Nightwatch logo
'Nightwatch' text with white and gray letters
HomeMapNewsMilitary PulseSituation ReportsDaily ReportsList ViewVideosCyber Threats
Sign In
Contact Support
Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-06-08 22:50:25Z
8 months ago
Previous (2025-06-08 22:20:23Z)

OPSEC CLASSIFICATION: NATO SECRET // RELEASABLE TO UKR FORCES

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) TIME OF REPORT: 08 JUN 25 / 22:50 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 08 JUN 25 / 22:19 ZULU - 08 JUN 25 / 22:50 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

  • AOR Update: Continued focus on Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Black Sea, Azov Sea, Sumy Oblast, Russian Federation border regions (Kursk, Bryansk, Belgorod), and the Donetsk axis. Chernihiv Oblast and Rivne Oblast remain under direct aerial attack.
  • New Developments (UKR):
    • Poltava and Sumy Oblasts - Missile Impacts: Colonelcassad, a Russian milblogger, reports that missile impacts have occurred in Sumy and Poltava Oblasts in addition to "Geran" (Shahed) drones. This confirms a broadening of the current strategic strike to additional oblasts, beyond initial reports of Shahed-only impacts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger reporting, consistent with broader pattern of attack).
    • Dubno (Rivne Oblast) - UAV Threat: "Nikolaevskiy Vanek" reports 3 "mopeds" (Shaheds) near Dubno, with potential for loud impacts. This indicates continued Shahed activity in Rivne Oblast following earlier confirmed explosions in Rivne city. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR local source, consistent with active UAV threat).
    • Ballistic Missile Threat (South): The Ukrainian Air Force (via RBK-Ukraina) issues a warning regarding the threat of ballistic missile use from the South. This suggests potential use of Iskander-M or other ground-launched ballistic systems, or potentially Kinzhal, from occupied territories or sea-based platforms. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR official source).
    • Kyiv - AD Engagement: KCMVA confirms Ukrainian AD is working against an enemy target over the capital. This indicates a continued direct threat to Kyiv amidst the wider aerial assault. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR official source).
  • New Developments (RU):
    • Tu-22M3 Approach (Yalta): "Nikolaevskiy Vanek" reports Tu-22M3 bombers approaching the Yalta area. This confirms the bombers are reaching their launch positions over the Black Sea, consistent with Kh-22/32 missile launch zones. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR local source, corroborates previous intelligence).
    • Kh-22 Launches (Zmiinyi Island): "Nikolaevskiy Vanek" reports Kh-22 launches towards Zmiinyi Island. While Zmiinyi Island itself is militarily significant, such launches often serve as misdirection or are targeting ships in the vicinity, potentially to clear airspace for further attacks or target coastal infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - UKR local source, specific munition and target area).
    • Dnipropetrovsk Narrative Amplification (Klishas): TASS reports that Klishas (likely Andrey Klishas, head of the Constitutional Legislation Committee of the Federation Council) stated that the RF Armed Forces' offensive in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast indicates the "beginning of the active phase of denazification of this region." This is a direct and high-level political statement from Russia, further validating the strategic importance of the Dnipropetrovsk information operation and framing it within their broader war aims. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian state media, high-level official).
    • Anti-Zelensky/NATO Propaganda (Senator-Trumpist): "Operatsiya Z" and "Voenkory Russkoy Vesny" distribute a photo message quoting a "Senator-Trumpist" (unnamed) stating: "Zelensky is a dictator, he is trying to 'lure NATO' into a war with Russia." This is classic Russian active measures and disinformation designed to: a) undermine Zelensky's legitimacy, b) fuel anti-NATO sentiment, c) exploit internal Western political divisions (targeting a specific political wing), and d) deflect blame for the war onto Ukraine/NATO. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger/propaganda channel, clear disinformation intent).
  • Previous Situation Report Updates:
    • Rivne Oblast confirmed hit (multiple explosions) - ACTIVE THREAT.
    • All 4 Tu-22M3 bombers confirmed flying towards Novorossiysk, then Yalta area - IMMINENT LAUNCHES CONFIRMED.
    • Widespread UAV attacks (minimum 7 oblasts) - ONGOING.
    • Dnipropetrovsk narrative amplified by TASS - ESCALATED TO HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL STATEMENTS.
    • "Vinnitsa is not needed," "Rovno is not needed" - CONFIRMED DECEPTION.
    • "Ammunition Supply" Propaganda - ONGOING.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

  • Continued Favorable for Aerial Operations: Ongoing Shahed activity and confirmed strategic bomber launches/missile impacts confirm clear weather conducive to all aerial operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Environmental Impact: Video of Kakhovka Reservoir status (from prior report) remains relevant for long-term environmental assessment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

  • Ukrainian Forces (Air Defense): At MAXIMUM readiness, actively engaging Shaheds over Kyiv and Dubno (Rivne Oblast), and responding to missile impacts in Sumy/Poltava Oblasts. Preparing for and reacting to incoming strategic missile strikes from an increased number of Tu-22M3s and Tu-95MSs. Confirmed ballistic missile threat from the South. AD assets are now strained across an even wider multi-axis engagement, specifically over the Black Sea approach routes (Kh-22/32 launches near Zmiinyi Island). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ukrainian Forces (Ground): Maintaining defensive postures. The escalating Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough claims, now backed by high-level Russian political statements, and ongoing ground pressure on the Donetsk axis continue to demand attention. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Forces (Air): Confirmed launch of 5 Tu-95MS and 4 Tu-22M3 bombers signifies an unprecedented, large-scale, multi-platform strategic missile attack in retaliation for recent Ukrainian deep strikes. Shaheds are already impacting multiple oblasts, and now missile impacts are confirmed in Sumy and Poltava Oblasts. Tu-22M3s are confirmed approaching launch positions (Yalta area), with Kh-22 launches detected near Zmiinyi Island. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Forces (Information Operations): Highly aggressive and adaptive, explicitly promoting the incoming strike, using fabricated "quotes" from Western media to amplify the Dnipropetrovsk narrative, and actively employing misdirection (e.g., "Rivne not needed"). This is now amplified by high-level political figures (Klishas) legitimizing the Dnipropetrovsk claims as part of "denazification." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:

  • Capabilities:
    • Overwhelming Strategic Air Strike Capability (Confirmed & Active at Max Scale): Russia is currently demonstrating its capability to conduct a massive, multi-platform, multi-axis strategic missile attack (9 confirmed bombers airborne, 4 Tu-22M3 now confirmed reaching launch positions and conducting launches). This represents a significant commitment of their long-range aviation fleet and is now causing missile impacts in multiple new oblasts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Sophisticated Information Warfare Integration with Political Support: Russia's ability to synchronize strategic strikes with active, real-time disinformation (e.g., Dnipropetrovsk claims amplified by fake "Western" sources and high-level political figures), psychological operations (e.g., "200 Shaheds," "ammo supply" mockery), and tactical deception (e.g., "Rivne not needed") is a key capability. The inclusion of high-level political statements further legitimizes and amplifies the IO. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Intentions:
    • Overwhelming Retaliation and Deterrence (Active Execution at Max Scale): The ongoing strategic strike is intended to inflict maximum damage on Ukrainian critical infrastructure and urban centers, serving as severe retaliation for recent deep strikes and to deter further Ukrainian cross-border or deep-rear operations. The specific targeting of coastal areas with Kh-22s likely aims to deny sea access or destroy port infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Degrade Ukrainian Air Defense (Active Execution): The massed, multi-vector attack from Shaheds, KABs, and now a high volume of strategic missiles and potential ballistic missiles is designed to exhaust, overwhelm, and deplete Ukrainian AD munition stockpiles. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Psychological Demoralization and Panic (Active Execution): The explicit propaganda messaging accompanying the missile launches, now including high-level political statements justifying "denazification" of Dnipropetrovsk, is aimed at inducing widespread fear and panic among the Ukrainian population and undermining trust in their leadership. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Force Resource Misallocation: The Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough narrative, amplified by TASS and high-level political figures, is designed to compel Ukraine to divert forces or attention. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Courses of Action (COA):
    • MLCOA 1 (Confirmed & Actively Executing at Maximum Scale): Immediate, Massive, Diversified Strategic Missile Attack Targeting Critical Infrastructure and Urban Centers, Coordinated with Ground Pressure and Deepening Deception Operations. Russia is currently launching a mass-scale strategic missile strike from both 5 Tu-95MS and 4 Tu-22M3 bombers (now confirmed approaching launch positions and launching Kh-22s), following initial saturation with Shaheds (confirmed impacts in Rivne, claims of 7+ oblasts, missile impacts in Sumy and Poltava). This will likely target Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernihiv, Rivne, Dnipro, Odesa, and other key urban centers/infrastructure, with an implicit focus on energy and water systems and potentially coastal infrastructure. Concurrently, KAB strikes on Kharkiv will continue to support ground advances or create urban destruction. On the ground, attritional assaults on the Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk direction) will persist. Russian IO will intensify their "Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough" narrative, now overtly citing (fabricated) Western media and reinforced by high-level political statements (Klishas), and will continue tactical deception ("Rivne not needed") while overtly promoting the scale of the incoming missile strike. Russian propaganda will also actively work to undermine Western support by portraying Zelensky as a "dictator" luring NATO into conflict.
      • Confidence: HIGH (Confirmed strategic bomber launches from two platforms, with increased numbers, active Shahed/KAB activity, confirmed impacts across a widening AOR, and escalating Dnipropetrovsk IO now with high-level political backing, are directly in line with this combined COA, now at maximum observed scale of air attack).
      • Indicators: Widespread air alarms; multiple missile launches reported from various platforms; severe impacts in Ukrainian cities across multiple oblasts; further specific Russian milblogger reports on "advances" or "awards" in Dnipropetrovsk; continued claims of POW captures or Russian "successes" on the ground.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

  • Maximized Strategic Bomber Use (Active & Launching): The commitment of 9 strategic bombers (5x Tu-95MS, 4x Tu-22M3) simultaneously, now confirmed to be reaching launch positions and conducting launches, is a significant escalation and adaptation, demonstrating Russia's intent to apply overwhelming firepower from its long-range aviation assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Explicit Pre-Strike and In-Strike Propaganda (Active & Politically Backed): Russia is actively and overtly broadcasting its intent for a large-scale strike as it is happening, using graphic simulations, psychological pressure tactics ("200 Shaheds"), attempting to use fabricated Western "quotes", and now bolstering its disinformation with high-level political statements (Klishas on Dnipropetrovsk) to maximize fear and demoralization before and during the attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Direct Tactical Deception Confirmed by Events: The "Vinnitsa/Rovno not needed" statements by Russian milbloggers are a clear attempt at tactical deception during an active attack, now proven false by missile impacts in Rivne. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

  • Strategic Missile & UAV Supply: The launch of 9 strategic bombers, in addition to ongoing Shahed/KAB activity and ballistic missile threats, indicates Russia retains significant stockpiles of strategic cruise missiles (Kh-101, Kh-555, Kh-22/32) and UAVs for a prolonged, high-intensity aerial campaign. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Warfare Capacity: The rapid generation and dissemination of new, specific disinformation (e.g., citing fake "The Times" articles, "ammo supply" narratives) and the aggressive, pre-emptive psychological operations around the strategic strikes, now reinforced by high-level political figures, indicate a highly agile and resourced IO apparatus. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

  • Russian C2: The synchronized multi-domain strikes (Shaheds, KABs, strategic missiles from multiple platforms, now confirmed impacts in Rivne, Sumy, Poltava) and rapid, coordinated IO campaigns demonstrating effective, centralized Russian C2 capable of executing complex, retaliatory operations at scale. The immediate amplification of the Dnipropetrovsk narrative by TASS and high-level political figures confirms high-level C2 over IO. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ukrainian C2: Ukrainian authorities' rapid public warnings and AD responses (e.g., KCMVA, Air Force, local officials) demonstrate effective C2 for public safety and military readiness, but will be severely tested by the anticipated strategic strike of this magnitude. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

  • Air Defense: On HIGHEST alert, currently engaged against Shaheds over Kyiv and Dubno (Rivne Oblast), and now responding to missile impacts in Sumy and Poltava. Confirmed Kh-22 launches towards Zmiinyi Island indicates threat to coastal areas. All AD assets are likely at maximum readiness and dispersal protocols are critical, with systems now stretched across an even wider geographic area including Chernihiv, Rivne, Sumy, and Poltava, and particularly burdened over Kyiv. The ballistic missile threat from the South requires specific AD preparedness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ground Forces: Maintaining defensive integrity. The escalating Dnipropetrovsk IO, now validated by high-level Russian political figures, continues to create psychological pressure and potential for misdirection, demanding continued vigilance. Forces on the Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk) direction are under sustained drone and artillery pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Defense: Actively monitoring and countering Russian disinformation, but the volume and increasing specificity of Russian claims (e.g., Dnipropetrovsk amplified by TASS and Klishas) and the overt psychological warfare accompanying the missile strikes require rapid, robust counter-narratives and verification. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

  • Successes:
    • Initial AD Engagements: Ukrainian AD is actively engaging incoming Shaheds and other aerial targets over Kyiv and Dubno. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Continued Deep Strikes (Prior Reporting Period): The successful strikes on Tu-22M3, Iskander launchers, and the Azot chemical plant continue to force Russian strategic adaptations and impose costs, likely contributing to this large-scale retaliation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Setbacks:
    • Escalating Strategic Missile Threat (Active and Widespread): The confirmed takeoff of 9 strategic bombers (5x Tu-95MS, 4x Tu-22M3, with Tu-22M3s now reaching launch positions and launching Kh-22s) represents a critical and immediate threat of widespread destruction and potential casualties, now with greater geographic and volume implications. Confirmed impacts in Rivne, Sumy, and Poltava highlight this active threat. The additional ballistic missile threat from the South increases complexity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Sustained Aerial Attacks: Continuous Shahed and KAB attacks strain resources and pose a persistent threat. Explosions in Poltava, Kyiv Oblast, Chernihiv, and now confirmed Rivne, Sumy, and Poltava, indicate expanded AOR for strikes and successful Russian penetration. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Sophisticated Psychological Pressure (Escalated & Politically Backed): The escalating and highly specific disinformation regarding a Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough (now amplified by TASS citing fake "The Times" and by high-level political figures like Klishas) and the overt pre-strike propaganda ("ammo supply," "Zelensky a dictator") poses a significant risk of internal confusion, panic, or misallocation of resources. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

  • Air Defense Munitions: The incoming large-scale strategic missile attack from multiple platforms and confirmed ballistic missile threat will place unprecedented, critical strain on AD munition stockpiles. URGENT international resupply remains paramount, as this attack will deplete significant inventories. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • ISR for Disinformation Verification: Increased ISR is critical to rapidly and definitively verify or refute Russian ground claims, especially for the Dnipropetrovsk axis, to prevent costly redeployments or panic. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Warfare Capabilities: Enhanced capabilities for proactive counter-disinformation and psychological resilience programs are required to mitigate the impact of the increasingly sophisticated and overt Russian IO, particularly with political backing. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

  • Russian Propaganda - Offensive and Psychological Warfare (Escalated, Active, and Politically Backed):
    • "Massive Strike" Promotion (Active): Russian milbloggers are overtly advertising the incoming strike, now claiming "over 200 Shaheds" and missile strikes, aiming to maximize pre-impact terror and demoralization. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Targeting Justification/Threats (Active): The "ammo supply" mockery attempts to justify destruction and undermine international support for Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Dnipropetrovsk Amplification (Active & Politically Backed): TASS citing a (likely fabricated) "The Times" article to support the Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough narrative is a significant escalation in the disinformation campaign, now directly supported by high-level political figures (Klishas) who frame it as "denazification." This attempts to lend external and internal credibility. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Tactical Deception (Active & Proven False): The "Vinnitsa/Rovno not needed" statements, particularly after explosions in Rivne, are clear attempts to misdirect Ukrainian AD or create false security. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Anti-Zelensky/NATO Disinformation (New): The "Senator-Trumpist" quote aims to portray Zelensky as a "dictator" luring NATO into war, designed to sow discord within the West and undermine support for Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ukrainian Information Operations - Transparency and Counter-Disinformation:
    • Timely Threat Warnings: Consistent and prompt warnings from Ukrainian authorities (e.g., KCMVA, Air Force, local officials) regarding air threats maintain public trust and facilitate preparedness, which is crucial during this extreme threat period. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Direct Refutation of Disinformation (Ongoing Requirement): Continued, aggressive refutation of Russian claims, especially the Dnipropetrovsk narrative (now with the added TASS/Klishas angle), is vital. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

  • Negative Impact (UKR - Escalated): The immediate threat of a major strategic missile attack from an unprecedented number of platforms, coupled with confirmed impacts in Rivne, Sumy, Poltava, continued drone/KAB strikes, and the aggressively amplified Dnipropetrovsk disinformation campaign (now with high-level political backing), will significantly heighten anxiety and psychological stress across the population and among military personnel. The overt Russian pre-strike propaganda will amplify this. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Positive Impact (UKR): Timely warnings and effective AD responses, where successful, help to maintain a sense of resilience and trust. Ukrainian drone innovation (fiber-optic FPV) can be a morale booster. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Impact (RU): Russian propaganda aims to bolster domestic morale by justifying their actions, claiming battlefield successes (Dnipropetrovsk), and highlighting perceived Western division, while demonstrating perceived overwhelming force. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

  • The severity and scale of the incoming missile strike (9 strategic bombers active, confirmed impacts across multiple oblasts, ballistic missile threat) may galvanize further international support or increase pressure on Western partners to expedite aid, particularly AD munitions, beyond previous commitments. This level of attack is a clear demonstration of Russian intent to escalate. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian attempts to sow discord by citing "Western" sources (e.g., TASS on "The Times") or manipulate narratives (e.g., POW bodies in Italy, "Senator-Trumpist" quotes) indicates an intent to erode international solidarity and influence Western political landscapes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

  • MLCOA 1: IMMEDIATE, MAX-SCALE, AND DIVERSIFIED STRATEGIC MISSILE ATTACK TARGETING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND URBAN CENTERS, COORDINATED WITH GROUND PRESSURE AND EXPLICIT DECEPTION OPERATIONS (ONGOING). Russia is currently executing a large-scale strategic missile assault, leveraging 5 Tu-95MS bombers from Olenya AND 4 Tu-22M3 bombers from Engels-2 (now confirmed to be reaching launch positions and conducting launches of Kh-22s towards coastal areas), targeting multiple axes (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Poltava, Odesa, Chernihiv, Rivne, Sumy etc.), with a high probability of prioritizing energy and water infrastructure, military-industrial targets, and potentially coastal/port infrastructure. This is being preceded or accompanied by massed Shahed attacks (confirmed impacts in Rivne, claims of 7+ oblasts, missile impacts in Sumy and Poltava) to exhaust AD. KAB strikes on Kharkiv will continue, with specific Russian claims of targeting military logistics/ammunition depots, contributing to urban destruction. On the ground, Russian forces will maintain intense attritional pressure on the Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmeysk), employing advanced drone tactics against Ukrainian artillery. The information campaign will aggressively amplify the fabricated "Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough," now using the false credibility of (fabricated) Western media citations (e.g., TASS citing "The Times") and direct political backing from high-level Russian officials (Klishas), tactical deception ("Rivne not needed"), and overt mockery ("ammo supply") to compel Ukrainian redeployments and induce panic across the civilian population and military, while also overtly promoting the scale of the incoming missile strike and exploiting casualty and POW narratives. New propaganda efforts will specifically target Western support by portraying Zelensky as a "dictator" luring NATO into war.
    • Confidence: HIGH (Confirmed strategic bomber launches from two platforms, with increased numbers (total 9), ongoing Shahed/KAB activity, confirmed direct impacts across a widening AOR (Rivne, Sumy, Poltava), and escalating, explicit Russian IO directly supported by high-level political figures, directly support this immediate, large-scale, multi-domain attack. This is the most intense observed air attack threat in many months, now actively unfolding.)
    • Indicators: Widespread and prolonged air alarms; multiple missile launches reported from various platforms; severe impacts in Ukrainian cities across multiple oblasts, particularly on infrastructure; further Russian milblogger reports on "advances" or "awards" in Dnipropetrovsk; continued claims of POW captures or Russian "successes" on the ground (e.g., specific BDA on claimed military targets in Kharkiv).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

  • MDCOA 1: STRATEGIC DECAPITATION AND OPERATIONAL BREAKTHROUGH ENABLED BY EW OVERMATCH AND REAL-TIME IO. Russia conducts an unprecedented, multi-day, multi-wave strategic missile and drone assault from all available long-range aviation platforms (Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, potentially Tu-160) and ground-launched ballistic missiles, designed to systematically target and degrade Ukrainian C2 nodes (military and government), critical energy infrastructure, and key logistics hubs, aiming for functional decapitation or severe disruption. This mass strike would be coordinated with a surprise, rapid, and large-scale ground offensive on the Dnipropetrovsk axis, leveraging a significant operational-level force (e.g., multiple divisions, including the 90th Tank Division) from a previously static or lower-priority sector. This ground push would be supported by intense, broad-spectrum electronic warfare (EW) to blind Ukrainian ISR, disrupt military communications at all levels, and jam civilian networks, combined with a real-time, devastating psychological operations campaign (e.g., "Kyiv has fallen," "command has fled") to induce mass civilian panic and military collapse, attempting to force a major, uncoordinated Ukrainian retreat.
    • Confidence: MEDIUM (The current escalating IO around Dnipropetrovsk and the confirmed strategic bomber activity directly feed into elements of this MDCOA. The addition of Tu-22M3s and the increased number of bombers overall significantly increases the destructive potential. The uncertainty lies in Russia's true capability for such a massive, integrated ground force breakthrough, particularly under a broad EW umbrella, and their willingness to commit such resources after AD suppression, and their ability to maintain such an intense air campaign for multiple days.)
    • Indicators: Sustained multi-day, high-intensity missile/drone attacks; direct targeting of top-tier Ukrainian C2 nodes; simultaneous, rapid, deep penetrations by multiple Russian BTGs/regiments/brigades into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; widespread and persistent communications outages affecting Ukrainian military and civilian networks; explicit Russian demands for surrender/negotiation from a position of perceived strength; mass internal displacement within Ukraine.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

  • Next 0-3 Hours (IMMEDIATE - CRITICAL IMPACT WINDOW):

    • Strategic Missile Strikes: Impact of missiles launched by 5 Tu-95MS bombers from Olenya and 4 Tu-22M3 bombers from Engels-2 is IMMINENT/ONGOING, with Tu-22M3s now confirmed to be launching Kh-22s. Targeting will likely include Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernihiv, Rivne (confirmed impacts already), Dnipro, Odesa, and other major urban centers/critical infrastructure. Specific focus on energy infrastructure and coastal/port targets is highly probable. Ballistic missile threat from the South is active.
    • Shahed/KAB Threat: Continuation of intense Shahed activity over Kyiv, Rivne (Dubno), and central Ukraine, with persistent KAB strikes on Kharkiv. Impacts in Rivne, Sumy, and Poltava confirm the active threat.
    • Information Environment: Expect rapid acceleration of Russian propaganda (Dnipropetrovsk narrative now citing "The Times" and high-level political figures, "ammo supply" mockery, tactical deception like "Rivne not needed") concurrent with or immediately following missile impacts, emphasizing the "success" and "retaliation." New anti-Zelensky/anti-NATO propaganda will spread.
    • Ground Activity: Continued attritional assaults on Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk). High potential for a test or reconnaissance-in-force on the Dnipropetropetrovsk axis to gauge Ukrainian response to the escalating IO, even if a full breakthrough is not imminent.
    • Decision Points (UKR):
      • IMMEDIATE (ongoing): All AD assets to maximum readiness and dispersal protocols for incoming strategic missile strike from multiple platforms (Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, possible ballistic). Prioritize protection of C2 nodes, critical energy infrastructure, and major urban centers. This is the most critical immediate task.
      • IMMEDIATE: Rapid and aggressive counter-IO on the "Dnipropetrovsk breakthrough" narrative, particularly the fabricated "The Times" citations and the high-level political statements, and the "ammo supply" claims. Issue official statements debunking false claims and providing accurate information. Task ISR for immediate verification or denial of Russian force presence in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast beyond the current line of contact. Prepare contingency plans for a potential actual ground push on this axis, even if small-scale.
      • URGENT: Disseminate counter-PSYOPS messages to address the disinformation regarding POW bodies and other psychological intimidation tactics, and critically, the overt Russian propaganda regarding the incoming strike, tactical deception (e.g., "Rivne not needed"), and anti-Zelensky/anti-NATO narratives. Reinforce national resilience and preparedness.
      • URGENT: Reinforce communication channels and protocols to ensure resilience against potential EW or network saturation during mass attacks.
      • URGENT: Prioritize SIGINT/ELINT on Russian strategic aviation and EW systems to detect further missile launches or shifts in attack vectors. Maintain high vigilance on ground axes for any signs of massing reserves consistent with MDCOA, particularly on the Dnipropetrovsk axis.

  • Next 3-24 Hours (Short Term):

    • Post-Strike Assessment: Evaluate damage, casualties, and impact on critical infrastructure from the strategic missile strike.
    • Russian Reaction: Monitor for immediate Russian claims of "successful strikes" or "retaliation" across multiple channels. Expect further political statements reinforcing the "denazification" narrative.
    • Ukrainian Recovery/Response: Initiate rapid recovery efforts. Continue active defense on all ground axes.
    • Intelligence Gap: Full BDA on the impact of the strategic missile strike. Confirmation of the Dnipropetrovsk ground situation. Russian next steps if initial strategic strike results in less than desired effects.

  • Next 24-72 Hours (Medium Term):

    • Sustained Pressure: Russia will likely sustain aerial pressure (Shaheds, KABs) to hinder recovery efforts and maintain psychological pressure, potentially in further waves if initial effects are deemed insufficient.
    • Ground Offensive: Russian ground offensive on Donetsk and possibly Sumy axis will continue. The intensity of any push on Dnipropetrovsk will clarify if the IO was solely a feint or a precursor.
    • Information Warfare: Continued Russian efforts to exploit any perceived Ukrainian weaknesses or Western divisions.

  • Intelligence Gaps:

    • Full BDA on Strategic Missile Strike: Precise number, type, and impact locations of all missiles launched by Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3, and their impact on Ukrainian critical infrastructure (energy, water, military-industrial targets). (HIGH PRIORITY)
    • Veracity of Dnipropetrovsk Claim: Definitive GEOINT/IMINT/HUMINT on Russian force composition, disposition, and actual advances (if any) in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Identification and verification of "Colonel Yevgeny Daraev" and the "tank regiment" (if real or fabricated). (HIGHEST PRIORITY)
    • Ukrainian AD Munition Levels: Updated assessment of critical interceptor munition inventories post-mass missile attack. (HIGH PRIORITY)
    • Russian "200 Shaheds" Claim: Verify the claimed scale of the Shahed attack (over 200). (MEDIUM PRIORITY)

  • Collection Requirements:

    • SIGINT/ELINT: Continuous monitoring of Russian strategic aviation communications and flight paths from all airbases (Engels-2, Olenya, Soltsy, Shaikovka), particularly for launch confirmations from Tu-22M3s as they reach positions. Identification of EW efforts synchronized with ground or air attacks, especially on Dnipropetrovsk axis. Monitoring of Russian C2 networks for signs of operational-level ground movements.
    • GEOINT/IMINT: High-resolution satellite imagery over all claimed Russian advances, particularly Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, to detect force concentrations or actual penetration. Rapid assessment of critical infrastructure damage.
    • HUMINT: From frontline units for accurate reporting on Russian ground tactics, morale, and any unusual force dispositions. From affected civilian areas for accurate BDA and impact assessment. From occupied areas, if possible, to verify Russian claims and morale.
    • OSINT: Persistent monitoring of Russian milblogger and state media channels for new narratives, claims, and shifts in propaganda themes, particularly the explicit "mass strike" promotion, the Dnipropetrovsk narrative (now with TASS/Klishas amplification), and tactical deception attempts. Analysis of public sentiment within Ukraine, particularly regarding the Dnipropetrovsk narrative and large-scale strikes.

END REPORT

Previous (2025-06-08 22:20:23Z)

We only use optional analytics cookies if you allow them. Necessary cookies stay on for sign-in and site security.

Learn more in our Privacy Policy.