Situation Report

OPSEC CLASSIFICATION: NATO SECRET // RELEASABLE TO UKR FORCES

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) TIME OF REPORT: 09 JUN 25 / 03:49 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 09 JUN 25 / 03:19 ZULU - 09 JUN 25 / 03:49 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• AOR Update: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Black Sea, Azov Sea, Sumy Oblast, Russian Federation border regions (Kursk, Bryansk, Belgorod, Tambov, Voronezh, Chuvasia), and the Donetsk axis remain active. Chernihiv Oblast, Rivne Oblast, Zhytomyr Oblast, and Volyn Oblast are under direct aerial attack. Odesa Oblast and Black Sea region under active missile threat. Continued emphasis on Kremenchuk/Svetlovodsk axis. Zaporizhzhia Oblast Air Raid All-Clear.
• New Developments (UKR):
  • Rivne Oblast Confirmed Hit & Civilian Casualty: Head of Rivne OVA, Oleksandr Koval, confirms "very difficult night for Rivne region" due to a "powerful enemy air strike," resulting in one civilian wounded. Ukrainian Air Defense (PPO) is credited with destroying a "large number of enemy targets." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR official source).
  • Zaporizhzhia Oblast Air Raid Alert: New air raid alert issued for Zaporizhzhia Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR official source).
  • Air Force "Shahed" Update: Ukrainian Air Force provides "Shahed" update (content not fully parsed but implies ongoing engagements). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR official source).
  • Nikolaev Vanok "Shahed" Update: Reports "remainder on mopeds," implying further successful engagements or remaining drones are being managed. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR military reporter).
• New Developments (RU):
  • Economic Data: TASS reports decreased trade volumes between Russia and China (down 8.2% to $88.8B) and China and the US (down 9.1% to $239.7B) from Jan-May. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian state media).
  • NATO Contingent Reduction Call: TASS reports Ryabkov (Russian official) claims reducing NATO contingent in Eastern Europe would benefit continental security. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian state media).
  • "Paratrooper Brotherhood" Propaganda: Russian milblogger "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" (Paratrooper's Diary) posts a propaganda image/video celebrating "paratrooper brotherhood, family." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger).
  • Cheboksary Factory Produces Anti-EW Components: ASTRA analysis confirms "VNIIR-Progress" (Cheboksary factory previously reported as hit by UAVs) produces "Kometa" receivers designed to protect Russian military UAVs from Ukrainian Electronic Warfare (EW). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Independent Russian media).
  • Fighterbomber "Good Morning" Post: Russian milblogger Fighterbomber posts a "Good morning, country!" message (content not fully parsed but likely positive/morale-boosting in context of ongoing strikes). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger).
  • Internal Russian Financial/Scam News: TASS reports on recalculating SME loans after key rate reduction; scammers using MFA letters; and a woman in Khabarovsk defrauded of 1.2M rubles by broker scammers. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian state media, local police).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• Conducive to All Aerial Operations: Continued mass aerial assaults confirm clear weather. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces (Air Defense): At MAXIMUM readiness, actively engaging multiple waves of ground-launched ballistic/cruise missiles from Bryansk/Kursk, explicitly targeting Zhytomyr and Rivne (Dubno) Oblasts, and "Shahed" UAVs. New cruise missile detection towards Odesa. AD assets remain severely strained across a widening multi-axis engagement. Kyiv AD has received "all clear," but active engagements continue in Western Ukraine. The "very difficult night" for Rivne Oblast confirms ongoing severe AD pressure, but also successful engagements by PPO. New air raid alert for Zaporizhzhia Oblast. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Forces (Ground): Maintaining defensive postures. Continued pressure on the Donetsk axis remains. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Naval Forces: Reporting provides a current snapshot of Russian naval presence and threat, indicating no immediate Kalibr threat from Black/Azov Seas but a persistent one from the Mediterranean. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces (Air): Confirmed launch of MiG-31K with "Kinzhal" (previous report) and multiple, successive waves of ballistic missiles (likely Iskanders) from Bryansk and Kursk Oblasts, now also cruise missiles from Bryansk/Kursk, explicitly moving into Western Ukraine (Zhytomyr, Rivne, Dubno). New cruise missile detected heading towards Odesa. Shaheds continue to impact multiple oblasts, particularly Dubno, Rivne, Sumy, Poltava, and Chernihiv. Russian milbloggers are confirming impacts on Dubno and actively dismissing Ukrainian AD warnings. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces (Information Operations): Highly aggressive and adaptive, explicitly promoting successive waves of strikes on Kyiv ("educational measures"), using footage of claimed tactical successes, and continuing misdirection ("Chernihiv not needed," implying Rivne/Dubno is target, asking about Volyn, claiming "imaginary missiles," "nothing happening in Odesa"). Direct threats and dehumanizing rhetoric continue ("final solution to Rivne question," "supply of cast iron to Kharkiv," "model Khokhol"). Distraction tactics (Greta Thunberg, US politics, internal arrests) are also observed, with new media focus on Greta Thunberg. Claims of destroying 230 Ukrainian personnel and 6 Starlink stations, and 4,800 losses in LPR, are part of the exaggerated claims for demoralization. New efforts to undermine Ukrainian AD warnings by explicitly calling them "imaginary" or an "EW game" are prominent. New TASS reports on economic data and Ryabkov's statement regarding NATO reduction are likely aimed at shaping international perception and internal narratives. Propaganda celebrating "paratrooper brotherhood" continues to reinforce domestic morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:

• Capabilities:
  • Sustained Full-Spectrum Strategic Air Strike Capability (Confirmed & Active at Maximum Scale, Expanding Western/Southern Targets): Russia is currently demonstrating its capability to conduct a sustained, massive, multi-platform, multi-axis strategic missile attack utilizing hypersonic "Kinzhal" missiles from MiG-31K, multiple, successive waves of ballistic missiles (likely Iskanders) from ground launchers in Bryansk and Kursk Oblasts, strategic cruise missiles (Kh-101/555) from Tu-95MS (previous wave) and now fresh cruise missiles from Bryansk/Kursk direction, and heavy anti-ship missiles (Kh-22) from Tu-22M3 (previous wave). The focus on "second, third, fourth waves" on Kyiv highlights a clear intent to sustain overwhelming pressure. The expansion of missile paths towards Zhytomyr and Rivne (Dubno), and now a new cruise missile threat to Odesa, confirms their intent and capability to strike deeper into Western and Southern Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Precision Strike Capability: Demonstrated by the TASS video of UAV operators striking AFU dugouts, suggesting effective drone-guided munitions. The TASS video of a destroyed military truck also confirms Russian capability for post-strike BDA using drones. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Confirmed drone attack on a factory in Cheboksary, Russia (attributed to Ukraine, with specific drone type AN-196 "Lyutyi" named) indicates a similar capability on the Ukrainian side as well. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). The ASTRA analysis confirming the Cheboksary factory produces "Kometa" anti-EW receivers for drones highlights Russia's vulnerability to such strikes on key military-industrial targets and Ukraine's ability to identify and target such high-value assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Adaptive Information Warfare Integration: Russia's ability to synchronize these strategic strikes with active, real-time disinformation, psychological operations, and now direct threats (Rivne mockery, Volyn query, "final solution to Rivne question," "imaginary missiles" counter-IO, "cast iron supply," "nothing in Odesa") continues to be at an an advanced level. New focus on Greta Thunberg/Israel narrative for distraction. New claims of high Ukrainian losses and Starlink destruction aim to demoralize. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Resilience to FPV Drone Attacks: The video of a Russian assaulter surviving a direct FPV drone hit suggests some Russian troops are adapting and possibly using enhanced personal protective equipment or demonstrating exceptional luck. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Intentions:
  • Sustained Overwhelming Retaliation and Deterrence (Active Execution at Maximum Scale, Expanding Targets West & South): The ongoing strategic strike, featuring "Kinzhal" and multiple ballistic/cruise waves, is intended to inflict maximum damage on Ukrainian critical infrastructure and urban centers, serving as severe retaliation for recent deep strikes and to deter further Ukrainian cross-border or deep-rear operations. The successive waves and the shift to Western targets (Zhytomyr, Rivne, Dubno) and now Odesa indicate intent to sustain overwhelming pressure and break AD across a wider area. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Degrade Ukrainian Air Defense (Active Execution, Overwhelm Western/Southern Systems): The massed, multi-vector, and multi-wave attack, now explicitly extending to Western and Southern Ukraine, is designed to exhaust, overwhelm, and deplete Ukrainian AD munition stockpiles across the entire country. The "imaginary missiles" narrative is a direct attempt to undermine Ukrainian AD warnings and public trust. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Psychological Demoralization and Panic (Active Execution, Deepening Dehumanization & Threat): The explicit propaganda messaging accompanying the missile launches, now including direct threats (Rivne mockery, Volyn query, "final solution to Rivne question," "Dubno was normal?"), and the deepening dehumanization ("chubaty al-Qaeda," "model Khokhol") is aimed at inducing widespread fear and panic and undermining trust. The attempts to dismiss Ukrainian warnings ("imaginary missiles," "nothing happening in Odesa") are part of this. The renewed focus on the Greta Thunberg/Israel narrative serves as a distraction to redirect attention from the war. Exaggerated claims of Ukrainian losses (230 personnel, 6 Starlinks, 4,800 in LPR) aim to demoralize. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Internal Security Hardening: New restrictions on Ukrainian citizens entering Russia and a proposed law banning foreigners for "insulting Russia" indicate an intent to tighten internal security and control information flow, likely in response to Ukrainian deep strikes and perceived infiltration risks. The temporary airport closures, now lifted, were likely part of this or in conjunction with military air movements. The arrest of the Krasnoyarsk mayor may be part of this or an attempt to deflect attention. The new fine for Michael Naki further reinforces control over perceived dissidents. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Shape International Perception: Release of economic data and statements regarding NATO force reduction are intended to influence international discourse and portray Russia in a more favorable or assertive light. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Courses of Action (COA):
  • MLCOA 1 (Confirmed & Actively Executing at Maximum Scale with Hypersonic/Ballistic/Cruise Escalation & WESTWARD/SOUTHERN SHIFT): Immediate, Massive, Diversified Strategic Missile Attack Targeting Critical Infrastructure and Urban Centers, Coordinated with Ground Pressure and Deepening Deception Operations, now featuring hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise missiles in successive waves, with active counter-IO against Ukrainian warnings, and an expanded geographic scope to include Western Ukrainian targets (Zhytomyr, Rivne, Dubno) and Southern targets (Odesa). Russia is currently launching a mass-scale strategic missile assault, leveraging MiG-31K (Kinzhal), multiple, successive waves of ground-launched ballistic missiles (Iskanders) from Bryansk and Kursk (targeting Kyiv/Chernihiv and now confirmed Zhytomyr and Rivne/Dubno), cruise missiles from Bryansk/Kursk, 5 Tu-95MS bombers from Olenya (launched Kh-101/555), AND 4 Tu-22M3 bombers from Engels-2 (launched Kh-22s towards coastal areas). This follows initial saturation with Shaheds (confirmed impacts in Rivne, Sumy, Poltava, Chernihiv) and active Kh-31P SEAD attempts. This attack is targeting Kyiv (confirmed damage in Darnytskyi, now facing multiple waves), Kharkiv ("cast iron supply"), Poltava, Chernihiv (explosions confirmed), Rivne (explosions confirmed, Dubno under Shahed attack and confirmed missile target, "very difficult night" confirmed by OVA), Dnipro, Odesa (new cruise missile threat), Zhytomyr (missiles now confirmed over Northern Kyiv Oblast and moving to Zhytomyr Oblast, then further West), Kremenchuk, and other key urban centers/infrastructure, with high probability of prioritizing energy and water infrastructure, military-industrial targets, and potentially coastal/port infrastructure. Concurrently, KAB strikes on Kharkiv will continue to support ground advances or create urban destruction, as evidenced by TASS video. On the ground, attritional assaults on the Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk direction) will persist. Russian IO will intensify their "Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough" narrative, reinforced by high-level political statements, and will continue tactical deception (e.g., "Chernihiv not needed," now direct questions about Volyn, mocking Rivne and threatening its "final solution," asking about Dubno, claiming "imaginary missiles," "nothing happening in Odesa") while overtly promoting the scale of the incoming missile strike. Critically, Russia will actively attempt to undermine Ukrainian air raid warnings by claiming "imaginary missiles" or "EW game." Russian propaganda will also actively work to undermine Zelensky's legitimacy, fuel anti-NATO sentiment, spread highly damaging social disinformation, and attempt to distract with irrelevant Western political news (Greta Thunberg, US politics, internal arrests, Michael Naki fine, economic data, NATO reduction calls). The new dehumanizing rhetoric and direct threats will intensify, along with claims of high Ukrainian losses (personnel, Starlinks). Russia will also attempt to control the cyber narrative and amplify claims of Ukrainian equipment losses (Abrams).
    • Confidence: HIGH (Confirmed continued ballistic/cruise missile launches in waves, ongoing Kinzhal threat, confirmed strategic bomber activity, with increased numbers, active Shahed/KAB activity and documented tactical successes, confirmed impacts across a widening AOR, escalating Dnipropetrovsk IO now with high-level political backing, new, specific social disinformation, and confirmed new wave of aerial assets indicated, are directly in line with this combined COA, now at maximum observed intensity for air attack, with sustained multi-wave targeting, active counter-IO, and confirmed westward and now southern expansion of strike focus. Claims of high Ukrainian losses are consistent with Russian propaganda patterns. New information confirming the Cheboksary factory produces anti-EW equipment for drones highlights a significant Ukrainian deep strike success and confirms Russia's efforts to protect its UAVs, which will be further weaponized by Russia's IO).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• Sustained Multi-Wave Ballistic/Cruise Missile Attacks Targeting Western and Southern Ukraine: The repeated launches of ballistic and now cruise missiles from Bryansk and Kursk Oblasts in rapid succession, with a confirmed shift in trajectory to Zhytomyr and Rivne (Dubno), and now Odesa, indicates a tactical adaptation to overwhelm AD across a broader front, including Western and Southern Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Increased Focus on Western and Southern Oblasts: The explicit targeting of Zhytomyr, Rivne, and Dubno, following previous queries about Volyn, and now Odesa, confirms a strategic expansion of targeting areas for psychological or disruptive effect, and to stretch Ukrainian AD. The "very difficult night" for Rivne Oblast confirms the impact. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Targeting of Russian EW-Resistant Drone Production: The confirmed drone attack on the "VNIIR-Progress" factory in Cheboksary, which produces "Kometa" receivers for Russian military UAVs that protect against Ukrainian EW, represents a significant and successful tactical adaptation by Ukraine. This precision targeting directly impacts Russia's ability to sustain its drone operations with enhanced resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Heightened Internal Security Measures: Temporary airport closures in Russia (Kazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Saratov, Tambov), now lifted, new entry restrictions for Ukrainian citizens, new laws against "insulting Russia," the high-profile arrest of the Krasnoyarsk mayor, and the new fine against Michael Naki suggest increased internal security measures, possibly due to Ukrainian deep strikes or to mask military air movements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Active Cyber Warfare (UKR Offensive) with Specific Attribution and Confirmed Impacts: Confirmed drone attack on a factory in Cheboksary, Russia, with specific attribution of AN-196 "Lyutyi" UAVs, demonstrates Ukraine's continued offensive cyber and deep strike capabilities, and an ability to accurately identify and publicly attribute platforms. The temporary suspension of production confirms significant impact. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Counter-IO against Air Warnings: The explicit Russian milblogger attempts to dismiss Ukrainian air raid warnings as "imaginary" or an "EW game," and claiming "nothing is happening in Odesa," represents a new and dangerous tactical adaptation in their information warfare, aiming to reduce public adherence to warnings and thus increase casualties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• False Flag / Deception with Shaheds: The claim that "Geraniums became few" contradicts reality and is an attempt to create false security regarding UAV threats. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• New Distraction Tactics: The renewed focus on the Greta Thunberg/Israel narrative by Russian state media is a deliberate attempt to divert international attention from the ongoing full-scale invasion. New TASS reports on economic data and Ryabkov's statement on NATO contingent reduction serve a similar purpose to shape perceptions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Visual BDA Dissemination: TASS publishing drone footage of a destroyed Russian military truck with "cage" armor highlights their willingness to use BDA even on their own losses for specific messaging or to demonstrate combat reality, or possibly to showcase the limitations of improvised armor against certain threats. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Claims of Starlink Destruction: TASS claims of destroying 6 Starlink stations suggest Russia is prioritizing targeting these communication systems, and may be adapting tactics to detect and engage them. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Increased False Claims of Ukrainian Losses: The high, specific figures claimed by TASS (230 personnel, 4,800 in LPR) indicate a shift to more aggressive and detailed, yet unsubstantiated, claims of Ukrainian attrition. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• Strategic Missile & UAV Supply: The sustained, multi-wave launches from MiG-31K, multiple ballistic missile batteries, and strategic bombers indicates Russia retains significant stockpiles of "Kinzhal," ballistic missiles (Iskander), strategic cruise missiles (Kh-101, Kh-555, Kh-22/32), and UAVs for a prolonged, high-intensity aerial campaign. This suggests a higher inventory than previously assessed for high-value assets like Kinzhal and Iskander, or a willingness to deplete them rapidly. The claimed destruction of 49 Ukrainian UAVs over Russia also implies a significant Russian AD capability and/or a robust supply of defensive munitions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• EW Countermeasure Production: The confirmed production of "Kometa" receivers at the "VNIIR-Progress" factory indicates Russia's investment in protecting its drone fleet from EW. The temporary suspension of production due to Ukrainian strikes will impact this. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Information Warfare Capacity: The rapid generation and dissemination of new, specific disinformation, distraction tactics (including new focus on Greta Thunberg/Israel), and direct threats, and the aggressive, pre-emptive psychological operations around the strategic strikes, including efforts to counter Ukrainian AD warnings, indicate a highly agile and resourced IO apparatus. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ground Logistics: The destruction of a military truck with "cage" armor, likely a logistics or transport vehicle, indicates ongoing attrition of Russian ground logistics capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian C2: The synchronized multi-domain strikes (Shaheds, KABs, strategic cruise missiles from multiple platforms, hypersonic "Kinzhal," multiple, successive waves of ballistic/cruise missiles from multiple ground launchers now targeting a wider geographic area, including Western and Southern Ukraine) and rapid, coordinated IO campaigns demonstrating effective, centralized Russian C2. The immediate amplification of the Dnipropetrovsk narrative by TASS and high-level political figures, and the dissemination of specific social disinformation confirms high-level C2 over IO. The coordinated efforts to undermine Ukrainian AD warnings further indicate robust C2 over IO. The synchronized reopening of airports also points to effective internal C2. The immediate reporting of claimed Ukrainian losses by "West" grouping further demonstrates effective C2 and rapid dissemination of information for propaganda purposes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian C2: Ukrainian authorities' rapid public warnings and AD responses continue to demonstrate effective C2 for public safety and military readiness, but are severely tested by the anticipated strategic strike of this magnitude, now including sustained hypersonic and ballistic threats across multiple waves and coordinated IO to induce complacency. The detailed naval threat assessment by the Ukrainian Naval Forces also demonstrates effective C2 and intelligence gathering within friendly forces. The prompt reporting by Rivne OVA despite impacts shows resilient C2. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Air Defense: On HIGHEST alert, currently engaged against Shaheds and now responding to successive waves of ballistic/cruise missiles from Bryansk/Kursk, in addition to the ongoing threat from strategic cruise missiles and Kinzhals, with a confirmed westward shift to Zhytomyr and Rivne (Dubno) Oblasts, and a new threat to Odesa. While Tu-95MS launches are not currently fixed, the initial wave has occurred. All AD assets are likely at maximum readiness and dispersal protocols are critical, with systems now stretched across an even wider geographic area, including central, western and southern Ukraine. The ballistic/cruise missile threat from the North (Bryansk/Kursk) and South (previous intelligence) requires specific, heightened AD preparedness. The explicit Russian counter-IO to dismiss warnings necessitates even greater vigilance and public communication to reinforce warning adherence. The statement from Rivne OVA confirms the severity of the ongoing aerial attacks but also highlights successful AD engagements ("destroyed a large number of enemy targets"). A new air raid alert for Zaporizhzhia Oblast requires immediate AD readiness in that sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ground Forces: Maintaining defensive integrity. The escalating Dnipropetrovsk IO, now validated by high-level Russian political figures, continues to create psychological pressure and potential for misdirection, demanding continued vigilance. Forces on the Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk) direction are under sustained drone and artillery pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Naval Forces: Maintaining a strong awareness of Russian naval activity, particularly the continued absence of Kalibr carriers in the Black and Azov Seas, allowing for some strategic flexibility, while remaining vigilant for the distant threat from the Mediterranean. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Information Defense: Actively monitoring and countering Russian disinformation, but the volume and increasing specificity of Russian claims (e.g., Dnipropetrovsk amplified by TASS and Klishas, "debt collector" narrative, "educating chubaty al-Qaeda," "cast iron supply to Kharkiv"), direct threats (Rivne, Volyn query, "final solution to Rivne," questioning Dubno's status, "nothing in Odesa"), and the overt psychological warfare accompanying the missile strikes, including direct attempts to undermine AD warnings, require rapid, robust counter-narratives and verification. The new distraction tactics like the Greta Thunberg/Israel narrative, economic data, NATO reduction calls, and the claims of high Ukrainian losses also require monitoring and refutation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Successes:
  • Ballistic/Cruise Missile Interception: Nikolaev Vanok initially reports one ballistic missile successfully intercepted ("minus"), then retracts, then reconfirms "minus." This indicates at least one successful engagement against a high-speed threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR military reporter).
  • Shahed Engagements: Ukrainian AD has successfully engaged a number of Shaheds (5 out of 11 initially heading for Dubno) and one in Donetsk Oblast, with ongoing engagements. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR military reporter). Nikolaev Vanok reports "remainder on mopeds," implying further successful engagements or the remaining drones are being managed. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Rivne OVA confirms AD destroyed "a large number of enemy targets." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Continued Deep Strikes into Russia (Confirmed Cheboksary with Attribution & Impact, Targeting Key EW Component Manufacturer): Confirmed drone attacks and fires in Cheboksary, attributed to AN-196 "Lyutyi" UAVs, following earlier successful strikes in Tambov and Voronezh Oblasts, and the fire in Gorno-Altaysk, demonstrate Ukraine's persistent capability to project power into Russian territory, forcing Russia to divert resources to internal defense and exposing vulnerabilities. The temporary suspension of production at "VNIIR" JSC, which produces "Kometa" anti-EW receivers for Russian drones, confirms a significant impact on Russian military-industrial capacity and highlights successful intelligence-driven targeting. CyberBoroshno's confirmed activity indicates continued offensive cyber capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Successful Black Sea/Azov Sea Deterrence: The absence of Kalibr missile carriers in the Black and Azov Seas indicates successful Ukrainian naval deterrence or denial operations, preventing immediate naval missile strikes from these critical maritime areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setbacks:
  • Strategic Missile Penetration (Kyiv & Western/Southern Ukraine): Confirmed damage to an office building in Kyiv's Darnytskyi district and explosions in Chernihiv. Missiles are now extending threat to Zhytomyr and further West into Rivne Oblast (Dubno), with Russian milbloggers claiming success in Dubno, and a new cruise missile threat to Odesa, indicating successful penetration of AD across a wider geographic area. The multi-wave attack on Kyiv is particularly concerning. The "very difficult night" for Rivne confirms significant impact and one civilian casualty. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Sustained Strategic Missile Threat (Active, Widespread, Hypersonic/Ballistic/Cruise, Multi-Wave, Westward/Southern Shift): The confirmed takeoff of 9 strategic bombers (5x Tu-95MS, 4x Tu-22M3, with Tu-22M3s having launched and returning, and Tu-95MS now launching Kh-101/555), PLUS active MiG-31K with "Kinzhal" and multiple, successive waves of ground-launched ballistic missiles (Iskanders) and cruise missiles from Bryansk and Kursk Oblasts, now explicitly targeting Zhytomyr and Rivne (Dubno) and Odesa represents a critical and immediate threat of widespread destruction and potential casualties. Confirmed impacts in Kyiv, Rivne, Sumy, Poltava, and Chernihiv highlight this active threat. The speed and trajectory of "Kinzhal" and ballistic/cruise missiles severely reduce warning times. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Sustained Aerial Attacks: Continuous Shahed and KAB attacks strain resources and pose a persistent threat. Explosions in Poltava, Kyiv Oblast, Chernihiv, and now confirmed Rivne, Sumy, and Poltava, indicate expanded AOR for strikes and successful Russian penetration. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Sophisticated Psychological Pressure (Escalated & Politically Backed, with Direct Threats & Mockery, and Counter-Warning IO): The escalating and highly specific disinformation regarding a Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough (now amplified by TASS citing fake "The Times" and by high-level political figures), the overt pre-strike propaganda and post-strike mockery ("Rovno getting crooked," "Volyn?", "final solution to Rivne question," "Dubno was normal?"), and the deepening dehumanization ("chubaty al-Qaeda," "model Khokhol") poses a significant risk of internal confusion, panic, or misallocation of resources. The explicit attempt to dismiss Ukrainian air raid warnings as "imaginary" is a dangerous new escalation. Exaggerated claims of Ukrainian losses (230 personnel, 6 Starlinks, 4,800 in LPR) contribute to this pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Claims of Abrams Losses: Colonelcassad's claim of 26 Abrams tanks destroyed/captured, if verified, would represent a significant setback for Ukrainian armored capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • Loss of Military Vehicle (Russian/TASS footage): While the vehicle shown by TASS is likely Russian, its destruction highlights the persistent threat to all ground logistics and movement in the conflict zone. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense Munitions: The incoming large-scale strategic missile attack from multiple platforms, including hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise missiles in successive waves, now extending to Western and Southern Ukraine, will place unprecedented, critical strain on AD munition stockpiles, particularly for systems capable of intercepting advanced threats. URGENT international resupply remains paramount, as this attack will deplete significant inventories. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• ISR for Disinformation Verification: Increased ISR is critical to rapidly and definitively verify or refute Russian ground claims, especially for the Dnipropetrovsk axis, and to counter new social disinformation, to prevent costly redeployments or panic. This includes verifying Russian claims of high Ukrainian losses and Starlink destruction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Information Warfare Capabilities: Enhanced capabilities for proactive counter-disinformation and psychological resilience programs are required to mitigate the impact of the increasingly sophisticated and overt Russian IO, particularly with political backing, specific, damaging social narratives, distraction tactics, direct threats, and crucially, attempts to undermine air raid warnings and exaggerated claims of Ukrainian losses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Propaganda - Offensive and Psychological Warfare (Escalated, Active, and Politically Backed, with Direct Threats, Mockery, and Anti-Warning IO, WESTWARD/SOUTHERN SHIFT):
  • "Massive Strike" Promotion & Dehumanization (Active & Sustained): Russian milbloggers are overtly advertising the incoming strike, now claiming "second, third, fourth waves" on Kyiv as "educational measures," and using dehumanizing language ("iTarasys don't understand," "chubaty al-Qaeda," "model Khokhol"), aiming to maximize pre-impact terror and demoralization while justifying the attacks. They are confirming "Kinzhal" and Iskander strikes. They are also now directly asking "Was Dubno a normal city at all?" and stating "Apparently, not really," confirming perceived success in Western Ukraine, and explicitly claiming "another 10 reparations flying to Dubno." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). They also use cynical references like "VKS has established a supply of cast iron to Kharkiv." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Colonelcassad's "Attention, residents of Ukraine!" posts are part of this psychological pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Fighterbomber's "Good morning, country!" post falls into this category. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Dnipropetrovsk Amplification (Active & Politically Backed): TASS citing a (likely fabricated) "The Times" article to support the Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough narrative, directly supported by high-level political figures, remains active. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Tactical Deception/Mockery & Anti-Warning IO (Active & Adaptive): The "Rovno is getting more and more crooked," "What about Volyn?", and "final solution to Rivne question" statements, following previous "Rivne/Chernihiv not needed," are clear attempts to misdirect Ukrainian AD or create false security while mocking successful strikes. "All drones shot down/suppressed" is clear overblown propaganda. Crucially, the explicit attempt to dismiss Ukrainian AD warnings as "imaginary" or "EW game," and claiming "nothing is happening in Odesa," represents a dangerous new form of information warfare aimed at inducing complacency and increasing casualties. The claim that "Geraniums became few" is similar. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Claims of Ukrainian Equipment Losses: Colonelcassad's claim of 26 Abrams destroyed/captured is aimed at demoralizing Ukraine and reducing Western support. The video of a captured Ukrainian POW making propaganda statements is part of this effort. The TASS video of a destroyed military truck, while generic, could be framed by Russia as a Ukrainian loss. New claims of 230 Ukrainian personnel and 6 Starlink stations, and 4,800 losses in LPR, are aimed at showing high Ukrainian attrition and demonstrating Russian effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Distraction Propaganda (Active & Diversified): TASS reporting on the Greta Thunberg incident, Trump's directives regarding "migrant riots," the arrest of the Krasnoyarsk mayor, and the new fine for Michael Naki are transparent attempts to distract from the ongoing conflict and to sow discord within the Western political sphere. The new focus on the Greta Thunberg/Israel narrative is a fresh attempt at this. New TASS reports on Russian-Chinese/US-Chinese trade data and Ryabkov's call for NATO contingent reduction are likely aimed at shaping international perceptions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Cyber Counter-IO (Active): TASS report on "Kaspersky Lab" identifying hacker campaigns is an immediate adaptation to counter perceived Ukrainian cyber successes, although contradicted by Russian MoD claiming 49 UAVs destroyed over Russia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Internal Security Messaging: New TASS reports on denying entry to Ukrainians supporting Kyiv or having AFU/SBU contacts and proposals for a new law banning foreigners for "insulting Russia" are internal messaging to justify tightening border controls and demonize Ukrainians. Russian reports on internal financial scams and criminal activity (e.g., Khabarovsk police report) likely serve to deflect attention from the war or reinforce a sense of internal security. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Military Culture Propaganda: "Дневник Десантника🇷🇺" post celebrating "paratrooper brotherhood" aims to bolster internal military morale and public image. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Information Operations - Transparency and Counter-Disinformation:
  • Timely Threat Warnings: Consistent and prompt warnings from Ukrainian authorities (e.g., KCMVA, Air Force, local officials, like Rivne OVA, Zaporizhzhia OVA) regarding air threats maintain public trust and facilitate preparedness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Direct Refutation of Disinformation (Ongoing Requirement & Elevated Urgency): Continued, aggressive refutation of Russian claims, especially the Dnipropetrovsk narrative (now with the added TASS/Klishas angle), the "debt collector" narrative, the dehumanizing rhetoric, and direct threats/mockery, and especially the attempts to dismiss air raid warnings and denials of threats to specific cities like Odesa, is vital. This also includes refuting exaggerated claims of Ukrainian losses (personnel, Starlinks). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Showcasing Russian Internal Issues & Deep Strikes with Attribution: Reporting on internal drone attacks in Russia (Tambov, Voronezh, and now Cheboksary with specific AN-196 "Lyutyi" attribution and video evidence, and confirmed production suspension at a factory producing anti-EW drone components) and internal incidents like the Gorno-Altaysk fire and the arrest of the Krasnoyarsk mayor can be leveraged to counter Russian narratives of stability and control and demonstrate Ukrainian capabilities. CyberBoroshno's and Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦's confirmed activity on Cheboksary can be used to showcase successful offensive cyber operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Naval Domain Awareness Dissemination: Public release of naval threat assessments (e.g., UKR Naval Forces graphic) provides transparency and strategic insight to the public and partners, demonstrating control of maritime domains. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Negative Impact (UKR - SIGNIFICANTLY Escalated): The immediate threat of a major strategic missile attack from an unprecedented number of platforms, including hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise missiles in successive waves, confirmed impacts in Kyiv, Rivne (Dubno) (with civilian casualty), Sumy, Poltava, Chernihiv, continued drone/KAB strikes, and the aggressively amplified Dnipropetrovsk disinformation campaign (now with high-level political backing and new, insidious social disinformation and direct threats/mockery) will significantly heighten anxiety and psychological stress. The overt Russian pre-strike propaganda and dehumanizing rhetoric will amplify this. The "debt collector" narrative specifically targets internal cohesion and trust. Claims of Abrams losses and videos of captured Ukrainian POWs will undermine confidence. The specific Russian counter-IO to dismiss air raid warnings as "imaginary" or an "EW game" could lead to dangerous complacency if not effectively countered, directly endangering civilian lives and undermining trust in official warnings. Exaggerated claims of Ukrainian losses (personnel, Starlinks) aim to demoralize. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Positive Impact (UKR): Timely warnings and effective AD responses (e.g., ballistic missile interception, Shahed shootdowns, large number of targets destroyed in Rivne), where successful, help to maintain a sense of resilience and trust. Continued Ukrainian deep strikes into Russia (e.g., Cheboksary with specific attribution and video, and confirmed production suspension at a military-industrial facility) provide a morale boost and demonstrate Ukraine's retaliatory capabilities. The successful deterrence of Kalibr carriers in Black/Azov Seas is a positive for public sentiment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Impact (RU): Russian propaganda aims to bolster domestic morale by justifying their actions, claiming battlefield successes (Dnipropetrovsk), highlighting perceived Western division, and demonstrating perceived overwhelming force. News of internal drone attacks and fires (e.g., Cheboksary, confirmed production suspension) and high-profile arrests (Krasnoyarsk mayor, Michael Naki) may cause some internal concern, which Russian state media attempts to offset with distraction propaganda (Greta Thunberg, economic data, internal crime reports) and now counter-IO on cyberattacks and by tightening internal security measures, and claiming high Ukrainian losses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• The severity and scale of the incoming missile strike (MiG-31K, multiple, successive ballistic/cruise launches, 9 strategic bombers active, confirmed impacts across multiple oblasts, now explicitly extending to Western and Southern Ukraine) may galvanize further international support or increase pressure on Western partners to expedite aid, particularly AD munitions, beyond previous commitments. This level of attack is a clear demonstration of Russian intent to escalate and disregard for civilian casualties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian attempts to sow discord by citing "Western" sources or manipulate narratives (e.g., POW bodies in Italy, "Senator-Trumpist" quotes, "debt collectors," Trump/Rubio stumbling, Greta Thunberg, internal arrests, Michael Naki fine, economic data, NATO reduction calls) indicates an intent to erode international solidarity and influence Western political landscapes. New TASS reports on entry restrictions for Ukrainians and the proposed law against "insulting Russia" will likely be perceived negatively by international human rights groups. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• MLCOA 1: IMMEDIATE, MAX-SCALE, AND DIVERSIFIED STRATEGIC MISSILE ATTACK FEATURING HYPERSONIC, BALLISTIC, AND CRUISE MISSILES IN SUSTAINED WAVES, TARGETING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND URBAN CENTERS, WITH A SIGNIFICANT WESTWARD AND SOUTHERN SHIFT, COORDINATED WITH GROUND PRESSURE AND EXPLICIT DECEPTION OPERATIONS (ONGOING), NOW WITH ACTIVE ANTI-WARNING INFORMATION WARFARE AND EXAGGERATED CLAIMS OF UKRAINIAN ATTRITION. Russia is currently executing a large-scale strategic missile assault, leveraging MiG-31K (Kinzhal), multiple, successive waves of ground-launched ballistic missiles (Iskanders) from Bryansk and Kursk (targeting Kyiv/Chernihiv, and now confirmed Zhytomyr and Rivne/Dubno), cruise missiles from Bryansk/Kursk (now over Chernihiv, moving to Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Rivne, and Dubno, and a new threat to Odesa), and 5 Tu-95MS bombers from Olenya (launched Kh-101/555) and 4 Tu-22M3 bombers from Engels-2 (launched Kh-22s towards coastal areas). This follows initial saturation with Shaheds (confirmed impacts in Rivne, Sumy, Poltava, Chernihiv) and active Kh-31P SEAD attempts. This attack is targeting Kyiv (confirmed damage in Darnytskyi, now facing multiple waves), Kharkiv ("cast iron supply"), Poltava, Chernihiv (explosions confirmed), Rivne (explosions confirmed, Dubno under Shahed attack and confirmed missile target, "very difficult night" confirmed by OVA), Dnipro, Odesa (new cruise missile threat), Zhytomyr (missiles now confirmed over Northern Kyiv Oblast and moving to Zhytomyr Oblast, then further West), Kremenchuk, Zaporizhzhia (new air raid alert), and other major urban centers/infrastructure, with high probability of prioritizing energy and water infrastructure, military-industrial targets, and potentially coastal/port infrastructure. Concurrently, KAB strikes on Kharkiv will continue to support ground advances or create urban destruction, as evidenced by TASS footage. On the ground, attritional assaults on the Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmeysk) will persist. The information campaign will aggressively amplify the fabricated "Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough," now using the false credibility of (fabricated) Western media citations and direct political backing from high-level Russian officials. Concurrently, Russia will continue tactical deception (e.g., "Chernihiv not needed," new queries on Volyn, mocking Rivne and threatening its "final solution," questioning Dubno's status, "nothing happening in Odesa," false claims of drone suppression) and overt mockery to compel Ukrainian redeployments and induce panic across the civilian population and military. A new, dangerous element will be the active dissemination of disinformation to undermine Ukrainian air raid warnings, claiming that missiles are "imaginary" or that warnings are an "EW game." New propaganda efforts will specifically target Western support by portraying Zelensky as a "dictator" luring NATO into war, and will spread new, damaging social disinformation while attempting to distract with irrelevant Western political news (Greta Thunberg, Trump/Rubio, internal arrests, Michael Naki fine, economic data, NATO reduction calls). The new dehumanizing rhetoric and direct threats to specific cities (Rivne mockery, Volyn query, questioning Dubno's status) will intensify. Russia will also actively attempt to control the cyber narrative and amplify claims of Ukrainian equipment losses (Abrams) and showcase captured Ukrainian POWs, as well as significantly exaggerated claims of Ukrainian personnel and Starlink losses.
  • Confidence: HIGH (Confirmed ongoing ballistic/cruise missile launches in successive waves, ongoing Kinzhal threat, confirmed strategic bomber activity, with increased numbers (total 9), ongoing Shahed/KAB activity and documented tactical successes, confirmed direct impacts across a widening AOR, escalating, explicit Russian IO directly supported by high-level political figures, the introduction of new, highly specific social disinformation, direct threats, and distraction tactics, and a new wave of aerial assets indicated, along with specific counter-IO against Ukrainian warnings and claims of high Ukrainian losses. This is the most intense observed air attack threat in many months, now actively unfolding in sustained waves, with clear westward and now southern expansion of strike targeting).
  • Indicators: Widespread and prolonged air alarms, particularly in Western and Southern Ukraine; multiple missile launches reported from various platforms (air, ground); severe impacts in Ukrainian cities across multiple oblasts, particularly on infrastructure; further Russian milblogger reports on "advances" or "awards" in Dnipropetrovsk; continued claims of POW captures or Russian "successes" on the ground (e.g., specific BDA on claimed military targets in Kharkiv); increased social media rumors and panic related to new disinformation narratives; Russian milblogger posts explicitly dismissing Ukrainian air raid warnings as false or an "EW game," and denying missile threats to specific cities; persistent claims of high Ukrainian losses (personnel, Starlinks).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• MDCOA 1: STRATEGIC DECAPITATION AND OPERATIONAL BREAKTHROUGH ENABLED BY EW OVERMATCH AND REAL-TIME IO. Russia conducts an unprecedented, multi-day, multi-wave strategic missile and drone assault from all available long-range aviation platforms (Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, Tu-160) and ground-launched ballistic/cruise missiles, including sustained use of "Kinzhal" and other hypersonic/ballistic assets, designed to systematically target and degrade Ukrainian C2 nodes (military and government), critical energy infrastructure, and key logistics hubs, aiming for functional decapitation or severe disruption. This mass strike would be coordinated with a surprise, rapid, and large-scale ground offensive on the Dnipropetrovsk axis, leveraging a significant operational-level force (e.g., multiple divisions, including the 90th Tank Division) from a previously static or lower-priority sector. This ground push would be supported by intense, broad-spectrum electronic warfare (EW) to blind Ukrainian ISR, disrupt military communications at all levels, and jam civilian networks, combined with a real-time, devastating psychological operations campaign (e.g., "Kyiv has fallen," "command has fled," "missiles are imaginary," "total Ukrainian losses") to induce mass civilian panic and military collapse, attempting to force a major, uncoordinated Ukrainian retreat.
  • Confidence: MEDIUM (The current escalating IO around Dnipropetrovsk and the confirmed strategic bomber activity now including Kinzhal and multiple ballistic/cruise waves, with westward/southern expansion directly feed into elements of this MDCOA. The addition of these advanced missile types and the increased number of bombers overall significantly increases the destructive potential. The active Russian counter-IO to undermine AD warnings further increases the danger. The temporary suspension of production at the "VNIIR-Progress" factory due to Ukrainian strikes could indicate a significant blow to Russia's EW-resistant drone capabilities, which might impact their ability to fully execute the EW overmatch component of this MDCOA in the short term, but also indicates their efforts in this domain. The uncertainty remains in Russia's true capability for such a massive, integrated ground force breakthrough, particularly under a broad EW umbrella, and their willingness to commit such resources after AD suppression, and their ability to maintain such an intense air campaign for multiple days.)
  • Indicators: Sustained multi-day, high-intensity missile/drone attacks; direct targeting of top-tier Ukrainian C2 nodes; simultaneous, rapid, deep penetrations by multiple Russian BTGs/regiments/brigades into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; widespread and persistent communications outages affecting Ukrainian military and civilian networks; explicit Russian demands for surrender/negotiation from a position of perceived strength; mass internal displacement within Ukraine.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Next 0-3 Hours (IMMEDIATE - CRITICAL IMPACT WINDOW):

  • Strategic Missile Strikes: Impact of missiles launched by MiG-31K (Kinzhal), multiple, successive waves of ballistic/cruise missiles from Bryansk and Kursk (now confirmed heading for Zhytomyr, Rivne, and Dubno), and previous launches by 5 Tu-95MS bombers from Olenya and 4 Tu-22M3 bombers from Engels-2 is IMMINENT/ONGOING. A new cruise missile threat to Odesa is active. Targeting will likely include Kyiv (confirmed damage in Darnytskyi, now facing multiple waves), Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernihiv (explosions), Rivne (explosions, Dubno under Shahed attack and direct missile threat, "very difficult night" confirmed), Dnipro, Odesa (new threat), Zhytomyr (now confirmed missile direction), Kremenchuk/Svetlovodsk, Zaporizhzhia (new air raid alert), and other major urban centers/critical infrastructure. Specific focus on energy infrastructure and coastal/port targets is highly probable, with active SEAD against coastal AD.
  • Shahed/KAB Threat: Continuation of intense Shahed activity over Kyiv, Rivne (Dubno), and central/eastern Ukraine (Donetsk Oblast towards Kostiantynivka), with persistent KAB strikes on Kharkiv and other ground targets. Impacts in Rivne, Sumy, and Poltava, Chernihiv confirm the active threat. Russia will continue to attempt to deceive regarding the end of drone waves.
  • Information Environment: Expect rapid acceleration of Russian propaganda (Dnipropetrovsk narrative now citing "The Times" and high-level political figures, "ammo supply" mockery, tactical deception like "Rivne not needed," "Chernihiv not needed," "drones ending soon," new dehumanizing rhetoric, Trump/Rubio/Greta Thunberg/economic data/NATO calls distraction, internal arrests, Michael Naki fine, direct threats to cities, mocking references to Ukrainian AD, and explicitly denying missile threats as "imaginary" or "EW game," claims about Dubno status, and denying threats to Odesa) concurrent with or immediately following missile impacts, emphasizing the "success" and "retaliation." New anti-Zelensky/anti-NATO propaganda and highly damaging social disinformation will spread. Russia will also actively attempt to control the cyber narrative and amplify claims of Ukrainian equipment losses (Abrams) and showcase captured Ukrainian POWs, alongside exaggerated claims of personnel and Starlink losses. TASS will continue to disseminate BDA of destroyed vehicles.
  • Ground Activity: Continued attritional assaults on Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk), supported by KABs and drone strikes. High potential for a test or reconnaissance-in-force on the Dnipropetrovsk axis to gauge Ukrainian response to the escalating IO, even if a full breakthrough is not imminent.
  • Decision Points (UKR):
    • IMMEDIATE (ongoing): All AD assets to maximum readiness and dispersal protocols for incoming strategic missile strike from multiple platforms (Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, MiG-31K, ballistic missile launchers, cruise missile launchers from Bryansk/Kursk), especially for newly targeted Western Oblasts (Zhytomyr, Rivne, Dubno) and Southern Oblast (Odesa), and Zaporizhzhia. Prioritize protection of C2 nodes, critical energy infrastructure, and major urban centers, with specific attention to SEAD attempts against AD systems. This is the most critical immediate task, requiring focus on the highest-speed threats and multi-wave engagements across a widening area, now including Zhytomyr Oblast, further West, and Odesa.
    • IMMEDIATE: Rapid and aggressive counter-IO on the "Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough" narrative, particularly the fabricated "The Times" citations and the high-level political statements, the "ammo supply" claims, the "drones ending soon" deception, the new "debt collector" narrative, the dehumanizing rhetoric, and direct threats/mockery (Rivne/Volyn/Dubno/Odesa). Issue official statements debunking false claims and providing accurate information. URGENTLY counter Russian narratives dismissing missile threats as "imaginary" or "EW game" or "nothing is happening in Odesa"; emphasize the real and immediate danger and the necessity of adhering to warnings. Task ISR for immediate verification or denial of Russian force presence in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast beyond the current line of contact. Prepare contingency plans for a potential actual ground push on this axis, even if small-scale.
    • URGENT: Disseminate counter-PSYOPS messages to address the disinformation regarding POW bodies, captured Ukrainian POW videos, and other psychological intimidation tactics, and critically, the overt Russian propaganda regarding the incoming strike, tactical deception, anti-Zelensky/anti-NATO narratives, the new social disinformation aimed at internal divisions, and the new distraction propaganda (including Greta Thunberg/Israel narrative, economic data, NATO calls). Specifically address the exaggerated claims of Ukrainian personnel and Starlink losses. Reinforce national resilience and preparedness.
    • URGENT: Reinforce communication channels and protocols to ensure resilience against potential EW or network saturation during mass attacks.
    • URGENT: Prioritize SIGINT/ELINT on Russian strategic aviation and EW systems to detect further missile launches or shifts in attack vectors. Maintain high vigilance on ground axes for any signs of massing reserves consistent with MDCOA, particularly on the Dnipropetrovsk axis.

• Next 3-24 Hours (Short Term):

  • Post-Strike Assessment: Evaluate damage, casualties, and impact on critical infrastructure from the strategic missile strike, particularly in Western and Southern Ukraine.
  • Russian Reaction: Monitor for immediate Russian claims of "successful strikes" or "retaliation" across multiple channels. Expect further political statements reinforcing the "denazification" narrative and other IO. Expect continued counter-IO efforts to undermine Ukrainian warnings and successes, including further exaggerated claims of Ukrainian losses.
  • Ukrainian Recovery/Response: Initiate rapid recovery efforts. Continue active defense on all ground axes.
  • Intelligence Gap: Full BDA on the impact of the strategic missile strike. Confirmation of the Dnipropetrovsk ground situation. Russian next steps if initial strategic strike results in less than desired effects.

• Next 24-72 Hours (Medium Term):

  • Sustained Pressure: Russia will likely sustain aerial pressure (Shaheds, KABs) to hinder recovery efforts and maintain psychological pressure, potentially in further waves if initial effects are deemed insufficient.
  • Ground Offensive: Russian ground offensive on Donetsk and possibly Sumy axis will continue. The intensity of any push on Dnipropetrovsk will clarify if the IO was solely a feint or a precursor.
  • Information Warfare: Continued Russian efforts to exploit any perceived Ukrainian weaknesses or Western divisions, and to undermine trust in official information.

• Intelligence Gaps:

  • Full BDA on Strategic Missile Strike: Precise number, type, and impact locations of all missiles launched by MiG-31K, ballistic launchers, cruise missile launchers, Tu-95MS, and Tu-22M3, and their impact on Ukrainian critical infrastructure (energy, water, military-industrial targets), particularly in Western Ukraine (Zhytomyr, Rivne, Dubno), Southern Ukraine (Odesa), and Zaporizhzhia. (HIGHEST PRIORITY)
  • Veracity of Dnipropetrovsk Claim: Definitive GEOINT/IMINT/HUMINT on Russian force composition, disposition, and actual advances (if any) in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Identification and verification of "Colonel Yevgeny Daraev" and the "tank regiment" (if real or fabricated). (HIGHEST PRIORITY)
  • Ukrainian AD Munition Levels: Updated assessment of critical interceptor munition inventories post-mass missile attack, especially for high-value ballistic/hypersonic interceptors. (HIGH PRIORITY)
  • Russian "200 Shaheds" Claim & New Wave Indication: Verify the claimed scale of the Shahed attack (over 200) and the scale/nature of the newly indicated wave of "reparations." (MEDIUM PRIORITY)
  • Impact of Russian Anti-Radiation Missile Strikes: Assessment of damage/suppression to Ukrainian AD radars from Kh-31P launches. (MEDIUM PRIORITY)
  • Impact of Ukrainian Deep Strikes within Russia: BDA on the Cheboksary factory (VNIIR-Progress) production suspension, Gorno-Altaysk fire and the drone attacks in Tambov and Voronezh Oblasts, and any impact of the Kaspersky cyberattack. (MEDIUM PRIORITY)
  • Verification of Abrams Losses: Independent verification of Colonelcassad's claim regarding 26 Abrams tanks destroyed/captured. (MEDIUM PRIORITY)
  • Verification of Starlink Destructions: Independent verification of TASS claims regarding 6 Starlink stations destroyed. (MEDIUM PRIORITY)
  • Significance of Krasnoyarsk Mayor Arrest & Michael Naki Fine: Determine if these internal Russian events have any direct or indirect impact on military operations or internal stability relevant to the conflict. (LOW PRIORITY)
  • Identification of Destroyed Vehicle (TASS video): Precise identification of the destroyed military truck in the TASS video (origin, model, specific role) and verification if it is Russian or Ukrainian. (LOW PRIORITY).

• Collection Requirements:

  • SIGINT/ELINT: Continuous monitoring of Russian strategic aviation communications and flight paths from all airbases (Engels-2, Olenya, Soltsy, Shaikovka), particularly for launch confirmations from Tu-95MS and MiG-31K. Monitor ballistic and cruise missile launch signatures, especially those shifting towards Western or Southern Ukraine. Identification of EW efforts synchronized with ground or air attacks, especially on Dnipropetrovsk axis and Black Sea coastal areas. Monitoring of Russian C2 networks for signs of operational-level ground movements.
  • GEOINT/IMINT: High-resolution satellite imagery over all claimed Russian advances, particularly Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, to detect force concentrations or actual penetration. Rapid assessment of critical infrastructure damage in Ukraine (especially Western and Southern Ukraine) and within Russia (e.g., Cheboksary factory, with confirmation of production suspension) from Ukrainian deep strikes. Imagery of ballistic/cruise missile launch sites in Bryansk/Kursk Oblasts. BDA on the destroyed vehicle shown in TASS video, including precise geolocation.
  • HUMINT: From frontline units for accurate reporting on Russian ground tactics, morale, and any unusual force dispositions. From affected civilian areas for accurate BDA and impact assessment. From occupied areas, if possible, to verify Russian claims and morale and the impact of social disinformation.
  • OSINT: Persistent monitoring of Russian milblogger and state media channels for new narratives, claims, and shifts in propaganda themes, particularly the explicit "mass strike" promotion (multi-wave claims), the Dnipropetrovsk narrative (now with TASS/Klishas amplification), tactical deception attempts (e.g., "drones ending soon," "Chernihiv not needed," "Rovno getting crooked," "Volyn?", "final solution to Rivne," "Dubno was normal?"), the new social disinformation, any new distraction tactics (e.g., Trump/Rubio, Greta Thunberg, Kaspersky cyber claims, Krasnoyarsk arrest, Michael Naki fine, economic data, NATO reduction calls), and especially attempts to undermine Ukrainian air raid warnings by claiming "imaginary missiles" or "EW game," or denying threats to specific cities like Odesa. Monitor exaggerated claims of Ukrainian losses (personnel, Starlinks). Analysis of public sentiment within Ukraine, particularly regarding the Dnipropetrovsk narrative and large-scale strikes, and adherence to air raid warnings. Monitoring of Russian internal news for shifts in focus or new internal security measures.

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END REPORT