Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME OF REPORT: 13 JUN 25 / 08:45 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 13 JUN 25 / 08:15 ZULU - 13 JUN 25 / 08:45 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET / ORCON / NOFORN

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Ukraine Operational Area:
  • Kharkiv Axis: Clashes reported near Vovchansk (AFU General Staff). Russian aviation conducting airstrikes at Kozatske (Donetsk region), Novopil (Donetsk region), Novozlatopil, Olhivske, Hulyaypole, Pryutne, Prymorske, Bilohirya, Chumatske (Zaporizhzhia region), and Lvove (Kherson region) (AFU General Staff). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - AFU reporting).
  • Kupyansk Axis: Clashes reported near Pischane and Novoplatonivka (AFU General Staff). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Lyman Axis: Clashes reported near Nadiya, Novyy Myr, Yampolivka, Torske and towards Shandryholove (AFU General Staff). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). This confirms continued Russian pressure on this axis, aligning with previous reports of increased surrenders.
  • Siversk Axis: Clashes reported near Serebryanka and Verkhnokamyanske (AFU General Staff). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Kramatorsk Axis: Clashes reported near Chasiv Yar and towards Bila Hora (AFU General Staff). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Toretsk Axis: Clashes reported near Dyliyivka, Toretsk, Scherbynivka, Romanivka and towards Rusyn Yar, Oleksandro-Kalynove and Yablunivka (AFU General Staff). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). This indicates significant Russian pressure towards Toretsk.
  • Pokrovsk Axis: Clashes reported near Myrolubivka, Andriyivka, Lysivka, Malynivka, Myrne, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Udachne, Novoserhiyivka, Horikhove and towards Oleksiyivka, Poltavka and Muravka (AFU General Staff). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). This indicates the most active and expansive Russian ground efforts on the eastern front.
  • Novopavlivka Axis: Clashes reported near Vesele, Bahatyr, Skudne, Dniproenerhiya, Fedorivka, Novosilka, Vilne Pole, Novyy Komar, Shevchenko and towards Myrne, Zaporizhzhya, Komar (AFU General Staff). Russian milblogger "Воин DV" claims "Battle for Komar!" (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). This is critical, as Novopavlivka direction was previously assessed as a potential for a new major offensive.
  • Orikhiv Axis: Clashes reported near Novoandriyivka and towards Pavlivka (AFU General Staff). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Huliaipole Axis: Clashes reported near Malynivka (AFU General Staff). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Kherson Axis: Ukrainian forces repelled 1 Russian army assault (AFU General Staff). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Nikopol region): One fatality reported due to enemy artillery shelling in Pokrovska community (Serhiy Lysak / Dnipropetrovsk RMA). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Russian milbloggers "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" are claiming "Dnipropetrovsk direction" and displaying a map, suggesting active operations or preparation. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • Kursk Region (Border Area, Russian Territory): Ukrainian forces reported repelling 27 Russian army assaults, with 18 airstrikes (34 guided bombs), 225 artillery strikes, and 5-13 MLRS (AFU General Staff). Key settlements marked include Lyubimivka, Nikols'kyi, Nyzhnii Klyn, Lebedivka, Basivka, Noven'ke, Viktorivka, Bilovody, Oleksiiivka, Yunakivka, Mohrytsia, Sudzha, Makhnivka, Cherkas'ka Konopel'ka, Hus'ovo, Borki, Martinivka, Cherkas'ke Porechne, Nova Sorochyna, Bakhtynka, Vorozhba. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). This confirms continued, extremely high-intensity Ukrainian cross-border operations.
• Russian Territory:
  • Moscow Oblast: GUR hackers claimed to have attacked Russian customs, tax service, and Russian Railways (RBC-Ukraine citing sources). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian claim, unverified technical impact).
  • Voronezh Oblast: Official detained for embezzlement of funds for war recruitment (Север.Реалии). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Unspecified Location (General Gerasimov inspection): Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov inspected "West" Group of Forces in SVO zone (Colonelcassad, Операция Z). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• International (Israel-Iran): The situation remains CRITICAL, RAPIDLY ESCALATING, AND HIGHLY UNSTABLE.
  • New Alleged Strikes/Explosions (Iran):
    • Natanz Reactor: ASTRA (Russian Telegram channel) claims "Iran confirmed damage to nuclear facility in Natanz after Israeli attack." This directly contradicts IAEA (via TASS) previous statements of no damage. (CONFIDENCE: LOW for independent verification of damage, HIGH for ASTRA claim).
    • Unspecified Military/Weapons Facilities: Оперативний ЗСУ shares videos of alleged Israeli airstrikes on "ballistic missile launchers" and "weapons facilities" in Iran, with Hebrew text confirming "Ground-to-ground missile attack in Iran" and "Attack on weapons facilities in Iran." (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - attributed, visual BDA shows successful destruction of targets).
    • Residential Damage/High-Value Target Claims: Alex Parker Returns publishes a photo of a damaged bedroom, claiming it is "bedroom of one of the eliminated high-ranking officials in Iran. Drone hit exactly the target." TASS publishes photos of "consequences of Israeli Air Force strikes on Tehran," showing widespread urban damage, including civilian vehicles. (CONFIDENCE: LOW for "eliminated official" claim; MEDIUM for general urban damage in Tehran, unverified attribution to Israeli strikes).
  • Israeli Statements/Actions:
    • Mossad stated "civilians no longer need to be in bomb shelters" (Alex Parker Returns, implies de-escalation of immediate threat to Israel). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Russian reporting of Mossad statement).
    • Israel is "ready for a full-scale war with Iran" (TASS citing Netanyahu's office). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Israel is in "close contact with the USA" on the situation (TASS citing Netanyahu's office). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Israel "relies on its own forces" in case of escalation (TASS citing Netanyahu's office). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Israel issued "direct ultimatum to Iran" (Alex Parker Returns): "If they attack us, we attack their oil refineries and destroy their economy. If they allow us to destroy their nuclear facilities without harsh response, we leave their oil refineries intact." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Russian reporting of ultimatum, unverified direct quote).
  • Iranian Statements/Actions:
    • Iranian Atomic Energy Organization states IAEA "completely lost authority" after Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities (TASS). This is a significant diplomatic escalation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Narratives (CRITICAL - CONTINUED HYPER-AMPLIFICATION AND FABRICATION):
    • Peskov states Russia is "concerned and condemns sharp escalation" between Israel and Iran, and Putin is receiving "real-time" reports. Russia MFA will issue a detailed statement for UN. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). This is a public attempt to appear as a responsible global actor, but contrasts with previous internal milblogger rhetoric.
    • Russian milbloggers continue to sensationalize the crisis: "Старше Эдды" expresses surprise at how quickly Israel "dismantled Iran" based on Israeli media, and praises Israeli "reconnaissance-sabotage operations." "Два майора" shares a map showing 1500km strike range from Israel into Iran. "Alex Parker Returns" amplifies the Mossad statement and the "direct ultimatum" to Iran, interpreting it as "Iran called to capitulate." "Военкор Котенок" notes Brent oil price rising 6%. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). This confirms continued exploitation for geopolitical gain.
    • Rybar posts videos claiming "riots in Northern Ireland," depicting civil unrest with burning barricades and police vehicles. This is likely an attempt to portray Western nations as unstable and internally conflicted. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• The unexpected geomagnetic storm has begun on Earth. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). This continues to have significant implications for satellite communications, GPS/GNSS, and potentially high-frequency radio communications, affecting precision-guided munitions, drone operations, and general C2 for all parties.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces: Actively engaged on multiple axes (Kharkiv, Kupyansk, Lyman, Siversk, Kramatorsk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Orikhiv, Huliaipole, Kherson). Conducting successful counter-battery operations (15th OBSAR destroyed a Russian 2S7 Pion and ammo truck). Continuing cross-border operations into Kursk region. Conducting internal security operations (Prosecutor General's Office notifying Russian rapper of suspicion for propaganda concerts in Crimea, National Police conducting over 500 searches for arms trafficking). GUR hackers claim cyber attacks on Russian customs, tax, and railways. Coordinating with families of POWs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces: Maintaining high pressure on Pokrovsk, Toretsk, Lyman, and Kupyansk axes. Conducting airstrikes in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions. Conducting artillery shelling in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Chief of General Staff Gerasimov inspected "West" Group of Forces, including drone/anti-drone tech. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Israeli Forces: Claiming successful precision strikes in Iran. Stating readiness for full-scale war and issuing ultimatum. Maintaining close contact with USA. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Iranian Forces: Confirming damage to nuclear facility (ASTRA claim, unverified). Accusing IAEA of lost authority. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RUSSIA FOCUSED)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA):

• Capabilities (Russia):
  • Sustained Ground Offensive Operations: Evidence of continued, multi-axis ground assaults, particularly intense on Pokrovsk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka axes, as well as persistent cross-border pressure in Sumy and Kharkiv/Kursk regions. This demonstrates significant, albeit costly, ground combat capability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Aerial Attack Capabilities: Continued use of guided aerial bombs (KABs) and general aviation airstrikes across multiple oblasts, showing maintained air-to-ground strike capacity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Precision Artillery/MLRS: The fatal artillery strike in Dnipropetrovsk and constant shelling reports indicate continued artillery effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Warfare (CRITICAL - CONTINUED HYPER-AMPLIFICATION AND FABRICATION): Russia continues its highly agile and aggressive information operations on the Israel-Iran conflict and internal Western stability. They are:
    • Contradicting Official Reports: ASTRA directly contradicting IAEA on Natanz damage, aimed at fueling panic. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Fabricating High-Value Iranian Casualties: Alex Parker Returns claiming drone strike on "bedroom of one of the eliminated high-ranking officials in Iran." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Russian claim, LOW for verification).
    • Amplifying Iranian Claims/Threats: Immediately amplifying Iranian claims of IAEA losing authority. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Propagating Global Conflict Narrative: Milbloggers actively share maps of Israeli strike ranges into Iran and discuss Iran's "capitulation" vs. war, keeping the crisis at peak intensity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Creating Discord in Europe: Rybar's amplification of "riots in Northern Ireland" attempts to destabilize Western narratives and portray internal chaos. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Cyber Warfare: GUR claims of attacks on Russian customs, tax, and railways suggest ongoing Ukrainian cyber capabilities against Russian critical infrastructure. This could provoke Russian counter-cyber measures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Internal Control: Continued arrests for embezzlement in war recruitment underscore internal corruption issues, but also the state's capacity to identify and act on them, however selectively. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intentions (Russia):
  • Maximize Global Distraction (PRIMARY, HYPER-ACCELERATED INTENT - Reinforced): Russia's overarching intent is to intensify and exploit the Israel-Iran conflict to the maximum extent possible to divert global attention, political capital, and military resources away from Ukraine. Peskov's statement of "condemning" escalation while Russian milbloggers celebrate oil prices confirms this dual narrative approach. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Degrade Ukrainian AD & Infrastructure / Achieve Tactical Gains: Continued KAB/aviation strikes across multiple oblasts and intense ground assaults on Pokrovsk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka axes demonstrate persistent intent to inflict damage, exhaust Ukrainian resources, and achieve localized breakthroughs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Test New Axes / Fix Reserves: The persistent border attacks into Kursk region and recent claims/activity in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast indicate a clear intent to open new directions, create buffer zones, and force Ukraine to disperse its reserves. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Consolidate Gains & Open New Fronts: Claims of "liberating" Yablonovka in Sumy Oblast are likely part of a shaping operation for a larger offensive, aiming to create a buffer zone and fix Ukrainian reserves, as previously assessed. Continued pressure on Lyman indicates intent to achieve localized gains. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Courses of Action (COA) (Russia):
  • COA 1 (Hyper-Intensified & Expanded IO on Middle East & "Global Conflict" - PRIMARY, HYPER-ACCELERATED): Russia will immediately and relentlessly escalate its information operations regarding the Israel-Iran conflict. This includes continuously pushing unsubstantiated high-value Iranian casualty claims, fabricating or dramatically exaggerating details of Iranian retaliation (e.g., specific numbers of Shaheds/ballistic missiles, despite unverified sources), and explicitly celebrating the diversion of Western resources and the rise of oil prices. They will also use any Israeli or Iranian statements (e.g., Israel's "ultimatum") and NATO statements to bolster their narratives, while also continuing to push narratives explicitly linking the US/West to "exploding the Middle East." They will leverage new claims of Mossad operations (e.g., via Azerbaijan) to tie the conflict to "Ukrainian tactics," and amplify internal Western instability (e.g., Northern Ireland riots). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • COA 2 (Sustained Attritional Ground Operations & Opportunistic Probes on Multiple Axes - Reinforced): Russia will maintain high-intensity, attritional assaults on key axes (Pokrovsk, Toretsk) and continue opportunistic probes into border regions (Sumy, Chernihiv, now Dnipropetrovsk). The reported activity on the Novopavlivka axis and the "Battle for Komar!" narrative are strong indicators of potential escalation in this direction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • COA 3 (Sustained Targeted Aerial Attacks - UAVs, KABs, Ballistic Missiles): Russia will continue to employ a mix of UAVs (Shaheds), guided aerial bombs (KABs), and ballistic missiles against Ukrainian targets, aiming to deplete AD and inflict damage. Expect opportunistic missile strikes against rear targets if Ukrainian AD is perceived to be distracted by frontline pressure or resource strain, especially with the distraction of the Middle East and potential geomagnetic storm effects. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • COA 4 (Exploitation of Internal Ukrainian Issues and Internal Crackdown - Reinforced): Russia will likely attempt to exploit internal Ukrainian security issues, political discourse, and social challenges (e.g., Odesa water outage, reported internal police operations, legal actions against Ukrainian officials like NAAN President) to sow discord and undermine confidence in the Ukrainian armed forces and government. They will also amplify claims of Ukrainian shelling causing civilian casualties in occupied areas (Makeevka) to deflect blame and generate anti-Ukrainian sentiment. Concurrently, Russia will maintain its internal crackdown on dissent, as seen with the Irkutsk blogger and now the Voronezh official. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• Increased Pressure on Novopavlivka Axis: The increased reporting and milblogger focus on the Novopavlivka direction (Komar) suggests a potential shift or intensification of Russian ground efforts towards that area, beyond previous levels. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Gerasimov Inspection of "West" Group: The public inspection by Gerasimov of the "West" Group of Forces indicates an assessment of their readiness and potentially a preparation for new directives or operations in that sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Explicit Ultimatum to Iran: The reported Israeli "ultimatum" (as amplified by Russian sources) represents a direct, high-stakes diplomatic/military pressure tactic that Russia will undoubtedly analyze and attempt to exploit. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Civil Unrest Amplification: Rybar's focus on "riots in Northern Ireland" indicates a deliberate effort to shift IO narratives to internal Western vulnerabilities, broadening the scope of Russian hybrid operations beyond Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• The continued high volume of IO content and claims of large-scale drone/missile attacks (even if unverified in terms of numbers) suggests a sustained capacity to produce and disseminate information warfare. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• The detention of a Voronezh official for embezzling recruitment funds highlights continued internal corruption within Russia's military-industrial complex and recruitment efforts. This suggests that while recruitment is ongoing, it faces internal challenges. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Gerasimov's inspection of the "West" Group of Forces, including new drone/anti-drone tech, suggests Russia is attempting to address equipment and sustainment needs on the frontline, likely as part of lessons learned. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• The proposed EU oil price cap reduction, if implemented, could significantly impact Russia's revenue streams, thereby affecting its long-term war funding and sustainment capabilities, especially as milbloggers explicitly celebrate rising oil prices. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian IO C2: The almost instantaneous, coordinated, and multi-platform dissemination of highly speculative and inflammatory claims regarding the Israel-Iran conflict, including active promotion of specific Iranian retaliation narratives, fabricated sensationalized claims of high-value Iranian casualties, explicit acknowledgment of geopolitical benefits, and now fabricated Mossad links, highlights an exceptionally effective, highly centralized, and adaptable C2 for real-time information warfare. They are leveraging both official (TASS) and unofficial (milblogger) channels simultaneously, including the use of simulated maps to visually reinforce narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Military C2: General Gerasimov's inspection indicates that high-level military leadership remains engaged with frontline units and operational planning. The coordinated assaults on multiple axes suggest functional operational C2. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Impact of Geomagnetic Storm: The unexpected geomagnetic storm continues to pose C2 challenges for both sides, particularly affecting long-range communications and GNSS-reliant systems. Russian and Ukrainian forces will need to adapt their C2 practices to mitigate these effects. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UKRAINIAN FOCUSED)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• High Alert on Multiple Fronts: Ukrainian forces are actively engaged in repelling Russian assaults and conducting defensive operations on a wide range of axes, from Kharkiv to Kherson, indicating a dispersed but engaged posture. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Internal Security: Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office pursuing legal action against Russian cultural figures (rapper) for propaganda, reinforcing Ukraine's sovereignty over Crimea. National Police continue large-scale operations against illegal arms trafficking. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Deep Strike & Cyber Capabilities: Confirmed destruction of a Russian 2S7 Pion SPG and ammunition truck by the 15th OBSAR demonstrates effective long-range fire capabilities. GUR's claimed cyberattacks on Russian critical infrastructure (customs, tax, railway) indicates continued asymmetric capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• POW Support: Coordination Staff for POWs continues to meet with families of defenders, providing crucial morale and support to affected families. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Counter-Offensive in Kursk Region: Sustained Ukrainian pressure and multiple repelled Russian assaults in the Kursk border region indicate a robust and effective defensive posture on that front. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Success (Deep Battle): Destruction of Russian 2S7 Pion and ammunition truck is a significant tactical success, targeting a high-value artillery asset and its logistical support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Success (Cyber Warfare): GUR's claimed cyberattacks on Russian customs, tax, and railway services represent a potentially significant strategic success, disrupting Russian critical infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Success (Internal Security/Rule of Law): Legal action against Russian rapper for propaganda activities in Crimea reinforces Ukrainian sovereignty and rule of law in occupied territories. National Police's large-scale anti-arms trafficking operation enhances internal security. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Success (Cross-Border Defense): Repelling 27 Russian assaults in Kursk region indicates strong defensive effectiveness in those areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setback (Humanitarian): One fatality reported due to artillery shelling in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Nikopol region) highlights continued targeting of civilian areas and the human cost of Russian aggression. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setback (Information Environment): The continued aggressive Russian IO campaign on the Middle East, including new fabrications (Natanz damage, high-value Iranian casualties) and the re-amplification of "Third World War" narratives, represents a persistent and escalating challenge for Ukraine to maintain international focus. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setback (Resource Diversion): The focus on Northern Ireland riots by Russian milbloggers indicates a new avenue for Russia to divert Western attention away from Ukraine by highlighting internal Western divisions and instability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense Capabilities: Ukraine's AD requirements for ballistic missiles and KABs remain paramount, especially with Russia potentially capitalizing on a global distraction and any effects from the geomagnetic storm.
• Counter-Battery Systems: The successful targeting of a Russian 2S7 Pion underscores the continued need for advanced counter-battery radar systems and precision long-range artillery to target Russian artillery assets.
• International Support Focus: The intensifying Middle East crisis, amplified by Russian IO, poses an immediate and significant risk to the continued flow of international military and financial aid to Ukraine. The EU's proposed oil price cap is a positive development but needs to be rigorously enforced and potentially lowered further. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Cybersecurity Resources: The GUR's claimed attacks on Russian state services suggest the need for continued investment in and development of offensive and defensive cyber capabilities.
• Internal Security Resources: Large-scale police operations require significant resources and personnel, indicating a sustained need for funding and training in law enforcement.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Narratives (CRITICAL - EXTREMELY ACTIVE, AGGRESSIVE, AND FABRICATED):
  • Middle East Escalation Amplification & Fabrication (Primary, Hyper-Aggressive): Russian state media (TASS amplifying Iranian claims of IAEA losing authority, photos of urban damage) and milbloggers (Alex Parker Returns, ASTRA, Старше Эдды, Два майора, Воин DV) are massively and sensationally amplifying the Israel-Iran conflict. They are:
    • Fabricating Nuclear Facility Damage: ASTRA claiming Iran confirmed Natanz damage, directly contradicting IAEA. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Russian claim, LOW for verification).
    • Fabricating High-Value Iranian Casualties: Alex Parker Returns publishing photos of damaged bedrooms claiming "eliminated high-ranking officials." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for Russian claim, LOW for verification).
    • Exaggerating Retaliation & Threat: Amplifying Israeli "ultimatums" to Iran as calls for "capitulation" to suggest uncontrolled escalation. Sharing maps of Israeli strike ranges. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Propagating Global Conflict Narrative: "Старше Эдды" expresses surprise at how quickly Israel "dismantled" Iran, while "Военкор Котенок" highlights rising oil prices. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Western Internal Destabilization: Rybar posting videos of "riots in Northern Ireland" with burning barricades and police vehicles. This is a clear attempt to portray Western nations as unstable and draw attention from Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Military Strength & Control: Gerasimov's inspection video portrays strong military leadership and ongoing modernization (drones, anti-drone rifles). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Claims of active ground operations on multiple fronts.
  • Internal Russian Issues Downplayed/Weaponized: The arrest of a Voronezh official for embezzlement is reported, but not framed as a systemic issue, but rather an individual failing. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Counter-Narrative: Ukrainian sources (AFU General Staff, Оперативний ЗСУ, РБК-Україна, Офіс Генерального прокурора, ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS, Координаційний штаб з питань поводження з військовополоненими) are providing daily operational updates across all axes, highlighting Russian airstrikes and artillery (Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk), and successful Ukrainian defense (Kursk, Kherson). They are also reporting on their own successful deep strikes (2S7 Pion), cyber operations (GUR on Russian state services), and internal security measures (National Police arms trafficking, Prosecutor General's Office on Russian rapper). This aims to show resilience, capability, and continued governance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian Morale: Sustained intense combat on multiple axes and continued Russian aerial threats (KABs, artillery fatalities in Dnipropetrovsk) will place a strain on public morale. However, clear reports of successful defenses (Kursk, Kherson), significant enemy losses (2S7 Pion), and deep cyber strikes will bolster confidence. Internal security operations and POW support efforts contribute positively to trust in governance. The ongoing Middle East crisis, heavily amplified by Russia, remains a concern for sustained Western support, potentially impacting long-term morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Morale: The narrative of Israel-Iran conflict benefiting Russia (financially, by diverting attention) will likely boost domestic morale and support for the war in Ukraine. The public appearance of General Gerasimov with troops is intended to project leadership and competence. Milblogger sensationalism of the Middle East conflict and "Western instability" (Northern Ireland) reinforces a narrative of Russia benefiting from global chaos. Internal corruption issues (Voronezh official) could create localized discontent but appear to be contained. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• Middle East Escalation (CRITICAL & ACCELERATING): The Israel-Iran conflict continues to escalate with alleged Israeli strikes on strategic Iranian targets (including disputed claims of nuclear facilities), Iranian accusations against IAEA, and direct Israeli ultimatums. Russian state media's immediate public response of "condemning" the escalation while their milbloggers celebrate oil prices shows a calculated diplomatic maneuver designed to portray Russia as a stabilizing force while reaping geopolitical benefits. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Global Attention Diversion (CRITICAL, HYPER-ACCELERATED): The primary and most immediate threat to Ukraine remains the successful, rapid, and aggressive diversion of global attention by Russia to the Middle East crisis. Russia's explicit statements about this diversion benefiting them (financially, militarily) confirm this as a deliberate, opportunistic strategy. This directly imperils sustained political, military, and financial support for Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Oil Prices & EU Sanctions (CRITICAL): Brent oil price rising by 6% (Военкор Котенок) directly supports Russia's war funding. The EU's proposal to lower the oil price cap on Russian oil to $45/barrel is a significant counter-measure to Russia's strategy of profiting from the Middle East instability, but its implementation is crucial. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Diplomatic Disengagement: Russian diplomatic missions recommending citizens leave Israel (TASS, Alex Parker Returns, WarGonzo, Новости Москвы) underscores the severity of the perceived threat and the potential for a wider conflict.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Hyper-Intensified & Sustained Russian IO on Middle East & "Global Conflict" Narrative (Reinforced): Russia will continue its current aggressive, fabricated, and celebratory information campaign regarding the Israel-Iran conflict, doubling down on claims of Iranian high-value casualties (even if unverified by others), exaggerating Iranian retaliation (e.g., claiming Natanz damage despite IAEA denials), and openly stating the conflict's benefits to Russia (financial gain, US resource diversion). Expect narratives accusing the US/West of orchestrating the crisis, leveraging claims of Mossad operations to sow confusion, and amplifying internal Western discord (Northern Ireland). They will also react aggressively to the proposed EU oil price cap, attempting to undermine it through propaganda. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Sustained Attritional Ground Operations & Opportunistic Probes on Multiple Axes (Reinforced): Russia will maintain high-intensity, attritional assaults on key axes (Pokrovsk, Toretsk, Lyman). The increasing focus and reporting on the Novopavlivka direction (Komar) suggests a sustained push to achieve significant gains there. Opportunistic probes into border regions (Sumy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk) will continue, potentially supported by intensified reconnaissance and KAB strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Persistent Massed Aerial Attacks on Ukraine (UAVs, KABs, Ballistic Missiles) (Reinforced): Russia will continue its mixed aerial attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure using Shaheds, KABs, and ballistic missiles, potentially attempting to capitalize on any perceived Western distraction or resource strain, especially given the geomagnetic storm which could affect AD systems. Targeted attacks on military and critical infrastructure will persist, with a high likelihood of civilian casualties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Increased Exploitation of Internal Ukrainian Issues and Internal Crackdown (Reinforced): Russia will seek to exploit any internal Ukrainian legal issues (e.g., police operations against arms trafficking, legal actions against NAAN President), political discourse, or social challenges to sow discord and undermine trust in Ukrainian leadership. They will also amplify claims of civilian casualties in occupied areas (Makeevka) to deflect blame. Internally, Russia will continue to suppress dissent through arrests and information control. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Coordinated Escalation under Global Cover (CRITICAL - HIGHLY ELEVATED): Russia perceives the current Middle East crisis as a golden opportunity for a significant strategic offensive or a major hybrid escalation in Ukraine, betting on overwhelming global distraction. This could manifest as:
  • Major Ground Offensive: A large-scale ground offensive on a new axis (e.g., Sumy, a renewed Kharkiv offensive, or a deeper push towards Dnipropetrovsk (Novopavlivka direction)), potentially synchronized with:
  • Intensified Long-Range Precision Strikes: Massed strikes (Kalibrs, Kh-series missiles, potentially Iranian-supplied ballistic missiles) against critical Ukrainian logistics nodes, Western aid entry points, energy infrastructure, or strategic C2 facilities, potentially exploiting geomagnetic storm effects on navigation.
  • Synchronized Sabotage/Cyber: Coordinated and widespread sabotage attacks against critical transport (railway, as GUR claims to have hit) and energy infrastructure in the deep rear, alongside major cyberattacks, aiming to sever supply lines and cripple command/control before a coordinated Western response can materialize. The explicit acknowledgment of economic benefits and the aggressive IO amplification of the Middle East crisis suggest Russia is actively creating conditions for such an MDCOA. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Probability and impact are very high).
• Exploitation of Geopolitical Chaos to Pressure NATO/EU (New MDCOA - Reinforced): Russia may use the increased global instability stemming from the Israel-Iran conflict to overtly or covertly pressure NATO/EU members, particularly those reliant on Russian energy, to reduce support for Ukraine or withdraw from sanctions, presenting itself as a necessary stabilizing force or by threatening to escalate conflicts further. This includes leveraging statements from NATO officials for their narrative and exacerbating internal divisions (e.g., Northern Ireland riots, conscription in Germany). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Based on long-term Russian strategy and current IO).
• Increased Targeting of Civilian Logistics/Personnel with Drones (Elevated): Russia adapts its FPV drone tactics to explicitly target civilian logistics routes, humanitarian aid operations, or demining teams, potentially under false flag narratives (e.g., "HIMARS disguised as containers"). This could further exacerbate humanitarian crises and disrupt civilian support infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Observed FPV targeting of civilian vehicles and previous reports, confirmed by Makeevka incident and Zaporizhzhia casualties, and Dnipropetrovsk fatality).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Immediate (Next 1-3 hours):
  • ISR: CRITICAL: Continue uninterrupted, high-priority monitoring of Russian IO channels for new sensationalized claims regarding the Middle East (especially related to new explosions, alleged high-value Iranian casualties, or escalated Iranian retaliation, or specific missile types), particularly focusing on any claims related to nuclear facilities and contrasting with IAEA statements. Prioritize verification of claimed Iranian casualties and target damage (especially in Tehran). Continue monitoring UAV activity in Crimea, Sumy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, and other border oblasts. Monitor for further Iranian drone/missile launches towards Israel and their interception by Israel/Jordan. Monitor the full impact of the geomagnetic storm on communications, navigation, and AD systems. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • IO: Commanders and IO elements must prepare for an immediate, aggressive, and evidence-based counter-narrative against Russian disinformation regarding the Middle East crisis, particularly emphasizing that Russia is exploiting the crisis and that rising oil prices directly benefit Moscow. Prepare to debunk specific Russian claims regarding Israeli/Iranian military actions and expose their economic and geopolitical motivations. Publicize successful PSYOPs tactics (Lyman surrenders, 2S7 Pion destruction) and the National Police operation.
• Short Term (Next 6-12 hours):
  • IO: Ukrainian forces must actively debunk sensationalized/unverified claims from Russian sources regarding the Middle East, and reinforce the message that global aggression requires a unified front against all aggressors. Proactively counter narratives of "Ukrainian terrorism" and "internal opposition" railway sabotage. Highlight forced Russification efforts in occupied territories. Actively promote the EU's proposed oil price cap reduction as a direct hit on Russia's war funding and a sign of continued international pressure. Debunk Russian narratives of "Western instability" (e.g., Northern Ireland riots) as diversionary tactics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Military Readiness: Commanders must ensure all air defense units are at highest readiness in targeted oblasts (Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Chernihiv), anticipating potential opportunistic strikes including ballistic missile and KAB threats. Increase physical security measures for critical railway infrastructure and cultural sites. Re-evaluate force posture on Dnipropetrovsk (Novopavlivka direction) axis for any opportunistic escalation, and maintain vigilance against probes despite local "controlled" status. Review force posture on Sumy/Chernihiv axes in light of persistent border attacks and new MDCOA. Anticipate potential effects of geomagnetic storm on AD and C2 and implement contingency plans.
  • Diplomatic/Inter-Agency: Actively engage with international partners to secure immediate, public condemnation of Russian exploitation of the Middle East crisis and to reaffirm commitment to Ukraine.
• Mid Term (Next 24-72 hours):
  • Diplomatic: Ukrainian diplomats must proactively engage with international partners to ensure sustained focus and aid despite global geopolitical developments, explicitly highlighting the Russian manipulation of the Middle East crisis and its economic benefits from rising oil prices. Advocate for the implementation and potential further reduction of the EU oil price cap. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • AD/Counter-Battery: Re-evaluate and reinforce AD and counter-battery postures in light of persistent and targeted aerial threats, including ballistic missile strikes and KABs. Prioritize acquisition of more ballistic missile interceptors and countermeasures against new Russian drone variants. Continue effective counter-battery fire against assets like 2S7 Pion.
  • Force Protection/Counter-Sabotage: Immediately review and enhance security protocols for critical infrastructure, particularly railway networks and utility grids (Odesa water outage), and intensify counter-intelligence operations against potential sabotage cells. Increase protection measures for civilian logistics and humanitarian operations against FPV drone threats. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Personnel Management: Continue to monitor enemy loss rates and plan for sustained personnel rotation and training needs. Address potential challenges in fundraising/volunteer support and internal issues like recruitment payment corruption.

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• GAP 1: VERIFICATION OF IRANIAN NUCLEAR FACILITY DAMAGE & HIGH-VALUE CASUALTIES (CRITICAL & HYPER-PRIORITY): The primary and most critical intelligence gap is the lack of independent, confirmed verification of claimed Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities (e.g., Natanz, which IAEA states is undamaged) and the extent of damage to other strategic Iranian military/industrial facilities. The claims of high-value Iranian casualties (General Staff Chief Baqeri, IRGC Chief Salami, and now Air Defense Commander, and now "high-ranking official" in a bedroom) remain unverified and are being actively fabricated/amplified by Russia.
  • COLLECTION REQUIREMENT (CR): Prioritize SIGINT, GEOINT, and HUMINT from credible, independent third-party sources to verify or refute Russian/Iranian claims of casualties and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) on alleged Iranian military/industrial facilities, especially nuclear sites. Engage with allied intelligence partners for rapid information sharing. Analyze newly emerged videos and images for precise location identification and damage assessment. Monitor Iranian military communications and public statements for further details on drone/missile operations and retaliation. (PRIORITY: EXTREME)
• GAP 2: SCALE AND OBJECTIVE OF RUSSIAN GROUND ADVANCES IN DNIPROPETROVSK (NOVOPAVLIVKA) & SUMY OBLAST (CRITICAL): The increased reporting on the Novopavlivka direction (Komar) in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, alongside continued Sumy claims, requires immediate verification. The precise scale, units involved, and immediate objectives of Russian ground operations in these areas remain critical intelligence gaps. Distinguishing between limited incursions/shaping operations and a major offensive is key.
  • CR: Intensify IMINT, SIGINT, and HUMINT collection on Russian force dispositions, logistics build-up, and command movements on the Novopavlivka/Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy axes. Focus on unit identification and their actual operational roles, and distinguish between attritional/fixing operations and genuine preparations for a major breakthrough. (PRIORITY: EXTREME)
• GAP 3: OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF GEOMAGNETIC STORM (CRITICAL): The unexpected geomagnetic storm could significantly impact C2, navigation, and AD systems. The extent of this impact on both Russian and Ukrainian forces is a critical intelligence gap.
  • CR: Monitor Russian and Ukrainian military communications for mentions of interference or changes in electronic warfare/UAV/precision strike operations. Assess any observable degradation in GNSS-reliant systems or increased reliance on alternative navigation. (PRIORITY: EXTREME)
• GAP 4: BDA FOR IRANIAN URBAN IMPACTS & SU-25 CRASH CAUSE/LOCATION: Lack of specific BDA for the reported urban damage in Tehran (TASS photos) and the claimed "bedroom" strike (Alex Parker Returns), as well as the previously reported Su-25 crash.
  • CR: Intensify IMINT, SIGINT, and OSINT on Iran to confirm targets and extent of damage to civilian vs. military structures. For the Su-25, confirm exact circumstances and location to understand if it was accidental or due to enemy action. (PRIORITY: HIGH).
• GAP 5: OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF RUSSIAN IO ON WESTERN SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE (CRITICAL - REINFORCED): The effectiveness of Russian IO in diverting Western attention and potentially impacting aid decisions is a critical unknown, especially with rising oil prices and Iranian accusations of US coordination, and now the focus on internal Western instability (Northern Ireland riots). The proposed EU oil price cap needs to be monitored for its implementation and impact on Russian behavior.
  • CR: Conduct continuous OSINT monitoring of Western media narratives, social media trends, and parliamentary/congressional discussions to assess the influence of the Middle East crisis and Russian disinformation on public and political support for Ukraine. Analyze the impact of rising oil prices and the proposed EU oil price cap on Western political will and Russian revenue. (PRIORITY: HIGH)
• GAP 6: IMPACT OF UKRAINIAN CYBERATTACKS ON RUSSIAN INFRASTRUCTURE: The claimed GUR attacks on Russian customs, tax, and railway services need independent verification of impact and duration to assess their strategic effectiveness.
  • CR: Conduct OSINT/TECHINT to verify the extent of disruption to Russian customs, tax, and railway services. Monitor Russian public and official statements regarding these disruptions. (PRIORITY: MEDIUM)

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

• Intelligence & Special Operations (ISR, HUMINT, OSINT critical):

  1. CRITICAL PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE VERIFICATION & AGGRESSIVE COUNTERING OF MIDDLE EAST DISINFORMATION. All-source intelligence must rapidly verify all claims and counter-claims regarding the Israel-Iran conflict, particularly Russian narratives aiming to implicate US leadership, or exaggerate the crisis/casualties (especially regarding new explosions, alleged high-value Iranian casualties including Air Defense Commander, and the extent of Iranian drone/missile attacks). Leverage IAEA statements for nuclear sites. Provide verified intelligence to strategic decision-makers and IO elements for immediate, public, and aggressive counter-messaging. (Supports CR 1, 5)
  2. CRITICAL PRIORITY: INTENSIFY ISR ON DNIPROPETROVSK (NOVOPAVLIVKA), SUMY & CHERNIHIV BORDER REGIONS. Divert all significant ISR assets (IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT) to these areas, especially around Novopavlivka/Komar and Sumy border areas. Prioritize identifying Russian force composition, logistics build-up, and intent (fixing operations vs. major offensive). (Supports CR 2)
  3. CRITICAL PRIORITY: ASSESS GEOMAGNETIC STORM IMPACT. Immediately assess potential effects of the geomagnetic storm on friendly and enemy navigation, communication, and AD systems. Implement mitigation measures for friendly forces and exploit potential enemy vulnerabilities. (Supports CR 3)
  4. IMMEDIATE BDA ON IRANIAN URBAN IMPACTS & SU-25 CRASH. Rapidly assess Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) on reported urban damage in Tehran and confirm circumstances and location of Russian Su-25 crash. (Supports CR 4).
  5. VERIFY CYBERATTACK IMPACTS: Prioritize intelligence collection to verify the actual impact and duration of GUR's claimed cyberattacks on Russian customs, tax, and railway services. (Supports CR 6).
  6. MONITOR RUSSIAN CROWDSOURCING & INTERNAL ISSUES: Continue to monitor Russian milblogger and volunteer channels for specific equipment requests, delivery confirmations, and unit affiliations. Track internal Russian dissent (Irkutsk blogger detention) and military administrative failures (Voronezh official, recruitment payment corruption) for PSYOPs.
  7. CONTINUOUS COUNTER-SABOTAGE INTELLIGENCE. Reinforce intelligence efforts to identify and disrupt Russian-directed railway sabotage networks, particularly in light of increased hybrid threat.

• Air Defense & Force Protection:

  1. MAINTAIN HIGHEST AIR DEFENSE READINESS ACROSS ALL OBLASTS, ESPECIALLY KHARKIV, DONETSK, DNIPROPETROVSK, CHERNIHIV, SUMY, ZAPORIZHZHIA, AND KYIV. Anticipate Russia may increase the intensity or breadth of aerial attacks (UAVs and ballistic missiles, KABs) to capitalize on global distraction. Ensure layered AD coverage for critical infrastructure and population centers. Prioritize resources for ballistic missile interception.
  2. ENHANCE BORDER SECURITY AGAINST DRONES & KABS. Increase air defense coverage and rapid response capabilities in northern border regions like Chernihiv and Sumy against persistent kamikaze drone and KAB threats.
  3. PROTECT CIVILIAN LOGISTICS AND HUMANITARIAN AID. Develop and disseminate specific TTPs for protecting civilian vehicles, demining teams, and humanitarian operations from FPV drone attacks, considering Russia's observed targeting of civilian vehicles (Zaporizhzhia casualties, Dnipropetrovsk fatality).
  4. REVIEW SECURITY AT CULTURAL SITES. Proactively review and enhance security measures at significant cultural and historical sites, given the temporary closure of "Софія Київська," anticipating potential opportunistic strikes.
  5. ADAPT TO GEOMAGNETIC STORM: Implement contingency plans for AD systems, radar, and communications that may be affected by the geomagnetic storm. Emphasize manual backup procedures where automation is degraded.

• Ground Forces:

  1. MAINTAIN DISCIPLINED DEFENSIVE POSTURE IN DNIPROPETROVSK (NOVOPAVLIVKA), SUMY & CHERNIHIV BORDER REGIONS. Commanders on these axes must remain prepared for potential increased ground probing or offensive actions, but continue to exercise extreme caution against committing strategic reserves until Russian intent and force composition are definitively confirmed. Avoid being drawn into attritional engagements on axes that are primarily diversionary, unless it is confirmed as a major new offensive requiring immediate strategic response. (Supports CR 2)
  2. CONTINUE ATTRITIONAL DEFENSE ON EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AXES. Maintain robust, attritional defense on the key axes (e.g., Pokrovsk, Toretsk, Lyman direction), exploiting costly Russian assault tactics to degrade their forces, as indicated by AFU General Staff updates and the increase in Russian surrenders.
  3. CONTINUE COUNTER-UAV MEASURES. Reinforce and practice counter-FPV drone and anti-UAV tactics at all echelons, including electronic warfare countermeasures and integrated air defense. Ensure all units are aware of Russian drone tactics against PVDs and vehicles.
  4. MAXIMIZE PSYOP OPPORTUNITIES. Leverage successes like the increase in drone-induced surrenders of Russian soldiers (Lyman direction) and the destruction of high-value assets (2S7 Pion) for further PSYOP campaigns, emphasizing the viability and safety of surrender and the effectiveness of Ukrainian forces.

• Information Operations (IO):

  1. IMMEDIATE & AGGRESSIVE: COUNTER RUSSIAN NARRATIVES ON MIDDLE EAST IMPACT AND RISING OIL PRICES. Proactively counter Russian attempts to leverage the Israel-Iran conflict to diminish international support for Ukraine. Emphasize that aggression in one region (Iran) emboldens aggression in others (Ukraine), and that Ukraine's fight for sovereignty remains a cornerstone of global stability. Explicitly highlight that rising oil prices, a direct consequence of Middle East instability, financially benefit Moscow and fund its war against Ukraine, referencing Russian milblogger statements. Publicize the EU's proposed oil price cap as a direct counter to this Russian strategy. This is a critical message for Western audiences. (Supports CR 5)
  2. RAPID DEBUNKING OF MISINFORMATION. Establish a rapid response mechanism to immediately debunk unverified and sensationalized claims propagated by Russian state media and milbloggers regarding the Middle East conflict (e.g., high-value Iranian casualties like the General Staff Chief, specific missile types, false US involvement, fabricated Mossad links, Iranian "destruction" of Natanz unless independently verified). Highlight these as deliberate Russian disinformation tactics intended to distract from Ukraine. Expose Russian analysis of hypothetical US operations against Iran as a tool for fear-mongering and the use of simulated maps as part of IO. Actively counter narratives of "Western internal instability" using verifiable facts (e.g., Northern Ireland riots). (Supports CR 1)
  3. EXPOSE RUSSIAN WAR CRIMES AND DEHUMANIZATION. Continue to highlight Russian strikes on civilian areas (Dnipropetrovsk fatality, Zaporizhzhia casualties, KABs on Donetsk) and the dehumanizing language used by Russian propagandists. Expose Russian "Russification" efforts in occupied territories and internal repression (Irkutsk blogger, Voronezh official).
  4. MAINTAIN DOMESTIC NARRATIVE FOCUS. Continue to emphasize Ukrainian resilience and successes (e.g., successful UAV interceptions, 2S7 Pion destruction, GUR cyberattacks, increase in Russian surrenders, police operations against arms trafficking, drone development policy, legal actions against propagandists) to maintain public morale amidst external geopolitical turbulence and internal threats. Utilize daily enemy loss reports to demonstrate progress. Reinforce national unity through remembrance events. Address utility outages transparently (Odesa).

• Diplomatic/Inter-Agency:

  1. IMMEDIATE & PROACTIVE: ENGAGE KEY PARTNERS ON SUSTAINED SUPPORT. Ukrainian diplomatic missions should immediately engage with US, EU, and other key partners to highlight the potential for the Middle East escalation to divert attention or resources, and to advocate for continued, robust military and financial support for Ukraine. Explicitly present the Russian disinformation campaign as evidence of Moscow's intent to exploit the crisis, and highlight the financial benefit Russia gains from rising oil prices due to regional instability. Strongly advocate for the swift implementation and potential further reduction of the EU's proposed oil price cap. (Supports CR 5)
  2. COORDINATE WITH ALLIES ON IO STRATEGY: Seek to coordinate with allied intelligence and information agencies on a unified strategy to counter Russian disinformation regarding the Middle East and maintain focus on Ukraine. (Supports CR 1, 5)
  3. INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION OF CIVILIAN TARGETING. Work with international partners to secure swift and strong condemnation of Russian attacks against civilian populations (e.g., Dnipropetrovsk fatality, Zaporizhzhia casualties) and continued KAB strikes on Donetsk, emphasizing this as a breach of international law.