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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-07-06 16:03:51Z
7 months ago
Previous (2025-07-06 15:33:31Z)

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT

TIME: 061600Z JUL 25


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

  • Kyiv Oblast: Power was temporarily disrupted in residential buildings on the Left Bank after a night attack, confirmed not to be on TPP-6. Power supply has been restored. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Kirovohrad Oblast: An agricultural enterprise in Znamyanka Community sustained damage from a Russian Federation (RUF) attack. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Kharkiv Oblast: RUF Shahed UAVs impacted Kharkiv city, causing injuries and damage. Glide bombs (KABs) continue to be used against Kharkiv city and 13 settlements. RUF forces attacked emergency responders in Kharkiv and Kherson. RUF claims liberation of Sobolivka in Kharkiv Oblast and are attempting to cut off Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) logistics near Kupyansk, aiming for encirclement. RUF aviation conducted airstrikes across multiple settlements including Vovchansk and Chuhuiv. A civilian vehicle was attacked by an FPV drone, resulting in a child's death. UAF UAVs were reportedly destroyed over Bryansk Oblast. Mine detonations continue to pose a threat to civilians. CONFIDENCE: HIGH (Collateral damage, RUF intent for Kupyansk encirclement), MEDIUM (RUF claims of encirclement).
  • Dnipropetrovsk Oblast: Threat of RUF aviation weapons employment in Synelnykivskyi district. Two districts terrorized by RUF throughout the day, with damage to residential buildings. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Donetsk Oblast: No significant changes to battlefield geometry. Pokrovsk direction remains the most active, with UAF 46th Separate Airmobile Brigade repelling 42 attacks between June 29 and July 5, eliminating 147 RUF personnel. RUF claims "liberation" of Poddubnoye and Tolstoy, indicating localized gains. RUF VDV (Airborne) units are active in the Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) direction. RUF continues to press in Kramatorsk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, Orikhiv, Huliaipole, Velyka Novosilka, Lyman, Kupyansk, and Siversk directions. UAF drone operations remain active near Toretsk. RUF propaganda suggests the fall of Chasiv Yar would lead to a collapse of UAF defenses further west. CONFIDENCE: HIGH (UAF defense, RUF pressure), MEDIUM (RUF claimed gains, RUF aspirational claims).
  • Kherson Oblast: RUF claims a UAF strike on a polyclinic in Nova Kakhovka, awaiting independent verification. RUF "Dnepr" unit reportedly destroyed a UAF M777 howitzer. RUF FPV drone strike on an OKKO gas station in Kherson. RUF attacked rescuers in Kherson. UAF reports repelling one RUF assault. RUF aviation conducted airstrikes at Olhivka. UAF Marines continue air defense operations. CONFIDENCE: HIGH (RUF attacks on rescuers, UAF repelled assault), LOW (RUF claim of polyclinic strike).
  • Mykolaiv Oblast: RUF Shahed UAVs detected from Black Sea, impacting Mykolaiv city. Significant damage to residential buildings, a catering facility, and a bank. Multiple Shaheds reported shot down. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Odesa Oblast: RUF Shahed UAVs detected from Black Sea, no reported impacts in Odesa. UAF Naval Forces celebrated in Odesa, indicating high morale. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Poltava Oblast: RUF Shahed UAVs targeted Poltava Oblast, with a confirmed strike on a Territorial Recruitment Center (TCC) building in Kremenchuk, causing two injuries and damage to nearby residential buildings. This marks the third TCC strike this week. The number of victims from a July 3rd strike in Poltava has increased. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Sumy Oblast: RUF tactical aviation continues KAB (glide bomb) launches. UAF reports KABs launched towards Sumy Oblast. RUF UAVs are moving into Poltava and Chernihiv Oblasts from Sumy. RUF sources claim UAF has redeployed new units to Sumy, and over 20 trucks with RUF personnel are reportedly being redeployed to Sumy region from southern regions. RUF reports 23 UAF assaults repelled in Kursk and North Slobozhansky (Sumy) direction. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Vinnytsia Oblast: RUF Shahed UAVs detected moving towards Vinnytsia Oblast from southern Kyiv Oblast. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Zaporizhzhia Oblast: RUF attack using 5 Shahed UAVs resulted in damage to private and farming enterprises, warehouses, and three multi-story buildings, injuring one civilian. FPV drone attack on Polohivskyi district. UAF drones continue to destroy RUF artillery and logistics in the Zaporizhzhia direction. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Russian Territory:
    • Belgorod Oblast: Local authorities report UAF drone attacks on a bus and two vehicles, causing casualties (2 killed, 6 injured). RUF claims advanced 2km on a new front section at the junction of Belgorod and Kharkiv Oblasts. CONFIDENCE: HIGH (Casualties/damage), MEDIUM (RUF claimed advance).
    • Bryansk Oblast: Governor reports 30 UAF aircraft-type UAVs detected and destroyed by RUF AD. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • Kaluga Oblast: 5 UAF UAVs reportedly destroyed by RUF AD, no casualties. Airport restrictions lifted. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • Krasnodar Krai (Novorossiysk): UAF Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) attacks confirmed on Novorossiysk throughout the night, with RUF claiming successful repel of some targets. A destroyed USV was found. CONFIDENCE: HIGH (UAF attack confirmed), MEDIUM (RUF claim of successful repel).
    • Kursk Oblast: UAF reports repelling 23 Russian army assaults in Kursk direction. Putin posthumously named the 155th Kursk Marine Brigade after Mikhail Gudkov, who died in Kursk Oblast and was posthumously awarded "Twice Hero of Russia." This is a significant propaganda effort. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • Lipetsk Oblast (Yelets): "UAV attack threat" lifted. Su-57s observed flying over Yelets. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • Moscow Oblast: 6 UAF UAVs reportedly shot down by RUF AD, according to Mayor Sobyanin. High temperatures reported. Aviation between Moscow and St. Petersburg is practically halted, with increased rail transport, indicating air travel disruptions. Putin attended the "All for Victory!" forum, focusing on military support. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • Nizhny Novgorod Oblast: Airport restrictions temporarily introduced and then lifted. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • Pskov Oblast: Temporary restrictions introduced at Pskov airport due to UAV threat. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • Leningrad Oblast (Ust-Luga): Explosion and ammonia leak on Eco Wizard tanker in Ust-Luga port, with reports of sinking. This is the sixth such incident. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • St. Petersburg (Pulkovo Airport): Mass flight delays and cancellations due to UAV threats. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • General (RU): RUF MoD claims 120 Ukrainian UAVs shot down over Russian regions and the Sea of Azov overnight, likely exaggerated (UAF claims 117/157 neutralized). UAF deep strikes continue to affect Russian air travel. RUF MoD claims 39 Ukrainian UAVs shot down over six regions between 08:30 and 14:00 MSK. Satellite imagery indicates possible damage to Borisoglebsk airfield from a July 5th strike, but extent is unclear. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM (RUF UAV claims), HIGH (UAF deep strike persistence, airport disruptions).
    • Dagestan (Buynaksk): Teenager arrested for alleged terrorist act attempt near Ministry of Internal Affairs building, head of district arrested for fraud. Domestic security issues. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • Samara Oblast: Governor transferred significant aid (drones, EW, vehicles) to troops. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Black Sea: New groups of RUF Shahed UAVs detected from the Black Sea, en route to Mykolaiv/Odesa Oblasts and Kinburn Spit/Dmytrivka/Parutyne. RUF Naval activity includes 1 ship, 1 frigate, 1 missile carrier (8 Kalibr missiles), and 1 patrol ship. No missile carriers in the Sea of Azov. RUF tactical aviation activity in Azov Sea. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

  • Ukraine: Forecast indicates heat up to +37°C and thunderstorms for the coming week.
  • Impact: High temperatures will exacerbate heat stress on personnel and equipment, particularly for armored operations and sustained physical activity. Thunderstorms may disrupt drone operations, limit air support, and affect ground maneuverability due to muddy conditions. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

  • UAF: Maintaining defensive posture across most sectors. Active counter-drone operations in Sumy and Donetsk. Redeploying units to Sumy direction in response to RUF activity. Prioritizing air defense against Shahed and ballistic missile threats. Actively using FPV drones against RUF logistics and personnel in Zaporizhzhia and Toretsk directions. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • RUF: Main effort in Donetsk (Pokrovsk/Chasiv Yar) with persistent, high-intensity assaults. Fixing operations in Kharkiv and Sumy to pin UAF reserves. Continued widespread use of glide bombs and FPV drones. Increased drone and missile activity against Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure (TCCs). Demonstrating continued deep strike capability into Russian territory by UAF. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Control Measures: Widespread air raid alerts across multiple Ukrainian oblasts due to UAV, ballistic missile, and aviation weapon threats. Temporary flight restrictions in various Russian airports due to UAV threats. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

  • Capabilities: RUF maintains significant artillery and air support capabilities, particularly with FAB-series glide bombs. Continued ability to conduct sustained ground assaults using mechanized and VDV units. Robust drone and missile attack capabilities demonstrated against Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure (TCCs). Effective Electronic Warfare (EW) is implied by high UAF UAV losses. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Intentions:
    • Eastern Axis (Chasiv Yar/Pokrovsk): Intent to seize Chasiv Yar and consolidate control to open further avenues towards Kramatorsk-Sloviansk. Maintain pressure on Pokrovsk direction. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • Northern Axis (Kharkiv/Sumy): Intent to fix UAF forces, prevent redeployment of reserves to the eastern axis. Potential for a renewed, larger-scale offensive towards Kharkiv city remains, but currently appears as a shaping operation. Increased RUF activity in Sumy region may indicate a new shaping or diversionary effort, or potential for a new offensive direction. CONFIDENCE: HIGH (Fixing), MEDIUM (Larger offensive in Kharkiv/Sumy).
    • Deep Operations: Continue to degrade Ukrainian morale and mobilization efforts by striking TCCs and civilian infrastructure. Disrupt Ukrainian logistics and energy supply. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Courses of Action (COAs):
    • MLCOA: Continued high-intensity assaults on Chasiv Yar to secure the Kanal microdistrict and attempt to cross the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal. Sustained fixing operations in Kharkiv and Sumy regions with localized ground probes and heavy use of glide bombs and artillery. Persistent drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian rear areas, particularly TCCs and energy infrastructure. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • MDCOA: A concerted, large-scale armored thrust towards Kharkiv city from the north, or a new ground offensive in Sumy Oblast, aimed at opening a new front to further stretch UAF defenses, potentially supported by intensified long-range strikes. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

  • RUF:
    • TCC Targeting: Deliberate and repeated targeting of Ukrainian Territorial Recruitment Centers (TCCs) in cities like Kremenchuk (3rd strike this week). This indicates a specific intent to disrupt UAF mobilization and recruitment efforts. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • Combined Attacks: Continued use of coordinated drone (Shahed) and ballistic missile attacks against civilian and critical infrastructure targets, including attempts to hit energy facilities (Kyiv). CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • VDV Role: Observed active engagement of VDV units in the Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) direction, indicating commitment of elite forces to this axis. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • Adaptation in Chasiv Yar: Shift from larger battalion-level assaults to more frequent company-sized mechanized attacks to conserve combat power and probe weaknesses. CONFIDENCE: HIGH (from previous report).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

  • RUF: Continued ability to sustain offensive operations across multiple axes, including logistics for extensive glide bomb and drone usage. Regional governmental support (e.g., Samara Oblast) provides material aid to troops, indicating decentralized sustainment efforts. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • UAF: Evidence of continued resupply and support to frontline units, including drones, vehicles, and thermal imagers for the Zaporizhzhia front. However, GLOCs into Chasiv Yar are under severe RUF fire control, degrading resupply efforts. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

  • RUF: Appears to maintain effective C2 for coordinating multi-domain strikes (drones, missiles, aviation) and ground operations across different fronts. Putin's public appearances (e.g., "All for Victory!" forum) serve to project strong centralized leadership and reinforce military-industrial complex narratives. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • UAF: Demonstrating coordinated air defense responses and effective counter-drone operations. Concerns regarding the readiness and effectiveness of some Territorial Defense Forces (TRO) units due to conscription challenges may impact overall combat effectiveness, as highlighted by a UAF serviceman. CONFIDENCE: HIGH (Air defense/counter-drone), MEDIUM (TRO readiness issues).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

  • Defensive Posture: UAF maintains a resilient defensive posture, particularly in Donetsk and Kharkiv. Significant efforts are underway to counter RUF advances and fix their forces. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Air Defense: UAF successfully neutralized 117/157 RUF UAVs and 4 S-300 missiles, demonstrating continued air defense capabilities, though a significant number of UAVs still penetrate. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Drone Operations: UAF continues to effectively employ drones for reconnaissance and precision strikes against RUF equipment, logistics, and personnel in multiple sectors (Zaporizhzhia, Toretsk). CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Challenges: The repeated targeting of TCCs by RUF indicates an attempt to disrupt UAF mobilization. Internal discourse on the effectiveness of conscription and the readiness of some newly conscripted personnel (specifically TRO) could impact overall force generation and quality. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • Successes:
    • UAF 46th Separate Airmobile Brigade successfully repelled 42 RUF attacks in Pokrovske direction, eliminating 147 RUF personnel. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • Successful neutralization of a high percentage of incoming RUF UAVs. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • Confirmed UAF USV attacks on Novorossiysk, demonstrating deep strike capabilities against Russian naval assets/infrastructure. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • Confirmed UAF drone strikes against RUF artillery and logistics in Zaporizhzhia direction and near Toretsk. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Setbacks:
    • RUF claimed capture of Sobolivka and Poddubnoye in Donetsk/Kharkiv, and Tolstoy in Novopavlovka direction. These are localized territorial losses. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • Continued RUF pressure on Chasiv Yar, with efforts to establish lodgements west of the canal. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • Civilian casualties and infrastructure damage from persistent RUF drone, missile, and glide bomb attacks across multiple oblasts, including strikes on TCCs. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

  • Resource Requirements: Continued need for robust air defense systems to counter RUF's persistent drone and missile attacks. Enhanced counter-battery fire and ISR capabilities for Chasiv Yar. Additional protective equipment and medical supplies for frontline units. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Constraints: Degradation of GLOCs into Chasiv Yar due to RUF fire control. Challenges in rapidly integrating and training new conscripts to frontline standards, especially for TRO units. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

  • RUF:
    • Hero Worship: Extensive propaganda campaign around the posthumous naming of the 155th Kursk Marine Brigade after Mikhail Gudkov and Putin presenting the award to his widow. This aims to bolster morale, glorify military service, and frame casualties as heroic sacrifices. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • Narrative Control: RUF attempts to control the narrative of military operations, claiming "liberation" of villages (Sobolivka, Poddubnoye, Tolstoy) and exaggerating UAF losses (e.g., 120 UAVs shot down). CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • Targeting TCCs: RUF sources explicitly frame strikes on TCCs as "saving Ukrainian population" and disrupting mobilization, intending to sow dissent and deter recruitment. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • Domestic Focus: Putin's public appearances at forums (e.g., "All for Victory!") emphasize Russia's domestic military-technological superiority over NATO and resilience, aimed at internal audience reassurance. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • UAF:
    • Counter-Narratives: UAF sources (e.g., BUTUSOV PLUS, ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS) actively counter RUF narratives and highlight RUF misconduct (e.g., killing a child, attacking rescuers). CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
    • Transparency: Reporting on internal challenges (e.g., TCC recruitment effectiveness) reflects a degree of transparency, though may also be used by RUF for propaganda. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

  • Ukrainian Public: Civilian casualties and destruction of infrastructure (including TCCs) likely cause fear and distress. However, public celebrations (UAF Naval Forces in Odesa) indicate resilience and continued support for the military. The internal debate over conscription methods could reflect public apprehension or concern over fairness and effectiveness. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Russian Public: Putin's rhetoric and awards ceremonies aim to consolidate public support for the "Special Military Operation." Domestic security incidents (Dagestan) and airport disruptions could cause public unease, but state media likely controls the narrative. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

  • International Support: Continued military aid from partner nations to Ukraine (implied by discussion on coalition support and drone/military aid mentions from "Dva Mayora" RUF source, though in a negative light). CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Diplomatic Initiative: Agreement on [Issue] between [Actors] (Dempster-Shafer Belief: 0.56): No specific diplomatic initiatives or agreements are directly mentioned in the current intelligence update, but the context of ongoing conflict always allows for the possibility of such developments in the broader geopolitical sphere. This general belief suggests an underlying recognition of diplomatic efforts in the broader conflict.
  • Diplomatic Initiative: Proposal by [Actor] for [Action] (Dempster-Shafer Belief: 0.16): Similar to the above, this indicates a general awareness of ongoing or potential diplomatic proposals related to the conflict.
  • Geopolitical Shift: Change in [Type of Support] from [Country] to [Recipient] (Dempster-Shafer Belief: 0.08): This low confidence belief suggests that while changes in international support are always possible, there is no strong indication of a significant shift based on the current data.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

  • Eastern Axis: RUF will intensify efforts to secure the Kanal microdistrict in Chasiv Yar and establish a bridgehead across the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal. This will involve combined arms assaults, likely employing small, agile assault groups supported by overwhelming artillery and air (glide bomb) cover. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Northern Axis: RUF will maintain high-intensity fixing operations around Vovchansk and Lyptsi in Kharkiv Oblast, with continued heavy use of glide bombs and localized infantry probes to attrit UAF defenses and prevent redeployment. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Sumy Direction: RUF will likely continue to build up forces and conduct shaping operations in Sumy Oblast, potentially including increased KAB strikes and localized ground actions, to further stretch UAF resources and divert attention from the main effort in Donetsk. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
  • Deep Strikes: RUF will continue systematic long-range strikes against Ukrainian TCCs, energy infrastructure, and other critical civilian targets to degrade mobilization and disrupt the home front. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

  • Northern Offensive: A coordinated, large-scale offensive by RUF ground forces, possibly leveraging new units observed moving towards Sumy, to open a new major front in Sumy Oblast or launch a renewed thrust directly towards Kharkiv city. Such an offensive would aim to significantly expand the front line and overwhelm UAF's defensive capabilities, potentially forcing a reallocation of critical reserves from other sectors. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.
  • Breakthrough at Chasiv Yar: A rapid and decisive RUF breakthrough across the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal in Chasiv Yar, leading to the collapse of UAF defenses in the immediate area and rapid RUF advance towards Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka. This would necessitate a major UAF fighting withdrawal and repositioning, with significant loss of terrain and strategic depth. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

  • Chasiv Yar: RUF will likely attempt to consolidate control of Kanal microdistrict and attempt canal crossings within the next 24-72 hours. UAF decision point: Evaluate ability to hold Kanal microdistrict vs. planned withdrawal to western canal defenses.
  • Kharkiv/Sumy: Increased RUF activity in Sumy suggests potential for escalation within the next 72-96 hours. UAF decision point: Determine if RUF intent in Sumy is solely fixing or preparatory for a larger offensive, and allocate reserves accordingly.
  • TCC Strikes: Expect continued RUF strikes on TCCs and critical infrastructure in the coming week, requiring UAF to harden defenses and adapt recruitment strategies.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

6.1. Intelligence Gaps

  • RUF Reserve Composition (Eastern Axis): Lack of detailed information on the exact location, strength, and readiness of RUF operational reserves positioned behind the Chasiv Yar axis. Are they designated for exploitation, rotation, or to reinforce other sectors? (HIGH PRIORITY)
  • RUF Intent (Sumy/Kharkiv): Precise determination of RUF's strategic intent in the Sumy region. Is it purely a fixing operation, a new line of advance, or a diversion? Similarly, confirmation of the threshold or conditions for a renewed major RUF offensive towards Kharkiv city. (HIGH PRIORITY)
  • EW Effectiveness Assessment: Comprehensive analysis of the full impact of Russian EW suites on UAF C2 and ISR drone operations across all active fronts. This impacts UAF's ability to conduct effective ISR and target acquisition. (MEDIUM PRIORITY)

6.2. Collection Requirements

  • ISR (IMINT/SIGINT/HUMINT): Prioritize collection on RUF rear areas in Belgorod, Kursk, and Sumy Oblasts for indicators of large-scale force build-up, logistics hubs, and troop movements (e.g., rail movements, convoy activity). Focus on identifying potential second-echelon forces. (HIGH PRIORITY)
  • ISR (UAV/OSINT): Task UAVs and open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts to monitor RUF activity around the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal for pre-assault preparations, bridging equipment, and likely crossing points. (HIGH PRIORITY)
  • SIGINT/HUMINT: Collect on RUF command and control communications to gain insights into their assessment of UAF defenses, tactical objectives, and planned offensive timelines in both eastern and northern axes. (HIGH PRIORITY)
  • HUMINT: Develop sources within occupied territories to gather information on RUF logistics, morale, and personnel issues, particularly in areas near claimed RUF gains (Sobolivka, Poddubnoye, Tolstoy). (MEDIUM PRIORITY)

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. For Joint Operations Command (EAST):

    • Counter-Battery Priority: Immediately allocate maximum available counter-battery fire assets (artillery, HIMARS) to the Chasiv Yar axis to degrade Russian artillery and mortar positions, specifically targeting those interdicting GLOCs and supporting canal crossing attempts. Pre-plan fires on identified RUF concentration areas and potential crossing points along the canal.
    • Defensive Layering: Reinforce defensive positions west of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal in Chasiv Yar with additional anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles to prepare for a potential RUF crossing.
    • ISR Overmatch: Prioritize ISR assets (MALE UAVs, SIGINT) to maintain constant surveillance over key RUF maneuver areas and GLOCs within the Chasiv Yar sector to provide early warning of breakthrough attempts.
  2. For Joint Operations Command (NORTH):

    • Targeting FAB Platforms: Prioritize targeting of known RUF FAB glide bomb launch platforms (e.g., Su-34s and associated airfields/logistics) and their support infrastructure to reduce the volume of glide bomb attacks on Kharkiv and Sumy.
    • Reserve Allocation Review: Reassess the allocation of tactical and operational reserves in the Kharkiv-Sumy sector. Maintain high readiness for rapid deployment to counter any potential shift from fixing operations to a full-scale offensive.
    • Enhanced Counter-UAV/EW: Deploy additional anti-drone systems and EW capabilities to counter RUF's prevalent use of FPV and reconnaissance UAVs in this sector, particularly targeting their control points.
  3. For General Staff (UAF):

    • Mobilization Strategy Adjustment: Conduct an urgent review of TCC operations and mobilization strategies to address public concerns and ensure the effective and equitable recruitment of personnel, mitigating the impact of RUF's propaganda and targeted strikes.
    • Strategic Reserve Positioning: Maintain a flexible and readily deployable strategic reserve capable of reinforcing either the Eastern (Chasiv Yar/Pokrovsk) or Northern (Kharkiv/Sumy) axis, given the uncertainty of RUF's main effort and MDCOA.
    • International Support Coordination: Advocate for accelerated delivery of advanced air defense systems (e.g., Patriot, NASAMS) to protect population centers and critical infrastructure from continued RUF deep strikes. Coordinate with partners to address the challenges posed by RUF EW capabilities.

Previous (2025-07-06 15:33:31Z)

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