnipropetrovsk, 20 UAVs and 1 missile downed in Cherkasy, 34 Shaheds downed in Southern Operational Zone, Zelenskyy's reporting of high intercept rates, 344 targets downed reported by AFU/General Staff), and reporting of RF losses will help sustain resolve, but the constant and now deeper threat poses a severe emotional and psychological toll, particularly regarding the safety of Western aid logistics and central regions. RF milbloggers' mockery and explicit calls for "closing Ukraine" are likely to be perceived as hostile and further stiffen resolve, but the physical impacts are significant. The public awareness of Polish fighter jet scrambles may offer a sense of external support. The warning against filming strikes indicates a concern about public safety and strategic information. Video of emergency services responding to fires will reinforce public trust in civilian authorities. The STERNENKO fundraising post demonstrates continued public commitment despite the ongoing attacks. The daily national minute of silence reinforces national unity and remembrance, crucial for morale. The increased casualties reported in Poltava will likely further depress local morale and heighten nationwide anxiety about the pervasive nature of the threat. Civilian casualties in Lviv (6 injured, including child) and Chernivtsi (2 dead, 4 critically injured) will have a strong negative impact on public morale, especially in previously 'safer' western regions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). The HUR video's strong message of retribution aims to galvanize morale and resolve. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: Additional fatalities in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast will further degrade public morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Russia: Public sentiment is being shaped by narratives of RF military success, the "necessity" of the conflict, and administrative consolidation of occupied territories. The large-scale aerial attacks and selective external commentary are used to project strength and efficiency. The prisoner exchange video is likely intended to boost morale among military personnel and their families. The confident and aggressive tone of milbloggers suggests a perception of momentum. TASS's reporting on diplomatic meetings (Lavrov in North Korea, including fabricated military claims and North Korean support statements) aims to project normalcy and international legitimacy amidst military operations. Gladkov's interview and new TASS videos on Belgorod housing restoration, along with the announcement about protecting schools in Shebekino, aim to build resilience in Belgorod and showcase competent governance while framing Ukraine as the aggressor. The engineering video for the Southern Grouping portrays competence and progress. The TASS claim of UAF camouflage issues is likely intended to boost RF morale by portraying UAF as tactically unsound. CONFIRMED: Colonelcassad's video of a Russian officer recounting combat successes near Kursk, coupled with the award ceremony, is a strong morale-boosting narrative for RF forces and the public. Lavrov's statements on DPRK "help" and future sea communication contribute to a positive perception of expanding alliances and self-sufficiency. The unit-level appeal for a drone suggests that individual soldiers may feel a lack of adequate resources, which could negatively impact morale if widespread. The State Duma considering stricter laws for "foreign agents" may instill fear and control, potentially dampening public dissent, but also indicates underlying concerns about internal information security. War Reporter Kotenok's recognition of deep US/UK strategic scanning and deeper Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory suggests a growing awareness of the war's reach into Russia, which could erode the narrative of a distant, successful "special operation" if not carefully managed by state propaganda. The video from the RF sergeant (via БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС) complaining about lack of basic equipment directly contradicts state propaganda and could significantly undermine morale among frontline RF personnel and their families if widely disseminated. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). "Fighterbomber" comment on generals' "lampases" may be an attempt to boost officer morale by signaling restored prestige. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: The highly emotional video on the child's death in Kursk (Дневник Десантника) is designed to evoke strong emotional responses and likely aims to boost morale by rallying public anger against Ukraine and reinforcing the necessity of the "special military operation." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.3. International support and diplomatic developments

• Ukraine: Previous reports of renewed US weapons supply remain critical. The ongoing intensity and nationwide geographic scope of RF strikes will likely increase international pressure for accelerated aid and much more robust and geographically dispersed AD systems, as the threat to Western aid logistics and central infrastructure becomes immediate and severe. Poland's scramble of fighter jets indicates a direct NATO response to the intensity of RF's air campaign, highlighting the severity of the threat near its borders. The ISW note on Beijing not wanting RF defeat indicates a complex geopolitical environment. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy's statement confirms the official resumption of US weapons supply, a key diplomatic success. Confirmation from Germany of long-range missile delivery by end-July signals continued strong European support. General-Major Christian Freuding confirms German-funded long-range missile delivery, reinforcing the message of sustained international support. The fatality of a Hungarian volunteer highlights the continued international commitment to Ukraine's defense, though individual losses are a setback. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russia: The international community will continue to condemn RF's mass aerial attacks, particularly the targeting of civilian infrastructure and the deepening threat to Western aid routes and central regions. RF's attempts to manipulate foreign statements (e.g., Tucker Carlson's comments, specifically on citizenship revocation) and project diplomatic readiness (e.g., Lavrov's meeting in North Korea, including fabricating military involvement and North Korea's public statement of support) will likely be seen as further evidence of their information warfare tactics. Colonelcassad highlighting Chinese hypersonic development implies a potential for technology transfer or shared military advancement, which could influence international perceptions. The TASS report on Saudi Arabia's willingness to cooperate on rare earth metals aims to project international economic partnerships, potentially bypassing Western sanctions. Lavrov's public statements regarding DPRK military "help" and renewed maritime communication will likely be viewed by international observers as further evidence of deepening military-technical cooperation between Russia and North Korea, potentially triggering additional sanctions or diplomatic condemnation. US sanctions against the Cuban president (as reported by RBK-Ukraine, though potentially an older news item) could be framed by RF as Western overreach and an an attempt to consolidate its anti-Western alliance. Воин DV (Warrior DV) quoting Trump on NATO funding of Ukraine aid represents an attempt by Russia to exploit perceived divisions within the Western alliance. The ASTRA report on Russia/Belarus AI development based on "traditional values" is a diplomatic message aimed at projecting shared ideological and technological advancement. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: RF milbloggers' open accusations of UAF "war crimes" and calls for "The Hague" (Alex Parker Returns) are attempts to shift international blame and justify RF actions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

• Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

  • Sustained Massed Aerial Attack with Adaptive Tactics, Deepest Western & Central/Southern Thrust (IMMEDIATE - 0-12 hours): RF will continue and likely execute additional waves of its large-scale strategic missile strike (from airborne Tu-95MS and any available MiG-31K), concurrently with or following the ongoing massed UAV attack. These attacks will continue to employ adaptive "chaotic movement" tactics and will now prioritize even deeper targeting of Western Ukraine (Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts) and key central regions (Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad Oblasts, targeting Myrhorod, Hlobyne, Semenivka, Kremenchuk areas, Zolotonosha, Bila Tserkva, Lityn, Ozerne air base, Kamianets-Podilskyi, Chernivtsi airport, Rohstyn, Yampil, Zboriv, Berestechko), and southern Odesa Oblast. New aviation munition threats will persist against Dnipropetrovsk (Synelnykove Raion). Primary targets will remain critical infrastructure (energy, transport hubs, particularly rail infrastructure connecting to Western aid routes), major population centers (with increased civilian casualties), and likely military airfields/industrial sites in central Ukraine (e.g., Lviv "Elektron" factory, Lviv Polytechnic, missile guidance systems production). The immediate objective is to severely disrupt or interdict Western aid flows and saturate UAF AD. KAB launches will continue on frontline areas (Donetsk, Sumy, Kharkiv). Black Sea naval assets (Kalibr carriers) may also be employed for follow-on strikes. Zelenskyy's statement on the current wave numbers (26 missiles, 597 drones) reinforces the high volume and nationwide MLCOA. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Increased Ground Pressure on Northern Axis & Eastern Axis (6-24 hours): RF forces will sustain high-intensity, localized ground assaults on the Donetsk and Kupyansk axes, leveraging drone support and KABs for targeted strikes and reconnaissance. A renewed push to establish or expand a bridgehead in Kursk Oblast to enable advances into Sumy Oblast will occur, aiming to create a new axis of pressure. RF will likely continue small-unit probing and infiltration attempts, specifically targeting special operations forces (e.g., claims of SSO liquidation in Sumy, TASS claims of Grad strike on 20 UAF soldiers), and exploit identified UAF camouflage deficiencies in the Sumy direction. Increased RF C-UAS efforts will continue to challenge UAF tactical drone use in these areas, including targeting communications such as Starlink. RF will attempt to counter UAF force generation by targeting newly identified units or their staging areas. Pressure on Chasiv Yar will be maintained or intensified for a decisive breakthrough. Ground probing and shaping fires (KABs) on Kharkiv will continue. Attacks on Ukrainian PVDs will continue. "Два майора" fundraising for Marines on the "Sumy direction" indicates sustained RF commitment to this northern axis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: RF will continue training and deploying assault detachments (e.g., 25th Combined Arms Army) for localized ground pushes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Intensified Information Offensive Leveraging External Commentary and "Legitimacy" (Concurrent): RF will continue to rapidly disseminate propaganda framing successful strikes, exaggerated UAF losses, and will increasingly seek to leverage selective or decontextualized external commentary (e.g., from ISW regarding China, Tucker Carlson's claims) and fabricating claims (e.g., North Korean military involvement, North Korea's "unconditional support"). Concurrently, RF will push narratives of administrative consolidation and "normalization" in occupied territories, using actions like property nationalization to project an image of irreversible control. This will include further emphasis on reconstruction and control over damaged areas in Belgorod, and highlight protective measures for civilian infrastructure. They will openly boast about targeting successes (e.g., Lviv, Chernivtsi airport, Lviv "Elektron" factory, Lviv Polytechnic, missile guidance systems production) and call for Ukraine's defeat, and continue to mock UAF AD effectiveness, particularly on Western targets. The showcasing of drone strike videos and diplomatic meetings (Lavrov/DPRK) will continue this trend. Narratives of RF military valor, particularly in defending against Ukrainian attacks in border regions, will be amplified. Expect continued RF claims of UAF program hacks or other cyber "successes" to undermine UAF confidence. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). RF will continue to amplify messages aimed at creating internal divisions in Western countries and undermining Ukrainian leadership, particularly through figures like Trump. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). NEW: RF will increasingly employ emotional narratives around civilian casualties (e.g., child's death in Kursk) to demonize UAF and garner domestic support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) NEW: RF will continue to produce "For the Hague" style content to accuse UAF of war crimes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

• Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

  • Coordinated Kinzhal/Hypersonic Strike on Western Logistics Hubs and Central Military Sites Followed by Massed UAV Wave: RF's current high-volume UAV and missile attack, now extending across all of Western Ukraine and into central/southern regions, serves as a primary decoy for highly precise Kinzhal or other hypersonic missile strikes from available platforms (e.g., MiG-31K), specifically targeting critical rail hubs, transshipment points, and potential underground storage facilities for Western aid in Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, Ternopil, or Khmelnytskyi Oblasts (e.g., Kamianets-Podilskyi, Chernivtsi airport, Lutsk rail hub), as well as key military airfields or industrial sites in Poltava Oblast (e.g., Myrhorod air base, Kremenchuk industrial areas), Ozerne air base, Bila Tserkva, or Cherkasy industrial areas, and critical points in Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, and Odesa. This would be immediately followed by a new, denser wave of UAVs and conventional cruise missiles to exploit any created gaps in UAF air defense and completely disrupt incoming Western aid, potentially isolating the front lines. The claimed use of cluster munitions with X-101 (if verified) would exacerbate this effect. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Combined Arms Breakthrough (Kharkiv Axis) Exploiting AD Saturation and Logistical Disruption: RF commits its unlocated operational reserves (from previous daily report) in a concentrated armored thrust on the Lyptsi or Vovchansk axis, immediately following the peak of the nationwide aerial bombardment and deep Western/Central/Southern logistical interdiction. The objective is to achieve a rapid breakthrough and establish fire control over main supply routes into Kharkiv city before Ukrainian mobile reserves can effectively respond, leveraging the severe disruption caused by nationwide AD engagement and the critical AD coverage requirements in Western, Central, and Southern Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Simultaneous Ground Offensives on Eastern Front & New Northern Axis (Kharkiv/Sumy), Coupled with Widespread Rail/Industrial Interdiction in Western/Central/Southern Ukraine: RF launches significant ground offensives on both the Eastern Front (e.g., Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, potentially with immediate capture of Chasiv Yar) and simultaneously initiates a large-scale ground offensive in the Kharkiv/Sumy Oblasts, aiming to force UAF to split its already strained reserves and AD assets across multiple critical axes. Concurrently, RF will conduct widespread precision strikes targeting all key rail hubs and logistics nodes in Western Ukraine (e.g., Lviv, Rivne, Kovel, Lutsk, Chop, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Kamianets-Podilskyi, Chernivtsi) and critical industrial/military sites in central Ukraine (e.g., Poltava Oblast, Kremenchuk, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad) and southern port/logistics hubs (e.g., Odesa, Mykolaiv) to critically disrupt incoming military aid shipments, sever supply lines to the front, and cripple remaining industrial capacity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

• Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

  • IMMEDIATE (0-3 hours):
    • MAXIMUM AIR DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT & ADAPTATION (NATIONWIDE INCLUSION & WESTERN/CENTRAL/SOUTHERN LOGISTICS FOCUS): All UAF air defense assets must be on maximum alert and fully engaged against the ongoing and anticipated strategic missile wave and the massed, adaptable UAV attack, with a CRITICAL focus on the newly targeted Western Oblasts (Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi) and central Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad Oblasts, targeting Myrhorod, Hlobyne, Semenivka, Kremenchuk areas, Zolotonosha, Bila Tserkva, Lityn, Ozerne air base, Kamianets-Podilskyi, Chernivtsi airport, Rohstyn, Yampil, Zboriv, Berestechko, and southern Odesa Oblast. Urgent attention to new aviation munition threats in Dnipropetrovsk (Synelnykove Raion). Prioritize defense of C2 nodes, critical infrastructure (especially rail links to the west and central industrial complexes including Lviv Polytechnic, and missile guidance system production sites), and major population centers, dynamically reallocating assets based on updated threat vectors and the anticipated "second wave" of drones/missiles, including countermeasures for "chaotic movement." Prioritize defense of Kharkiv against ongoing KAB/UAV strikes. DECISION POINT: Dynamic allocation of high-value AD systems, particularly for Kinzhal threat to Western logistics and central/southern military targets; assessment of sustained AD operations and tactical adjustments for new UAV flight patterns and extended geographic reach. Potential activation of passive defenses for critical Western, central, and southern infrastructure. Prioritize defense of Kharkiv against ongoing KAB/UAV strikes.
    • C-UAS Deployment: Rapid deployment and activation of C-UAS systems (EW, kinetic) to protect high-value Ukrainian drone assets and deny RF successful FPV-on-UAV engagements, particularly in high-activity areas like Kharkiv and border regions, and to counter precision strikes like the one shown by "Два майора" and Colonelcassad, and for protecting Starlink and other critical communications. DECISION POINT: Prioritization and deployment of specific C-UAS assets to vulnerable UAF drone units/sectors, and evaluation of passive drone countermeasures and active protection for communication nodes.
    • Public Safety & Operational Security: Issue continuous and urgent public warnings, instructing civilians to seek and remain in shelters, particularly in all newly targeted western, central, and southern regions, including Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, and Odesa. Ensure emergency services are pre-positioned for rapid response and casualty management (e.g., Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Lviv, Lutsk, Chernivtsi, Dnipropetrovsk). Reinforce public messaging against filming and sharing strike-related content. DECISION POINT: Activation of comprehensive public alert and response protocols, pre-staging of emergency teams, and ensuring full coverage in newly threatened areas, specifically emphasizing threat to Western, central, and southern regions. Implement stricter enforcement of content sharing restrictions.
  • SHORT-TERM (3-24 hours):
    • BDA and Post-Strike Response (Expanded & Logistical/Central/Southern Focus): Conduct rapid BDA on all affected areas, including new Western, central, and southern strike zones, prioritizing search and rescue, medical support, and immediate damage assessment for critical infrastructure (especially rail/logistics nodes in Western Ukraine and military/industrial sites in central Ukraine, including Chernivtsi airport, Lviv Polytechnic, and newly affected areas in Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, and Odesa) and military assets. DECISION POINT: Allocation of emergency and reconstruction resources, with an IMMEDIATE focus on critical Western, central, and southern logistics infrastructure and military/industrial targets.
    • Air Defense Munitions Assessment (CRITICAL & GEOGRAPHIC): Immediate and granular assessment of air defense munitions expenditure and initiation of urgent resupply requests based on current consumption rates and the effectiveness of RF's adaptive tactics, anticipating sustained high-volume attacks across the entire country. Prioritize urgent requests for Western AD munitions, specifically addressing critical needs for newly exposed Western, central, and southern regions and the protection of logistical pathways. DECISION POINT: Urgent logistical requests, particularly for Western AD munitions, and advocacy for accelerated deliveries, with a clear breakdown of critical geographic requirements and vulnerabilities.
    • Ground Force Readiness Review (Eastern & Northern): Evaluate RF ground assault patterns and UAF defensive successes/challenges in Donetsk, Kupyansk, Sumy, and Kharkiv Oblasts, particularly concerning RF C-UAS efforts and any claimed bridgehead or specific tactical claims (e.g., SSO liquidation, UAF camouflage deficiencies, UAF troop withdrawals, Grad strike on UAF soldiers, destruction of North Korean MLRS). Adjust force posture and reserve allocation as needed, anticipating potential follow-on ground offensives, especially if AD is significantly degraded or shifted west to protect logistics. DECISION POINT: Operational adjustments for ground forces, including reinforcement of critical sectors and border regions, and defensive measures against potential targeting of newly formed units, particularly regarding Chasiv Yar defense and Kharkiv defense.
  • MID-TERM (24-72 hours):
    • Logistical Security for US Aid (CRITICAL - NATIONAL & WESTERN/CENTRAL/SOUTHERN FOCUS): Implement enhanced security measures for anticipated incoming US weapons shipments and related logistical routes to mitigate MDCOA of targeting supply lines, especially those through Western, central, and southern Ukraine. This includes enhanced air defense coverage for rail/road hubs and transit points in Ternopil, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, Lviv, Volyn, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, and Odesa Oblasts. Develop redundancy plans for critical logistical nodes. DECISION POINT: Enhanced convoy protection, anti-strike measures, and immediate logistical redundancy planning for incoming aid, with specific, heightened attention to western, central, and southern transit routes and alternative supply avenues.
    • Strategic ISR Adaptation (Western Logistics, Central/Southern Targets & Deep Strike Focus): Refine ISR collection plans to anticipate and track future large-scale RF aerial attacks, assess the effectiveness of their multi-domain saturation tactics, identify new high-value RF targets (e.g., missile launch platforms, drone production/assembly sites, potential heavy transport drone applications), and understand adaptive C-UAS methods. Prioritize ISR on RF intent for deeper strikes into Western, Central, and Southern Ukraine and their targeting of logistics, particularly rail networks, major transit hubs, and key industrial/military sites. Closely monitor RF milblogger channels for targeting hints and specific claims like UAF camouflage deficiencies and PVD destruction. DECISION POINT: Adjust long-term ISR plan to focus on RF deep strike capabilities, critical Western, central, and southern logistics/targets interdiction, and emerging ground pressure points, particularly in the west.
    • Information Warfare Counter-Narrative (Adaptive & Resilient): Develop and disseminate counter-narratives to RF propaganda regarding overwhelming force and territorial gains, especially those using external commentary or attempts to spin Ukrainian force generation (e.g., North Korean involvement claim, North Korea's support, Tucker Carlson's citizenship comments, UAF camouflage claims, Belgorod reconstruction narrative, RF officer valor narratives, record attack claims, Shebekino drone protection nets). Leverage UAF successes (e.g., BDA on RF vehicles, successful AD intercepts, US aid confirmation, RF personnel losses, public fundraising, national minute of silence, destruction of North Korean MLRS) and highlight civilian suffering and the continued integrity of Western supply lines. Counter RF's "diplomacy" narrative by emphasizing their simultaneous aggression and address RF claims about UAF AD inefficiency, especially the overt boasts about Lviv and Chernivtsi hits. DECISION POINT: Develop and implement proactive public information campaigns to maintain morale and counter RF psychological operations, specifically addressing RF's diplomatic overtures in contrast to their ongoing aggression and the direct threat to Western aid, central, and southern Ukraine. Immediately debunk fabricated claims of foreign military involvement and counter narratives designed to deter foreign volunteers. Develop immediate response to RF claims of UAF program hacks or cyber vulnerabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Actively highlight and disseminate RF soldier complaints about equipment and morale, as seen in the БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС video, to undermine RF morale and recruitment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Counter RF accusations of UAF "war crimes" with documented evidence and highlight RF's deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

1. Full RF Strategic Missile Loadout and Target Intent (CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE & WESTERN/CENTRAL/SOUTHERN REACH):
   • GAP: Precise types and quantities of missiles launched from Tu-95MS aircraft and MiG-31K. Confirmation of Kinzhal missile launch from MiG-31K and its flight path/target, particularly any targeting of Western Ukrainian critical logistics infrastructure (rail hubs, transshipment points, warehouses), central military/industrial sites (e.g., Myrhorod air base, Kremenchuk industrial areas, Ozerne air base, Chernivtsi airport, Kirovohrad targets, Lviv Polytechnic, missile guidance system production), southern port infrastructure (Odesa), or AD assets. Detailed analysis of RF's primary and secondary targeting for the current and anticipated strategic missile wave, especially concerning high-value targets (UAF C2, AD nodes, critical infrastructure, including rail/logistics hubs in Western, central, and southern Ukraine and industrial/military sites, and newly identified targets such as Kamianets-Podilskyi, Rohstyn, Yampil, Zboriv, Berestechko, and new threats in Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, and Odesa). Confirmation of "second wave" capabilities for drones/missiles and their specific trajectories into new central/western/southern regions. Verification of RF milblogger claims regarding the specific numbers of Shaheds/decoys and Kh-101 missiles launched in the recent mass attack.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT on RF strategic aviation communications and missile guidance systems (especially for Kinzhal). HIGH PRIORITY IMINT (satellite and aerial reconnaissance) of missile launch areas and impact sites for BDA. HIGH PRIORITY OSINT from monitoring public airspace data and RF channels for inadvertent disclosures.
2. RF Drone Inventory, Production/Acquisition Rate, and Launch Sites & Adaptive Tactics (URGENT & GEOGRAPHICALLY EXPANDED):
   • GAP: Detailed assessment of RF's current inventory of Shahed-type and other strike UAVs. Confirmation of their daily/weekly production or acquisition rate. Identification of all active RF UAV launch sites and their operational patterns, including any new sites supporting expanded Western, central, and southern strikes, particularly those facilitating attacks on Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, and Odesa Oblasts. Specific analysis of the "chaotic movement" tactic to determine its prevalence, effectiveness, and the resources it requires. Assessment of RF's intent and capability to employ heavy-lift drones (e.g., DJI FlyCart 100) for military purposes. Assessment of the prevalence and impact of unit-level drone acquisition (e.g., "Дневник Десантника" appeal, "Два майора" appeal).
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from captured RF drone operators or intelligence on RF supply chains. MEDIUM PRIORITY OSINT on Russian industrial reports and Iranian/Chinese supply chain indicators, and milblogger content. HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT to identify drone control frequencies and persistent monitoring of suspected launch sites. HIGH PRIORITY GEOINT/IMINT/SIGINT to track and analyze specific flight paths and patterns of incoming UAVs, noting changes in launch origin for Western, central, and southern strikes.
3. Effectiveness of RF C-UAS Operations and Countermeasures (Multi-platform) & Targeting of Communications:
   • GAP: Comprehensive assessment of RF's C-UAS capabilities, particularly the widespread use of FPV drones against Ukrainian UAVs and the deployment/effectiveness of rotary-wing platforms (e.g., Ka-52) for aerial intercepts. Quantification of success rates and impact on Ukrainian drone operations. Identification of RF's C-UAS equipment, tactics, and their impact on UAF ISR and strike capabilities, specifically in relation to the drone strike video posted by "Два майора" and Colonelcassad's 'Anwar Detachment' video and the claimed destruction of a Ukrainian PVD, and the "АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА" vehicle strike video. Detailed analysis of RF capabilities to target and neutralize critical communication infrastructure like Starlink terminals.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY IMINT (UAV footage from UAF, satellite imagery) of RF C-UAS engagements. HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from UAF drone operators encountering RF C-UAS and communications disruptions. HIGH PRIORITY EW/SIGINT to identify RF C-UAS frequencies and methods, and to detect communication interdiction efforts.
4. Impact of Renewed US Weapons Supply and Upcoming German Missiles on RF Planning and Cyber Response (ONGOING & WESTERN/CENTRAL/SOUTHERN LOGISTICS):
   • GAP: Assessment of RF's immediate and long-term adaptation to the confirmed resumption of US weapons supply to Ukraine and the upcoming delivery of German long-range missiles. Will this trigger a change in RF operational tempo, targeting priorities (especially logistical routes in Western, Central, and Southern Ukraine), or lead to increased cyber activity targeting supply chains or critical infrastructure? Specific verification of RF claims regarding UAF program hacks or cyber vulnerabilities.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT on RF high-level command discussions and military planning communications, specifically for discussions related to Western aid logistics and long-range missile capabilities. MEDIUM PRIORITY OSINT on Russian state media and expert commentary reacting to the announcements. HIGH PRIORITY CYBINT to monitor for preparatory cyber activity targeting Ukrainian infrastructure or supply chain logistics, particularly focusing on Western, central, and southern transit nodes, and to verify RF hack claims.
5. Verification and Capability of New UAF Formations (CONFIRMED CR):
   • GAP: Confirmation of the creation and current status of the claimed "fourth heavy mechanized formation" within UAF Ground Forces, as reported by RF milbloggers. Assessment of its composition, readiness, and potential deployment plans. This is crucial for understanding both UAF capability and RF targeting priorities.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from UAF personnel. MEDIUM PRIORITY SIGINT on UAF internal communications. MEDIUM PRIORITY IMINT (satellite imagery, drone reconnaissance) to identify new unit signatures or training activities. HIGH PRIORITY OSINT to monitor official UAF announcements or credible reporting on force generation.
6. Verification of RF Ground Gains and Damage Assessment (Eastern Axis, Northern Border & Southern Axis - IMMEDIATE):
   • GAP: Independent verification of RF claims regarding "taking a settlement" (Zelena Dolyna), disruption of UAF rotations (Kupyansk), UAF withdrawal from Yunakovka (Sumy Oblast), the establishment of a "bridgehead" near Guyevo, Kursk Oblast, for a push into Sumy Oblast, the claimed liquidation of a Ukrainian SSO commander in Sumy Oblast, the claimed withdrawal of 425th Separate Assault Regiment from Melove to Khatnie due to losses, and particularly the claim of near-total control over Chasiv Yar. Verification of the veracity of TASS's claim regarding North Korean military involvement in Kursk Oblast and the claims of UAF camouflage deficiencies in the Sumy direction. Precise RF and UAF lines of contact in the Donetsk, Kupyansk, Sumy, and Kharkiv Oblasts following recent engagements. Confirmation of exact locations of RF engineering activity in the Southern Grouping of Forces area. Verification of the alleged destruction of a Ukrainian PVD by the 20th MRD. Independent verification of damage to Lviv kindergarten and other civilian structures, and accurate casualty figures in Zaporizhzhia, Chernivtsi, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts. Verification of TASS claim of 20 UAF soldiers destroyed by Grad in Sumy Oblast. Verification of the impact of drone protection nets in Shebekino on Ukrainian UAS operations. Verification of RF claims of striking MIC factories and Yavoriv polygon, Lviv Polytechnic, and missile guidance system production in Lviv. Independent verification of damage to Bukovel.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY IMINT (drone and satellite imagery) of the claimed areas and recent impact sites. HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from local sources or UAF units in contact. HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT on RF ground unit communications for confirmation of territorial control and BDA.
7. RF Northern Grouping Reserves (CRITICAL - Confirmed from previous report):
   • GAP: The composition, readiness, and exact disposition of the RF operational reserve in the Belgorod and Kursk Oblasts remain unclear. Determining the size and trigger for commitment of this force is the highest priority intelligence requirement for the ground domain.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY ISR (UAV, SIGINT, satellite imagery) to focus on the Belgorod Oblast to identify, characterize, and track the RF operational reserve force. HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from cross-border sources.
8. RF Strategic Intent in Kharkiv (CRITICAL - Confirmed from previous report):
   • GAP: It is unclear if the current Kharkiv operation is a feint to draw Ukrainian reserves from the Donbas, an effort to establish a limited buffer zone, or the initial phase of a deliberate assault on the city. This understanding informs UAF strategic reserve allocation.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT on high-level RF command communications regarding operational objectives for the Kharkiv axis. MEDIUM PRIORITY HUMINT from captured RF personnel or defectors.
9. Effectiveness of RF Electronic Warfare (EW) in Kharkiv Axis (Confirmed from previous report):
   • GAP: The extent and effectiveness of RF EW systems deployed to counter Ukrainian drone operations in the Kharkiv axis requires further assessment. This impacts UAF drone efficacy and counter-EW requirements.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY EW/SIGINT to identify RF EW system locations, frequencies, and operational patterns. HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from UAF drone operators experiencing EW effects.
10. RF Unit-Level Morale and Equipment Status (NEW):
    • GAP: Assess the prevalence and actual impact of equipment shortages and low morale among RF frontline units, as indicated by the sergeant's video (БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС) and various fundraising appeals. Determine if this represents isolated incidents or systemic issues affecting combat effectiveness.
    • CR: HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from captured RF personnel. MEDIUM PRIORITY SIGINT on RF tactical unit communications for discussions on logistics and morale. HIGH PRIORITY OSINT by systematically monitoring RF milblogger and soldier channels for similar complaints and fundraising efforts.
11. RF Claimed Cluster Munition Use (NEW):
    • GAP: Independent verification of RF claims of X-101 missile with cluster munition warhead on Chernivtsi. This is a critical development if true, as it would indicate a new escalation in RF targeting tactics.
    • CR: HIGH PRIORITY BDA (Imagery, EOD reports) from Chernivtsi strike site to confirm munition type and submunition presence. HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from local witnesses and emergency responders.