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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-07-03 17:54:53Z
7 months ago
Previous (2025-07-03 17:29:52Z)

SITUATION REPORT

TIME: 031754Z JUL 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

  • Donetsk Oblast: RUF continues high-intensity offensive operations along the Pokrovsk and Toretsk axes, with persistent clashes. UAF General Staff confirms Pokrovsk remains the hottest direction, repelling 41 assaults in the last 24 hours. RUF forces are approximately 2.5 km from Krasnoarmiisk (Pokrovsk). In Chasiv Yar, RUF maintains a foothold in the Kanal microdistrict, with UAF conducting a tactical fighting withdrawal to prepared positions west of the canal. UAF drone footage indicates high RUF casualties near Pokrovsk and ongoing UAF strikes in Rozdolivka and Chasiv Yar. RUF video shows continued FAB-500 strikes and UGV operations in the Pokrovsk direction. Confidence: HIGH.

  • Luhansk Oblast: UAF General Staff reports all enemy attacks repelled in the Lyman direction. RUF claims of complete "liberation of LNR" persist but are contradicted by RUF sources and UAF reports of ongoing clashes. The liquidation of former "mayor" of occupied Luhansk, Manolis Pilavov, via IED is confirmed, with RUF sources also confirming his death. Confidence: HIGH.

  • Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Dnipro): Critical intelligence contradiction persists regarding RUF penetration into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. RUF claims "liberation" of Dachne and advancements towards Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, with supporting video of flag raising. However, UAF General Staff and other UAF sources strongly deny sustained RUF breakthroughs, stating any small reconnaissance groups were destroyed. UAF reports capture of 9 RUF soldiers from a failed offensive into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. RUF missile strike on Kamianske district caused civilian casualties and agricultural infrastructure damage. Significant RUF losses in the 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade (Commander, Deputy, Chief of Staff) due to a missile strike in Huliaipole are confirmed by both sides. Confidence: CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE CONTRADICTION.

  • Sumy Oblast: UAF Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi states Russian advances in border areas have been completely stopped and the contact line stabilized. UAF General Staff reports repelling 13-22 Russian army assaults in Kursk and North Slobozhansky (Sumy) directions. RUF continues KAB launches and drone activity into Sumy Oblast. A new video from "Два майора" (RUF source) shows aerial footage of multiple explosions in "Sumy direction, Khoten area," indicating active RUF fires. RUF sources claim a battle near Tyotkino with Russian paratroopers storming positions. New groups of enemy UAVs are entering Sumy Oblast airspace. Confidence: HIGH (on stabilized front line, ongoing RUF activity); MEDIUM (on specific RUF claims of gains).

  • Kharkiv Oblast: RUF continues aviation airstrikes and ground clashes near Vovchansk and Kupyansk direction. RUF claims "liberation" of Melove in Kharkiv Oblast, with video evidence of flag raising by "North" Group forces. UAF reports a successful SFO raid near the border with a captured soldier and reports updated RUF combat losses (1000 personnel in 24 hours). Confidence: HIGH.

  • Zaporizhzhia Oblast: RUF claims breakthrough to the center of Kamyanske, with "Операция Z" reporting RUF secured positions and is dividing the town. UAF General Staff reports continued clashes near Kamyanske. Kadyrovites are being prepared for assaults on the Zaporizhzhia direction, with approximately 15 military trucks moving them to Enerhodar/Melitopol/Vasylivka area. UAF SFO units successfully took control of one enemy position near Kamyanske. Confidence: HIGH (on Kadyrovite buildup, SFO success); LOW (on verified RUF control of Kamyanske).

  • Kherson Oblast: Positional fighting, shelling, and aerial reconnaissance continue. RUF shelled Central District of Kherson, causing civilian casualties. UAF Defense Forces of Southern Ukraine report 16 enemy assaults repelled and significant RUF losses. Nikolaevsky Vanek shares a video depicting drone footage targeting and destroying an RLM-D 55Zh6M NEBO-M radar system. Confidence: HIGH.

  • Odesa Oblast: Significant overnight RUF Shahed UAV attacks. A multi-story residential building was hit, two civilian fatalities and multiple injuries confirmed. 14 Shahed UAVs destroyed by UAF AD. RUF reports "powerful strike and huge fire" at an enemy object near Odesa, targeting an oil terminal. A ballistic missile strike on Odesa port infrastructure resulted in two killed and three wounded civilians, later rising to six injured including two Syrian citizens. A second ballistic missile arrival reported. Confidence: HIGH.

  • Mykolaiv Oblast: Mykolaiv was struck by ballistic missiles (6 Iskanders) and Shahed UAVs overnight, with confirmed impacts on infrastructure. Confidence: HIGH.

  • Kyiv Oblast: Massed RUF overnight attack included cruise missiles and UAVs. UAF AD operating effectively, downing 40 of 52 enemy UAVs. Two UAF Air Force pilots killed while repelling the attack. Fragments of an enemy drone fell on open ground in Solomianskyi district, Kyiv, confirmed by KVM A. Air raid alerts continue. Confidence: HIGH.

  • Cherkasy Oblast: RUF attacked Smila with missiles and drones, resulting in 11 casualties, including 2 children, and damage to residential buildings and a college. SBU exposed an FSB agent preparing shelling. Confidence: HIGH.

  • Poltava Oblast: RUF drone attacks targeted a TCC (military enlistment office) building in Poltava, confirmed by multiple RUF and UAF sources. This strike resulted in 2 killed and 59 injured, including military personnel and civilians, and caused fires in the TCC and nearby buildings. Confidence: HIGH.

  • Lviv Oblast: RUF video shows multiple missile/drone impacts and explosions at a refinery in Drohobych, Lviv Oblast. SBU detained an Air Force major suspected of espionage for Russia. Confidence: HIGH.

  • Zhytomyr Oblast: RUF missile strike near Zhytomyr resulted in a large explosion, destroying two production facilities, killing 2 and injuring 82. The M-06 Kyiv - Chop highway was temporarily closed. Confidence: HIGH.

  • Russian Territory:

    • Deep Strikes (UAF): Confirmed successful UAF deep strikes on the Izhevsk "Kupol" plant (damaging four UAV production workshops, stopping operations), the "Energiya" enterprise in Yelets, Lipetsk Oblast (sanctioned military-industrial complex), and Khalino airfield in Kursk (damaging aviation weapons storage complex). These attacks caused casualties, including one fatality and two injuries in Lipetsk, and led to temporary flight restrictions at multiple airports (Saratov, Ulyanovsk, Kazan, Nizhnekamsk, Izhevsk, Tambov, Samara). A powder factory in Kotovsk, Tambov Oblast, also caught fire due to a UAV strike, killing 3 and injuring 3.
    • High-Value Target (HVT) Loss (RUF): Multiple RUF and UAF sources confirm the liquidation of Mikhail Gudkov ("Varyag"), Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, along with his deputy, Colonel Shikhaliev, in Kursk Oblast from a missile strike on a field headquarters.
    • Internal Security: FSB detained a 23-year-old Russian woman in St. Petersburg suspected of preparing an explosive device. An influential Azerbaijani "thief-in-law" (Vagif Suleymanov) was detained in Moscow, reported by RUF sources, linked to the Russia-Azerbaijan diplomatic spat. Confidence: HIGH.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

  • Ukraine: European reports of temperatures up to +42°C suggest continued heat stress on personnel and equipment across Ukraine.
  • Russia: North Atlantic cyclone "Cornelius" brought rain and colder temperatures to Moscow, but a heatwave of over +30C is expected by mid-next week. Temporary flight restrictions have been imposed and lifted at various airports due to drone activity. The Main Naval Parade in St. Petersburg on July 27 has been canceled for security reasons. Confidence: HIGH.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

  • RUF Dispositions:
    • Donetsk: Continues high-intensity offensive, employing units from "Center" and "Vostok" groups, 30th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, and VDV (98th Guards Airborne Division, 247th Air Assault Regiment). Observed use of T-90 tanks, BMP-3s, TOS-1A, and BM-21 Grad MLRS. RUF claims "liberation" of Razino (Donetsk) and Melove (Kharkiv).
    • Zaporizhzhia: Kadyrovite (Chechen special forces) transfer to Enerhodar/Melitopol/Vasylivka area with 15 military trucks indicates a significant buildup for potential assault operations.
    • Force Generation: Continued recruitment for "African Corps" and contract soldiers (over 210,000 in H1 2025). North Korea intends to send up to 30,000 additional troops to assist Russia, with a DPRK military academy delegation visiting Russia.
    • Equipment: New batches of BMP-3s shipped to MoD. Public fundraising for BM-21 Grad MLRS by "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" indicates a capability gap being addressed by public donations.
    • UAVs: Widespread use of Shahed (Geranium) UAVs for deep strikes, FPV drones for tactical engagements, and reconnaissance UAVs. RUF sources claim increased Geranium production.
    • EW: Sophisticated and widespread EW capabilities, with continued reports of RUF forces employing EW systems and laser-based anti-UAV systems. Confidence: HIGH.
  • Control Measures: RUF maintains extensive electronic warfare (EW) and layered air defense. Recent reports confirm 69 Ukrainian UAVs shot down over Russian regions overnight. Mobile internet will be restricted in Rostov Oblast, likely for counter-UAV or security purposes. RUF sources report on "Rubicon" combat groups targeting air defense systems. The Russian government is implementing new legislation impacting digital platforms and administrative fines, potentially tightening information control. Confidence: HIGH.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

  • Capabilities:

    • Ground Offensive: Sustained high-intensity ground assaults, particularly along the Pokrovsk and Toretsk axes, and in Chasiv Yar. Use of combined arms tactics, including T-90 tanks, new BMP-3 deliveries, and MT-LBs.
    • Air-Dropped Ordnance: Continued extensive use of FAB-500/1500 with UMPK glide kits to suppress and destroy Ukrainian defenses.
    • UAV Operations: Highly developed and integrated UAV capabilities for ISR, FPV strikes, and deep strikes. Use of remote-controlled UGVs. Confirmed increased production and deployment of Geranium drones.
    • EW: Sophisticated and widespread EW capabilities.
    • Precision Strikes: Demonstrated long-range precision strikes against critical infrastructure, military targets, and command posts, including military-industrial facilities (Izhevsk, Energiya), TCCs (Poltava), and airfields (Khalino).
    • Special Forces: Active Spetsnaz operations and internal security operations (FSB detentions).
    • New Weapon Systems: Stated intent to deploy "Oreshnik" (new weapon system) in Belarus by year-end.
    • Force Generation: Continued ability to generate personnel through contract service and potential foreign military support (DPRK, "African Corps").
    • Mine Clearance: Capability to use robotic complexes (Uran-6) for mine clearance.
    • Naval Forces: Demonstrated capability to destroy enemy USVs and drones in the Black Sea. Confidence: HIGH.
  • Intentions:

    • Territorial Control: Primary intention remains the complete capture of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, with a focus on Pokrovsk, Toretsk, and Chasiv Yar. The purported penetration into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and the capture of Melove (Kharkiv) indicate an intent to broaden offensive areas and create buffer zones.
    • Strategic Depth: Continue to establish "buffer zones" in border regions (Sumy, Kharkiv) to secure Russian territory.
    • Infrastructure Degradation: Continued systematic degradation of Ukraine's military-industrial complex, energy infrastructure, and logistics through precision strikes. The targeting of TCCs indicates an intent to disrupt Ukrainian mobilization efforts.
    • Information Dominance: Maintain and escalate information warfare to shape narratives, demoralize UAF, and influence international opinion, particularly by exploiting perceived Western aid inconsistencies and promoting Russian "victories."
    • Force Reinforcement: Integrate additional personnel from contract service and international partners (DPRK, "African Corps") to sustain offensive operations. Confidence: HIGH.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

  • Defensive Posture: UAF maintains a primarily defensive posture, successfully repelling numerous RUF assaults. Tactical fighting withdrawals are being conducted in Chasiv Yar.
  • Tactical Adaptation: Demonstrated ability to adapt to RUF tactics, including effective use of drones for ISR, BDA, and precision strikes; successful SFO raids; counter-propaganda leveraging POWs; decentralized air defense efforts; and successful targeting of HVTs (Goryachkin, Pilavov, Gudkov). Demonstrated capability for deep strikes into Russian territory.
  • Personnel & Training: Syrskyi states general training will be increased. High operational tempo continues. Ukraine is preparing new agreements for joint weapons production, including interceptor drones.
  • Resource Requirements & Constraints: Critical air defense deficit and lack of modular shelters remain pressing concerns. Continued reliance on international partners for critical capabilities, particularly in light of US arms suspension. UAF personnel are under significant pressure, sustaining casualties, necessitating continued mobilization and training.
  • Logistics & Sustainment: Ukrainian military administration continues to support troops and civilians.
  • Morale: High morale demonstrated by continued defensive operations, successful tactical actions, and efforts to support military families. Confidence: HIGH.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • Successes:
    • Repelled 41 RUF assaults in Pokrovsk direction in 24 hours.
    • Successful tactical fighting withdrawal in Chasiv Yar to prepared positions.
    • Successful drone strikes causing high RUF casualties, destroying equipment, and targeting fortified positions.
    • Confirmed liquidation of RUF 8th Combined Arms Army acting commander, Lt. Col. Ruslan Goryachkin.
    • Successful counter-DRG/SFO raid near the Kharkiv border, including prisoner capture.
    • Confirmed SBU exposure of FSB agents preparing attacks in Cherkasy.
    • Successful deep strikes on military-industrial targets within Russia (Izhevsk 'Kupol' plant, Energiya plant in Yelets, Khalino airfield).
    • Successful interception and downing of a high percentage of RUF Shahed UAVs (40 of 52).
    • Confirmed liquidation of former "mayor" of occupied Luhansk, Manolis Pilavov.
    • UAF capture of 9 RUF soldiers from a failed offensive into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
    • Confirmed liquidation of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Mikhail Gudkov.
    • Destruction of three Nebo-M key radars.
  • Setbacks:
    • RUF penetration into the Kanal microdistrict in Chasiv Yar, forcing UAF tactical withdrawal.
    • Continued high number of RUF air attacks on Kharkiv.
    • Significant civilian casualties and infrastructure damage from RUF strikes across multiple oblasts (Poltava casualties increased to 59, Zhytomyr to 82, Odesa to 6).
    • Heavy officer losses in 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade due to missile strike in Huliaipole.
    • Unverified but persistent RUF claims of territorial gains, including entry into Dachne (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast), create uncertainty.
    • Direct hit on a TCC building in Poltava, causing military and civilian casualties.
    • Continued air raid alerts for Kyiv. Confidence: HIGH.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

  • Critical Air Defense Deficit: Urgent need for more advanced air defense systems and interceptor drones.
  • Shelter Shortages: Shortfall in protective infrastructure for civilians in urban areas.
  • Ammunition & Equipment: Ongoing need for ammunition and equipment, particularly advanced systems. US suspension of certain weapons supplies is a significant constraint.
  • Personnel Attrition: UAF personnel are under significant pressure and sustaining casualties, necessitating continued mobilization and training.
  • Foreign Military Aid Dependency: Continued reliance on international partners for critical capabilities. Confidence: HIGH.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

  • RUF Narratives: Highlighting UAF losses, portraying Western abandonment, claiming Russian successes and liberation of territory, undermining Ukrainian stability, justifying the war, and showcasing internal Russian unity. The detention of an Azerbaijani "thief-in-law" in Moscow is being leveraged to emphasize Russian control and possibly link to the diplomatic spat with Azerbaijan.
  • UAF Narratives: Emphasizing resilience and defensive success, showcasing effective counter-offensives and strikes, documenting RUF war crimes and civilian impact, highlighting international support, and demonstrating transparency.
  • Key Information Fights: The situation in Dnipropetrovsk, the US aid suspension and its implications, HVT liquidations, and casualty reporting remain active areas of information warfare. The Putin-Trump call is a central focus for both sides to shape narratives. Confidence: HIGH.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

  • Ukrainian Public Sentiment: Resilience and determination are evident despite ongoing attacks. Concerns exist over aid and security deficiencies (AD, shelters).
  • Russian Public Sentiment (Inferred): State-controlled media promotes support for the "SVO." Potential economic strain (wage arrears) and domestic security concerns (UAF deep strikes, internal detentions, St. Petersburg parade cancellation) could affect public sentiment. The broadening of "terrorist" lists to include teenagers indicates a tightening of internal control.
  • International Relations: Russia-Azerbaijan diplomatic spat continues to escalate. Ukraine-Western Allies relationship remains complex due to US aid uncertainty, but European support is consistent. The Putin-Trump call adds a new layer to international dynamics. Confidence: HIGH (for narratives); MEDIUM (for actual public sentiment).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

  • US Support: Ambiguous due to arms suspension, but joint drone production agreements are being pursued. The Putin-Trump call and its content are critical.
  • European Support: Consistent, with Denmark and Sweden providing strong political and military aid.
  • New Military Aid & Production: Ukraine-US memorandum for drone production. Zelenskyy announced production of hundreds of thousands of "anti-Shahed" drones.
  • Diplomatic Engagements: Putin-Trump call is a significant development, with Putin reiterating readiness for negotiations. Russia-Azerbaijan relations are strained. DPRK-Russia military cooperation is advancing. US-Iran nuclear talks are scheduled. Confidence: HIGH.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

  • Deepening the Donetsk Offensive: RUF will maintain high-intensity assaults along the Pokrovsk and Toretsk axes, focusing on incrementally gaining ground and securing the remaining administrative borders of Donetsk Oblast. The push in Chasiv Yar for the Kanal microdistrict will continue with sustained force, aiming to seize control of the western bank of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal. This will involve continued reliance on FAB glide bombs. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Sustained Border Area Pressure & Shaping Operations: RUF will continue to conduct probing attacks and artillery/air strikes along the Sumy and Kharkiv border regions. These operations will primarily serve to fix Ukrainian reserves and prevent their redeployment. Limited tactical gains in these "buffer zones" may occur. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Escalated Precision Strikes on Infrastructure and Logistics: RUF will continue and possibly increase its use of long-range precision missiles and Shahed UAVs to target Ukrainian military-industrial complex sites, TCCs, logistics hubs, and energy infrastructure across Ukraine, accepting civilian casualties as collateral damage. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Intensified Information Warfare: RUF will double down on narratives of Ukrainian weakness, Western abandonment, and Russian success, especially following the Putin-Trump call. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Force Generation and Diversification: Russia will continue efforts to generate additional forces, including recruitment of contract soldiers, and will likely integrate North Korean personnel as they arrive. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

  • Coordinated Breakthrough in Dnipropetrovsk and Donbas: RUF could launch a larger-scale, synchronized mechanized offensive leveraging recently transferred Kadyrovite units in Zaporizhzhia and the purported deep penetrations into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to create a new operational axis threatening key Ukrainian rear areas or major urban centers. This would be coupled with a decisive push to completely secure Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk, overwhelming UAF defenses. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE, HIGH IMPACT)
  • Major Offensive in Sumy Aimed at Deep Penetration: RUF could commit substantial operational reserves to a full-scale offensive towards Sumy city, aiming to bypass established Ukrainian defenses and seize a significant provincial capital, forcing a major UAF redeployment from other critical fronts. (LOW CONFIDENCE, HIGH IMPACT)
  • Increased Use of Non-Conventional/Hybrid Tactics: RUF could escalate the use of covert sabotage operations and proxies against perceived adversaries beyond the immediate conflict zone, including further attacks on maritime logistics or targeted destabilization efforts in bordering countries, potentially in response to the diplomatic spat with Azerbaijan. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE, MEDIUM IMPACT)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

  • Donetsk Offensive: RUF will sustain current offensive tempo on Pokrovsk, Toretsk, and Chasiv Yar for the next 7-14 days. A decisive attempt to fully secure Chasiv Yar (western bank) is likely within 72 hours.
  • Dnipropetrovsk Contradiction Resolution: The conflicting intelligence regarding RUF penetration into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast should be resolved with high confidence within 24-48 hours through intensified ISR and ground reporting. This will be a critical decision point for UAF force allocation.
  • Sumy Border Escalation: The scale and intent of RUF operations in Sumy Oblast will become clearer within 3-5 days. If significant mechanized formations are detected assembling, UAF command will face a decision point on whether to commit strategic reserves.
  • Deep Strike Reciprocity: UAF deep strikes into Russian territory will likely continue as long as RUF maintains its long-range missile and drone attacks. RUF will respond with further strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure. This cycle is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

  • CRITICAL - RUF Intent in Dnipropetrovsk: Confirm the depth and permanence of RUF presence in Dachne and surrounding areas of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Determine if claimed gains are verified and if a larger RUF force grouping is consolidating.
    • CR: All available ISR, especially UAV and ground patrols, targeting reported RUF penetration points. Local HUMINT.
  • CRITICAL - RUF Order of Battle and Force Strength (Sumy): Precisely identify RUF units, their strength, and readiness levels of the Russian force grouping opposite Sumy Oblast. Identifying specific units is an urgent priority.
    • CR: SIGINT, IMINT (high-resolution satellite), HUMINT on the ground, pattern of life analysis.
  • CRITICAL - RUF Reinforcement for Chasiv Yar: Confirm disposition and commitment threshold of Russian operational reserves for the Chasiv Yar battle.
    • CR: SATINT, long-range SIGINT, cross-border HUMINT.
  • RUF Strategic Reserves (General): Monitor for the movement and deployment of RUF operational reserves.
    • CR: SATINT, long-range SIGINT, cross-border HUMINT.
  • Logistics Assessment: Assess the impact of UAF deep strikes on RUF military-industrial production and ammunition depots.
    • CR: Post-strike BDA, IMINT, open-source monitoring of Russian internal reports on production.
  • EW Countermeasures Effectiveness: Real-time assessment of Ukrainian EW system effectiveness against latest RUF drone variants and tactical communication jamming.
    • CR: Technical intelligence, unit reports, and analysis of drone loss rates.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. IMMEDIATE - Prioritize ISR for Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy: Reallocate all available ISR assets (UAV, SIGINT, SATINT, ELINT) to establish a clear picture of RUF force dispositions and intent, particularly focusing on the contested administrative border of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and the Sumy axis. Confirm or deny RUF claims of deep penetration and identify any new RUF build-ups.
  2. FIRES - Intensify Counter-Battery and Interdiction: Continue and increase counter-battery fires against identified RUF artillery and MLRS, especially TOS-1A systems. Prioritize interdiction of RUF logistics and supply routes supporting offensive operations in Donbas and any confirmed new axes. Allocate additional FPV drone assets for immediate response to RUF tactical assaults. Leverage "Kryla OMEGA" unit for targeted strikes against RUF personnel and equipment.
  3. FORCE POSTURE - Adaptive Defense in Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy: Prepare and activate layered defensive positions along the administrative border of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Maintain mobile tactical reserves ready for rapid deployment to counter any confirmed RUF breakthrough attempts, but avoid premature commitment. In Sumy, strengthen border defenses, conduct active reconnaissance, and prepare for potential larger-scale assaults, but do not overcommit strategic reserves from Donbas. Reinforce AD for Kyiv against ongoing UAV threats.
  4. AIR DEFENSE - Reinforce Critical Nodes: Accelerate the deployment of any newly acquired or internally produced air defense systems, especially short-range interceptor drones, to protect key TCCs, logistics hubs, and military-industrial facilities, particularly in response to the demonstrated RUF intent to target these. Prioritize protection for Kyiv and other major population centers from Shahed attacks.
  5. C-IED and Counter-Sabotage: Implement heightened security measures and intelligence collection to counter RUF hybrid operations, including internal sabotage and IED attacks, particularly in occupied territories and against infrastructure targets. Increase monitoring of individuals and groups susceptible to RUF recruitment for such actions.
  6. Diplomatic and Information Campaign: Coordinate with international partners to counter RUF disinformation regarding Western aid and to highlight RUF's continued aggression and targeting of civilian infrastructure. Leverage captured RUF POWs for counter-propaganda to undermine enemy morale. Ensure clear and consistent messaging regarding the outcomes of high-level diplomatic engagements (e.g., Putin-Trump call) to manage public and international perceptions, emphasizing Ukraine's commitment to self-defense and sovereignty.

END OF REPORT

Previous (2025-07-03 17:29:52Z)

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