Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME OF REPORT: 16 JUN 25 / 01:23 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 16 JUN 25 / 00:53 ZULU - 16 JUN 25 / 01:23 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // ORCON // NOFORN

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Ukraine Operational Area:
  • Zaporizhzhia Oblast: Russia conducted an attack on Zaporizhzhia, resulting in a fire at a "promyslovykh pidpryyemstv" (industrial enterprise). (RBC-Ukraine, Head of OVA Ivan Fedorov, 01:22Z). This confirms ongoing Russian targeting of industrial infrastructure in the rear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Operational Area (Internal):
  • Colonelcassad disseminated a video compilation titled "Attacks on AFU Facilities in May-June 2024 by Bear007" showcasing drone and artillery strikes against Ukrainian positions and equipment in Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv Oblasts. Locations include Tolstodubovo, Bachevsk, Seredina-Buda, Gorsk, Khrenovka, Udy, and Veterynarnoye. This serves as Russian propaganda demonstrating claimed tactical successes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for dissemination, LOW for independent verification of all claims within the compilation).
• Global Operational Area (Middle East Focus - Escalated):
  • Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported detecting missile launches from Iran towards Israeli territory and initiated interception procedures. (RBC-Ukraine, TASS, 01:12Z, 01:13Z). This is a significant escalation of the regional conflict. Population in Israel ordered to take shelter. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ukrainian milblogger Tsaplienko (citing Iran International) reports "Iranian elite packing bags and negotiating with the Russian Federation about possible evacuation." (01:02Z). This, if true, suggests a perception of significant risk among Iranian elites and potential Russian involvement in facilitating their exfiltration, possibly for influence or logistical purposes. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM for report, LOW for specific details of negotiation/evacuation).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• Night operations ongoing. No new specific weather or environmental factors affecting operations reported.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces: Maintain active air defense readiness (as evidenced by earlier reporting of AD activity, though a strike has now occurred in Zaporizhzhia). Defensive posture remains focused on countering Russian deep strikes and ground pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces: Demonstrated continued capability for precision strikes against Ukrainian industrial targets (Zaporizhzhia). Actively engaging in multi-pronged information warfare, including newly distributed compilations of alleged combat successes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Iranian Forces (External): Demonstrated capability for missile launches towards Israeli territory. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Israeli Forces (External): Actively engaged in air defense operations to intercept incoming missile threats. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RUSSIA FOCUSED)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA):

• Capabilities (Russia):
  • Deep Strike (CRITICAL - Confirmed and persistent): Continues to possess and utilize capabilities for deep strikes against Ukrainian industrial and rear area targets (Zaporizhzhia). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Sophisticated Information Warfare (CRITICAL - Confirmed and diversified): Highly adaptive, aggressive, and increasingly radicalized IO, leveraging international crises (Middle East, North Korea) and domestic narratives (civilian support for war, combat compilations). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Propaganda & Influence Operations: Able to produce and widely disseminate curated combat footage compilations (Colonelcassad's "Bear007" video) to showcase claimed tactical successes and maintain internal/external narratives of military effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Facilitation of Foreign Personnel Movement (Potentially New): May be involved in or offering to facilitate the evacuation of Iranian elites, suggesting a deeper, more active partnership than previously assessed. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Intentions (Russia):
  • Degrade Ukrainian Industrial/Logistical Capacity: Continued strikes on industrial targets aim to undermine Ukraine's war economy and logistics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Undermine Western Support to Ukraine (CRITICAL): Intensify efforts to promote narratives of Western resource diversion and aid reduction, now directly attempting to fracture Western alliances by appealing to specific political factions and escalating Middle East narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Project Global Relevance & Domestic Stability/Unity: Utilize state media to project an image of economic stability and successful domestic governance, while simultaneously leveraging global events to portray Russia as a key player. Morale-boosting videos (e.g., "Mamulya," "Bear007" compilation) aim to foster domestic unity and support for the war. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Legitimize Alliances and Future Cooperation: Propaganda on North Korea and potential involvement in Iranian elite evacuation aims to normalize and legitimize future cooperation with pariah states. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Provoke Regional Instability & Divert Attention (CRITICAL - Confirmed Escalation): Actively amplifying and potentially facilitating escalation in the Middle East to draw international attention away from Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Courses of Action (COA) (Russia):
  • COA 1 (Sustained Deep Strikes & AD Attrition): Continue high-volume drone and missile attacks across Ukrainian operational depth, aiming to deplete AD munitions and force redeployments, while simultaneously targeting critical infrastructure and C2 nodes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • COA 2 (Accelerated, Radicalized Narrative Campaign - CRITICAL): Intensify information operations, leveraging specific, often unverified or misrepresented, claims (e.g., "The Telegraph" on US aid, TASS on Tehran casualties) to aggressively promote narratives that fracture Western alliances, undermine aid, and radicalize global audiences. This COA is becoming more targeted and potentially more damaging due to its specificity and extremist content. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • COA 3 (Exploitation of Middle East Instability & Domestic Narrative Control): Continue to amplify and potentially encourage any negative developments in the Middle East, especially those related to Iran and Israel, to reinforce narratives of global instability and draw attention away from Ukraine. Simultaneously, state media will promote domestic "successes" and "unity" (e.g., "Mamulya," "Bear007" compilation) to project stability and resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • COA 4 (Visual Propaganda of Military/Civilian Support): Regularly release curated combat footage (e.g., "Bear007" compilation) and civilian support videos to reinforce perceptions of Russian tactical effectiveness, technological advantage, and domestic unity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• Continued Targeting of Industrial Infrastructure: The strike on a Zaporizhzhia industrial enterprise confirms Russia's ongoing focus on degrading Ukraine's war-related industrial capacity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Propagandistic Combat Compilations: The dissemination of professionally edited combat footage compilations, attributed to specific content creators ("Bear007"), indicates a formalized effort to control the narrative of battlefield success and potentially inspire pro-Russian milbloggers. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Deepening Role in Middle East Dynamics: The reported willingness to facilitate Iranian elite evacuation, if true, suggests a more direct and active role in the Israel-Iran conflict beyond mere diplomatic posturing, implying a potential for significant future cooperation or logistical support. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• The strike on Zaporizhzhia indicates continued availability of strike assets (likely missiles or drones). The compilation of drone/artillery footage from "Bear007" highlights the continued high operational tempo and consumption of munitions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for availability of strike assets, HIGH for high consumption rate). The report of Iranian elite evacuation discussions with Russia points to potential logistical and political coordination capabilities between Russia and Iran. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian Military C2: Effective in coordinating deep strikes on industrial targets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian IO/Diplomatic C2: Highly agile, aggressive, and effective in responding to real-time events and shaping narratives, now employing more specific and potentially damaging, even extremist, claims. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Iranian C2 (External): Demonstrated ability to launch missile strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UKRAINIAN FOCUSED)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Ukrainian air defenses remain engaged (prior alerts). The strike on Zaporizhzhia indicates that despite AD efforts, some Russian assets are penetrating defenses. Ukrainian forces must maintain vigilance against persistent deep strike threats. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Setback (Deep Strike): A Russian attack on an industrial enterprise in Zaporizhzhia resulted in a fire, indicating a successful Russian strike against Ukrainian infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Challenge (Information Warfare): The escalating Israel-Iran conflict, actively amplified by Russia, presents a significant and growing challenge to maintaining international focus and support for Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• The attack on Zaporizhzhia underscores the critical and ongoing need for robust, layered air defense systems to protect industrial and civilian infrastructure. The intensifying geopolitical distractions will create additional political and material constraints on resource allocation from Western partners. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Narratives (CRITICAL - HIGHLY ACTIVE, AGGRESSIVE & MANIPULATIVE):
  • "US Stops Aid to Ukraine" (HIGH IMPACT, SPECIFIC): Remains active (from previous reporting). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Escalation of Middle East Conflict (CRITICAL - Ongoing and escalating): TASS and RBC-Ukraine confirming missile launches from Iran towards Israel, with Israeli interception, directly plays into Russia's strategy of global destabilization to divert attention from Ukraine. Russia will amplify this and likely blame Western actors or portray itself as a peacemaker. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Pro-North Korea Alignment & Anti-Western Subversion (NEW FOCUS): Colonelcassad's rhetoric continues from previous reporting. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Showcasing Military Successes & Domestic Unity: Colonelcassad's distribution of the "Bear007" combat compilation is a clear effort to demonstrate Russian military effectiveness, technological prowess (drones, thermal imaging), and potentially to foster domestic morale and support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Potential Iranian Elite Evacuation by Russia: Tsaplienko's report, if confirmed, would be a potent symbol of deepening Russia-Iran ties, despite Russia's attempts to portray neutrality in the Israel-Iran conflict. Russia could leverage this to project influence and control over key regional actors. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Ukrainian Counter-Narratives: Ukrainian channels (RBC-Ukraine) accurately report on the escalation in the Middle East and domestic attacks (Zaporizhzhia), providing real-time transparency. Ukraine needs to proactively link this new Middle East escalation to Russian destabilization efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian Morale: The successful Russian strike on Zaporizhzhia and the escalating Middle East conflict will undoubtedly increase public anxiety and concern, reinforcing the need for stronger air defenses and sustained international support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Morale: Russian IO aims to boost domestic morale by portraying Russia as a globally relevant power, promoting domestic unity and support for the war, and by suggesting Western support for Ukraine is fragile and actively collapsing, now reinforced by "combat success" videos and global chaos. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• The direct missile launches from Iran to Israel, and subsequent interception, represent a dangerous and significant escalation that will undoubtedly consume significant international diplomatic attention. This plays directly into Russia's strategy of diverting focus and resources away from Ukraine. Russia will likely attempt to leverage this new crisis to further its narrative of a multi-polar world where Western influence is waning and its own position as a global player is rising. The reported Iranian elite evacuation discussions with Russia suggest deeper strategic alignment that will concern Western intelligence. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Renewed Deep Strikes (Post-Lull): Russia will resume large-scale drone/missile attacks across Ukraine, aiming to deplete AD munitions and force redeployments, while targeting critical infrastructure, industrial sites (like Zaporizhzhia), and C2 nodes. Tactical aviation will remain active in the eastern direction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Aggressive, Targeted, and Radicalized Narrative Campaign (CRITICAL): Russia will continue its intensified information campaign, leveraging specific, often unverified or misrepresented, claims (e.g., "The Telegraph" on US aid, TASS on Tehran casualties) to aggressively promote narratives that fracture Western alliances, undermine aid, and radicalize global audiences. This will be the primary focus of Russian IO, with a clear intent to internationalize and escalate other conflicts. Russia will amplify any further escalations in the Middle East. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Increased Visual Propaganda & "Combat Success" Narratives: Russia will increase the release of curated combat footage (like "Bear007" compilation) and domestic support videos to showcase tactical successes, technological prowess, and widespread civilian support, aimed at both internal and external audiences. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Deepening Russia-Iran Cooperation: Russia will likely continue to deepen its strategic cooperation with Iran, potentially including logistical support or political facilitation, as suggested by the elite evacuation discussions. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Coordinated Strategic Strike Package with Ground Offensive under Cover of Diversion Narrative & Political Pressure (Retained from previous ISR, now with intensified IO component and Middle East Crisis Amplification): Russia executes a highly coordinated, large-scale combined arms offensive, potentially targeting the Pokrovsk axis or a renewed thrust from the north. This would involve:
  1. A massed strike of ballistic and cruise missiles in conjunction with loitering munitions against critical Ukrainian C2, logistics, and major AD sites across the entire operational depth, aimed at achieving temporary air superiority and operational paralysis, capitalizing on the psychological impact of perceived Western aid withdrawal.
  2. Simultaneous major ground offensives on multiple axes, capitalizing on the psychological impact of perceived Western aid diversion and the physical degradation of Ukrainian command and control.
  3. This would be synchronized with an unprecedented surge in Russian IO, including fabricated "false flag" events in Ukraine or neighboring countries to justify the escalation and reinforce the narrative of Western impotence and Ukrainian collapse, especially on the back of amplified claims of aid cessation and escalated global conflicts (e.g., Middle East). The new, radicalized IO themes (anti-Semitic, pro-NK) and direct Middle East escalation indicate a willingness to employ even more extreme methods to sow chaos. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Immediate (Next 1-6 hours):
  • ISR: Continue to prioritize collection to verify or refute the "The Telegraph" claim regarding US military aid cessation. Monitor for any renewed drone/missile activity after the current lull. Continue real-time tracking of Russian milblogger and state media channels for new narratives or amplification of existing ones, particularly regarding Western aid, Middle East developments (especially the TASS claim on Tehran and the ongoing missile exchanges), and new "combat footage/support videos." Prioritize BDA for the Zaporizhzhia industrial strike. Crucially, monitor for Russian commentary or involvement regarding the Israel-Iran missile exchange.
  • IO: Commanders must continue preparation for a robust counter-narrative to the "US stops aid to Ukraine" claim. Ukrainian channels should highlight any successful AD engagements. Prepare immediate debunking of false TASS/Russian claims regarding the Middle East crisis. Proactively link the escalating Middle East crisis to Russian efforts to destabilize the global security environment and divert attention from Ukraine.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• GAP 1: VERIFICATION OF "THE TELEGRAPH" REPORT ON US AID CESSATION (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE, HYPER-PRIORITY): Independent, all-source verification of the "The Telegraph" report amplified by Russian sources regarding the cessation of US military aid to Ukraine. Assess the type, quantity, and operational impact of any such claims on Ukrainian defense capabilities.
  • COLLECTION REQUIREMENT (CR): Prioritize SIGINT, OSINT (direct source review of "The Telegraph" article for context, content, and accuracy), IMINT, and HUMINT from US, NATO, and Ukrainian sources to confirm or refute these reports. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 2: VERIFICATION OF TASS CLAIM ON ISRAELI STRIKES IN TEHRAN (CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE): Independent, all-source verification of the TASS report citing Iranian MFA on 70+ women and children killed in Israeli strikes on Tehran. Assess veracity and specific locations if confirmed.
  • CR: Prioritize SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT from Israeli, US, and regional sources. Monitor for satellite imagery confirmation or denial of damage. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 3: BDA OF OREL STRIKES & UKRAINIAN INVOLVEMENT (HIGH, NEW): Determine the full extent of damage from reported explosions in Orel, Russia, and confirm Ukrainian operational involvement and method of strike (e.g., drone type, long-range missile).
  • CR: Prioritize OSINT (local reports, social media, imagery), and HUMINT to ascertain impact and attribution. (PRIORITY: HIGH).
• GAP 4: RUSSIAN INTENT & FORCE DISPOSITION ON NORTHERN AXIS (CRITICAL): Verification of reports of Russian troop movements to Belarus.
  • CR: Prioritize IMINT, SIGINT, and HUMINT on Russian force composition, logistics build-up, and intent on the Belarus border. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 5: UKRAINIAN BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (BDA) FROM RECENT DEEP STRIKES (CRITICAL): Full extent of damage and operational impact from recent Russian deep strikes on Ukrainian C2 and ammunition depots (e.g., "Lugansk" OTG KP, 36th Marine Bde KP, 142nd Mech Bde ammo depot), and now the Zaporizhzhia industrial site.
  • CR: Prioritize HUMINT from affected units, OSINT (local reports, social media analysis), and IMINT (satellite imagery analysis if available) to determine operational impact and identify vulnerabilities. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 6: NATURE OF RUSSIA-AZERBAIJAN LOGISTICAL CHANNEL & IRANIAN ELITE EVACUATION (CRITICAL, NEW): Full scope and purpose of the new transit route via Baku. Is this a one-off evacuation or the establishment of a strategic corridor for personnel and/or materiel from Iran? Confirm details of "Iranian elite" discussions with Russia regarding evacuation. What specific Russian capabilities are being offered/utilized?
  • CR: Prioritize HUMINT and SIGINT on Russia-Iran-Azerbaijan diplomatic and logistical interactions. Monitor for increased cargo or personnel movements along this route beyond stated purposes. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 7: CLARIFICATION ON COLONELCASSAD'S DRONE COMPILATION (MEDIUM, ONGOING): Determine if the compilation of drone footage includes misattributed Ukrainian combat footage or if the source analysis was inaccurate. Clarify the specific origin of all clips.
  • CR: OSINT analysis of "Parabellum," "ГРУППА ЗЛОГО," and "Bear007" channels to confirm original sources of video clips. (PRIORITY: MEDIUM).
• GAP 8: RUSSIAN ROLE IN ISRAEL-IRAN ESCALATION (CRITICAL, NEW): Assess the extent of direct or indirect Russian involvement in instigating or facilitating the recent missile launches from Iran towards Israel. Is Russia providing intelligence, materiel, or political cover?
  • CR: Prioritize SIGINT, HUMINT, and OSINT on Russia-Iran communications and coordination. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

• Intelligence & Special Operations (ISR, HUMINT, OSINT critical):

  1. CRITICAL PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE VERIFICATION OF "THE TELEGRAPH" AID CESSATION CLAIM. All-source intelligence must rapidly confirm or refute the Russian-amplified report on US military aid cessation. This is the single most critical collection requirement for the next 6-12 hours, as it directly impacts morale and international support. (Supports CR 1).
  2. CRITICAL PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE VERIFICATION OF TASS CLAIM ON TEHRAN CASUALTIES AND RUSSIAN ROLE IN ISRAEL-IRAN ESCALATION. Rapidly confirm or deny the alleged 70+ casualties from Israeli strikes in Tehran and any direct Russian instigation or facilitation of the current missile exchange. This is a highly inflammatory disinformation narrative that needs immediate debunking if false, and Russia's role needs to be exposed. (Supports CR 2, CR 8).
  3. IMMEDIATE: ASSESS BDA OF OREL STRIKES & UKRAINIAN INVOLVEMENT. If Ukrainian forces were involved, leverage this for strategic messaging (see IO below). If not, understand the source and impact for defensive planning. (Supports CR 3).
  4. CRITICAL PRIORITY: INTENSIFY ISR ON POKROVSK, KHARKIV-KUPYANSK, SUMY, DNIPROPETROVSK AXES, AND NORTHERN BORDER WITH BELARUS. Maintain continuous monitoring for any signs of Russian force buildup or offensive preparations. (Supports CR 4).
  5. URGENT: ASSESS BDA OF RECENT C2/LOGISTICS/INDUSTRIAL STRIKES. GUR/SBU to conduct immediate, granular battle damage assessment (BDA) for the "Lugansk" OTG KP, 36th Marine Bde KP, 142nd Mech Bde ammo depot, and the Zaporizhzhia industrial site strikes. Identify systemic vulnerabilities and develop immediate counter-measures. (Supports CR 5).
  6. IMMEDIATE: INVESTIGATE RUSSIA-IRAN ELITE EVACUATION CLAIMS. Prioritize collection on the alleged discussions and any logistical support from Russia for Iranian elite evacuation. This could reveal deeper, covert aspects of their alliance. (Supports CR 6).
  7. IMMEDIATE: MONITOR AND EXPLOIT RUSSIAN IO NARRATIVES (ESPECIALLY ON WESTERN AID CESSATION & MIDDLE EAST "EFFECTIVE STRIKES" / "INSTABILITY"). Actively monitor for and analyze new Russian IO narratives, particularly those claiming reduced/stopped Western aid to Ukraine, exaggerating Middle East "successes" or "incidents," and the new pro-North Korea rhetoric. (Supports CR 1, 2).
  8. CLARIFY DRONE FOOTAGE ATTRIBUTION. Expedite analysis of Colonelcassad's drone compilation to confirm the origin and attribution of all clips, particularly if any Ukrainian combat footage was included or misattributed. (Supports CR 7).
  9. CONTINUOUS COUNTER-SABOTAGE INTELLIGENCE & INTERNAL SECURITY MONITORING.

• Air Defense & Force Protection:

  1. MAINTAIN HIGHEST AIR DEFENSE READINESS ACROSS ALL OBLASTS, WITH EMPHASIS ON EASTERN AIR THREAT AND INDUSTRIAL TARGETS. Despite the current lull in some drone strikes, anticipate Russia may increase the intensity or breadth of aerial attacks (UAVs, ballistic missiles, KABs, tactical aviation) to capitalize on global distraction and the IO narrative of Western aid cessation. Ensure layered AD coverage for critical infrastructure and population centers, particularly industrial sites.
  2. ADAPT TO WIDER GEOGRAPHIC DRONE/MISSILE THREAT & COUNTER DEEP STRIKES. Implement and refine TTPs to counter widespread, multi-axis attacks. Prioritize resources for defending critical C2 nodes, ammunition depots, and industrial facilities against confirmed Russian deep strikes.
  3. ENHANCE ACTIVE DEFENSE MEASURES: Consider increasing the frequency and range of proactive long-range strikes against Russian launch sites, logistics hubs, and military infrastructure in response to their persistent deep strikes on Ukrainian territory. (Linked to CR 3).

• Ground Forces:

  1. MAINTAIN DISCIPLINED DEFENSIVE POSTURE IN POKROVSK, KHARKIV-KUPYANSK, SUMY, DNIPROPETROVSK, AND NORTHERN BORDER DIRECTIONS. Prioritize strong defensive lines.
  2. REVIEW AND REHEARSE CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS (COOP) PLANS. Due to recent successful deep strikes on C2 nodes, all units must immediately review and rehearse COOP plans, ensuring redundant communication pathways and alternate command posts are ready.

• Information Operations (IO):

  1. IMMEDIATE & AGGRESSIVE: COUNTER RUSSIAN NARRATIVES ON "US AID CESSATION" & MIDDLE EAST "SUCCESSES/ATROCITIES." Proactively and forcefully counter the narrative (originating from "The Telegraph" via TASS) that the US is stopping aid. If false, debunk unequivocally. If there are any legitimate reallocations, frame it within the context of adaptive, ongoing support, emphasizing the sustained long-term commitment. Immediately debunk the false claim of TASS on Tehran casualties. Emphasize that Russia seeks to destabilize both regions to exhaust Western resources.
  2. LEVERAGE POTENTIAL OREL STRIKES: If Ukrainian involvement in the Orel explosions is confirmed, use this information strategically to demonstrate Ukrainian offensive capabilities and the cost to Russia of its aggression, countering the narrative of Western aid drying up.
  3. RAPID DEBUNKING OF MISINFORMATION. Maintain rapid response to immediately debunk unverified and sensationalized claims propagated by Russian state media and milbloggers (e.g., Iranian AD successes over Tehran, fabricated Israeli/US actions, internal Iranian issues, pro-North Korea rhetoric, exaggerated "combat compilations").
  4. PROMOTE UKRAINIAN RESILIENCE & AD SUCCESSES: Highlight ongoing Ukrainian AD operations and any successful intercepts to reassure the public and international partners of continued defensive capabilities.
  5. COUNTER NARRATIVES OF RUSSIAN DOMESTIC UNITY. While acknowledging civilian support for the Russian military exists, contextualize it within the framework of state propaganda and suppression of dissent.

• Diplomatic/Inter-Agency:

  1. IMMEDIATE & PROACTIVE: ENGAGE KEY PARTNERS ON SUSTAINED SUPPORT AND COUNTERING RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC MANIPULATION AND AID NARRATIVES. Ukrainian diplomatic missions should immediately engage with US, EU, and other key partners to address "The Telegraph" report on aid cessation. Seek clarification and a unified, strong public message of continued robust support. Emphasize that such narratives are deliberate Russian attempts to sow discord and undermine support.
  2. COORDINATE WITH ALLIES ON IO STRATEGY: Coordinate closely with allied IO agencies to ensure a unified and consistent counter-narrative to Russian disinformation, particularly regarding aid, global conflict, and the new, more extreme narratives.
  3. INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION OF CIVILIAN/INDUSTRIAL TARGETING. Continue to highlight Russian strikes on civilian/industrial targets (e.g., Zaporizhzhia) to maintain international pressure and secure further AD assistance.
  4. HIGHLIGHT RUSSIAN ALLIANCES WITH PARIAH STATES & ROLE IN GLOBAL INSTABILITY. Utilize the pro-North Korea propaganda and any confirmed Russian involvement in facilitating Iranian elite movement or encouraging Middle East escalation as evidence of Russia's desperation and its alignment with authoritarian regimes, seeking to strengthen international resolve against both. Emphasize that Russia directly benefits from and seeks to amplify global instability.