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Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-06-08 16:20:31Z
8 months ago
Previous (2025-06-08 15:50:33Z)

OPSEC CLASSIFICATION: NATO SECRET // RELEASABLE TO UKR FORCES

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) TIME OF REPORT: 08 JUN 25 / 16:19 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 08 JUN 25 / 15:49 ZULU - 08 JUN 25 / 16:19 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

  • AOR Update: Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (including Synelnykivskyi Raion, Mezheva community, Nikopol, Marhanets community, Pavlohrad, Kryvyi Rih, Eastern Dnipropetrovsk, Maliyivka, Dnipro, Oleksandrivskyi Raion, Orekhovo, Myrne, Piatykhatky, Tomakivka, Pokrovske, Poltavka), Zaporizhzhia Oblast (including Stepnohirsk community, Vasylivskyi Raion, Prymorske village, Northern Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Melitopol, Olhivske, Zaliznychne, Novoandriyivka, Orikhiv, Malynivka, Huliaipole), Black Sea, Azov Sea, Sumy Oblast (including Loknya, Sumy city, Osoyivka, Myropilske, Nedryhailivska community, Esman community, Nikolskoye, Vorochina, Novonikolaevka, Russkoye Porechnoye, Yunakovka), Russian Federation (Kursk - including Kursk region, Bryansk - including Bryansk Oblast, Moscow Oblast - including Dubna, Kstovo - Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, Belgorod Oblast - including Nikolskoye, Kaluga - including Sukhinichi and Borovsk districts, Smolensk Oblasts, Moscow Region including Dubna, Podmoskovye, Moscow city, Pushkino, Vnukovo Airport, Domodedovo Airport, Zhukovsky Airport, Ramensky district, Sokolovo-Khomyanovo, Klenovo; Irkutsk region - Belaya airfield; Tambov Oblast - Michurinsk; Ryazan Oblast - Dyagilevo; Belgorod Oblast - Prokhorovka-Belenikhino, Zhuravlevka, Pushkarozhadinsky, Azov - Rostov Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast - Kstovo, Sevastopol, Lipetsk Oblast, Orel Oblast, Tula Oblast - Novomoskovsk, Azot chemical plant; Mariupol, Kazan, Kamchatka, Sudzhansky district, St. Petersburg), Southern Donetsk Direction (including Stupochky, Bahatyr, Vesele, Burlatske, Vilne Pole, Zarya, Komar), Konstantinovka direction, Siversk direction (Verkhnokamyanske), Odesa Oblast, Donetsk Oblast (Pokrovsk, Kurakhovo - Alekseevka, Chasov Yar, Kramatorsk axis - including Chasiv Yar, Markove, Bila Hora, Predtechyne; Toretsk axis - including Toretsk, Dyliyivka, Yablunivka; Novopavlivka axis - including Bahatyr, Vesele, Burlatske, Vilne Pole; Krasnoarmeysk-Novosergeevka, Maryinka, Dalnee, Sokol, Lipovoe, Bakhmut, Progress, Kleshcheevka, Vasyutinskoye, south Donetsk region, Hryhorivka, Andriivka, Zarya, Poltavka, Myrolubivka, Myrne, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Lysivka, Novoserhiyivka, Udachne, Kotlyne, Novomykolayivka, Horikhove, Kotlyarivka, Bohdanivka, Novoukrayinka, Andriyivka), Kupyansk axis (Kupyansk-Vuzlovyy, Stepova Novoselivka, Kindrashivka), Kherson axis (Lvove, Kherson region), Ternopil Oblast, Kyiv, Krasnoarmeysk direction, Lviv Oblast, Mykolaiv Oblast (including Varvarivka, Matviivka, Voskresenske, Konstantinivka), Poltava Oblast, Kirovohrad Oblast, Vinnytsia Oblast, Cherkasy Oblast, Zhytomyr Oblast, Kyiv Oblast, Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast), Vremivka Direction. Lyman Direction (Hrekivka, Novyy Myr, Ridkodub, Zelena Dolyna, Torske, Bilohorivka). Colombia (Bogota). Belgium. Chernihiv Oblast (Hotiyevka). Komsomolsk-on-Amur (Khabarovsk Krai, RU). Washington D.C., US. Kharkiv Oblast (including Kharkiv city). Engels (Saratov Oblast), Russia. Chelyabinsk Oblast (Argayash). Hvardiiske Airfield (Crimea). Borisoglebsk Airfield. Kursk Airfield. Ugledar. Chernivtsi Oblast. Ramensky district (Moscow Oblast). Los Angeles, USA. Gagauzia, Moldova. Kazakhstan. Gaza.

  • New Developments (UKR):

    • Air Raid All-Clear (Zaporizhzhia): 🇺🇦 Запорізька обласна військова адміністрація 🇺🇦 reports an air raid all-clear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration, official report). This indicates a reduction in immediate air threat in this specific area.
    • Strategic Messaging (Putin Threat): РБК-Україна reports Zelenskyy's statement: "Putin is a maniac and he came to our children's playground." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian official news agency). Reinforces the narrative of Russia as an aggressor and threat to civilians.
    • Propaganda Counter/Morale (Russian Atrocities): Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦 posts video with caption "Рашисті - чисті гандони" (Rascists are pure condoms/scumbags). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian milblogger, morale/counter-propaganda). This is an emotionally charged condemnation of Russian actions.
    • Logistics Interdiction Target Identification (RU): Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦 provides detailed analysis of a video showing multiple white IVECO Stralis and TOHAP refrigerated semi-trucks on a road, identified as potential logistical targets if confirmed to be supporting Russian military operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for vehicle type, MEDIUM for confirmed military support without further context). This suggests potential intelligence gathering on Russian supply lines.
    • Kakhovka Reservoir Status: Шеф Hayabusa🫡🇺🇦 posts video showing the former Kakhovka Reservoir two years after the dam destruction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian milblogger, environmental impact). This serves as a reminder of Russian ecological warfare and potentially highlights new terrain features.
    • Weather Forecast (Ukraine): РБК-Україна provides a week-long weather forecast for Ukraine, indicating temperature swings from +36 to +18 C with rain and thunderstorms. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian official news agency). Important for military planning.
    • Strategic Messaging (Trump/Putin): РБК-Україна reports Zelenskyy's statement that Trump believes Putin is winning the war, but that this is untrue. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Ukrainian official news agency). This is a direct engagement with international perceptions of the conflict.
  • New Developments (RU):

    • Propaganda (Missing Personnel): Kotsnews refers to "394 thousand missing." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger, likely propaganda or disinformation aiming to highlight large numbers of missing Ukrainian soldiers or to sow doubt about overall casualty figures).
    • Air Traffic Diversion (Moscow): ТАСС reports three flights to Vnukovo were diverted due to a thunderstorm in Moscow. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian state media, weather impact). Confirms previous weather reporting.
    • Aviation Strike Claim (Poltavka): Воин DV posts video claiming 11th Guards Air and Air Defense Army's bomber aviation struck Ukrainian positions in Poltavka. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger, claimed tactical success). The video shows multiple impacts in an open field, characteristic of KAB strikes.
    • Recruitment/Supply Appeal (Russian Units): Colonelcassad posts video appealing for donations (body armor, helmets, medical supplies, Mavic 3D drone) for "Maestro Tank Group" and "Lyutyi Group," mentioning "Z Para Bellum MD" Telegram channel. Video shows soldiers on a T-80 series tank, and another video shows personnel driving on a dirt road past a destroyed vehicle. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger, direct appeal for supplies, indicates equipment shortages or need for specialized gear). The destroyed vehicle seen earlier could be a Ukrainian civilian or non-combatant vehicle.
    • Domestic News (St. Petersburg): ТАСС reports a patron's apartment is for sale in St. Petersburg for 140 million rubles. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian state media, domestic news). No direct military relevance.
    • Counter-UAV Claim (Ukrainian FPV): Дневник Десантника🇷🇺 posts video claiming "scouts intercepted a Ukrainian fiber-optic FPV drone in an unusual but effective way." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger, claimed tactical success/counter-drone adaptation).
    • Propaganda (Information Graphic): Рыбарь posts a graphic titled "Mistake of the Non-Survivor." (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger, propaganda/information warfare, content not explicitly clear from title alone but likely anti-Ukrainian).
    • Ground Offensive Claim (Pokrovsk): Операция Z (via Военкоры Русской Весны) posts video claiming "🅾️tvazhnye" (Russian Center group) are "massively burning NATO equipment, infantry and enemy artillery" in fierce battles near Pokrovsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger, claimed tactical success/propaganda).
    • AOR Update (Dnipropetrovsk Direction): Военкор Котенок posts a map image and a video with the caption "Dnipropetrovsk direction." The map shows red arrows indicating movement or attack, possibly Russian advances. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian milblogger, indicates claimed operational focus). The video appears to be FPV drone footage of attacks.
    • Domestic News (COVID-19): ТАСС reports COVID-19 situation in Russia is stable and controlled. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH - Russian state media, domestic news). No direct military relevance.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

  • Current: Kyiv and Moscow (Vnukovo) experiencing thunderstorms with hail/heavy rain, leading to air traffic diversions in Moscow. This continues to impact air operations and general mobility.
  • Forecast (Ukraine): Weekly forecast indicates significant temperature fluctuations (from +36 C to +18 C) and continued rain/thunderstorms. This will lead to varied ground conditions (mud, dust) and potentially reduce visibility for air assets depending on local conditions.
  • Kakhovka Reservoir: The video showing the dried-up Kakhovka Reservoir two years after its destruction highlights a long-term environmental and terrain change that could affect future operations, especially for cross-river movements or water supply. It presents potential new avenues of approach or obstacles.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

  • Ukrainian Forces (Air Defense): Air raid all-clear in Zaporizhzhia, but high alert likely maintained elsewhere due to ongoing threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ukrainian Forces (Strategic Messaging): Actively engaged in shaping international and domestic perceptions, condemning Putin and refuting Trump's assessment of the war. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ukrainian Forces (Intelligence/Targeting): Actively gathering intelligence on Russian logistics (refrigerated truck convoy), suggesting a focus on disrupting enemy sustainment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Forces (Air): Continuing to use bomber aviation for strikes, with a claimed strike on Poltavka. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Forces (Ground Operations): Intensifying offensive efforts on the Pokrovsk axis (claiming "massively burning NATO equipment") and confirming attacks in Poltavka (Donetsk Oblast). The "Dnipropetrovsk direction" map and video from Russian sources indicate a continued focus on this axis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Forces (Information Operations): Actively deploying propaganda regarding Ukrainian missing personnel, claimed tactical successes, and internal supply shortages (public appeals). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Forces (Logistics): Public appeals for basic combat equipment (body armor, helmets, medical kits) and drones (Mavic 3D) by Russian units (Maestro Tank Group) suggest persistent, localized logistical shortfalls or a desire for higher-quality equipment not uniformly supplied. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian Counter-UAV: Claim of intercepting a fiber-optic FPV drone shows ongoing adaptation and development of counter-drone measures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:

  • Capabilities:
    • Air-to-Ground Strike: Continues to employ bomber aviation for precision (KAB-like) strikes, as seen in Poltavka. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Ground Offensives: Sustains high-intensity assaults on multiple axes, particularly Pokrovsk and now explicitly mentioning Poltavka in Donetsk Oblast, and maintaining focus on the Dnipropetrovsk axis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Logistics Interdiction: Has demonstrated limited capability to disrupt Ukrainian FPV drones. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
    • Information Warfare: Highly adept at crafting narratives to demoralize Ukrainian forces and public, exploit civilian anxieties (missing personnel), claim tactical successes, and highlight (potentially fabricated) weaknesses in Ukrainian forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Exploitation of Civilian Support: Reliance on public donations for basic combat gear and drones suggests that while the formal military supply chain exists, it may be insufficient or slow to meet specific unit needs, leading to reliance on civil society. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Intentions:
    • Sustain Pressure: Maintain relentless kinetic pressure on key axes (Pokrovsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltavka) to attrit Ukrainian forces and secure tactical gains. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Disrupt Ukrainian Morale/Recruitment: Continue to employ propaganda to undermine Ukrainian morale and public trust, including exaggerated claims of losses or targeting of civilian anxieties. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Improve Tactical Readiness: Address localized equipment shortfalls and enhance combat capabilities through public donation appeals. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Counter Ukrainian UAVs: Develop and implement new methods to counter Ukrainian FPV and other drone threats. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Shape Narrative: Portray successful ground operations and effective counter-drone measures to reinforce the perception of Russian military effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Courses of Action (COA):
    • MLCOA 1 (Confirmed & Intensified): Continued Multi-Vector Offensives and Advanced Information Warfare: Russia will continue its multi-vector aerial assault (drones, missiles) as previously indicated, while intensifying ground offensives on the Pokrovsk axis (claiming significant destruction of NATO equipment) and in the Dnipropetrovsk direction, including targeted strikes in Poltavka. Concurrently, Russia will amplify information operations designed to undermine Ukrainian resolve, such as highlighting large numbers of "missing" Ukrainians, and showcasing claimed successes in counter-drone warfare. Public appeals for military supplies will continue, signaling ongoing combat and localized needs.
      • Confidence: HIGH (All new messages confirm and amplify previous MLCOA, showing no deviation from established patterns but an increase in specific operational claims and propaganda efforts.)
      • Indicators: Renewed Russian claims of advances/battles in Pokrovsk and Poltavka. The map showing "Dnipropetrovsk direction" (Kotoknews). Public appeals for equipment from Russian units. Propaganda regarding "394k missing." Claimed FPV drone interception.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

  • Logistics (RU): The explicit public appeal for combat gear (body armor, helmets, Mavic 3D drone, medical kits) by specific Russian units via Telegram indicates a reliance on, or at least augmentation by, non-state supply chains for critical battlefield equipment. This could be an adaptation to circumvent formal logistical bottlenecks or acquire specialized/higher-quality gear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Counter-UAV (RU): The claimed "unusual but effective" interception of a Ukrainian fiber-optic FPV drone suggests ongoing experimentation and adaptation in counter-drone tactics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Operations (RU): The immediate use of the "394 thousand missing" narrative appears to be a rapid response disinformation tactic designed to exploit existing anxieties and distract from Russian losses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

  • Munitions (RU): Continued use of bomber aviation for KAB strikes (Poltavka) indicates sustained production/supply of these munitions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Personnel & Equipment (RU): The direct appeals for body armor, helmets, medical kits, and drones confirm that some frontline units are facing shortfalls in basic protective equipment and advanced combat tools, or are seeking higher quality/specific items not fully provided by formal channels. The destroyed vehicle seen in the "Maestro Tank Group" video indicates ongoing attrition of vehicles. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Transportation (RU): The identification of IVECO Stralis and TOHAP refrigerated semi-trucks as potential logistical assets for Russian forces (if confirmed military support) highlights the variety of vehicles in use for sustainment. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
  • COVID-19 (RU): Stable COVID-19 situation in Russia is a positive for overall workforce availability, including military reserves. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

  • Russian C2: Continues to demonstrate effective coordination of air and ground attacks on specific axes (Pokrovsk, Poltavka), and rapid deployment of information operations to support tactical narratives. The internal appeals for supplies, however, suggest a decentralized or fragmented system for provisioning individual units, or C2 is aware of and tolerating these external fundraising efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for offensive operations and IO; MEDIUM for internal logistics).
  • Ukrainian C2: Ukrainian leadership maintains consistent strategic messaging on resolve and the nature of the conflict. Regional authorities continue to manage air defense responses effectively (Zaporizhzhia all-clear). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

  • Strategic Resolve: President Zelenskyy's statements continue to project unwavering resolve against Russian ultimatums and firmly refute false narratives (Trump's assessment), maintaining high morale and clarity of purpose. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Air Defense: Air raid alerts are being managed efficiently (Zaporizhzhia all-clear), but the forecast for thunderstorms and hail across Ukraine could impact AD effectiveness and necessitate adaptive tactics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ground Forces: Engaged in fierce defensive battles, particularly on the Pokrovsk axis, facing intense Russian pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Intelligence & Reconnaissance: Continues to demonstrate effective intelligence gathering on Russian logistical assets and troop movements, as seen in the analysis of the truck convoy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Operations: Actively engaged in countering Russian propaganda with direct, emotionally charged messages ("Putin is a maniac") and refuting international misperceptions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

  • Successes:
    • Air Defense (Zaporizhzhia): Successful neutralization of an immediate air threat, leading to an all-clear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Strategic Communication: Zelenskyy's clear and firm statements against Putin and Trump's comments serve to solidify international and domestic support and expectations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Logistics Intelligence: Identification of potential Russian logistical convoys is a key intelligence success, enabling future interdiction planning. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Counter-IO: Direct and sharp responses to Russian propaganda efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Setbacks:
    • Ground Pressure: Continued heavy fighting and Russian claims of success in Pokrovsk and Poltavka indicate persistent, high-intensity pressure on Ukrainian defensive lines. Verification of Russian claims is needed. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for pressure, MEDIUM for Russian success).
    • Information Environment (RU Narratives): Russian narratives about "394 thousand missing" and "NATO equipment burning" create significant information challenges that could affect public morale if not effectively countered. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Weather Impact: Predicted thunderstorms and hail could pose operational challenges for Ukrainian air operations and ground mobility. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

  • Air Defense (Ongoing): Continued need for AD munitions and systems, especially given the anticipated large-scale attacks and complex weather conditions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ground Forces (Sustainment): Sustained resupply of ammunition, equipment, and personnel for forces engaged in high-intensity combat on key axes like Pokrovsk and Donetsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Counter-Information Warfare Resources: Continued investment in rapid response and proactive counter-IO capabilities to address evolving Russian disinformation tactics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Logistics Interdiction Capabilities: Resources (ISR, long-range fires, special operations) for effective targeting and interdiction of identified Russian logistical convoys. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

  • Russian Propaganda:
    • Demoralization/Loss Amplification: Kotsnews's reference to "394 thousand missing" is a clear attempt to exaggerate Ukrainian losses and demoralize the population. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Justification for Aggression: Claims of "massively burning NATO equipment" near Pokrovsk serve to justify Russian advances, portray Ukrainian forces as Western puppets, and boost domestic morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Portrayal of "Success": Videos claiming successful air strikes (Poltavka) and counter-UAV actions reinforce the narrative of Russian military effectiveness. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Internal Appeals as Propaganda: The public appeals for equipment, while highlighting shortages, also serve as a rallying cry, showing "grassroots" support for the war effort and an image of fighters dedicated enough to seek their own gear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Ukrainian Counter-Propaganda/Information Operations:
    • Condemnation of Aggressor: Zelenskyy's strong language ("Putin is a maniac") and direct refutation of misleading international statements (Trump's views) aim to maintain moral high ground and clarity of purpose. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Emotional Appeals/Morale: Шеф Hayabusa's direct condemnation of "Rashists" and reminder of the Kakhovka catastrophe serve to reinforce unity and resolve. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
    • Transparency/Factual Basis for Action: Intelligence gathering on Russian logistics provides a factual basis for future interdiction operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

  • Negative Impact (UKR): The "394 thousand missing" narrative is highly toxic and, if not effectively countered, could cause significant anxiety and undermine trust in official information. Ongoing ground pressure and civilian casualties will continue to impact morale. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Positive Impact (UKR): Zelenskyy's firm and decisive leadership, combined with counter-propaganda efforts, is crucial for maintaining national unity and resilience. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Positive Impact (RU): Claims of tactical successes (Pokrovsk, Poltavka, FPV interception) and the public support campaigns (donations) are likely to boost morale within Russia and among pro-Russian forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

  • Ukrainian Appeals: Zelenskyy's direct engagement with international figures (Trump) on the conflict's reality is critical for maintaining international understanding and continued support, countering narratives that might promote premature or disadvantageous peace terms. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Russian IO Impact: Russian propaganda, especially the "394k missing" narrative, is likely designed to deter further Western aid by suggesting the war is unwinnable for Ukraine due to insurmountable losses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

  • MLCOA 1: Persistent Multi-Domain Attrition Campaign with Targeted Operational Maneuvers and Amplified Disinformation: Russia will continue its current operational rhythm, prioritizing persistent high-intensity ground assaults on the Pokrovsk axis and increasing pressure on the Dnipropetrovsk direction (including Poltavka), likely employing coordinated KAB and drone strikes to support ground forces. They will sustain aerial attacks against Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure, exploiting any perceived AD vulnerabilities, particularly with the forecasted adverse weather. Concurrently, Russia will intensify its information warfare, focusing on narratives designed to demoralize Ukrainian society (e.g., exaggerated casualty figures, "missing" personnel) and to justify their actions to both domestic and international audiences (e.g., claiming destruction of "NATO equipment"). Public appeals for military equipment will continue, supplementing official supply lines. Russia will also continue to develop and deploy counter-drone tactics.
    • Confidence: HIGH (All new intelligence points to a direct continuation and intensification of observed patterns, with a clear focus on specific axes and information operations.)
    • Indicators: Confirmed ground activity and Russian claims in Pokrovsk and Poltavka. Russian map indicating focus on "Dnipropetrovsk direction." Public appeals for Russian military supplies. Russian counter-UAV claims. Continued strong Ukrainian strategic messaging.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

  • MDCOA 1: Coordinated Operational Breakthrough on a New/Weakened Axis, Supported by Decisive Air Superiority and Mass Disinformation: Russia will launch a synchronized, large-scale ground offensive following a concentrated mass aerial assault (missiles, drones) designed to overwhelm and degrade Ukrainian air defenses, specifically targeting military C2 nodes and critical infrastructure that protect frontline areas. The offensive will focus on achieving an operational breakthrough on a weakened or newly identified vulnerable axis, potentially the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, attempting to push beyond previous claimed lines of advance into deeper Ukrainian territory and split Ukrainian forces. The "394 thousand missing" narrative will be amplified to create a sense of overwhelming Ukrainian collapse, forcing a panicked retreat or surrender. This operation would be supported by enhanced EW and counter-drone measures to blind Ukrainian ISR and targeting capabilities.
    • Confidence: MEDIUM-HIGH (The ongoing pressure on Dnipropetrovsk, coupled with the previous unverified claim of the 90th Tank Division and the new, highly demoralizing "missing personnel" narrative, suggests Russia may be preparing for a significant, high-stakes push. The anticipated weather could also be exploited for surprise.)
    • Indicators: Persistent Russian claims and map imagery on "Dnipropetrovsk direction." Explicit Russian propaganda about "394k missing." Continued high tempo of attacks on Pokrovsk and Poltavka, potentially stretching Ukrainian reserves. Weather conditions conducive to low-visibility operations.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

  • Next 24-48 Hours (Short-Term - CRITICAL):
    • Immediate Air Defense Posture: The threat of large-scale aerial attacks remains EXTREME. All AD assets must be on highest alert, prepared for multi-vector attacks amidst challenging weather conditions (thunderstorms, hail).
    • Intensified Ground Battles: Expect continued, high-intensity ground engagements on the Pokrovsk axis and increased probing/assaults in the Dnipropetrovsk direction (Poltavka).
    • Peak Disinformation: Russian propaganda regarding "394k missing" will likely be at its peak amplification during this period, requiring immediate and decisive counter-messaging.
    • Decision Point (UKR):
      • IMMEDIATE: Prioritize defensive preparations and reinforcement for the Pokrovsk axis and the Dnipropetrovsk direction. Deploy mobile fire groups and EW assets to counter increased drone activity and KAB strikes.
      • IMMEDIATE: Implement a rapid and robust counter-information campaign to debunk the "394k missing" narrative. Provide factual and transparent information on personnel status, potentially utilizing official channels for regular updates.
      • URGENT: Maximize ISR efforts on Russian logistical routes and staging areas, particularly for truck convoys, to enable potential interdiction.
      • URGENT: Maintain heightened vigilance for signs of operational-level force accumulation or shifts in Russian intent, especially for the 90th Tank Division or similar large formations.
      • Intelligence Gap: Full BDA on Russian claims of "massively burning NATO equipment" near Pokrovsk. Specific unit identification for the "Maestro Tank Group" and "Lyutyi Group" and their current locations. Detailed information on Russian counter-UAV capabilities and effectiveness.
      • Collection Requirement: IMINT/SIGINT on Dnipropetrovsk and Pokrovsk axes for enemy force concentrations, movements, and activity. HUMINT/OSINT on Russian Telegram channels for further appeals and unit designations. Continued tracking of Russian air assets and munitions.

END REPORT

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