Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME OF REPORT: 16 JUN 25 / 08:38 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 16 JUN 25 / 08:08 ZULU - 16 JUN 25 / 08:38 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // ORCON // NOFORN

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Ukraine Operational Area:
  • Donetsk Oblast (Kramatorsk Direction): Poddubny |Z|O|V| edition reports Russian TOS 'Solntsepyok' thermobaric MLRS engaging and destroying "militant shelters" in the Kramatorsk direction, implying continued Russian offensive and fire support operations in this sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Russian claim/footage, LOW for independent verification of target/BDA).
  • Kherson Oblast (Occupied Territories): MoD Russia claims destruction of an "enemy UAV command post" in Kherson region by 152-mm Msta-B gun of Dnepr Group of Forces, with video. This indicates continued Russian counter-UAV and deep strike operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Russian claim/video, LOW for independent verification of target). "Операция Z" (Военкоры Русской Весны) re-amplifies FSB claims of detaining a "saboteur" who planned to blow up a car of a Kherson Oblast official, with video evidence. This reinforces the ongoing counter-insurgency/propaganda operations in occupied areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Russian claim/video, LOW for independent verification of details/pretext).
  • Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Voskresenka): TASS reports, citing Russian security forces, that Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) units that survived operations in the Komar area have withdrawn to Voskresenka, on the border with Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. This indicates continued Russian pressure on Ukrainian defensive lines and possible Ukrainian force repositioning. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM for Russian claim, LOW for independent verification).
  • Kyiv Oblast (Rusanivski Sady): ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS reports on the "first minutes after enemy strike" on Rusanivski Sady in Kyiv, with video evidence of explosions and aftermath (damaged building, crater). This confirms continued Russian deep strikes against Ukrainian population centers. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Sumy Oblast (Border Area): ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS reports that "continuous destruction of enemy assault aircraft" in the Sumy border area has resulted in a "decrease in the intensity of assaults" according to State Border Guard Service (DPGU) spokesman Andrii Demchenko. This indicates successful Ukrainian defensive actions against Russian border incursions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Southern Direction (General): "Сили оборони Півдня України" (Southern Defense Forces of Ukraine) reports continued enemy assault actions, high intensity of shelling, and aviation strikes in the southern direction. Concurrently, they claim successful strikes against enemy locations, firing positions, and rear areas. This confirms continued active engagement and counter-operations in the south. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Zaporizhzhia Direction: STERNENKO reports ongoing enemy assault actions despite less media coverage, involving small infantry groups, vehicles, and occasionally heavy equipment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Unspecified Location (Ukrainian FPV Drone Intercept): "БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС" shows video of Ukrainian soldiers engaging and destroying a Russian fiber-optic FPV drone with small arms fire, preventing it from striking them. This demonstrates effective Ukrainian tactical air defense against low-flying threats. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Donetsk Oblast (General): Air Force of Ukraine reports KAB strikes on Donetsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Donetsk Oblast (Novotoretskoye): Народная милиция ДНР reports drone footage showing destruction of Ukrainian equipment in the Novotoretskoye area. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for claim/footage, LOW for independent verification of target/BDA).
  • Unspecified Location (Russian MLRS - North Korean Type 75): БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС shows photos of a "DIY jihad-mobile 'Bukhanka'" (UAZ-452 van) with a North Korean 107-mm Type 75 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) installed, mocking it as belonging to the "second army of the world." This confirms the use of improvised MLRS systems by Russian forces, potentially incorporating North Korean materiel. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Internal Affairs/Occupied Territories:
  • Belgorod Oblast: TASS reports Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov proposed suspending restoration of housing damaged by AFU attacks for residents who have left Russia. This indicates continued administrative challenges and socio-economic tensions due to the conflict, and a punitive approach. ASTRA reports one of the Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems for drone defense was listed for sale on "Avito" (Russian classifieds site) in Belgorod Oblast. This suggests potential issues with accountability, discipline, or internal corruption within Russian forces or associated entities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Igor Artamonov (Belgorod governor) claims Russian fighters released from Ukrainian captivity via exchange over the last two days. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for claim, LOW for independent verification of numbers/details).
  • Oryol Oblast: ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS reports "dozens of explosions" in Oryol, Russia, overnight, with helicopters chasing "good drones." This indicates successful Ukrainian drone strikes deep within Russian territory. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Kursk Border Region: Старше Эдды and Поддубный |Z|О|V| edition both publish photos from a meeting with the commander of the 11th VDV Brigade in the Kursk border region, suggesting continued Russian military presence and activity near the Ukrainian border. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Global Operational Area (Middle East Focus - Intensified Escalation and Propaganda, now with claimed fatalities and direct Iranian actions, and new claims of AD failure):
  • Israel/Iran: ASTRA reports Israeli Ministry of Health revised casualty figures to 8 killed after the night attack from Iran. TASS reiterates its earlier claim of 287 wounded. WarGonzo claims over 70 Iranian women and children killed by Israeli attacks. Rybar reports Iran executed a "Mossad agent" (Turkish national Ismail Fikri). Alex Parker Returns claims the Iranian Parliament voted to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), linking it to a "strange earthquake," however TASS subsequently reports that the Iranian Parliament denies considering such a bill. Alex Parker Returns now claims Israel's THAAD air defense system "destroyed itself" during the night attack, possibly due to Iranian hacking. Colonelcassad shows Maxar satellite imagery claiming to show damage to the Khorramabad Missile Base in Iran after Israeli strikes. TASS reports Iranian MFA called on UNSC to condemn Israeli attack on Iran. Басурин о главном publishes video claiming to show residents leaving Tehran. Alex Parker Returns claims Russia advises citizens to leave Israel via Egypt border crossing. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for reports, LOW for independent verification of specific BDA/casualty figures or NPT withdrawal, MEDIUM for THAAD self-destruction claim). These reports confirm continued, highly conflicting, and rapidly escalating narratives regarding the Middle East. Fighterbomber (Russian milblogger) speculates that the global power shift might involve "exchanging Ukraine for Iran," suggesting a perceived strategic benefit for Russia from the Middle East escalation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for statement, LOW for validity of the "exchange" concept).
  • US Air Operations (Global): Операция Z (Военкоры Русской Весны) amplifies Military Watch's report that the US is "massively redeploying tankers to Europe," with ADS-B Exchange screenshots showing USAF KC-135R/T Stratotankers. This is likely used by Russian sources to suggest increased US preparations or involvement in broader conflicts, especially given the Middle East context. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for report, LOW for implied intent).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• Night-time conditions continue to be utilized for deep strikes (TOS 'Solntsepyok', drones on Oryol, Kyiv) and FPV drone operations. Dawn/Dusk conditions were present during Iranian missile launches. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Rural/forested areas remain battlegrounds, with drone footage showing operations against dug-in positions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces: Maintaining active defense against ground advances (Kramatorsk, Southern, Zaporizhzhia directions). Demonstrating effective tactical air defense against FPV drones and strategic air defense against Russian deep strikes (Sumy). Reportedly repositioning some forces in response to Russian pressure. Conducting successful FPV drone strikes against Russian vehicles and positions. Actively pursuing counter-intelligence operations against Russian agents. Conducting drone strikes deep within Russian territory (Oryol). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces: Actively conducting thermobaric MLRS strikes, continuing ground offensives (claimed pressure in Komar, Kramatorsk, Zaporizhzhia), and engaging in counter-insurgency/propaganda operations in occupied territories (FSB in Kherson). Maintaining military presence near the Kursk border. Conducting exchanges of POWs. Employing deep strikes on Ukrainian C2 and population centers. Employing improvised MLRS systems. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Iranian/Israeli Forces (External): Both sides are conducting strikes and information operations, with highly conflicting casualty figures and claims. Russia continues to leverage this crisis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RUSSIA FOCUSED)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA):

• Capabilities (Russia):
  • Offensive Ground Operations & Fire Support: Demonstrated ability to employ TOS 'Solntsepyok' thermobaric MLRS for localized destruction and supporting ground advances. Continuing to conduct limited assaults with infantry and light/heavy equipment in Zaporizhzhia. Utilizing improvised MLRS systems (North Korean Type 75 on UAZ). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Deep Strike Capabilities: Confirmed ability to conduct drone/missile strikes against Ukrainian urban centers (Kyiv, Oryol) causing casualties and damage. Claims destruction of a Ukrainian UAV command post in Kherson. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Warfare & Destabilization (CRITICAL - Confirmed, Intensified, and now explicitly leveraging Middle East conflict for direct threats and diplomatic pressure, and introducing highly inflammatory narratives, including denial of earlier false claims): Russia's IO apparatus is highly agile and aggressive. It immediately amplifies highly escalatory claims (Iranian IRGC's "complete destruction" rhetoric, high Israeli/Iranian casualty figures, Iranian NPT withdrawal claims – later denied by TASS, THAAD self-destruction due to hacking) and leverages direct diplomatic actions (embassy warnings, potential evacuation via Egypt) to reinforce the perception of a rapidly escalating global conflict. Russia continues to project domestic normalcy (TASS trivial news, Moscow news) while simultaneously exposing perceived Ukrainian subversive activity in occupied territories to justify its actions. The "Ulyanovka liberation" narrative is being pushed to suggest new operational successes. The re-introduction of overt anti-Semitic propaganda and nuclear threats by state-aligned channels represents a new, dangerous escalation in their IO. The call for UNSC condemnation by Iranian MFA, as reported by TASS, provides Russia with further diplomatic leverage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Counter-UAV/EW Operations: Despite a reported EW system being sold on Avito, Russia still claims destruction of Ukrainian UAV C2 posts, indicating continued efforts in this domain. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Intentions (Russia):
  • Degrade Ukrainian Defense and Force Redeployment: Continue efforts to advance on the ground (Kramatorsk direction, Komar area, Zaporizhzhia) and conduct deep strikes (KABs on Donetsk, drones on Kyiv/Oryol, artillery on Kherson UAV C2). Force Ukrainian repositioning to stretch defensive lines. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Exploit Global Crises (CRITICAL - Confirmed and Intensified, leveraging Middle East conflict for direct threats and diplomatic pressure, and now for strategic "exchange" narratives, and denying its own false claims): Intensify efforts to promote narratives of Western resource diversion and aid reduction by explicitly framing the Israel-Iran conflict as an escalating existential threat, now with official warnings for its citizens and direct threats from Iranian IRGC. Fighterbomber's comment suggests a strategic intent to see Western focus shift permanently, potentially "exchanging Ukraine for Iran." This aims to further demonstrate perceived Western vulnerability and distract from Ukraine. The call for UNSC condemnation by Iran aligns with Russia's goal of portraying the West as a source of global instability. Russia's denial of the NPT withdrawal claim, after its initial amplification, shows a willingness to retract even highly inflammatory claims when they become inconvenient or demonstrably false. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Project Global Relevance & Domestic Stability/Unity: Utilize state media and milbloggers to project an image of global influence (amplification of Iranian military "resolve," speculation on strategic "exchanges," diplomatic engagement at UNSC level, US tanker redeployments), successful domestic governance (TASS trivial news, Belgorod administration addressing issues, Artek anniversary, POW exchanges), and military adaptation, while simultaneously undermining Ukrainian resistance by showcasing "FSB successes" and territorial gains. Colonelcassad's fundraising for "Summer Campaign 2025" and propaganda imagery on mortar rounds aim to foster domestic support and volunteerism. The Avito EW system listing, if not addressed, could undermine this narrative. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• Escalated Middle East IO (Diplomatic Pressure & Radicalization, with selective denials): Russia is actively issuing official warnings for its citizens to leave Israel and considering embassy evacuation (now via Egypt), signaling a direct acknowledgment and diplomatic leveraging of the escalating conflict. The re-introduction of overt anti-Semitic propaganda and nuclear threats represents a new, more dangerous phase of their IO. The quick denial of the Iranian NPT withdrawal claim, previously amplified, shows an adaptive, albeit cynical, approach to information management. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Sustained Offensive in Donetsk/Kramatorsk/Zaporizhzhia: Continued TOS 'Solntsepyok' activity and pressure in the Komar area suggest a sustained and possibly successful advance on the eastern front. Activity in Zaporizhzhia, though less reported, continues. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for activity, MEDIUM for independent verification of "liberation").
• Deep Strikes on Ukrainian Cities/C2: Confirmed strikes on Kyiv and Oryol, and claims of striking a Kherson UAV C2, indicate a sustained and effective deep strike campaign. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Force Repositioning: Russian claims of Ukrainian withdrawal to Voskresenka suggest Russian pressure is having an effect on Ukrainian force disposition, potentially freeing up Russian forces for further advances. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Focus on Southern Flank: Continued intense Russian activity in the southern direction indicates a sustained effort to gain ground or fix Ukrainian forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• POW Exchanges: Russian claims of recent prisoner exchanges indicate ongoing efforts to manage personnel and potentially boost morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for claim).
• Use of Improvised/North Korean MLRS: The appearance of a North Korean Type 75 MLRS on a UAZ van indicates Russian willingness to field unconventional and foreign-sourced systems to supplement fire support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• Continued MLRS strikes (TOS 'Solntsepyok'), deep UAV/artillery strikes, and KAB usage suggest that Russia's long-range strike and conventional ammunition supplies remain sufficient for current operational tempo. The presence of TOS 'Solntsepyok' indicates high-value asset deployment. The use of North Korean MLRS suggests a need to supplement domestic production or a tactical advantage in using readily available, if improvised, systems. Colonelcassad's fundraising for "Summer Campaign 2025" could indicate either a supplemental effort or a continued reliance on public support for specific equipment. The listing of an EW system on Avito suggests potential issues with accountability or internal supply chain integrity for some equipment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian Military C2: Continues to coordinate localized ground operations, fire support (TOS), deep strikes (KABs, drones), and counter-battery fire (Msta-B on UAV C2). Functional C2 despite tactical setbacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian IO/Diplomatic C2: Highly agile, aggressive, and effective in responding to real-time events and shaping narratives. The immediate and consistent amplification of sensationalized Middle East claims, combined with direct diplomatic actions, across state media and milbloggers points to a well-oiled, multi-channel propaganda apparatus with a clear agenda. The quick denial of the NPT withdrawal claim, despite initial amplification, demonstrates a level of adaptive control over their narrative. FSB's coordinated release of "terrorist" arrest videos indicates functional domestic security C2. The deliberate re-introduction of anti-Semitic propaganda indicates a centralized decision to radicalize their messaging. The coordinated diplomatic push at the UNSC further demonstrates a multi-domain C2. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UKRAINIAN FOCUSED)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Ukrainian forces are maintaining active defense, with confirmed successes in tactical air defense against FPV drones and conducting successful FPV drone strikes against Russian equipment and positions in Zaporizhzhia and elsewhere. Southern Defense Forces are active in both defensive and offensive operations. Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration's photo message indicates ongoing efforts to formalize veteran support, crucial for long-term force sustainment and morale. Prosecution of Russian agents (Mykolaiv Oblast) indicates robust counter-intelligence operations. Successful defense against border incursions in Sumy, reducing assault intensity. Successful deep drone strikes into Russian territory (Oryol). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Success (Tactical Air Defense): Confirmed successful small arms engagement against a Russian FPV drone, preventing impact. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Success (FPV Drone Offensives): Confirmed successful FPV drone strikes against a Polaris Ranger MRZR, a Buggy, a dugout/foxhole, and potentially Russian personnel in open terrain. This demonstrates effective precision targeting. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Success (Counter-Intelligence): Agent of Russia in Mykolaiv Oblast sentenced to 15 years, indicating effective SBU operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Success (Border Defense): Reported reduction in Russian assault intensity in Sumy border area due to "continuous destruction of enemy assault aircraft" (likely drones/aircraft). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Success (Deep Strikes into Russia): Confirmed drone strikes in Oryol, Russia, indicating continued offensive capabilities into Russian territory. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Success (IO - Countering Middle East narratives implicitly): Ukrainian channels continue to report on Israeli casualties (RBC-Ukraine: "sharply increased") without additional Russian spin, implicitly highlighting the reality of the crisis without amplifying Russian narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Success (Internal Morale/Sustainment): Formalized veteran support programs (Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration) are a positive step for long-term force morale and social reintegration. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). President Zelenskyy has submitted a proposal to the Rada to appoint Ruslan Kravchenko as Prosecutor General, signaling continued governance and anti-corruption efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setback (Deep Strike on Kyiv): Russian drone attack reported in Kyiv (Rusanivski Sady) causing damage and casualties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). KAB strikes on Donetsk Oblast continue. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setback (Deep Strike on C2/Logistics): Russian claims of destroying a Ukrainian UAV C2 in Kherson, if true, represent a tactical setback. (CONFIDENCE: LOW for independent verification, HIGH for Russian claim).
• Setback (Information Warfare/Propaganda): Russian claims of "liberation" of Ulyanovka, continued FSB "terrorist" arrests, and the aggressive radicalization of anti-Semitic rhetoric target Ukrainian morale and legitimacy. The Hungarian ruling party's "criticism" of Ukraine's EU accession, linking it to human trafficking, adds to external pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setback (Tactical Repositioning under pressure): Russian claims of Ukrainian withdrawal to Voskresenka, if verified, indicate Russian pressure is forcing Ukrainian tactical adjustments. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Setback (Prisoner Exchange): Russian claim of releasing fighters from Ukrainian captivity suggests that Ukraine is also under pressure to exchange prisoners. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for claim).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• The continuous UAV strikes against Ukrainian cities (Kyiv) and KAB strikes underscore the ongoing strain on Ukrainian air defense munitions. The escalating rhetoric and direct diplomatic actions from Russia regarding the Middle East conflict continue to complicate Western resource allocation and diplomatic efforts. The claimed capture of Ulyanovka and pressure in Komar/Kramatorsk/Zaporizhzhia will require defensive resources to counter. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• The need for veteran support specialists indicates a growing number of personnel requiring assistance, which strains social and financial resources. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• The potential for further Russian deep strikes on C2 nodes and logistics hubs necessitates robust defensive measures and redundant systems. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Narratives (CRITICAL - HIGHLY ACTIVE, AGGRESSIVE, MANIPULATIVE, RADICALIZED & REAL-TIME RESPONSE, NOW FEATURING DIRECT DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE AND THREATS FROM MIDDLE EAST ACTORS, IDEOLOGICAL EXTREMISM, AND SELECTIVE DENIALS OF PREVIOUS FALSE CLAIMS):

  • Escalation of Middle East Conflict & Iranian "Resolve" (CRITICAL - Ongoing, Escalated, and Immediately Amplified/Manipulated, now with official Russian diplomatic actions, direct threats, and the introduction of highly inflammatory, ideological narratives, and denials of previously pushed false claims): Russian milbloggers (Fighterbomber) and state media (TASS) are extensively amplifying sensational, unverified claims regarding Israeli/Iranian casualties (ASTRA: 8 killed in Israel; WarGonzo: 70+ Iranian women/children killed) and direct threats from Iranian IRGC to continue operations until "complete destruction" of Israel. Crucially, Russia is now translating this amplification into direct diplomatic action, recommending its citizens leave Israel (via Egypt border) and considering embassy evacuation. TASS reports Iranian MFA call for UNSC condemnation. Alex Parker Returns claims THAAD AD system "destroyed itself" due to Iranian hacking. However, TASS has now reported that the Iranian Parliament denies considering a bill to withdraw from the NPT, directly contradicting earlier Russian-amplified claims. This demonstrates Russia's willingness to retract claims that become untenable, but still aims to create chaos. This is designed to psychologically impact Western audiences, promote a narrative of Israeli/Western vulnerability, and bolster the perception of advanced military capabilities among Russia's partners and global instability. Fighterbomber's "Ukraine for Iran" rhetoric signals a deliberate attempt to frame the Middle East conflict as a strategic win for Russia. Basurin's video of "Tehran residents leaving" (uncertified) adds to the panic narrative. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Military Successes in Ukraine: Poddubny |Z|O|V| edition reports TOS 'Solntsepyok' successes in Kramatorsk. "Операция Z" claims "liberation" of Ulyanovka with supporting drone footage. MoD Russia releases video of MLRS strikes and claims destruction of UAV C2 in Kherson. Народная милиция ДНР reports drone destruction of AFU equipment in Novotoretskoye. "Сливочный каприз" (Russian channel) publishes a self-produced chart showing "Темп наступательной операции ВС РФ в зоне СВО" (Pace of Offensive Operation of the Russian Armed Forces in the SVO zone), claiming advances in km² per day. This is a clear attempt to project progress and maintain domestic morale, though the data source is internal. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for claim/imagery, LOW for independent verification of details, HIGH for intent to project success).
  • Ukrainian Subversive Activity & FSB Successes: "Операция Z" (Военкоры Русской Весны) re-amplifies FSB reports on detaining a "Kyiv agent" in Kherson preparing a terrorist act, with video evidence. Офіс Генерального прокурора confirms sentencing of a Russian agent in Mykolaiv, which Russia can spin. This aims to legitimize Russian occupation and demonize Ukrainian resistance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Domestic Resilience & Progress/Normalcy: TASS reports on a new scam in Belarus. "Новости Москвы" shows purely civilian content (marketplace item). ASTRA reports Belgorod Oblast head's proposal regarding restoration, showing the administration grappling with war-related issues, but still projecting governance, albeit with a punitive element. TASS celebrates Artek's 100th anniversary, evoking Soviet nostalgia and projecting normalcy. Igor Artamonov's announcement of prisoner exchange is intended to show the state caring for its citizens. "МОБИЛИЗАЦИЯ | Новости | Срочники" reports "military personnel deceived with free land in Krasnoyarsk Krai," which is a negative internal message but shows some domestic reporting on grievances. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for effort).
  • Ukrainian Weakness/Western Aid Fragmentation: Kotsnews' discussion of "cessation of supplies and Russian successes" explicitly reinforces the narrative of Western aid diversion and aid fragility, as global attention is increasingly drawn elsewhere. The direct diplomatic actions regarding the Middle East conflict indirectly reinforce this. Colonelcassad's fundraising for "Summer Campaign 2025" for the Russian army itself also reinforces a "people's war" narrative. "Операция Z" amplifying Military Watch on US tanker redeployments to Europe is likely framed to suggest US resource diversion. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ideological Radicalization: "Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦" highlights a Russian milblogger's desire for "big news" (e.g., assassinations of Ukrainian leaders) and praising "beautiful footage" of strikes on civilian buildings (Kherson administration), which indicates a drive for more extreme and visually impactful propaganda to maintain domestic engagement. Alex Parker Returns' message citing Patriarch Kirill's call to "repent and convert to Islam" is a clear attempt to sow inter-religious division and further radicalize the information space (despite the initial message being against inciting conflict). A Ukrainian channel "Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦" also features a video of a man (claimed to be a Mexican mercenary, Muhammad Davud) making disturbing claims of cannibalism and fighting "only for money," which is used by Ukrainian channels to discredit Russian forces as "mrazozta" (scum/freaks). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

• Ukrainian Counter-Narratives: Ukrainian channels (Оперативний ЗСУ, STERNENKO, Сили оборони Півдня України, Офіс Генерального прокурора, Air Force, ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS) are consistently reporting on Russian strikes (Kyiv casualties, southern front intensity, KABs on Donetsk, Oryol), and emphasizing effective counter-operations (drone attacks against Russian positions, FPV drone intercepts, successful agent arrests, reduction in Sumy assaults). Ukraine needs to proactively link this new Middle East escalation and the direct diplomatic actions taken by Russia to Russian destabilization efforts and directly counter Russian narratives about Ukrainian tactical operations. The ZOA's efforts to support veterans demonstrate a focus on long-term national resilience. Publicizing official appointments like the Prosecutor General nominee emphasizes stability. ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS' report on reduced assault intensity in Sumy is a positive counter-narrative. The Hungarian ruling party's "discreditation" of Ukraine is being highlighted by Ukrainian channels (Оперативний ЗСУ). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian Morale: Successful drone intercepts, tactical FPV drone strikes, deep strikes into Russia (Oryol), and counter-intelligence operations will boost frontline morale. Air defense activity (though with casualties in Kyiv) demonstrates continued resistance. Formalized veteran support programs can contribute to social cohesion and morale, but the scale of the need also highlights the human cost of the war. Continued political appointments show stability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Morale: Russian IO aims to boost domestic morale by portraying Russia as a globally relevant power (Middle East narratives, strategic "exchange" rhetoric, UNSC diplomatic moves, US tanker redeployments), a nation of stability and care for its citizens (TASS trivial news, Belgorod administration addressing issues, Artek anniversary, POW exchanges), and military effectiveness (claimed Ulyanovka capture, TOS strikes, FSB successes, drone destruction footage, self-produced "advances" charts). The milblogger's desire for "big news" (i.e., more extreme Russian "victories" or Ukrainian "losses") indicates a need to sustain domestic enthusiasm for the war. Colonelcassad's fundraising indicates a segment of the population actively supporting the war effort. The Avito EW system listing and "free land" deception claims could potentially undermine morale or trust in authorities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Belgorod Citizen Morale: The proposal to not restore property for those who left indicates potential for discontent and division among the affected Russian population, potentially impacting morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Iranian Public Sentiment: Basurin's video claiming Teheran residents are leaving suggests a narrative of fear and displacement in Iran, intended to highlight the instability there. (CONFIDENCE: LOW for video veracity, HIGH for Russian intent).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• The intensified Russian amplification of the Israel-Iran conflict, with new sensational claims (e.g., 8 killed / 287 wounded), and now official Russian diplomatic warnings for its citizens to leave Israel and consideration of embassy evacuation (via Egypt), along with Iran's call for UNSC condemnation of Israel (as reported by TASS), represents a dangerous and significant diplomatic pressure point. This plays directly into Russia's strategy of diverting focus and resources away from Ukraine by creating a perception of broader global instability and conflict that demands Western attention and resources. Fighterbomber's comment on "exchanging Ukraine for Iran" is a clear articulation of this strategic goal. The initial Iranian NPT withdrawal claim (later denied by TASS), even if false, would further destabilize global security and international non-proliferation efforts. The Hungarian ruling party's "discreditation" of Ukraine's EU accession could indicate further fragmentation of EU support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Aggressive, Targeted, and Real-time Manipulative Narrative Campaign (CRITICAL, CONFIRMED IMMEDIATE FOCUS, NOW INCLUDING DIRECT DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE AND THREATS FROM MIDDLE EAST ACTORS, IDEOLOGICAL RADICALIZATION, AND SELECTIVE DENIALS/RETRACTIONS): Russia will continue its intensified information campaign, with an immediate and sustained focus on amplifying and manipulating the Israel-Iran conflict, explicitly promoting sensational claims of high casualties and direct threats from Iranian IRGC, leveraging its own diplomatic presence to underscore the severity and global implications of the crisis, and introducing highly inflammatory ideological narratives (e.g., anti-Semitic rhetoric, "strategic exchange" of Ukraine for Iran). While they may retract demonstrably false claims (e.g., NPT withdrawal), they will continue to introduce new, unverified accusations (e.g., THAAD self-destruction due to hacking). This will be done to drive wedges in Western alliances, undermine aid, and radicalize global audiences. Russia will amplify any further escalations in the Middle East and will likely introduce more specific, potentially false, claims about impacts or Western involvement. Russia will also actively attempt to control the narrative around Ukrainian tactical operations, spinning any setbacks and linking them to their own "successes" (e.g., Ulyanovka capture, pressure in Komar/Kramatorsk/Zaporizhzhia), while continuing to highlight domestic stability and military adaptation (FSB "terrorist" arrests, POW exchanges, self-produced "advances" charts). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Sustained Localized Ground Pressure with Exaggerated Claims: Russian forces will continue localized ground pressure, particularly in the Donetsk axes (Pokrovsk direction, including Novopavlivka, Burlatske, Novopol, Konstantinovka, and Ulyanovka/Malynivka, and now Kramatorsk direction), and the Zaporizhzhia direction. They will also likely attempt to exploit any perceived Ukrainian withdrawals (e.g., to Voskresenka) to advance further. They will continue to use state media and milbloggers to claim disproportionately high Ukrainian casualties and BDA, and to exaggerate territorial gains. They will continue to use TOS 'Solntsepyok' for localized effect and employ improvised MLRS systems. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Sustained Massed UAV/Missile Strikes on Ukrainian Cities/Infrastructure & C2: Russia will continue to launch large numbers of UAVs against Ukrainian targets (critical infrastructure, urban centers like Kyiv, Kharkiv) to deplete Ukrainian long-range air defense capabilities and exert psychological pressure. They will also conduct KAB strikes on frontline areas (Donetsk) and target Ukrainian C2 nodes (as claimed in Kherson). Continued drone strikes deep within Russian territory by Ukraine (Oryol) are likely to elicit further retaliatory strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Continued Counter-Insurgency/Propaganda Operations in Occupied Territories: FSB will likely continue to stage or publicize arrests of alleged "terrorists" to legitimize Russian control and demonize Ukrainian resistance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Coordinated Strategic Strike Package with Ground Offensive under Cover of Diversion Narrative & Political Pressure (Retained from previous ISR, now with intensified IO component, Middle East Crisis Amplification/Manipulation, including direct diplomatic pressure and threats, ideological radicalization, and selective denials of previous false claims): Russia executes a highly coordinated, large-scale combined arms offensive, potentially targeting the Pokrovsk axis or a renewed thrust from the north. This would involve:
  1. A massed strike of ballistic and cruise missiles in conjunction with loitering munitions against critical Ukrainian C2, logistics, and major AD sites across the entire operational depth, aimed at achieving temporary air superiority and operational paralysis, capitalizing on the psychological impact of perceived Western aid withdrawal and the intensified global distraction. The recent pattern of deep strikes and massed UAVs could be a precursor.
  2. Simultaneous major ground offensives on multiple axes (e.g., Pokrovsk, Sumy/Northern-Slobozhanskyi, Kharkiv/Southern-Slobozhanskyi), capitalizing on the psychological impact of perceived Western aid diversion and the physical degradation of Ukrainian command and control.
  3. This would be synchronized with an unprecedented surge in Russian IO, including fabricated "false flag" events in Ukraine or neighboring countries to justify the escalation and reinforce the narrative of Western impotence and Ukrainian collapse, especially on the back of amplified and manipulated claims of aid cessation and escalated global conflicts (e.g., Middle East, now with magnified focus on high casualties, Iranian threats, direct Russian diplomatic actions, and the introduction of highly inflammatory ideological rhetoric like NPT withdrawal claims or explicit anti-Semitism, alongside the selective denial of previous false claims to maintain credibility for future ones). (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Immediate (Next 1-6 hours):
  • ISR: Continue to prioritize collection to verify or refute claims of Russian territorial gains and Ukrainian withdrawals (Voskresenka, Komar area, Novotoretskoye). Continue real-time tracking of Russian milblogger and state media channels for new narratives or amplification of existing ones, particularly regarding the Israel-Iran conflict and its implications for Western aid, focusing now on deeper, fabricated claims of US involvement/ties/BDA/casualties, intensified diplomatic pressure from Russia, and the highly inflammatory claims such as THAAD self-destruction due to hacking, explicit anti-Semitism, or the "exchange Ukraine for Iran" narrative, as well as the Iranian MFA's call to the UNSC. Note and analyze Russian denials of previously amplified false claims (e.g., NPT withdrawal). Monitor for follow-on UAV/missile waves and KAB/TOS strikes into Sumy/Donetsk/Kharkiv/Kyiv. Track any further claims regarding POW exchanges. Monitor for any reports of Russian force movements towards the Sumy border.
  • IO: Commanders must continue preparation for a robust counter-narrative to the "US stops aid to Ukraine" claim. Ukrainian channels should highlight the continued effectiveness of Ukrainian drone operations (including new FPV drone strike videos, deep strikes on Oryol), counter-battery fire, and high air defense success rates (e.g., FPV drone intercepts, Sumy defense successes), and successful counter-intelligence operations. Prepare immediate debunking of false TASS/Russian claims regarding the Middle East crisis and Ukrainian tactical setbacks, especially the new, more insidious claims of high Israeli/Iranian casualties, Iranian threats as amplified by Russia, the THAAD self-destruction claim, and the direct Russian diplomatic actions to withdraw citizens. Proactively link the escalating Middle East crisis to Russian destabilization efforts and expose Russian amplification and manipulation. Publicly expose Russian casualties or equipment losses (e.g., from successful Ukrainian AD or FPV drone strikes). Proactively expose Russian corruption (e.g., EW system on Avito).

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• GAP 1: VERIFICATION OF "THE TELEGRAPH" REPORT ON US AID CESSATION (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE, HYPER-PRIORITY, RETAINED): Independent, all-source verification of the "The Telegraph" report amplified by Russian sources regarding the cessation of US military aid to Ukraine. Assess the type, quantity, and operational impact of any such claims on Ukrainian defense capabilities.
  • COLLECTION REQUIREMENT (CR): Prioritize SIGINT, OSINT (direct source review of "The Telegraph" article for context, content, and accuracy), IMINT, and HUMINT from US, NATO, and Ukrainian sources to confirm or refute these reports. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 2: VERIFICATION OF ISRAELI/IRANIAN IMPACTS & RUSSIAN CLAIMS ON IRANIAN "HYPERSONIC" USE / AD DEFEAT / US INVOLVEMENT/TIES/BDA/CASUALTIES / NUCLEAR THREATS / IRAN NPT WITHDRAWAL / IRANIAN MFA UNSC PUSH (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE, UPDATED FOCUS): Independent, all-source verification of all specific impact claims in Israel (e.g., Haifa refinery/power station damage, US Embassy damage, specific casualty figures in Haifa, 8 killed, 287 wounded) and the reconciliation of conflicting casualty figures. Critically, assess the veracity of claims of Iranian "hypersonic" missile use and "new methods" to defeat Israeli air defenses, as well as claims of US Embassy damage in Tel Aviv and the shooting down of a US MQ-9 Reaper drone. Verify the claim of THAAD self-destruction due to Iranian hacking. Also, verify the claim that Israel is attempting to convince the US to join military operations against Iran, the new, fabricated claims of US-Iranian consultations or an "American-Israeli war," and the specific claim of an Arrow-3/THAAD AD system being struck at Nevatim (from previous ISR). Additionally, verify Rybar's claims of US refueling aircraft redeployment and changes in communication patterns for sea-based cruise missiles (from previous ISR). Assess the specific impact and intent of the re-introduction of overt anti-Semitic propaganda and nuclear threats by Russian state-aligned channels, as well as the impact of direct Russian diplomatic actions (citizen warnings, embassy evacuation consideration, calls for UNSC condemnation of Israel). CONFIRM AND ANALYZE THE RUSSIAN DENIAL OF THE IRANIAN PARLIAMENT VOTE TO WITHDRAW FROM NPT. Verify claims of Tehran residents leaving.
  • CR: Prioritize OSINT (cross-referencing with Israeli official reports, international news agencies, US official statements, IAEA), IMINT (satellite imagery post-strike), and HUMINT from Israeli and US sources. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 3: RUSSIAN INTENT & FORCE DISPOSITION ON NORTHERN AXIS (CRITICAL, RETAINED): Verification of reports of Russian troop movements to Belarus. Assess if the sustained Russian presence in Kursk border region indicates a future offensive push.
  • CR: Prioritize IMINT, SIGINT, and HUMINT on Russian force composition, logistics build-up, and intent on the Belarus border and Kursk. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 4: UKRAINIAN BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (BDA) FROM RECENT DEEP STRIKES (CRITICAL, ONGOING): Full extent of damage and operational impact from recent Russian deep strikes on Ukrainian C2, logistics, and industrial sites (e.g., Dnipropetrovsk industrial enterprise from previous ISR), and civilian areas (Kyiv, Kharkiv). Also, full BDA of claimed Russian strikes on Ukrainian dugout/UAV control point near Mirnoye. Specifically, verify Russian claims of destroying a Ukrainian UAV command post in Kherson, and assess the operational impact.
  • CR: Prioritize HUMINT from affected units, OSINT (local reports, social media analysis), and IMINT (satellite imagery analysis if available) to determine operational impact and identify vulnerabilities. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 5: RUSSIAN ROLE IN ISRAEL-IRAN ESCALATION (CRITICAL, RETAINED, NEW FOCUS ON "HYPERSONIC" CLAIMS, ANTI-SEMITISM, NUCLEAR THREATS, NPT WITHDRAWAL, AND DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE): Assess the extent of direct or indirect Russian involvement in instigating or facilitating the recent missile launches from Iran towards Israel, beyond mere amplification and narrative manipulation. Is Russia providing intelligence, materiel, or political cover? Specifically, analyze the motivation and target audience for the amplification of "hypersonic" claims, nuclear threats, the introduction of overt anti-Semitic propaganda, and the initial (and now denied) claim of Iranian NPT withdrawal by Russian state-aligned channels, as well as the intent behind official Russian diplomatic warnings/evacuations and the "Ukraine for Iran" rhetoric. Analyze the impact of Russian retractions of false claims.
  • CR: Prioritize SIGINT, HUMINT, and OSINT on Russia-Iran communications and coordination, and US military movements in the region. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 6: VERIFICATION OF RUSSIAN TACTICAL GAINS AND UKRAINIAN WITHDRAWALS (MEDIUM, UPDATED): Independent verification of Russian claims of "full clearing" of Malynivka (Ulyanovka), advances near Burlatske and Novopol, and Pushilin's claim of deep penetration into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast towards Pokrovsk. Critically, verify the Russian claim of Ukrainian forces withdrawing from Komar area to Voskresenka. Verify Russian claims of destruction of AFU equipment at Novotoretskoye. Assess the veracity of the Russian-produced "Pace of Offensive Operation" chart and its data.
  • CR: Prioritize HUMINT from Ukrainian units in the area, OSINT (local reports, geolocated video/photos), and IMINT. (PRIORITY: MEDIUM).
• GAP 7: RUSSIAN TACTICAL UAV SUPPLY SHORTFALLS AND FUNDRAISING (MEDIUM, UPDATED): Determine if the crowdfunding appeals for specific drone models by Russian units (VDV, Zaporozhye infantry) or general "Summer Campaign 2025" fundraisers indicate systemic logistical issues or localized shortages. Assess the scale of these shortfalls and their impact on Russian tactical reconnaissance and targeting capabilities. Investigate the Avito listing of an EW system from Belgorod Oblast for indications of internal corruption or supply chain issues.
  • CR: Prioritize OSINT (monitoring further crowdfunding appeals, social media analysis of Russian military personnel discussions), HUMINT. (PRIORITY: MEDIUM).
• GAP 8: VERACITY OF RUSSIAN "TERRORIST" ARRESTS (MEDIUM, RETAINED): Independent verification of the details and context surrounding the FSB's claimed arrest of a "Kyiv agent" in Kherson Oblast. Assess whether this is a legitimate counter-terrorism operation or a propaganda fabrication.
  • CR: Prioritize HUMINT, OSINT (local reports, independent media), and review of Russian methodology. (PRIORITY: MEDIUM).
• GAP 9: DETAILS OF POW EXCHANGES (LOW, NEW): Verify numbers, conditions, and composition of personnel involved in claimed POW exchanges.
  • CR: Prioritize OSINT (Ukrainian official reports, international organizations) and HUMINT (from released personnel). (PRIORITY: LOW).
• GAP 10: USE OF NORTH KOREAN MATERIEL (LOW, NEW): Assess the prevalence and impact of North Korean weapons systems (e.g., Type 75 MLRS) in the Russian armed forces.
  • CR: Prioritize OSINT (imagery analysis), HUMINT. (PRIORITY: LOW).

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

• Intelligence & Special Operations (ISR, HUMINT, OSINT critical):

  1. CRITICAL PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE VERIFICATION OF "THE TELEGRAPH" AID CESSATION CLAIM. All-source intelligence must rapidly confirm or refute the Russian-amplified report on US military aid cessation. This remains the single most critical collection requirement for the next 6-12 hours. (Supports CR 1).
  2. CRITICAL PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE VERIFICATION OF CLAIMS REGARDING IRANIAN "HYPERSONIC" USE / AD DEFEAT / US INVOLVEMENT/TIES/BDA/CASUALTIES / NUCLEAR THREATS / IRAN NPT WITHDRAWAL / IRANIAN MFA UNSC PUSH IN MIDDLE EAST. Rapidly confirm or deny claims of Iranian hypersonic missile use, AD defeat, US Embassy damage, and US MQ-9 Reaper drone shootdown. Expose any exaggeration or fabrication by Russian/Iranian sources. Critically, assess the intent and impact of nuclear threats and overt anti-Semitic slurs from Russian-aligned channels, the veracity of the THAAD self-destruction claim, and the implications of Russia's denial of the Iranian NPT withdrawal claim, as well as the impact of direct Russian diplomatic actions (citizen warnings, embassy evacuation consideration, calls for UNSC condemnation of Israel). (Supports CR 2, CR 5).
  3. CRITICAL PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE VERIFICATION OF RUSSIAN TERRITORIAL CLAIMS/ACTIVITY IN SUMY OBLAST AND DNIPROPETROVSK/POKROVSK/KRAMATORSK/ZAPORIZHIA AXES, INCLUDING ULYANOVKA AND VOSKRESENKA, AND NOVOTORETSKOYE. Deploy all available ISR assets to confirm or refute the scale and nature of Russian "activation" and claimed positions in Sumy Oblast and the alleged deep penetration towards Pokrovsk/Kramatorsk, particularly the claimed capture of Ulyanovka, the reported Ukrainian withdrawal to Voskresenka, and destruction of equipment at Novotoretskoye. If verified, assess the implications for the overall defense posture. If false, prepare a robust counter-narrative. (Supports CR 3, CR 6).
  4. URGENT: VERIFY RUSSIAN "TERRORIST" ARRESTS IN KHERSON AND UKRAINIAN UAV C2 DESTRUCTION CLAIM. Assess the veracity of FSB claims regarding the detained "Kyiv agent" and MoD claims of destroyed UAV C2 to determine if it is a legitimate operation or a propaganda pretext. (Supports CR 4, CR 8).
  5. CRITICAL PRIORITY: INTENSIFY ISR ON POKROVSK, KHARKIV-KUPYANSK, SUMY, DNIPROPETROVSK, KRAMATORSK, ZAPORIZHIA AXES, AND NORTHERN BORDER WITH BELARUS. Maintain continuous monitoring for any signs of Russian force buildup or offensive preparations. (Supports CR 3, CR 6).
  6. URGENT: ASSESS BDA OF RECENT C2/LOGISTICS/INDUSTRIAL/CIVILIAN STRIKES. GUR/SBU to conduct immediate, granular battle damage assessment (BDA) for the Kyiv civilian damage, Oryol strikes, Kharkiv strikes, and other recent deep strikes. Identify systemic vulnerabilities and develop immediate counter-measures. (Supports CR 4).
  7. IMMEDIATE: MONITOR AND EXPLOIT RUSSIAN IO NARRATIVES (ESPECIALLY ON WESTERN AID CESSATION, MIDDLE EAST "US INVOLVEMENT/TIES/BDA/CASUALTIES," IRANIAN "HYPERSONIC" CLAIMS, NUCLEAR THREATS, IRAN NPT WITHDRAWAL (AND ITS DENIAL), "UKRAINIAN LOSSES" AND EXPLICIT ANTI-SEMITISM). Actively monitor for and analyze new Russian IO narratives, particularly those claiming reduced/stopped Western aid to Ukraine, exaggerating Middle East "successes" or "incidents," speculating on US involvement or ties (including specific unverified BDA/casualties), and the new, sensational claims of Iranian "hypersonic" missile use and AD defeat, explicit nuclear threats, claims of Iranian NPT withdrawal (and subsequent denial), and the use of overt anti-Semitic propaganda. Also track Russian diplomatic actions in the Middle East and the "Ukraine for Iran" narrative, and Iranian MFA calls to UNSC. (Supports CR 1, 2, 5).
  8. CONTINUOUS COUNTER-SABOTAGE INTELLIGENCE & INTERNAL SECURITY MONITORING. Continue efforts to identify and neutralize collaborators, as demonstrated by the recent success in Mykolaiv and Donetsk. Investigate the Avito EW system listing for signs of internal corruption or diversion.

• Air Defense & Force Protection:

  1. MAINTAIN HIGHEST AIR DEFENSE READINESS ACROSS ALL OBLASTS, WITH EMPHASIS ON EASTERN AIR THREAT AND INDUSTRIAL/CIVILIAN TARGETS. Anticipate Russia may increase the intensity or breadth of aerial attacks (UAVs, ballistic missiles, KABs, tactical aviation, TOS) to capitalize on global distraction and the IO narrative of Western aid cessation. Ensure layered AD coverage for critical infrastructure and population centers, particularly industrial sites and population centers.
  2. ADAPT TO WIDER GEOGRAPHIC DRONE/MISSILE THREAT & COUNTER DEEP STRIKES. Implement and refine TTPs to counter widespread, multi-axis attacks, including FPV drones using small arms. Prioritize resources for defending critical C2 nodes, ammunition depots, and industrial/civilian facilities against confirmed Russian deep strikes.
  3. REVIEW AND REHEARSE CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS (COOP) PLANS. All units must immediately review and rehearse COOP plans, ensuring redundant communication pathways and alternate command posts are ready, given the persistent threat of deep strikes.
  4. IMMEDIATE DISPERSAL AND CONCEALMENT. Disperse all high-value assets and personnel. Reinforce concealment measures, especially for C2 nodes and logistics hubs, against FPV drones and KABs.

• Ground Forces:

  1. MAINTAIN DISCIPLINED DEFENSIVE POSTURE IN POKROVSK, KHARKIV-KUPYANSK, SUMY, DNIPROPETROVSK, KRAMATORSK, ZAPORIZHZHIA, AND NORTHERN BORDER DIRECTIONS. Prioritize strong defensive lines.
  2. REINFORCE DEFENSES IN SUMY OBLAST (NORTHERN-SLOBOZHANSKYI DIRECTION). Based on DPGU announcement and Russian intent, prepare for increased Russian ground activity and cross-border incursions. Continue to leverage successes in countering Russian assault attempts.
  3. CONTAIN RUSSIAN ADVANCES IN DONETSK/DNIPROPETROVSK/ZAPORIZHZHIA, ESPECIALLY AROUND ULYANOVKA/MALYNIVKA, KOMAR AREA, AND VOSKRESENKA, AND NOVOTORETSKOYE. Reinforce defensive lines near Burlatske, Novopol, Novopavlivka, and especially on the axis towards Pokrovsk/Kramatorsk, and Zaporizhzhia, to prevent further Russian tactical/operational gains. Prepare for counter-attacks to regain lost ground or consolidate defensive lines.
  4. CONTINUE FPV DRONE OPERATIONS & COUNTER-BATTERY. Leverage successes in FPV drone attacks against Russian targets (e.g., dugouts, vehicles, personnel) and continue aggressive counter-battery fire against Russian artillery and MLRS (TOS, improvised MLRS). Analyze successful targeting methods.
  5. MAINTAIN DNEPR RIVER PATROLS AND INTERDICTION CAPABILITIES. Continue successful operations to prevent Russian river crossings in Kherson.

• Information Operations (IO):

  1. IMMEDIATE & AGGRESSIVE: COUNTER RUSSIAN NARRATIVES ON "US AID CESSATION," MIDDLE EAST "HYPERSONIC" CLAIMS / "US INVOLVEMENT/TIES/BDA/CASUALTIES," NUCLEAR THREATS, IRAN NPT WITHDRAWAL (AND ITS DENIAL), "UKRAINIAN LOSSES," AND EXPLICIT ANTI-SEMITISM. Proactively and forcefully counter the narrative that the US is stopping aid. Immediately debunk false TASS/Russian claims regarding Iranian "hypersonic" use and advanced AD defeat, and any fabricated claims of US-Iranian consultations or an "American-Israeli war" AND the specific unverified BDA/casualty claims, including US Embassy damage, and the high Israeli/Iranian casualty figures. FORCEFULLY CONDEMN THE INTRODUCTION OF OVERT ANTI-SEMITIC PROPAGANDA, ESPECIALLY WHEN COMBINED WITH NUCLEAR THREATS, by Russian channels. IMMEDIATELY ADDRESS THE RUSSIAN DENIAL OF THE IRANIAN NPT WITHDRAWAL CLAIM, highlighting the previous amplification as evidence of Russian disinformation tactics. Emphasize that Russia seeks to destabilize both regions to exhaust Western resources and attention, as evidenced by the "Ukraine for Iran" rhetoric. Highlight Ukrainian successes in inflicting Russian losses (e.g., successful drone defense, artillery engagements, high AD kill rates, FPV drone intercepts, successful agent arrests, deep strikes on Oryol) and AD effectiveness. Expose the neglect of Russian war graves as a counter to their "patriotic" narrative. Expose any internal Russian corruption (e.g., EW system on Avito).
  2. RAPID DEBUNKING OF MISINFORMATION. Maintain rapid response to immediately debunk unverified and sensationalized claims propagated by Russian state media and milbloggers (e.g., fabricated Israeli/US actions, rapidly escalating and unverified casualty figures, specific BDA claims, and aggressive territorial claims like "Dnipropetrovsk bridgehead" or "Sumy breakthrough," claimed "liberation" of Ulyanovka, Ukrainian withdrawals to Voskresenka, and claims of Tehran residents leaving). Expose Russia's use of emotionally charged propaganda and anti-Semitic rhetoric.
  3. PROMOTE UKRAINIAN RESILIENCE & AD SUCCESSES: Highlight ongoing Ukrainian AD operations and any successful intercepts to reassure the public and international partners of continued defensive capabilities. Project local control and normalcy despite civilian casualties. Publicize formalized veteran support programs to boost morale and show national resilience. Publicize successful counter-intelligence operations. Publicly highlight official appointments (e.g., new Prosecutor General nominee) to demonstrate governmental stability.
  4. HIGHLIGHT RUSSIAN ALLIANCES WITH PARIAH STATES & ROLE IN GLOBAL INSTABILITY. Emphasize that Russia directly benefits from and seeks to amplify and manipulate global instability, and is now using potentially unverified claims and narratives of US involvement (and fabricated US ties/BDA/casualties and anti-Semitic slurs) to further this aim. Expose Russian attempts to draw the US into the Middle East conflict as a deliberate strategy to divert attention from Ukraine. Highlight the use of North Korean materiel by Russian forces.

• Diplomatic/Inter-Agency:

  1. IMMEDIATE & PROACTIVE: ENGAGE KEY PARTNERS ON SUSTAINED SUPPORT AND COUNTERING RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC MANIPULATION AND AID NARRATIVES. Ukrainian diplomatic missions should immediately engage with US, EU, and other key partners to address "The Telegraph" report on aid cessation. Seek clarification and a unified, strong public message of continued robust support. Emphasize that such narratives are deliberate Russian attempts to sow discord and undermine support. Leverage the confirmed Trump-Zelenskyy meeting at the G7 summit to reinforce direct communication and continued high-level engagement.
  2. COORDINATE WITH ALLIES ON IO STRATEGY: Coordinate closely with allied IO agencies to ensure a unified and consistent counter-narrative to Russian disinformation, particularly regarding aid, global conflict, and the new, more extreme and manipulative narratives, including the direct attempt to draw the US into the Middle East conflict with fabricated claims and unverified BDA/casualties, the sensational claims of "hypersonic" use, claims of Iranian NPT withdrawal (and its denial), and the introduction of overt anti-Semitic propaganda and nuclear threats. Also coordinate response to Russian diplomatic actions in the Middle East and the "Ukraine for Iran" rhetoric, and Iranian MFA calls to UNSC.
  3. INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION OF CIVILIAN/INDUSTRIAL TARGETING AND RUSSIAN ANTI-SEMITIC PROPAGANDA. Continue to highlight Russian strikes on civilian/industrial targets to maintain international pressure and secure further AD assistance. Simultaneously, seek strong international condemnation of Russia's use of overt anti-Semitic propaganda as a tool of information warfare. Condemn Russia's punitive measures against citizens in Belgorod. Engage international partners regarding the Hungarian ruling party's "discreditation" campaign.
  4. ENGAGE WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON VETERAN SUPPORT. Seek international assistance and partnerships for formal veteran support programs to ensure their sustainability and effectiveness.