Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT

TIME: 120405Z JUL 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Ukraine General: Russian Federation (RF) strategic aerial attack persists with extreme volume, depth, and expanded geographic scope, now definitively including almost all western and central oblasts. New threats of aviation-launched munitions identified for Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. Zaporizhzhia has since sounded the "all clear."
  • Western Ukraine: Continued massed drone and missile attacks on Lviv, with confirmed non-residential building roof fire (200 sq m) in Zaliznychnyi District and residential damage on Metropolitan Andrey Street. Mayor Sadovyi confirms multiple explosions. Confirmed impacts in Lutsk from drones and missiles, with OVA confirming a private residential building "practically destroyed." Chernivtsi has confirmed explosions from missile strikes.
  • Central/Eastern Ukraine: Multiple explosions confirmed in Kharkiv city, with Mayor Terekhov confirming a strike on a residential area in the Kyivskyi District. UAVs reported inbound to Kharkiv, with at least four strikes confirmed in Kyivskyi District, one hitting a garage, causing two civilian casualties. KAB launches from tactical aviation confirmed on Donetsk Oblast and Sumy Oblast. Kyiv region has sounded the "all clear" for air raid alerts. Dnipropetrovsk (Synelnykove Raion) also faces new aviation munition threats.
  • Key Terrain Implications: The nationwide aerial assault continues to directly threaten and impact critical Western aid logistics, particularly rail networks, and military/industrial sites, alongside civilian population centers. The dynamic and adaptive targeting (e.g., Kamianets-Podilskyi, Rohstyn, Khotin, Yampil, Zboriv, Berestechko, Chernivtsi airport) aims to stretch UAF AD and interdict aid flows into Ukraine. RF milblogger video claims of identifying Ukrainian forces in locations like 'Khutor Mikhailovsky,' 'Berilovka,' 'Glukhov,' and 'Rozhkovichi' imply ongoing reconnaissance against Ukrainian positions, possibly in border regions of Sumy or Kharkiv, or deeper within Ukrainian territory. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Ukraine General: Night operations continue, with low visibility favoring RF UAV and missile saturation tactics. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF:
  • Air Defense (AD): Fully engaged across an expanding and unprecedented number of oblasts, now specifically including Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Lutsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, and Khmelnytskyi, alongside Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv. New threats in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia (aviation munitions). UAF AF continues to provide continuous updates on UAV and missile concentrations and movement directions, demonstrating effective Command and Control (C2) and public warning systems. Successful AD engagements reported in Chernivtsi, Bila Tserkva, and now successful negations of UAVs approaching Lviv and Lutsk. "Mykolaiv Vanek" reports "minus" for mopeds on Kharkiv, indicating successful AD engagements there. A reconnaissance UAV is reported over Chernihiv Oblast, with potential AD work. CONFIDENCE: HIGH. Poland has raised fighter jets due to the intensity of the RF attack, indicating the scale of the threat. CONFIDENCE: HIGH. Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia have issued all-clears, indicating localized AD success, though new threats have emerged for Dnipropetrovsk.
  • Ground Forces: Maintaining defensive posture on the northern border (Kharkiv, Sumy) and eastern axis (Donetsk). Russian MoD engineers of "Southern Grouping of Forces" reported clearing roads of UXO and preparing for transport of wounded and supplies to forward positions, likely in Southern Axis (e.g., Zaporizhzhia or Kherson), indicating active ground operations. The Ukrainian Navy's reported disposition includes 11 vessels (RF) in the Black Sea (including 3 Kalibr carriers, 10-16 missiles), 1 vessel in the Azov Sea (no missiles), and 3 vessels in the Mediterranean Sea (no missiles). This indicates a potential continued threat from Black Sea naval assets. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• RUF:
  • Deep Operations (UAV/Missile/KAB/Aviation Munitions): Sustained, high-volume, multi-vector drone and missile attack continues, now extending even further west into Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts, and now deeper into central Ukraine targeting Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, and Zhytomyr Oblasts with high-speed targets. New aviation munition threats against Dnipropetrovsk (Synelnykove Raion). Confirmed tactical aviation KAB launches on Sumy and Donetsk Oblasts, and Kharkiv. Confirmed explosions in Kharkiv from air attacks, with multiple drone impacts in Kyivskyi District, causing civilian casualties. RF milbloggers are increasingly aggressive in their rhetoric, celebrating hits and mocking UAF AD effectiveness, specifically boasting about striking Chernivtsi airport and Lviv. "Два майора" (Two Majors) milblogger posts imagery of "night strikes on the enemy" and a video of a drone strike on a vehicle, indicating continued precision targeting capabilities and propaganda efforts. Colonelcassad shares drone reconnaissance footage highlighting Ukrainian positions and equipment, including a blue van, in areas such as 'Khutor Mikhailovsky,' 'Berilovka,' 'Glukhov,' and 'Rozhkovichi,' indicating active ISR and targeting. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Ground Forces (Northern/Eastern/Southern Axes): Confirmed KAB and UAV strikes on Kharkiv suggest ongoing preparatory fires for potential ground operations. RF milblogger claims regarding liquidation of a Ukrainian SSO commander and group in Sumy Oblast, indicating active ground engagement or infiltration attempts along the border. Russian MoD engineers supporting "Southern Grouping" indicating active logistical support for offensive or defensive operations. TASS reports a senior operator from the 40th Separate Guards Marine Brigade claiming UAF forces on the Sumy direction are not properly camouflaging personnel and equipment, indicating RF reconnaissance activity and perceived UAF vulnerabilities in that sector. CONFIDENCE: HIGH (for claims, MEDIUM for verifiable truth of liquidation).
  • Information Warfare/Propaganda: RF milbloggers continue to propagate claims of UAF AD inefficiency and mock Ukrainian efforts, alongside TASS reports on tactical advances and now fabricating claims of foreign troop involvement in Russian territory. Russian channels are overtly boasting about hits in Lviv and calling for "closing the Ukraine project," and specifically target Chernivtsi airport in their rhetoric. "Два майора" continues its aggressive psychological operations, boasting about "meeting the dawn in nature while beating Khokhols" and posting mocking imagery. TASS continues to propagate messages of resilience in Belgorod, reporting 380km border as "stably difficult." Colonelcassad showcases a large transport drone (DJI FlyCart 100), implying its potential for military use, likely in logistical support for ground operations or payload delivery, though DJI maintains it is for civilian use. TASS also reports North Korea's Foreign Minister declaring "unconditional support" for Russia's policy on protecting territorial integrity, a likely attempt to project international legitimacy. TASS quotes Tucker Carlson suggesting US citizenship revocation for Americans fighting in Ukraine, aiming to deter foreign volunteers and sow discord. Colonelcassad shares a video on Chinese hypersonic missile development, subtly implying RF access to similar or advanced technologies. A new TASS video of Lavrov meeting with the North Korean Foreign Minister reinforces the narrative of diplomatic engagement and potential for military cooperation, despite the lack of specific details from the video itself. A new TASS report on Saudi Arabia's readiness to cooperate on rare earth metals seeks to project economic strength and new partnerships. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:
  • Strategic Drone/Missile/Aviation Munition Strikes (Sustained, Adaptive, Critically Deepening & Expanding Western/Central Reach, Multi-Wave): RF continues to demonstrate an unprecedented capability for widespread, high-volume, multi-vector UAV and missile attacks, now penetrating even deeper into western Ukraine, including Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts, and now extending into central Ukraine (Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, and Zhytomyr Oblasts) with high-speed targets. New aviation munition threats against Dnipropetrovsk (Synelnykove Raion). The "chaotic movement" reported, and dynamic targeting of varied locations (e.g., Kamianets-Podilskyi, Rohstyn, Yampil, Zboriv, Berestechko) indicates an adaptive strategy to challenge UAF AD. Confirmed missile launches following UAV saturation, and the identification of "another wave" of cruise missiles, indicates a sophisticated and coordinated multi-platform deep strike. KAB launches from tactical aviation on Sumy, Donetsk, and now Kharkiv Oblasts confirm a multi-layered aerial attack. RF naval presence in the Black Sea with Kalibr carriers (3 vessels, 10-16 missiles) maintains a standoff strike capability. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Ground Maneuver (Northern/Eastern/Southern Axes): Confirmed KAB and UAV strikes on Kharkiv indicate preparatory fires for potential ground operations. RF milbloggers' claims of SSO liquidation in Sumy Oblast indicate active reconnaissance or limited ground engagements along the border. TASS's bizarre claim of North Korean involvement in Kursk "liberation" indicates RF's intent to project strength and perhaps justify future actions along the northern border. MoD reports on Southern Grouping engineers indicate ongoing ground operations requiring logistical support. New TASS reporting on UAF camouflage deficiencies in Sumy direction suggests active RF reconnaissance and potential for exploitation. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.
  • Information Warfare (Sophisticated, Adaptive & Aggressive): RF continues to employ sophisticated information operations, including selectively using tactical video claims (e.g., drone strike on vehicle from "Два майора", 'Anwar Detachment' drone footage), administrative actions, direct mockery of UAF AD effectiveness, fabricating claims about foreign troop involvement, and utilizing external commentators to bolster its narrative. They are openly boasting about hits and calling for Ukraine's "closure." The TASS report on North Korea's support and Tucker Carlson's statements are part of this. Colonelcassad's focus on Chinese hypersonic tech aligns with the "overwhelming force" narrative. The Lavrov meeting video is used to project diplomatic influence. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Heavy Transport Drone Potential (DJI FlyCart 100): While nominally civilian, RF's milblogger "Colonelcassad" showcasing the DJI FlyCart 100 with its 80kg payload capacity and rapid recharge suggests potential RF interest in using such platforms for resupply, reconnaissance, or even improvised munitions delivery, particularly in contested forward areas. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.
• Intentions:
  • Systemic Degradation of Ukrainian Infrastructure, Air Defense & Western Aid Logistics (PRIMARY - Deepest & Widest Expansion): The immediate intention is to maximize damage to critical civilian and military infrastructure, exhaust UAF air defense munitions, and instill widespread fear through a sustained, high-intensity, multi-domain aerial campaign. The expansion to Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, and Zhytomyr Oblasts specifically aims to stretch UAF AD assets to their absolute limit, directly threaten critical logistics routes for Western aid and key central military/industrial targets, and cause maximum psychological impact. New threats to Dnipropetrovsk further expand this intent. The "chaotic movement" and dynamic targeting indicate an intent to overwhelm and confuse UAF AD. Specific targeting rhetoric from milbloggers regarding Chernivtsi airport highlights this. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Create Pressure on Northern Border (Kharkiv/Sumy Oblast): RF intends to establish or expand ground presence in border regions, specifically to create a new axis of pressure, potentially fix UAF forces, or open new lines of advance into Kharkiv/Sumy Oblasts. KAB and UAV launches on Kharkiv and KAB launches on Sumy support this. The claimed liquidation of SSO in Sumy further indicates active ground probing/engagement. The TASS report on North Korean involvement in Kursk, while false, shows an intent to bolster the narrative of RF's northern defense/offense. The TASS report on UAF camouflage deficiencies in Sumy direction indicates ongoing reconnaissance and intent to exploit perceived weaknesses. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Degrade Ukrainian Drone Capabilities: RF intends to directly counter and degrade Ukrainian heavy-lift and tactical strike drone capabilities, particularly those operating in the Kharkiv sector and near border regions. "Два майора" video showing a drone strike on a vehicle indicates continued targeting of UAF assets. Colonelcassad's 'Anwar Detachment' video highlights RF's ongoing ISR and targeting of Ukrainian positions using drones. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Consolidate Narrative of Territorial Control and Military Supremacy: RF aims to project an image of overwhelming military strength and legitimate control over occupied territories, both domestically and internationally, through its large-scale strikes, administrative actions, and aggressive propaganda. The TASS report on North Korea's support and use of Tucker Carlson's statements are part of this. The demining/engineering video for the Southern Grouping emphasizes logistical sustainment for operations. The Lavrov/DPRK meeting video reinforces diplomatic ties. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Complete Seizure of Chasiv Yar: TASS claims RF forces almost completely control Chasiv Yar (only one district left). This indicates a renewed or intensified intent to finalize the capture of this strategically important town. KAB launches on Donetsk support this. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM (for veracity of claim, HIGH for intent).

2.2. Recent tactical changes or adaptations

• RUF:
  • Geographic Expansion of UAV/Missile/Aviation Munitions Strikes (CRITICAL - Deeper West & Central, Including New Regions and Specific Logistic Hubs): The further extension of UAV threats to Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts, coupled with new high-speed missile threats to previously less impacted areas like Kamianets-Podilskyi, Rohstyn, Yampil, Zboriv, Berestechko, and Chernivtsi, and new aviation munition threats to Dnipropetrovsk, indicates RF's intent to stretch UAF AD resources to their breaking point, isolate Western aid routes, impact civilian morale across the entire breadth of Ukraine, and target key central military/industrial sites. The overt boasting by milbloggers about targeting Chernivtsi airport highlights this specific focus on logistics. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Coordinated UAV/Missile/KAB Wave (Confirmed Execution & Multi-Wave): The confirmed launch of strategic missiles following the UAV saturation, along with the detection of "new waves" of cruise missiles, and KAB launches on Sumy, Donetsk, and Kharkiv, indicates a clear coordinated multi-platform deep strike strategy to maximize AD confusion and penetration. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Northern Border Probing/Bridgehead Establishment (Confirmed Air Support for Kharkiv & KABs for Sumy, and Reconnaissance Claims): The TASS report regarding a bridgehead near Guyevo for a push into Sumy Oblast, supported by KAB launches on Sumy and confirmed explosions/UAVs inbound to Kharkiv, and now claims of SSO liquidation in Sumy, suggests a new or intensified ground maneuver component on the northern border, likely complementing the deep strikes. The TASS report on UAF camouflage deficiencies in Sumy direction further corroborates active RF reconnaissance and targeting focus in that area. Colonelcassad's video shows detailed drone reconnaissance of potential UAF positions in border regions. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.
  • Aggressive Information Operations & Direct Boasting (Targeting Western Aid & Fabricating Alliances): Immediate mocking of UAF AD effectiveness, explicit statements about "closing the Ukraine project" and "preludes are over," and specifically boasting about hits in Lviv and Chernivtsi airport indicate a real-time, aggressive information warfare component integrated with their physical strikes, designed to maximize psychological impact and portray successful interdiction of Western aid. The false TASS report regarding North Korean involvement and use of Tucker Carlson's comments are new escalations of this, aiming to legitimize Russian border actions, project international support, and deter foreign volunteers. "Два майора" showcasing drone strike footage reinforces this. The Lavrov/DPRK meeting video is part of this. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Claims of Chasiv Yar Near-Capture: TASS report suggests RF is intensifying efforts to fully capture Chasiv Yar, likely as a psychological victory and to open further avenues of advance, supported by KAB launches on Donetsk. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.
  • Logistical Reinforcement in Southern Axis: Russian MoD engineers conducting demining and road preparation in the Southern Grouping of Forces area indicates active logistical adaptation to support ongoing or future ground operations in that sector. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• UAF:
  • Real-time Threat Awareness and Dissemination (Maintaining, Adapting to New Routes and Targets): UAF AF continues to demonstrate high-level, real-time threat detection and dissemination capabilities for incoming UAVs and missiles, including detailed movement patterns and the immediate expansion of warning zones into new western and central regions (Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Lutsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, and Khmelnytskyi), and now new aviation munition threats for Dnipropetrovsk. AD confirmed active in Lutsk, Lviv, and Chernivtsi, with reported successful engagements. Public messaging from Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia on air raid all-clears, and from Kharkiv on UAV activity and impacts, indicates robust and responsive public warning systems. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Poland Fighter Jet Scramble: Poland's decision to scramble fighter jets indicates the severity and scale of the RF aerial threat, highlighting a coordinated international response to RF aggression near NATO borders. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Warning Against Content Filming: Chernivtsi OVA's warning against filming/sharing content of strikes indicates an active counter-intelligence/security measure to deny RF BDA and propaganda material. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Personnel Loss Reporting (Transparent): General Staff of UAF and RBK-Ukraine reporting estimated RF personnel losses (1070 over 24 hours) demonstrates continued operational transparency and a counter-narrative to RF claims of dominance. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2.3. Logistics and sustainment status

• RUF:
  • VERY High Munitions Consumption (Sustained & Critically Expanded, Multi-Wave): The continued massed drone attacks, now covering an even wider and deeper area, including central Ukraine, confirm RF's capacity to sustain high rates of UAV and missile deployment. The "chaotic movement" tactic further implies a sufficient inventory to afford less efficient (but more challenging to intercept) flight profiles. Confirmed strategic missile launches, KAB launches, new waves, and new aviation munition threats reinforce this assessment. Naval assets with Kalibr missiles also contribute to this inventory. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Northern Axis Logistical Support: Increased rail logistics into Belgorod Oblast (previous report) supports the TASS claim of a bridgehead for Sumy operations and ongoing strikes on Kharkiv, indicating continued capacity to supply forward ground operations. The showcasing of DJI FlyCart 100 by a milblogger, while speculative, suggests an interest in augmenting forward logistics or special payload delivery. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Southern Axis Logistical Support: Russian MoD engineers actively clearing roads and preparing for transport in the Southern Grouping of Forces area indicates robust logistical support for ongoing ground operations in that sector. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• UAF:
  • Air Defense Munitions Strain (CRITICAL - EXTREME & NATIONWIDE): The current massed drone and missile strikes, now extending to almost the entire country, continue to place unprecedented strain on UAF air defense munitions stockpiles. The expanded area of operations (Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk) severely exacerbates this strain and risks critical AD gaps, particularly for key Western aid logistics and critical central infrastructure. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2.4. Command and control effectiveness

• RUF:
  • Centralized Strategic C2 (Highly Effective & Adaptive): The coordinated, high-volume, multi-vector drone and missile attack, incorporating adaptive tactics and significantly expanded geographic scope into the far west and central Ukraine, continues to demonstrate highly effective, centralized strategic C2 for deep operations. Their information operations are also tightly controlled and rapidly deployed. The ability to launch multi-wave attacks further confirms effective C2. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Ground C2 (Northern Axis, Eastern Axis & Southern Axis): The claim of establishing a bridgehead, if accurate, suggests effective C2 for tactical ground operations in border regions. The TASS claim about Chasiv Yar control also indicates coordinated C2 for offensive ground operations. RF milblogger claims of SSO liquidation in Sumy also indicate effective tactical C2 for border engagements. The Russian MoD report on engineer work in the Southern Grouping of Forces suggests effective C2 for logistical support in active ground zones. The TASS report on UAF camouflage issues in Sumy direction, if accurate, suggests effective RF reconnaissance and targeting C2. Colonelcassad's drone footage also indicates effective ISR C2. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.
• UAF:
  • Highly Effective Air Defense C2 (Strained, Adapting to New Routes and Targets): Rapid detection, tracking, and public warning of incoming threats across multiple oblasts, including specific drone and missile movement updates and immediate expansion of alerts to all newly affected Western and central regions (Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Lutsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, and Khmelnytskyi), and now including new aviation munition threats for Dnipropetrovsk. Public messages from Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Zaporizhzhia authorities illustrate effective C2 for public warning. However, this C2 system is now operating under extreme pressure due to the national scope of the threat and the need to constantly adapt to new missile/UAV trajectories and target sets. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian force posture and readiness

• Posture: UAF is currently operating at maximum defensive alert against a complex, multi-domain RF aerial attack across almost the entire country. Ground forces maintain defensive lines, including on the northern border, Eastern, and Southern Axes. Naval forces maintain defensive posture in the Black Sea and Azov Sea, monitoring RF naval assets.
• Readiness:
  • Air Defense: At peak readiness and fully engaged. Systems are being critically tested by the volume, complexity, and now nationwide geographic scope of the current RF attacks, particularly the "chaotic movement" of UAVs and the confirmed multi-wave missile attacks. AD is confirmed active in Lutsk, Lviv, and Chernivtsi, with successful negation of some UAVs reported. "Mykolaiv Vanek" reports successful "minus" for mopeds in Kharkiv, indicating ongoing AD effectiveness there. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Counter-UAS: Active in countering RF drones and responding to RF C-UAS efforts. Successful engagements confirmed near Bila Tserkva, Chernivtsi, and now for UAVs over Lviv, Lutsk, and Kharkiv. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Overall: Readiness remains high but under immense and unsustainable pressure due to sustained, nationwide aerial attacks, severe resource consumption, and the desperate need to extend AD coverage across the entire country. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

3.2. Recent tactical successes or setbacks

• Successes:
  • Active Air Defense Engagements & Early Warnings (Nationwide & Adaptive): Ongoing successful interceptions of RF UAVs (e.g., Bila Tserkva, Chernivtsi, Lviv, Lutsk, Kharkiv) and timely public warnings across critical areas, now including Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, and Dnipropetrovsk. The ability to identify "chaotic movement" and provide detailed tracking indicates strong ISR and C2. AD confirmed active in Lutsk, Lviv, Chernivtsi, and Kharkiv. Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia "all clears" indicate successful AD engagements. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Destruction of RF TOS-1A (Previous Report): Confirmed destruction of a high-value RF TOS-1A system near Vovchansk indicates successful UAF counter-battery and precision strike capabilities. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Poland Scrambles Jets: The immediate response of Polish air forces to the intensity of the RF attack underscores international awareness and potential for collaborative defense measures. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Operational Security Measures: Chernivtsi OVA's proactive public message regarding not filming strikes is a tactical success in counter-BDA and information warfare. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • RF Personnel Losses: General Staff of UAF reports 1070 RF personnel losses, indicating continued effectiveness of UAF ground forces and attrition of RF manpower. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Setbacks:
  • CRITICAL Massed Aerial Attack (Sustained, Adaptive & NATIONAL Scope, Multi-Wave): Ukraine is currently under an unprecedented multi-vector, high-volume RF aerial assault, which is proving highly adaptable with "chaotic movement" tactics and has now expanded into virtually all western regions and central Ukraine, posing extreme risk to infrastructure and population centers, particularly critical Western aid logistics and central industrial/military targets. Explosions in Khmelnytskyi, Hostomel, Lutsk (private house destroyed), Lviv (with fire and residential damage, multiple districts impacted), Chernivtsi (with explosions), and Kharkiv (residential strike confirmed, multiple drone impacts including a garage fire, causing 2 civilian casualties) confirm significant impacts. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • RF C-UAS Effectiveness: RF's ability to successfully engage Ukrainian "Baba-Yaga" drones and new claims of Ka-52 engagements indicate a growing challenge to UAF's organic drone capabilities, particularly in the Kharkiv sector and near border regions. "Два майора" video of a drone strike on a vehicle suggests continued RF counter-drone and precision strike capabilities. Colonelcassad's 'Anwar Detachment' video highlights RF's drone-based ISR capabilities, which contribute to their targeting effectiveness. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.
  • Northern Border Pressure: RF's claim of establishing a bridgehead for a push into Sumy Oblast, if verified, represents a new area of concern and potential for resource diversion. KAB launches on Sumy and Kharkiv, and claims of SSO liquidation in Sumy, indicate sustained pressure. TASS reporting on UAF camouflage deficiencies in Sumy direction indicates RF is actively looking to exploit weaknesses. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.
  • Chasiv Yar Pressure: TASS claims indicate very strong RF pressure on Chasiv Yar, suggesting potential for an imminent capture or significant withdrawal. KAB launches on Donetsk reinforce this pressure. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.
  • Civilian Casualties: Two civilians confirmed injured in Kharkiv from morning attacks underscore the direct human cost of the sustained RF aerial campaign. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

3.3. Resource requirements and constraints

• Requirements:
  • Air Defense Munitions (CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE & EXPANDED, SUSTAINED): Sustained critical requirement for interceptor missiles, particularly for countering high-volume, adaptable drone swarms and high-speed threats. This remains the top priority, with an urgent and drastically increased need for coverage across all western and central regions, especially targeting key logistics hubs for Western aid and critical central military/industrial targets, and now newly affected Dnipropetrovsk.
  • C-UAS Capabilities (Enhanced): Enhanced requirement for advanced C-UAS systems, including electronic warfare (EW) and kinetic interceptors, to counter RF's evolving drone tactics (e.g., FPV-on-drone) and its own C-UAS efforts, particularly in Kharkiv/Sumy and for countering precision strikes like the one shown by "Два майора" and Colonelcassad.
  • ISR Assets (Enhanced Focus on Western Logistics, Central Infrastructure & Northern/Eastern/Southern Border): Continued high demand for real-time ISR to track RF strategic aviation, missile trajectories, and high-volume drone movements, particularly to identify potential follow-on waves, understand their adaptive flight profiles across the expanded target area, and CRITICALLY monitor for threats to Western aid logistics and railway networks, as well as critical central military/industrial sites, including newly identified targets such as Chernivtsi airport and rail hubs in Volyn/Rivne/Ternopil/Khmelnytskyi, and new aviation munition threats to Dnipropetrovsk. New requirement for focused ISR on the northern border, specifically Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts, to verify and track any RF bridgehead or ground advance and KAB launch points, and to assess reported UAF camouflage deficiencies. Continued ISR focus on Chasiv Yar and Eastern Axis for ground truth. New requirement for ISR on Southern Axis engineering activity.
• Constraints:
  • Air Defense Saturation (CRITICAL): The sheer volume and adaptive nature of incoming RF attacks, now impacting the vast majority of Ukrainian territory, is severely risking the overwhelming of UAF air defenses, leading to breakthroughs and increased damage, especially with the extended geographic reach and the ongoing multi-wave missile attacks.
  • Personnel Fatigue (SEVERE): Continuous high-intensity air defense operations across virtually all oblasts place immense strain on UAF personnel.
  • Geographic Stretch (EXTREME): The nationwide expansion of deep strikes forces UAF to further disperse already severely strained AD assets, creating critical vulnerabilities across the entire country, particularly for vital Western supply lines and central infrastructure. Potential ground pressure on the northern border (Kharkiv/Sumy) and intensified pressure on Chasiv Yar would further exacerbate this.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive domain)

4.1. Propaganda and disinformation campaigns

• RUF:
  • "Overwhelming Force" Narrative (Amplified, Sustained & Aggressive): The visible, large-scale drone and missile attacks, now reaching virtually all of Ukraine, continue to be used as direct psychological operations. This is further amplified by RF milblogger claims of tactical successes (e.g., FPV-C-UAS engagements, Ka-52 drone shootdown, SSO liquidation in Sumy), the strategic use of external commentary (e.g., Tucker Carlson's statements), and direct mockery of UAF AD ("spent a third of their ammunition on decoys," "PVO u etikh lvov nikakoe"). New messages are overtly boasting about hits in Lviv, using phrases like "preludes are over," and calling for "closing the Ukraine project," and specifically targeting Chernivtsi airport. The "Два майора" milblogger's image and video posts on "night strikes" and a drone strike on a vehicle serve to propagate this narrative of Russian effectiveness and dominance. The TASS report on property nationalization reinforces a narrative of permanent territorial control, while the prisoner exchange video aims to demonstrate care for their personnel. The claim of near-full control of Chasiv Yar also serves this narrative. The most extreme new example is Lavrov's fabricated claim of North Korean military involvement in Kursk, designed to project an image of overwhelming, even international, support for RF border operations. TASS reports North Korea's FM declaring unconditional support for Russia's territorial integrity policy, explicitly legitimizing the invasion and occupation. The Lavrov/DPRK meeting video, while without specific military content, serves as a visual reinforcement of diplomatic ties. A TASS report on Saudi cooperation for rare earth metals aims to project economic resilience and new partnerships. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • "Legitimacy of Occupation" Narrative (Reinforced): The formal move to take damaged property in occupied regions onto the RF balance sheet is a clear legal and information maneuver to legitimize their claims over these territories, disregarding international law. Russian MoD video on Southern Grouping engineers clearing roads reinforces this, showing "normal" military logistics in contested areas. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • "Ukrainian Weakness" Narrative: RF milbloggers directly mock UAF AD, claiming they waste munitions on decoys and are ineffective against current attacks, aiming to sow doubt about UAF capabilities and demoralize the population. This is highly visible in messages concerning Lviv airport and now Chernivtsi airport. "НгП раZVедка" provides mocking visual 'evidence' of impacts. A new TASS video claims UAF forces are not camouflaging personnel or equipment on the Sumy direction, aiming to portray UAF as undisciplined and vulnerable. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • "Shared Burden" Narrative (Belgorod): TASS's interview with Governor Gladkov portraying regional officials sharing the same conditions as residents aims to foster solidarity and resilience in border regions under Ukrainian fire, while subtly legitimizing the conflict. His reporting on a "stably difficult" 380km border suggests ongoing threat but implies RF resilience. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Promoting New Technologies for War: Colonelcassad's posts on the DJI FlyCart 100 drone aim to highlight RF's access to advanced technologies and their potential military application, further contributing to the "overwhelming force" narrative. His video on Chinese hypersonic missile development serves a similar purpose, implicitly linking Russia to advanced military capabilities. His recent drone reconnaissance video of Ukrainian positions reinforces RF's advanced ISR capabilities. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Western Internal Divisions Narrative: TASS reports on Tucker Carlson's claims about the US government and the Epstein case, seeking to amplify internal dissent and distrust within Western countries. The specific quote on revoking citizenship for Americans fighting in Ukraine aims to deter foreign volunteers and create internal division in Western societies. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• UAF:
  • Transparency and Resilience (Maintaining & Countering RF BDA): Immediate public warnings and continuous updates on air defense operations aim to maintain public trust and foster resilience, countering RF's psychological pressure. The image of Kyiv metro as a shelter reinforces the civilian impact and the need for public safety. Chernivtsi OVA's warning against filming strikes is a direct counter-propaganda measure. Public updates from Kharkiv OVA regarding UAV activity and impacts maintain transparency and report civilian casualties. Mayor Sadovyi's immediate reports on Lviv impacts and Lutsk OVA/Mayor reports on destroyed residential buildings emphasize the civilian impact of RF strikes. The Ukrainian Navy's public report on maritime situation highlights transparency on threats. The General Staff and RBK-Ukraine reporting of high RF personnel losses (1070) serves as a direct counter-narrative to RF claims of military dominance and bolsters Ukrainian morale. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

4.2. Public sentiment and morale factors

• Ukraine: Public sentiment is under extreme and unprecedented pressure due to the widespread air raid alerts and the exceptional volume, adaptive nature, and now nationwide geographic reach of incoming aerial threats. The image of Kyiv metro as a shelter highlights the direct impact on civilian life and the need for immediate protective measures. Mayor Sadovyi's comments on multiple explosions in Lviv and the direct destruction of residential buildings in Lutsk will significantly impact public morale and sense of security, particularly in Western regions previously less affected. The confirmed civilian casualties in Kharkiv further compound this. UAF's transparency, active air defense engagements, and reporting of RF losses will help sustain resolve, but the constant and now deeper threat poses a severe emotional and psychological toll, particularly regarding the safety of Western aid logistics and central regions. RF milbloggers' mockery and explicit calls for "closing Ukraine" are likely to be perceived as hostile and further stiffen resolve, but the physical impacts are significant. The public awareness of Polish fighter jet scrambles may offer a sense of external support. The warning against filming strikes indicates a concern about public safety and strategic information. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Russia: Public sentiment is being shaped by narratives of RF military success, the "necessity" of the conflict, and administrative consolidation of occupied territories. The large-scale aerial attacks and selective external commentary are used to project strength and efficiency. The prisoner exchange video is likely intended to boost morale among military personnel and their families. The confident and aggressive tone of milbloggers suggests a perception of momentum. TASS's reporting on diplomatic meetings (Lavrov in North Korea, including fabricated military claims and North Korean support statements) aims to project normalcy and international legitimacy amidst military operations. Gladkov's interview aims to build resilience in Belgorod. The engineering video for the Southern Grouping portrays competence and progress. The TASS claim of UAF camouflage issues is likely intended to boost RF morale by portraying UAF as tactically unsound. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

4.3. International support and diplomatic developments

• Ukraine: Previous reports of renewed US weapons supply remain critical. The ongoing intensity and nationwide geographic scope of RF strikes will likely increase international pressure for accelerated aid and much more robust and geographically dispersed AD systems, as the threat to Western aid logistics and central infrastructure becomes immediate and severe. Poland's scramble of fighter jets indicates a direct NATO response to the intensity of RF's air campaign, highlighting the severity of the threat near its borders. The ISW note on Beijing not wanting RF defeat indicates a complex geopolitical environment. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Russia: The international community will continue to condemn RF's mass aerial attacks, particularly the targeting of civilian infrastructure and the deepening threat to Western aid routes and central regions. RF's attempts to manipulate foreign statements (e.g., Tucker Carlson's comments, specifically on citizenship revocation) and project diplomatic readiness (e.g., Lavrov's meeting in North Korea, including fabricating military involvement and North Korea's public statement of support) will likely be seen as further evidence of their information warfare tactics. Colonelcassad highlighting Chinese hypersonic development implies a potential for technology transfer or shared military advancement, which could influence international perceptions. The TASS report on Saudi Arabia's willingness to cooperate on rare earth metals aims to project international economic partnerships, potentially bypassing Western sanctions. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

• Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

  • Sustained Massed Aerial Attack with Adaptive Tactics, Deepest Western & Central Thrust (IMMEDIATE - 0-12 hours): RF will continue and likely execute additional waves of its large-scale strategic missile strike (from airborne Tu-95MS and any available MiG-31K), concurrently with or following the ongoing massed UAV attack. These attacks will continue to employ adaptive "chaotic movement" tactics and will now prioritize even deeper targeting of Western Ukraine (Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts) and key central regions (Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi Oblasts, targeting Myrhorod, Hlobyne, Semenivka, Kremenchuk areas, Zolotonosha, Bila Tserkva, Lityn, Ozerne air base, Kamianets-Podilskyi, Chernivtsi airport, Rohstyn, Yampil, Zboriv, Berestechko). New aviation munition threats will persist against Dnipropetrovsk (Synelnykove Raion). Primary targets will remain critical infrastructure (energy, transport hubs, particularly rail infrastructure connecting to Western aid routes), major population centers, and likely military airfields/industrial sites in central Ukraine. The immediate objective is to severely disrupt or interdict Western aid flows and saturate UAF AD. KAB launches will continue on frontline areas (Donetsk, Sumy, Kharkiv). Black Sea naval assets (Kalibr carriers) may also be employed for follow-on strikes. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Increased Ground Pressure on Northern Axis & Eastern Axis (6-24 hours): RF forces will sustain high-intensity, localized ground assaults on the Donetsk and Kupyansk axes, leveraging drone support and KABs for targeted strikes and reconnaissance. A renewed push to establish or expand a bridgehead in Kursk Oblast to enable advances into Sumy Oblast will occur, aiming to create a new axis of pressure. RF will likely continue small-unit probing and infiltration attempts, specifically targeting special operations forces (e.g., claims of SSO liquidation in Sumy), and exploit identified UAF camouflage deficiencies in the Sumy direction. Increased RF C-UAS efforts will continue to challenge UAF tactical drone use in these areas. RF will attempt to counter UAF force generation by targeting newly identified units or their staging areas. Pressure on Chasiv Yar will be maintained or intensified for a decisive breakthrough. Ground probing and shaping fires (KABs) on Kharkiv will continue. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Intensified Information Offensive Leveraging External Commentary and "Legitimacy" (Concurrent): RF will continue to rapidly disseminate propaganda framing successful strikes, exaggerated UAF losses, and will increasingly seek to leverage selective or decontextualized external commentary (e.g., from ISW regarding China, Tucker Carlson's claims) and fabricating claims (e.g., North Korean military involvement, North Korea's "unconditional support"). Concurrently, RF will push narratives of administrative consolidation and "normalization" in occupied territories, using actions like property nationalization to project an image of irreversible control. They will openly boast about targeting successes (e.g., Lviv, Chernivtsi airport) and call for Ukraine's defeat, and continue to mock UAF AD effectiveness, particularly on Western targets. The showcasing of drone strike videos and diplomatic meetings (Lavrov/DPRK) will continue this trend. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

• Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

  • Coordinated Kinzhal/Hypersonic Strike on Western Logistics Hubs and Central Military Sites Followed by Massed UAV Wave: RF's current high-volume UAV and missile attack, now extending across all of Western Ukraine and into central regions, serves as a primary decoy for highly precise Kinzhal or other hypersonic missile strikes from available platforms (e.g., MiG-31K), specifically targeting critical rail hubs, transshipment points, and potential underground storage facilities for Western aid in Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, Ternopil, or Khmelnytskyi Oblasts (e.g., Kamianets-Podilskyi, Chernivtsi airport, Lutsk rail hub), as well as key military airfields or industrial sites in Poltava Oblast (e.g., Myrhorod air base, Kremenchuk industrial areas), Ozerne air base, Bila Tserkva, or Cherkasy industrial areas, and critical points in Dnipropetrovsk. This would be immediately followed by a new, denser wave of UAVs and conventional cruise missiles to exploit any created gaps in UAF air defense and completely disrupt incoming Western aid, potentially isolating the front lines. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Combined Arms Breakthrough (Kharkiv Axis) Exploiting AD Saturation and Logistical Disruption: RF commits its unlocated operational reserves (from previous daily report) in a concentrated armored thrust on the Lyptsi or Vovchansk axis, immediately following the peak of the nationwide aerial bombardment and deep Western/Central logistical interdiction. The objective is to achieve a rapid breakthrough and establish fire control over main supply routes into Kharkiv city before Ukrainian mobile reserves can effectively respond, leveraging the severe disruption caused by nationwide AD engagement and the critical AD coverage requirements in Western and Central Ukraine. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Simultaneous Ground Offensives on Eastern Front & New Northern Axis (Kharkiv/Sumy), Coupled with Widespread Rail/Industrial Interdiction in Western/Central Ukraine: RF launches significant ground offensives on both the Eastern Front (e.g., Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, potentially with immediate capture of Chasiv Yar) and simultaneously initiates a large-scale ground offensive in the Kharkiv/Sumy Oblasts, aiming to force UAF to split its already strained reserves and AD assets across multiple critical axes. Concurrently, RF will conduct widespread precision strikes targeting all key rail hubs and logistics nodes in Western Ukraine (e.g., Lviv, Rivne, Kovel, Lutsk, Chop, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Kamianets-Podilskyi, Chernivtsi) and critical industrial/military sites in central Ukraine (e.g., Poltava Oblast, Kremenchuk, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk) to critically disrupt incoming military aid shipments, sever supply lines to the front, and cripple remaining industrial capacity. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

• Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

  • IMMEDIATE (0-3 hours):
    • MAXIMUM AIR DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT & ADAPTATION (NATIONWIDE INCLUSION & WESTERN/CENTRAL LOGISTICS FOCUS): All UAF air defense assets must be on maximum alert and fully engaged against the ongoing and anticipated strategic missile wave and the massed, adaptable UAV attack, with a CRITICAL focus on the newly targeted Western Oblasts (Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi) and central Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr Oblasts, and the protection of rail/logistics nodes and key central military/industrial sites, specifically including Chernivtsi airport, Kamianets-Podilskyi, and other identified deep targets. Urgent attention to new aviation munition threats in Dnipropetrovsk (Synelnykove Raion).* Prioritize defense of C2 nodes, critical infrastructure (especially rail links to the west and central industrial complexes), and major population centers, dynamically reallocating assets based on updated threat vectors and the anticipated "second wave" of drones/missiles, including countermeasures for "chaotic movement." DECISION POINT: Dynamic allocation of high-value AD systems, particularly for Kinzhal threat to Western logistics and central military targets; assessment of sustained AD operations and tactical adjustments for new UAV flight patterns and extended geographic reach. Potential activation of passive defenses for critical Western and central infrastructure. Prioritize defense of Kharkiv against ongoing KAB/UAV strikes.
    • C-UAS Deployment: Rapid deployment and activation of C-UAS systems (EW, kinetic) to protect high-value Ukrainian drone assets and deny RF successful FPV-on-UAV engagements, particularly in high-activity areas like Kharkiv and border regions, and to counter precision strikes like those showcased by RF milbloggers. DECISION POINT: Prioritization and deployment of specific C-UAS assets to vulnerable UAF drone units/sectors, and evaluation of passive drone countermeasures.
    • Public Safety & Operational Security: Issue continuous and urgent public warnings, instructing civilians to seek and remain in shelters, particularly in all newly targeted western and central regions, including Dnipropetrovsk. Ensure emergency services are pre-positioned for rapid response and casualty management (e.g., Kharkiv). Reinforce public messaging against filming and sharing strike-related content. DECISION POINT: Activation of comprehensive public alert and response protocols, pre-staging of emergency teams, and ensuring full coverage in newly threatened areas, specifically emphasizing threat to Western and central regions. Implement stricter enforcement of content sharing restrictions.
  • SHORT-TERM (3-24 hours):
    • BDA and Post-Strike Response (Expanded & Logistical/Central Focus): Conduct rapid BDA on all affected areas, including new Western and central strike zones, prioritizing search and rescue, medical support, and immediate damage assessment for critical infrastructure (especially rail/logistics nodes in Western Ukraine and military/industrial sites in central Ukraine, including Chernivtsi airport, and newly affected areas in Dnipropetrovsk) and military assets. DECISION POINT: Allocation of emergency and reconstruction resources, with an IMMEDIATE focus on critical Western logistics infrastructure and central military/industrial targets.
    • Air Defense Munitions Assessment (CRITICAL & GEOGRAPHIC): Immediate and granular assessment of air defense munitions expenditure and initiation of urgent resupply requests based on current consumption rates and the effectiveness of RF's adaptive tactics, anticipating sustained high-volume attacks across the entire country. Prioritize urgent requests for Western AD munitions, specifically addressing critical needs for newly exposed Western and central regions and the protection of logistical pathways. DECISION POINT: Urgent logistical requests, particularly for Western AD munitions, and advocacy for accelerated deliveries, with a clear breakdown of critical geographic requirements and vulnerabilities.
    • Ground Force Readiness Review (Eastern & Northern): Evaluate RF ground assault patterns and UAF defensive successes/challenges in Donetsk, Kupyansk, Sumy, and Kharkiv Oblasts, particularly concerning RF C-UAS efforts and any claimed bridgehead or specific tactical claims (e.g., SSO liquidation, UAF camouflage deficiencies). Adjust force posture and reserve allocation as needed, anticipating potential follow-on ground offensives, especially if AD is significantly degraded or shifted west to protect logistics. DECISION POINT: Operational adjustments for ground forces, including reinforcement of critical sectors and border regions, and defensive measures against potential targeting of newly formed units, particularly regarding Chasiv Yar defense and Kharkiv defense.
  • MID-TERM (24-72 hours):
    • Logistical Security for US Aid (CRITICAL - NATIONAL & WESTERN/CENTRAL FOCUS): Implement enhanced security measures for anticipated incoming US weapons shipments and related logistical routes to mitigate MDCOA of targeting supply lines, especially those through Western Ukraine. This includes enhanced air defense coverage for rail/road hubs and transit points in Ternopil, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, Lviv, Volyn, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts. Develop redundancy plans for critical logistical nodes. DECISION POINT: Enhanced convoy protection, anti-strike measures, and immediate logistical redundancy planning for incoming aid, with specific, heightened attention to western and central transit routes and alternative supply avenues.
    • Strategic ISR Adaptation (Western Logistics, Central Targets & Deep Strike Focus): Refine ISR collection plans to anticipate and track future large-scale RF aerial attacks, assess the effectiveness of their multi-domain saturation tactics, identify new high-value RF targets (e.g., missile launch platforms, drone production/assembly sites, potential heavy transport drone applications), and understand adaptive C-UAS methods. Prioritize ISR on RF intent for deeper strikes into Western and Central Ukraine and their targeting of logistics, particularly rail networks, major transit hubs, and key industrial/military sites. Closely monitor RF milblogger channels for targeting hints and specific claims like UAF camouflage deficiencies. DECISION POINT: Adjust long-term ISR plan to focus on RF deep strike capabilities, critical Western and central logistics/targets interdiction, and emerging ground pressure points, particularly in the west.
    • Information Warfare Counter-Narrative (Adaptive & Resilient): Develop and disseminate counter-narratives to RF propaganda regarding overwhelming force and territorial gains, especially those using external commentary or attempts to spin Ukrainian force generation (e.g., North Korean involvement claim, North Korea's support, Tucker Carlson's citizenship comments, UAF camouflage claims). Leverage UAF successes (e.g., BDA on RF vehicles, successful AD intercepts, US aid confirmation, RF personnel losses) and highlight civilian suffering and the continued integrity of Western supply lines. Counter RF's "diplomacy" narrative by emphasizing their simultaneous aggression and address RF claims about UAF AD inefficiency, especially the overt boasts about Lviv and Chernivtsi hits. DECISION POINT: Develop and implement proactive public information campaigns to maintain morale and counter RF psychological operations, specifically addressing RF's diplomatic overtures in contrast to their ongoing aggression and the direct threat to Western aid and central Ukraine. Immediately debunk fabricated claims of foreign military involvement and counter narratives designed to deter foreign volunteers.

INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

1. Full RF Strategic Missile Loadout and Target Intent (CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE & WESTERN/CENTRAL REACH):
   • GAP: Precise types and quantities of missiles launched from Tu-95MS aircraft and MiG-31K. Confirmation of Kinzhal missile launch from MiG-31K and its flight path/target, particularly any targeting of Western Ukrainian critical logistics infrastructure (rail hubs, transshipment points, warehouses), central military/industrial sites (e.g., Myrhorod air base, Kremenchuk industrial areas, Ozerne air base, Chernivtsi airport), or AD assets. Detailed analysis of RF's primary and secondary targeting for the current and anticipated strategic missile wave, especially concerning high-value targets (UAF C2, AD nodes, critical infrastructure, including rail/logistics hubs in Western Ukraine and central industrial/military sites, and newly identified targets such as Kamianets-Podilskyi, Rohstyn, Yampil, Zboriv, Berestechko, and new threats in Dnipropetrovsk). Confirmation of "second wave" capabilities for drones/missiles and their specific trajectories into new central/western regions.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT on RF strategic aviation communications and missile guidance systems (especially for Kinzhal). HIGH PRIORITY IMINT (satellite and aerial reconnaissance) of missile launch areas and impact sites for BDA. HIGH PRIORITY OSINT from monitoring public airspace data and RF channels for inadvertent disclosures.
2. RF Drone Inventory, Production/Acquisition Rate, and Launch Sites & Adaptive Tactics (URGENT & GEOGRAPHICALLY EXPANDED):
   • GAP: Detailed assessment of RF's current inventory of Shahed-type and other strike UAVs. Confirmation of their daily/weekly production or acquisition rate. Identification of all active RF UAV launch sites and their operational patterns, including any new sites supporting expanded Western and central strikes, particularly those facilitating attacks on Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts. Specific analysis of the "chaotic movement" tactic to determine its prevalence, effectiveness, and the resources it requires. Assessment of RF's intent and capability to employ heavy-lift drones (e.g., DJI FlyCart 100) for military purposes.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from captured RF drone operators or intelligence on RF supply chains. MEDIUM PRIORITY OSINT on Russian industrial reports and Iranian/Chinese supply chain indicators, and milblogger content. HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT to identify drone control frequencies and persistent monitoring of suspected launch sites. HIGH PRIORITY GEOINT/IMINT/SIGINT to track and analyze specific flight paths and patterns of incoming UAVs, noting changes in launch origin for Western and central strikes.
3. Effectiveness of RF C-UAS Operations and Countermeasures (Multi-platform):
   • GAP: Comprehensive assessment of RF's C-UAS capabilities, particularly the widespread use of FPV drones against Ukrainian UAVs and the deployment/effectiveness of rotary-wing platforms (e.g., Ka-52) for aerial intercepts. Quantification of success rates and impact on Ukrainian drone operations. Identification of RF's C-UAS equipment, tactics, and their impact on UAF ISR and strike capabilities, specifically in relation to the drone strike video posted by "Два майора" and Colonelcassad's 'Anwar Detachment' video.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY IMINT (UAV footage from UAF, satellite imagery) of RF C-UAS engagements. HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from UAF drone operators encountering RF C-UAS. HIGH PRIORITY EW/SIGINT to identify RF C-UAS frequencies and methods.
4. Impact of Renewed US Weapons Supply on RF Planning and Cyber Response (ONGOING & WESTERN LOGISTICS):
   • GAP: Assessment of RF's immediate and long-term adaptation to the confirmed resumption of US weapons supply to Ukraine. Will this trigger a change in RF operational tempo, targeting priorities (especially logistical routes in Western and Central Ukraine), or lead to increased cyber activity targeting supply chains or critical infrastructure?
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT on RF high-level command discussions and military planning communications, specifically for discussions related to Western aid logistics. MEDIUM PRIORITY OSINT on Russian state media and expert commentary reacting to the announcement. HIGH PRIORITY CYBINT to monitor for preparatory cyber activity targeting Ukrainian infrastructure or supply chain logistics, particularly focusing on Western transit nodes.
5. Verification and Capability of New UAF Formations (CONFIRMED CR):
   • GAP: Confirmation of the creation and current status of the claimed "fourth heavy mechanized formation" within UAF Ground Forces, as reported by RF milbloggers. Assessment of its composition, readiness, and potential deployment plans. This is crucial for understanding both UAF capability and RF targeting priorities.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from UAF personnel. MEDIUM PRIORITY SIGINT on UAF internal communications. MEDIUM PRIORITY IMINT (satellite imagery, drone reconnaissance) to identify new unit signatures or training activities. HIGH PRIORITY OSINT to monitor official UAF announcements or credible reporting on force generation.
6. Verification of RF Ground Gains and Damage Assessment (Eastern Axis, Northern Border & Southern Axis - IMMEDIATE):
   • GAP: Independent verification of RF claims regarding "taking a settlement" (Zelena Dolyna), disruption of UAF rotations (Kupyansk), UAF withdrawal from Yunakovka (Sumy Oblast), the establishment of a "bridgehead" near Guyevo, Kursk Oblast, for a push into Sumy Oblast, the claimed liquidation of a Ukrainian SSO commander in Sumy Oblast, and particularly the claim of near-total control over Chasiv Yar. Verification of the veracity of TASS's claim regarding North Korean military involvement in Kursk Oblast and the claims of UAF camouflage deficiencies in the Sumy direction. Precise RF and UAF lines of contact in the Donetsk, Kupyansk, Sumy, and Kharkiv Oblasts following recent engagements. Confirmation of exact locations of RF engineering activity in the Southern Grouping of Forces area.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY IMINT (drone and satellite imagery) of the claimed areas and recent impact sites. HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from local sources or UAF units in contact. HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT on RF ground unit communications for confirmation of territorial control and BDA.
7. RF Northern Grouping Reserves (CRITICAL - Confirmed from previous report):
   • GAP: The composition, readiness, and exact disposition of the RF operational reserve in the Belgorod and Kursk Oblasts remain unclear. Determining the size and trigger for commitment of this force is the highest priority intelligence requirement for the ground domain.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY ISR (UAV, SIGINT, satellite imagery) to focus on the Belgorod Oblast to identify, characterize, and track the RF operational reserve force. HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from cross-border sources.
8. RF Strategic Intent in Kharkiv (CRITICAL - Confirmed from previous report):
   • GAP: It is unclear if the current Kharkiv operation is a feint to draw Ukrainian reserves from the Donbas, an effort to establish a limited buffer zone, or the initial phase of a deliberate assault on the city. This understanding informs UAF strategic reserve allocation.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT on high-level RF command communications regarding operational objectives for the Kharkiv axis. MEDIUM PRIORITY HUMINT from captured RF personnel or defectors.
9. Effectiveness of RF Electronic Warfare (EW) in Kharkiv Axis (Confirmed from previous report):
   • GAP: The extent and effectiveness of RF EW systems deployed to counter Ukrainian drone operations in the Kharkiv axis requires further assessment. This impacts UAF drone efficacy and counter-EW requirements.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY EW/SIGINT to identify RF EW system locations, frequencies, and operational patterns. HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from UAF drone operators experiencing EW effects.