Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME OF REPORT: 12 JUN 25 / 20:43 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 12 JUN 25 / 20:13 ZULU - 12 JUN 25 / 20:43 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET / ORCON / NOFORN

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka Axis (Donetsk Oblast): Ukrainian sources (ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS) report approximately 1000 KAB (Glide Bomb) strikes on Ukrainian positions along a ~30 km front between Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka over the past three weeks. This indicates a sustained and extremely high intensity of Russian aerial bombardment targeting a critical defensive axis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Tiotkino Area (Kursk Oblast): Russian milbloggers (Операция Z) claim "battles near Tiotkino" and show an FPV drone strike on a Ukrainian vehicle in the Kursk border region. This suggests continued cross-border engagements and Russian efforts to expand "buffer zones" or inflict damage on Ukrainian border defenses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for drone strike, MEDIUM for claimed "battles").
• Hryhorivka (Siversk Salient, Donetsk Oblast): Russian sources (Colonelcassad) claim capture of Hryhorivka and physical installation of a Russian flag, indicating a tactical advance in the Siversk direction. This would represent a further erosion of Ukrainian defensive lines. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM, pending independent verification).
• Sumy and Donetsk Oblasts (General): Ukrainian Air Force (Повітряні Сили ЗС України / Оперативний ЗСУ) reports new KAB launches towards Sumy and Donetsk Oblasts, confirming continued Russian aerial strike operations against these regions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• No new specific weather or environmental updates affecting operational zones.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces:
  • Air Defense Alert: Ukrainian Air Force continues to report KAB launches on Sumy and Donetsk, indicating ongoing air defense vigilance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Defensive Posture (Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka): Ukrainian forces on the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis are subjected to extremely heavy KAB bombardment, implying a hardened defensive posture under severe aerial pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Counter-Information Operations: Ukrainian media (ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS) immediately dismissed a Russian propaganda video showing a Ukrainian soldier, possibly a POW, making extremist statements, likely to counter Russian information operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Georgia Legion: Reports of a "sabotage" at a Georgian Legion base resulting in a fatality (РБК-Україна) suggest potential internal security vulnerabilities or Russian subversive activities against foreign volunteer units. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Russian Forces:
  • High-Intensity Aerial Bombardment: Russia is maintaining an extremely high rate of KAB (glide bomb) application, particularly on the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis. This indicates a sustained effort to degrade Ukrainian defenses ahead of potential ground assaults or to create fire superiority. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Continued FPV Drone Employment: Russian FPV drones continue to be employed effectively against Ukrainian vehicles in border regions (e.g., Tiotkino), indicating a persistent tactical threat. The observation of a potential counter-drone system on a targeted Ukrainian pickup truck suggests an ongoing EW/drone war. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Tactical Gains (Hryhorivka): Russian claims of capturing Hryhorivka, if verified, indicate localized tactical success on the Siversk salient. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • Information Operations / Propaganda:
    • Psychological Operations (PsyOps): "Два майора" continues the "apocalyptic sunset" propaganda, now juxtaposing peaceful Western/Russian sunsets with violent Ukrainian explosions. This is a clear attempt to demoralize Ukrainians and portray their nation as a zone of destruction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Narrative Shaping (US Peace Talks): TASS reports a US special envoy's statement on "stopping the Ukrainian conflict along the front line," which Russian media selectively amplifies to suggest Western fatigue or a shift towards de facto recognition of current front lines. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Internal Celebration: MoD Russia and Moscow news channels highlight "Russia Day" celebrations (e.g., illuminated Ferris wheel), aiming to project an image of national unity, normalcy, and success, primarily for domestic consumption. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Exploitation of Extremism: Russian sources (Оперативний ЗСУ, despite being a Ukrainian channel, the content is Russian psyop) disseminate a video of a purported Ukrainian soldier making neo-Nazi statements, attempting to delegitimize the Ukrainian military and appeal to anti-Ukrainian sentiment internationally. This is a highly dangerous and provocative propaganda effort. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for content, LOW for veracity of claim).
    • Historical/Cultural Manipulation: Глеб Никитин's images celebrate Russia Day with cityscapes, continuing the narrative of Russian national pride and stability amidst conflict. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • International Division: Rybar posts a political cartoon seemingly about Israeli ultra-Orthodox and Netanyahu, potentially trying to draw parallels or foster division concerning other conflicts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.4. Other Actors:

• United States: TASS amplifies statements from a US special envoy suggesting a desire to halt the conflict along current front lines. While likely a Russian misrepresentation, this narrative impacts international perceptions of US commitment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• European Union: Politico reports on the appointment of an EU Special Representative for Ukrainians, indicating continued EU diplomatic and humanitarian engagement. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Georgia Legion: The reported "sabotage" incident (РБК-Україна) highlights the vulnerability of foreign volunteer units to internal or external subversive activities. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA):

• Capabilities:
  • Overwhelming Aerial Bombardment: Russia possesses the capability to deliver extremely high volumes of KABs (glide bombs) over specific front-line sectors, designed to pulverize defenses and create conditions for ground advances. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Tactical FPV Drone Dominance: Continued effective use of FPV drones in cross-border engagements and against identified Ukrainian systems. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Targeted Information Warfare: Russia maintains a highly adaptive and aggressive information warfare apparatus capable of rapid narrative dissemination, psychological operations, and exploitation of perceived vulnerabilities (e.g., extremist rhetoric). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Limited Tactical Ground Advances: Capability for localized ground assaults resulting in small gains (e.g., Hryhorivka). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intentions:
  • Degrade Defenses & Gain Ground (Donetsk/Siversk): Russia intends to continue the high-intensity KAB bombardment on the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis to destroy Ukrainian fortifications and personnel, paving the way for further ground assaults. Concurrently, they intend to make tactical gains in other vulnerable sectors like the Siversk salient. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Demoralize Ukrainian Population/Military: Russia intends to sustain psychological operations (e.g., "apocalyptic sunsets") to instill fear and hopelessness among Ukrainians. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Delegitimize Ukrainian Leadership/Military: Russia intends to exploit any opportunity (e.g., extremist rhetoric video) to discredit Ukraine in the eyes of international partners and its own population. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Influence International Opinion: Russia intends to selectively amplify Western statements and create misleading narratives to portray Ukraine as losing and Western support as wavering. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Courses of Action (COA):
  • COA 1 (Heavy KAB Attrition & Ground Assault - Donetsk Focus): Russia will continue to concentrate overwhelming KAB strikes on the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis and other critical defensive sectors in Donetsk, followed by ground assaults to achieve tactical breakthroughs and expand occupied territory. This will be supported by integrated FPV drone operations for immediate tactical effect and reconnaissance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • COA 2 (Enhanced Hybrid Operations & Destabilization): Russia will intensify its information warfare, focusing on psychological operations against the Ukrainian populace and military, and increasing efforts to delegitimize Ukraine internationally. This will be coupled with continued efforts to conduct sabotage or subversive activities against high-value targets or foreign volunteer units in the deep rear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • COA 3 (Pressure on Border Regions): Russia will maintain and potentially increase cross-border FPV drone and artillery strikes, and limited ground engagements in regions like Kursk and Sumy, to fix Ukrainian forces and continue attempts to create a "buffer zone." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• Increased KAB Concentration: The sheer volume of KABs on the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis (1000 strikes in 3 weeks) represents a significant concentration of aerial firepower, a tactical adaptation to overcome hardened defenses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Counter-Drone Systems on Vehicles: The presence of what appears to be a counter-drone system on a targeted Ukrainian pickup truck (Tiotkino) indicates ongoing adaptation by Ukrainian forces to the FPV drone threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Physical Flag Placement: Russian emphasis on "not by drone, but by hand" for flag placement in Hryhorivka might be a tactical-level morale boost, highlighting physical presence and control over captured territory. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• Glide Bomb Production: The high rate of KAB employment suggests Russia has significantly ramped up production or conversion of these bombs, indicating a sustainable supply for this type of attack. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Continued Tactical Shortfalls: While not explicitly stated in this update, the previous report's confirmation of 'cope cages' and reliance on donations for basic equipment (e.g., vehicles, drones) continues to indicate persistent tactical-level logistical shortfalls despite overall military industrial output. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Integrated Fire Support: The ability to mass KAB strikes on a specific sector (Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka) demonstrates effective air-ground coordination and C2 for delivering concentrated fire support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Rapid Information Dissemination: Russian state media and milbloggers (TASS, Два майора, Операция Z) continue to rapidly disseminate information and propaganda, indicating a highly effective and coordinated information C2 apparatus. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Resilient Defense (Donetsk): Ukrainian forces on the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis are demonstrating high resilience under extreme KAB bombardment, holding defensive lines. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Vigilant Air Defense: Ukrainian Air Force remains vigilant, issuing warnings for KAB launches into Sumy and Donetsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Counter-Subversion Awareness: The reported "sabotage" at the Georgian Legion base highlights a general awareness and vigilance against internal threats, but also a vulnerability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for awareness, MEDIUM for vulnerability).
• Adapting to Drone Threat: Observation of counter-drone systems on vehicles suggests active efforts to mitigate the FPV drone threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Successes:
  • Holding Under Fire: Ukrainian forces' ability to absorb 1000 KAB strikes in three weeks and continue holding the line near Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka is a significant defensive success. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Quick IO Response: Rapid Ukrainian counter-propaganda regarding the alleged neo-Nazi video demonstrates effective strategic communications. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Adaptive Countermeasures: Deployment of counter-drone systems on vehicles shows tactical adaptability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setbacks:
  • Tactical Ground Loss: The claimed loss of Hryhorivka (if verified) represents a tactical setback in the Siversk direction, eroding defensive lines. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • Sabotage Incident: The "sabotage" and fatality at the Georgian Legion base highlight a security vulnerability in the rear and a potential impact on foreign volunteer morale/security. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • Intense Aerial Pressure: The sheer volume of KABs remains a significant challenge, likely inflicting heavy casualties and material damage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Enhanced Air Defense: The extreme volume of KABs necessitates urgent additional air defense systems capable of intercepting glide bombs and suppressing launch platforms (e.g., tactical aviation).
• Counter-Subversion Capabilities: Increased focus and resources are required for counter-intelligence and security measures against internal sabotage and subversive networks, especially targeting foreign volunteer units.
• Defensive Fortifications: Continued emphasis on hardened, resilient fortifications is critical to mitigate the impact of massed KAB strikes.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Narratives:
  • "Apocalyptic Ukraine": Continued efforts by "Два майора" to demoralize by contrasting peaceful Russian/Western scenes with violent Ukrainian explosions.
  • "Ukrainian Extremism": The video of the purported Ukrainian soldier making neo-Nazi statements is a highly aggressive and dangerous Russian information operation aimed at delegitimizing the Ukrainian military and eroding international support.
  • "Western Fatigue/Betrayal": TASS amplifying statements from a US envoy about halting conflict along front lines is intended to sow doubt about Western commitment and pressure Ukraine.
  • "Russian Strength/Normalcy": Celebrations of "Russia Day" by MoD Russia and Moscow news channels aim to project stability and success domestically.
  • "Russian Gains": Claims of capturing Hryhorivka (Colonelcassad) are part of a narrative of continuous Russian battlefield success.
• Ukrainian Counter-Narratives:
  • "Resilience Under Fire": Highlighting the sheer volume of KABs endured on the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis implicitly frames Ukrainian forces as incredibly resilient.
  • "EU Support": News of an EU special representative for Ukrainians counters narratives of diminishing international support.
  • "Exposure of Russian PsyOps": Quick dismissal of the extremist video as a likely Russian fabrication demonstrates awareness and intent to counter.
• Dempster-Shafer Beliefs (Updated):
  • No Military Significance (0.554662): This dominant belief remains high, primarily due to the inclusion of several civilian or propaganda-only messages that do not directly depict military activity. This highlights a need for better filtering of source material or a more nuanced interpretation of "military significance" to include the information domain.
  • Uncertainty (0.320578): Remains significant, likely due to unverified claims (Hryhorivka capture, Tiotkino battles) and the inherent ambiguity of information warfare content.
  • Military Action: Airstrike by Russia on Military Targets in Eastern Ukraine (0.010630): This has increased slightly, reflecting the reported KAB strikes.
  • Information Warfare: Propaganda Effort by Rybar (0.000246): This is still very low, which is a critical analytical gap. The current Dempster-Shafer model seems to consistently undervalue the impact and prevalence of information warfare, treating it as less significant than kinetic events. This needs to be addressed for a comprehensive multi-domain analysis. Analyst's Note: The model's low assessment of propaganda despite clear evidence of high-intensity IO campaigns (e.g., "apocalyptic sunsets," extremist video) is a significant limitation of its current weighting and requires manual override in the final analysis.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian Morale: Under severe pressure due to intense KAB bombardment and ongoing ground assaults. The "sabotage" incident at the Georgian Legion base could also impact morale within foreign volunteer units and perceptions of internal security. Countered by narratives of resilience and continued EU support. The extremist video, if widely believed, could be highly damaging to morale and social cohesion, but quick counter-propaganda may mitigate this.
• Russian Morale: Actively boosted by state-sponsored celebrations (Russia Day), claims of battlefield successes (Hryhorivka), and efforts to portray Ukraine negatively. The focus on FPV drone successes (Tiotkino) also contributes to a narrative of tactical effectiveness.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• US Stance: Russian amplification of a US envoy's statement about halting conflict along front lines could be a deliberate attempt to test the resolve of Ukraine's Western partners or to influence ongoing diplomatic discussions, potentially creating fissures in the alliance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• EU Engagement: The appointment of an EU Special Representative for Ukrainians signals continued political and humanitarian support, which is a positive development for Ukraine's international standing. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Volunteer Security: The incident at the Georgian Legion base could raise security concerns for other foreign volunteer units and impact future recruitment, requiring attention from diplomatic and security channels. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Sustained KAB Attrition & Incremental Ground Gains (Donetsk): Russia will continue to apply extreme pressure on the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis and other critical sectors in Donetsk with high volumes of KABs. This will be followed by persistent, incremental ground assaults aimed at exploiting softened defenses and achieving small but cumulative territorial gains (e.g., further advances in the Siversk salient). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intensified Hybrid Operations, Particularly PsyOps: Russia will escalate its information warfare efforts, including highly inflammatory psychological operations (e.g., exploiting alleged extremism) and targeted disinformation campaigns to demoralize Ukrainian forces and civilians, and to erode international support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Cross-Border Harassment & Fixing: Continued FPV drone, artillery, and limited ground engagements in border regions (Kursk, Sumy) to fix Ukrainian forces and prevent their redeployment to more critical fronts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Breakthrough on Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka Axis: After sustained KAB bombardment, Russia successfully achieves a significant operational breakthrough on the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis, leading to a rapid advance that threatens key logistics nodes or urban centers in Donetsk Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM-HIGH).
• Massive Coordinated Hybrid Attack: Russia combines a major new ground offensive (e.g., exploiting Dnipropetrovsk foothold or opening a new axis) with a highly coordinated, large-scale cyberattack against Ukrainian critical infrastructure (energy, communications) and a global information campaign involving deepfakes and fabricated intelligence to sow panic and paralyze Ukrainian response efforts. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Immediate (Next 1-3 hours):
  • AD/ISR: Maintain highest alert for KAB launches on Sumy and Donetsk. Prioritize ISR on Hryhorivka for verification of Russian claims. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • IO/STRATCOM: Immediately and aggressively counter the alleged "extremist soldier" video, exposing it as a Russian PSYOP. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Short Term (Next 6-12 hours):
  • Force Protection: Enhance security measures for foreign volunteer units and critical rear facilities following the Georgian Legion incident. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Battlefield Assessment: Conduct rapid BDA on Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis to assess damage from KABs and anticipate potential ground assaults. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Mid Term (Next 24-72 hours):
  • Resource Allocation: Re-evaluate and potentially reallocate AD assets to best counter massed KAB attacks in critical sectors. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Fortification Efforts: Expedite construction of multi-layered defensive fortifications, particularly on the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

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6. RECOMMENDATIONS

• Intelligence & Special Operations (ISR, TECHINT, HUMINT critical):

  1. CRITICAL PRIORITY: VERIFY Hryhorivka Capture and Assess Siversk Salient. Task all available ISR assets to definitively confirm or deny the Russian capture of Hryhorivka and assess the immediate implications for the Siversk defensive line. Determine Russian force composition and intent in this sector. (Collection Requirement: IMINT, SIGINT, OSINT).
  2. IMMEDIATE PRIORITY: INTENSIFY ISR ON POKROVSK-KOSTIANTYNIVKA AXIS. Prioritize overhead ISR, SIGINT, and HUMINT to monitor Russian force buildup, logistics, and intent following sustained KAB bombardment. Identify any signs of impending large-scale ground assaults. (Collection Requirement: IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT).
  3. URGENT: Investigate Georgian Legion Incident. Task SBU and GUR to thoroughly investigate the "sabotage" at the Georgian Legion base. Determine if it was internal, external, or a Russian special operation, and identify vulnerabilities to prevent recurrence. (Collection Requirement: HUMINT, CI, FORENSICS).
  4. CONTINUOUS: Document KAB Impact. Systematically document and analyze the impact of KAB strikes on Ukrainian fortifications and personnel to inform defensive adaptations and advocate for additional air defense. (Collection Requirement: BDA, IMINT).
  5. TECHINT: Analyze Counter-Drone Systems. Seek opportunities to recover and analyze any Russian FPV drones that have encountered Ukrainian counter-drone systems, and vice versa for Russian systems. This will inform TTPs and R&D.

• Air Defense & Force Protection:

  1. CRITICAL: ENHANCE AD FOR DONETSK AXIS. Immediately review and adjust air defense coverage for the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis and other critical sectors in Donetsk to counter the overwhelming KAB threat. Prioritize allocation of available AD assets.
  2. URGENT: COUNTER-UAV AND EW DEPLOYMENT. Accelerate deployment of mobile counter-UAV and electronic warfare systems to front-line units and vulnerable rear areas, particularly in border regions, to counter FPV drones and other tactical UAVs.
  3. FORTIFICATION REINFORCEMENT: Expedite the construction and reinforcement of deep, resilient defensive lines, including underground bunkers and covered positions, to mitigate the devastating impact of KAB strikes.

• Ground Forces:

  1. DEFENSIVE PREPARATIONS (POKROVSK-KOSTIANTYNIVKA): Prepare for potential large-scale ground assaults following KAB bombardments. Ensure reserve forces are positioned for rapid deployment to counter breakthroughs.
  2. LOCALIZED COUNTERATTACKS (SIVERSK SALIENT): If confirmed, consider tactical counterattacks in the Hryhorivka area to deny Russian gains and regain favorable terrain, provided force ratios allow.
  3. ANTI-DRONE TTPs: Develop and disseminate updated TTPs for protecting vehicles and personnel from FPV drone attacks, incorporating lessons learned from the observed counter-drone systems.

• Information Operations (IO):

  1. CRITICAL: AGGRESSIVELY COUNTER "EXTREMIST" PROPAGANDA. Immediately and widely publicize a robust counter-narrative to the alleged "extremist soldier" video, exposing it as a Russian information operation, highlighting Russian history of such tactics, and reaffirming Ukrainian national values and unity.
  2. HIGHLIGHT KAB DEVASTATION: Publicize the scale and impact of KAB strikes on Ukrainian civilian areas and military positions (where appropriate) to reinforce the narrative of Russian brutality and solicit further international support for air defense.
  3. REINFORCE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT: Proactively amplify news of continued international support, such as the EU Special Representative, to counter Russian narratives of Western fatigue or disunity.
  4. CHALLENGE RUSSIAN TERRITORIAL CLAIMS: When Russian claims of capture are made (e.g., Hryhorivka), issue timely and factual updates, or if denied, provide clear counter-evidence to prevent Russian narrative dominance.

• Diplomatic/Inter-Agency:

  1. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION WITH ALLIES: Engage key allies to preemptively counter Russian narratives (e.g., US desire for "front line" peace) by reaffirming shared strategic goals and unwavering support for Ukraine's territorial integrity.
  2. COORDINATE ON SABOTAGE THREATS: Enhance intelligence sharing and coordination with allied security services regarding potential Russian sabotage or subversive operations against foreign volunteer units or critical infrastructure in Ukraine.
  3. ADVOCATE FOR ANTI-GLIDE BOMB CAPABILITIES: Intensify diplomatic efforts to acquire advanced air defense systems capable of countering Russian glide bombs and the platforms that launch them (e.g., fighter jets), highlighting the severe humanitarian and military impact of these weapons.