Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME OF REPORT: 13 JUN 25 / 02:40 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 13 JUN 25 / 02:15 ZULU - 13 JUN 25 / 02:40 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET / ORCON / NOFORN

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Ukraine Operational Area:
  • Mykolaiv Oblast: Explosions persist, details unconfirmed. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Sumy Oblast: Multiple groups of Russian attack UAVs (Shaheds) confirmed inbound towards Bilopillia. Continued aerial targeting. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Kharkiv Oblast: UAV inbound towards Lozova. Continued aerial threat to southern Kharkiv. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Zaporizhzhia Oblast: Air raid alert concluded. No immediate threat observed. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Saratov & Tambov Oblasts (RUSSIA): Temporary flight restrictions imposed at Saratov and Tambov airports. This often indicates drone activity or air defense activation. Given recent Ukrainian deep strikes, this is significant. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Moscow Oblast (RUSSIA): Previous confirmed strike on "Resonit" electronics facility in Moscow Oblast remains pertinent to Russian defense industry. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• International (Israel-Iran): The situation remains highly volatile with continued kinetic activity and an intensifying information war.
  • Natanz, Iran: IRNA (via TASS) reports an explosion at a facility in Natanz. This is a critical development given Natanz is a known nuclear site. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - Russian source citing Iranian media; specific target/cause unconfirmed).
  • Israeli Strikes (Previous Report): Israel confirms attacking Iranian nuclear and missile programs. Operation stated to continue "as long as needed." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Alleged Iranian Casualties (CRITICAL - Unconfirmed): Claims of Iranian Chief of General Staff Bagheri, IRGC Commander Salami, and "high-ranking nuclear scientists" casualties remain unconfirmed. (CONFIDENCE: LOW)
  • Alleged Iranian Target Damage (CRITICAL - Unconfirmed): Claims of missile base at Piranshahr, multiple military bases near Tehran, nuclear programs, A-stations, and IRGC command damage. (CONFIDENCE: LOW-MEDIUM)
  • Israeli Response: Israel is mobilizing "tens of reservists." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Iranian Airspace/Airports (Previous Report): Airspace closed, Imam Khomeini Airport operations suspended. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • US Reaction: Trump to hold National Security Council meeting on June 13th. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - TASS report)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• No new weather information. Conditions in Sumy and Kharkiv remain favorable for UAV operations. Muddy terrain observed in Ukrainian imagery (Colonelcassad) confirms challenging ground mobility in some areas, favoring tracked vehicles.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces: Maintaining air defense alert and tracking UAVs. Personnel operating MBTs with "cope cages" observed, indicating adaptive counter-drone measures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces: Continued deployment of Shahed UAVs. Active in information operations. Russian MoD claims destruction of Ukrainian T-72 in Southern Donetsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Flight restrictions in Saratov and Tambov suggest active Russian air defenses or protective measures.
• Israeli Forces: Actively conducting air/missile strikes, mobilizing reservists, on high domestic alert. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Iranian Forces: Responding to strikes, likely on high alert, with airspace closed. Confirmed explosion at Natanz facility. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RUSSIA FOCUSED)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA):

• Capabilities (Russia):
  • Persistent Aerial Attacks: Russia continues to demonstrate the capability to deploy Shahed UAVs against multiple Ukrainian oblasts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ground Offensive Operations: Russian MoD claims destruction of a Ukrainian T-72 in Southern Donetsk, indicating continued ground engagement. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Warfare (CRITICAL - EXTREMELY HIGH): Russia's state media (TASS) and milbloggers (Colonelcassad) are demonstrating an accelerated and highly aggressive disinformation campaign regarding the Israel-Iran conflict, immediately amplifying reports of an explosion at Natanz. They continue to propagate unverified claims of high-value Iranian casualties and extensive damage, and continue to link the US to the crisis (Trump NSC meeting). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Internal Security: Russian MoD pursuing legal action against "Glavnoe Upravlenie Spetsial'nogo Stroitel'stva" for 346 million rubles, indicating internal governance issues or potential corruption. Changes to drug scheduling (mephedrone) also suggest internal policy focus. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Intentions (Russia):
  • Degrade Ukrainian Air Defense & Infrastructure: Persistent UAV attacks continue as a core intent. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Exploit Global Distraction (PRIMARY, ACCELERATED INTENT): Russia's intent to amplify and exploit the Middle East conflict to divert international attention and resources from Ukraine has become the dominant observable intent in this reporting period. The immediate amplification of the Natanz explosion report is a prime example. This aims to force a shift in Western priorities away from Ukraine by creating global panic and focusing on perceived US instability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Maintain Domestic Support: Showcasing aid deliveries to Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) personnel and claiming battlefield successes (T-72 destruction) aim to bolster domestic morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Courses of Action (COA) (Russia):
  • COA 1 (Intensified IO on Middle East & US Instability - PRIMARY): Russia will immediately and aggressively escalate its information operations regarding the Israel-Iran conflict, pushing narratives of significant Iranian casualties, widespread damage (especially on nuclear sites), and unconfirmed Iranian retaliations. They will continue to link this to perceived US leadership failures or lack of control, attempting to erode international confidence and support for Ukraine. The rapid reporting on Natanz and Trump's NSC meeting are direct indicators. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • COA 2 (Sustained Aerial Campaign & Fixing Operations): Russia will continue its mixed aerial attacks on Kharkiv, Sumy, and potentially other threatened oblasts using Shaheds to fix Ukrainian resources. Ground operations in Sumy are likely to remain focused on fixing Ukrainian reserves rather than a full-scale breakthrough. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • COA 3 (Continue Attritional Ground Operations): Russia will maintain high-intensity, attritional assaults on key axes, particularly Southern Donetsk, while continuing to present claimed tactical successes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • COA 4 (Internal Stabilisation Measures): Russia will continue to address internal issues, including legal disputes with defense contractors and social policies, to maintain internal stability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• The rapid and explicit amplification of highly sensationalized and unverified claims (including the Natanz explosion) by TASS and pro-Kremlin milbloggers demonstrates a significant, agile adaptation in the information domain. This suggests pre-programmed responses or highly flexible IO cells ready to capitalize on any geopolitical instability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• The widespread use of "cope cages" on Russian tanks, and now observed on Ukrainian tanks (via Colonelcassad imagery), confirms the pervasive and adaptive nature of anti-drone countermeasures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• Continued UAV operations indicate a sustained supply chain. Video showing Russian VKS personnel receiving tactical medicine, backpacks, and other equipment via an NGO suggests continued reliance on non-state support for some logistical needs, but also efforts to equip frontline units. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian IO C2: The almost instantaneous, coordinated, and multi-platform (TASS, milbloggers) dissemination of highly speculative and unverified claims concerning the Israel-Iran conflict highlights an extremely effective, highly centralized, and adaptable C2 for real-time information warfare. This is a significant capability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Military C2: Ongoing UAV operations and claimed ground successes indicate effective C2 for kinetic operations. The imposition of flight restrictions in Saratov and Tambov further suggests effective air defense C2. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UKRAINIAN FOCUSED)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Air Defense Alert: Ukrainian Air Force remains at high alert and provides timely updates on UAV movements in Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Regional Vigilance: Sumy and Kharkiv remain under active aerial threat, requiring continuous air defense vigilance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Armored Capability Adaptations: Observation of Ukrainian T-series MBT with a "cope cage" indicates proactive adaptation to the pervasive drone threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Zaporizhzhia: Air raid alert concluded. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Setback (Russian Claim): Russian MoD claims destruction of a Ukrainian T-72 in Southern Donetsk. (CONFIDENCE: LOW - Russian source, unverified).
• No new confirmed Ukrainian tactical successes or setbacks reported in this short reporting window.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense Assets: Continued high volume of Russian UAVs across multiple axes underscores the continuous need for robust, mobile, and layered air defense systems and munitions. The global shift in focus due to the Middle East could constrain future resupply or new deliveries. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Anti-Drone Measures: The prevalence of "cope cages" highlights the ongoing need for both passive and active anti-drone measures and the need to quickly disseminate best practices across the force. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Narratives (CRITICAL - EXTREMELY ACTIVE):
  • Middle East Escalation Amplification & Misinformation: Russian state media (TASS) and milbloggers are aggressively pushing unverified claims of high-value Iranian casualties and widespread damage to critical Iranian facilities. The immediate report of an explosion at Natanz, a nuclear site, is designed to maximize international alarm. The linking of Trump's NSC meeting further attempts to create a perception of US involvement and instability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Internal Russian Strength: Videos showcasing Russian VKS troops receiving aid and claims of destroying Ukrainian tanks aim to project strength and morale, particularly for domestic consumption. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • "Ukrainian War Crimes" Accusations: (Previous report) The "Hieromonk Meletiy" narrative from Kursk persists, accusing Ukraine of shelling civilian targets and a monastery. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Israeli Narratives: Israel maintains its strikes are for defense and targeting specific programs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Counter-Narrative: Ukrainian sources continue to provide updates on Russian UAV activity, but there is an urgent need to counter the Middle East distraction.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian Morale: The intense global focus on the Middle East, amplified by Russian disinformation, could lead to increased anxiety among the Ukrainian population about a potential reduction in Western support. Continued drone threats also contribute to stress. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Morale: Russian state media's projection of Russia as a global player, and the use of "Ukrainian war crimes" narratives, aims to maintain domestic support for the war. Videos showing troops receiving aid aim to bolster morale.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• Middle East Escalation (CRITICAL & ACCELERATING): The Israel-Iran conflict has escalated rapidly in the information domain, with highly sensationalized and unconfirmed reports. The reported explosion at Natanz is a significant development requiring urgent verification. The Israeli mobilization of reservists indicates preparations for further escalation or defensive measures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Global Attention Diversion (CRITICAL): The primary and immediate concern is the successful, rapid, and aggressive diversion of global attention by Russia to the Middle East crisis. This is a direct threat to sustained political, military, and financial support for Ukraine. The unverified but widely reported claims of high-value Iranian casualties and attacks on nuclear facilities are designed to create a perception of extreme, immediate crisis, demanding immediate international focus. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• US Stance: Trump to hold a National Security Council meeting, which will be closely monitored for any shifts in US policy regarding the Middle East or Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Intensified & Sustained Russian IO on Middle East: Russia will immediately and significantly ramp up its information warfare concerning the Israel-Iran conflict, with a primary focus on sensationalizing casualties, exaggerating damage (especially to nuclear sites like Natanz), and fabricating Iranian counter-responses to maximize global distraction and shift attention from Ukraine. This will be the primary and most visible Russian activity in the immediate future. Expect Russia to continue leveraging statements from international figures and reporting on US internal political activity (e.g., Trump's NSC meeting) to support their narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Sustained Aerial Pressure on Sumy/Kharkiv: Russia will continue its mixed aerial attacks on Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts using Shaheds to degrade Ukrainian defenses and fix resources, potentially attempting to capitalize on any perceived distraction or resource reallocation within Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Continued Attritional Ground Operations: Russia will maintain current ground offensive tempo on key axes (e.g., Southern Donetsk), seeking localized gains while attempting to fix Ukrainian forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Continued False Flag/Atrocity Propaganda: Russia will continue disseminating "Ukrainian war crimes" narratives to justify its actions and undermine international support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Coordinated Escalation under Global Cover: Russia perceives the global distraction from the Israel-Iran conflict as a "window of opportunity" and launches a more significant ground offensive on a new axis (e.g., Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk), synchronized with intensified long-range precision strikes (Kalibrs, Kh-series missiles) against critical Ukrainian logistics nodes, Western aid entry points, or strategic command and control facilities. This aims to achieve significant gains before a coordinated Western response can materialize. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM-HIGH - The level of IO suggests they are actively creating conditions for this.)
• Deep Rear Area Sabotage/Terrorism Amplified & Escalated: Exploiting the high-stress environment and global distraction, Russia activates deep-rear sabotage cells or conducts targeted terror attacks in Ukrainian population centers or key logistical hubs, possibly with more sophisticated methods or targets. This could be coupled with propaganda to frame Ukrainian responses or sow panic. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - Based on previous foiled plots and current IO, particularly against youth recruitment.)
• Heightened Cyberattacks: Russia launches a more aggressive and widespread cyberattack campaign against critical Ukrainian civilian infrastructure (energy, communications, banking) to cause chaos and degrade Ukraine's ability to operate and coordinate responses, leveraging global attention elsewhere. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Immediate (Next 1-3 hours):
  • ISR: CRITICAL: Continue uninterrupted monitoring of Russian IO channels for new sensationalized claims regarding the Middle East, especially related to the Natanz explosion. Prioritize verification of claimed Iranian casualties and target damage. Continue monitoring UAV activity in Sumy (Bilopillia) and Kharkiv (Lozova) and assess new explosions in Mykolaiv. Monitor Russian air activity related to flight restrictions in Saratov/Tambov. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • IO: Commanders and IO elements must prepare for an immediate, aggressive counter-narrative against Russian disinformation regarding the Middle East crisis, particularly emphasizing that Russia is exploiting the crisis.
• Short Term (Next 6-12 hours):
  • IO: Ukrainian forces must actively debunk sensationalized/unverified claims from Russian sources regarding the Middle East, and reinforce the message that global aggression requires a unified front against all aggressors. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Military Readiness: Commanders must ensure all air defense units are at highest readiness in targeted oblasts, anticipating potential opportunistic strikes.
• Mid Term (Next 24-72 hours):
  • Diplomatic: Ukrainian diplomats must proactively engage with international partners to ensure sustained focus and aid despite global geopolitical developments, explicitly highlighting the Russian manipulation of the Middle East crisis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • AD/Counter-Battery: Re-evaluate and reinforce AD and counter-battery postures in light of persistent and targeted aerial threats.
  • Force Protection: Disseminate observed tactical adaptations (e.g., "cope cages") to all units for rapid adoption and counter-measure development. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• GAP 1: VERIFICATION OF IRANIAN CASUALTIES AND NATANZ DAMAGE (CRITICAL): The primary intelligence gap is the lack of independent, confirmed verification of claimed Iranian high-value casualties (Bagheri, Salami, nuclear scientists) and the extent of damage to strategic Iranian facilities, especially the Natanz nuclear site. Russian sources are deliberately amplifying these claims without independent corroboration.
  • COLLECTION REQUIREMENT (CR): Prioritize SIGINT, GEOINT, and HUMINT from credible, independent third-party sources to verify or refute Russian/Iranian claims of casualties and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) on alleged Iranian nuclear/military facilities. Engage with allied intelligence partners for rapid information sharing. (PRIORITY: HIGH)
• GAP 2: RUSSIAN INTENT FOR GROUND OFFENSIVE IN SUMY/DNIPROPETROVSK (CRITICAL): While current ground operations appear to be probing/fixing, the unprecedented IO on the Middle East suggests Russia may be preparing for a larger, opportunistic ground offensive.
  • CR: Intensify IMINT, SIGINT, and HUMINT collection on Russian force dispositions, logistics build-up, and command movements on the Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk axes. Distinguish between attritional/fixing operations and genuine preparations for a major breakthrough. (PRIORITY: HIGH)
• GAP 3: DETAILS ON RUSSIAN INTERNAL MILITARY ISSUES: The legal dispute between MoD and "Glavnoe Upravlenie Spetsial'nogo Stroitel'stva" and the reliance on NGO aid for VKS supplies indicates internal issues.
  • CR: Collect further intelligence on the nature and scale of administrative and logistical challenges within the Russian military, particularly concerning procurement, infrastructure, and soldier welfare. (PRIORITY: MEDIUM)
• GAP 4: IMPACT OF IO ON WESTERN SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE (HIGH): The effectiveness of Russian IO in diverting Western attention and potentially impacting aid decisions is a critical unknown.
  • CR: Conduct continuous OSINT monitoring of Western media narratives, social media trends, and parliamentary/congressional discussions to assess the influence of the Middle East crisis and Russian disinformation on public and political support for Ukraine. (PRIORITY: HIGH)
• GAP 5: OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF RUSSIAN FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS: The cause and operational impact of flight restrictions in Saratov and Tambov.
  • CR: Monitor Russian air defense activity, drone movements, and any statements related to these restrictions to identify if they are defensive measures against Ukrainian deep strikes or other internal events. (PRIORITY: MEDIUM)

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

• Intelligence & Special Operations (ISR, HUMINT, OSINT critical):

  1. CRITICAL PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE VERIFICATION & COUNTERING OF MIDDLE EAST DISINFORMATION. All-source intelligence must rapidly verify all claims and counter-claims regarding the Israel-Iran conflict, particularly Russian narratives aiming to implicate US leadership or exaggerate the crisis/casualties, especially regarding the Natanz explosion. Prioritize debunking unconfirmed reports of high-value Iranian casualties (Bagheri, Salami, nuclear scientists) and "hypersonic missile" retaliation unless definitively confirmed by credible, independent sources. Provide verified intelligence to strategic decision-makers and IO elements for immediate public release. (Supports CR 1, 4)
  2. CRITICAL PRIORITY: CONTINUOUS MONITORING OF SUMY/KHARKIV UAV ACTIVITY & POTENTIAL GROUND SHIFTS. Maintain uninterrupted ISR on all UAV movements. More importantly, intensify monitoring for any signs of opportunistic Russian ground force buildup or redeployment on the Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk axes, as Russia may attempt to exploit the global distraction for a more substantial ground push. (Supports CR 2)
  3. MONITOR RUSSIAN INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS: Continue to collect on internal Russian military issues (e.g., MoD legal disputes, reliance on NGO aid) for potential exploitation in PSYOPs or for assessing overall Russian military sustainability. (Supports CR 3)
  4. MONITOR RUSSIAN AIR DEFENSE ACTIVITY: Analyze flight restrictions in Saratov/Tambov for indicators of specific threats (e.g., Ukrainian drone activity) or broader Russian defensive posture shifts. (Supports CR 5)

• Air Defense & Force Protection:

  1. MAINTAIN HIGHEST AIR DEFENSE READINESS ACROSS ALL OBLASTS, ESPECIALLY SUMY, KHARKIV, ODESA, AND KYIV. Anticipate Russia may increase the intensity or breadth of aerial attacks to capitalize on global distraction. Ensure layered AD coverage for critical infrastructure and population centers. Preposition mobile AD units. (Supports CR 2)
  2. DISSEMINATE AND ADOPT ANTI-DRONE COUNTERMEASURES. Expedite the analysis and widespread adoption of effective anti-drone measures observed on both sides, including "cope cages" and electronic warfare tactics, across all combat units. (Supports CR 2)

• Ground Forces:

  1. MAINTAIN DISCIPLINED DEFENSIVE POSTURE IN SUMY/DNIPROPETROVSK. Commanders on the Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk axes must remain prepared for potential increased ground probing or offensive actions, but continue to exercise extreme caution against committing strategic reserves until Russian intent and force composition are definitively confirmed. Avoid being drawn into attritional engagements on axes that are primarily diversionary. (Supports CR 2)
  2. CONTINUE COUNTER-UAV MEASURES. Reinforce and practice counter-FPV drone and anti-UAV tactics at all echelons, including electronic warfare countermeasures and integrated air defense.

• Information Operations (IO):

  1. IMMEDIATE & AGGRESSIVE: COUNTER RUSSIAN NARRATIVES ON MIDDLE EAST IMPACT. Proactively counter Russian attempts to leverage the Israel-Iran conflict to diminish international support for Ukraine. Emphasize that aggression in one region (Iran) emboldens aggression in others (Ukraine), and that Ukraine's fight for sovereignty remains a cornerstone of global stability. This is a critical message for Western audiences. (Supports CR 4)
  2. RAPID DEBUNKING OF MISINFORMATION. Establish a rapid response mechanism to immediately debunk unverified and sensationalized claims propagated by Russian state media and milbloggers regarding the Middle East conflict (e.g., high-value Iranian casualties, specific missile types, false US involvement). Highlight these as deliberate Russian disinformation tactics intended to distract from Ukraine. (Supports CR 1)
  3. EXPOSE RUSSIAN FALSE FLAG NARRATIVES. Actively highlight and expose Russian false flag and atrocity propaganda (e.g., "Hieromonk Meletiy" video) as deliberate attempts to sow discord, justify aggression, and mislead international audiences.
  4. MAINTAIN DOMESTIC NARRATIVE FOCUS. Continue to emphasize Ukrainian resilience and successes (e.g., deep strikes, thwarted terror plots) to maintain public morale amidst external geopolitical turbulence.

• Diplomatic/Inter-Agency:

  1. IMMEDIATE & PROACTIVE: ENGAGE KEY PARTNERS ON SUSTAINED SUPPORT. Ukrainian diplomatic missions should immediately engage with US, EU, and other key partners to highlight the potential for the Middle East escalation to divert attention or resources, and to advocate for continued, robust military and financial support for Ukraine. Explicitly present the Russian disinformation campaign as evidence of Moscow's intent to exploit the crisis. (Supports CR 4)
  2. COORDINATE WITH ALLIES ON IO STRATEGY: Seek to coordinate with allied intelligence and information agencies on a unified strategy to counter Russian disinformation regarding the Middle East and maintain focus on Ukraine. (Supports CR 1, 4)

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