Archived operational intelligence briefing
SITUATION REPORT 061233Z JUL 25
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RUF Dispositions:
RUF Control Measures: Air restrictions/warnings continue in various Russian regions due to UAV/USV threat (e.g., Novorossiysk, Lipetsk, Kaluga, Pulkovo, Pskov, Leningrad), though some have been lifted (Nizhny Novgorod, general airport operations), indicates reactive air defense measures. RUF MoD claims 120 Ukrainian UAVs shot down over Russian regions and the Sea of Azov, indicating widespread AD activity. TASS reports change in official name for Communist Party of Russia (KPRF), indicating political-administrative control. RUF MoD issues daily progress reports on the special military operation. CONFIDENCE: HIGH. Aviation between Moscow and St. Petersburg is practically halted. CONFIDENCE: HIGH. (New) Nizhny Novgorod airport has temporary restrictions. CONFIDENCE: HIGH. (New) TASS reports FPK (Federal Passenger Company) is monitoring free seats on trains between Moscow and St. Petersburg and can increase wagons if needed, suggesting a shift to rail transport due to air travel disruptions. CONFIDENCE: HIGH. (New) TASS reports Putin will discuss allowing civilian doctors to work in military hospitals near the front line, indicating a C2 focus on military medical support. CONFIDENCE: HIGH. (New)
UAF Dispositions:
UAF Control Measures: Issuance and lifting of air raid alerts nationwide based on RUF aerial activity, including new alerts for Shaheds in Poltava/Chernihiv/Sumy. Alerts for Kharkiv city, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhzhia in response to current Shahed attacks. All previous UAV threats reported as cleared. UAF AFU has issued warnings for KABs towards Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts. AFU immediately issued a ballistic threat warning from the East (subsequently lifted) and a fast-moving target warning for Sumy/Poltava. New ballistic threat warning from the East for Poltava and Zaporizhzhia (now lifted). General Staff reports 170 combat engagements over the past 24 hours. General Staff reports estimated RUF losses (1180 personnel) for 05-06 JUL, indicating continued high intensity of combat. Situation in Kryvyi Rih reported as controlled. Ukrainian General Staff also releasing image of total Russian losses. Martial Law and General Mobilization to be extended for the 16th time (until November 5, 2025). Оперативний ЗСУ states main goal of RUF TCC strikes is to disrupt mobilization, and strikes may continue. UAF General Staff provides updated reports on clashes across all major fronts, including South Slobozhansky (Kharkiv), Kupyansk, Lyman, Siversk, Kramatorsk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Orikhiv, Huliaipole, Kherson, Kursk and North Slobozhansky (Sumy). UAF MFA states Ukraine will not accept limitations, likely referring to negotiations on territory or NATO membership. RBC-Ukraine reports a TCC military personnel was beaten in Rivne Oblast during a document check, highlighting civilian resistance to mobilization efforts. CONFIDENCE: HIGH. (Updated) RBC-Ukraine shares photos from emergency services showing the aftermath of the Kremenchuk strike, indicating UAF response and damage assessment. CONFIDENCE: HIGH. (New) ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS reports on a TCC military personnel being beaten in Rivne Oblast, indicating UAF awareness of internal challenges. CONFIDENCE: HIGH. (New) Оперативний ЗСУ reports on a TCC military personnel being beaten in Rivne Oblast during a document check, providing imagery, indicating a challenge to UAF mobilization efforts and control. CONFIDENCE: HIGH. (New) RBC-Ukraine reports the MFA named two main tasks for Ukraine in negotiations with Russians, indicating a diplomatic control measure. CONFIDENCE: HIGH. (New) Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration reports on a week of aid to the Zaporizhzhia front, indicating organized volunteer support. CONFIDENCE: HIGH. (New) 1.4. Intelligence Gaps:
PIR 1 (HIGH): Confirm exact composition (unit types, armored vehicles, artillery systems), strength, and readiness levels of RUF forces concentrating near Sudzha, Kursk Oblast, and their intent for an incursion into Sumy Oblast. This includes verifying the scale and specific units of the reported "20+ trucks with personnel." Collection Requirement: Persistent multi-source ISR (SATINT, SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT if possible, OSINT) on RUF force generation, movement patterns, and logistical staging areas in Kursk and Belgorod Oblasts. Focus on indicators of imminent cross-border movement. This remains the #1 Intelligence Priority.
PIR 2 (MEDIUM): Assess the specific types, launch locations, and targets of ballistic missiles employed from the eastern axis, and whether this axis is now capable of sustained launches. Determine if the "fast-moving target" in Sumy is ballistic or a high-speed UAV. Collection Requirement: SIGINT and ELINT to pinpoint launch signatures and trajectories; IMINT of potential launch sites; forensic analysis of impact sites.
PIR 3 (MEDIUM): Determine the full impact of UAF deep strikes on RUF logistical networks in Belgorod, Lipetsk, Tula, Moscow, Kaluga, Nizhny Novgorod, St. Petersburg, Pskov, Leningrad and Krasnodar Krai (Novorossiysk). Collection Requirement: Post-strike BDA, IMINT of road networks, airport, and port operations, HUMINT from local population (if safe).
PIR 4 (LOW): Monitor for any indicators of RUF preparation or intent for the use of non-conventional weapons. Collection Requirement: All-source intelligence, particularly HUMINT, SIGINT, and OSINT from Russian military and political discourse.
PIR 5 (LOW): Confirm the scale and nature of any RUF gains at the Belgorod/Kharkiv junction and in the Poddubnoye area, and the capture of Sobolivka. Collection Requirement: IMINT, UAV reconnaissance, and ground force reporting.
PIR 6 (HIGH): Confirm the origin, trajectory, and type of ballistic missile threat that recently affected Kyiv and was subsequently lifted. Assess if this was a new launch point or system, or a re-engagement from a previously observed vector. Collection Requirement: SIGINT and ELINT on launch signatures; AD radar tracking; forensic analysis of potential impact sites if applicable.
PIR 7 (MEDIUM): Confirm the type and trajectory of the missile threat currently active in Kherson Oblast. Determine if it is a conventional ballistic missile, cruise missile, or an air-launched munition. Collection Requirement: AD radar tracking; SIGINT; forensic analysis of impact sites if applicable.
PIR 8 (LOW): Assess the claimed formation of UAF's 17th Army Corps, including its true composition and readiness, and the alleged redeployment of two additional UAF brigades to Kharkiv. Determine RUF's intelligence capabilities and potential disinformation efforts. Collection Requirement: UAF internal reports, HUMINT, open-source intelligence monitoring for indicators of new unit formations or reorganizations.
PIR 9 (MEDIUM): Determine the full extent of damage and casualties from RUF attacks on emergency services and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kirovohrad, and Kremenchuk. Collection Requirement: UAF damage assessment reports, OSINT (local media, social media), HUMINT from affected areas.
PIR 10 (MEDIUM): Determine the specific aviation assets active in the Synelnykivskyi district of Dnipropetrovsk and their intent (reconnaissance, strike, or electronic warfare). Collection Requirement: AD radar tracking, SIGINT.
PIR 11 (MEDIUM): Assess the veracity and implications of RUF claims regarding a concealed incident at the South Ukrainian NPP. Collection Requirement: IAEA reports, UAF internal reports, satellite imagery, and independent OSINT analysis for corroboration or refutation.
PIR 12 (LOW): Confirm the alleged encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Myrne, west of Donetsk, by RUF forces. Collection Requirement: IMINT, UAV reconnaissance, ground force reporting from the area.
PIR 13 (LOW): Assess the impact of anti-drone tarps on FPV drone effectiveness and thermal detection. Collection Requirement: UAF tactical reports, BDA, and technical analysis of encountered counter-drone measures.
PIR 14 (LOW): Verify RUF claims about Slovenia considering leaving NATO. Collection Requirement: Diplomatic reporting, official government statements, and reputable international media.
PIR 15 (MEDIUM): Confirm the extent of damage and impact on operations at Borisoglebsk airfield. Collection Requirement: High-resolution IMINT, SIGINT (analysis of changes in air activity/signatures), and OSINT from local sources.
PIR 16 (MEDIUM): Assess the full extent of damage and operational impact of the explosion and ammonia leak on the Eco Wizard tanker in Ust-Luga port. Collection Requirement: Satellite imagery, port activity monitoring, and OSINT from local sources. (New)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
END OF REPORT
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