Situation Report

OPSEC CLASSIFICATION: NATO SECRET // RELEASABLE TO UKR FORCES

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) TIME OF REPORT: 08 JUN 25 / 19:19 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 08 JUN 25 / 18:49 ZULU - 08 JUN 25 / 19:19 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• AOR Update: Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (including Synelnykivskyi Raion, Mezheva community, Nikopol, Marhanets community, Pavlohrad, Kryvyi Rih, Eastern Dnipropetrovsk, Maliyivka, Dnipro, Oleksandrivskyi Raion, Orekhovo, Myrne, Piatykhatky, Tomakivka, Pokrovske, Poltavka), Zaporizhzhia Oblast (including Stepnohirsk community, Vasylivskyi Raion, Prymorske village, Northern Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Melitopol, Olhivske, Zaliznychne, Novoandriyivka, Orikhiv, Malynivka, Huliaipole), Black Sea, Azov Sea, Sumy Oblast (including Loknya, Sumy city, Osoyivka, Myropilske, Nedryhailivska community, Esman community, Nikolskoye, Vorochina, Novonikolaevka, Russkoye Porechnoye, Yunakovka, Khotin, Bilopillya, Urozhayne, Konotop), Russian Federation (Kursk - including Kursk region, Bryansk - including Bryansk Oblast, Moscow Oblast - including Dubna, Kstovo - Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, Belgorod Oblast - including Nikolskoye, Kaluga - including Sukhinichi and Borovsk districts, Smolensk Oblasts, Moscow Region including Dubna, Podmoskovye, Moscow city, Pushkino, Vnukovo Airport, Domodedovo Airport, Zhukovsky Airport, Ramensky district, Sokolovo-Khomyanovo, Klenovo; Irkutsk region - Belaya airfield; Tambov Oblast - Michurinsk; Ryazan Oblast - Dyagilevo; Belgorod Oblast - Prokhorovka-Belenikhino, Zhuravlevka, Pushkarozhadinsky, Azov - Rostov Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast - Kstovo, Sevastopol, Lipetsk Oblast, Orel Oblast, Tula Oblast - Novomoskovsk, Azot chemical plant; Mariupol, Kazan, Kamchatka, Sudzhansky district, St. Petersburg, Rylsk), Southern Donetsk Direction (including Stupochky, Bahatyr, Vesele, Burlatske, Vilne Pole, Zarya, Komar), Konstantinovka direction (including Oleksandro-Kalynove), Siversk direction (Verkhnokamyanske), Odesa Oblast (including Tuzy, Lebedivka), Donetsk Oblast (Pokrovsk, Kurakhovo - Alekseevka, Chasov Yar, Kramatorsk axis - including Chasiv Yar, Markove, Bila Hora, Predtechyne; Toretsk axis - including Toretsk, Dyliyivka, Yablunivka; Novopavlivka axis - including Bahatyr, Vesele, Burlatske, Vilne Pole; Krasnoarmeysk-Novosergeevka, Maryinka, Dalnee, Sokol, Lipovoe, Bakhmut, Progress, Kleshcheevka, Vasyutinskoye, south Donetsk region, Hryhorivka, Andriivka, Zarya, Poltavka, Myrolubivka, Myrne, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Lysivka, Novoserhiyivka, Udachne, Kotlyne, Novomykolayivka, Horikhove, Kotlyarivka, Bohdanivka, Novoukrayinka, Andriyivka), Kupyansk axis (Kupyansk-Vuzlovyy, Stepova Novoselivka, Kindrashivka), Kherson axis (Lvove, Kherson region), Ternopil Oblast, Kyiv, Krasnoarmeysk direction, Lviv Oblast, Mykolaiv Oblast (including Varvarivka, Matviivka, Voskresenske, Konstantinivka, Pervomaisk), Poltava Oblast, Kirovohrad Oblast (including Novoukrainka), Vinnytsia Oblast, Cherkasy Oblast, Zhytomyr Oblast, Kyiv Oblast, Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast), Vremivka Direction. Lyman Direction (Hrekivka, Novyy Myr, Ridkodub, Zelena Dolyna, Torske, Bilohorivka, Lyman district). Colombia (Bogota). Belgium. Chernihiv Oblast (Hotiyevka). Komsomolsk-on-Amur (Khabarovsk Krai, RU). Washington D.C., US. Kharkiv Oblast (including Kharkiv city, Izyum, Lozova). Engels (Saratov Oblast), Russia. Chelyabinsk Oblast (Argayash). Hvardiiske Airfield (Crimea). Borisoglebsk Airfield. Kursk Airfield. Ugledar. Chernivtsi Oblast. Ramensky district (Moscow Oblast). Los Angeles, USA. Gagauzia, Moldova. Kazakhstan. Gaza. Lutsk. Volyn Oblast.

• New Developments (UKR):

  • TU-95MS Takeoff Warning: ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS reports that TU-95MS aircraft takeoffs are expected by 00:00Z. This indicates a very high probability of a large-scale Russian missile strike. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian source with history of accurate warnings regarding strategic aviation).
  • Communication Interruption Claims: РБК-Україна reports public claims of mobile communication outages during Shahed attacks, noting that the Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) is commenting on the issue. This suggests concerns about EW or collateral damage impacting civilian communications. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian news reporting public and official statements).
  • Ukrainian FPV Drone Success: Оперативний ЗСУ shares video of Ukrainian FPV drones ("Skala 4:25" unit) effectively targeting Russian personnel. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian source, visual evidence).

• New Developments (RU):

  • Power Restored in Kursk: TASS reports power supply restored in Kursk Oblast after alleged Ukrainian strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian state media, indicates damage and subsequent repair).
  • FPV Drone Success (RU Claim): Операция Z (reposting Военкоры Русской Весны) shares video of Russian 103rd Regiment FPV drone strike near Konstantinovka, allegedly destroying Ukrainian infantry. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger, visual evidence).
  • Bridge Demolition (RU Claim): Colonelcassad shares video footage from "Southern" grouping scouts claiming the destruction of a Ukrainian-mined bridge near Siversk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger, visual evidence of bridge damage/demolition).
  • Belgorod Drone Strike Casualties: ASTRA reports four injured in Belgorod Oblast due to drone strikes, including one official. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Independent Russian media, indicates cross-border strike impact).
  • Moscow Warehouse Fire Cause: TASS reports the preliminary cause of the Moscow warehouse fire (two fatalities) was a short circuit. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian state media, civilian incident).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• General: The continued high volume of both Russian and Ukrainian drone and aviation activity (FPV, UMPK, missile strikes, TU-95MS warning) across the operational area suggests generally favorable weather conditions (clear visibility, moderate winds) for aerial operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Kursk Oblast: Reports of power restoration after alleged Ukrainian strikes indicate previous environmental conditions allowed for drone operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Siversk Area: The successful demolition of a bridge via drone/explosive placement indicates suitable ground conditions and visibility for such operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces (Air Defense): At CRITICAL alert status due to the imminent threat of TU-95MS launches and predicted "massive shelling." Reports of perceived mobile communication outages during Shahed attacks indicate potential EW challenges or network saturation that needs addressing. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Forces (Ground Operations): Actively employing FPV drones against Russian personnel, demonstrating offensive tactical capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Maintaining defensive posture against Russian ground advances and aerial support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces (Air): Confirmed continued high tempo of FPV drone operations for ground support (Konstantinovka area). The imminent TU-95MS takeoff warning indicates preparation for a large-scale, deep strike air campaign. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces (Ground Operations): Continued pressure on the Konstantinovka axis, with the 103rd Regiment actively advancing. Reconnaissance and demolition operations observed near Siversk, indicating efforts to disrupt Ukrainian logistics and movement. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces (Information Operations): Actively engaged in propaganda (e.g., Kursk power restoration after alleged UKR strikes, Muscovites' positive views of Moscow from Elon Musk's father). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:

• Capabilities:
  • Strategic Aviation: Russia maintains a strong capability for massed long-range missile strikes using strategic bombers (TU-95MS). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • FPV Drone Warfare: Russia continues to effectively utilize FPV drones for precision strikes against Ukrainian personnel and light vehicles. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Engineering/Demolition: Demonstrated capability for targeting and demolishing bridges, likely for tactical purposes (e.g., securing flanks, impeding Ukrainian counter-movements). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Cross-Border Strikes: Continued drone attacks on Belgorod Oblast, causing civilian casualties, show sustained capability for cross-border operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intentions:
  • Overwhelm Ukrainian Air Defense: The imminent TU-95MS launch warning signals an intent to launch a large-scale missile attack, likely to overwhelm and deplete Ukrainian air defense resources. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Degrade Ukrainian Logistics/Movement: Demolition of bridges (e.g., near Siversk) indicates an intent to disrupt Ukrainian supply lines, troop movements, or potential counter-offensives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Sustain Ground Offensives: FPV drone usage on the Konstantinovka axis supports continued ground pressure and attempts to eliminate Ukrainian infantry. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Retaliation & Justification: The restoration of power in Kursk after alleged strikes, and the reporting of Belgorod casualties, serve to publicly justify ongoing and future Russian strikes on Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Courses of Action (COA):
  • MLCOA 1 (Confirmed & Escalating): Massive Coordinated Strategic Missile Strike Coupled with Sustained Ground Pressure and Information Warfare. Russia will execute a large-scale missile attack (potentially involving dozens of missiles from TU-95MS bombers) within the next 6-12 hours, targeting critical infrastructure and major urban centers across Ukraine, aimed at overwhelming air defenses and causing widespread disruption. Simultaneously, Russian ground forces will continue attritional assaults on the Donetsk axes (e.g., Konstantinovka), heavily supported by FPV drones and KABs. Efforts to disrupt Ukrainian logistics, such as bridge demolitions (Siversk), will continue. Russia will amplify information operations to justify these strikes, potentially using fabricated claims of Ukrainian attacks on civilian targets in Russia (e.g., Kursk power outages, Belgorod casualties).
    • Confidence: HIGH (The immediate warning of TU-95MS takeoffs, coupled with consistent Russian ground pressure and explicit claims of Ukrainian attacks, strongly supports this MLCOA.)
    • Indicators: TU-95MS takeoff warning; continued FPV drone strikes on Ukrainian infantry; reported bridge demolition; continued reports of drone attacks and damage in Russian border regions.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• Synchronized Deep Strike Preparation: The explicit warning of TU-95MS takeoffs by a reliable Ukrainian source suggests a deliberate Russian preparation for a synchronized, large-scale deep strike, potentially in response to recent Ukrainian deep strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Focused Bridge Demolition: The reported demolition of a bridge near Siversk indicates a specific tactical focus on engineering/logistics disruption, potentially in preparation for or in response to specific operational needs on that front. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Public Information Regarding Infrastructure Repair: TASS's prompt reporting of power restoration in Kursk Oblast after alleged Ukrainian strikes serves as a tactical information maneuver to demonstrate resilience and frame Ukraine as the aggressor. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• Ammunition (RU): The preparations for strategic aviation strikes indicate Russia maintains a significant inventory of long-range cruise missiles. The continuous use of FPV drones suggests a stable supply chain for these platforms and their explosive payloads. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Infrastructure (RU): The ability to quickly restore power in Kursk Oblast after alleged strikes indicates robust emergency response and repair capabilities for civilian infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Personnel (RU): Consistent FPV drone operations on the front lines demonstrate availability of trained operators. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian C2: The coordination required for strategic bomber operations and the synchronized nature of ground-support FPV drone strikes suggest effective Russian C2 across air and ground domains. The rapid dissemination of propaganda and combat footage also indicates efficient C2 in the information sphere. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian C2: The timely warning of TU-95MS takeoffs by Ukrainian intelligence sources demonstrates effective real-time C2 and information dissemination to alert forces and population. The reported public concern regarding mobile network disruptions during Shahed attacks highlights a potential C2 vulnerability that requires attention. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Air Defense: On HIGHEST alert due to the imminent TU-95MS threat. The reported public claims of mobile communication outages during Shahed attacks suggest that while AD is active, there are collateral impacts or EW challenges that need to be assessed for their effect on C2 and public warning systems. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ground Forces: Actively engaging Russian forces with FPV drones, demonstrating offensive capabilities at the tactical level. Units are holding defensive lines against sustained Russian pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Civilian Infrastructure: Facing sustained pressure from Russian strikes, evidenced by the alleged communication issues and previous reports of KAB damage. Repair crews are continuously engaged. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Successes:
  • Effective FPV Drone Use: Ukrainian FPV drone unit "Skala 4:25" shows successful targeting of Russian personnel, demonstrating tactical initiative and effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Intelligence Alertness: Timely warning of TU-95MS takeoffs indicates effective intelligence gathering and dissemination, allowing for pre-emptive defense measures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Setbacks:
  • Imminent Large-Scale Strike: The confirmed TU-95MS takeoff warning signals an imminent large-scale missile attack, posing a significant challenge to air defense and potential for widespread damage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Cross-Border Damage: Reports of casualties and power outages in Belgorod/Kursk due to alleged Ukrainian drone strikes, while providing tactical effect, are leveraged by Russia for propaganda and justification of retaliation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Mobile Communication Issues: Claims of mobile communication outages during Shahed attacks, if widespread, could impede public warning systems and civilian response during missile attacks. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - as these are public claims and not definitively confirmed as systemic EW or network failure).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense Munitions: The impending large-scale missile strike will place extreme demand on Ukrainian air defense interceptors. Continued and accelerated resupply is paramount. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Counter-EW Capabilities: If mobile network outages are due to Russian EW, there is an urgent need to deploy counter-EW systems or harden communications infrastructure to maintain C2 and public warning. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Civilian Repair Crews: Continued targeting of civilian infrastructure will require sustained support for repair crews and necessary equipment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Propaganda - Justification & Resilience:
  • Retaliation Narrative: TASS reporting on power restoration in Kursk after alleged Ukrainian strikes serves to justify future Russian retaliation against Ukraine, portraying Ukraine as targeting civilian infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Demonstrating Resilience: Prompt reporting of infrastructure repair (Kursk power) aims to project an image of Russian resilience despite Ukrainian attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Military Effectiveness: Russian milbloggers continue to publish FPV drone footage (e.g., near Konstantinovka) and bridge demolition claims (Siversk) to showcase tactical successes and Russian military prowess to domestic and international audiences. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Distraction/Positive Framing: News about Moscow concerts and Elon Musk's father's positive impressions of Moscow serve as distractions from the ongoing war and aim to reinforce a sense of normalcy and stability within Russia. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian Information Operations - Transparency & Resilience:
  • Timely Warnings: ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS providing pre-strike warnings (TU-95MS takeoffs) is a key element of Ukrainian IO to ensure public and military preparedness, maintaining trust and demonstrating intelligence effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Highlighting Enemy Losses: Оперативний ЗСУ sharing footage of successful Ukrainian FPV drone strikes on Russian personnel serves to boost morale and demonstrate tactical effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Addressing Public Concerns: РБК-Україна addressing claims of mobile network outages shows an attempt by Ukrainian authorities to remain transparent and respond to public concerns, even if the underlying issue is unclear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Negative Impact (UKR): The imminent threat of a massive missile strike from TU-95MS bombers will significantly increase public anxiety and fear. Perceived issues with mobile communication during attacks (if widespread) could erode trust in warning systems and public safety. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Positive Impact (UKR): Timely warnings from officials and the visible effectiveness of Ukrainian FPV drones (e.g., "Skala 4:25") can help bolster morale and a sense of resistance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Impact (RU): Propaganda focusing on Russian military successes, infrastructure resilience, and positive external views of Russia aims to maintain domestic morale and support for the war. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• Challenges: Slovakia's continued stance on blocking EU sanctions, while not a new development, represents a persistent challenge to EU unity and could be leveraged by Russia to project disunity within the Western alliance. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Propaganda Impact: Russian claims of Ukrainian drone attacks on Belgorod/Kursk serve as a narrative tool to justify their own actions to international audiences, potentially complicating Western support for Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• MLCOA 1: Immediate, Large-Scale Strategic Missile Assault with Concurrent Ground Pressure and IO Amplification. Russia will launch a massive missile strike within the next 6-12 hours, utilizing TU-95MS strategic bombers and other platforms (e.g., Shaheds, ballistic missiles). This assault will be multi-vector and likely target critical infrastructure, major urban centers, and military facilities across Ukraine to overwhelm air defenses and cause widespread disruption. Concurrently, Russian ground forces will maintain high-intensity attritional assaults on the Donetsk axes (e.g., Pokrovsk, Konstantinovka), heavily supported by FPV drones and artillery. Russia will continue tactical demolitions (e.g., bridges near Siversk) to disrupt Ukrainian logistics. Russian information operations will intensify to frame the missile strikes as legitimate retaliation for alleged Ukrainian "terrorist" actions on Russian territory (e.g., Belgorod drone attacks, Kursk power outages).
  • Confidence: HIGH (The immediate warning of TU-95MS takeoffs, coupled with consistent reporting of ongoing ground offensives and Russian information patterns, strongly supports this MLCOA.)
  • Indicators: Confirmed TU-95MS takeoff warnings by 00:00Z; continued FPV drone activity on the front lines; Russian claims of damage/casualties in border regions; increased Russian propaganda justifying strikes.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• MDCOA 1: Strategic-Level Offensive Aiming for Operational Collapse. Russia will launch a pre-emptive, overwhelming strategic missile and drone assault designed not only to degrade AD but to simultaneously incapacitate Ukrainian C2, energy grid, and military logistics across multiple regions, creating a systemic collapse. This aerial assault will be directly followed by, or synchronized with, multiple rapid, large-scale ground thrusts on key axes (e.g., a concerted breakthrough on the Pokrovsk/Donetsk axis and a significant, multi-pronged offensive into Sumy Oblast aimed at seizing major population centers like Sumy or Konotop and creating a deep, undefendable salient). This MDCOA would aim to force a large-scale Ukrainian retreat, disrupt the flow of Western aid, and establish new, defensible lines far inside Ukrainian territory. This would be supported by aggressive EW to blind Ukrainian ISR and communication, and a robust psychological operations campaign to induce panic and demoralization.
  • Confidence: MEDIUM-HIGH (The previous warning of "massive shelling," the unprecedented scale of aerial activity in Sumy, the strategic aviation communication, and the persistence of multiple ground offensives indicate Russia's capability and intent for a dramatic escalation beyond current attritional warfare. This MDCOA represents a high-risk, high-reward strategy for Russia to achieve decisive operational gains.)
  • Indicators: Sustained multi-wave missile/drone attacks over several days; rapid and widespread movement of Russian operational reserves; significant increase in Russian EW activity across the front; explicit Russian calls for Ukrainian surrender or mass retreat in propaganda.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Next 6-12 Hours (Immediate - CRITICAL):
  • Strategic Missile Threat: IMMEDIATE and EXTREME threat of large-scale missile strikes originating from TU-95MS bombers. All air defense assets must be on HIGHEST alert and prepared for multi-vector attacks. Prioritize protection of C2, energy, and major urban centers.
  • Ground Pressure: Continued high-intensity ground engagements on the Donetsk axes (Pokrovsk, Konstantinovka). Be prepared for Russian attempts to disrupt logistics via demolition operations.
  • Information Environment: Expect an immediate surge in Russian propaganda following or concurrent with any missile strikes, framing them as justified retaliation.
  • Decision Point (UKR):
    • IMMEDIATE: Initiate maximum AD readiness and dispersal protocols for all critical assets. Ensure full readiness of mobile fire groups to intercept cruise missiles and Shaheds.
    • IMMEDIATE: Conduct a rapid assessment of reported mobile communication outages during Shahed attacks. Prioritize restoration of communication infrastructure and investigate potential EW impacts or network saturation.
    • IMMEDIATE: Prepare rapid response teams for civilian damage control and humanitarian aid in anticipated strike areas.
    • URGENT: Enhance ISR on Russian strategic bomber airfields and front-line logistical nodes for any unusual activity or concentrations that might indicate preparations for MDCOA elements (e.g., massing of operational reserves).
    • URGENT: Develop and disseminate pre-emptive counter-narratives to potential Russian false-flag operations or justifications for missile strikes.
    • Intelligence Gap: Definitive cause and scope of mobile communication outages during Shahed attacks. Full BDA on the claimed Russian demolition of the bridge near Siversk. Precise flight paths and target sets of the anticipated TU-95MS missile strike.
    • Collection Requirement: SIGINT/ELINT on Russian strategic aviation and EW systems. IMINT/OSINT on Russian ground force movements, particularly operational reserves. HUMINT from front-line units on Russian demolition TTPs. OSINT on public reaction to communication outages and missile warnings.

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END REPORT