Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT

TIME: 120100Z JUL 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Ukraine General (Current): Russian Federation (RF) strategic aerial attack persists with extreme volume and depth, now actively threatening Poltava Oblast with high-speed targets and Cherkasy Oblast, in addition to western oblasts. UAV threats are confirmed and highly active in Rivne, Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts.
  • New high-speed targets: Confirmed from Sumy Oblast heading towards Poltava Oblast (Shyshaky, Hlobyne, Kremenchuk reservoir direction). Additional targets from Kharkiv Oblast also heading towards Poltava Oblast. Missiles from Poltava Oblast now reported heading towards Zolotonosha/Cherkasy. Another wave of cruise missiles detected entering from the North.
  • Western Ukraine: UAVs over Lviv (now 4 confirmed, 9 en route from East and Zolochiv), confirmed explosions in Lviv. UAVs continue towards Lutsk (1 confirmed over, 6 en route from Dubno/Rivne). UAVs west of Chernivtsi (2 confirmed, heading towards Krasnoilsk), and 2 more approaching Chernivtsi from the South.
  • Central Ukraine: One UAV approaching Kremenchuk. One cruise missile confirmed past Lysianka, heading towards Kyiv Oblast, then Vinnytsia Oblast (Stavyshche, Lityn). Two UAVs heading towards Bila Tserkva. Two missiles from Vinnytsia Oblast heading to southern Khmelnytskyi Oblast.
  • Key Terrain Implications: The new and continued threats to Poltava, Cherkasy, and Vinnytsia Oblasts, alongside the sustained pressure on Lviv and Lutsk, further emphasize RF's intent to stretch UAF Air Defense (AD) and target critical logistical hubs for Western aid, as well as industrial and military sites in central Ukraine. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Kyiv Oblast (Kyiv City): One missile previously reported heading to Kyiv is now confirmed to have continued through Lysianka towards Vinnytsia. Two UAVs are en route to Bila Tserkva. Explosions previously reported in Hostomel (near Kyiv) remain confirmed. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Khmelnytskyi Oblast: Explosions confirmed from previous reporting. Two missiles from Vinnytsia Oblast now heading towards Southern Khmelnytskyi Oblast. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Ternopil Oblast: Continues to be under UAV threat from previous reporting. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Rivne Oblast: UAVs continue to be tracked over Western Rivne Oblast moving towards Lutsk (3 en route from Rivne to Lutsk). CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Volyn Oblast: Explosions confirmed in Lutsk. Four UAVs confirmed heading to Lutsk, with an additional two en route. Two more UAVs from Rivne Oblast are also heading to Lutsk, now totaling 7 UAVs heading to Lutsk from various directions, with an additional 3 in Dubno area likely also targeting Lutsk. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Lviv Oblast: Five UAVs previously over Lviv, with another five en route. Current update indicates 4 UAVs over Lviv, with 4 more approaching from Zolochiv. Explosions confirmed in Lviv. New total of 8 UAVs heading to Lviv. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Chernivtsi Oblast: Explosions confirmed in Chernivtsi. An enemy object previously approaching Chernivtsi. New update shows 2 UAVs west of Chernivtsi heading towards Krasnoilsk, and 2 more approaching Chernivtsi from the South. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast: New threat of strike UAVs detected. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Poltava Oblast: High-speed targets detected from Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts, heading towards Poltava Oblast (Myrhorod, Hlobyne, Semenivka, Shyshaky). Missiles confirmed flying west of Poltava towards Kremenchuk/Cherkasy Oblast. Six high-speed targets identified heading towards Kremenchuk Reservoir. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Sumy Oblast: Enemy reconnaissance UAVs detected, with means for their interception engaged. High-speed targets detected from Sumy Oblast heading towards Poltava Oblast (via Okhtyrka). CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Kharkiv/Sumy Direction: TASS reports RF forces are establishing a bridgehead near Guyevo, Kursk Oblast, for a push into Sumy Oblast. This indicates renewed northern axis ground maneuver intent. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM (for claim, LOW for independent verification of bridgehead establishment). A high-speed target detected from Kharkiv Oblast heading towards Poltava Oblast. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Cherkasy Oblast: Missiles reported flying from Poltava Oblast towards Zolotonosha/Cherkasy. UAF AF confirms targets heading for Cherkasy. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Vinnytsia Oblast: One missile confirmed to have passed Lysianka (Kyiv Oblast) and is heading towards Vinnytsia Oblast (Stavyshche, Lityn). CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Zhytomyr Oblast: Four UAVs reported heading towards Ozerne/Zhytomyr. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Ukraine General: Night operations continue, with low visibility favoring RF UAV and missile saturation tactics. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF:
  • Air Defense: Fully engaged across an expanding and unprecedented number of oblasts, now specifically including Poltava, Cherkasy, and Vinnytsia, in addition to confirmed active engagement in Lutsk, Lviv, and Chernivtsi, alongside Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Odesa, Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, and Rivne. UAF AF continues to provide continuous updates on UAV and missile concentrations and movement directions, demonstrating effective Command and Control (C2) and public warning systems. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Ground Forces: Maintaining defensive posture on the northern border (Sumy) and eastern axis. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• RUF:
  • Deep Operations (UAV/Missile): Sustained, high-volume, multi-vector drone attack continues, now extending even further west into Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts, and now deeper into central Ukraine targeting Poltava and Cherkasy Oblasts with high-speed targets. "Chaotic movements" are ongoing, designed to saturate and confuse UAF AD. Intent for "another wave" from previous reporting remains highly relevant, with warnings of strategic bomber activity now appearing to manifest with confirmed missile launches and now "new wave of cruise missiles entering from the North." CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Ground Forces (Northern Axis): Claims of establishing a bridgehead in Kursk Oblast for advances into Sumy Oblast indicate a proactive stance and potential for renewed ground offensive in the northern border regions. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.
  • Information Warfare/Propaganda: RF milbloggers continue to propagate claims of UAF AD inefficiency ("spent a third of their ammunition on decoys," "PVO u etikh lvov nikakoe") and mock Ukrainian efforts, alongside TASS reports on tactical advances and prisoner exchanges. Russian channels are now overtly boasting about hits in Lviv and calling for "closing the Ukraine project." CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:
  • Strategic Drone/Missile Strikes (Sustained, Adaptive, Deepening & Expanding Western/Central Reach, Multi-Wave): RF continues to demonstrate an unprecedented capability for widespread, high-volume, multi-vector UAV and missile attacks, now penetrating even deeper into western Ukraine, including Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts, and now extending into central Ukraine (Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia Oblasts) with high-speed targets. The "chaotic movement" reported indicates an adaptation to challenge UAF AD targeting. Confirmed missile launches following UAV saturation, and now the identification of "another wave" of cruise missiles, indicates a sophisticated and coordinated multi-platform deep strike. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Ground Maneuver (Northern Axis): Demonstrated capability to establish forward positions (e.g., bridgehead claim near Guyevo) for offensive operations into border regions, particularly Sumy Oblast. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.
  • Information Warfare (Sophisticated, Adaptive & Aggressive): RF continues to employ sophisticated information operations, including selectively using tactical video claims, administrative actions, and direct mockery of UAF AD effectiveness to bolster its narrative. They are now openly boasting about hits and calling for Ukraine's "closure." CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Intentions:
  • Systemic Degradation of Ukrainian Infrastructure, Air Defense & Western Aid Logistics (PRIMARY - Deepest & Widest Expansion): The immediate intention is to maximize damage to critical civilian and military infrastructure, exhaust UAF air defense munitions, and instill widespread fear through a sustained, high-intensity, multi-domain aerial campaign. The expansion to Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Cherkasy, and Vinnytsia Oblasts specifically aims to stretch UAF AD assets to their absolute limit, directly threaten critical logistics routes for Western aid and key central military/industrial targets, and cause maximum psychological impact. The "chaotic movement" indicates an intent to overwhelm and confuse UAF AD. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Create Pressure on Northern Border (Sumy Oblast): RF intends to establish or expand ground presence in border regions, specifically to create a new axis of pressure, potentially fix UAF forces, or open new lines of advance into Sumy Oblast. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.
  • Degrade Ukrainian Drone Capabilities: RF intends to directly counter and degrade Ukrainian heavy-lift and tactical strike drone capabilities, particularly those operating in the Kharkiv sector and near border regions. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Consolidate Narrative of Territorial Control and Military Supremacy: RF aims to project an image of overwhelming military strength and legitimate control over occupied territories, both domestically and internationally, through its large-scale strikes, administrative actions, and aggressive propaganda. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Complete Seizure of Chasiv Yar: TASS claims RF forces almost completely control Chasiv Yar (only one district left). This indicates a renewed or intensified intent to finalize the capture of this strategically important town. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM (for veracity of claim, HIGH for intent).

2.2. Recent tactical changes or adaptations

• RUF:
  • Geographic Expansion of UAV/Missile Strikes (CRITICAL - Deeper West & Central, Including New Regions): The further extension of UAV threats to Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts, coupled with new high-speed missile threats to Poltava Oblast (Myrhorod, Hlobyne, Semenivka, Shyshaky, Kremenchuk reservoir area) and Cherkasy/Vinnytsia Oblasts, indicates RF's intent to stretch UAF AD resources to their breaking point, isolate Western aid routes, impact civilian morale across the entire breadth of Ukraine, and target key central military/industrial targets. The identification of 6 missiles heading towards Kremenchuk reservoir suggests a focus on critical infrastructure. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Coordinated UAV/Missile Wave (Confirmed Execution & Multi-Wave): The confirmed launch of strategic missiles following the UAV saturation, along with the detection of a "new wave" of cruise missiles entering from the North, indicates a clear coordinated multi-platform deep strike strategy to maximize AD confusion and penetration. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Northern Border Probing/Bridgehead Establishment: The TASS report regarding a bridgehead near Guyevo for a push into Sumy Oblast suggests a new or intensified ground maneuver component on the northern border, potentially complementing the deep strikes. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.
  • Aggressive Information Operations & Direct Boasting: Immediate mocking of UAF AD effectiveness and explicit statements about "closing the Ukraine project" indicate a real-time, aggressive information warfare component integrated with their physical strikes, designed to maximize psychological impact. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Claims of Chasiv Yar Near-Capture: TASS report suggests RF is intensifying efforts to fully capture Chasiv Yar, likely as a psychological victory and to open further avenues of advance. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.
• UAF:
  • Real-time Threat Awareness and Dissemination (Maintaining, Adapting to New Routes): UAF AF continues to demonstrate high-level, real-time threat detection and dissemination capabilities for incoming UAVs and missiles, including detailed movement patterns and the immediate expansion of warning zones into new western and central regions (Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr). AD confirmed active in Lutsk, Lviv, and Chernivtsi. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2.3. Logistics and sustainment status

• RUF:
  • VERY High Munitions Consumption (Sustained & Critically Expanded, Multi-Wave): The continued massed drone attacks, now covering an even wider and deeper area, including central Ukraine, confirm RF's capacity to sustain high rates of UAV and missile deployment. The "chaotic movement" tactic further implies a sufficient inventory to afford less efficient (but more challenging to intercept) flight profiles. Confirmed strategic missile launches and new waves reinforce this assessment. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Northern Axis Logistical Support: Increased rail logistics into Belgorod Oblast (previous report) supports the TASS claim of a bridgehead for Sumy operations, indicating continued capacity to supply forward ground operations. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• UAF:
  • Air Defense Munitions Strain (CRITICAL - EXTREME & NATIONWIDE): The current massed drone and missile strikes, now extending to almost the entire country, continue to place unprecedented strain on UAF air defense munitions stockpiles. The expanded area of operations (Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr) severely exacerbates this strain and risks critical AD gaps, particularly for key Western aid logistics and critical central infrastructure. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2.4. Command and control effectiveness

• RUF:
  • Centralized Strategic C2 (Highly Effective & Adaptive): The coordinated, high-volume, multi-vector drone and missile attack, incorporating adaptive tactics and significantly expanded geographic scope into the far west and central Ukraine, continues to demonstrate highly effective, centralized strategic C2 for deep operations. Their information operations are also tightly controlled and rapidly deployed. The ability to launch multi-wave attacks further confirms effective C2. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Ground C2 (Northern Axis & Eastern Axis): The claim of establishing a bridgehead, if accurate, suggests effective C2 for tactical ground operations in border regions. The TASS claim about Chasiv Yar control also indicates coordinated C2 for offensive ground operations. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.
• UAF:
  • Highly Effective Air Defense C2 (Strained, Adapting to New Routes): Rapid detection, tracking, and public warning of incoming threats across multiple oblasts, including specific drone and missile movement updates and immediate expansion of alerts to all newly affected Western and central regions, continue to demonstrate highly effective C2 for air defense operations. However, this C2 system is now operating under extreme pressure due to the national scope of the threat and the need to constantly adapt to new missile/UAV trajectories. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian force posture and readiness

• Posture: UAF is currently operating at maximum defensive alert against a complex, multi-domain RF aerial attack across almost the entire country. Ground forces maintain defensive lines, including on the northern border.
• Readiness:
  • Air Defense: At peak readiness and fully engaged. Systems are being critically tested by the volume, complexity, and now nationwide geographic scope of the current RF attacks, particularly the "chaotic movement" of UAVs and the confirmed multi-wave missile attacks. AD is confirmed active in Lutsk, Lviv, and Chernivtsi. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Counter-UAS: Active in countering RF drones and responding to RF C-UAS efforts. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Overall: Readiness remains high but under immense and unsustainable pressure due to sustained, nationwide aerial attacks, severe resource consumption, and the desperate need to extend AD coverage across the entire country. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

3.2. Recent tactical successes or setbacks

• Successes:
  • Active Air Defense Engagements & Early Warnings: Ongoing successful interceptions of RF UAVs and timely public warnings across critical areas, now including Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Cherkasy, and Vinnytsia. The ability to identify "chaotic movement" and provide detailed tracking indicates strong ISR and C2. AD confirmed active in Lutsk, Lviv, and Chernivtsi. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Destruction of RF TOS-1A (Previous Report): Confirmed destruction of a high-value RF TOS-1A system near Vovchansk indicates successful UAF counter-battery and precision strike capabilities. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Setbacks:
  • CRITICAL Massed Aerial Attack (Sustained, Adaptive & NATIONAL Scope, Multi-Wave): Ukraine is currently under an unprecedented multi-vector, high-volume RF aerial assault, which is proving highly adaptable with "chaotic movement" tactics and has now expanded into virtually all western regions and central Ukraine, posing extreme risk to infrastructure and population centers, particularly critical Western aid logistics and central industrial/military targets. Explosions in Khmelnytskyi, Hostomel, Lutsk, Lviv, and Chernivtsi confirm impacts. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • RF C-UAS Effectiveness: RF's ability to successfully engage Ukrainian "Baba-Yaga" drones and new claims of Ka-52 engagements indicate a growing challenge to UAF's organic drone capabilities, particularly in the Kharkiv sector and near border regions. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.
  • Northern Border Pressure: RF's claim of establishing a bridgehead for a push into Sumy Oblast, if verified, represents a new area of concern and potential for resource diversion. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.
  • Chasiv Yar Pressure: TASS claims indicate very strong RF pressure on Chasiv Yar, suggesting potential for an imminent capture or significant withdrawal. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.

3.3. Resource requirements and constraints

• Requirements:
  • Air Defense Munitions (CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE & EXPANDED, SUSTAINED): Sustained critical requirement for interceptor missiles, particularly for countering high-volume, adaptable drone swarms and high-speed threats. This remains the top priority, with an urgent and drastically increased need for coverage across all western and central regions, especially targeting key logistics hubs for Western aid and critical central military/industrial targets.
  • C-UAS Capabilities (Enhanced): Enhanced requirement for advanced C-UAS systems, including electronic warfare (EW) and kinetic interceptors, to counter RF's evolving drone tactics (e.g., FPV-on-drone) and its own C-UAS efforts.
  • ISR Assets (Enhanced Focus on Western Logistics, Central Infrastructure & Northern/Eastern Border): Continued high demand for real-time ISR to track RF strategic aviation, missile trajectories, and high-volume drone movements, particularly to identify potential follow-on waves, understand their adaptive flight profiles across the expanded target area, and CRITICALLY monitor for threats to Western aid logistics and railway networks, as well as critical central military/industrial sites. New requirement for focused ISR on the northern border, specifically Sumy Oblast, to verify and track any RF bridgehead or ground advance. Continued ISR focus on Chasiv Yar and Eastern Axis for ground truth.
• Constraints:
  • Air Defense Saturation (CRITICAL): The sheer volume and adaptive nature of incoming RF attacks, now impacting the vast majority of Ukrainian territory, is severely risking the overwhelming of UAF air defenses, leading to breakthroughs and increased damage, especially with the extended geographic reach and the ongoing multi-wave missile attacks.
  • Personnel Fatigue (SEVERE): Continuous high-intensity air defense operations across virtually all oblasts place immense strain on UAF personnel.
  • Geographic Stretch (EXTREME): The nationwide expansion of deep strikes forces UAF to further disperse already severely strained AD assets, creating critical vulnerabilities across the entire country, particularly for vital Western supply lines and central infrastructure. Potential ground pressure on the northern border and intensified pressure on Chasiv Yar would further exacerbate this.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive domain)

4.1. Propaganda and disinformation campaigns

• RUF:
  • "Overwhelming Force" Narrative (Amplified, Sustained & Aggressive): The visible, large-scale drone and missile attacks, now reaching virtually all of Ukraine, continue to be used as direct psychological operations. This is further amplified by RF milblogger claims of tactical successes (e.g., FPV-C-UAS engagements, Ka-52 drone shootdown), the strategic use of external commentary, and direct mockery of UAF AD ("spent a third of their ammunition on decoys," "PVO u etikh lvov nikakoe"). New messages are overtly boasting about hits in Lviv and calling for "closing the Ukraine project," indicating a more aggressive and confident tone. The TASS report on property nationalization reinforces a narrative of permanent territorial control, while the prisoner exchange video aims to demonstrate care for their personnel. The claim of near-full control of Chasiv Yar also serves this narrative. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • "Legitimacy of Occupation" Narrative (Reinforced): The formal move to take damaged property in occupied regions onto the RF balance sheet is a clear legal and information maneuver to legitimize their claims over these territories, disregarding international law. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • "Ukrainian Weakness" Narrative: RF milbloggers directly mock UAF AD, claiming they waste munitions on decoys and are ineffective against current attacks, aiming to sow doubt about UAF capabilities and demoralize the population. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• UAF:
  • Transparency and Resilience (Maintaining): Immediate public warnings and continuous updates on air defense operations aim to maintain public trust and foster resilience, countering RF's psychological pressure. The image of Kyiv metro as a shelter reinforces the civilian impact and the need for public safety. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

4.2. Public sentiment and morale factors

• Ukraine: Public sentiment is under extreme and unprecedented pressure due to the widespread air raid alerts and the exceptional volume, adaptive nature, and now nationwide geographic reach of incoming aerial threats. The image of Kyiv metro as a shelter highlights the direct impact on civilian life and the need for immediate protective measures. UAF's transparency and active air defense engagements will help sustain resolve, but the constant and now deeper threat poses a severe emotional and psychological toll, particularly regarding the safety of Western aid logistics and central regions. RF milbloggers' mockery and explicit calls for "closing Ukraine" are likely to be perceived as hostile and further stiffen resolve, but the physical impacts are significant. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Russia: Public sentiment is being shaped by narratives of RF military success, the "necessity" of the conflict, and administrative consolidation of occupied territories. The large-scale aerial attacks and selective external commentary are used to project strength and efficiency. The prisoner exchange video is likely intended to boost morale among military personnel and their families. The confident and aggressive tone of milbloggers suggests a perception of momentum. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

4.3. International support and diplomatic developments

• Ukraine: Previous reports of renewed US weapons supply remain critical. The ongoing intensity and nationwide geographic scope of RF strikes will likely increase international pressure for accelerated aid and much more robust and geographically dispersed AD systems, as the threat to Western aid logistics and central infrastructure becomes immediate and severe. The ISW note on Beijing not wanting RF defeat indicates a complex geopolitical environment. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
• Russia: The international community will continue to condemn RF's mass aerial attacks, particularly the targeting of civilian infrastructure and the deepening threat to Western aid routes and central regions. RF's attempts to manipulate foreign statements and project diplomatic readiness will likely be seen as further evidence of their information warfare tactics. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

• Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

  • Sustained Massed Aerial Attack with Adaptive Tactics, Deepest Western & Central Thrust (IMMEDIATE - 0-12 hours): RF will continue and likely execute additional waves of its large-scale strategic missile strike (from airborne Tu-95MS and any available MiG-31K), concurrently with or following the ongoing massed UAV attack. These attacks will continue to employ adaptive "chaotic movement" tactics and will now prioritize even deeper targeting of Western Ukraine (Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts) and key central regions (Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr Oblasts, targeting Myrhorod, Hlobyne, Semenivka, Kremenchuk areas, Zolotonosha, Bila Tserkva, Lityn, Ozerne air base). Primary targets will remain critical infrastructure (energy, transport hubs, particularly rail infrastructure connecting to Western aid routes), major population centers, and likely military airfields/industrial sites in central Ukraine. The immediate objective is to severely disrupt or interdict Western aid flows and saturate UAF AD. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Increased Ground Pressure on Northern Axis & Eastern Axis (6-24 hours): RF forces will sustain high-intensity, localized ground assaults on the Donetsk and Kupyansk axes, leveraging drone support for targeted strikes and reconnaissance. A renewed push to establish or expand a bridgehead in Kursk Oblast to enable advances into Sumy Oblast will occur, aiming to create a new axis of pressure. Increased RF C-UAS efforts will continue to challenge UAF tactical drone use in these areas. RF will attempt to counter UAF force generation by targeting newly identified units or their staging areas. Pressure on Chasiv Yar will be maintained or intensified for a decisive breakthrough. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Intensified Information Offensive Leveraging External Commentary and "Legitimacy" (Concurrent): RF will continue to rapidly disseminate propaganda framing successful strikes, exaggerated UAF losses, and will increasingly seek to leverage selective or decontextualized external commentary (e.g., from ISW regarding China). Concurrently, RF will push narratives of administrative consolidation and "normalization" in occupied territories, using actions like property nationalization to project an image of irreversible control. They will openly boast about targeting successes and call for Ukraine's defeat. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

• Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

  • Coordinated Kinzhal/Hypersonic Strike on Western Logistics Hubs and Central Military Sites Followed by Massed UAV Wave: RF's current high-volume UAV and missile attack, now extending across all of Western Ukraine and into central regions, serves as a primary decoy for highly precise Kinzhal or other hypersonic missile strikes from available platforms (e.g., MiG-31K), specifically targeting critical rail hubs, transshipment points, and potential underground storage facilities for Western aid in Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, or Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts, as well as key military airfields or industrial sites in Poltava Oblast (e.g., Myrhorod air base, Kremenchuk industrial areas, Ozerne air base, Bila Tserkva). This would be immediately followed by a new, denser wave of UAVs and conventional cruise missiles to exploit any created gaps in UAF air defense and completely disrupt incoming Western aid, potentially isolating the front lines. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Combined Arms Breakthrough (Kharkiv Axis) Exploiting AD Saturation and Logistical Disruption: RF commits its unlocated operational reserves (from previous daily report) in a concentrated armored thrust on the Lyptsi or Vovchansk axis, immediately following the peak of the nationwide aerial bombardment and deep Western/Central logistical interdiction. The objective is to achieve a rapid breakthrough and establish fire control over main supply routes into Kharkiv city before Ukrainian mobile reserves can effectively respond, leveraging the severe disruption caused by nationwide AD engagement and the critical AD coverage requirements in Western and Central Ukraine. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Simultaneous Ground Offensives on Eastern Front & New Northern Axis (Kharkiv/Sumy), Coupled with Widespread Rail/Industrial Interdiction in Western/Central Ukraine: RF launches significant ground offensives on both the Eastern Front (e.g., Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, potentially with immediate capture of Chasiv Yar) and simultaneously initiates a large-scale ground offensive in the Kharkiv/Sumy Oblasts, aiming to force UAF to split its already strained reserves and AD assets across multiple critical axes. Concurrently, RF will conduct widespread precision strikes targeting all key rail hubs and logistics nodes in Western Ukraine (e.g., Lviv, Rivne, Kovel, Lutsk, Chop) and critical industrial/military sites in central Ukraine (e.g., Poltava Oblast, Kremenchuk, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr) to critically disrupt incoming military aid shipments, sever supply lines to the front, and cripple remaining industrial capacity. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

• Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

  • IMMEDIATE (0-3 hours):
    • MAXIMUM AIR DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT & ADAPTATION (NATIONWIDE INCLUSION & WESTERN/CENTRAL LOGISTICS FOCUS): All UAF air defense assets must be on maximum alert and fully engaged against the ongoing and anticipated strategic missile wave and the massed, adaptable UAV attack, with a CRITICAL focus on the newly targeted Western Oblasts (Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk) and central Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr Oblasts, and the protection of rail/logistics nodes and key central military/industrial sites. Prioritize defense of C2 nodes, critical infrastructure (especially rail links to the west and central industrial complexes), and major population centers, dynamically reallocating assets based on updated threat vectors and the anticipated "second wave" of drones/missiles, including countermeasures for "chaotic movement." DECISION POINT: Dynamic allocation of high-value AD systems, particularly for Kinzhal threat to Western logistics and central military targets; assessment of sustained AD operations and tactical adjustments for new UAV flight patterns and extended geographic reach. Potential activation of passive defenses for critical Western and central infrastructure.
    • C-UAS Deployment: Rapid deployment and activation of C-UAS systems (EW, kinetic) to protect high-value Ukrainian drone assets and deny RF successful FPV-on-UAV engagements, particularly in high-activity areas like Kharkiv and border regions. DECISION POINT: Prioritization and deployment of specific C-UAS assets to vulnerable UAF drone units/sectors, and evaluation of passive drone countermeasures.
    • Public Safety: Issue continuous and urgent public warnings, instructing civilians to seek and remain in shelters, particularly in all newly targeted western and central regions. Ensure emergency services are pre-positioned for rapid response. DECISION POINT: Activation of comprehensive public alert and response protocols, pre-staging of emergency teams, and ensuring full coverage in newly threatened areas, specifically emphasizing threat to Western and central regions.
  • SHORT-TERM (3-24 hours):
    • BDA and Post-Strike Response (Expanded & Logistical/Central Focus): Conduct rapid BDA on all affected areas, including new Western and central strike zones, prioritizing search and rescue, medical support, and immediate damage assessment for critical infrastructure (especially rail/logistics nodes in Western Ukraine and military/industrial sites in central Ukraine) and military assets. DECISION POINT: Allocation of emergency and reconstruction resources, with an IMMEDIATE focus on critical Western logistics infrastructure and central military/industrial targets.
    • Air Defense Munitions Assessment (CRITICAL & GEOGRAPHIC): Immediate and granular assessment of air defense munitions expenditure and initiation of urgent resupply requests based on current consumption rates and the effectiveness of RF's adaptive tactics, anticipating sustained high-volume attacks across the entire country. Prioritize urgent requests for Western AD munitions, specifically addressing critical needs for newly exposed Western and central regions and the protection of logistical pathways. DECISION POINT: Urgent logistical requests, particularly for Western AD munitions, and advocacy for accelerated deliveries, with a clear breakdown of critical geographic requirements and vulnerabilities.
    • Ground Force Readiness Review (Eastern & Northern): Evaluate RF ground assault patterns and UAF defensive successes/challenges in Donetsk, Kupyansk, and Sumy Oblasts, and in the Kharkiv sector, particularly concerning RF C-UAS efforts and the claimed Guyevo bridgehead. Adjust force posture and reserve allocation as needed, anticipating potential follow-on ground offensives, especially if AD is significantly degraded or shifted west to protect logistics. DECISION POINT: Operational adjustments for ground forces, including reinforcement of critical sectors and border regions, and defensive measures against potential targeting of newly formed units, particularly regarding Chasiv Yar defense.
  • MID-TERM (24-72 hours):
    • Logistical Security for US Aid (CRITICAL - NATIONAL & WESTERN/CENTRAL FOCUS): Implement enhanced security measures for anticipated incoming US weapons shipments and related logistical routes to mitigate MDCOA of targeting supply lines, especially those through Western Ukraine. This includes enhanced air defense coverage for rail/road hubs and transit points in Ternopil, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, Lviv, Volyn, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, and Zhytomyr Oblasts. Develop redundancy plans for critical logistical nodes. DECISION POINT: Enhanced convoy protection, anti-strike measures, and immediate logistical redundancy planning for incoming aid, with specific, heightened attention to western and central transit routes and alternative supply avenues.
    • Strategic ISR Adaptation (Western Logistics, Central Targets & Deep Strike Focus): Refine ISR collection plans to anticipate and track future large-scale RF aerial attacks, assess the effectiveness of their multi-domain saturation tactics, identify new high-value RF targets (e.g., missile launch platforms, drone production/assembly sites), and understand adaptive C-UAS methods. Prioritize ISR on RF intent for deeper strikes into Western and Central Ukraine and their targeting of logistics, particularly rail networks, major transit hubs, and key industrial/military sites. DECISION POINT: Adjust long-term ISR plan to focus on RF deep strike capabilities, critical Western and central logistics/targets interdiction, and emerging ground pressure points, particularly in the west.
    • Information Warfare Counter-Narrative (Adaptive & Resilient): Develop and disseminate counter-narratives to RF propaganda regarding overwhelming force and territorial gains, especially those using external commentary or attempts to spin Ukrainian force generation. Leverage UAF successes (e.g., BDA on RF vehicles, successful AD intercepts, US aid confirmation) and highlight civilian suffering and the continued integrity of Western supply lines. Counter RF's "diplomacy" narrative by emphasizing their simultaneous aggression and address RF claims about UAF AD inefficiency, especially the overt boasts about Lviv hits. DECISION POINT: Develop and implement proactive public information campaigns to maintain morale and counter RF psychological operations, specifically addressing RF's diplomatic overtures in contrast to their ongoing aggression and the direct threat to Western aid and central Ukraine.

INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

1. Full RF Strategic Missile Loadout and Target Intent (CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE & WESTERN/CENTRAL REACH):
   • GAP: Precise types and quantities of missiles launched from Tu-95MS aircraft and MiG-31K. Confirmation of Kinzhal missile launch from MiG-31K and its flight path/target, particularly any targeting of Western Ukrainian critical logistics infrastructure (rail hubs, transshipment points, warehouses), central military/industrial sites (e.g., Myrhorod air base, Kremenchuk industrial areas, Ozerne air base), or AD assets. Detailed analysis of RF's primary and secondary targeting for the current and anticipated strategic missile wave, especially concerning high-value targets (UAF C2, AD nodes, critical infrastructure, including rail/logistics hubs in Western Ukraine and central industrial/military sites). Confirmation of "second wave" capabilities for drones/missiles and their specific trajectories into new central/western regions.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT on RF strategic aviation communications and missile guidance systems (especially for Kinzhal). HIGH PRIORITY IMINT (satellite and aerial reconnaissance) of missile launch areas and impact sites for BDA. HIGH PRIORITY OSINT from monitoring public airspace data and RF channels for inadvertent disclosures.
2. RF Drone Inventory, Production/Acquisition Rate, and Launch Sites & Adaptive Tactics (URGENT & GEOGRAPHICALLY EXPANDED):
   • GAP: Detailed assessment of RF's current inventory of Shahed-type and other strike UAVs. Confirmation of their daily/weekly production or acquisition rate. Identification of all active RF UAV launch sites and their operational patterns, including any new sites supporting expanded Western and central strikes, particularly those facilitating attacks on Volyn, Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, and Zhytomyr Oblasts. Specific analysis of the "chaotic movement" tactic to determine its prevalence, effectiveness, and the resources it requires.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from captured RF drone operators or intelligence on RF supply chains. MEDIUM PRIORITY OSINT on Russian industrial reports and Iranian/Chinese supply chain indicators. HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT to identify drone control frequencies and persistent monitoring of suspected launch sites. HIGH PRIORITY GEOINT/IMINT/SIGINT to track and analyze specific flight paths and patterns of incoming UAVs, noting changes in launch origin for Western and central strikes.
3. Effectiveness of RF C-UAS Operations and Countermeasures (Multi-platform):
   • GAP: Comprehensive assessment of RF's C-UAS capabilities, particularly the widespread use of FPV drones against Ukrainian UAVs and the deployment/effectiveness of rotary-wing platforms (e.g., Ka-52) for aerial intercepts. Quantification of success rates and impact on Ukrainian drone operations. Identification of RF's C-UAS equipment, tactics, and their impact on UAF ISR and strike capabilities.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY IMINT (UAV footage from UAF, satellite imagery) of RF C-UAS engagements. HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from UAF drone operators encountering RF C-UAS. HIGH PRIORITY EW/SIGINT to identify RF C-UAS frequencies and methods.
4. Impact of Renewed US Weapons Supply on RF Planning and Cyber Response (ONGOING & WESTERN LOGISTICS):
   • GAP: Assessment of RF's immediate and long-term adaptation to the confirmed resumption of US weapons supply to Ukraine. Will this trigger a change in RF operational tempo, targeting priorities (especially logistical routes in Western and Central Ukraine), or lead to increased cyber activity targeting supply chains or critical infrastructure?
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT on RF high-level command discussions and military planning communications, specifically for discussions related to Western aid logistics. MEDIUM PRIORITY OSINT on Russian state media and expert commentary reacting to the announcement. HIGH PRIORITY CYBINT to monitor for preparatory cyber activity targeting Ukrainian infrastructure or supply chain logistics, particularly focusing on Western transit nodes.
5. Verification and Capability of New UAF Formations (CONFIRMED CR):
   • GAP: Confirmation of the creation and current status of the claimed "fourth heavy mechanized formation" within UAF Ground Forces, as reported by RF milbloggers. Assessment of its composition, readiness, and potential deployment plans. This is crucial for understanding both UAF capability and RF targeting priorities.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from UAF personnel. MEDIUM PRIORITY SIGINT on UAF internal communications. MEDIUM PRIORITY IMINT (satellite imagery, drone reconnaissance) to identify new unit signatures or training activities. HIGH PRIORITY OSINT to monitor official UAF announcements or credible reporting on force generation.
6. Verification of RF Ground Gains and Damage Assessment (Eastern Axis & Northern Border - IMMEDIATE):
   • GAP: Independent verification of RF claims regarding "taking a settlement" (Zelena Dolyna), disruption of UAF rotations (Kupyansk), UAF withdrawal from Yunakovka (Sumy Oblast), the establishment of a "bridgehead" near Guyevo, Kursk Oblast, for a push into Sumy Oblast, and particularly the claim of near-total control over Chasiv Yar. Precise RF and UAF lines of contact in the Donetsk, Kupyansk, and Sumy Oblasts following recent engagements.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY IMINT (drone and satellite imagery) of the claimed areas and recent impact sites. HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from local sources or UAF units in contact. HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT on RF ground unit communications for confirmation of territorial control and BDA.
7. RF Northern Grouping Reserves (CRITICAL - Confirmed from previous report):
   • GAP: The composition, readiness, and exact disposition of the RF operational reserve in the Belgorod and Kursk Oblasts remain unclear. Determining the size and trigger for commitment of this force is the highest priority intelligence requirement for the ground domain.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY ISR (UAV, SIGINT, satellite imagery) to focus on the Belgorod Oblast to identify, characterize, and track the RF operational reserve force. HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from cross-border sources.
8. RF Strategic Intent in Kharkiv (CRITICAL - Confirmed from previous report):
   • GAP: It is unclear if the current Kharkiv operation is a feint to draw Ukrainian reserves from the Donbas, an effort to establish a limited buffer zone, or the initial phase of a deliberate assault on the city. This understanding informs UAF strategic reserve allocation.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY SIGINT on high-level RF command communications regarding operational objectives for the Kharkiv axis. MEDIUM PRIORITY HUMINT from captured RF personnel or defectors.
9. Effectiveness of RF Electronic Warfare (EW) in Kharkiv Axis (Confirmed from previous report):
   • GAP: The extent and effectiveness of RF EW systems deployed to counter Ukrainian drone operations in the Kharkiv axis requires further assessment. This impacts UAF drone efficacy and counter-EW requirements.
   • CR: HIGH PRIORITY EW/SIGINT to identify RF EW system locations, frequencies, and operational patterns. HIGH PRIORITY HUMINT from UAF drone operators experiencing EW effects.