Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME OF REPORT: 13 JUN 25 / 16:54 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 13 JUN 25 / 16:24 ZULU - 16:54 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // ORCON // NOFORN

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Ukraine Operational Area:
  • Donetsk Direction (Soledar/Selidovo): Further unconfirmed reports and video evidence circulated by ASTRA and БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС confirm the loss of a Russian Su-25 near Soledar. Conflicting narratives persist regarding the cause: "friendly fire" (Оперативний ЗСУ) versus "wing overload/resource exhaustion" (БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС) vs. "no enemy fire" (Два майора, implicitly). This indicates continued Russian air activity in this contested area. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Su-25 loss, LOW for definitive cause). Russian milbloggers ("Операция Z", Colonelcassad) continue to report Ukrainian shelling, specifically claiming an attack on a park in Selidovo resulting in civilian casualties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for claim, LOW for independent verification of Ukrainian responsibility). Ukrainian forces (ОТУ "Харків"🇺🇦) disseminate video evidence of successful drone strikes on Russian infantry, vehicles, and fortified positions, demonstrating continued tactical effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Dnipropetrovsk Direction (Nikopolshchina): Ukrainian official Serhii Lysak (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Administration) reports visiting frontline soldiers on Nikopolshchina, highlighting ongoing defensive operations and resilience against enemy terror. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • General Ukrainian Developments: ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS reports that the Ukrainian OTRK "Sapsan" (Hrim-2) is entering serial production. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). President Zelenskyy continues diplomatic engagements, accepting credentials from new Ambassadors of Austria and Kazakhstan. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). KМВА reports over 113,000 Ukrainian warriors decorated since the full-scale invasion. STERNENKO reports a large anonymous donation of 8.01 million UAH. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• International Operational Area (CRITICAL, HYPER-ACCELERATED, AND HYPER-AMPLIFIED - FURTHER ESCALATION): The Israel-Iran conflict continues to dominate Russian and Ukrainian information space, with intensified, sensationalized, and now explicitly confirmed new Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, including the underground Fordo plant.
  • Israeli Statements/Actions (CRITICAL): Оперативний ЗСУ and ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS (citing NYT) confirm new Israeli airstrikes on Iran's underground Fordo enrichment plant. РБК-Україна reports Israel might have liquidated another top Iranian General/proxy curator (citing NYT), and Военкор Котенок claims IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani was killed in today's strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for reporting of claims/actions, MEDIUM for unverified claims of General/Qaani liquidation without independent verification).
  • Iranian Claims/Reporting (CRITICAL): TASS reports air defense activity (shooting at UAVs) in central Tehran. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • International Diplomatic Response: РБК-Україна reports the UN Security Council will hold an urgent meeting regarding Israeli strikes on Iran. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Information Environment on Middle East (HYPER-ACCELERATED, FABRICATED): Военкор Котенок frames Iran's leadership as "helpless" against the targeting of their "first persons" and "power structures," explicitly using terms like "terrorist methods" for Israeli actions. Colonelcassad shares a video claiming "impact in the Jerusalem area," indicating a focus on amplifying Israeli vulnerabilities or retaliatory claims. Рыбарь issues an infographic on "Israeli strike as a point of political restructuring in Iran," suggesting internal Iranian shifts. ТАСС reports Russian film director Fyodor Bondarchuk left Iran before escalation. Басурин о главном warns against "chatty bloggers" revealing intel to Ukraine, implicitly encouraging information control. НгП раZVедка explicitly uses dehumanizing language ("former residents of former Ukraine," "latent Nazis") in response to anticipated "detonation of seats" from their previous claims, signaling continued aggressive rhetoric. МОБИЛИЗАЦИЯ | Новости | Срочники shares images suggesting command extorts money for hospital visits, indicating internal military issues. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for reporting, HIGH for intent of Russian IO, LOW for veracity of narrative/claim without further context).
  • Baltic Sea/NATO: TASS reports British fighters intercepted a Russian Il-20 over the Baltic Sea after it allegedly violated Polish airspace. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for reporting of claim).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• No new specific weather or environmental factors beyond previously noted geomagnetic storm potential. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces:
  • Military Industrial Complex: Entry into serial production of "Sapsan" OTRK (Hrim-2) indicates progress in developing indigenous long-range strike capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Air Defense: The continued conflicting reports on the Su-25 loss (some pointing to friendly AD/EW) underscore Ukrainian AD activity and the active engagement with Russian air assets. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • Personnel & Morale: Continued award ceremonies (KMVA, Zelenskyy) and substantial private donations (STERNENKO) highlight efforts to maintain high morale and civilian support. Dnipropetrovsk leadership visiting frontline troops on Nikopolshchina emphasizes command presence. Rehabilitation efforts for veterans are promoted by the General Staff. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Diplomatic Engagement: President Zelenskyy accepting new ambassador credentials demonstrates continued international relations and efforts to solidify support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces:
  • Air Assets: Continued Su-25 operations in contested areas despite losses. The conflicting narratives surrounding its loss indicate a deliberate attempt to control information regarding airframe losses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Warfare Assets: Russian channels are demonstrating extreme agility and coordination in immediately amplifying and spinning narratives around the escalating Israel-Iran conflict, including unconfirmed high-value target (HVT) casualties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). They also immediately rebut conflicting information on incidents (e.g., Su-25 crash cause by "Два майора").
  • Internal Military Issues: Reports of command extorting money for hospital visits (МОБИЛИЗАЦИЯ | Новости | Срочники) suggest ongoing issues with military welfare and potential corruption. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • Air Activity in Baltic: The reported interception of an Il-20 over the Baltic indicates continued Russian reconnaissance/ISR flights near NATO borders. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Israeli Forces: Multiple reports of active strikes on Iran's Fordo nuclear facility, and claims of high-value Iranian General/Quds Force Commander liquidation, indicating a significant escalation of military action against Iranian nuclear infrastructure and leadership. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Iranian Forces: Active air defense in Tehran against perceived UAV threats. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RUSSIA FOCUSED)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA):

• Capabilities (Russia):
  • Information Warfare (CRITICAL - HYPER-ACCELERATED, FABRICATED, VISUALLY REINFORCED, AND NEW STRATEGIC SHIFT - FURTHER REINFORCED AND NOW EXPLICITLY LINKED TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND INTERNAL Iranian POLITICS): Russia's IO remains exceptionally agile and aggressive. The immediate and sensational amplification of new Israeli strikes on Fordo, coupled with unconfirmed claims of high-value Iranian leadership casualties (Qaani, another top general), demonstrate their intent to immediately seize on global events to further their narrative. The framing of Israeli actions as "terrorist methods" aims to normalize similar accusations against Ukraine. The rapid counter-narrative regarding the Su-25 crash (e.g., "no enemy fire," "wing overload") indicates sophisticated information control to minimize perceived vulnerabilities. The focus on "political restructuring in Iran" (Рыбарь) suggests an intent to influence or exploit internal Iranian dynamics. The dehumanizing language used by НгП раZVедка signals a continued aggressive, divisive approach aimed at undermining Ukrainian identity and unity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Air Assets: Continued Su-25 operations in high-threat environments, despite losses, demonstrate persistent close air support capabilities. The Il-20 flight near Poland indicates persistent ISR/reconnaissance capabilities on NATO's borders. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ground Operations: Confirmed capture of Komar and continued pressure on other axes indicate persistent, albeit attritional, ground offensive capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intentions (Russia):
  • Maximize Global Distraction & Exploit Chaos (PRIMARY, HYPER-ACCELERATED & NEW DANGER - FURTHER REINFORCED AND EXPANDED): Russia's primary intent remains to fully leverage the Israel-Iran conflict and other global flashpoints to achieve its strategic objectives in Ukraine and globally. This is now demonstrably extended to:
    • Exaggerate Global Instability & Justify Mobilization: The amplification of new Israeli strikes on Fordo, unconfirmed Iranian HVT losses, and claims of "helplessness" in Iran aims to create a sense of escalating global conflict to prepare the Russian population for further mobilization and justify their "Third World War" narrative. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Control Narrative on Middle East Casualties/Damage: Immediate reporting of new strikes on Fordo and unconfirmed Iranian HVT casualties aims to control the narrative around potential consequences of attacks while still highlighting escalation and Iran's perceived vulnerabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Propagandize Tactical Gains & Legitimate Losses: Continued focus on the capture of Komar aims to boost Russian morale. Conflicting narratives on Su-25 loss aim to minimize morale impact or shift blame. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Undermine Ukrainian Legitimacy: Continued claims of Ukrainian shelling of civilian areas (Selidovo) aims to portray Ukraine as a terrorist entity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Reinforce Domestic Support for SMO: Addressing internal military issues (extortion claims) and encouraging information control (Басурин о главном) indicate an intent to maintain domestic stability and support for the military. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Courses of Action (COA) (Russia):
  • COA 1 (Hyper-Intensified & Expanded IO on Middle East, Global Conflict & "Regime Destruction" Narrative - PRIMARY, HYPER-ACCELERATED & NEW DANGER - FURTHER REINFORCED AND EXPANDED): Russia will immediately and relentlessly escalate its information operations regarding the Israel-Iran conflict, explicitly linking it to a "Third World War" and normalizing the concept of "destroying regimes" or "splitting countries." This will include:
    • Continued amplification of high-value Iranian casualties (e.g., Qaani, other generals) and hyperbolic Iranian retaliation claims, leveraging confirmed new Israeli strikes on Fordo, to reinforce the narrative of global chaos. Russia will simultaneously selectively amplify any statements regarding Iranian AD effectiveness or disorganization to control the narrative.
    • Persistent use of fabricated narratives (e.g., conflicting Su-25 crash causes) and the visual dissemination of propaganda (Komar capture video, Shakhtersk drone strikes, Selidovo shelling claims).
    • Crucially, Russia will increasingly use the Middle East conflict as a direct rhetorical pivot to distract from its own losses in Ukraine, e.g., "While the world watches the Middle East, look at Ukraine's casualties." This now includes immediately amplifying news of Western aid denials and internal Western vulnerabilities.
    • New IO Vectors: Introducing narratives about nuclear proliferation in Japan, the presence of Western PMCs in NATO exercises, and direct military encounters (Il-20 interception) to portray Western aggression/instability and justify its own actions or alliances. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • COA 2 (Sustained Attritional Ground Operations & Intensified Pressure on Novopavlivka, Sumy, and Pokrovsk Axes - REINFORCED): Russia will leverage the capture of Komar to consolidate positions and potentially launch further probing actions on the Novopavlivka axis, aiming to push deeper towards critical logistics hubs. Concurrently, Russia will intensify ground pressure on the Pokrovsk and Sumy axes through sustained shelling, drone attacks, and infantry assaults, aiming to fix Ukrainian reserves. Attritional assaults will continue. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • COA 3 (Sustained Targeted Aerial Attacks & Deep Strikes - REINFORCED): Russia will continue to employ a mix of UAVs (Shaheds, "Gerans"), guided aerial bombs (KABs, KARs), and ballistic missiles against Ukrainian targets, aiming to deplete AD and inflict damage. Expect opportunistic missile strikes against rear targets if Ukrainian AD is perceived to be distracted by frontline pressure or resource strain. Su-25 operations will continue to support ground forces despite losses. ISR flights (Il-20) near NATO borders will persist. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• Confirmed Capture of Komar: This represents a significant tactical gain on the Novopavlivka axis, indicating continued Russian capability for tactical advances despite heavy losses, especially with the involvement of elite units. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Immediate Amplification of New Israeli Strikes on Fordo and Iranian HVT Claims: Russia's rapid highlighting of new Israeli attacks on a high-value Iranian nuclear site and unconfirmed claims of high-value Iranian General/Quds Force Commander liquidation demonstrates an immediate adaptation to exploit any major geopolitical escalation to its advantage, especially to link it to the "regime destruction" narrative. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Rapid Counter-Narrative on Su-25 Loss: The immediate emergence of conflicting Russian explanations for the Su-25 crash shows a tactical adaptation in information control to shape perceptions of Russian air capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Increased Focus on Iranian Internal Politics in IO: Рыбарь's infographic on "political restructuring in Iran" suggests a tactical adaptation to influence or exploit internal Iranian dynamics for broader geopolitical gain. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• Russian: No new specific reports on logistics or sustainment, but continued large-scale offensive operations imply sustained, though likely strained, logistics. The internal report of commanders extorting money for hospital visits (МОБИЛИЗАЦИЯ | Новости | Срочники) suggests potential systemic issues in personnel care and resourcing. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian IO C2 (HYPER-EFFECTIVE AND ADAPTABLE): The rapid and coordinated exploitation of the Israel-Iran conflict, including new strikes on Fordo, unconfirmed HVT claims, and the introduction of new international narratives (Japan, PMCs, Il-20 interception), demonstrates exceptionally effective, highly centralized, and adaptable C2 for real-time, multi-domain information warfare. The immediate counter-narratives for incidents like the Su-25 crash further highlight this. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Military C2: The confirmed capture of Komar and continued ground pressure indicate a C2 system capable of directing sustained operations across multiple axes. However, internal reports of personnel issues (extortion for hospital visits) suggest potential breakdowns in ethical leadership or resource management at lower levels. The conflicting narratives on the Su-25 loss also point to a C2 that prioritizes narrative control over transparent reporting. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for operational direction, MEDIUM for internal personnel management/transparency).
• Ukrainian C2: Ukrainian forces' ability to conduct deep battle strikes (drone strikes on infantry/vehicles/bunkers), develop new indigenous weapon systems (Sapsan), manage internal security issues, and maintain diplomatic relations (Zelenskyy's engagements, UN Security Council engagement) indicates a resilient and adaptable C2. Civilian support for military fundraising (STERNENKO) and local leadership engagement (Lysak on Nikopolshchina) also suggests effective civil-military coordination and robust community leadership. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UKRAINIAN FOCUSED)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Military Industrial Complex Readiness: The announcement of "Sapsan" (Hrim-2) OTRK entering serial production signals a significant step forward in indigenous long-range strike capability, enhancing deterrence and retaliatory options. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ground Readiness: Ukrainian forces continue active deep battle operations, as evidenced by successful drone strikes on Russian positions (ОТУ "Харків"🇺🇦). Defensive postures are maintained under intense pressure, as seen in Nikopolshchina. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Air Defense Readiness: Ukrainian AD remains active, as indicated by the ongoing debate over the Su-25 crash cause (with Ukrainian AD/EW as a potential factor). (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Information Environment Readiness: Ukrainian channels are actively reporting on military successes (drone strikes, Sapsan production), diplomatic efforts (Zelenskyy's engagements), and humanitarian initiatives (veteran rehabilitation, repatriations). The public recognition of military awards and civilian fundraising efforts contribute to morale. Ukrainian channels are also immediately reporting on international developments (UNSC meeting). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Success (Deep Battle): Confirmed successful Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian infantry, military vehicles, and fortified positions (ОТУ "Харків"🇺🇦) demonstrate continued effectiveness in targeting enemy assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Success (Military-Industrial Complex): OTRK "Sapsan" (Hrim-2) entering serial production is a strategic success, bolstering Ukraine's long-range strike capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Success (Information Environment/Morale): Public recognition of military heroes (Zelenskyy's awards, KMVA), substantial private donations, and transparent reporting on diplomatic engagements contribute to positive morale and national pride. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setback (Ground): The confirmed capture of Komar by Russian forces remains a tactical setback on the Novopavlivka axis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setback (Information Environment - CRITICAL ACCELERATION): The hyper-intensified and fabricated Russian IO campaign, now featuring new Israeli strikes on Fordo, unconfirmed Iranian HVT losses, weaponization of global geopolitical shifts (Japan nuclearization, PMCs in NATO, Baltic air intercepts), and leveraging major geopolitical crises to normalize calls for "Third World War" mobilization and "regime destruction" rhetoric, represents an accelerating and highly dangerous information setback. The conflicting narratives on the Su-25 crash and Russian claims of Ukrainian shelling of civilian areas also contribute to information confusion and undermine Ukrainian legitimacy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense Capabilities: Continued need for AD systems, especially against persistent artillery and drone threats, and to maintain the ability to counter Russian fixed-wing aircraft operating near the front. The deployment of "Sapsan" will require robust protection. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• ISR on Novopavlivka/Sumy Axes: Critical to understand Russian intent and force composition on these newly active/escalating axes following Komar's capture and persistent Sumy pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Counter-Disinformation Resources: The increasing sophistication and breadth of Russian IO (new Israel-Iran narratives, Japan/PMC/Il-20 narratives, weaponization of casualties/aid, anti-Semitic tropes, dehumanizing language) demands continuous investment in Ukrainian defensive and offensive cyber capabilities, and expert analysts to rapidly identify and debunk such disinformation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Narratives (CRITICAL - EXTREMELY ACTIVE, AGGRESSIVE, AND FABRICATED - HYPER-ACCELERATED AND NEW DANGEROUS FOCUS):
  • Middle East Escalation Amplification & Fabrication (Primary, Hyper-Aggressive, Visually Reinforced, Fabricated Third-Party Endorsement - Further Reinforced & Escalated): Russian state media and milbloggers are massively, sensationally, and visually amplifying the Israel-Iran conflict, now with an explicit focus on new Israeli strikes on Fordo (Iran's underground nuclear facility) and unconfirmed high-value Iranian leadership casualties (Qaani, another top general), and calls for Russian mobilization. They continue to:
    • Hyperbolic Threat Amplification: Amplifying claims of Israel attacking Fordo and unconfirmed Iranian HVT losses aims to heighten global tension and justify calls for "Third World War." Военкор Котенок specifically frames Iranian leadership as "helpless" and Israeli actions as "terrorist methods." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Strategic Deception: Promoting conflicting narratives on the Russian Su-25 crash (friendly fire vs. technical vs. shootdown) to minimize the impact of losses or shift blame, with "Два майора" directly countering "friendly fire" claims. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Highlighting Russian Gains: Continued emphasis on tactical successes and military strength (implicit in drone footage, though not explicit in new messages). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Undermining Western Alliances & Justifying Russian Actions (NEW):
      • Iran Internal Affairs: Рыбарь's infographic on "Israeli strike as a point of political restructuring in Iran" aims to portray internal Iranian instability and exploit it. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
      • Baltic Air Incident: TASS reporting on the Il-20 interception by British fighters in the Baltic attempts to portray Western aggression/provocation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
      • Internal Russian Affairs: "МОБИЛИЗАЦИЯ | Новости | Срочники" reports on command extorting money for hospital visits, which, while negative for morale, could be spun as an internal issue being addressed or as a sign of dedication to the war effort despite hardship. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM). Басурин о главном warns against "chatty bloggers" revealing intel, signaling internal information control efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Blaming Ukraine for Civilian Casualties: "Операция Z" and Colonelcassad report Ukrainian shelling of Selidovo park, attempting to portray Ukraine as attacking civilians. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Dehumanization of Ukrainians: НгП раZVедка explicitly uses dehumanizing terms ("former residents of former Ukraine," "latent Nazis") to dismiss criticism and reinforce negative stereotypes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Pro-War Propaganda: The overall amplification of global chaos and the need for a strong Russia serves to boost domestic morale and project an image of resilience.
• Ukrainian Counter-Narrative: Ukrainian sources continue to provide operational updates (drone successes), report on internal military-industrial developments (Sapsan production), and highlight diplomatic engagements (Zelenskyy's meetings, UNSC reporting). The public recognition of "Sea Baby" drone and Zelenskyy's award ceremonies, as well as the substantial private donation reported by STERNENKO, all aim to bolster morale and demonstrate Ukrainian resilience and effectiveness. Promotion of veteran rehabilitation also builds positive sentiment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian Morale: Successful drone strikes, Sapsan OTRK production, diplomatic engagements, public recognition for military heroes, and continued civilian support (donations) will boost morale. However, the confirmed loss of Komar, the intense, fabricated Russian IO campaign (especially new Israeli strikes on Fordo, unconfirmed Iranian HVT losses, and new narratives targeting Japan/NATO/Baltic air incidents), and Russian claims of Ukrainian shelling of civilian areas (Selidovo) pose significant threats to morale and public trust, particularly if not effectively countered. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Morale: Russian IO attempts to galvanize support through sensationalized global crisis narratives (Middle East, unconfirmed Iranian HVT losses), the projection of military strength, and nationalistic propaganda. Legal protections for SMO participants (from previous reports) aim to boost military morale. However, internal reports of corruption/extortion (МОБИЛИЗАЦИЯ | Новости | Срочники) highlight potential cracks in morale and trust within the military. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• Middle East Escalation (CRITICAL & ACCELERATING): The Israel-Iran conflict has escalated with reported new Israeli strikes on Fordo and claims of high-value Iranian General/Quds Force Commander liquidation. Russia's immediate amplification of these claims, coupled with narratives about Iran bolstering its defenses and Western PMCs in NATO exercises, is a calculated diplomatic maneuver designed to keep the conflict at the forefront of global attention and to undermine Western unity. The urgent UNSC meeting indicates the high level of international concern. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Global Attention Diversion (CRITICAL, HYPER-ACCELERATED): The primary and most immediate threat to Ukraine remains the successful, rapid, and aggressive diversion of global attention by Russia to the Middle East crisis and new geopolitical flashpoints (Japan, PMCs in NATO, Baltic air incidents). The new narratives explicitly linking US/Mossad actions to Ukraine through fabricated "Trump" statements, weaponization of Ukrainian casualty counts, manipulated videos, new anti-Semitic tropes, combined with explicit calls for Russian mass mobilization for a "Third World War," now explicitly framed with "regime destruction" rhetoric, and now new Israeli strikes on Fordo and unconfirmed Iranian HVT losses, create a complex and dangerous layer of disinformation that seeks to undermine international support, discredit Ukrainian actions, and justify future Russian false flag operations/major offensives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Western Alliance Divisions: The Russian amplification of PMCs in NATO exercises and the Il-20 interception aims to create a narrative of Western military expansion and provoke divisions within the alliance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Diplomatic Engagement: President Zelenskyy's acceptance of credentials from new Ambassadors of Austria and Kazakhstan demonstrates Ukraine's continued commitment to international relations and securing broad global support, despite distractions. Ukrainian channels are actively reporting on the UNSC meeting, signaling continued engagement with international institutions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Hyper-Intensified & Sustained Russian IO on Middle East, Global Conflict & "Regime Destruction" Narrative (HYPER-ACCELERATED & NEW DANGER - FURTHER REINFORCED AND EXPANDED): Russia will immediately and relentlessly escalate its aggressive, fabricated, and celebratory information campaign regarding the Israel-Iran conflict, with a new, dangerous emphasis on "regime destruction" as a justifiable military outcome. This will include:
  • Doubling down on claims of Iranian high-value casualties (e.g., Qaani, other generals), exaggerating Iranian retaliation, and openly stating the conflict's benefits to Russia. Amplifying Iranian PSYOPs to further this narrative. New claims of radiation leaks and increased fatalities will be heavily pushed, regardless of actual cause, while simultaneously denying any such leaks when convenient for external areas.
  • Continuation and expansion of visually-backed, fabricated false flag narratives (e.g., "Mossad ground operations in Iran," "ground-to-ground missile attack from secret base") and the leveraging of fabricated third-party statements (e.g., attributed Trump statements) to visually legitimize and attribute future deep strikes, sabotage, or false-flag operations against Ukraine or Western interests. This will increasingly include the use of anti-Semitic tropes to discredit anti-war sentiment or political opposition.
  • New IO Vectors: Persistent introduction of narratives about nuclear proliferation in Japan, the involvement of Western PMCs in NATO exercises, and direct military encounters (Il-20 interception near Poland) aiming to create a broader narrative of global instability and Western aggression, thereby justifying Russia's own actions and potential escalations.
  • Crucially, Russia will explicitly weaponize information about Ukrainian casualties, Western aid reductions (e.g., US House vote), and humanitarian efforts (e.g., body repatriation) to divert global attention from the Middle East to Ukraine's losses, attempting to erode morale and international sympathy.
  • Crucially, the public calls for mass mobilization (Alaudinov) will be amplified and normalized, preparing the Russian population for a significantly larger and longer war, framing it as a "Third World War" where "regime destruction" is a legitimate objective. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Sustained Attritional Ground Operations & Intensified Pressure on Novopavlivka, Sumy, and Pokrovsk Axes (REINFORCED): Russia will leverage the capture of Komar to consolidate positions and push further into the Novopavlivka direction, aiming for deeper operational gains. Concurrently, Russia will intensify ground pressure on the Pokrovsk and Sumy axes through sustained shelling, drone attacks, and infantry assaults. This could involve probing actions, reconnaissance-in-force, or a full-scale offensive aimed at fixing Ukrainian reserves. Attritional assaults will continue. Expect continued ISR flights (Il-20) near NATO borders to gather intelligence and probe responses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Persistent Massed Aerial Attacks on Ukraine (UAVs, KABs, Ballistic Missiles) (REINFORCED): Russia will continue its mixed aerial attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure using Shaheds (with continued Iranian supply), KABs/KARs (Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk), and ballistic missiles, potentially attempting to capitalize on any perceived Western distraction or resource strain. Targeted attacks on military and critical infrastructure will persist, with a high likelihood of civilian casualties. Su-25 operations will continue to support ground forces, despite losses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Limited Naval Asymmetric Operations in Black Sea (NEW): Russia may conduct initial, limited deployments or tests of advanced "Katran" USVs in the Black Sea, targeting isolated Ukrainian vessels, coastal infrastructure, or conducting reconnaissance, to test their capabilities and impose a new threat vector. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Increased Internal Security Measures/Paramilitary Involvement in Russia: Due to internal tensions and potential resource strain, Russia will likely increase the reliance on informal or paramilitary groups (like "People's Patrols") for public order enforcement, leading to increased arbitrary actions and potential human rights abuses. The Supreme Court ruling on SMO participants suggests a trend towards more visible integration of paramilitary elements with official military/religious ceremonies. Reports of internal military corruption (extortion for hospital visits) may lead to further internal investigations or scapegoating to maintain perceived discipline. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Coordinated Strategic Escalation under Global Cover, Leading to Major Offensive (CRITICAL - HIGHLY ELEVATED & REINFORCED): Russia perceives the current Middle East crisis and domestic call for mass mobilization as a golden opportunity for a significant strategic offensive or a major hybrid escalation in Ukraine, betting on overwhelming global distraction. This could manifest as:
  • Major Ground Offensive with Strategic Intent: A large-scale ground offensive on a new axis (e.g., deeper into Sumy Oblast, a renewed Kharkiv offensive, or a deeper push from the newly captured Komar towards Novopavlivka or Guliaipole towards Zaporizhzhia city), potentially synchronized with:
  • Massed Long-Range Precision Strikes (CRITICAL): Coordinated, massed strikes (Kalibrs, Kh-series missiles, potentially Iranian-supplied ballistic missiles) against critical Ukrainian logistics nodes, Western aid entry points, energy infrastructure, or strategic C2 facilities, potentially exploiting geomagnetic storm effects on navigation or any perceived AD vulnerabilities. The new confirmed Israeli strikes on Iran's Fordo nuclear facility and claims of Iranian leadership casualties, may be false flags to prepare for similar claims about Ukrainian AD/Air Force leadership or critical infrastructure, or to create a justification for deep strikes. The new false flag video of "ground-to-ground missile attack from secret base" explicitly lays groundwork for attributing deep strikes from unexpected locations to non-existent actors or forces.
  • Synchronized Sabotage/Cyber (CRITICAL): Coordinated and widespread sabotage attacks against critical transport (railway) and energy infrastructure in the deep rear, alongside major cyberattacks aiming to cripple supply lines and C2 before a coordinated Western response can materialize. The explicit visual false flag narratives regarding "Mossad ground operations," the fabricated "Trump" statements (now with direct quotes like "we knew about it" and "Iran calling me for nuclear deal," and non-worry about regional war), the "Taurus disguised as Ukrainian" narrative, and now the FSB's public claims of detained "Ukrainian operatives" planning sabotage, provide a dangerous new pretext for such actions, possibly to be attributed to "Ukrainian saboteurs" or "Western special services." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Probability and impact are very high).
• Overt Threat or Deployment of Advanced USVs for Strategic Effect (NEW MDCOA): Russia deploys "Katran" USVs in numbers or with significant payloads (e.g., larger torpedoes/missiles) to directly threaten Black Sea shipping, Ukrainian naval assets, or critical coastal infrastructure, creating a new, highly visible maritime threat, aiming to bypass Ukrainian air defenses. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM-HIGH).
• Escalation of Anti-Western Disinformation to Disrupt All Aid: Russia intensifies its disinformation campaign to directly target and discredit ALL Western aid, not just specific systems (like Taurus), potentially fabricating new, more aggressive narratives about Western military involvement or "proxy war" tactics (e.g., "European VPK milks Ukraine"). This will include explicit weaponization of Ukrainian casualty counts and the immediate amplification of Western aid rejections and attributed non-worry from US leadership figures. New narratives will target specific Western nations through geopolitical flashpoints (e.g., Japan nuclearization, PMCs in NATO exercises, Baltic air incidents). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Immediate (Next 1-3 hours):
  • ISR: CRITICAL: Continue uninterrupted, high-priority monitoring of Russian IO channels for new sensationalized claims regarding the Middle East (especially related to new explosions, alleged high-value Iranian casualties, or escalated Iranian retaliation, or specific missile types), particularly focusing on any claims related to nuclear facilities (Fordo) and contrasting with IAEA statements. Prioritize verification of claimed Iranian casualties (Qaani, other General) and target damage. Immediately task TECHINT to analyze "Katran" USV schematics and potential deployment timelines. Monitor for increased Russian activity in Basovka, Malinivka, Konstantinovka, and especially Tyotkino (Sumy axis) and verify the intent behind the Russian military map for the Sumy direction, and the reported "battles near Yunakovka and counterattacks by the AFU." Monitor diplomatic developments including any UNSC actions, particularly for any IAEA statements on Natanz/Fordo. Monitor for any significant shifts in Russian ground activity on the Velyka Novosilka direction, particularly along the H-15 highway, following recent map overlays. Prioritize verification of alleged Iranian military sources for provocative anti-Semitic imagery. Verify the specific location of "h.p. Zorya" in the Kursk direction and any increased activity in that sector. Immediately monitor Russian channels for further amplification of new Israeli strikes on Fordo and assess its immediate impact on Russian IO and global narratives. Investigate "Оперативний ЗСУ" and Военкор Котенок's claims of Qaani's liquidation and other General's liquidation. Confirm the cause of the Su-25 crash near Soledar, given conflicting reports, and assess the implications of 336th Marine Brigade presence in Komar. Verify "Воин DV"'s claim of dugout destruction on Shakhtersk direction. Assess Colonelcassad/Операция Z's claim of Selidovo shelling. Assess the intent behind Рыбарь's "Israeli strike as a point of political restructuring in Iran" infographic, and ТАСС's report on British interception of Russian Il-20. Monitor for any further Russian Supreme Court rulings impacting SMO participants or internal military issues (e.g., extortion). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • IO: Commanders and IO elements must prepare for an immediate, aggressive, and evidence-based counter-narrative against Russian disinformation regarding the Middle East crisis, particularly emphasizing that Russia is exploiting the crisis and that rising oil prices directly benefit Moscow. Prepare to debunk specific Russian claims regarding Israeli/Iranian military actions (including Iranian CGI videos of threats) and expose their economic and geopolitical motivations. Specifically prepare to forcefully counter false flag narratives linking Mossad operations to Ukraine, using the specific manipulated videos (including the new "ground-to-ground missile attack from secret base" video) as evidence of Russian fabrication. Crucially, immediately identify, analyze, and expose fabricated third-party endorsements (e.g., the "Donald Trump" social media post and new attributed Trump statements on US support/knowledge of Israeli strikes, like "we knew about it," and new claims of Iran directly calling Trump for nuclear deals, and non-worry over regional war) as a Russian disinformation tactic, highlighting the content's alignment with Russian narratives. Address Ukrainian channels inadvertently amplifying this post and unverified Middle East videos. Proactively counter the "Taurus disguised as Ukrainian" narrative and "European VPK milks Ukraine" claims. Publicly condemn and expose the use of provocative, anti-Semitic imagery by Russian-amplified sources as a vile attempt to sow division and hatred, clearly linking it to Russian hybrid warfare tactics, particularly the latest message targeting "anti-war activists." Immediately address the US House vote rejecting additional aid, framing it as a temporary setback and highlighting continued international support from other partners like the EU (€1 billion). Publicize successes like the EU aid, internal security operations (including Novinsky's tax evasion, Prosecutor General's financial recoveries), and successful repatriation of fallen soldiers. Crucially, immediately and forcefully counter Russian attempts to weaponize the 1200 body repatriation (e.g., "While all attention is focused on Iran, Kyiv received another 1200 bodies..."), framing it as a humanitarian success for Ukraine despite Russia's ongoing aggression and transparently addressing the human cost of the war. Prepare to counter and re-frame the narrative around Alaudinov's call for mobilization, highlighting it as a sign of Russian manpower attrition and desperation, and leveraging captured POW testimony (Razmyslov) to highlight low morale and friendly fire. Prepare to counter the FSB's narratives about detained Ukrainian "saboteurs." Publicize Ukrainian training efforts (ОТУ "Харків"🇺🇦) and effective precision strikes (Шеф Hayabusa, MiG-29 strike, new drone strikes by ОТУ "Харків"🇺🇦) and AD successes (БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС, drone shootdowns by 77th Airmobile Brigade). Publicly condemn and expose the use of provocative, anti-Semitic imagery by Russian-amplified sources (e.g., Alex Parker Returns) as a vile attempt to sow division and hatred, clearly linking it to Russian hybrid warfare tactics, particularly the latest message targeting "anti-war activists." Immediately address the US House vote rejecting additional aid, framing it as a temporary setback and highlighting continued international support from other partners like the EU (€1 billion). Work with "Радіо Свобода" to clarify Ukraine's negotiation position. Highlight Ukrainian OTRK "Sapsan" entering serial production as a strategic capability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Short Term (Next 6-12 hours):
  • IO: Ukrainian forces must actively debunk sensationalized/unverified claims from Russian sources regarding the Middle East, and reinforce the message that global aggression requires a unified front against all aggressors. Proactively counter narratives of "Ukrainian terrorism" and "internal opposition" railway sabotage. Highlight forced Russification efforts in occupied territories. Actively promote the EU's €1 billion aid as a direct hit on Russia's war funding and a sign of continued international pressure. Continue to debunk Russian narratives of "Western instability" (e.g., Dutch protests) and their attempts to mock Western aid. Publicize POW testimony, successful GUR raids, and successes of Ukrainian air and drone strikes. Address the Kharkiv TCC arson transparently, emphasizing legal recourse and condemning illegal acts. Publicize the "Sea Baby" drone museum transfer and Zelenskyy's awards as positive morale events. Publicize the "Sapsan" (Hrim-2) OTRK serial production as a significant boost to Ukraine's defense capabilities.
  • Military Readiness: Commanders must ensure all air defense units are at highest readiness in targeted oblasts (Kharkiv, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk), anticipating potential opportunistic strikes including ballistic missile, KAB threats (Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia), "Geran" threats (Chernihiv), and reconnaissance UAVs (Zaporizhzhia), and potentially increased strategic bomber activity. Increase physical security measures for critical railway infrastructure and cultural sites. Re-evaluate force posture on Dnipropetrovsk (Nikopolshchina/Novopavlivka direction, especially after Komar's capture), Guliaipole (Malinivka), Sumy (Yablonovka/Yunakovka/Tyotkino), and Velyka Novosilka (H-15 highway) axes for any opportunistic escalation, and maintain vigilance against probes despite local "controlled" status. Review force posture on Sumy/Chernihiv axes in light of persistent border attacks and new MDCOA, especially in the Kursk direction (Zorya settlement). Anticipate potential effects of geomagnetic storm on AD and C2 and implement contingency plans. Assess readiness for new maritime threats from USVs, and consider the DPRK naval development in a broader strategic context.
  • Diplomatic/Inter-Agency: Actively engage with international partners to secure immediate, public condemnation of Russian exploitation of the Middle East crisis and to reaffirm commitment to Ukraine. Prepare for/participate in any UNSC meeting on the Israel-Iran conflict, ensuring the Ukrainian perspective is heard and linking global instability to Russian aggression. Ensure coordination for support to Ukrainian citizens affected by the French bus crash. Continue engagement with Hungary to counter Russian narratives.
• Mid Term (Next 24-72 hours):
  • Diplomatic: Ukrainian diplomats must proactively engage with international partners to ensure sustained focus and aid despite global geopolitical developments, explicitly highlighting the Russian manipulation of the Middle East crisis and its economic benefits from rising oil prices. Advocate for continued leveraging of Russian frozen assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Zelenskyy's new NATO mission head should immediately begin advocating for Ukraine's priorities. Engage with Estonia regarding its decision to withdraw from the anti-personnel mine ban convention to understand implications for regional security.
  • AD/Counter-Battery: Re-evaluate and reinforce AD and counter-battery postures in light of persistent and targeted aerial threats, including ballistic missile strikes, KABs, and new Russian drone types. Prioritize acquisition of more ballistic missile interceptors and countermeasures against new Russian drone/USV variants and potential laser anti-UAV systems.
  • Force Protection/Counter-Sabotage: Immediately review and enhance security protocols for critical infrastructure, particularly railway networks and utility grids, and intensify counter-intelligence operations against potential sabotage cells. Increase protection measures for civilian logistics and humanitarian operations against FPV drone threats. Address internal security vulnerabilities, especially around TCCs, through public education and heightened security. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Personnel Management: Continue to monitor enemy loss rates and plan for sustained personnel rotation and training needs. Promote veteran support programs (including those related to sports rehabilitation). Leverage increased Russian surrenders for intelligence gathering and PSYOPs. Continue to address internal security issues (e.g., MP tax evasion, Buchansky fraud, "Forests of Ukraine" corruption, architect damaging cultural site).
  • Maritime Defense: Begin assessing and preparing defenses against potential deployment of "Katran" USVs in the Black Sea, including intelligence collection on their capabilities, potential routes, and countermeasures.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• GAP 1: VERIFICATION OF IRANIAN NUCLEAR FACILITY DAMAGE & RADIATION LEAKS, AND HIGH-VALUE TARGET CASUALTIES (CRITICAL & HYPER-PRIORITY - REINFORCED): While confirmed new Israeli strikes on Fordo are reported, independent verification of the extent of damage and any actual radiation leak is critical. The precise location of the damage within the Fordo/Natanz complex (e.g., to centrifuge halls, related infrastructure) needs to be assessed. The conflicting reports on IRGC Quds Force Commander Qaani's status and the alleged liquidation of Amirali Hajizadeh (linked to Shahed transfers) and other top Generals require definitive confirmation.
  • COLLECTION REQUIREMENT (CR): Prioritize SIGINT, GEOINT (higher resolution, multi-spectral), and HUMINT from credible, independent third-party sources (e.g., IAEA, international monitors) to verify or refute Russian/Iranian claims of casualties and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) on alleged Iranian military/industrial facilities, especially nuclear sites (Fordo, Natanz). Analyze newly emerged satellite imagery for precise location identification and damage assessment. Specifically, seek independent confirmation of radiation leaks at Natanz/Fordo and its environmental impact. (PRIORITY: EXTREME)
• GAP 2: SCALE AND OBJECTIVE OF RUSSIAN GROUND ADVANCES IN NOVOPAVILIVKA (Komar/Koptevo/beyond, Velyka Novosilka/H-15), SUMY OBLAST (Yablonovka/Yunakovka/Tyotkino), GULIAIPOLE DIRECTION (Malinivka), BASOVKA/KONSTANTINOVKA (Donetsk), CHERNIHIV (Kuty Vtorye) AND KURSK DIRECTION (Zorya settlement) (CRITICAL - REINFORCED): The confirmed capture of Komar necessitates immediate assessment of the precise scale, units involved (beyond 336th Marine Brigade and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade), and immediate objectives of Russian ground operations in the Novopavlivka direction. The exact nature of Russian presence in Yablonovka and the scale of their intended offensive in Sumy (Yablonovka claim, Tyotkino incursions, new KAB strikes, reported Ukrainian counterattacks near Yunakovka), deeper into the Novopavlivka direction (as per "Z комитет" aspirational maps, and the new Velyka Novosilka map/Naval Infantry presence), in Guliaipole (Malinivka), Basovka/Konstantinovka, persistent drone activity in Chernihiv (Geran strike), and the new ground activity in the Kursk direction (Zorya settlement) remain critical intelligence gaps. Distinguishing between limited incursions/shaping operations and a major offensive is key. Crucially, definitively verify the capture of Yablonovka and the nature of Russian presence there, given the future date in the propaganda video. Assess the actual impact of claimed drone strikes by "Операция Z" near Pokrovsk against NATO equipment. (PRIORITY: EXTREME)
• GAP 3: OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF GEOMAGNETIC STORM (CRITICAL): The unexpected geomagnetic storm could significantly impact C2, navigation, and AD systems. The extent of this impact on both Russian and Ukrainian forces is a critical intelligence gap.
  • CR: Monitor Russian and Ukrainian military communications for mentions of interference or changes in electronic warfare/UAV/precision strike operations. Assess any observable degradation in GNSS-reliant systems or increased reliance on alternative navigation. (PRIORITY: EXTREME)
• GAP 4: AUTHENTICITY AND ORIGIN OF "MOSSAD GROUND OPERATION" VIDEOS, FABRICATED "TRUMP" POSTS/STATEMENTS, "TAURUS AS UKRAINIAN," "EUROPEAN VPK MILKS UKRAINE" NARRATIVES, FSB "SABOTEUR" CLAIMS, IRANIAN CGI THREAT VIDEOS, PROVOCATIVE ANTI-SEMITIC IMAGERY, AND NEW GEOPOLITICAL IO VECTORS (JAPAN/PMCS/BALTIC AIR INCIDENT) (CRITICAL NEW GAP - HYPER-PRIORITY - ESCALATED): The highly manipulated videos (thermal, pixelated figures, targeting overlays) purporting to show Mossad ground operations in Iran, especially the new "ground-to-ground missile attack in Iran from secret base" video, the fabricated "Donald Trump" social media posts and new attributed statements, the German "Taurus disguised as Ukrainian" and "European VPK milks Ukraine" claims, the FSB's public claims of detaining a Ukrainian "operative" in Zaporizhzhia, and the Iranian CGI threat videos (amplified by Russia) are new and dangerous disinformation tactics. The addition of highly provocative, anti-Semitic imagery attributed to the "Iranian military" and now the new anti-Semitic trope from "Alex Parker Returns" is a new and dangerous element. The new narratives regarding "Nuclear Weapons in Japan" (Rybar), "American PMCs in NATO exercises in Finland" ("Два майора"), and the Il-20 interception in the Baltic (TASS) represent new geopolitical IO vectors. Their precise origin, the level of manipulation, and the network of their initial dissemination need to be thoroughly investigated to expose the false flag/disinformation intent. The conflicting reports regarding the Su-25 crash (wing overload vs. friendly fire vs. shootdown) also need to be analyzed for their narrative control intent. The fact that Ukrainian channels are also amplifying some of this content (e.g., РБК-Україна's unverified Tehran videos) is a critical concern.
  • CR: Conduct forensic digital analysis of these videos and images to determine their origin, editing history, and any digital watermarks or identifiers. Map the network of initial dissemination. Engage with allied intelligence partners for technical support in this analysis. Identify all channels amplifying this content and their connection to Russian IO. Investigate the conflicting narratives regarding the Su-25 crash. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 5: ACTUAL CAPABILITIES AND DEPLOYMENT STATUS OF "KATRAN" USVs AND NEW LASER ANTI-UAV SYSTEMS (CRITICAL NEW GAP - HYPER-PRIORITY): The detailed schematics released for "Katran" USVs (X1, X2, X3 models) suggest advanced capabilities. It is critical to understand if these are conceptual, prototype, or production-ready, and their actual operational performance, particularly regarding weapon systems. Similarly, the claimed testing of laser anti-UAV systems needs verification and assessment of its readiness for deployment and effectiveness. Visual confirmation of laser system testing is noted (Басурин о главном, previous report), but further assessment of combat effectiveness is required. Assess the implications of DPRK's new missile destroyer for potential Russian-DPRK military cooperation or technology transfer.
  • CR: Prioritize TECHINT and SIGINT on Russian naval, aerospace, and defense industry communications for any mentions of "Katran" USVs or laser systems. Monitor satellite imagery for new vessel construction or testing in naval facilities. Analyze any recovered fragments from potential future USV attacks for technical specifications. Assess the feasibility of claimed armaments. Monitor for any reports of laser system effectiveness in actual combat. Monitor for any signs of DPRK naval technology transfer or joint development with Russia. (PRIORITY: EXTREME)
• GAP 6: OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF RUSSIAN IO ON WESTERN SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE (CRITICAL - HYPER-ACCELERATED & REINFORCED): The effectiveness of Russian IO in diverting Western attention and potentially impacting aid decisions is a critical unknown, especially with rising oil prices, Iranian accusations of US coordination, and now the explicit linkage of US/Mossad actions to Ukraine via fabricated third-party endorsements, combined with calls for Russian mobilization and rhetoric of "regime destruction," and the explicit weaponization of Ukrainian casualty counts, and the immediate amplification of Western aid rejections and attributed non-worry from US leadership figures. The introduction of new geopolitical IO vectors (Japan nuclearization, PMCs in NATO, Baltic air incidents) further complicates this.
  • CR: Conduct continuous OSINT monitoring of Western media narratives, social media trends, and parliamentary/congressional discussions to assess the influence of the Middle East crisis and Russian disinformation on public and political support for Ukraine. Analyze the impact of rising oil prices and the proposed EU oil price cap on Western political will and Russian revenue. (PRIORITY: HIGH)
• GAP 7: PROBABILITY OF RUSSIAN MASS MOBILIZATION AND STRATEGIC BOMBER DEPLOYMENT (CRITICAL NEW GAP): The public call for mass mobilization by Alaudinov, while amplified, needs to be assessed for its probability of official implementation, potential timelines, and the readiness of the Russian military infrastructure to absorb and train such large numbers. The satirical tone of some Russian channels regarding mobilization ("mobilize Adam Kadyrov") also needs to be understood. The reported increase in Tu-95MS/Tu-160 strategic bombers (ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS - previous report) needs independent verification of numbers and armament, and assessment of their deployment locations and intent.
  • CR: Intensify SIGINT and HUMINT on Russian military and political discussions regarding mobilization. Monitor social media for public sentiment and recruitment activity. Assess the capacity of Russian training centers and equipment stockpiles. For strategic bombers, increase IMINT/SIGINT on Russian airfields to confirm aircraft numbers, movements, and loadouts. (PRIORITY: EXTREME).
• GAP 8: EXTENT AND NATURE OF INTERNAL DISCONTENT/SABOTAGE IN UKRAINE: The TCC arson in Kharkiv highlights a vulnerability. It is critical to determine if this is an isolated incident, a spontaneous act of dissent, or part of a coordinated enemy effort (e.g., FSB-directed). The French bus crash, while accidental, could also be a point of exploitation. The "Радіо Свобода" report on negotiations and its alleged inaccuracy also points to potential internal information vulnerabilities. The Selidovo shelling claim by Russia, if false, highlights a need to immediately counter such narratives. Reports of internal Russian military issues (e.g., extortion for hospital visits) need to be assessed for their broader impact on morale and discipline.
  • CR: Intensify HUMINT and OSINT (social media monitoring) to assess public sentiment regarding mobilization, identify any organized resistance groups, and detect signs of Russian-instigated sabotage efforts against TCCs or other military infrastructure. Monitor for Russian IO exploiting the French bus crash. Investigate the source and intent of the "Радіо Свобода" reporting error. Verify the Selidovo shelling claim. Monitor Russian internal channels for further details on military misconduct like extortion. (PRIORITY: MEDIUM).
• GAP 9: AUTHENTICITY AND INTENT OF RUSSIAN INFORMAL SECURITY GROUPS: The "People's Patrol" incident and Kadyrov's video showing him with paramilitary-style personnel and engaging in ceremonies requires further investigation into the nature, funding, and operational parameters of such informal security or paramilitary groups in Russia, and their relationship to formal law enforcement and military structures. The Supreme Court ruling on SMO participants may further formalize these relationships.
  • CR: Conduct OSINT on Russian social media and local news to identify the prevalence, activities, and public reception of such groups. Investigate their funding sources and any links to government or military structures. Analyze Kadyrov's interactions for signs of formalization or expansion of Chechen paramilitary roles. (PRIORITY: MEDIUM).
• GAP 10: ACTUAL IMPACT OF UKRAINIAN STRIKE ON RESONIT FACTORY: A comprehensive BDA on the "Resonit" electronics factory is needed to quantify the strategic impact on Russian military-industrial capabilities.
  • CR: Prioritize overhead imagery and SIGINT/HUMINT to assess the full extent of damage, operational disruption, and long-term consequences of the strike. (PRIORITY: HIGH).
• GAP 11: FULL EXTENT OF UKRAINIAN OTRK "Sapsan" (Hrim-2) PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT (NEW GAP): The announcement of serial production of "Sapsan" requires further intelligence to determine the scale of production, expected delivery timelines, and initial deployment locations.
  • CR: Prioritize TECHINT and HUMINT to assess production capacity, component supply chains, and potential unit assignments for "Sapsan." Monitor for any signs of testing or training related to its deployment. (PRIORITY: MEDIUM).

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

• Intelligence & Special Operations (ISR, HUMINT, OSINT critical):

  1. CRITICAL PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE VERIFICATION & AGGRESSIVE COUNTERING OF MIDDLE EAST DISINFORMATION AND FALSE FLAGS, ESPECIALLY THOSE JUSTIFYING "REGIME DESTRUCTION" AND WEAPONIZING UKRAINIAN CASUALTIES AND WESTERN AID, AND NEW GEOPOLITICAL NARRATIVES. All-source intelligence must rapidly verify all claims and counter-claims regarding the Israel-Iran conflict, particularly Russian narratives aiming to implicate US leadership, exaggerate the crisis/casualties, and especially those explicitly justifying "regime destruction" as a legitimate outcome, and those making hyperbolic claims of missile attacks, and unconfirmed Iranian HVT losses (Qaani, other General). Leverage IAEA statements for nuclear sites (Fordo, Natanz). Specifically identify and highlight Russian narratives that explicitly link Mossad operations to Ukrainian deep strikes on Russian territory as false flag justifications, using the specific manipulated videos (including the new "ground-to-ground missile attack from secret base" video) as evidence of Russian fabrication. Crucially, immediately identify, analyze, and expose fabricated third-party endorsements (e.g., the "Donald Trump" social media post and new attributed Trump statements on US support/knowledge of Israeli strikes, like "we knew about it," and new claims of Iran directly calling Trump for nuclear deals, and non-worry over regional war) as a new, dangerous form of Russian disinformation aimed at destabilizing the information environment and diverting attention. Ensure Ukrainian channels are not inadvertently amplifying these and other unverified Middle East videos. Forcefully debunk the "Taurus disguised as Ukrainian" narrative and "European VPK milks Ukraine" claims. Also, expose and counter new geopolitical IO vectors such as "Nuclear Weapons in Japan," "PMCs in NATO exercises in Finland," and the Baltic Il-20 interception as attempts to sow division and distract. Provide verified intelligence to strategic decision-makers and IO elements for immediate, public, and aggressive counter-messaging. Publicly condemn and expose the use of provocative, anti-Semitic imagery by Russian-amplified sources (e.g., Alex Parker Returns) as a vile attempt to sow division and hatred, clearly linking it to Russian hybrid warfare tactics, particularly the latest message targeting "anti-war activists." (Supports CR 1, 4, 6)
  2. CRITICAL PRIORITY: INTENSIFY ISR ON NOVOPAVILIVKA (Komar/Koptevo/beyond, Velyka Novosilka/H-15) AND SUMY (Yablonovka/Yunakovka/Tyotkino) DIRECTIONS. Divert all significant ISR assets (IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT) to these areas. Prioritize identifying Russian force composition (especially unit IDs for 336th Marine Brigade and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade in Komar), logistics build-up, and intent (fixing operations vs. major offensive), and verify any deployment of Ukrainian reserves. Assess the ground truth against aspirational Russian maps, particularly the Velyka Novosilka map. Leverage intelligence from captured soldiers on morale and plans (e.g., Razmyslov Evgeniy Vadimovich). Specifically verify the accuracy and implications of the Russian military map for the Sumy direction, identifying any actual ground movements or unit deployments, and assess the effectiveness of AFU counterattacks near Yunakovka. Crucially, definitively verify the capture of Yablonovka. Assess the actual impact of claimed drone strikes by "Операция Z" near Pokrovsk against NATO equipment. (Supports CR 2)
  3. CRITICAL PRIORITY: ASSESS GEOMAGNETIC STORM IMPACT. Immediately assess potential effects of the geomagnetic storm on friendly and enemy navigation, communication, and AD systems. Implement mitigation measures for friendly forces and exploit potential enemy vulnerabilities. (Supports CR 3)
  4. CRITICAL PRIORITY: ASSESS KATRAN USV & LASER ANTI-UAV THREAT AND DPRK IMPLICATIONS. Immediately task TECHINT and SIGINT to fully analyze the "Katran" USV schematics, confirm operational capabilities, and assess potential deployment timelines and areas of operation (Black Sea, coastal). Similarly, assess the readiness and effectiveness of reported laser anti-UAV systems, building on visual confirmation. Develop countermeasures accordingly. Assess the implications of DPRK's new missile destroyer for potential Russian-DPRK military cooperation or technology transfer that could benefit Russia's war effort. (Supports CR 5)
  5. CRITICAL PRIORITY: ASSESS RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION PROBABILITY AND STRATEGIC BOMBER DEPLOYMENT. Intensify intelligence collection on Russian military and political intentions regarding mass mobilization. Assess the feasibility of Apti Alaudinov's public call and the broader sentiment within Russian channels. For strategic bombers, increase IMINT/SIGINT on Russian airfields to confirm aircraft numbers, movements, and loadouts. (Supports CR 7)
  6. CONTINUOUS COUNTER-SABOTAGE INTELLIGENCE & INTERNAL SECURITY MONITORING. Reinforce intelligence efforts to identify and disrupt Russian-directed railway sabotage networks, particularly in light of increased hybrid threat, and monitor for any new false flag justifications. Specifically, actively debunk FSB claims of detained civilian "Ukrainian "operatives" planning sabotage, highlighting them as Russian propaganda. Intensify monitoring of internal dissent related to mobilization efforts, including acts like the TCC arson in Kharkiv, to understand motivations and identify any external instigation. Monitor for and counter any Russian exploitation of the French bus crash in France involving Ukrainian children. (Supports CR 8)
  7. INVESTIGATE RUSSIAN INFORMAL SECURITY GROUPS. Launch immediate collection efforts (OSINT, HUMINT) to understand the nature, authority, funding, and activities of informal "People's Patrol" or "Narodnaya Druzhina" groups in Russia, assessing their potential for internal repression or misuse of authority. Analyze Kadyrov's interactions with military-style personnel and award ceremonies for signs of formalization or expansion of Chechen paramilitary roles, especially in light of the Supreme Court ruling. (Supports CR 9).
  8. CONDUCT BDA ON RESONIT FACTORY. Prioritize overhead imagery and SIGINT/HUMINT to assess the full extent of damage, operational disruption, and long-term consequences of the strike on the "Resonit" electronics factory. (Supports CR 10).
  9. CONFIRM SU-25 CRASH CAUSE. Task all-source intelligence to definitively determine the cause of the recent Su-25 crash near Soledar, given conflicting reports from Russian and Ukrainian sources, to inform Russian air asset capabilities and training. (Supports CR 4)
  10. ASSESS SAPSAN OTRK PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT. Conduct immediate intelligence collection to ascertain the scale of "Sapsan" (Hrim-2) OTRK serial production, estimated delivery timelines, and anticipated initial deployment locations, along with any related training requirements. (Supports CR 11).

• Air Defense & Force Protection:

  1. MAINTAIN HIGHEST AIR DEFENSE READINESS ACROSS ALL OBLASTS, ESPECIALLY KHARKIV, DONETSK, DNIPROPETROVSK, CHERNIHIV, SUMY, ZAPORIZHZHYA, AND KYIV. Anticipate Russia may increase the intensity or breadth of aerial attacks (UAVs and ballistic missiles, KABs/KARs) to capitalize on global distraction, potentially with increased strategic bomber activity and continued reliance on Iranian Shaheds. Ensure layered AD coverage for critical infrastructure and population centers. Prioritize resources for ballistic missile interception.
  2. ENHANCE BORDER SECURITY AGAINST DRONES & KABS/KARS. Increase air defense coverage and rapid response capabilities in northern border regions like Chernihiv and Sumy against persistent kamikaze drone and KAB/KAR threats, particularly in areas like the Kursk direction (Zorya settlement). Leverage modernized AD systems (e.g., Trojka).
  3. PROTECT CIVILIAN LOGISTICS AND HUMANITARIAN AID. Develop and disseminate specific TTPs for protecting civilian vehicles, demining teams, and humanitarian operations from FPV drone attacks, considering Russia's observed targeting of civilian vehicles and the new disinformation narratives. Leverage and widely deploy newly tested UGVs for these tasks.
  4. ADAPT TO GEOMAGNETIC STORM: Implement contingency plans for AD systems, radar, and communications that may be affected by the geomagnetic storm. Emphasize manual backup procedures where automation is degraded.
  5. PREPARE MARITIME DEFENSES AGAINST USVs. Assess potential vulnerabilities to advanced Russian USVs (Katran models) in the Black Sea and coastal areas. Prioritize development or acquisition of counter-USV capabilities, including detection, interception, and electronic warfare, learning from Israeli successes.

• Ground Forces:

  1. MAINTAIN DISCIPLINED DEFENSIVE POSTURE IN DNIPROPETROVSK (Nikopolshchina), SUMY (Yablonovka/Yunakovka/Tyotkino, Yunakovka counterattacks), NOVOPAVILIVKA DIRECTION (Komar/Koptevo/beyond, Velyka Novosilka/H-15), GULIAIPOLE DIRECTION (Malinivka), BASOVKA/KONSTANTINOVKA, AND KURSK DIRECTION (Zorya settlement). Commanders on these axes must remain prepared for potential increased ground probing or offensive actions, but continue to exercise extreme caution against committing strategic reserves until Russian intent and force composition are definitively confirmed. Avoid being drawn into attritional engagements on axes that are primarily diversionary, unless it is confirmed as a major new offensive requiring immediate strategic response. Address the Russian military map for Sumy as a potential psychological operation, while preparing for actual ground action. (Supports CR 2)
  2. CONTINUE ATTRITIONAL DEFENSE ON EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AXES. Maintain robust, attritional defense on the key axes (e.g., Pokrovsk, Toretsk, Lyman direction), exploiting costly Russian assault tactics to degrade their forces, as indicated by AFU General Staff updates and the increase in Russian surrenders.
  3. CONTINUE COUNTER-UAV MEASURES & LOGISTICAL INNOVATION. Reinforce and practice counter-FPV drone and anti-UAV tactics at all echelons, including electronic warfare countermeasures and integrated air defense. Ensure all units are aware of Russian drone tactics against PVDs and vehicles, and the increasing threat to logistics. Continue to develop and implement drone-based logistical solutions and UGV deployments as highlighted by the General Staff and recent Zaporizhzhia efforts.
  4. MAXIMIZE PSYOP OPPORTUNITIES. Leverage successes like the increase in drone-induced surrenders of Russian soldiers (Lyman direction), humane treatment of captured soldiers (e.g., Razmyslov), and their testimony on low morale/friendly fire for further PSYOP campaigns, emphasizing the viability and safety of surrender and the effectiveness of Ukrainian forces. Specifically use testimony from POWs like Razmyslov Evgeniy Vadimovich to undermine Russian recruitment and morale. Acknowledge and honor fallen soldiers through dignified repatriation and memorial efforts, countering Russian mockery. Publicize the IHL training as a sign of professionalism.

• Information Operations (IO):

  1. IMMEDIATE & AGGRESSIVE: COUNTER RUSSIAN NARRATIVES ON MIDDLE EAST IMPACT AND RISING OIL PRICES, EXPOSE FALSE FLAGS AND FABRICATED THIRD-PARTY STATEMENTS, AND ESPECIALLY "REGIME DESTRUCTION" RHETORIC AND WEAPONIZED CASUALTY COUNTS AND AID REJECTIONS, AND NEW GEOPOLITICAL IO. Proactively counter Russian attempts to leverage the Israel-Iran conflict (especially new Israeli strikes on Fordo, and unconfirmed Iranian HVT losses) to diminish international support for Ukraine. Emphasize that aggression in one region (Iran) emboldens aggression in others (Ukraine), and that Ukraine's fight for sovereignty remains a cornerstone of global stability. Explicitly highlight that rising oil prices, a direct consequence of Middle East instability, financially benefit Moscow and fund its war against Ukraine, referencing Russian milblogger statements. Publicize the EU's €1 billion aid from Russian assets as a direct counter to this Russian strategy and proof of continued Western support. Crucially, immediately and forcefully debunk Russian attempts to link alleged Mossad covert operations to Ukrainian deep strikes on Russian territory, exposing this as a fabrication and a dangerous false flag justification, using forensic analysis of their manipulated videos (especially the new "ground-to-ground missile attack from secret base" video). Most critically, expose and debunk the fabricated "Donald Trump" social media post and any new attributed Trump statements as a sophisticated Russian disinformation tactic, highlighting its clear alignment with Russian interests. Prompt Ukrainian channels that amplified this post and other unverified Middle East videos to remove it and issue corrections. Immediately counter the "Taurus disguised as Ukrainian" narrative and "European VPK milks Ukraine" claims. Forcefully counter new geopolitical IO vectors, particularly the "Nuclear Weapons in Japan" narrative, claims of "PMCs in NATO exercises in Finland," and the Baltic Il-20 interception, by exposing their intent to sow discord and justify Russian aggression. Re-frame Apti Alaudinov's call for mass mobilization: highlight it as evidence of Russia's manpower crisis and high attrition, rather than a sign of strength, and underscore that Russia's aggression is depleting its own resources and personnel. Leverage captured POW testimony (Razmyslov) to support this. Strongly condemn and expose the new, highly provocative, anti-Semitic imagery amplified by Russian sources as a clear example of Russian hybrid warfare and attempts to sow hatred, especially the latest message from Alex Parker Returns. This is a critical message for Western audiences. Explicitly counter Russian attempts to weaponize the 1200 body repatriation, framing it as a solemn humanitarian achievement and a testament to Ukrainian resilience in the face of Russian aggression. Prepare for and immediately counter any Russian exploitation of the tragic bus crash in France involving Ukrainian children, and the claimed shelling of Selidovo park, focusing on humanitarian aspects and condemning any attempts to politicize the incident. Immediately address the US House vote rejecting additional aid, framing it as a temporary setback and highlighting continued international support from other partners like the EU (€1 billion). Work with "Радіо Свобода" to clarify Ukraine's negotiation position. (Supports CR 1, 4, 6, 7)
  2. RAPID DEBUNKING OF MISINFORMATION. Establish a rapid response mechanism to immediately debunk unverified and sensationalized claims propagated by Russian state media and milbloggers regarding the Middle East conflict (e.g., high-value Iranian casualties like the General Staff Chief, specific missile types, false US involvement, fabricated Mossad links, Iranian "destruction" of Natanz unless independently verified, Iranian CGI threat videos, claims of radiation leaks, Iranian cancellation of nuclear talks unless independently verified, the meaning of the red flag over Qom). Highlight these as deliberate Russian disinformation tactics intended to distract from Ukraine. Expose Russian analysis of hypothetical US operations against Iran as a tool for fear-mongering and the use of simulated maps (like "Z комитет") as part of IO. Actively counter narratives of "Western internal instability" (e.g., Dutch protests) using verifiable facts, and counter anti-NATO narratives. (Supports CR 1, 4, 6)
  3. PROMOTE UKRAINIAN SUCCESSES: Actively publicize successful FPV drone strikes on Russian personnel, capture of POWs, GUR raids, internal security successes (MP treason/tax evasion charges - especially Novinsky's, Buchansky fraud exposure, "Forests of Ukraine" corruption, architect damaging cultural site, FSB terror plot foiled, Prosecutor General's financial recoveries), the successful return of 11 children from occupied Kherson, and the €1 billion EU aid from Russian assets to demonstrate Ukrainian effectiveness and continued international backing. Highlight the resilience of Ukrainian communications and logistical innovation with drones and UGVs. Promote the new drone manufacturing laws and NATO mission leadership. Publicize Chinese humanitarian aid to Zaporizhzhia as a sign of broad international support. Publicize the successful repatriation of fallen Ukrainian soldiers, countering Russian mockery. Showcase ongoing training and readiness efforts (ОТУ "Харків"🇺🇦) and AD successes (БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС, drone shootdowns by 77th Airmobile Brigade, MiG-29 strike). Promote adherence to IHL. Leverage Enerhodar's anniversary to demonstrate Ukrainian resilience and effective local administration despite occupation. Publicize the "Sea Baby" drone transfer to a museum as a symbol of innovation and achievement. Publicly recognize military awards given by President Zelenskyy and highlight the "Sapsan" OTRK entering serial production. Promote veteran rehabilitation programs.
  4. MAINTAIN DOMESTIC NARRATIVE FOCUS. Continue to emphasize Ukrainian resilience and successes (e.g., successful UAV interceptions, deep cyberattacks, increase in Russian surrenders, police operations against arms trafficking, SBU action against propagandists, drone development policy, legal actions against propagandists) to maintain public morale amidst external geopolitical turbulence and internal threats. Utilize daily enemy loss reports to demonstrate progress. Reinforce national unity through remembrance events. Address utility outages transparently. Address internal security challenges, such as the Kharkiv TCC arson, transparently and explain government efforts to manage mobilization fairly and securely. Use briefings from local leaders like Oleksandr Vilkul to inform and reassure the public.

• Diplomatic/Inter-Agency:

  1. IMMEDIATE & PROACTIVE: ENGAGE KEY PARTNERS ON SUSTAINED SUPPORT. Ukrainian diplomatic missions should immediately engage with US, EU, and other key partners to highlight the potential for the Middle East escalation (especially new Israeli strikes on Fordo, and unconfirmed Iranian HVT losses) to divert attention or resources, and to advocate for continued, robust military and financial support for Ukraine. Explicitly present the Russian disinformation campaign (including fabricated "Trump" statements and false flag videos, and the public calls for Russian mobilization, and the new "regime destruction" rhetoric, and the weaponization of Ukrainian casualty counts, and the immediate amplification of Western aid rejections and attributed non-worry from US leadership figures, and new geopolitical IO vectors like "Nuclear Weapons in Japan," "PMCs in NATO exercises in Finland," and the Baltic Il-20 interception) as evidence of Moscow's intent to exploit the crisis, and highlight the financial benefit Russia gains from rising oil prices due to regional instability. Strongly advocate for the swift and expanded leveraging of frozen Russian assets, citing the recent €1 billion success. The new head of Ukraine's NATO mission should immediately prioritize this. (Supports CR 4, 6)
  2. COORDINATE WITH ALLIES ON IO STRATEGY: Seek to coordinate with allied intelligence and information agencies on a unified strategy to counter Russian disinformation regarding the Middle East, especially false flag narratives and manipulated videos/fabricated third-party statements, and the dangerous new "regime destruction" rhetoric, and the weaponization of Ukrainian casualty counts, and new geopolitical IO vectors. (Supports CR 1, 4, 6)
  3. INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION OF CIVILIAN TARGETING. Work with international partners to secure swift and strong condemnation of Russian attacks against civilian populations and continued KAB/KAR/FPV strikes on civilian infrastructure, emphasizing this as a breach of international law. Also, work to debunk Russian claims blaming Ukraine for civilian casualties, such as the Selidovo park shelling.
  4. Clarify Chinese Aid: Ensure transparent communication with international partners regarding the nature and extent of Chinese humanitarian/civilian aid, differentiating it from military support.
  5. PREPARE FOR UNSC ENGAGEMENT: If the UNSC meets today regarding the Israel-Iran conflict, Ukrainian diplomatic missions should ensure Ukraine's perspective is represented, highlighting the interconnectedness of global security challenges and the need to address Russian aggression simultaneously, and countering Russian mockery of international institutions. (Supports CR 6).
  6. ENGAGE ESTONIA ON MINE CONVENTION: Engage with Estonian counterparts to understand the motivations and implications of their withdrawal from the anti-personnel mine ban convention, and assess its potential impact on regional security and Ukraine's own military posture.
  7. COORDINATE HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT FOR FRENCH BUS CRASH. Ensure immediate and comprehensive diplomatic and consular support for Ukrainian citizens affected by the tragic bus accident in France, coordinating with French authorities for victim assistance and investigation.
  8. ADDRESS HUNGARIAN NARRATIVE. Ukrainian diplomats should proactively engage with Hungarian counterparts to counter Prime Minister Orban's narrative regarding Ukrainian "threats," emphasizing shared European security interests and the need for unity against Russian aggression.